PHILODEMUS

ON PIETY

PART 1

CRITICAL TEXT WITH COMMENTARY

EDITED BY

DIRK OBBINK

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD
1996

Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford New York
Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogotá Bombay
Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam
Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne
Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore
Taipei Tokyo Toronto
and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan

Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press

Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press, Inc., New York

© *Dirk Obbink 1996*

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Data available

ISBN 0-19-815008-3

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Designed and typeset by
Jeffrey Dean, Chorlton-cum-Hardy, Manchester
Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by
Bookcraft (Bath) Ltd, Midsomer Norton

PREFACE

> The charred papyri of Philodemus—preserved in various states of disarray, fragmentation, and physical deterioration sustained over two millennia—are among the most difficult Greek texts to edit. The Greek in which they are written is so esoteric that they would be hard to control and to translate even if they had come down to us in perfect condition.
>
> Albert Henrichs

INTRODUCING a new method of reconstructing the fragmented papyrus rolls excavated from the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum, this volume offers a new critical text of the philosophical part of Philodemus' *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, together with an English translation and commentary. The best-known among the papyri from Herculaneum, Philodemus' *On Piety* was read by Cicero and has received extensive editorial attention by scholars but has not been available in a modern critical edition since 1866. I have utilized a new format in order to present on facing pages the technical details of the papyrus and a continuous text with running English translation, to which are attached brief explanatory notes for the benefit of the reader. In the commentary, new work on ancient religion and philosophy and the history of atheism is brought to bear on the interpretation of a text that expounds Epicurus' theory of the gods and cult as an outgrowth of cultural history.

In 1787 archaeologists cut open and transcribed the first few columns of a carbonized papyrus roll which, it was soon recognized, contain a Hellenistic treatise on religion. The texts dealt enticingly with charges of atheism against philosophers, but were too fragmentary to provide anything in the way of a continuous text. Nearly three

decades later, the fragmentary first column of what was thought to be another papyrus roll was removed in Naples and transcribed. Miraculously, it matches perfectly with one of the fragmentary columns recovered two decades earlier: for both come from the same papyrus roll. Yet this fact went unnoticed both by the Italian *accademici* and by Theodor Gomperz, who produced the *editio princeps*. It now provides for the first time the basis for an approximate reconstruction of the original order of fragments in the treatise.

De pietate consists of two parts: one dealing with the philosophy of religion, rebutting charges that Epicurus was an atheist, and a second part (see vol. ii) criticizing the theological views of poets and pre-Socratic and Stoic philosophers. The present volume treats the first (previously believed to be the *second*, 'philosophical' part of the treatise), which provides details on Epicurean theology, cult practices, organization of Epicurean groups, accusations of impiety among philosophers, and philosophical criticism of mythological poetry. In order to set out the structure of the treatise, it has been necessary to deal in places with the second, 'critical' part of the treatise. In many respects the present volume thus serves as an introduction to *De pietate* as a whole.

A new method of papyrological reconstruction makes it possible to recover the original order of columns in the treatise, and thus to join many previously unconnected passages. We can now read two or even three continuous columns without a lacuna, where before we could only read one or half of one.[1] But it would be over-optimistic to pretend that the new method completely restores the narrative to its original continuous form. It is rather like being able to see the skeletal reconstruction of a dinosaur, instead of a mere pile of bones. We can, within limits, envisage the living, breathing beast, but never quite see it in the flesh. A major gain, however, is produced in seeing for the first time the extant columns in their original order, rather than the chaotic disorder in which they have come down to us. As a result it is possible to discern the plan and argument of both parts of the treatise as a unified, organic whole.

The primary objective of the present edition is therefore to present

[1] The method has since been applied to other Herculaneum rolls opened through the process of *scorzatura* (see below, p. 25) with great success, and promises to afford additional progress in the future: see Obbink 1986 and 1989; Delattre 1989 and 1993, endorsed by E. Pöhlmann, 'Philodem, De musica, 1969–1989', *Gnomon*, 63 (1991), 481–6 at 484–5; Janko 1992 and 1993 applies it to Philodemus' *On Poems*.

a satisfactory text of the papyrus in such a way as to provide the relevant papyrological information contained both in the papyri (where these survive) and in the original apographs, in order to provide a reliable basis on which to propose new conjectural readings. Constraints of space make it necessary to omit here (except in special cases) both the initial stage of full diplomatic transcription with which the edition began, and the reproduction of most of the original apographs, which remain unpublished. The information of a detailed papyrological apparatus, in which every uncertain trace is analysed in terms of all the possible letters it could represent, even if some of these might appear to be ruled out on philological grounds, has been partially abridged, or, for crucial passages, largely relegated to the critical notes. All previous editions of *De pietate* have been based not on the papyri, whether existing or lost, but on engraved (and in many cases erroneous or deficient) reproductions issued by the Neapolitan Academy in 1863. The columns of the text bear new numbers, and continuous line-numbering has been introduced. For equivalences with the numbering of previous editions see the Concordances (pp. 639–45). The present edition is based upon the papyri themselves, where they are extant, and, in those cases where the papyri have unfortunately perished, upon the next closest textual witnesses, the original pencil-drawn facsimiles of the papyrus (*disegni*) made by Italian and British draftsmen during the process of unrolling.

With its columns arranged in their proper order, the treatise affords an excellent and extended example of a large category of ancient writing on the gods, mythography, and religion, of which only tantalizing traces otherwise survive. The treatise presents a defence of Epicurus' views on the gods, religion, and cultural history, together with a philosophical rationale for participation in traditional cult-practices as illustrating an Epicurean theory of the role of religion in the operation of justice and social cohesion. Epicurus is revealed as a thinker who, like Prodicus and Democritus, regarded cult as an outgrowth of cultural history (Henrichs 1975*a*), and who sought to show how far cultural phenomena (including false beliefs) could be explained along atomist principles without recourse to the teleology of the Stoics and Peripatetics. As an intimate of such luminaries as Cicero, Torquatus, and the Pisones, and the mentor of Vergil, Philodemus touches in the treatise on such issues as the efficacy of cult, options for religious participation open to individuals, and the role of religion and religious poetry in society. A central concern of the treatise is the moral and

epistemological status of atheism, as is the function of religious beliefs in the affairs of the state and their consequences for the διάθεσις or psychosomatic constitution of the individual thinker.

A method of composition by compilation yields a plethora of illustrative passages preserving numerous citations from lost writers. In addition, the treatise provides an important link in the history of ideas (via Cicero, who drew directly upon the treatise or its source in the first book of *De Natura Deorum*) between pagan philosophical critiques of traditional religion and the arguments of the early Christian writers against polytheism. It is in this sense that it lives in two worlds, and looks in two directions at once.

An introductory essay on Epicurus and Greek religion sets out the significance of the text for our current understanding of Hellenistic philosophy and intellectual history. The remainder of the Introduction deals with the text's transmission and the reconstruction of its argument and of the papyrus roll, an important preliminary to any understanding of the text, especially in the (virtually unique) case of the Herculaneum papyri, where (unlike the papyri of Egyptian provenance) we have to deal with whole papyrus rolls and an entire library of books, rather than discrete and random fragments. To this are appended supplementary treatments of the genre and theme of the treatise and the style and syntax of Philodemus' Greek.

From time to time I cite other works by Philodemus by way of comparison. In view of the problems I set forth here, and the alarming variation in readings from one edition to another, the reader will no doubt wonder how secure their texts are. Due caution is in order. In general I refrained from citing any passage the text of which I felt was seriously in doubt. In some cases I have introduced corrections of my own devising, as noted.

This edition had its inception in Naples at the XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia in May 1983. It grew, from a paper at the Annual Meeting of the American Philological Association in Toronto in 1984 in which I presented the discovery of the method used to recover the original order of the eighty-six columns which appear here, twenty-five of which I included in my 1986 doctoral dissertation, through a series of articles to its present form. Prolegomena to the edition appeared in *GRBS* 30 (1989), 187–223, parts of which have been incorporated in revised form in § 1 of the Introduction. In the interim I have lectured on *De pietate* at UCLA, Tulane, Duke, Princeton, the Institute of Classical Studies in London, the University of

Texas at Austin, Columbia, New York University, in Washington D.C., in Copenhagen, and on Capri. The auditors on those occasions will recognize their numerous insights and criticisms incorporated or countered in the present volume. Fully to reconstruct my sources of information, and the contributions of individuals and institutions who have aided and abetted this project, would be an undertaking greater than that required for all the Herculaneum papyri taken together. Professor Marcello Gigante, on whose endless learning and resourcefulness I have drawn throughout, and the Centro Internazionale per lo Studio dei Papiri Ercolanesi, made it possible for me to collate the extant papyrus texts and original apographs in Naples. A. A. Long, David Furley, Peter Parsons, David Sedley, Susan Stephens, and Michael Wigodsky all provided unflagging criticism and sound advice. Knut Kleve (Oslo), the Bodleian Library, and the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples generously provided the photography that appears in the plates and important advice on matters of conservation in working on papyri of which lamentably fewer exist today than did a century ago, and many of which will probably not survive the next several decades. Sarah Sheffer produced the line art that appears as figs. 1–3. Daniel Delattre, Tiziano Dorandi, Leofranc Holford-Strevens, and Richard Janko lavished their own time ungrudgingly on my work and saved me from more blunders than anyone cares to remember. For expert consultation on individual problems I am grateful to Anna Angeli, Angela Blackburn, Jan Bremmer, Walter Burkert, Mario Capasso, Helene Foley, Francesca Longo Auricchio, Annick Monet, D. R. Shackelton Bailey, and Leonardo Tarán. I am happy to acknowledge a similar debt to others in the pages that follow, most of all to Albert Henrichs, to whom this book is dedicated, PIETATIS CAVSSA.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations xii

INTRODUCTION
1. Epicurus and Greek Religion 1
2. The Papyrus
   (*a*) Condition 24
   (*b*) Editions 26
   (*c*) Order of Fragments 37
   (*d*) Genuine and Spurious Fragments 54
   (*e*) Apographs and Detached Fragments 58
   (*f*) Stichometry 62
   (*g*) Orthography and Handwriting 73
   (*h*) Corrections and Scholia 76
3. The Work
   (*a*) Literary Form 81
   (*b*) Theme 84
   (*c*) Style 86
   (*d*) Title and Authorship 88
4. The Edition
   (*a*) System of Presentation 99
   (*b*) Conspectus Siglorum 102

ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥCΕΒΕΙΑC ΤΜΗΜΑ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ 105

COMMENTARY 279

Conspectus Studiorum 615
Concordances 639
Index verborum 647
General index 663
Index locorum potiorum 673

Plates 677

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURES

1. Papyrus roll in cross-section 39
2. Layout of papyrus roll, showing the fragments of Part 1 43
3. Reconstructed layout of extant texts 46
4. Formation of alpha, eta, epsilon, phi, and omega 75

PLATES
(at end of book)

1. Unopened papyrus scrolls carbonized during the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79
2. *P. Herc.* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 2 (= col. 45)
3. *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 (= cols. 56–7)
4. Detail of Pl. 3, with stichometric letter Ξ
5. Oxonian Apograph of *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 (= cols. 52–4)
6. Neapolitan Apograph of *P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 2 (= col. 54)
7. *Scorza* (*P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 29 = col. 1)
8. Final columns of *De pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 12–15 + *subscriptio*)

INTRODUCTION

1. Epicurus and Greek Religion

Atheism in the ancient world was never a well-defined or ideologically fixed position.[1] The gods themselves constituted the prevailing centre of attention. Deviation in the proper attitude towards them, particularly as recipients of cult, could result in a charge of impiety[2] or in the suspicion of atheism. We know of numerous atheists in antiquity by name, most of them philosophers who taught in or around Athens in the late fifth century BC. Attention came to be centred on the explicit denial of the existence of the gods or grounds for believing in them. Philodemus in *De pietate* gives a detailed classification of the various kinds of atheist:[3]

(i) Those who say that it is unknown whether there are any gods

[1] Henrichs 1976, 20. Further on atheism: Decharme 1904; Geffcken 1907; F. Mauthner, *Der Atheismus und seine Geschichte im Abendlande* (Stuttgart, 1920–3); Drachmann 1922; W. K. C. Guthrie, *OCD* (1st or 2nd edn.) s.v. 'Atheism'; W. Nestle, 'Atheismus', *RAC* i (1950), 866–70; O. Gigon, 'Atheismus', *Lexikon der alten Welt* (Zürich and Stuttgart, 1965), 370–1; Fahr 1969; Babut 1974; Henrichs 1975*b*; Dover 1976 = 1988; Meijer 1980; Winiarczyk 1990, and the standard bibliography on the major 'atheists' (including Epicurus), especially Diagoras, Prodicus, Critias, Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Euhemerus, and Theodorus.

[2] Derenne 1930; Rudhardt 1960; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986), apps. A–C, pp. 525–50.

[3] *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 14,32–15,8 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 25). Sextus' division (*Adv. math.* 9. 50–1), by contrast, is simply into those who say οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι, and those who, like good Pyrrhonist sceptics, suspend judgement on the question. I do not know whence Philodemus' classification derives; perhaps it is his own. It is in any case unlikely to be Academic (e.g. Carneades or Antiochus) because it avoids the conflation of categories apparent in Sextus' grouping. For a similar division of sceptics see Philod. *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 3.

or what they are like (*τοὺς ἄγνωστον εἴ τινές εἰσι θε[οὶ] λέγοντας ἢ ποῖοί τινές εἰσιν*).

(ii) Those who say openly that the gods do not exist (*τοὺς δι[α]ρρήδην ὅτι οὐκ εἰ[ς]ὶν ἀποφαινομένους*).

(iii) Those who clearly imply it (*φανεροὺς ὄντας ὡς ἀνήιρουν*, lit.: 'those of whom it is clear that they eliminate them').

This implies at least that the charge of atheism could be incurred for something less than an outright denial of the existence of the gods. But in general the later doxographical and biographical traditions tended to lump Philodemus' first and third groups into the second. The standard rosters of atheists, for instance, regularly include Protagoras among 'those who say that god does not exist' (Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 56, cf. 50–1). So in the light of explicit statements to the effect that Epicurus did in fact deny the existence of the gods,[1] I shall take such denial, or blatant disregard for their cult (commonly construed as tantamount to denial), to be the main points at issue—though of course Epicurus' views might well turn out to be in some weaker, rhetorical sense 'atheistic'[2] or 'heretical' by implication in the judge-

[1] For example, Cic. *De. nat. deor.* 1. 123 citing Posidonius (fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd, 346 Theiler): *nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse*; ibid. 1. 85 (Cotta): *video non nullis videri Epicurum, ne in offensionem Atheniensium cederet, verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse.* Cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 58, concluding his list of atheists: *Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κατ' ἐνίους ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει θεόν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς*; Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1102B, 1112D; *Adv. Col.* 1119DE, 1123E; Lact. *De ira dei* 4.7 (Posidonius fr. 22b Edelstein–Kidd, cf. 346 Theiler); *Inst. Epit.* 31. 3—to name but a few. A more complete list in Winiarczyk 1984, 157–83 at 168–70.

[2] A common sentiment is Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 5. 66. 5 (GCS 52 [15] p. 51, 6–9 Stählin–Treu): *Ἐπικούρου μὲν γὰρ μόνου καὶ ἑκὼν ἐκλήσομαι, ὃς οὐδὲν μέλειν οἴεται τῷ θεῷ, διὰ πάντων ἀσεβῶν.* In modern times such representation is commonplace (a glaring example is E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, iii/1 (5th edn., Leipzig, 1923), 429–30, 437 n. 2). Early protests were issued by F. Bacon (*Essays*, no. 16) and P. Gassendi (*De vita et moribus Epicuri libri* (Lyon, 1647), *Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii* (Lyon, 1649)), and later by C. Giussani (*Studi lucreziani* (Turin, 1845)). But the first English translator of Lucretius, a young Puritan named Lucy Hutchinson who worked in the late 1640s, could complain in her preface that she did not really like the poem and only translated it so that people might take a warning from its preposterous impiety (C. A. Gordon, *A Bibliography of Lucretius*, 2nd edn. rev. with introd. and notes by E. J. Kenney (Winchester, 1985), 169). Even the editors of the earliest published portion of Philodemus' *De pietate*, which was to turn the tide of opinion, could write: 'The Stoics and the Epicureans, who made lofty pretentions to popular applause, as the philosophical expounders of the popular religion, loudly accused each other of that atheism, of which both affected to be abhorrent, and of which both were indubitably culpable. The atheism of the Epicureans seems not to have been questioned by any men of learning, though their exoteric doctrines were so well disguised as not to offend the multitude' (Drummond and Walpole 1810, 123); cf. Young 1810, 20, who characterizes the subject of the treatise as 'the piety of atheism.'

ment of a particular individual.[1] In *De pietate* the Epicurean author undertakes to defend Epicurus and his earliest followers against charges of atheism and impiety. His discussion falls under four main headings:

(i) Epicurean argumentation for the existence of gods (cols. 1–25, ll. 1–723)
(ii) Instances of Epicurean participation in cult and ritual (cols. 26–36, ll. 723–1022)
(iii) The Epicurean doctrine of harms and benefits from gods (cols. 36–59, ll. 1023–1701)
(iv) Theories of the origin of atheism and justice (cols. 60–86, ll. 1702–2510)

In the first part of the treatise the author compiles a list of instances in which Epicurus and his early followers could be seen to maintain the position that the gods really exist. These he presents in response to objections to the Epicurean view posed by opponents (Ariston the Stoic is specifically named). Much of the argumentation concerns how the gods can be bodily in nature (as all existents for Epicurus must be) and therefore material compounds, yet somehow be imperishable (according to the Epicurean view all compounds must ultimately be perishable). Philodemus offers valuable evidence for how the Epicureans proposed to extricate themselves from this dilemma. In the process he claims to have shown that Epicurus and his early followers did in fact believe in the existence of gods, contrary to his opponents' allegations: if Epicurus had claimed to believe in the gods only for the sake of avoiding social opprobrium (as some had alleged), they would scarcely have offered demonstrations and arguments about their existence (col. 17). Next Philodemus catalogues instances in which Epicurus and his followers could be seen as having sincerely participated in observance of traditional cult and worship. Third, he expounds the Epicurean position justifying such worship on what we might call 'psychological' grounds, explaining how Epicurus thought that the gods could have virtuous and harmful influences on us, though they do not intentionally interfere with our world. In the fourth section the

[1] In the way, for instance, that a Muslim might accuse a Christian of being an 'atheist', or when a newspaper editorial alleges that 'the Bishop of —— is an atheist' for taking such or such a position in a church controversy. None of the persons engaging in such rhetoric seriously believes the other denies the existence of a divinity. The concept of 'heresy' on the other hand, familiar from Western church history, requires a sense of orthodoxy which simply did not obtain in ancient religion.

author expounds a historical reconstruction of the development of belief in the gods of the poets and of traditional belief: such views, he argues, were originally the result of false opinions about nature, which were exploited by early humans both for personal gain and in the interests of social and political control, and eventually came to be accepted as true. He defends this position against allegations that it is socially harmful and dangerous to reveal this to the many, as some sophistic thinkers had argued, and therefore turns to show that the conceptions of the gods in the poets championed by his philosophical opponents (who cite them as authorities) are not only false but themselves socially harmful and ultimately destructive. As an extended appendix to this section (see the text below, ll. 2339–43, 2480–9), the author catalogues at length instances of distorted views of the gods in the works of famous Greek poets and philosophers culminating in contemporary Stoics, in proof of his argument in the first part of the treatise that false stories about the gods do not in fact serve (as he says his opponents claim) to inhibit injustice.

Denial of the existence of the gods as a point of doctrine is not something generally associated with any of the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period. On the contrary, Sextus Empiricus reports[1] that, for any philosopher who wished to put forth positive views, a doctrine about the gods is by far *the most necessary*, and that it seemed so *to the dogmatists themselves*. We may suppose he meant that any view of the nature and influence of the gods is especially open to suspicion, and thus constitutes a kind of natural division between sceptical and dogmatic schools: anyone who purports to 'philosophize dogmatically' would be faced with a challenge from sceptical quarters to produce a theology not only consistent with his own system, but also capable of some measure of certainty.[2]

One of Philodemus' main contentions in *De pietate* is that Epicurus had no doubts about the necessity of giving an account of the gods. Epicurus does seem to have placed theology first in his system:[3] the

[1] *Adv. math.* 9. 13: ὁ περὶ θεῶν λόγος πάνυ ἀναγκαιότατος εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δογματικῶς φιλοσοφοῦσιν.

[2] On the role of epistemology in the debate over the gods, see Obbink 1992*b*.

[3] For the same reasons the Stoics placed it *last*. They argued from their etymology of τέλειος, τελετή, and the like (as allusions to the *arcana philosophiae*) that theology should come last (after physics, logic, and ethics) in philosophical inquiry: Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 1035 B; *Quaest. conviv.* 718 C; *De Iside* 382 DE; *Et. Magnum* s.v. τελετή (*SVF* ii. 1008; cf. i. 538); Boyancé 1937, 42–3, 49 n. 2; Lobeck 1829, i. 123–5.

gods are the subject[1] of the first of the *Kuriai Doxai* and stand first in the letter *Ad Menoeceum*, where Epicurus asserts that the gods exist, that they do so as supremely blessed, imperishable, yet living beings, and adds that ordinary knowledge of them, being derived from primary conceptions (*προλήψεις*), must be clear or evident: *θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν· ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις*. E. Norden[2] highlighted this passage for its early use of *γνῶσις* in a theological context, as implying and emphasizing a cognitive relationship between humans and the gods. On the other hand, *ἐναργής* is an Epicurean epistemological catchword, implying that such primary conceptions have a sound causal origin in the deliverances of perception. In this respect the statement looks both forward to later theological parlance, and backward in time to Epicurus' atomist predecessors, especially Democritus, for whom the gods existed as exceptionally large, long-lived, circumambient images, endowed with speech, and prophetic powers, and capable of conferring benefit or harm.[3] Epicurus' assertion was no doubt intended to be equally provocative in its dogmatism, much like the notorious claim[4] that 'all perceptions are true', which it partly recalls. As for the content of our conceptions of the gods,[5] Epicurus also states that the gods are anthropomorphic (*Σ* ad *KD* 1), perfectly blessed and immortal (*Ad Menoec.* 123: *τὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον*), and that they do not participate in the affairs of our world or the

[1] So also Lucr. (1. 62–4), and first in Diogenes of Oenoanda's list of the causes of all evil (fr. 34 col. 7 Smith). The first book of Philodemus' *De dis* deals with irrational fear of the gods as a basic philosophical problem. The gods also have pride of place in the first colon of the Epicurean fourfold remedy (*τετραφάρμακος*) quoted by Philodemus, *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 5,10–14 (Epic. fr. 196 Arr.[2]), in the new edition of Angeli 1988*a*, 173 (text), 265–70 (comm.), with restatements at *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 4 and Cic. *De fin.* 1.62, where the first colon appears as *de dis immortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit*; Demetrius Laco, *P. Herc.* 1006 p. 59–61 (De Falco). Further discussion in Gigante 1983, 60–1; F. Sbordone, 'Il quadrifarmaco epicureo', *CErc* 13 (1983) 117–19; A. Angeli, 'Compendi, eklogai, tetrapharmakos: due capitoli di dissenso nell'Epicureismo', *CErc* 16 (1986), 53–66.

[2] Norden 1923, 87–9, esp. 96–7; Henrichs 1975*b*, 105–6 n. 63 compares in this respect Philod. *De piet.* ap. *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 16,7–9 (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1975*b*, 96 = Democritus *VS* 68 A 75): *τὸ ἐξεργα|ζόμενον γνόντας* (sc. *τοὺς ἀρχαίους*) | *σέβεσθαι*.

[3] Democritus *VS* 68 A 74, 77–9, B 142. Epicurean criticism of Democritus' theory of such images at Diog. Oen. fr. 10 Smith, esp. col. 2, 7–3, 14 (*HPh* 15*g*): M. F. Smith, *AJA* 74 (1970), 51–62; *CQ*[2] 22 (1972), 159–62; D. Clay, *AJP* 101 (1980), 342–65.

[4] D.L. 10. 32, 146–7; Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7. 201–10; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1109–10; Striker 1980; Taylor 1980.

[5] Epicurus and his followers employ 'gods' (plural) and 'the divine' (sing.) indiscriminately as the occasion suits, as well as a range of substantivized adjectives (*τὸ μακάριον, τὸ σεμνόν, τὸ δαιμόνιον*)—and a neologism, *τὸ σέμνωμα* (Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77, *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,30).

working of the cosmos (*Ad Herod.* 76–8), such activities being incompatible with their blessedness and imperishability. Our conceptions result from a constant stream of similar images—for Epicurus the only immediate objects of perception—especially fine in structure, like the atoms of the soul, and so perceptible only by thought (*λόγῳ θεωρητοί*) that are naturally imprinted (especially during sleep) on the minds of all men.

Naturally we do not 'see' the gods, as we do other material entities. But their characteristics are according to Epicurean epistemology theoretically observable ones, which we can attribute to the gods, as to atoms (like the gods, perceptible only in thought), on the basis of analogy with the perceptible. Thus, for Epicurus, thinking about the existence and basic nature of the gods, in its reliability and persistence (for both individuals and whole cultures), constituted a range of experience criterially analogous to the reliability of sense impressions.

According to a fragment from Philodemus' *De pietate*, Epicurus in book 12 of his *magnum opus Περὶ φύσεως* (a source for Lucretius' book 5) gave another, similar account of the origin of belief in the gods, this time from a cultural-historical perspective. The earliest humans (*πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι*), he said, having received images of the gods in dreams, recognized that the gods existed and formed an understanding of their divine nature. Our most direct source for this comes from Philodemus' *De pietate*:[1] *κἀν τῶι δω|δεκάτ[ω]ι Περὶ φ[ύ]|c[ϵ]ω[c το]ὺc πρώτουc | φη[cὶν ἀ]νθρώπουc | ἐπὶ ν[οή]ματα ⟨τῶν ἔ⟩ξω | βα⟨ί⟩νειν ἀφθάρτων | φύcεων*. 'And in book 12 of *On Nature* he says that the first men arrived at conceptions of imperishable external entities.'

At the beginning of civilization, in other words, early humans conceived the gods as anthropomorphic, blessed, imperishable, and so on; later, as in the near-contemporary anthropological theories of Theophrastus and Dicaearchus, this conception of the gods underwent a process of decline, becoming contaminated with false notions.

[1] Lines 225–31. According to another portion of this account (417–20) this knowledge was attained by means of corporeal sensation (*τὴν παραιcθήcει cαρκ[ί]νηι περιληπτὴν αἴc[θη]cιν*). This fragmentary account should be supplemented by Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 25 (Epic. fr. 356 Us.), which attests that according to Epicurus people originally derived the conception of god from presentations received in sleep (*ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺc ὕπνουc φανταcιῶν οἴεται τοὺc ἀνθρώπουc ἔννοιαν ἐcπακέναι θεοῦ*), and quotes Epicurus' explanation: 'For when great images of human shape impressed them during sleep, they supposed that some such gods of human shape really existed' (*μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φηcί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομόρφων κατὰ τοὺc ὕπνουc προcπιπτόντων ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖc ἀληθείαιc ὑπάρχειν τινὰc τοιούτουc θεοὺc ἀνθρωπομόρφουc*) and 9. 43 (both standard accounts of concept formation), and Lucr. 5. 1168–70.

But in guaranteeing a correct *πρόληψις* of the gods[1] to the earliest men, Epicurus will have effectively denied the pre-anthropomorphic stage of thinking about the gods that Theophrastus assigned to early man in his account of the origin of religion.[2]

Among the false notions about the gods introduced at an early stage of civilization according to the Epicurean theory of cultural history[3] is that they intervene in this world to reward the good, punish the bad, cause natural disasters, and so on. Epicurus states emphatically that the gods, being blessed and imperishable, could not conceivably reside in this world, where they could be neither entirely free from care nor immune to terrestrial forces of destruction. This is the main point of Lucretius' planned digression at *DRN* 5. 146–7, *illud item non est ut possis credere, sedis / esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis* ('this, too, it cannot be that you should believe, that there are holy abodes of the gods in any parts of the world'), while his adaptation (3. 18–23) of the Homeric description of Olympus at *Od.* 6. 42–6 to describe the *sedes quietae* of the Epicurean gods was meant to depict how mankind has always conceptualized the gods in the same basic way, or to underscore poetically how deeply rooted such a conception of the gods (as alien to our world) really was in traditional thinking about the gods,[4] rather than to provide an account of their actual homes. Some later authors did of course speculate where in the Epicurean universe such gods could exist.[5] If Epicurus himself addressed the question 'where do the

[1] Or something approaching it (229 *νοήματα*); cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 43 *anticipationem quandam deorum*, and Kleve 1963, 99 with n. 6.

[2] Theophr. *De piet.* F 584A Fortenbaugh ap. Porph. *De abst.* 2. 5. See comm. on 229. So also Epicurus' account corrects Democritus' anthropological version (*VS* 68 A 75) of the origin of religious belief.

[3] See the text below, ll. 225–318; Lucr. 5. 1161–1240.

[4] Cf. the belief in a Homeric Olympus rationalized at Aristot. *De caelo* 2. 1, 284^a, and compare the celestial, extra-cosmic, yet mythological abodes of the gods in Aristoph. *Pax* (esp. 207–9) and *Aves*: Z. A. Pokrovskaja, 'Les dieux d'Épicure et Térée de Thrace', *Eirene*, 19 (1982), 57–70. Later reflections: Hermocles' ithyphallus (on the entry of Demetrius Poliorcetes into Athens in 290) ap. Athen. 6. 253; Lucian, *Iupp. tr.* 45, probably modelled on a (Varronian) Menippean (R. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig, 1906), 149 n. 3).

[5] Principally the *intermundia* (*μετακόσμια*, *διαστήματα*), the interstices between worlds in the Epicurean universe: so Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. praef. 18, *De div.* 2. 40 (cf. *De fin.* 2. 75). For a list of references—none earlier than Cicero and most (Seneca, Quintilian, Plutarch, Augustine) almost certainly derived from him—see Pease ad loc. on both passages, and F. Peters, *T. Lucretius et M. Cicero quo modo vocabula Graeca Epicuri disciplinae propria Latine verterint* (Münster, 1926), who includes Christian authors. This view was not known to the Epicurean sources used by Cicero in *De nat. deor.*; thus it does not occur in Velleius' positive exposition in book 1, where we might have expected it, though Cicero added disparaging references to it in his prefaces, perhaps in a wilful misinterpretation of Lucr. 3. 18–25, which

gods live?', he certainly said that they do not live in this world,[1] stressing the persistence and regularity with which individuals in fact formed conceptions of the divine, and the effect (primarily social and psychological) of these conceptions upon life in this world.

Naturally Epicurus does not think every conception of a god to be true. The gods represented by many theologians and poets, together with such popular conceptions as engender fear, are not based on προλήψεις, but on false conceptions due to the contamination of originally clear concepts. Thus Epicurus and his followers often talk as if it were up to us to preserve (φυλάττειν, τηρεῖν) the integrity of the gods by ensuring that our concepts of them are not impaired by some other defective conception. An example of this kind of reasoning occurs in the passage (cited above) from Epicurus' letter *Ad Menoeceum* (123–4). Here Epicurus undertakes to argue that the conception of the gods held by a great many men is defective; this requires (*a*) showing that it conflicts with some other more fundamental (pre)conception, that of the gods as perfectly blessed,[2] and (*b*) explaining how the faulty conception arose.[3] Similarly, a failure to preserve our conception of the gods unimpaired is effectively to 'eliminate' them (ἀναιρεῖν, *tollere*),

he will by this time have known; cf. Dionysius episcopus Περὶ φύσεως ap. Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 14. 27. 8, 782 C (= Epic. fr. 364 Us. in part). On τὴν μετακόσ[μιον χώραν] of Philod. *De morte* 4 col. 15,8 (p. 146 Kuiper) see Diels 1917, 24 n. 1: 'Hier ist aber das Platonische Elysium, nicht der Epikureische Götterwohnsitz gemeint.' I take Philod. *De dis* 3 cols. 8,20–9,27 (p. 26 Diels) to be an account of how the random passage of εἴδωλα which figure in the process of conceptualizing the gods accidentally gave rise to the belief in catasterism and the cult of apotheosized rulers—and not an account of images emanating from the gods' permanent places of existing. Contrary to the constant assertion of commentators, Lucretius in his remarks on the gods does not mention or allude to the *intermundia*.

[1] According to an important and relatively early source—Atticus, who had reason to be informed on the subject—Epicurus simply positioned the gods somewhere or other outside our world (Att. fr. 3.75–81 des Places (with n. ad loc., pp. 48–9) ap. Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 15. 5. 11, 800 B = Epic. fr. 362 Us.): ἔξω που τοῦ κόσμου καθίδρυσε), which is consistent with their being in the *intermundia*, but is equally likely to be an extension of an original statement to the effect that they are nowhere in this world. Atticus said nothing about the μετακόσμια, and it is clear from the only other source with a pretence to a doxographical pedigree (Hippolytus' Φιλοσοφούμενα) that the specification of the μετακόσμια was an inference from the belief that Epicurus positioned the gods ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου (*Dox. Gr.* 572). Moreover, both Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 8. 2, 731 D and Philo, *De somn.* 1. 184 place the Epicurean gods *either* in the μετακόσμια *or* in some other world, which suggests an elaboration of an original ἔξω που τοῦ κόσμου or οὐδαμοῦ ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ κόσμῳ. So also Plut. *Vit. Pyr.* 20 (Epic. fr. 363 Us.) ἀποικίζοντες. The combined testimony of both hostile and sympathetic accounts on this point is difficult to dispute.

[2] *Ad Menoec.* 123–4, *Ad Herod.* 76–7, Plut. *De stoic. repug.* 1051 E, *De comm. not.* 1075 E.

[3] *Ad Menoec.* 123–4, Lucr. 5. 1183–5; see the text below, ll. 225–318, a historical, anthropological account.

by distorting the experientially based preconceptions that guarantee our knowledge of them.

Epicurus' emphasis on the role which we ourselves play in this process cannot be too strongly emphasized. If it was an innovation of fifth-century sophistic thinking that man could, by his own thought and action, divorce himself from the gods, it was equally a novelty of Hellenistic theologies that man could by the same process align himself with divinity, *whether or not* that divinity was conceived as willing or capable of exercising care for individuals.[1] In this respect then, Epicurus seems to have substituted for the causal and governing roles accorded to the divine in earlier Greek philosophy the notion, already familiar from Plato and Aristotle, of the divine as a normative object of *moral* emulation (*ὁμοίωσις θεῷ*). Since, for Epicurus, the gods share with men pleasure as an ethical *telos*, and since our conceptions of them embody the Epicurean ideals of blessedness and tranquillity, the gods stand in relation to the wise virtually as paradigms of moral excellence. Their example is to be imitated,[2] a consideration which accounts for Epicurus' insistence that we conceive of the gods as anthropomorphic and capable of speech. While the intervention of the gods in the world is ruled out by its incompatibility with their own blessedness, they do nevertheless have a very real, if indirect, influence on the world of humans, inasmuch as one's own view of the gods would naturally have a major impact for better or worse on one's own *διάθεσις* or psychosomatic constitution.[3] Naturally, a 'true' conception of the gods is easily distorted by all sorts of false beliefs (e.g. that they exercise power, malevolence, etc.—the consequence of reading literally the tales of the poets). But the wise, who preserve a correct conception of the gods, derive a sense of immense calm and religious awe from perceiving and imitating their nature. For Epicurus, the restriction of the attributes of the divine to those compatible with blessedness and imperishability is less a devaluation of traditional forms of piety than a source (analogous to the concept of religious purity) of a deeper psychological dimension to religious ritual.[4] Thus

[1] I owe this observation to Zeph Stewart, who observes that already Plato is comfortable with the concept of *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* as long as the gods are regarded as providential, and theology as teleological.

[2] So also Epicurus is credited with having held (following the common Hellenistic trend of deification of great men) that the individual wise man could achieve a kind of divinity: see especially Clay 1986.

[3] See esp. W. Schmid 1951; Festugière 1968, 36–100.

[4] Cf. Theophr. *De piet.* ap. Porph. *De abst.* 2. 19; R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification*

traditional forms of worship are viewed by Epicurus as natural responses to the recognition of divine nature, and are not merely tolerated but recommended to his followers. Numerous acts of worship are attested for Epicurus and individual Epicureans, including sacrifice, prayer, and oaths,[1] adoration of statues,[2] dedications,[3] mystery initiation,[4] participation in calendrical festivals,[5] and rites of private and ancestral cult.[6] Their opponents, considering such practices were incompatible with the Epicurean rejection of natural teleology, divine providence, and divination,[7] viewed them as insincere parodies designed to cultivate popular favour. Epicureans, however, maintained that participation in such practices was intended to illustrate the Epicurean theory of religion and social cohesion, and the degree to which cultural phenomena (including false beliefs) could be accounted for; for Epicurus, like Prodicus and Democritus, viewed cult as a natural outgrowth of cultural history. Similarly, we find Epicureans, in an attempt to rationalize and thereby vindicate popular belief (thus

in Early Greek Religion (Oxford, 1983) 322–7; Burkert 1985*a*, 77; *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,2–3 τιμ[ᾶ]ν αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν, with Burkert 1985*a*, 311; Obbink 1984.

[1] For offerings of blood sacrifice: Philod. *De piet.* 796, 879–82, 1850, 2278; Athen. 5. 179 D (Epic. fr. 56 Us.); Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1102 B (Epic. fr. 30 Us.); Porph. *De abst.* 1. 7–12 = Hermarchus fr. 34 Longo, 24 Krohn (an account of the institution of animal sacrifice and a defence of this practice by Hermarchus); Obbink 1988*a*.

[2] Adoration of cult statues (ἀγάλματα): Philod. *De piet.* 910–12, comm. on 1065; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 85; Origen, *Contr. Cels.* 7. 66 (Epic. fr. 390 Us.); so also use of statuary and amulets as talismans: Frischer 1982, 87–128.

[3] Dedication of ἀναθήματα: D.L. 10. 126; Raubitschek 1949 = 1991 (dedicatory herms to the gods of Eleusis, in conjunction with the Eleusinian mysteries); Castner 1982 (dedications to Asclepius at Epidaurus).

[4] Initiation in the Attic (i.e. Eleusinian) mysteries: Philod. *De piet.* 558–9, 808–10.

[5] Attendance upon local calendrical festivals: the Attic festival of the Pitchers (τῶν Χοῶν) on the second day of the Anthesteria: Philod. *De piet.* 806–8; cf. 866–8 with Usener's restorations (= Epic. fr. 157 Us., fr. 86 Arr.²). The 2nd-c.-BC Epicurean Philonides was a θεωροδόκος from his native Laodicea ad mare, and appears at Delphi in several contemporary lists of θεωροδόκοι: see G. Plassart, *BCH* 45 (1921), 1–85; G. Daux, *REG* 62 (1949), 20–2; L. Robert, *REG* 63 (1950), 163 no. 127; G. Daux, *Delphes au IIe et au Ier siècle* (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 140; Paris, 1936), 511–14; P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, i (Oxford, 1972), 416 n. 320; Gallo 1980, 24–5.

[6] For religious feasting (εὐωχία) especially in the context of private or ancestral cult, see in particular Philod. *De piet.* 806–19 (cf. 1424–5), and the five separate calendrical rites stipulated by Epicurus in his will (D.L. 10. 18–20), which provide for the continuing funeral cult (τὰ ἐναγίσματα) of his parents and brothers (cf. *De piet.* 1475–6), the celebration of his own birthday on 10 Gamelion (together with similar rites for his brothers and for Polyaenus), and most importantly, the gatherings on the 20th of each month (ταῖς εἰκάσι) to commemorate himself and his favourite pupil Metrodorus (814). For the traditionally religious character of these rites of private cult, see esp. Clay 1983*a*, 272–4, and id. 1986.

[7] On Epicurus' rejection of divination, see D.L. 10. 135, with Diano 1935, 237–9.

demonstrating a clear philosophical understanding of even the most primitive of ideas), maintaining the proposition that 'gods' are actually capable of doing men harm (i.e. the wicked, as a result of their own depraved conceptions of the gods).[1]

So Epicurus has good reason for paying close attention to what people in the course of human history said about the gods. For Epicurus not only insisted on clear expression (*σαφήνεια*),[2] i.e. using words in accordance with their primary mental images and being aware of their current meanings: he also set an especially high premium on speaking correctly about the divine. Having one's gods properly sorted out is a prerequisite not only for doing philosophy correctly (so *KD* 1) and for facilitating the *ὠφέλεια* which Epicurus thought the gods provided to humans: it is also necessary, if the Long–Sedley view of Epicurean theology is correct, for the gods' very existence.[3] It is at any rate uncontroversial that Epicurus held that what we say about the gods is in part responsible for what we think about them, and that it is only in the form of our ideas that the gods themselves can benefit or harm us. At *Ad Herodotum* 77,[4] for example, Epicurus lays down very specific restrictions on the kind of *ὀνόματα* to be attributed to the gods, against the penalty of mental disquiet. What Epicurus says about the gods pertains explicitly to our ideas of them, or to the images which according to the Epicurean theory of cognition constitute such ideas.[5]

So if Epicurus thinks the gods exist, for all practical purposes, as concepts, and their effects stem primarily from our ideas of them, it

[1] e.g. Philod. *De piet.* ap. *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12 (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 22).

[2] According to D.L. 10. 13 Epicurus said in his *On Rhetoric* that *σαφήνεια* is the only goal of speaking and writing: *ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν.*

[3] *HPh* i. 144–9. That the gods are constituted, according to Epicurus, by our (materially formed) ideas of them, and that their material existence consists exclusively in this, was a view probably known to Cicero. For modern reformulations see G. Schömann, *Schediasma de Epicuri theologia*, iv (Greifswald, 1864) 346; F. A. Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus*[2], i (Iserlohn, 1873), 76–7; J. Bollack, *La Pensée du plaisir* (Paris, 1975), 236–8; D. N. Sedley, *CR* 29 (1979), 82–4; Long 1986, 142–5. Cf. Obbink 1989; cautious approbation in Woodward 1989. *Contra*: Mansfeld 1993.

[4] 'In all the terms with which we set forth our conceptions of such blessedness (i.e. the gods), we must preserve them in all their holiness lest from our expressions there grow opinions that deny this majesty. Otherwise these contradictions will cause the greatest confusion in our souls.' Epicurus discussed the matter in *De nat.* 12 and 13, to which this chapter of *Ad Herod.* corresponds.

[5] The standard counter-example, tirelessly propounded, for example, by Mansfeld 1993, 178–82, that Epicurus states that the gods are *ζῷα*, 'living beings', is explicitly said by Epicurus to pertain to how we are instructed to *think* of the gods as existing: *Ad Menoec.* 123: *τὸν θεὸν ζῷον . . . νομίζων . . . ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη . . . πρόσαπτε.*

would none the less be missing the point to insist that Epicurus' gods exist as 'mere' concepts.[1] According to Epicurus, our concepts of the gods have a unique ontological status;[2] our only access to the divine is through such concepts, just as our only access to solid objects is through the impressions which they are capable of presenting to us. Epicurus believes that such impressions are always true, in so far as they always provide a reliable piece of information: our 'preconceptions' of the gods are 'a genuine piece of moral knowledge, an accurate intuition of man's natural good'.[3] Epicurus' carefully orchestrated theory of the way in which human cultures conceptualize the gods represents an attempt to ensure that the conditions necessary to bring about people's ideas of divine beings were physically possible ones.

By the beginning of the first century BC, when works like Philodemus' *De pietate* and Cicero's *De natura deorum* drew the attention of an educated public, we find that Epicurus, who had been rather carefully dogmatic in his own pronouncements about the gods, was himself being paraded in certain circles as an atheist. In later antiquity the view that Epicurus was in reality a 'closet' atheist, whose statements and actions as regards the gods were only intended to placate a hostile public, in fact became the *communis opinio*.[4] We know, however, that at the beginning of the first century BC it was still a sufficiently controversial issue that entire books were devoted to the subject.

It might be supposed that the charge of atheism against Epicurus

[1] As many of Epicurus' detractors have in fact insisted (e.g. Cotta ap. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 77: Epicurus' gods are no more than images). The natural, if mistaken, conclusion was that Epicurus 'did not believe the gods existed', on the assumption that divinity could not sufficiently exist merely in the form of the idea of divinity. On the Epicurean view, concepts in fact have the same corporeal, atomic composition as all ὑπάρχοντα.

[2] According to Epicurean theory, the eternally regular pattern of cognition of the gods by mankind is facilitated by streams of 'similar' images (e.g. *Σ KD* 1). Our conceptions of them are thus said to constitute (or result from) a unique class of imperishable existents called in the technical accounts 'similarities', ὁμοιότητες ('Aëtius', *Plac.* 1. 7 in *Dox. Gr.* 307) or 'unities', ἑνότητες (Epic. *De sanct.* fr. 41 Us., 19. 4 Arr.[2] ap. Philod. *De piet.* 358) because, unique among existing things, they are always formed in the same way. In this way they are distinguished from other purely mental existents (e.g. the idea of a satyr, a Cyclops, or an eternally long-lived man) which are imaginatively or spontaneously formed by combination and reduction or expansion of images: see Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 43–7.

[3] *HPh* i. 147.

[4] See e.g. Winiarczyk 1984, 168–79 (on Epicurus and his followers); thus Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 86, where the Academic speaker Cotta declares: *ille* (sc. Epicurus) *vero deos esse putat*, and later in the same book (1. 123): *nullos esse deos Epicuro videri*; cf. Pease 1955, 36–45, esp. 43–5. A similar discrepancy exists in the text of Sextus: *Adv. math.* 9. 58 includes Epicurus in a list of atheists, yet this is directly contravened at 64, and at 43–7 is related Epicurus' physical account of the gods: see Philippson 1938, 1154; Pease 1955, 44–5.

originated with an actual indictment of Epicurus (or even the threat of one) on charges of impiety (*ἀσέβεια*), stemming from social or political hostility to his theology. If so, we might reasonably expect that such charges would have been utilized (or even fabricated) by the well-known early anti-Epicurean tradition, perhaps e.g. by the renegade Epicurean Timocrates, brother of Metrodorus (he alleged, for instance, that Epicurus used to vomit twice daily owing to his overeating and luxurious living). But while our sources for this anti-Epicurean tradition are given to exaggerated slander in other respects, they say nothing of atheism or impiety.[1] Philodemus, for his part, takes great pride in claiming that none of Epicurus' detractors could point to an instance in which Epicurus had been satirized in comedy, a genre which, as he points out, was only too given to harassment of philosophers for objectionable or outlandish views (1505–32):

> . . . as diverse as they were even in their chosen styles of life, [Epicurus] was inoffensive to [the Athenians], so that not only did he not engage in any lawsuit against anyone, he did not even have a quarrel. In fact, while some philosophers were prosecuted for their way of life and for their teachings, and some were exiled from city, some even from league and put to death, and all became the butt of writers of comedy, only Epicurus magnificently secured protection for himself together with those who dwelt with him according to the genuine precepts of the school, without falling prey to the virtue-hating and all-harassing mouth of comedy.

Philodemus' claims here are supported by the record, at least in so far as Epicurus' own lifetime is concerned[2] (the passage may in fact intend a contrast with Socrates in this respect). 'Epicureans' do appear occasionally in Hellenistic comedy (often, for example, as cooks—*μάγειροι*—pandering to the delicacies of taste), but in no surviving instance are they satirized explicitly for their theological views.[3]

So also neither the remains of Epicurus' own work nor that of his earliest followers contain any implication of, or response to, charges of impiety. Rather, we know that Epicurus attacked notorious fifth-century atheists, including Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias among

[1] The main source is D.L. 10. 4–9, a list of *οἱ δυσμενῶς ἔχοντες πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον*. A possible exception is that Diogenes includes in his general response to this tradition (10. 10) the defence: *τῆς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς θεοὺς ὁσιότητος καὶ πρὸς πατρίδα φιλίας ἄλεκτος ἡ διάθεσις* (sc. *τοῦ Ἐπικούρου*), though this might equally be taken as the language of conventional encomium, rather than a defence against a charge of impiety. On Timocrates' distortion of Epicurus' views, see Sedley 1976*a*, 121–59; A. Angeli, *CEπ* 23 (1993), 13–17.

[2] See below, p. 14 n. 4, for attestations of social and political harassment; all are non-Attic and postdate the lifetime of Epicurus.

[3] See the commentary below on 880 and 1528–31.

others, for removing the divine ἐκ τῶν ὄντων, which rather suggests an effort to distinguish his own philosophy from theoretical atheism.[1] Epicurus' famous affirmation of the existence of gods at *Ep. ad Men.* 123—an emphatic inversion of the atheists' notorious credo οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι and intended no doubt to be equally provocative in its (positive) dogmatism—indicates a desire to leave no doubt on the question. But it is unlikely to have been a response to any actual charge of impiety,[2] especially in the light of the statement that follows: οἵους δ' αὐτοὺς ⟨οἱ⟩ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἰσίν . . . ἀσεβὴς δ' οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας (here = false beliefs) θεοῖς προσάπτων ('but they [sc. the gods] are not such as the many believe them to be . . . . The impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many about them'), which is anything but a concession to traditional beliefs about the gods.

Moreover, public trials in Athens of philosophers for denying the traditional gods (if they took place at all, which is not universally accepted) seem to have been a phenomenon confined to the second half of the fifth and to the fourth centuries.[3] In other cities we do find episodes in which Epicureans are faced with expulsion, but in every case such measures are directed at their hedonism rather than their theology.[4] Even the public charges of impiety promulgated at Athens

[1] See the text below, 519–30.

[2] It more likely reflects hostility to contemporary trends towards scepticism (e.g. Pyrrho or Arcesilaus) than fear of social opprobrium. In general the assumption in later antiquity that Epicurus could not have publicly denied the existence of the gods, if he so wished, seems to be totally unfounded; many others certainly did so, if we can trust the doxographical record on this score (Drachmann 1922, 12–14; Dover 1976 = 1988; Winiarczyk 1984, 168–70). The Epicureans placed a high premium on the securing of social harmony, though this seems to have hindered them not at all in the development of positive doctrine, the most prominent example being their theory of pleasure (a doctrine for which we know they did in fact incur harsh persecution).

[3] Drachmann 1922, 6–7; Derenne 1930, 214–16 (public indictments of philosophers only in the 5th and 4th cc. BC) and 264–6 (confined to Athens). Cf. J. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, i (Leipzig, 1908), 358.

[4] For instances see Usener 1887, pp. lxxii f. These include the expulsion of Epicureans by the Messenians; Philiscus and Alcaeus expelled from Rome in 173 under the consul L. Postumius (Athen. 547 A; Aelian, *VH* 9. 12; *De provid.* fr. 39 Herch. ap. *Suda* s.v. Ἐπίκουρος, who also attests (loc. cit.) the expulsion of unnamed Epicureans from Lyctia). The expulsion under the consul L. Postumius is redated from 173 to 154 (both years having a consul by the same name) by E. S. Gruen, *Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy* (Cincinnati Classical Studies, NS 7; Leiden, 1990), 177, noting that out of all the Athenian philosophical schools present on the famous philosophical embassy to Rome in 155 BC, there was no representative from among the Epicureans; the expulsion by Postumius comes in 154, he argues, because the philosophic embassy in the previous year will have 'caused a sensation.' For the legisla-

seem to have been directed in the first instance against the disregard for religious custom, and this attitude may not have been widely extended to include theoretical speculation about the gods (Socrates is perhaps a notable exception).[1]

If contemporary social hostility seems an unpromising candidate for the source of the tradition concerning Epicurus' atheism, we must look next to the Hellenistic philosophers themselves, in whose debates the charge of irreverence toward the established order of things was a common argumentative tactic. As it happens, one of the earliest attested allegations of atheism against Epicurus comes in fact from a philosophical quarter. The Academic speaker Cotta concludes the first book of Cicero's *De natura deorum* with a citation[2] from Posidonius' *Περὶ θεῶν*:

> verius est igitur nimirum illud quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse.

It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as our good friend Posidonius argued in the fifth book of his *On the Nature of the Gods*, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium.

According to Cicero, Posidonius did not say that Epicurus ever explicitly denied the existence of gods (in fact, the fragment implies knowledge of statements to the contrary), nor that he was regarded as an atheist by his contemporaries (*videri*, in contrast to *dixerit*, is inferential), but only that he might have been, if his true views had been

tion of the Messenians and the Phalannaeans against Epicureans, see Philod. *De Stoicis*, col. 3,6–8 Dorandi: *καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡ[δ]ονὴν ὑπὸ Φαλαννα̣ίων καὶ Μεσσηνίων ἐκβεβλῆ̣σθαι τοὺς Ἐπικου[ρ]είους* (the text of *VH*[1], quoted by Usener, should be ignored). Notices of expulsions of Epicureans from unspecified cities: Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 2. 25; Cleomedes 2. 1; Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1100 D.

[1] See esp. Dover 1976 = 1988; Rudhardt 1960. A possible exception would be the controversial charge of impiety for the introduction of *καινὰ δαιμόνια*, which could conceivably have been directed towards philosophical reinterpretations of the traditional gods. Such considerations, however, did not at all figure in the charges of impiety promulgated in the late 4th c. against Aristotle and Theophrastus, the examples that will have been closest to Epicurus. Philodemus treats Socrates as an exception in this regard.

[2] Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 123 (Posidonius fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd = 346 Theiler). On the context, see further G. Rudberg, *Forschungen zu Poseidonios* (Uppsala, 1918), 30–2. See also J. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, ii (Breslau, 1928), 153–4; K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie* (Munich, 1926), 181–2; M. Pohlenz, *GGA* 192 (1930), 143; R. Philippson, *RE* xiii (1939), 1154; H. Uri, *Cicero und die epikureische Philosophie* (Munich, 1914), 106–7; G. Pfligersdorffer, 'Studien zu Poseidonios', *Sitz. Ber. Österr. Akad., Phil.-hist. Kl.*, 5. Abh. (Berlin, 1959).

popularly known.[1] Posidonius thus represents Epicurus as an atheist whose explicit pronouncements on the gods are merely specious attempts to placate a potentially hostile public. Posidonius' remark is well suited to the general drift of Cotta's entire critique of Epicurus' theology: Epicurus would have been better off denying the existence of the gods (they play no integral role in his general physical system), and so might just as well have done so.[2]

Did Posidonius invent Epicurus' atheism? The only other source is Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 9. 58: *καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κατ' ἐνίους ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει θεόν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς* ('and, according to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of god, but in expounding the physical nature of things he does not allow it'). The latter clause suggests that it is Epicurus' physical system (presumably its lack of teleology and denial of divine providence) that seemed to conflict with his written statements and practice concerning the gods.[3] That is, the philosophical charge of atheism against Epicurus bypasses Epicurus' explicit statements, attacking instead the premisses of his physical system, and inferring that the gods have no necessary place in this system.

The problem of the precise identification of this source has been much discussed,[4] though Sextus' handling of the matter certainly

[1] Apparently *quae* refers to Epicurus' account of the gods, in popular or technical terms. This would include his attitude towards participation in traditional religion and his habit of using religious language allusively, both ridiculed in the lines preceding the citation of Posidonius, and earlier at 1. 115.

[2] See e.g. the tentative formulation at 1. 87–8, and the conclusion *nullos esse deos* (on the authority of Posidonius) at 1. 123–4.

[3] Cf. Lactant. *De ira dei* 4. 7 (Posidonius fr. 22b Edelstein–Kidd, cf. 346 Theiler): *itaque verbis illum deos relinquere, re autem ipsa tollere quibus nullum motum nullum tribuit officium* (here the last clause cannot be simply derivative from the corresponding passage in Cicero, as most commentators assume, though for the idea cf. *De nat. deor.* 1. 92; 1. 101–2); Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117 B (Epic. fr. 141 Us., 65 Arr.[2]): *ἀφυσιολόγητον*; ibid. 1102 B (Epic. fr. 30 Us.): *ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις οὐθὲν δεόμενος διὰ φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ . . . οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ φθονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς*; *Adv. Col.* 1119 DE, 1123 A, 1124 E.

[4] See Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 123; Hirzel 1877, i. 33–7; Philippson 1938, 1154; 1940, 25–6. Hirzel (p. 37) argued (implausibly, I think) that the source of Sextus' charge cannot be Posidonius *alone*, because Sextus asserts that this view was held *κατ' ἐνίους*. Nor is there the slightest evidence for Hirzel's further suggestion that the charge of impiety against Epicurus was promulgated already by the Old Stoa. With *κατ' ἐνίους* should be compared Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 85: *quamquam video nonnullis videri Epicurum . . . verbis reliquisse deos, re sustulisse* (for the purposes of argument, Cotta here accepts that Epicurus meant what he said about the gods, which *may* indicate a source different from 123, but Academic method certainly allowed its adherents to vacillate in this manner; so also Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 58, cf. 64). Diels, at *Dox.*

suggests a sceptical origin.[1] Yet all indications suggest that Philodemus' main polemic in *De pietate* is against the Stoics. Since Philodemus concludes the treatise in *P. Herc.* 1428 with an attack on the Stoics (Zeno, Chrysippus, Persaeus, and Diogenes of Babylon are specifically named) for deviously 'accommodating what the poets say to the views of the Stoics' (col. 6,16–26; Henrichs 1974*a*, 17) and for developing their own philosophical mythology, a safe bet would be that the 'detractors' mentioned below in col. 86 are Stoics contemporary with Philodemus' teacher Zeno. Diogenes of Babylon is the latest philosopher in the chronological list (see below), and his pupil Apollodorus of Athens is also explicitly named earlier in *P. Herc.* 1428 (fr. 5).[2]

The fact that the list of philosophers criticized in *De pietate* culminates in a Stoic philosopher contemporary with Philodemus' teacher Zeno, who was active at Athens around the turn of the century and who himself wrote a *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, suggests that it is Stoics of the late second and early first century BC who are the opponents foremost in Philodemus' mind in the treatise. The most important Stoic of his day, Diogenes was a contemporary and rival of Zeno of Sidon. Both men worked in Athens, both headed schools, had many students, etc. Philodemus was so devoted to Zeno that he boasts that he 'was a devoted *ἐραστής* of Zeno while he was alive, and now that he is dead I am an indefatigable *ὑμνητής* of him'.[3]

Gr. 225 and *Sibyllinische Blätter* (Berlin, 1890), 21–2, argued that the ample five books of Posidonius' *Περὶ θεῶν* were filled with lists of examples of theological views rather than argument. Since we know that Posidonius in that work ignored Epicurus' explicit views on the gods, perhaps his physical views were adduced (on someone else's authority) as an example of atheism. In any case (on Diels's assumption) Posidonius too is likely to have followed a source for the atheism of Epicurus. On the doxographic character of Posidonius' work in these areas (as borne out by his influence on the later doxographies), see most recently P. A. Vander Waerdt, 'Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology', *GRBS* 26 (1985), 373–94, who defends (at 318 n. 30) Diels's general formulation against his subsequent detractors.

[1] For the sceptical background see Obbink 1989, 202–23; for Stoics see on 297–8, 489–500.

[2] *FGrHist* 244 F 103: [*Ἀπολ|λό*]*δωρος ὁ τὰ Πε*[*ρὶ θε|ῶν*] *εἴκοσιν καὶ τέτ*|[*τα*]*ρα συντάξας καὶ τὰ* | [*πά*]*ντα σχεδὸν εἰς* | [*τα*]*ῦτ' ἀναλώσας, εἰ καὶ* | [*μ*]*άχεταί που τοῖς* | [*συ*]*νοικειοῦσιν, οὐ δι*|[, '... who compiled *On Gods* in twenty-four books, pouring virtually everything he had into this, even if he polemicizes against the "synoikeizers", (he? did) not ...' (unfortunately the text of this column breaks off here; it almost certainly went on to condemn him for some other aspect of his treatment of the gods). It is unclear whether the 'synoikeizers' against whom Apollodorus is said to have been polemicizing were poets or philosophers. He seems to have served as the transition from the criticism of the poets to that of the philosophers.

[3] Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 14 Angeli.

Many parts of Philodemus' works are based on Zeno's writings, which are frequently cited, sometimes being actual notes or reflections on Zeno's lectures he heard as a student in Athens or unpublished research by Zeno.[1] One of Philodemus' familiar working methods is to structure a work by giving an annotated list of Zeno's arguments in response to various opponents. Philodemus' book *On Frankness* (*Περὶ παρρησίας*) which itself deals with master–pupil relationships, is marked below the title as being *ἐκ τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν*, that is, based on notes 'from Zeno's classes'. Others acknowledge a debt to Zeno, for example *On Signs*, a report on a debate over logical inference from observation (or what we might call scientific method) between Stoics and Epicureans in the late second century BC. Philodemus gives us his own notes on Zeno's lectures, plus those of his fellow pupil Bromius (who he tells us had attended a different set of lectures from his own), and adding as an appendix the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia's very similar account of the same debate. Apart from his connection to his teacher Zeno, Philodemus had no personal involvement in the debate, apart of course from his recounting of it in *De signis*. Not only Zeno's arguments, but also the Stoic ones to which they are rejoinders, are known to Philodemus only from those classes in Athens.[2]

Because of Diogenes' prominence in philosophical circles at the end of the second century, he is very often the target of Zeno's attack. In adherence to Zeno and his writings, Philodemus supplies elaborate summaries of Diogenes' views, as in *De musica*. Often these summaries came at the beginnings of Philodemus' works, followed by the refutation in the succeeding and final part. A number of scholars have pointed out that the pattern summary–refutation (*recapitulatio*), can be glimpsed through the disarray in which many of the papyri have come down to us.[3] So obliging is Philodemus in this respect that the opposition's argument can often be recovered, even when the beginning of the book is missing (as is often the case in the Herculaneum papyri where there are preserved many endings of rolls but no beginnings), namely through their lemmatization in Philodemus' report of Zeno's responses.

[1] Philodemus says he drew on Zeno's information about Epicurus in writing *De pietate* (see the text below, 1466–8 = Zeno fr. 22 Angeli–Colaizzo).

[2] Sedley 1989*b*, 104, suggests that Philodemus' works should be thought of in these respects as comparable to Arrian's transcripts of Epictetus' teaching.

[3] On *recapitulatio* see Henrichs 1974*a*, 10 n. 31; Delattre 1989. A similar procedure is followed by the speakers in Cicero's *De natura deorum* in responding to each other.

After defending Epicurus against allegations of atheism in the first part of *De pietate*, Philodemus turns in the second part of the treatise (see vol. ii) to treat the works of some three dozen Greek poets and philosophers, criticizing each for the view of the gods which they are claimed (by some) to entail. In the final section of the work (*P. Herc.* 1428), a series of philosophers in chronological order beginning with the pre-Socratics is criticized for their views of the gods. The Stoics (who come last) are criticized in particular for their interpretations of the poets in support of their own theological views. The whole list ends with Diogenes of Babylon, who is chronologically the latest figure mentioned.[1] Diogenes' treatise *On Athena* is treated at some length (*P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 8,14–10,8 = *SVF* iii, Diogenes 33):[2]

Δ[ι]ογένης δ' ὁ Βαβυ|[15]*λώνιος ἐν τῶι Περὶ | τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν | κόςμον γράφει τῶι | Δ[ιὶ τ]ὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρ|[χει]ν ἢ περιέχειν |*[20] *τ[ὸ]ν Δία καθάπ[ε]ρ | ἄνθρωπ[ον ψ]υχήν· | κα[ὶ] τὸν ἥλ[ι]ον μ[ὲν] | Ἀπόλλω, [τ]ὴν δ[ὲ cε]|λήνην [Ἄρ]τεμιν· [καὶ] |*[25] *παιδα[ρι]ῶδες εἶν[αι] | θεοὺς ἀ[ν]θρωποε[ι]|δεῖς λ[έ-γει]ν καὶ ἀδύ|νατον· ε[ἴ]ν[αί] τε τοῦ | Διὸς τὸ μὲν εἰς τὴν |*[30] *θάλ[α]ττα[ν] διατε|τα[κ]ὸς Ποcε[ι]δῶ|να, τὸ δ' εἰς τὴν γῆν | Δήμητρα, τὸ δ' εἰς | τὸν ἀέρα Ἥραν, κα||θάπερ κ[αὶ τ]ὸ[ν] Πλά|τωνα λέγειν ὡς [ἔ]|ὰν πολλάκις ἀὴ[ρ λέ]||γῃ τις ἐρ[ε]ῖν Ἥρα, τ[ὸ] |*[5] *δ' εἰς τὸ[ν] α⟨ἰθ⟩έρα Ἀθη|ναῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγ[εc]||θαι τὸ "ἐκ τῆς κεφα|λῆς" καὶ "Ζεὺς ἄρρην | Ζεὺς θῆλυς"· τινὰς |*[10] *δὲ τῶν Cτωικῶν | φάcκειν ὅτι τὸ ἡγε|μονικὸν ἐν τῆι κε|φαλῆι· φρόνηcιν γὰ[ρ] | εἶναι, διὸ καὶ Μῆτιν |*[15] *καλεῖcθαι· Χρύcιπ|πον δ' ἐν τῶι cτή|[θ]ει τὸ ἡ[γ]ε-μονικὸν | [ε]ἶναι κἀκεῖ τὴν [Ἀ|θ]ηνᾶν γεγονέναι[ι |*[20] *φ]ρόνηcιν οὖcαν, τῶι | δὲ τ[ὴ]ν φωνὴν ἐκ | τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐκκρί|νεcθαι λέγειν ἐκ τῆς | κεφα[λ]ῆς, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἡ|*[25]*φαίc[του] δ[ι]ότι τ[έ]|χνῃ γίνεθ' ἡ φρόνη|cιc· καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν μὲν | οἷον Ἀθ[ρ]ηνᾶν εἰρῆ|θαι, Τ[ριτω]νί'δα' δὲ καὶ |*[30] *Τριτ[ογέ]νειαν διὰ | τὸ τὴν φρόνηcιν | ἐκ τριῶν cυνεc|τηκέναι λόγων, || τῶν φυcικῶν καὶ | τῶν [ἠ]θι-κῶ[ν] καὶ τῶν | λογικῶν· κα[ὶ τ]ὰς ἄλλας | δ' αὐτῆ[c] πρ[ο]cηγορί|*[5]*ας κα[ὶ] τὰ φορήματα | μάλ[α] καταχ[ρ]ύcως τῆι | φρονήcει cυ[ν]οικει|οῖ.*

Col. 8 (p. 82 Gomperz, *Dox. Gr.* 548–9, Henrichs 1974*a*, 19): 24 [καὶ] Hayter 25 π[αι]-δ[αριῶ]δ[ε]c Bücheler 26 d[ν̣θρω]ποε[ι]|δε[ῖ]c Sauppe 27 Bücheler 28 ε[ἴ]ν[αι Hayter 30–1 διατε|τα[κ]ὸς Spengel **Col. 9** (p. 83 Gomperz, *Dox. Gr.* 549–50, 19 Henrichs): 1–2 κ[αὶ τὸν Πλά]|τωνα Young 2 ὡς [ἔ]|ὰν Young: ὥς[τ' ἔ]|ὰν Spengel (unde Gomperz, Schober) 4 Ἥ[ρα Hayter, [τὸ] Young 5 α⟨ἰθ⟩έρα Young coll. D.L. 7. 147 (= *SVF* ii.

[1] The only figure named in *On Piety* who worked later than Diogenes is Apollodorus of Athens, who is cited for his *On Gods* in twenty-four books near the beginning of the preceding section on pre-Socratic philosophers (above, p. 17 n. 2). But he is clearly differentiated from the synoikeizing Stoics who are criticized later in *P. Herc.* 1428, and it is unclear whether he is being grouped with the philosophers or with the poets and mythographers. For Apollodorus as a possible source of Philodemus/Zeno for the poets and mythographers see p. 21 below, with n. 4.

[2] See Krische 1840, 482–94; Dumont 1984; Henrichs 1974*a*, 19–20 (cf. Tieleman 1992).

1021) 7 κεφα]λῆς Petersen 18–19 [Ἀ|θ]ηνᾶν Young 25 Ἡ[φ]αίς[του et [δι]ότι Sauppe 26 γί]νεθ' Bücheler 28 Ἀθ[ρ]ηνᾶν Spengel coll. Corn. *De nat. deor.* 20 29 Τριτω]νίδα Petersen 30 Young, διὰ om. apogr., suppl. Hayter **Col. 10** (p. 84 Gomperz, *Dox. Gr.* 550, 20 Henrichs): 1 φ[υσικῶ]ν Hayter 4 αὐτ[ῆς Young 4–5 προς]-ηγορί]ας Petersen

Testimonia: *P.Herc.* 1428 col. 9: vv. 1–4: cf. Plat. *Crat.* 404 c εἰ πολλάκις λέγοις τὸ τῆς Ἥρας ὄνομα 7–8: cf. Hes. *Theog.* 924, Schol. Ap. Rhod. 4. 1310 = Stesich. fr. 56 *PMG* 233 Page = *PMGF* 274 Davies, Ibycus fr. 17 *PMG* 298 Page = *PMGF* 298 Davies, Pind. *Ol.* 7. 65 sqq. 8–9: deest in Orph. fr., cf. Orph. fr. 21a v. 4 = fr. 168 v. 3; West, *Orphic Poems*, pp. 218–19 9–col. 10,8 *SVF* ii. 910

Diogenes of Babylon in his book *On Athena* says that the cosmos is the same as Zeus, or it contains him as a man does a soul; and that the sun is Apollo, the moon Artemis; and that anthropomorphic gods are a childish and impossible story; and that the part of Zeus which extends into the sea is Poseidon, that which extends into the earth Demeter, that which extends into the air Hera, (col. 9) as (he says) Plato also says, so that if one says *aer* repeatedly he will say Hera; and that which extends into the aether Athena; this is what is meant by 'from the head' and 'Zeus is male, Zeus is female'; but that some of the Stoics say the ruling faculty of the will is in the head, for it is the wisdom, and therefore is called Metis; but that Chrysippus says that the ruling element of the soul is in the breast, and that Athena, who is wisdom, was born there, but (Diogenes says that) it is because the voice issues from the head (that) they (i.e. people) say (that Athena was born) from the head (i.e. of Zeus), and (that they say that she was born) with the help of Hephaestus because wisdom comes by art (*techne*); and that the name Athena is as though one were to say *Athrena*, and that she is called Tritonis and Tritogeneia because wisdom has three branches, (col. 10) physics, ethics, and logic. And he allegorizes as 'wisdom' her other epithets and manifestations very deceptively.

In *On Athena* Diogenes defended at length Chrysippus' view that the ruling part of the soul resides in the chest, and that a vast array of types of speech (φωνή), including myths told by poets, offer evidence for this positioning of the *hegimonikon*. From Galen's treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* we know many of the numerous quotations from the poets they adduced (Galen says they numbered in the thousands).[1]

From Galen we also know (3. 8. 8–19, Hesiod fr. 343 M.–W.) that Chrysippus and his defender Diogenes used a text of Hesiod's *Theogony* that was radically different from the one we have. Some of the passages from the poets criticized by Philodemus earlier in *On Piety* can be correlated with Diogenes' views as described by Philodemus in

[1] *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 3. 176. 7, 3. 182. 9; Obbink 1992*b*, 221–2. For the text see Phillip De Lacy, *Galeni de placitis Hippocratis et Platonis libri I–V* (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum V 4,1,2; Berlin, 1978).

the summary quoted above; many, if not all, were probably cited by Diogenes in defence of his position in his book *On Athena* (especially about the birth of Athena from Zeus' head)[1] or by earlier Stoics like Zeno and Chrysippus named by Philodemus in *P. Herc.* 1428. If so, Philodemus (or his teacher Zeno) did not consult all the literary works he seems to be familiar with in *On Piety*. Instead, he was responding point for point, more or less engaging in unstated polemic with Diogenes of Babylon or his Stoic followers.[2] The correspondences between Philodemus' mythography in *On Piety* and that of Apollodorus of Athens set forth by Albert Henrichs and others[3] are easily explained through the discovery of this common source: according to the doxographical tradition, Apollodorus was a student of Diogenes[4] who perpetuated the Stoic treatments of myth inaugurated by Zeno and augmented, as Philodemus tells us, by Cleanthes and Persaeus, but in the proportions exhibited in *De pietate*, only by Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon.

Some of Diogenes' prominence in the books from Herculaneum

[1] In Cicero's summary at *De nat. deor.* 1.41 of Philodemus' account of Diogenes (quoted above) it is Athena's birth that is singled out for mention: *quem* (sc. *Chrysippum*) *Diogenes Babylonius consequens in eo libro qui inscribitur de Minerva partum Iovis ortumque virginis ad physiologiam traducens deiungit a fabula.* Cicero summarizes the Epicurean criticism of the poets (*De nat. deor.* 1.42) immediately following the mention of Diogenes' *De Minerva* at 1.41, a collocation which can scarcely be coincidental, given that it is out of sequence in respect to his presumed exemplar: in *On Piety* the criticism of the poets precedes that of the philosophers. In Cicero's classification of poetic misrepresentations of the gods (1.42) Diogenes' original material and grouping may perhaps be glimpsed: (1) *et ira inflammatos et libidine furentis deos*, (2) *bella proelia pugnas vulnera* (note the asyndetic catalogue style), (3) *odia praeterea discidia discordias*, (4) *ortus* (including Athena's? cf. 1.41 *ortumque virginis*) *interitus*, (5) *querellas lamentationes*, (6) *effusas in omni intemperantia libidines*, (7) *adulteria vincula*, (8) *cum humano genere concubitus mortalisque ex inmortali procreatos.* (Ax compares Sallustius 3 Nock *ἀλλὰ διὰ τί μοιχείας καὶ κλοπὰς καὶ πατέρων δεσμοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀτοπίαν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις εἰρήκασιν;*) Cicero's list obviously reflects the polemical bias of his Epicurean source, but all have in common that they illustrate the passions: Diogenes' *On Athena* may have been a treatise on psychology rather than theology.

[2] At the beginning of the section on the poets (see the text below, ll. 2480–9) Philodemus announces that he is going to survey 'the theologues and poets especially praised by those who attack us for setting forth views impious and disadvantageous to mankind'. The catalogue of poets is then prefaced by a warning (2496–2501) to his reader not to expect too much accuracy with regard to names and titles in the citations, ostensibly out of false modesty or impatience with matters of poetry (2503–10), but perhaps acknowledging his borrowings and disclaiming responsibility for any errors they may contain, since his knowledge of them is not at first hand.

[3] Henrichs 1975*a*, developing the thesis of Dietze 1896.

[4] The main evidence is Ps.-Scymnus 10–14 (*SVF* 3 Diogenes 11). See H. von Arnim, 'Diogenes (45)', in *RE* v (1905), 773–6 at 774. On the Stoicism of Apollodorus of Athens see F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* Teil II B (Leiden, 1962), 758–61; Henrichs 1975*a*, 15–19.

may be due to the pivotal position he occupied in the transmission of Greek philosophical and literary culture to Republican Rome. This is at least suggested by the common interest in him exhibited him by Cicero and Philodemus. Diogenes himself had visited Rome within recent historical memory, an event aluded to more than once by Cicero.[1] About 16 August 45 BC Cicero, busy at work on *De natura deorum*, wrote to Atticus asking him to send post haste two books, the titles of which have been mutilated in the manuscripts, but which we are now generally agreed by editors to be the *Περὶ θεῶν* of the Epicurean Phaedrus[2] and the famous book *Περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνῆς* by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (*Att.* 13. 39. 2):[3]

libros mihi de quibus ad te antea scripsi velim mittas et maxime *Φαίδρου Περὶ θεῶν* et ⟨*Διογένους Περὶ*⟩ *Παλλάδος*.

θεῶν Victorius: OCΩN codd.; ⟨*Διογένους Περὶ*⟩ Shackleton Bailey; *Παλλάδος* Orelli: ΠΑΛΙΔΟC PMm: CIΑΛΙΑΟC R

Whereas Philodemus calls Diogenes' book *Περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς*, and at *De nat. deor.* 1. 41 it is *De Minerva*, it has now become *Περὶ Παλλάδος*. But it is easy to see the reason for Cicero's forms of reference: in *De Pietate* Philodemus discusses Athena's poetic epithets (e.g. *Παλλάς*) at some length:[4]

α⟨ἰ⟩γίδος μ[..... ἔ-
νιοι δὲ τὴν Ἀ[θη-
⟨ν⟩ᾶν Παλλάδα [τιθέ-
⟨ν⟩αι φασὶν ὅτι Πα[λλά-
δα τὴν Παλαμ[άο-
νος ἑαυτῆς ὀπ[α-
δὸν οὖσαν ἄκο[υ-
σα δ[ι]έφθειρεν. τ[ού-
τους [δ'] ἐταρτά[ρω||σαν

N 242 3 (*HV*² II 33, p. 6 Gomperz, 268 Philippson, Schober 1988, 81): continet inf. part. columnae; desunt 21 vv. 1–9 iterum tractavit Henrichs 1975, 30 coll. *N* 433 4,7 de Palamaone 1 fort. α⟨ἰ⟩γίδει, post δ *cιμ* vel *cυμ N*: *χρῆcθαι ἀντὶ*] | α[ἰ]γίδος [*μέλλουcα* Philippson 2 Nauck 3 *τιθέ*]|⟨*ν*⟩*αι* *: *κεκλῆc*]|⟨*θ*⟩*αι* spatio longius Nauck 4–8 Nauck 8 init. ante *cα* paragraphus *N* 8–9 τ[*ού*]||*τους* *, *τούc* spatio brevius Schober 9 Gomperz: *τουc*ʳ ˈ*εταρ N*: an *τοὺc* [*δ*]*ὲ ταρτα*[*ρωθέντας*?

Testimonia: 242 3: v. 2: eadem fere de Pallade Tritonis filia narrat Apollod. 3. 12, 3, 4 sqq.

[1] See *GRBS* 32 (1991), 389–96. [2] On Phaedrus see Raubitschek 1949 = 1991.

[3] *Att.* 13. 39. 2. See D. R. Shackleton Bailey's Teubner edition (Stuttgart, 1987), where his conjecture ⟨*Διογένους περὶ*⟩ *Παλλάδος* appears in the *apparatus criticus*. However, the editor assures me (*per litteras*) that he considers it 'pretty certain'.

[4] On the text see Henrichs 1975*a*, 29–34.

... of her shield (*word missing*). And some say that (the poets) portray Athena as Pallas because she accidently killed Palamaon's daughter Pallas who was her servant. And these they imprisoned in Tartarus...

If Diogenes dealt with poetic treatments of Athena (as I think we are obliged to assume he did from the passage summarizing his views, quoted above), an alternative title in Cicero's form *Περὶ Παλλάδος* would be unexceptionable.

A potential objection to this scenario is that the day before (*c.* 15 August 45) Cicero says that he was already writing *contra Epicureos* (13. 38. 1), indicating that he had already finished the pro-Epicurean section and begun Cotta's refutation.[1] But *De nat. deor.* 1. 41[2] follows Philodemus (*P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 8,14–10,8, quoted above, p. 19) so closely as to make one doubt whether Cicero had Diogenes' book when he wrote that.[3]

[1] *contra Epicureos* must refer specifically to Cotta's refutation in *De nat. deor.* 1. 57–124, for the following reasons. (1) Cicero was composing *De nat. deor.* at the time. (2) It cannot mean *De nat. deor.* as a whole, for books 2 and 3 concern the Epicureans very little, being given over to debate between Stoics and Academics. (3) Although Cicero's plan and intention all along was no doubt that book 1 should show the Epicureans worsted in argument, the phrase cannot refer to book 1 as a whole, since the Epicurean Velleius' speech (1. 8–56) occupies over a third of the book. To take it as including or actually referring to Velleius' avowedly *pro Epicureis* speech is perverse, requiring as it does of Cicero a sense of subtlety about his work beyond capability or necessity. This leaves only Cotta's speech as appropriately *contra Epicureos*. (4) Nor can Cicero have written Cotta's speech first, and later (i.e. later than *c.* 15 Aug. 45, the date of *Att.* 13. 38, after perhaps having received the required books of Diogenes and Phaedrus) inserted the speech of Velleius, for the reason that Cotta's speech is truly a refutation, responding to Velleius' exposition point for point, and quoting from it.

[2] Quoted above, p. 21 n. 1.

[3] See further vol. ii, introd. Put another way, *Att.* 13. 38 gives us the *terminus post quem non* of August 45 for the composition of *De nat. deor.* 1. 25–41, and thus for the composition of Philodemus' *On Piety*. This chronology, incidentally, also rules out the possibility (for which see Henrichs 1974*a*, 10) that our *De pietate* from Herculaneum is in fact the *Περὶ θεῶν* of Phaedrus, since it entails that Cicero wrote *De nat. deor.* 1. 15–41 (which appears to follow the Herculaneum *De pietate*) before he wrote *Att.* 13. 38. 2 requesting Phaedrus' book.

2. The Papyrus

(*a*) *Condition*

> The papyri continued for many years to lie neglected in the Museum of Portici, forgotten by the idle, and regretted by the learned.
>
> Drummond and Walpole 1810, ii

The Herculaneum papyrus roll containing the first part of *De pietate* is one of those originally opened by cutting through the hard outer layers of papyrus with a knife, then splitting the roll lengthwise down the centre into two halves. Each half was subsequently numbered mistakenly as a separate roll. As a result, separate series of (originally alternating) columns are preserved as *P. Herc.* 1077, first unrolled in 1787 and later transcribed under the supervision of the Revd John Hayter,[1] and as *P. Herc.* 1098, unrolled by Italian technicians in 1825, long after Hayter's departure from Naples.[2] A substantial portion of any column which lay in the path of the incision when the roll was opened is missing because of the physical damage incurred in this process. The outermost layers of one half of the the papyrus roll, being naturally more fully carbonized and congealed and so inseparable, still survive today. In the Herculaneum rolls, the innermost, protected layers of papyrus (or *midollo*, the 'marrow') were normally the best preserved.

The overall condition of the papyrus is very poor.[3] The surviving

[1] The first three fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077 were drawn in pen and ink in Naples some time between 1787 and 1790. Hayter brought these with him away from Naples when he departed. The remaining twenty columns were transcribed in 1809, more or less immediately after Hayter's departure from Naples under somewhat dubious circumstances: he absconded with all the apographs that had been produced by the Italian draughtsmen up to that time, the production of which he had been appointed to oversee by the Prince of Wales (later George IV), with the co-operation of the Bourbon government. The errant transcriptions were later installed in the Bodleian and became the Oxonian apographs. Undaunted, the Bourbons once reinstated proceeded to redraw all the surviving papyri: hence the two sets of apographs (*O* and *N*). On Hayter's activities see Indelli 1980; Longo 1980; Capasso 1991, 101–3, 106. It may be added that probably to Hayter belongs the credit of having assigned inventory numbers to each of the papyri, and thus for having produced the first complete inventory of the collection: see below, p. 29 n. 1.

[2] These contain the majority of the columns of the first part of *De pietate*. Short sequences of the text pass under a dozen different inventory numbers. For a list of the papyri of the second part of *De pietate* see Schober 1988, 67.

[3] An impression of the physical condition of the papyrus can be gained from Pls. 2–4 and

fragments are of the type termed *scorze* by the Italian technicians (e.g. Pls. 2–3); that is, they consist of individual, fragile pieces of 'bark' peeled from the inside of the papyrus roll after it has been broken apart, or the outer 'rind' of the papyrus roll that remains after such a process (e.g. Pl. 7).[1] The papyrus is substantially carbonized, brittle to the touch, and of a dark charcoal colour, resembling somewhat the surface of charred paper or grass-cloth. Traces of writing become visible only when, if held to the light at varying angles, the dull carbon-base ink begins to iridesce on the surface of the papyrus. Problems of reading are compounded by the fact (totally obscured in photography) that the surface of the papyrus is badly rippled and warped. Since all previous attempts to relax such *scorze* have ended in disaster, the traces of writing must be visually traced up and down courses of deep rills and ridges. The use of a binocular microscope, and in some cases special lighting and photographic techniques, are required.

The process (known as *scorzatura*) of 'unrolling' the congealed layers of each half of the broken papyrus roll actually consisted in transcribing the column of writing open to view on the exposed, inner layer, then removing that layer of papyrus in order to get to the next layer of writing underneath. The brittle, carbonized condition of the papyrus made it impossible in most cases (given the technology available at the time) to preserve intact the layer of papyrus when it was removed, a fact which accounts for the small number of actual papyri of *De pietate* which survive today. Thus the fragments that survive are usually the last ones in their series to be transcribed, and exhibit on the verso the diaphanous membrane that was glued to the back of the *scorza* to keep it from disintegrating during the process of transcription. Sometimes additional, unremoved layers (*sottoposti*) lie intact underneath the last exposed layer. Not infrequently in the case of such fragments, the uppermost layers become separated from the lower layers over the passage of time. This phenomenon may have been caused by the fluctuation in climatological conditions in the Biblioteca Nazionale,

7; cf. the photograph of *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 9–11 published in Cavallo 1983, tav. 25, which, however, fails to capture its colour and texture. For a description of the modern photographic process required, see K. Kleve in *CErc* 2 (1972), 106–7; 3 (1973), 117–18; 17 (1987), 141–3.

[1] e.g. Pls. 2–3. The only exception in the case of *De pietate* is *P. Herc.* 1428 (Henrichs 1974*a*), consisting of the final fifteen continuous columns of the treatise, the *midollo* of the roll which contained the second part of *De pietate* (Pl. 8). For what the rolls look like before they are opened see Pl. 1.

geo-seismic factors, unauthorized interference with the surface of the *scorza* by readers, or even simply by moving the *cassetto* in order to facilitate access, so that *scorze* sometimes multiply over time in the boxes (*cassetti*) in which they are conserved. Sometimes once visible texts simply vanish, because the exposed layer of the extremely thin papyrus disintegrates, leaving in its place sometimes a mysterious heap of dust, sometimes a new text on the underlying layers where twenty years before there had been a different one. This ghostly process sometimes leaves additional *scorze* strewn carelessly about in the *cassetto*.

The Oxonian and Neapolitan apographs (*O* and *N* respectively)—the pencil-drawn facsimiles produced during the unrolling process—are discussed in (*e*) below. In their present mountings, the extant papyrus fragments (too brittle to be housed between sheets of glass in accordance with the normal procedure) are attached by epoxy to heavy cardboard sheets called *cornici*, which are in turn housed in glass-topped boxes (*cassetti*) to protect the exposed surface of the papyri. Unfortunately, the fragments of *De Pietate* have further deteriorated (i.e. suffered in legibility as a result of the crumbling of the papyrus and the fading of traces of ink), not only since the time of their transcription in the early part of the nineteenth century, but even since the first decades of the twentieth (see (*e*) below).

(*b*) *The Editions*

Modern editorial work on *De pietate* began at a time when (with the sole exception of Philodemus' *De musica*) no papyrus written in Greek had been seen since the close of antiquity. Although papyri in Egyptian and Demotic were known, they could not yet be read, and the rush for Egyptian papyri written in Greek came later. Investigators proceeded with hesitation. When the first apographs of *De pietate* were made in 1787, there yet existed no edited text of a Greek papyrus (cf. Turner 1980, 18–19).

Hayter himself, although he prepared an edition and translation of the concluding columns of *De pietate* during the years 1802–6,[1] never

[1] Hayter concentrates exclusively on *P. Herc.* 1428, the famous critique of Stoic theology, which was relatively well preserved as the *midollo* of a roll and thus contains its conclusion and *subscriptio*. His edition, together with a Latin translation and commentary, is preserved in MS at Oxford; his edition of the text of *P. Herc* 1428 was published anonymously in Drummond and Walpole 1810. It was the subject of much publicity and opprobrium, due in part to the extraordinarily critical review also published anonymously in *Quarterly Review*

edited any portion of the first part. The earliest editorial work on that part was done by an Italian scholar, Bernardo Quaranta, who in 1824 was commissioned to produce an edition with commentary of *De pietate* as vol. vii of the *Collectio prior Herculanensium voluminum*.[1] Quaranta, working from more of the original papyri than now survive,[2] had a decided advantage over all subsequent editors. He identified and regrouped (on grounds of palaeography, content, and format) most of the dispersed segments of *De pietate*.[3] By the time his work was complete—over thirty-five years later—the plan of the *Collectio prior* had been discontinued altogether, in favour of the procedure followed in the *Collectio altera* of simply printing engravings of the Naples apographs alone. Thus the projected vol. vii of *HV*[1] was never printed; portions of Quaranta's handwritten edition with Latin translation and commentary are preserved in manuscript at Naples in the Officina dei Papiri.[4] Its importance lies in its value as secondary testimony to the

(Young 1810). The author of the review was Thomas Young. A physician, president of the Royal Society, and an intimate of Richard Porson's perhaps best known for his part in the decipherment of the Rosetta Stone, Young had a passion for anonymity. (The signed manuscript of the Review written in Young's hand was recently discovered among his papers: McIlwaine 1988, 521–3 esp. 523.) For the editorial tradition of *P. Herc.* 1428 see Henrichs 1972*a* and 1974*a*, where Young's readings and supplements are designated in the apparatus criticus as 'Anon. I'. On Young's extraordinary career see W. R. Dawson and E. P. Uphill, *Who was who in Egyptology*[2] (London, 1972), 312–14.

[1] For an account of Quaranta's work see Bassi 1911; Rispoli 1987; Capasso 1991, 106–7, 247–8. For nearly a century after the discovery of the Herculaneum papyri, the Neapolitan editors chose to delay the publication of each roll until a ponderous commentary, often of little or no philological value, had been prepared to accompany it. Meanwhile Quaranta exercised a kind of monopoly over the texts, and this accounts in part for the scant interest in the remainder of *De pietate* in comparison to that shown in the first part of the work popularized by Hayter *et al.* in the English-speaking world in the years preceding 1863 (but see p. 29 n. 2).

[2] *P. Herc.* 1098, for example, which contains nearly half of the first part of *De pietate*, and *P. Herc.* 1610 were not 'unrolled' (i.e. subjected to *scorzatura*) and copied until 1825, a year after Quaranta began work on the text. The papyri of *P. Herc.* 229, 242, and 247, and many of the *scorze* from the second part of *De pietate* were still extant in 1830. Quaranta will undoubtedly have consulted with the copyist, C. Malesci, in the preparation of his text, and checked his own text, if not the Naples apographs as well, against the papyri.

[3] First notice in the 'Ragguaglio' (signed O.K.) in *Annali Civili del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, 8 (1834), 73–5 = *Bullettino dell'Instituto di Corrispondenza Archeologica*, 7 (1835), 46, which ascribes the task of assembling the various pieces (not named) of *De pietate* to Quaranta and F. M. Avellino (then *Segretario perpetuo* of the Accademia Ercolanese); on the latter see Scatozza 1987*a*. Quaranta's selection (though not his order) of texts is identical to that printed in *HV*[2] II. The *Catalogo dei papiri ercolanesi* credits Quaranta for the ascription of most of these texts to *De pietate*.

[4] According to Bassi 1911, a second copy of Quaranta's manuscript was in his day kept at the Accademia di Archeologia, though I was unable to locate it there. The decision to

text contemporary with the apographs.[1] It is significant, however, that Quaranta (either by inference or from actual knowledge of the physical constitution of the roll) realized that *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 were not independent and connecting series of papyri but interrelated columns from a single roll; unfortunately he did not in the end discern their proper order and in his edition the columns appear integrated almost at random.[2] Gomperz was either unaware of the existence of Quaranta's work,[3] or chose to ignore it. Apart from a passing reference, Philippson (with characteristic disregard for the editorial tradition) makes no use of his work.[4] The significance of Quaranta's observation has thus been neither noticed nor appreciated.[5]

The first published edition of *De pietate* as a whole is, strictly speaking, the collected Naples facsimiles engraved on copperplate and published in Naples in 1863 as *Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt, collectio altera*, vol. ii. This collection omits several key fragments preserved among the Oxford apographs (then unpublished),[6] as well as

suspend publication of Quaranta's ill-fated edition was due to Minervini (see p. 29 n. 2), who immediately proceeded with the publication of the Neapolitan engravings in *HV*² II. The decision coincided roughly with the fall of the Bourbon government upon unification in 1860; Quaranta had been a favourite of the Bourbon regime. In his edition, as was standard practice in the *Collectio prior*, words are separated and restored letters are printed as though they were actually preserved on the papyrus. In his handwritten MSS, however, he was careful to distinguish restored letters by pointing each with red ink. I am grateful to Marcello Gigante and Giovanni Indelli for supplying photocopies of Quaranta's papers and for providing clarifications in Quaranta's inscrutable hand when I collated them in the original.

[1] Especially for *P. Herc.* 1098, portions of 229, and for those portions of the text extant on papyrus today, which were probably more legible in Quaranta's day than at present. For the unfortunate fate of his papers (they were never found) on *P. Herc.* 1428, which, if they survived, might have corroborated one of the conjectures for the title and authorship of the work, see Bassi 1911; Rispoli 1987, 526 n. 67.

[2] A complete list of the fragments edited by Quaranta in the order in which they appear in his edition and a sample of his editorial skills is given by Bassi 1911, 140–1. Some successions appear to be dictated by vague verbal resemblances or (less often) content. But it is significant that in Quaranta's ordering, the individual fragments of separate series (1077, 1098, 229) alternate with each other as though interrelated parts of a single, continuous text.

[3] Although, with all deference to that eminent scholar, I doubt it, since he elsewhere demonstrated an intimate acquaintance with the history of the Herculaneum papyri and the Accademia Ercolanese. On the other hand, Gomperz visited Naples, for the first time, in 1867, after the publication of his edition of *De pietate* in *Herculanische Studien* (see Dorandi 1993, xvi), so that he never saw Quaranta's manuscript.

[4] Philippson 1920, 226 and n. 1.

[5] See further (*c*) below.

[6] i.e. O 1077 frr. 1–3. Also omitted from the first part of *De pietate* in *HV*² II were the fragments of of 437 = *HV*² IX (1874), 117–20, those of 452 (ined.) and one fragment from 1788 = *HV*² VIII (1873), 62; and from the second part: the fragments of 1602 = *HV*² VIII

transmitting numerous inaccuracies and errors of detail and spacing introduced by conjecture or error in the engraving process. For this reason, it must be used with caution; I have collated it as a secondary witness to the text (rather than as an edition) because more of the papyri of *De pietate* were available to its preparers than now exist. Unfortunately it became the basis for all subsequent editions of *De pietate*. The Naples editors make no attempt to ascertain the original order in which the different pieces followed one another. *P. Herc.* 1428, known to be a *midollo* and the end of a roll, is placed *first* in the volume, and the rest of the papyri (i.e. those texts regrouped by Quaranta) follow in the ascending order of their inventory numbers. This order, of course, reflects nothing except the chaos and confusion in which the individual pieces have come down to us.[1]

On the basis of the published Naples facsimiles,[2] the first proper edition of any portion of the first part of *De pietate* was published by Leonhard Spengel in 1864. In conjunction with *P. Herc.* 1428 (the criticism of the Stoics), he presented a restored text of two columns of *P. Herc.* 229 (from the account of cultural history in the first part of the treatise).[3] He wrongly assumed the existence of an Oxonian copy of these columns, in addition to that of the Neapolitan. The columns

(1873), 101–7, several fragments from 1428 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 81 n. 37), 1692, and O 1815 (so Luppe 1974, 193–202; id. 1975, 143–4; but see Henrichs 1974*b*, 302–4; cf. A. Angeli *et al.*, *CErc* 8 (1978), 159; Angeli 1983, 611–12; Dorandi 1990*a*, 2354 n. 13).

[1] Inventory numbers were arbitrarily assigned to all the Herculaneum papyri, whether whole rolls or unidentified and ungrouped pieces of broken rolls, under Hayter's direction during 'l'epoca del cappellano inglese' (1802–6), and the numbering of individual fragments of each inventoried item followed subsequently: neither Piaggio (who died in 1796) nor his predecessors ever mention any of the papyri by inventory number (private communication from Mario Capasso, 16 Nov. 1993). The papyri given by Ferdinand IV to Napoleon in 1802 (now *P. Herc. Paris*; see *SIFC*[3] 7 (1989), 3–6) bore no inventory numbers (presumably because the collection had not yet been inventoried). The papyri of the recently identified copy of Lucretius (K. Kleve, *CErc* 19 (1989), 5–27) also have no inventory number: but since they were found lying among 'a heap of loose *pezzi* in the *cassetto*' (no. CXIV: op. cit. p. 5) I suspect that they were once at least grouped under some inventory number.

[2] Capasso 1986, 150 quotes a letter from Minervini (*Ispettore della Sezione Numismatica ed Epigrafia* of the National Museum), regarding his decision to suspend publication of Quaranta's ill-fated edition of *De pietate* and print instead (as *HV*[2] II) the copperplate facsimiles (*rami*) of the Naples *disegni* (addressed to the Consiglio di Direzione of the Museum in August 1862), which gives some impression of the urgency with which the text was awaited by the scholarly community, and how few scholars had actually had access to it previously: 'Dovendosi procedere alla pubblicazione del secondo volume de' papiri Ercolanesi, io ho prescelto il celebre trattato di Filodemo *intorno la Religione*, che si aspetta da piú di trent'anni da tutti i dotti di Europa.' On Minervini see further Scatozza 1987*b*.

[3] Spengel 1864, 150–2. The columns Spengel edited were *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 5 (col. 75) and fr. 6 (col. 71).

from *P. Herc.* 229 were carefully chosen by Spengel for what he took to be their representation of the positive theology of Epicurus, in contrast to the criticism of other philosophers in *P. Herc.* 1428. Spengel was the first scholar to speak of 'der dogmatische Theil der epikureischen Theologie' in *De pietate*, and cited in comparison the corresponding thematic division at Cicero *De nat. deor.* 1. 43.[1]

The early editions of *De pietate*, produced as they were during the formation of the first great collections of the fragmentary poets and philosophers, concentrate their editorial efforts on the famous critique of poets and philosophers contained in the second part of the treatise, in contrast to the 'dogmatischer Teil.' Thus the editions of Sauppe[2] and Nauck[3] significantly advanced work on the criticism of the poets, as did those of Petersen and Krische[4] on the criticism of philosophers. Petersen and Nauck both raised the significant possibility that Phaedrus may have been the author of the treatise.[5] But none of these scholars treated any portion of the first, philosophical part of *De pietate*. Franz Bücheler, however, building on the work of these commentators, was the first to give an account of the treatise as a whole, and in his edition[6] included some of the better-preserved portions of the first part of *De pietate*, where he was able to make some continuous sense out of the Neapolitan engravings. His text consists of brief sections of broken sentences and (more often) phrases, wrenched out of context and interlarded with brief comments. These sections he arranges where possible on the basis of context, thus abandoning the order of the Naples engravings, sometimes even when it represents the original order of columns in the treatise. Bücheler theorized[7] (by inference from the content of the fragments) that the original treatise was divided into three parts: first, 'der Volksglaube und die Mythen über die Götter', in which he included the criticism of the poets; second, 'die Religionsvorstellungen der griechischen Philosophen' from the pre-Socratics to the Stoics (*P. Herc.* 1428); and third, 'die Epikureische Auffassung der εὐσέβεια'. On the basis of the final column of *P. Herc.* 1428,[8] he inferred that the third part followed upon the second, but suggests an alternative plan of organization for the

[1] Spengel 1864, 149. [2] Sauppe 1864*a*. [3] Nauck 1864.

[4] Petersen 1833; Krische 1840. Both were produced before the publication of the Neapolitan apographs in *HV*² II, and are therefore solely dependent on the text of Hayter in Drummond and Walpole 1810 and its reviews.

[5] Petersen 1833; Nauck 1864, 191–3 (= ii.585–7); cf. Henrichs 1972*a*, 81 n. 37.

[6] Bücheler 1865, 535–41 (= 605–12).

treatise as a whole: namely, that the critique of poets and mythology may have originally followed upon this third division, as a part of 'die Darstellung der Epikureischen Lehre'.[1]

The edition of Gomperz in 1866 represents a marked advance over the previous work on *De pietate*, in so far as it renders tractable a greater portion of the text than before, under the scrutiny of a learned historian of philosophy with a good command of the Greek language.[2] Gomperz scrupulously presents the text column by column, pays close attention to format (i.e. line length and column dimensions), and offers numerous well-judged if conservative restorations. Perhaps following a lead by Spengel,[3] he divides the treatise into two parts, the first critical, the second constructive or 'dogmatic'.[4] His reasons, however, for this division and for his ordering of the fragments within each part were reserved for his promised commentary, which was never completed.[5] From the final column and

[1] Bücheler 1865, 514 (= 582): 'Daß der dritte Teil dem zweiten nachfolgte, liegt in der Natur der Dinge und erhellt überdies aus dem Schluß von [*HV*² II] Taf. 22. Ob dagegen, was ich als ersten Teil setzte, selbständig und für sich ausgeführt, oder *vielmehr in die Darstellung der Epikureischen Lehre eingeflochten war*, kann ich nicht bestimmen' (my italics). Since Bücheler understood *παραγράφειν* at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,13–23 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 25) to mean 'add on', 'append', his alternative suggestion for the reconstruction of the treatise is: (1) criticism of philosophers (*P. Herc.* 1428), to which is added (2) the Epicurean philosophical part, directly followed by (3) the criticism of poets. To my knowledge Bücheler's suggestion that the criticism of poets was originally connected to the Epicurean philosophical part has never received serious consideration.

[2] Gomperz 1866, Zweiter Hauptheil 91–151, 'Darlegung und Rechtfertigung der epikureischen Lehren von der Frömmigkeit'. See also his preliminary study of *De pietate* in his review of *HV*² II (Gomperz 1864). The texts presented there were revised in his edition of 1866.

[3] Spengel 1864, 149. It is unlikely that while preparing his edition Gomperz had much acquaintance with the work of Bücheler or his theory of the organization of the treatise.

[4] However, 'dogmatische' has different connotations from 'dogmatic' in English. The contrast between 'dogmatic' and sceptical philosophical schools is not natural to the English word, nor does even this properly express the true contrast between the two parts of the treatise. Gomperz meant 'doctrinal' (in the sense of a positive exposition, in contrast to the direct criticism of philosophers and poets in the second part), but this is only partly true of these texts. As an indicator of subject and literary theme, 'apologetic' is a better designation for the first part of the treatise. For in it the author rebuts the criticisms of his opponents which he recounts as he goes along.

[5] In Gomperz's edition of *De pietate*, the texts of the first, philosophical part are placed second, following the critique of poets and philosophers. *P. Herc.* 229 is placed last of all, following *P. Herc.* 1610. But in his brief preface to the volume he explains (p. xi) that on further consideration there were actually better grounds for placing *P. Herc.* 229 first among the texts of the 'dogmatic' part: 'Zu spät den Irrthum zu berichtigen habe ich erkannt daß die Gründe welche mich bestimmten den Papyrus 229 den Nummern 1077, 1098 und 1610 folgen zu lassen durch andere, mindestens ebenso triftige, Gegengründe aufgewogen werden und es gerathener war dieses Stück an die Spitze der Ueberreste des zweiten—

subscriptio of *P. Herc.* 1428, Gomperz infers that the two parts (or books) of the treatise must each have occupied a separate papyrus roll.[1]

Unfortunately Gomperz based his edition not on the papyri themselves, whether extant or lost, but on the unreliable engravings of the Naples apographs printed in *HV*² II. Consequently he sometimes prints an erroneous text when a look at the papyrus or the original Naples apograph would have told him the right reading.[2] Gomperz edited for the first time three fragments from *P. Herc.* 1077 preserved in Oxford and not included in *HV*² II.[3] But he failed to join one of these columns with its following column (hidden among those texts labelled *P. Herc.* 1098). As a result he made no progress toward reconstructing the original order of columns. Further, in his edition Gomperz somewhat unscrupulously relegates to the critical apparatus not only individual words, but whole lines and sections of text when he failed to make sense of the Naples engravings, thus often giving the false impression of a continuous thought or complete sentence where in fact there was none. Nevertheless, Gomperz's edition, in spite of these flaws, was a monumental work of scholarship and erudition, and up to now has served as the 'reference' edition for the treatise.[4]

In an article published in 1883,[5] Walter Scott re-edited a selection

dogmatischen—Theils zu stellen.' But his reasons for this suggestion (almost certainly wrong) are not further unexplained. I offer a plausible explanation in (*c*) below, p. 51 n. 1.

[1] See Gomperz's letter to Diels in *Dox. Gr.* 529–30.

[2] On three occasions Gomperz visited the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi where the papyri and original *disegni* are housed, but not for the first time until 1867 after the publication of his edition. Thus he consulted neither the papyri themselves nor the original Neapolitan *disegni*, though he did carefully collate at his home the Oxonian apographs (and perhaps Hayter's papers in the Bodleian) by means of a private copy made for him by the Revd J. J. Cohen (see letter cit. n. 1; Capasso 1983, 68; Dorandi 1993, Einleitung). He is also careful to note in his edition when he prints a letter editorially changed from the reading of the engraving in *HV*² II. Such letters appear in his edition in slanted Greek (not easily distinguished from the other Greek letters, and usually missed or ignored by users of his text). The present edition follows Gomperz's procedure in clearly designating such changed letters (where the papyrus does not exist to verify the correction) by means of sublinear asterisks (see the System of Presentation, below).

[3] Gomperz also printed at the end of his volume engraved the tracings of these Oxford facsimiles. The 'primo foglio' of Gomperz's engravings later appeared as Taf. 4 in W. Wattenbach, *Schrifttafeln zur Geschichte der griechischen Schrift und zum Studium der griechischen Palaeographie* (Berlin, 1876).

[4] Gomperz himself was careful to refer to his edition as a 'Versuch einer kritisch-exegetischen Gesammt-Bearbeitung' (Gomperz 1866, x).

[5] Scott 1883, 232–43. Scott, a fellow of Merton College, Oxford and later Professor of Classics at the University of Sydney, researched in detail the history of scholarship on the

of nine fragments from *De pietate*, revising and supplementing the text of Gomperz. Focusing in particular on the Epicurean theory of the physical constitution of the gods, he contributed several important supplements and interpretations of these very difficult passages.[1]

Also building on the work of Gomperz, Hermann Usener included twenty-six of the citations from Epicurus contained in the treatise (which he called *De sanctitate*) in his *Epicurea* of 1887.[2] He based the text of these citations on the editions of Gomperz and *HV*² II, but incorporated many of his own supplements and emendations, which are still worthy of consideration. In addition, Usener produced his own version of several passages of *De pietate* that were not included as fragments in *Epicurea*; these appear in citations of lexical parallels in his *Glossarium Epicureum*.[3]

In 1898 (and later in 1906) W. Crönert added several new fragments of the treatise to those papyri regrouped by Quaranta.[4] Unlike the other early editors of *De pietate* (with the exceptions of Hayter and Quaranta), Crönert collated the text of these fragments with the extant papyri in the Officina dei Papiri in Naples. He produced rudimentary editions of these texts, but had only a peripheral interest in

Herculaneum papyri and arranged and catalogued the Oxford facsimiles, together with Hayter's unpublished papers, for the Bodleian Library. He published the results of his work in the form of a descriptive catalogue, *Fragmenta Herculanensia* (Oxford, 1885), which contains (pp. 41–6) an account of the history of *De pietate* but includes no texts from it.

[1] See esp. Scott 1883, 232–7; the fragments of *De pietate* edited by Scott were cols. 2,4–16, 4,2–18, 7,2–17, 12,4–15, 13,3–18, 15,13–18, 16,1–22. Scott's own reconstruction of Epicurean theology (adopted in part by Long–Sedley 1987) remains controversial. His work stimulated interest in the relation between *De pietate* and the positive exposition of Epicurean theology in Cicero, *De nat. deor.*—a subject which had been ignored in Diels's *Doxographi Graeci* (1879).

[2] Usener 1887, 433, Index Fontium s.v. Philodemus *De sanctitate*. On the Latin equivalent of the title *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, see the commentary on 206–7. Likewise the fragments of Epicurus' younger contemporary Metrodorus contained in *De pietate* were collected in the editions of Duening 1870 and Körte 1890, as were those of Hermarchus, for which see the dissertation of Krohn 1921 and the edition of Longo Auricchio 1988*a*.

[3] See e.g. s.v. *μακαριότης* (p. 415). These suggestions have been utilized in preparation of the new text. The *Glossarium*, which was Usener's personal working tool, long remained unpublished, though copies circulated among a handful of scholars and, at least in the 20th c., a copy was kept in the Officina in Naples. Despite the editorial efforts of M. Gigante and W. Schmid, the texts of citations from the Herculanensia (many based on early, inferior editions or on Usener's own editing of the transcripts in *HV*¹ and *HV*²) which appear in *Gloss. Epic.* should be treated with great caution.

[4] See W. Crönert 1898, 594, 595 nn. 1, 2 (= 1975, 25 nn. 35, 36) and 1906, 113 n. 512 (for *PHerc* 437). *P. Herc.* 452 was already identified as part of *De pietate* by Comparetti 1880, 176 (= Comparetti and De Petra 1883, 86): see W. Crönert 1901, 620–1 (= 1975, 117–18).

their contents and made no attempt to reconstruct from them the plan of the work.[1]

Inspired by the work of Gomperz and of his teacher Usener, Hermann Diels published in 1916 a re-edition with commentary of a fragmentary Hellenistic treatise on religion preserved on a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus.[2] Diels ascribed the fragment with some reason to Epicurus, but recognized its close thematic affinity with parts of *De pietate* and thus presents as parallel testimony editions of several columns of the latter work which had been insufficiently resolved by Gomperz.[3] Unfortunately, for his editions he did not consult the papyri or the original apographs (to which, during the First World War, he had no access). His collection of comparative material, however, especially on the literature of the Epicurean school, did succeed in stimulating interest in the first part of *De pietate*, especially as a source for the philosophical use of religious language and for Epicurus' participation in rites of Attic cult.[4]

The work of Robert Philippson on the text of *De pietate* spanned over thirty years and passed through at least three distinct stages. Adopting as a model Diels's work on Philodemus' *De dis* and the Oxyrhynchus fragment (*P. Oxy.* II 215), Philippson initially busied himself in tidying up the text of Gomperz and producing at times brilliant if somewhat unrestrained supplements to the text based on what could be known from ulterior sources about Epicurean theology and the history of Hellenistic philosophical polemics.[5] Encouraged by his successes, Philippson turned to treat the second part of *De pietate*, where he was not at all at home among the labyrinthine citations of poets and non-Epicurean philosophers.[6] The results could not have

[1] Although Crönert did in fact have a theory about the organization of the treatise as a whole, which he noted only in passing in Crönert 1901, 620 (= 1975, 117); cf. § 3(*d*) below.

[2] *P. Oxy.* II 215, re-edited in Diels 1916*a*; cf. (*d*) below and Obbink 1984; a new text in Obbink 1992*a*. Diels's work on these texts received a glowing review by R. Philippson in *PhW* 38 (1918), 121–6.

[3] Cols. 29, 31, and 33.

[4] A monograph (Picavet 1888) and several articles on the subject of Epicurus and religion which appeared in the first decade of the century (Fraccaroli 1900, Pascal 1906, Hadzits 1908) utilized some of the evidence of *De pietate* and recognized its potential importance for Epicurus' theory of religion, but laboured under the woeful state of the text.

[5] Philippson 1916 and 1918; cf. W. Nestle, *PhW* 38 (1918), 891–2, 41 (1921), 28–9; E. Bignone, *GCFI* 1 (1920), 85–7. The recent editors of Philippson's collected papers (Philippson 1983), on the shrewd judgement of W. Schmid and C. J. Classen, reprinted these earlier articles, but not his more complete revision and tranformation of Gomperz's edition (Philippson 1920, 1921).

[6] Philippson 1920; cf. W. Nestle, *PhW* 42 (1922), 1161–2; Henrichs 1974*a*, who concludes (7 n. 18) 'dass seine Bemühungen um den zweiten [i.e. the first part], dogmati-

been more disastrous.[1] His second, more thoroughgoing revision of the first part of the treatise[2] was marred by an increasingly excessive zeal for extensive, though at times impressive, restoration of lacunae. His attempts at producing an account of the organization of both parts of the treatise, as well as his reconstruction of individual passages, were thwarted by his disregard—nearly approaching contempt—for papyrological method. He never visited the Officina in Naples and thus never consulted a single papyrus or original apograph,[3] but based his text solely upon the Naples engravings in *HV*² II. In his reconstructions he habitually ignored constraints of format, such as line length, and he altered traces and even whole series of letters in the Naples engravings which he misleadingly represented simply as dotted letters. In the first part of *De pietate* he misconstrued the relation between the two major series of fragments, restored joins linking sections of texts now known to be non-continuous, altered the stichometric notations to fit his interpretation of the structure of the treatise, and even misunderstood Gomperz's ordering of the individual series of papyri.[4] In short, Philippson's attempt at a full edition of *De pietate* must be regarded as a failure. To be sure, his excesses were less pronounced in the first, philosophical portion of the work than in the second part; his work has been drawn upon cautiously in the present edition, especially for the intuitive brilliance of some of his restorations. He sometimes has an ingenious context to suggest for a broken passage.

In a later phase, Philippson devoted himself to the task of sorting out the doxographical sources used by Cicero in writing *De natura deorum* and gradually evolved a theory (based on his own reconstruction of the treatise) about the role played by *De pietate* in this process.[5]

schen Teil von *De pietate* von grösserem Nutzen sind als die um den ersten' [i.e. the second part].

[1] See also Henrichs 1972*a*, 68–9. [2] Philippson 1920.

[3] Capasso 1983, 78. Philippson can hardly be blamed for attaching so little value to the few extant fragments on papyrus (cf. his wholesale dismissal of the papyri in *RE* 19 (1938), 2462; Henrichs 1972*a*, 69 n. 6), and in any case the papyri were all but inaccessible during this period. On the other hand, closer attention to the original Naples apographs and to problems of papyrological detail might have allowed to him to reconstruct the proper order of the columns, which would in turn have facilitated greater accuracy in his restoration of the more lacunose passages. [4] For the placement of *P. Herc.* 229, see (*c*) below.

[5] Philippson 1939 and 1940. Impatient with points of papyrological detail, Philippson vacillated between the different readings of his own successive editions; for instance at 522–3 he had restored [*φλυα*]||*ροῦσιν* (Philippson 1921, 376, after Gomperz); but in 1939, 24 he printed: [*ἀλλ' ἐ*]||*ροῦσιν*, reverting to a supplement by Usener. This was sheer bad luck: both supplements are wrong, being based on a misreading of the original apograph (in ll. 520–1): see the text (now col. 19).

Virtually contemporary with Philippson's work on *De pietate*, Adolf Schober completed a 1923 Königsberg dissertation under the direction of Christian Jensen consisting of a critical text of the second part of *De Pietate*, the critique of poets and philosophers, with apparatus and brief Latin introduction. Schober's text, though marred by excessive reliance on Philippson's speculative restorations, represents the most important advance on the text since Gomperz's edition of 1866. Working only on the second part[1] of *De pietate*, Schober managed to connect many individual fragments transmitted separately under different inventory numbers but belonging together and forming continuous sections of text (e.g. tops of columns with their bottoms, and the separated right and left-hand portions of the same column). From Schober's combinations certain patterns and sequences of papyri emerge that repeat themselves. A good example is his realization[2] that the fragments in sequences separated through the process of *scorzatura* (i.e. removal of one *scorza* layer after another) are numbered in the reverse of their proper order in the original treatise: e.g. *P. Herc.* 247/242, 433/1088 (though in other sequences the principle is curiously abandoned). This insight is crucial for searching out similar links and recovering sections of continuous text elsewhere in the treatise. In addition several texts edited and joined by Schober, and thought by him to belong to the second part of the treatise, turn out to belong to the first. Schober, about whom nothing more is known after the completion of his dissertation, also published one brief note on *De pietate*. The one, single copy of his handwritten dissertation remained for over a half century inaccessible to all but a select few, but was recently published in a partially abridged form[3] in *Cronache ercolanesi*.

After Philippson's edition of 1921, interest in the text of *De pietate* waned considerably, with a few notable exceptions. A.-J. Festugière's

[1] Schober believed it to be the first part of the treatise. R. Merkelbach, *CErc* 20 (1990), 186 notes that in the German summary of the preface to his dissertation (Schober 1988, 67–72) Schober stated his intention to investigate the 'second' part of the treatise (i.e. the first, philosophical part) in a new edition of the entire text.

[2] Schober 1988, 67, 70. This principle is also apparent from his ordering of the fragments. He combined this insight with the alternation of columns from different sequences of papyri (for which see Scott 1885, 69 and cf. below p. 42 n. 2), e.g. 1610 with 247/242, or 1088 with 433 or 248 with the early fragments of 1428. I discerned the same relationship e.g. between the fragments of 1077 and 1098 for the first part of *De pietate*, and discovered that the two ostensibly separate parts of the treatise were in this way physically linked. Not until I saw Schober's then unpublished dissertation did I realize that all the papyri of *De pietate* (except the extant *P. Herc.* 243 and 1428) stand in this relationship with one another.

[3] Schober 1988; cf. id. 1915, and see the commentary below on 2198.

monograph on Epicurus and the gods and W. Schmid's article 'Götter und Menschen in der Theologie Epikurs' both drew widely on the treatise, while the edition of Epicurus by G. Arrighetti included re-editions of twenty-five of the citations from Epicurus in *De pietate*, together with a brief commentary and, perhaps most useful of all, a modern translation. All three works, however, are marked by excessive reliance on the text of Philippson.[1] In general it may be said that both parts of *De pietate* have been unjustly neglected in this century because most scholars who recognized the deficiencies of Gomperz's edition were only too aware of the excesses of Philippson's. A new edition of the text by Wolfgang Schmid (*Teil II: Epikureische Theologie*) was planned and announced as in progress in 1974,[2] but was cut short by his death in 1980.

The very exacting editorial work done in more recent years on the text of the second part[3] of the treatise (the critique of poetic mythology and Stoic theology), especially that of A. Henrichs and W. Luppe,[4] illustrates problems similar to those encountered in the editing of the first part of *De pietate* (especially with regard to the use of multiple editorial techniques[5]), and raises important questions regarding the relation of the first portion of the treatise to the second. No one has yet succeeded in giving a convincing account of the form and organization of the treatise as a whole.

(*c*) *Order of Fragments*

In the process used to open the papyrus roll containing the first part of *De pietate* the true order of columns is necessarily lost. The roll, at the centre of which lies the later part of the treatise,[6] is split lengthwise

[1] Festugière 1968; W. Schmid 1951; *Epicuro* (ed. Arr.[2] 1973), *Indice delle fonti*, s.v. Philodemus. A re-edition of *P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 9 (col. 37) based on the Naples apograph was published in Sedley 1974, 89–92, containing a difficult citation from Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* 35, argued by Sedley to have dealt with free will and determinism (Sedley 1983*a*, 1989*a*).

[2] See Henrichs 1974*d*; 1972*a*, 69; 1974*a*, 5 n. 4.

[3] Henrichs's work on the text (see below) builds on the 1923 Königsberg dissertation of Adolf Schober (Schober 1988, in part).

[4] See the Conspectus Studiorum.

[5] These include: collation of extant papyri against one or more apographs, collation of two or more apographs against each other, identification and removal of *sottoposti* and *sovrapposti*, and the uniting of fragments which belong together but which were transmitted separately. A secondary and more complex question concerns the ordering of indivdual fragments within a given thematic section and ultimately the arrangement of those sections into a complex whole (see (*c*) below).

[6] This would be the normal position, assuming that before storage in AD 79 the roll had been rerolled to the beginning after reading. If it had *not* been rerolled, the beginning or

down the centre into two halves, each of which may or may not remain intact, as illustrated in the accompanying Fig. 1.[1]

The portion of the papyrus which lies at the protected centre (or *midollo*) of the roll is usually the best preserved; once extracted from the outer layers, it is sometimes unrolled without difficulty.[2] The outer halves of the roll, consisting of stacks of hardened concave layers of papyrus, each contain on their inner (i.e. topmost) surfaces portions of either one or two successive columns of writing open to view on the same layer. When the roll was cut open in 1787, early Italian copyists at first transcribed the well-preserved columns on the first three layers of one of the hard outer halves (*P. Herc.* 1077), removing as usual each layer of papyrus in turn in order to get at the writing underneath.[3]

earlier part of the treatise would lie at the *centre* of the roll (but of this there are no known examples among the Herculaneum rolls). On the construction of the papyrus roll and the mechanics of reading and rolling in antiquity, see Birt 1882; Bassi 1909; Schubart 1921², 1961³; Ohly 1924; 1928; C. Wendel, *Griechisch-römische Buchbeschreibung* (Hallische Monographien, 3; Halle, 1949); F. G. Kenyon, *Books and Readers in the Ancient World*² (Oxford, 1951); Canfora 1974; G. Cavallo (ed.), *Libri, editori e pubblico nel mondo antico. Guida storica e critica* (Bari, 1975); id. 1983, 14–22.

[1] Dismantling the roll by splitting it lengthwise into two or more pieces (*scorze*) was dubbed the 'method of Paderni'—a rather dubious honour accorded to Camillo Paderni, then *direttore* of the Museo di Portici. A general account of the unrolling of the Herculaneum papyri is to be found in Comparetti 1880, 145–78 (= Comparetti and De Petra 1883, 57–88) and Capasso 1991; there is a contemporary description and defence of the method in de Iorio 1825. For Paderni's method and similar techniques used by the early Italian *accademici* before Piaggio, see Scott 1885, 1–3; G. Guerrieri, 'L'Officina dei papiri ercolanesi dal 1752 al 1952', in *I papiri ercolanesi* I, *I quaderni della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli*, Serie III 5 (Naples, 1954), 5–7; Capasso 1983, 106–97. On the subsequent method of Piaggio and the introduction of mechanical means of unrolling the papyri, see D. Bassi, 'Il P. Antonio Piaggio e i primi tentativi per lo svolgimento dei papiri ercolanesi (da documenti inediti)', *Archivo storico per le province napoletane*, 32 (1907), 637–90; Guerrieri, op. cit. 8–9; Capasso 1983, 44–5, 108–21; 1991; Dorandi 1992. The machine removed successive layers from the roll from the outside inward, whereas the process of *scorzatura* worked outwards from the innermost layers of a broken roll.

[2] A good example of just such a *midollo* is *P. Herc.* 1428 (the critique of Stoic theology), which consists of twelve contiguous columns plus a series of detached fragments, which became separated from the *outer* layers of the *midollo* when it was unrolled.

[3] This process is termed *scorzatura* by the Italians. The term *scorza* ('bark', 'rind', 'husk') is used indiscriminately to denote both the broken portion of papyrus roll (consisting of multiple layers of papyrus) before decortication and for each individual layer, extant or not, of papyrus within. Usually it is only the bottom or last (i.e. outermost) layer that survives, the others being destroyed in the process of *scorzatura*, though medial layers do sometimes survive (for an example, see *P. Herc.* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 2 = col. 45 with commentary), either because a topmost layer, exposed to light and the moist air, separates itself intact (sometimes chemically induced or manually removed), or because the impacted series of layers separates laterally into two or more series each consisting of fewer layers than before: in this case the medial surviving *scorza* is usually the last layer of newly separated group. But there is no term

[*cont. on p. 40*]



FIG. 1. Papyrus roll in cross-section

These columns of course originally linked with their succeeding and preceding columns on the inner layers of the other hard outer half of the roll. Shortly after the roll was opened,[1] however, all the pieces (the two outer halves, the *midollo*, and the detached pieces thereof) were carelessly dispersed, so that already by the time Hayter began work in Naples around the turn of the century it had been forgotten that they originally formed part of the same papyrus roll. The various parts of the roll thus languished dispersed and untouched until, during the period from 1807 to 1824, their columns were 'decorticated' and transcribed in a similar fashion along with many other Herculaneum rolls.[2] Consequently each of the groups of fragments (represented by *P. Herc.* inventory numbers) which make up *De pietate* has its own editorial history and reaches us by a separate process of transmission. Therefore from a palaeographical—or, if we were not dealing with a papyrus roll, one might say codicological—point of view, the reconstitution of the order of preserved fragments as they originally fell in the treatise is a task of the highest importance.

(i) P. Herc. *1077 and 1098:* The order of fragments followed in the present edition is established by means of a new physical join[3] between the right-hand and left-hand portions of the same column of writing

capable of distinguishing between the two. To avoid confusion when referring, for example, to *sovrapposti*, *sottoposti* and the like, I suggest the introduction of the term 'stack' (*fascio*) when referring to a broken portion of a papyrus roll consisting (either actually or theoretically) of multiple layers. I reserve the term *scorza* alone for any individual layer of papyrus, whether now extant or not, recovered through the decortication of the *scorza* stack.

[1] It was during this period that all the Herculaneum papyri were assigned arbitrary index numbers (see above, p. 29 n. 1). Any broken portion of a roll, whether or not it was grouped together with its other pieces, was assigned its own number, and this accounts for those cases in which contiguous portions of the same papyrus roll bear radically divergent inventory numbers. The papyri were also moved several times during this period (e.g. to Palermo with the Bourbon court, and back again), which may have occasioned damage and disordering of individual pieces of the same roll.

[2] For an excellent account contemporary with this activity by a technician who was actually present see de Iorio 1825, especially 41–7 on the process of *scorzatura*. De Iorio's account makes clear, among other details, that only after unrolling all the rolls that could be dismantled with Piaggio's machine did technicians resort to *scorzatura* for those that could not (including those that were too fully congealed and those fragments produced earlier by fracturing the roll in the 'method of Paderni'). Clearly sensitive to the degree of damage, loss of text, confusion, and illegibility to which the papyri were reduced by the process of *scorzatura*, and to the fact that, in the passing of time, a more satisfactory method might have been perfected for dismantling these rolls, de Iorio attempts to describe (pp. 46–7) the qualms with which the technicians proceeded. In the end, he says, 'courage prevailed'.

[3] On the mechanics of this join, see cols. 53–4 with commentary.

(col. 54) which became separated in this process of unrolling and were thus transmitted as part of discrete series of fragments, bearing deceptively different inventory numbers (*P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098). The new link effectively identifies these two series as the two hard outer halves (described above) of the roll containing the first part of *De pietate*, and allows for a secure starting-point from which to begin the complex process of reintegrating the columns into their original order. As it happens, the early Italian editors were thwarted in their attempts to do this by the fact that Hayter had removed with him from Naples the apograph of one of the two adjoining fragments (*P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1), leaving behind its adjoining member (*P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 2).[1] As a result all subsequent editors came to assume that *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 each consisted of fragments from separate papyrus rolls.[2]

Bücheler, Gomperz, and Philippson—the only editors who produced a relatively complete text of *De pietate*—simply printed *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 as independent series of columns in the order (followed in *HV*² II) in which they were copied by the *disegnatori*. Greater knowledge of the mechanics of the papyrus roll would have told them that, given the method used to unroll the treatise,[3] (1) no two successive columns in either sequence could be continuous[4] (unless of course they were columns which happened to appear on the same layer of papyrus), and (2) that at least some of the intervening columns must have existed elsewhere, at least originally, among the scattered portions of Herculaneum rolls opened in the late eighteenth century. Now we know where. As a result of the new joins between the first[5] few fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098, these columns can now be seen to be those which were separated at the centre of the roll when

[1] The actual papyri will have perished after transcription in the process of *scorzatura*.

[2] On the basis of his few remarks in his brief preface, it cannot be known for certain whether or not Gomperz believed that *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 originally occupied separate papyrus rolls; in his edition he simply followed *HV*² II in printing *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 one after the other as though they were two independent successions of columns. Gomperz did believe that *De pietate* as a whole originally occupied at least two papyrus rolls: see his letter to H. Diels in *Dox. Gr.* 529–30. On the question see further (*f*) and § 3(*d*) below.

[3] The method of splitting the roll into two halves is painfully obvious from a glance at Pl. 5, the Oxford apograph of *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 (available to Gomperz and Philippson but not to Quaranta or Bücheler), a three-dimensional drawing which depicts the broken half and concave inner (inscribed) surface of the roll. At the broken edges of the *scorza* the copyist has depicted the multiple layers of papyrus in the *scorza* stack.

[4] Philippson naïvely pretended that such columns could in fact be continuous, and proceeded by means of lavish restoration to link no less than seventeen columns, now shown to be non-contiguous, in the first part of *De pietate* alone.

[5] Referring, that is, to the earliest *numbered* fragments in each series.

it was first opened in 1787. The remaining columns of these two series of fragments—for which the immediately preceding and succeeding columns do not now survive (as a result of damage incurred when the roll was broken open)—must now be integrated in alternating sequence and ordered according to the constraints of context and the make-up of of the papyrus roll, as it may be inferred from the marginal stichometric notations and from what can be known about the habits of the nineteenth-century copyists.

The layout of the papyrus roll and the order of fragments of the first part of *De pietate* under the new reconstruction can be represented schematically by the accompanying Fig. 2.[1]

There are other instances of treatises with similarly disordered columns (because of this process of unrolling) among the Herculaneum papyri, e.g. *P. Herc.* 222/1082 (Philodemus *Περὶ κολακείας*), on which W. Scott observed: 'Consequently, the true order of columns is lost, and the nearest attainable approach to it might perhaps be made by reading the pages of the two numbers alternately.'[2] In fact the situation with *De pietate* is even more complex than Scott's remark might suggest. First, it appears that in addition to damage incurred when the roll was split apart, the edges of the outer half of the roll containing the columns numbered as *P. Herc.* 1077 were severely damaged at some point after the transcription of the earliest columns in the years 1787–90, but before transcription of the remaining columns in 1809.[3] The extent of damage can be judged from the Oxford apograph of *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 3, which contains on the left-hand side the remains of the

[1] Arrows indicate the direction of reading from incipit to explicit. Connected sections indicate the union of at least one physical link between separate series of papyri. In the case of broken lines, at least one (but not more than three) columns of writing are known to have been lost in this position. The open areas on the right and left of centre represent the portions of the papyrus roll lost to damage when the roll was incised laterally and forced open.

[2] Scott 1885, 69. For another example of such a roll split laterally and transmitted as two separate groups of papyri see *P. Herc.* 460 + 1073 (Philod. *Περὶ ποημάτων*) and the discussion of Sbordone, *Ricerche sui papiri ercolanesi*, ii (Naples, 1976), pp. xv–xviii and Dorandi 1992. Delattre 1989 presents an extensive demonstration that all the papyri of Philodemus' *De musica* can be reconstructed as a single roll, and all belong to book 4 (books 1–3 are in fact lost). The method has been further corroborated by Janko 1992 with regard to *De musica*, and further applied to *De poematis* in Janko 1993. In broad agreement is T. Dorandi, 'Per una ricomposizione dello scritto filodemeo *Sulla retorica*', *ZPE* 82 (1990), 59–87; id., 'Per una ricomposizione dello scritto di Filodemo *Sulla poetica*', *ZPE* 91 (1992), 29–52.

[3] Presumably this occurred in 1806, when all of the Herculaneum papyri (including those texts co-opted by Hayter) were removed with the Neapolitan (i.e. Sicilian) court to Palermo in advance of the invading French forces and at which time many of the other papyri suffered damage: see Scott 1885, 8–9 and n. 3.



FIG. 2. Layout of papyrus roll, showing the fragments of Part I

right-hand half of a column of writing broken lengthwise. A decade later, however, when copyists produced the Naples apograph of this fragment, what little if any that remained of this left-hand column was so negligible that the Italian copyists did not even bother to transcribe it.[1] They copied only the complete column on the central portion of the fragment. Second, it appears that the Italian copyists, as they proceeded through the remaining layers of *P. Herc.* 1077, which had been left uncopied in 1790, and those of *P. Herc.* 1098, regularly did not bother to represent such negligibly preserved columns,[2] which may appear of little value but which are absolutely essential for the reconstruction of a continuous text. This hypothesis is confirmed and illustrated by an extant papyrus text of *De pietate*, namely, *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9, the examination of which revealed, in addition to the column of writing copied as *N* 229 fr. 9, the first letters of the lines of the succeeding column, which had been ignored by the Neapolitan *disegnatori* when the papyrus was copied (some time after 1823) and therefore escaped the attention of all previous editors of *De pietate* (now col. 57).[3]

These two factors account for the fact that, although *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 are certainly two halves of the same papyrus roll, there are in fact relatively few physical links between preserved columns and therefore only an approximation of a continuous text. It is of course possible that more physical joins between columns in the present text are obscured by excessive damage incurred at the head and foot of columns. In any case, the amount of text lost as a result of physical damage and procedures of copying can be independently gauged.[4]

To summarize, for the majority of the now alternating columns of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098, their precise order in the original treatise must

[1] See cols. 53–4. The Naples apograph is dated 1809, but inventory records in the Officina show that the remaining fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077 had been decorticated several years earlier (in 1807).

[2] In general, it appears that (with the exception of the Oxford apographs of *P. Herc.* 1077 frr. 1–3) only those columns of which more than half the width remained visible on the surface of the papyrus qualified for transcription by the *disegnatori*. This was perhaps a conscious editorial decision in reaction to harsh and uninformed criticism levelled at the Italians from international quarters in the early 19th c. regarding the woefully poor state of preservation of the Herculaneum papyri. On the other hand, the *disegnatori* were sometimes paid by the column for their work, so that it may have seemed less prudent to engage them to transcribe the most fragmentary portions of texts when there was more than a sufficient number of well-preserved texts about to be dealt with.

[3] Although the new column yields nothing in the way of a continuous text, it reveals, after the removal of a small *sovrapposto* by Dr Kleve, a previously unread stichometric letter essential for a reconstruction of *De pietate* (see (*f*) below).

[4] See (*f*) below.

be determined by context,[1] by the order in which the fragments were transcribed by the copyists, and through the use of physical joins and stichometric notations to provide secure sequences in this process of coordination. Contextual coherence provides a check to verify the accuracy of suspected physical joins and the reconstruction of the stichometry (though naturally one must here guard against the problem of circularity). We can represent the relationship between the two papyri as 1077//1098, leaving the convention 100/200 to designate two sequences of columns whose tops and bottoms join, and 100–200 for two series which follow one upon another. The layout of the extant texts placed in their reconstructed order is depicted in the accompanying Fig. 3.

Apart from providing more continuous text of *De pietate* than before, the most important ramification of the new link between *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 concerns the sequence (i.e. ascending or descending order) of the columns. Assuming that the roll containing *De pietate* would have originally unrolled from incipit to explicit,[2] the latest columns in the treatise will have been the first columns sketched by the copyists as they worked from the inside of the roll (i.e. the concave upper surface of each broken half of the roll), where the columns of writing were visible, to the outside of the roll.[3] In order to recover the true (i.e. ascending) order of columns, it has thus been necessary to

[1] Naturally the order of any two columns determined on the basis of context and content alone is a potential target for scepticism. In any such instance where doubt arises, in order to avoid violating the physical constraints of the construction of the papyrus roll, reference should immediately be made (in attempting to ascertain the correct order) to the original numbering, which is as near as we can come to the order in which the fragments were originally transcribed by the copyists.

[2] Such at any rate was the case with *P. Herc.* 1428 (the critique of Stoic theology from the first part of *De pietate*) which was preserved as a *midollo* at the protected centre of the roll and thus contains the *subscriptio* of the treatise. If, after having been read, the roll had been stored in AD 79 without having been rerolled to the incipit, the opposite situation would obtain: the earliest columns of the treatise would be located at the centre of the roll, and consequently the order in which the fragments were transcribed by the copyists would represent their true (i.e. ascending) order in the treatise (but see above, p. 37 n. 6).

[3] Cf. Scott 1885, 1 n. 2: 'In the case of "scorze" however, the true sequence of columns is necessarily lost; and as it has usually been found necessary in opening them to destroy each layer of papyrus in turn, in order to get at the next, in these cases the last page only of the original is preserved.' This must be taken to mean, however, the last 'page' only of the original *scorza*, i.e. the bottommost layer of papyrus, and not the last 'page' or 'column' of the treatise itself, which would normally have been located toward the centre of the papyrus roll, i.e. the topmost layer in the broken half of the roll. The two newly joined fragments above (cols. 53–4) were situated on the upper (i.e. topmost) layers of their respective halves of the broken roll, and thus nearer the centre and end of the papyrus roll.



FIG. 3. Reconstructed layout of extant texts

reverse the order in which the individual layers of papyrus were transcribed by the copyists (and as they stand in all previous editions of the text),[1] in order to restore their original sequence in the treatise.[2] In other words, as a result of the circumstances of preservation and the method under which the roll was opened, and as presented by all previous editors, we have been reading the treatise backwards, from the inside out, as it were.[3] The dispersal and destruction of the various pieces during the process of transcription caused the original make-up of the roll to be totally forgotten. It is uncertain whether the early technicians who opened the papyrus roll assumed that this make-up would be perfectly obvious from the order in which the fragments were transcribed, or whether they were simply careless in their description of the papyri. In any case, some subsequent editors of *De pietate* were unaware of the existence of certain key fragments of the text (Quaranta, Bücheler), while others who were aware of them

[1] One may compare the transmission of *P. Herc.* 243 frr. 2–4 (from the second part of the treatise). It has been shown that the copyists renumbered these fragments in reverse order after transcribing them; i.e. they assigned the highest number to the fragment which had been recovered first, in order to recover their original order in the treatise. See Henrichs 1972*a*, 92–3 with n. 86. I suggest we represent this disposition of papyri in the present case as **1077//1098** ↓ (since the sign ↓ is no longer used to indicate the directions of the fibres in papyri relative to lines of writing: see *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* XLV (1977), xii), indicating that the fragments of these two series alternate and link vertically (//), and that the approximate correct sequence of columns has been determined to be the reverse, i.e. *descending* order of their assigned fragment numbers (↓). We can be sure that the copyists did not already reorder the fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 in this way (see previous note), from an examination of the Oxford apograph of *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 (see Pl. 5), which represents the inner surface of the broken half of the roll as it appeared to the earliest copyists in 1790. The sequence of eight lines in the centre of the fragmentary left-hand column (*P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 sin., ll. 10–17) belongs not to the exposed (i.e. uppermost) surface but to the layer of writing underneath. This underlying layer was later copied after the exposed layer of papyrus had been copied and removed, leaving the entire column underneath open to view. This fragment was numbered as *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. *2*; therefore the transmitted order of the apographs (followed in *HV*[2] II) represents the order in which the layers of papyrus were originally transcribed.

[2] In the editions of Bücheler, Gomperz, and Philippson, the columns of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 follow one another in the order in which they were transcribed by the copyists, and thus the columns of each series stand roughly in the reverse of their proper order in the treatise. (As a result, Philippson was attempting not only to link non-contiguous columns, but also to link them in the wrong order.) Closer attention to the codicology of the papyrus roll would have told them they were wrong. It must be stressed, however, that this is *not* rectified simply by reversing the order of the Naples series of fragments, because in some cases two columns may have appeared on the same layer of papyrus, and therefore *are* consecutive, even in the Naples series (see below).

[3] Strictly speaking, it is inappropriate to say that the fragments were transcribed in the wrong order; the *disegnatori* transcribed them in the only order that was physically possible, once the roll had been broken open.

(Gomperz, Philippson) paid too little attention to the mechanics of the papyrus roll to attempt a proper reconstruction of the original order of the columns.

If this account is correct, it is only fair to ask *why* the new combination and the proper relation of parts (which lay hidden for nearly two centuries) was never discerned by the earliest Italian editors, who were much closer in time and place to the dismantling of the papyrus roll. The reason for this was ultimately not palaeographical but geographical. For of the two newly joined fragments (each from a different half of the broken roll), one—*P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1—was removed (together with the rest of the Oxonian apographs) from Naples to Oxford as early as 1807 by the Revd John Hayter.[1] The other, adjoining fragment—*P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 2—was left behind in Naples. Thus the two portions of col. 54 (as discussed above), which were torn asunder in the unrolling process, became further separated by thousands of miles. The early Italian editors,[2] who tried to reconstruct the treatise on the basis of context and content, never really had a chance, because they lacked an integral piece of the puzzle. The adjoining fragment (which, since it came from near the *midollo* of the broken roll, originally joined with its Naples counterpart and would have revealed the constitution of the roll) remained all along, unknown to the Italian editors, in the Bodleian Library in Oxford.[3] It is

[1] For this reason none of the texts of *De pietate* preserved among the Oxford apographs of *P. Herc.* 1077 appears in *HV*² II or among the unpublished papers of B. Quaranta—except for fr. 3 (= *N* 1077 fr. 1), the last layer of the *scorza* stack left exposed to view when Hayter left Naples. Conversely, the existence of *P. Herc.* 1098 (including the adjoining fr. 2) was entirely unknown to Hayter. A clergyman and scholar by vocation, and the personal chaplain-in-ordinary by appointment of the Prince of Wales (later George IV), Hayter supervised the unrolling of the Herculaneum papyri between 1802 and 1806. He fell into disfavour with the Italians in the aftermath of political and personal disputes, and when French forces invaded in 1806, he co-opted into his possession the apographs produced by Italian draughtsmen under his supervision (including that of *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1). With these texts he made his way back to England, where the fragments, together with Hayter's unpublished papers, were eventually installed in the Bodleian (now MSS Gr. Class. c. 1–7), and later catalogued by W. Scott (Scott 1885). On Hayter's activities see the bibliography listed above, p. 24 n. 1.

[2] These were B. Quaranta and F. M. Avellino (see above, p. 27 n. 3).

[3] See *Photographs of the Oxford Facsimiles of Herculaneum Papyri*, published at the expense of the Oxford Philological Society, by Messrs Kingsbury and Notcutt (London, 1890). The texts of *P. Herc.* 1077 appear in vol. iv, pp. 957–62; the original Italian *disegni* (executed between 1787 and 1790, a decade before Hayter's career in Naples) are preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford (MSS. Gr. Class. c. 4, fos. 957–62). However, tracings made for Gomperz of the Oxford apographs of *P. Herc.* 1077 (see above, p. 32 n. 2) had already been printed in his edition of 1866, and a reproduction of fr. 1 was printed in Wattenbach 1876; cf. (*e*) below.

doubtful whether anyone could have seen the textual connection between the two fragments before Gomperz restored the beginnings of the lines in 1098 fr. 2 (col. 54)—and even he failed to solve the puzzle for which he had all the pieces. For by this time, all editors had come to believe firmly that *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 consisted of two discrete series of fragments from separate papyrus rolls. This assumption was never questioned.

There is an exception, however, to this principle of reversing the transcribed order of columns in order to recover the original sequence. In several instances it can be shown that when substantial portions of *two* consecutive columns appeared on the same papyrus layer, the Naples apographs (unlike their Oxford counterparts) do not represent such columns on a single drawing, but rather depict each column as though it were a separate fragment, assigning to each a consecutive fragment number. The result is that in a few demonstrable instances two consecutive fragments in the Naples apographs do not represent two separate layers of papyrus from the broken half of the roll, which, for the reasons outlined above, could not be contiguous, but actually do represent two consecutive columns in the treatise.[1] Thus in a few instances the numbering of the apographs may represent the original order of columns in the treatise. (The physical dimensions of the papyrus roll—or rather, of its broken halves—prohibit this peculiarity from extending in most cases to three successive columns in the Naples apographs.) A necessary (though not sufficient) indicator of such instances is when facing edges of two successively numbered fragments are represented as extant in the Naples apographs. In other words, when any two successively numbered fragments both preserve the right-hand (or both the left-hand) halves of columns only,

[1] For examples of this type of combination see *N* 1077 frr. 4–5 (cols. 38–9, a join already recognized by Diels without the knowledge of the confirmation in N^1), frr. 6–7 (the numbering of frr. was later reversed on the *disegno*, now cols. 35–6), frr. 10–11 (cols. 29–30). These links are confirmed by the original witness N^1, which presents each pair of these fragments on the same apograph, thus making it clear that each pair stood together on the same layer of papyrus in the *scorza* stack, whereas N^2 and HV^2 II deceptively separate these columns, depicting each on its own *disegno*. In general it was the practice of the *disegnatori* of the papyri of *De pietate* to present each column individually on a single apograph, even when they stood on the same layer of papyrus (other exceptions in *N* 242 and 247, and from the second part of the treatise in *N* 243, 433, and 1088). These successions created the mistaken impression that the assigned numbering of the fragments was in every case the original order in the treatise. Indeed, all previous reconstructions of *De pietate* (with the exception of Schober's) have been modelled on the continuous progression of columns in *P. Herc.* 1428, though this text was unique in the papyri of this treatise because it formed the tractable *midollo* of the papyrus roll.

these columns (whatever the order) cannot have been contiguous, since this disposition presupposes the existence (either in the other broken half of the papyrus roll or in the section destroyed when the roll was broken open) of the intervening section of papyrus.[1] If two successive fragments are believed to have originally stood on the same layer of papyrus and thus to contain contiguous columns, they must necessarily consist of the right-hand portion of column A plus the left-hand portion of column B (where A and B represent successively numbered fragments in the Naples apographs).[2]

(ii) P. Herc. *229, 437/452, 247/242, 1610, 1788:* Since *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 represent the two outer halves of the broken papyrus roll, it is clear that the other fragments assigned (on the basis of content and palaeography) to *De pietate* must be pieces that became detached from the *inside* (or *midollo*) of the roll when it was split open; if these fragments had come from the outer portion of the roll (and thus from the earlier part of the treatise) they would have formed part of either *P. Herc.* 1077 or 1098. The fact that they were accorded different inventory numbers shows that they had become separated, early in the process of dismantling the roll, both from the protected inner portion (or *midollo*) and from the hard outer halves of the roll, by necessity *before* the individual papyrus layers of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 were removed from these outer halves and transcribed. This hypothesis receives further confirmation from the marginal stichometric notations preserved in these detached fragments.

Once the fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 are integrated and renumbered in reverse order (as explained above) to restore their original order in the treatise, the sequence of topics provides a reliable guide for ordering the series of detached fragments. Thus on the basis of context the fragments of *P. Herc.* 229 can be directly linked to the

[1] Another way of stating this type of physical constraint is as follows: any single complete turn of the papyrus roll originally contained at least three (and potentially as many as five) columns of the treatise. The closer one approaches to the centre of the roll, the tighter become the turns of the papyrus and hence the fewer columns per single turn. As a result, between any two columns preserved on successive layers of *P. Herc.* 1077 or 1098 there originally existed one or two columns in the corresponding layer of the outer half of the roll (represented by the other *P. Herc.* number).

[2] Or alternatively, the right-hand portion of column B plus the left-hand portion of column A—assuming that the original order of columns on the papyrus layer was mistakenly inverted. The *disegnatori* were sometimes not careful in their numbering of fragments in the exact order transcribed. Careless disordering is especially evident in the earliest columns of the treatise (i.e. the last to be transcribed).

end of the (reordered) 1077//1098 sequence, for the final fragment in this series (containing four columns) treats the execution of Socrates for impiety at the hands of the Athenians, which is the last topic discussed in the (reordered) sequence 1077//1098. If the fragments of *P. Herc.* 229 are reversed in this fashion, the discussion of Socrates is then followed by an anthropological account of the formation of false beliefs about the gods and the origin of justice, together with the invention of mythographic poetry (see cols. 74–5). The use of such poetry by opponents of the Epicureans to support their own views is the next subject, followed by a critique of non-Epicurean philosophers, concluding with the Stoics.

Gomperz in his *editio princeps* seems to have reasoned in precisely the opposite fashion as regards *P. Herc.* 229. Wrongly assuming that the fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077 (as copied by the *disegnatori* and followed by *HV*² II) were in their original (i.e. ascending) order in the treatise, he must have concluded that the discussion of Socrates, which comes at the *beginning* of *P. Herc.* 1077 in the transmitted ordering, was immediately preceded by the discussion of the similar subject in *P. Herc.* 229, where in the series of numbered fragments (actually the reverse of their original order) those dealing with Socrates come last.[1] This perplexed Philippson, who noted that two of these fragments of *P. Herc.* 229 preserve the stichometric letters O and Φ, which requires that they fall relatively late in the treatise rather than at some early stage as Gomperz had supposed. He therefore placed *P. Herc.* 229 last, following both *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098, though, as Philippson himself knew, this solution left portions of the obviously continuous discussion of Socrates separated by all the column of *P. Herc.* 1077 plus those of 1098 (in the ordering of their *disegni*, repeated in *HV*² II). The order of fragments adopted in the present edition overcomes both these difficulties, by establishing that the columns as Gomperz and Philippson read them stand in the reverse of their proper order in the treatise. The discussion of Socrates in *P. Herc.* 229, with its relatively late stichometric letter O, continues that discussion at the end of the columns (when their order is reversed) of *P. Herc.* 1077.

Similarly, four fragments from *P. Herc.* 1610 clearly form part of the discussion of the concept of justice in the development of civilization in *P. Herc.* 229. Several fragments of *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 treat this same topic, and thus should now be removed from their own series and

[1] This reasoning seems to be the most likely origin of his view (Gomperz 1866, p. xi) that *P. Herc.* 229 should actually come first in his edition of the first part of *De pietate* (his 'Teil 2').

placed last in the first part of *De pietate*, integrated with those of *P. Herc.* 229 and 1610.[1] Previous editors have included them in the 'critical' part of the treatise, along with the other fragments of *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 (with which they must have been originally cohered), though with varying degrees of discomfort, since the other fragments of *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 deal with criticisms of the poets about the gods. Most editors have thought that these fragments on the topic of justice seemed out of place. If the two accounts were contiguous and interdependent in the original treatise, there is no discrepancy.

Bücheler[2] suggested the possibility (ignored by subsequent editors) that the philosophical criticism of the poets in *De pietate* may have originally formed part of the dogmatic, doctrinal part of the treatise, namely that they were connected with the discussion of proper and improper ideas about the gods in the philosophical part of the treatise. On this theory, the discussion of the rise of false beliefs about the gods and divine justice, resulting in the invention of mythographic poetry (*P. Herc.* 229; see col. 75), would have been followed by the critique of the poets' contribution to the spread of false beliefs about the gods, followed by a similar critique of the failings in this respect of rival philosophers in roughly chronological order from Thales down to Diogenes of Babylon (*P. Herc.* 1428).[3] Until now this picture has been largely obscured by insufficient knowledge of the makeup of the parts of *De pietate*, and by the assumption (unfounded, it now appears) that the fragments grouped by Gomperz as the 'critical' part necessarily preceded those he grouped as the 'dogmatic' part.[4] Under the new reconstruction, the historical, anthropological discussion in *P. Herc.* 229 of the origin of false beliefs about the gods leads quite naturally into a critical treatment of the representations of the gods by the earliest poets. In fact, the transition from the former topic to the latter one,

[1] The existence of a continuous series is further demonstrated by the discovery of a new link between 1610 and 247/242 (two other links between these series had already been perceived by Schober), and another between 247/242 and 229 (discussed below). Unfortunately the fragments of *P. Herc.* 437 and 452 are too fragmentary and of uncertain interpretation for us to be entirely certain about their placement. The best indicators are to be found in fr. 4 (col. 65) and fr. 6 (col. 61A), and in the fact that they preserve the tops and bottoms of columns respectively; see commentary ad loc. Examination of the extant papyri showed *P. Herc.* 437 to be written in the same hand of the other preserved texts of *De pietate*.

[2] See (*b*) above; Bücheler 1865, 514 (= 582).

[3] On the close contextual link between the historical digression on the formation of false beliefs about the gods in the first part of *De pietate* and the critique of the poets in the second part, see cols. 65, 75–8, 84–6 with commentary.

[4] See further on the division of parts § 3(*d*) below.

though unrecognized by previous editors, actually begins in a well-preserved column of *P. Herc.* 229 (col. 75, on the invention of mythographic poetry in cultural history),[1] while the transition itself, specifically marked by the author, occurs shortly afterward at 1610 fr. 4,17 + 247 fr. 7,2 (now cols. 85–6: *κατάρ*]*ξομαι δ' ἀπὸ τ*[*ῶν* || *cεμ*]*νῶν θεολόγων* | [*καὶ π*]*οητῶν*). This hypothesis receives the further support of textual evidence in two further instances: (1) one fragment of *P. Herc.* 1610 (fr. 3, + 247 fr. 6 left, pp. 61+19 G., connected by Schober, on cosmogonies and theogonies) was similarly transmitted in a series of five fragments, four of which clearly belong to the 'dogmatic' part of the treatise (all editors have transferred this text from its own series, the other fragments of *P. Herc.* 1610, to the criticism of the poets;[2] (2) similarly, several texts belonging to the 'dogmatic' part were preserved, as noted above, along with the fragments of *P. Herc.* 242 and 247, which otherwise preserve texts from the critique of poets. The inclusion of these fragments in their own series is hardly explicable except on the assumption that these texts came in close proximity in the original treatise, but became detached and disordered early in the unrolling process.

But the reconstitution of the treatise does not rest on a contextual argument from probability based solely on grounds of content. A new physical join (cols. 74–5) now links *P. Herc.* 229 to *P. Herc.* 247/242.[3] As a result, we can be sure that *P. Herc.* 229, known (from stichometry and the continuous discussion of Socrates) to be linked to the early part of the treatise (1077//1098), also contains material on the invention of mythographic poetry which is now seen to be continuous with the criticism of poets in of *P. Herc.* 247/242. This series therefore introduces and motivates the second part of *De pietate*. One of the principal gains of the new reconstruction is that it sets out for the first time the grounds for Philodemus' extensive attack on the Greek poets and philosophers in that section.[4]

[1] See the text below, ll. 2158–65: [*o*]*ἱ δὲ* | *μύθους μὲν εἰcῆγον* | *ἀμέλει καὶ τερατεί*]*ας, οὔτε δὲ τοῖc πρό*|*τερον ἐδόκουν ἐοι*|*κότα ταῦτ' εἰcφέρειν* | *οὔτε cωτηρίας αἰ*[*τία*] | *πολειτείας*, etc.

[2] Schober 1988 went so far as to group all five fragments of *P. Herc.* 1610 together at the *beginning* of his edition of the 'critical' part. The present reconstruction receives support from Schober's join between *P. Herc.* 1610 fr. 4 and 247 fr. 7 (see cols. 85–6).

[3] This effectively excludes the view of Dorandi 1988*b* that *P. Herc.* 247/242, along with 1610, derives from an ancient second edition of *De pietate*. Further discussion in (*g*) below.

[4] The preceding analysis firmly establishes that the fragments of *P. Herc.* 229, 1610, and 247/242 formed part of the same roll as the bulk of the first part of the treatise (1077//1098). For they are in all cases linked either physically by one or more combinations, or their sequence is assured by content and stichometry. The question of how many rolls were

(*d*) *Genuine and Spurious Fragments*

The connected series of columns *P. Herc.* 1428 contains the conclusion and the *subscriptio* bearing the vestiges of the author and title of the treatise. Since this sequence, being the *midollo* at the protected centre of a roll, survives intact, it serves as a palaeographical and scribal standard for the other parts of the treatise, even when their papyri themselves do not survive but are preserved for the most part in the form of apographs. The main series of of papyri that make up the first part of *De Pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1077//1098) is shown to be part of this series by the identity of the scribal hand,[1] of the format (i.e. length of lines and column dimensions),[2] and of the content.[3] The only other re-

occupied by the treatise as a whole is treated in (*f*) below and in 3(*d*) (on the division of parts).

[1] I list here the extant papyri, all written in the same hand as *P. Herc.* 1428, of the *first* part of *De pietate* only (all are *scorze*): *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 (with following column, undesigned); *P. Herc.* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 2, mistakenly inventoried as 1093 (fr. sin.); *P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 29; *P. Herc.* 1610 frr. 2 and new fr. (fr. 5 according to Bassi 1909, 504 and his handwritten note on the *disegno*, but the texts do not match); *P. Herc.* 1788 fr. 9, newly identified as the *scorza P. Herc.* 1114 (and not the virtually illegible *scorza* mistakenly catalogued as 1788), now separated by Dr Kleve into three layers of *sottoposti* and *sovrapposti*. *P. Herc.* 437 fr. 4 was extant and seen by me in 1983 when I began work but by 1993 had disintegrated. Autopsy shows that the *scorza* called *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 (= 3) is not written in the hand of *P. Herc.* 1428, in spite of the assertion of Cavallo 1983, 34, 41, followed by Dorandi 1988*a*, 50 fr. D (cf. Bassi 1909, 504), that it was written by the scribe 'anonimo XII' (see Cavallo 1983, 34, 45) who wrote *P. Herc.* 1428. *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 11, (wrongly) assigned to *De pietate* by Dorandi 1988*a*, 49 (his fr. C) is admitted there to be in a hand alien to that of the rest of the fragments of *De pietate* ('anonimo XVII'). Cavallo 1983, 37, 45, 53, 64 notes that the two *scorze* catalogued as *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 are also writen in that hand ('anonimo XVII'), and Dorandi 1988*b* argues that they therefore cannot be part of the same work or same edition as *P. Herc.* 1428. Examination of these two *scorze*, however, showed that their texts do not match with any of the apographs *P. Herc.* 242 or 247 or any other known parts of *De pietate*. Since their handwriting and content are demonstrably different (the word ἄσκησις occurs), I conclude that these two *scorze* are from an enirely different treatise (a *trattato etico* of unknown authorship) and have been mistakently catalogued as *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 (as we know happened in the case of *P. Herc.* 1077 and in many others). According to Cavallo 1983, 35, *P. Herc.* 1020 (Chrysippus, 'On Dialectical Virtues') is written in the same hand as *P. Herc.* 1428, but they are distinctly different (a fact confirmed for me by Livia Marrone). See further (*g*) below. For the other fragments miscatalogued as *P. Herc.* 1077 see Dorandi 1988*a*; Dorandi and Spinelli 1989, 12.

[2] The apparent uniqueness of the identity of palaeography and format (e.g. *P. Herc.* 1428) may of course be only a fortuitous circumstance of preservation: the scribe who copied *De pietate* may have copied other works. But there does not even seem to be an instance among the Herculaneum papyri where two demonstrably different works share *both* the same scribal hand *and* an identical format.

[3] See 3(*a*) and cf. *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,20–2 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 26): τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐ|σεβείας λόγον τῆς | κατ' Ἐπίκουρον.

motely conceivable context for this topic (apart from another treatise on piety by a different author) would be a biographical work like Philodemus' *Περὶ Ἐπικούρου* or *Πραγματεῖαι*, which, however, is quite unlikely to have dwelt at such length on the topic of Epicurus' view of piety alone. In general other peculiarities of content, style, and idiom, together with the concordance of physical features, appear to override this possibility. The remaining series of detached fragments (*P. Herc.* 229, 247/242, 437, 452, 1610, and 1788) are genuinely linked to the treatise as a whole on the same grounds,[1] and to the first part in particular on grounds of content, because these texts discuss Epicurus and his followers or their views, and present matters of philosophical doctrine in positive, apologetic, form, rather than in that adopted in the second part of the work, which consists exclusively of brief quotations and criticism of non-Epicurean philosophers and the poets. In general it can be said that the content of these detached fragments suits what is discussed in *P. Herc.* 1077//1098 better than the critical discussion in *P. Herc.* 1428.

Three fragments from *P. Herc.* 242 (bottoms of columns) and two from 247 (tops of columns, containing a discussion of divine justice in the poets)[2] have seemed out of place to more than one editor in their present sequence (a critique of the poets' representation of the gods, assigned by Gomperz to the second part of *De pietate*), but can be accommodated[3] quite naturally to the similar discussion of the development of the concept of divine justice in cultural history in *P. Herc.* 229 (assigned, on the independent grounds of content and stichometry to the first part). In the present edition these fragments are therefore regarded as genuine fragments of the first part, but as

[1] Of the papyri of *De pietate* (with the exception of 242, 247, and 452) there is at least one fragment extant of each numbered series today, so that palaeographical identification with the hand of *P. Herc.* 1428 has been confirmed on the basis of autopsy.

[2] *P. Herc.* 247 frr. 7 and 8 (pp. 20–1 G.); *P. Herc.* 242 frr. 7, 8 a + b, 9 a + b (all p. 8 G.), and fr. 10 (p. 6 G.). In the editions of Gomperz and Philippson, all these texts are included in the second, 'critical' part of the treatise. Bücheler 1865, 536–7 (= 606–7) shrewdly linked them with the account of cultural development in *P. Herc.* 229. Gomperz (edn. 1866, p. 6, app. crit.) concurred independently, at least with regard to *P. Herc.* 242 fr. 10: 'gehört vielleicht in den zweiten Haupttheil' (i.e. the first part). Quaranta, who was on hand when *P. Herc.* 242 was transcribed in 1830, explicitly linked *P. Herc.* 242 fr. 10 with 242 fr. 3 (on the poetic accounts of Aigis and Pallas, re-ed. Henrichs 1975*a*, 29–32) in his unpublished edition. Cf. *HV*[2] II 33 a–b; Bassi 1911, 141. Perhaps the most significant advance in this respect was made by Schober 1988, 12–19, who linked the fragments of *P. Herc.* 247 with those of 1610. These he placed at the beginning of his edition of the critical part.

[3] As explained above, (*b*) pp. 30–1, cf. (*c*) pp. 51–2.

spurious fragments of the second.[1] Further, the possibility remains that more, if not all, of the fragments from the critique of poets should be more closely aligned with the philosophical concerns of the first part than previous editors have allowed.[2]

Likewise the fragments of *P. Herc.* 452, first assigned to *De pietate* by Comparetti,[3] which treat festivals and sacrifices, and the formation of the concept of divinity, combine with those of *P. Herc.* 437 to form complete columns. Identification as part of the first part of *De pietate* is confirmed on the basis of content and the hand as represented by the apographs.

Examination of the extant papyri disclosed that none of the fragments[4] now preserved in Naples as *P. Herc.* 1077 are actually the texts originally transcribed by the *disegnatori* (i.e. the Naples apographs or Oxford apographs), but rather belong to several different works, and were at some point mistakenly catalogued under the inventory number 1077.[5] As far as the physical remains are concerned, all these papyri are to be regarded as spurious fragments of *De pietate*, since it has been shown that they were miscatalogued under that inventory number, and have nothing to do with the texts exhibited by the apographs of 1077. Since all previous editors of the treatise worked from the Naples apographs (as represented by HV^2 II), this discovery does not affect their editions. But until recently, we could not be absolutely sure that the original *P. Herc.* 1077 was written in the same

[1] So I exclude *P. Herc.* 1610 fr. 3 (criticism of early poetic cosmogonies) from the first part of the treatise (it is the first extant column after col. 86 in the present edition), but include the other texts of this series (*P. Herc.* 1610 frr. 1, 2, 4, and 5). (Schober grouped all five fragments of 1610 at the beginning of his edition of the critical part.)

[2] See previous note, and (*c*) above, esp. pp. 51–3; also Bücheler 1865, 582 (= 514). Under this assumption it would at least be possible to account for the inclusion of these fragments in the same series.

[3] D. Comparetti 1880 in Comparetti and De Petra 1883, 86; accepted by Crönert 1901, 620–1 (= 1975, 117–18) and by Philippson 1921. I initially doubted this identification, because the surviving *scorza* of 452 is not in the same hand as the rest of the fragments of *De pietate*, and is written in lines of a length considerably greater than any preserved portion of *De Pietate*. But neither does it correspond to any of the texts drawn by the *disegnatore* as 452, while the hand and format represented in those drawings are identical with those of the other apographs of the fragments of *De pietate*. Since the content is similar, we are therefore safe in concluding that the the surviving *scorza* of 452 (like those of 242, 247, and 1077) was mistakenly labelled with this number, while the *disegni* of 452 attest original texts of *De pietate* of which the papyri do not survive.

[4] *P. Herc.* 1077 frr. 8–12, preserved on *mobile* XVI (*colonna* 3, *cornice* 1) in the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi (Litta 1977, 98, 280). See also Dorandi 1988*b*.

[5] Cf. Cavallo 1983, 41 and 76, Dorandi 1988*b*, though this possibility had already been suggested by Bassi 1909, 503–4.

hand as the concluding columns of *De pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1428), for no fragment from it had been identified with certainty. A breakthrough in this regard was achieved when a very well-preserved, legible fragment was recently uncovered, catalogued as *P. Herc.* 1093.[1] The text of the papyrus is the first fourteen lines of the papyrus copied as *N* 1077 fr. 2 (see col. 45). It is unmistakably written (see Pl. 2, cf. Pl. 8) in the same hand as the rest of *De pietate*. Apart from thus confirming that the sequence copied as 1077 originally formed part of the treatise, the new fragment also confirms a correction (long suspected to have been made) by the scribe of an error in his text.

Because of the dispersal of fragments occasioned by the process used to open the roll, certain groups of detached fragments whose original context is uncertain have been conjecturally, though without sufficient reason, assigned to *De Pietate*. Philippson wrongly printed a fragment of *P. Herc.* 168 (containing a discussion of pleasure and the concept of god) as though it were part of the text of *De Pietate*.[2] In fact, all the fragments of *P. Herc.* 168 derive from a *ὑπόμνημα περὶ βίων καὶ ἠθῶν*, and it is clear from the original papyrus that the fragment in question is written in a hand other than that of *P. Herc.* 1428, in lines far too long to have formed any part of *De Pietate*. In addition may be noted the existence of other fragmentary works among the Herculanensia which also dealt with theology and with the doxography of theological views, but which demonstrably do not form any part of the three main theological treatises preserved on papyri from Herculaneum (*De Pietate*, *De Dis* 1 and 3), and thus now await collection in a modern edition.[3]

This treatise has the distinction of being the only work of Philodemus, indeed the only work from Herculaneum, to which any papyrus text found in Egypt has been closely linked. Diels, following Grenfell and Hunt, attributed the Oxyrhynchus fragment (*P. Oxy.* II 215, which belongs to a Hellenistic treatise on religion) to Epicurus.[4]

[1] It resides in *cassetto* 36, with another *scorza*, written in a very different hand, to its right. Together they are labelled 1093. I made the identification quite by chance while collating Philodemus' *On Rhetoric* during the Congresso Internazionale 'L'epicureismo greco e romano' in May 1993.

[2] Philippson 1916, 606–7; 1921, 360–1; 1938, 2463. But see Salvadori 1992; ead., *CErc* 20 (1990), 65–6.

[3] The majority of these texts are still *inedita*. For a list see Crönert 1906, 113 n. 512, to which add Philodemus, *Περὶ προνοίας*, with M. Ferrario, 'Filodemo "Sulla provvidenza"? (PHerc. 1670)', *CErc* 2 (1972), 67–94; Dorandi 1990*a*, 2352–3.

[4] See Diels 1916*b*, 886–909 (= 288–311). On the constitution of the text and its relationship to Lucretius, Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1, and the first part of *De Pietate* see Obbink 1984; 1992*a*.

This attribution was highly controversial. W. Schmid later demonstrated close parallels in style and content between the Oxyrhynchus fragment and known works of Philodemus and other treatises among the Herculanensia,[1] and considered the case for its assignment to Philodemus.[2] Schmid himself ultimately ruled out Philodemean authorship on palaeographical grounds. Its attribution to *De Pietate* can safely be excluded on account of the Oxyrhynchus fragment's extreme frequency of hiatus.[3]

(*e*) *Apographs and Detached Fragments*

The Oxonian and Neapolitan apographs (*O* and *N* respectively) of the papyrus were both drafted by Italian copyists.[4] The bulk of *P. Herc.* 1077 and all of *P. Herc.* 1098, together with the detached fragments, are not represented in *O*, since these papyri were not 'unrolled' until after Hayter's departure from Naples in 1809. In fact, *O* depicts only the first three (i.e. innermost) three layers of the *scorza* stack *P. Herc.* 1077, containing the remains of seven columns.[5] The right-hand column of *O* 1077 fr. 3 was copied a second time after Hayter's departure in 1809

[1] W. Schmid 1963, 40–4. Schmid had closely compared the two texts several years earlier (W. Schmid 1951, 97–157, cf. id. 1962, 368–77). Pascal 1906, 245–7, one of the earliest commentators on *P. Oxy.* II 215, had likewise emphasized the similarities between that text and Philodemus' *De Pietate*.

[2] W. Schmid 1963, 43–4 ultimately excluded Philodemus as the author of the Oxyrhynchus fragment by virtue of the palaeographical dating by the earliest editors, Grenfell and Hunt. This dating (2nd c. BC), however, has now been shown to be too early. Reconsideration of the dating of the hand (1st c. BC: see Obbink 1992*a*) brings the hand within the range of Philodemus and Phaedrus.

[3] Obbink 1984; 1992*a*. Hiatus is tolerated in the Oxyrhynchus fragment e.g. at col. 1,5, 14, 24, 32; col. 2,14, 28, 29. On Philodemus' consistent avoidance of hiatus see Strathmann 1892 and below, § 3 (*c*).

[4] The copyists were G. B. Malesci (*O* 1077), G. B. Casanova (*N* 1077), C. Malesci (*N* 247, 437, 452, 1098), F. Celentano (*N* 229, 242, 1610). Hayter was in no way personally responsible for the production of *O* 1077 (consisting of frr. 1–3 only), since the dates they bear (1787–90) indicate that they were made before Hayter's arrival (though he did subsequently remove them from Naples to England). They are therefore the first apographs of any part of *De pietate* to have been produced.

[5] As an aid towards understanding the relationship between these texts, reproductions of the original Oxonian and Neapolitan apographs have been included in the present edition (see Pls. 5–6). Unlike the later Naples pencil drawings, the early apographs before Hayter's time were produced in pen and ink. This accounts for the markedly different appearance of the Oxonian apographs (see Pl. 5) from that of their Naples counterparts (Pl. 6). With the pen and ink drawings of *O* 1077 1–2 may be compared the elegant Oxonian apographs produced in 1781 by the same copyist (G. B. Malesci) of Philodemus' *De musica* (*P. Herc.* 1497), for which see Capasso 1983, 137, tav. 57.

as the first fragment of *N* 1077.[1] The papyrus itself does not now survive.[2] After *O* 1077 frr. 1 and 2 (the first and second layers of the *scorza*) were transcribed and destroyed in 1790 (or 1787), work on the this half of the broken roll was not resumed until several decades later, when the copyists began by reproducing the exposed, top layer of the *scorza* stack (originally *O* 1077 fr. 3), labelling it as *N* 1077 fr. 1 (Hayter had removed the original *disegno* of this fragment with him to England).[3] Apart from this confusion over the duplication of the first few fragments of *P. Herc.* 1077, the apographs of *De pietate* display only minor traces of tampering or falsification of readings, though innocent miscopying is frequent enough.[4]

For *P. Herc.* 1077 we have Neapolitan apographs in double copies, and, for the first three fragments, also Oxonian apographs, except for *O* 1077 fr. 1 (Pl. 5), for which there is only one witness. N^2 was copied from N^1 (which is unsigned) as a fair copy, but introduced many inaccuracies; O^2 is a close copy of O^1 but very likely collated against the original and so of independent value. The engravings of 1077 in HV^2 II were made from the draft copy N^1, and thereby preserve better readings generally than N^2 (see (*h*) below). For the papyri of *De pietate* other than 1077 and 1428 (for which the Neapolitan apographs exist in double copies), we have only one apograph (*N*). It is unclear

[1] Thus there exist two independent witnesses *O* and *N* for this column, though the papyrus itself does not survive. See Scott 1885, 43: 'It appears, therefore, that two pages (Ox 1 and 2) must have been removed from the "scorze" and destroyed in 1790, leaving "terzo foglio" exposed to view; and consequently, when the remains of the roll were again taken in hand, after Hayter's departure, this page appeared as the first, and is so given in Nap.'

[2] *O* 1077 frr. 1 and 2 are dated 22 and 28 Aug. 1790 respectively. It is curious that *O* 1077 fr. 3 is dated 4 Sept. 1787, *three years before* frr. 1 and 2 (both dated 1790). The succession of dates arouses suspicion, and an error may be assumed (1787 for 1790 on fr. 3). Mario Capasso suggests to me that *O* 1077 frr. 1 and 2 may have been fair copies produced and redated in 1790 from original drafts of 1787 (as for *N* 1077 we possess both the fair copies and the original draft). According to the *Catalogo* (p. 257, based solely on the date on the *disegno* of *O* 1077 fr. 3, our only surviving record), *P. Herc.* 1077 was *svolto* first in 1787. But there is no record of who actually butchered the roll (*P. Herc.* 1428 was 'unrolled' by Paderni in 1802).

[3] Gomperz and Philippson, wrongly assuming that the fragments were transcribed in the order in which they originally stood in the treatise, simply printed these texts in the order of their Oxonian fragment numbers. It is essential to bear in mind that even if frr. 1–3 are transmitted in the original order of transcription, they still stand in the reverse of their original order in the treatise (see above, § 1). There can be no doubt that *O* 1077 frr. 1 and 2 *are* preserved in the order in which they were originally transcribed, since a portion of the text of *O* 1077 fr. 2 was transcribed (from the exposed layer underneath) on *O* 1077 fr. 1 (see Pl. 5; a reproduction of the underlying *O* 1077 fr. 2 appears as the penultimate plate in Gomperz 1866 and in Boserup 1971, 34). The repeated lines stand at centre left in both apographs.

[4] See e.g. Crönert 1898, 585–95 (= 1975, 15–25).

whether these were copied from original drafts (as N^2 was copied from N^1 for 1077) which were later discarded, or whether only one copy was made (N 1098, at any rate, resembles the fair copy N^2 (insofar as it is neater and cleaner but less accurate and detailed) far closer than it does the draft N^1 for 1077). But the engraving in HV^2 II can be seen in all these cases to have been made from the extant apograph, not from a lost draft apograph like N^1 for 1077. When discrepancies appear in HV^2 II (as they sometimes do) they will have been introduced by the engravers, either by error or on the advice of someone or even by clarification from the papyrus in rare cases when it was still extant.

The N and O apographs of *P. Herc.* 1077, and the N apographs of *P. Herc.* 229 and 1098 (for which we have no O apographs) reproduce vertically complete columns only. For the remaining series of *frustula* (*P. Herc.* 242, 247, 437, 452, 1610, 1788), the Neapolitan apographs depict in each case less than complete columns, presumably because the fragments of these series became detached from the *midollo* when the roll was first opened. This process often destroyed the tops or bottoms of columns or split columns into two halves. The apographs of *P. Herc.* 242, for instance, reproduce the bottoms of columns only, while those of *P. Herc.* 247 reproduce only the tops, as do those of 437, the bottoms of which are probably supplied in 452; some of these match perfectly as the tops and bottoms of the same column, as in 247/242; others are linked at the bottom with the top of the following column preserved under a different inventory number. Three fragments of *P. Herc.* 1610, which contains only bottoms of columns, join neatly with their following column preserved as a fragment of *P. Herc.* 247 (top halves only). A fragment of *P. Herc.* 242 (bottom halves only) links with its following column preserved as a fragment of *P. Herc.* 229 (cols. 74–5).

Some of the copying habits of the *disegnatori* have already been noted. It should be emphasized that the copyists did not copy every bit of writing exposed to view, but preferred to concentrate (up to a week was lavished on a single column) on the more completely preserved, legible columns of text. As a result they often did not copy the partially preserved columns on the edges of a given *scorza*, unless whole words were preserved.[1] It is for this reason that many gaps remain. Although much can be recovered through careful restoration and supplement,

[1] For examples see O 1077 fr. 3. O depicts a complete column (col. 47), with the right half of the preceding column (col. 46). N depicts only the complete column on the right, omitting the more fragmentary column on the left. Similarly the extant *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 8 (Pl.

not every column in the current edition links with its originally adjoining columns. A compensating factor in this respect is that the original order of the extant columns has been recovered.

In producing the apographs the copyists meticulously reproduced the letters or parts of letters they thought they saw, and very rarely mistook round letter shapes for square ones (or vice versa), for example, or diagonal strokes for horizontals or verticals. A, Δ, and Λ are often confused, as are C, Є, and O; Π for ΤΙ sometimes, but infrequently. The confusion that I have found most frequently overlooked by editors of *De pietate* is N for ΑΙ or vice versa, which occurs with alarming frequency. The services of the *disegnatori* have been casually maligned and generally underrated, especially in the light of the extraordinary difficulties involved in deciphering Herculaneum papyri. In the large number of cases where Herculaneum papyri have perished or deteriorated, the pencil drawings of these draughtsmen represent the closest textual witnesses to the original papyrus text. That copyists were employed who had no Greek was a conscious decision on the part of the eighteenth-century *accademici*, who sought to secure the only available element of editorial control against the introduction of error by conjecture. The resulting value of the original *disegni* in contrast to their reproductions on copperplate (in HV^2 II)[1] is manifold, although they necessarily require the use of special editorial techniques. That 'the eye of the draughtsman is not connected to the mind of the editor'[2] is perhaps regrettable but unavoidable in the

3) appears on the Neapolitan *disegno*, which, however, totally ignores the more fragmentarily preserved following column and an important stichometric letter in its margin (Pl. 4). Compare the contemporary defensive description by de Iorio 1825, 41–2 of how the *disegnatori* removed one layer of papyrus after another from the *scorza* stack, 'senza averne perduta una sola parola che non fosse stata fedelmente disegnata'; and see Dorandi 1992.

[1] I have collated HV^2 II in its entirety and in general treated it as a secondary witness to the papyri like the other apographs, rather than as an edition, although it was engraved after the apographs were drawn and is in most cases dependent on them. Because so many of the papyri have perished, in a few places it is difficult to tell whether, when HV^2 II differs from the reading of the apograph, this difference is due to mechanical error or conjecture on the part of one of the *accademici*, or whether it reflects a clarification in a papyrus that still existed in 1860 but which has since perished. For an example see l. 2426. It is usual to assume error or conjecture. When the new papyrus fragment of *P. Herc.* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 2 recently came to light (p. 57 n. 1), it confirmed the interlinear deletion by expunction point that appears in HV^2 II, but is missing from N^2. But the interlinear correction was accurately depicted in N^1, the first draft of N^2, which is thus shown to be the source of HV^2 II here (see the commentary on l. 1283).

[2] The language is that of E. G. Turner, 'The Need for New Work on the Herculaneum Papyri', *CErc* 1 (1971), 7–10.

absence of adequate photography and consistent editorial judgement: what they saw is what we get.

One deceptive feature of the apographs, although sometimes assumed, has never been explicitly stated, namely, with respect to spacing of letters and lacunae. Because the *disegnatori* wrote from left to right, it became almost impossible to insure that the relative length of lines, and therefore the entire vertical alignment of letters, was consistently represented as it appeared on the papyrus itself. The result is that in any apograph of a normal column, the reliability of spacing of letters and vertical alignment decreases as one moves from the left-hand to right-hand side of the column, and that spacing of letters lost at the ends of lines (and the vertical alignment by which one would normally judge the extent of the lacunae) is particularly unreliable. Certainty in judging precisely where incomplete lines end, relative to complete lines represented on the apographs at the right-hand margin, is almost unattainable. An added yet curiously welcome feature of this inaccuracy is that columns with intercolumnar lacunae tend to be significantly *more* reliable in this respect, because in these cases the copyist was forced to stop his progression of writing from left to right and, after spacing for the lacuna, pick up writing again by reference to the vertical alignment of letters in the preceding line above or following line below. The reliability of spacing in the lacunae themselves tends to be wildly divergent. In cases of lacunae of no fewer than five letters, where we can be absolutely certain of a supplement on the basis of context, errors of spacing of 0.5 to 1.0 letter are not uncommon in the apographs. This margin of error is not terribly great, but does unfortunately weaken any argument for a reading based on a difference in spacing less than 1.0 letter. But it would be absurd to discount altogether the evidence of the apographs as secondary witnesses or, what is more common, to disregard the spacing of the apographs at will and to rely upon context and the outer limits of line length alone.

(*f*) *Stichometry*

Scribal notations indicating the number of lines (στίχοι) copied by the scribe appear marginally throughout the text of *De pietate*.[1] A letter

[1] On the stichometry of the Herculaneum papyri, see Diels 1882, 377–84; Bassi 1909; Ohly 1924, 190–220; F. Sbordone, 'La sticometria nei papiri della Retorica di Filodemo', *RAAN* 50 (1975), 117–23; Cavallo 1983, 20–2; Dorandi 1987. On stichometric notations in

from the Ionic alphabet is used as a symbol[1] to indicate increments of 200 lines (roughly 6⅔ columns, of *c.*30 lines each).[2] Thus A and Γ designate the 200th and 600th lines copied by the scribe, respectively. This interval between any two successive numerals can be accurately determined for the present treatise from the stichometric notations preserved in the continuous columns of *P. Herc.* 1428.[3] The

ancient books generally: Wachsmuth 1879, 38–51; Ohly 1928. In papyri of Egyptian provenance, stichometric notations are rare in prose texts (perhaps an Athenian rather than an Alexandrian convention?): see Turner 1971, 19 n. 2, 95, and for examples, the Oxyrhynchus historian, Pack² 2189 col. 5,45; the logical papyrus *P. Parisina* 2 = *SFV* ii.180 = 1080 Hülser has the marginal letters M and N, apparently at 100-line intervals: photog. in W. Cavini *et al.*, *Studi su papiri greci di logica e medicina* (Florence, 1985), 112 (plate), 144, 156 (text), 130 (discussion); see also Ohly 1928, 57. In poetry books: Stesichorus, *Iliu persis*, *PMGF* S133 Davies (*P. Oxy.* 2803 fr. 1) col. 2 l. 9 (A); frag. incert. (*P. Lille* 76 Cii), *PMGF* 222(*b*).300 Davies (Γ); in editions of Homer: S. West, *The Ptolemaic Papyri of Homer* (Papyrologica Coloniensia, 3; Cologne and Opladen, 1965), index s.v. stichometry. Ancient books could be cited by such points of reference (not their primary function): see Zeno's *Πολιτεία* cited at D.L. 7. 33 and Chrysippus' *Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων* and *Περὶ δικαίου* cited at 7. 187–8 in the form *κατὰ τοὺς ἑξακοσίους στίχους*, 'in the 600s', *κατὰ τοὺς χιλίους*, 'in the 1,000s'. Such citations are very rare (Ohly 1928, 109–17, Wachsmuth 1879, 39–42, Schofield 1991, 4–5): Asconius' commentaries on Cicero, a scholiast on Oribasius (in reference to works of Galen), Eustathius on Origen (in reference to the Gospel of John), and Hegemonius against the Manichees being among the very few; i.e. such texts as Cicero, Galen, and some of the books of the New Testament contained such notations. In this system, the word *στίχος* is applied to prose works on the analogy of the verse line in poetry. Scribes writing prose texts observed no standard line length. But standard length was conventionally calculated, 'generally reckoned (on the model of the hexameter) as 15–16 syllables' (so Schofield 1991, 7 n. 12 following Diels 1882, 377–84; Cavallo 1989, 20–2). For prose written in actual hexameter lengths (together with hexameters as the model) see *P. Derveni* col. 17 (= new col. 21) in Turner and Parsons 1987, pl. 51 with p. 151 n. 113 ('the origin of the practice?'). The lines of *De pietate* are regarded as half the length of a hexameter; stichometric letters thus appear every 200 lines (= 100 standard, hexameter-length lines).

[1] These are not numerals (of either the acrophonic or alphabetic variety) but rather alphabetic labels such as designate the books of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (and Theophrastus' *Nomoi*): see *GG* 348b; [Plut.] *Vit. Hom. II* 4 (originally introduced by 'Aristarchus'); S. West, *The Ptolemaic Papyri of Homer*, 18–19 with n. 30.

[2] In the Herculaneum rolls this figure varies from between 75 and 210 lines per stichometric letter. Cavallo 1983, 20–2 rightly stresses the necessity for an accurate determination of this base (not always possible) for any analysis or reconstruction of the stichometry of an individual roll.

[3] $\bar{B}$ at col. 7, 15 (p. 18 Henrichs) and $\bar{\Gamma}$ exactly 200 lines later at col. 13, 13 (p. 23 Henrichs). The extant *P. Herc.* 1428 also exhibits these stichometric 'points' at 20-line intervals, on which see Bassi 1909, 70–1; Philippson 1920, 235, 364–5; K. Ohly, *Archiv*, 7 (1924), 191. These points originally appeared every 20 lines throughout the entire text of *De pietate*, but they were not recorded consistently by the copyists. I have recorded them in their original position in the diplomatic text only when they actually appear on the papyri or on the apographs. For a clear instance where two appear in the same column see col. 28 (*P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 12: the points appear before ll. 787 and 807, a 20-line interval); cf. col. 47 (at l. 1357),

stichometric notations provide an additional aid toward reconstruction of the treatise and an estimate of its original dimensions:[1]

N 1098 fr. 8, 17	(col. 40, line 1146)	Λ .
O 1077 fr. 2 dext., 11	(col. 50, line 1430)	N .
P. Herc. 229 fr. 9 dext., 16	(col. 57, line 1632)	Ξ .
N 229 fr. 8, 13	(col. 59, line 1686)	O .
N 229 fr. 4, 2	(col. 79, line 2274)	Φ .[2]
P. Herc. 1088 fr. 6, 3	(Schober 1923 = 1988, 87)	Ė .[3]
P. Herc. 1428 col. 7, 15	(Henrichs 1974, 18)	B .
P. Herc. 1428 col. 13, 13	(Henrichs 1974, 23)	Γ .
(*P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15, 23	(Henrichs 1974, 26)	end of a roll, 77 lines after Γ)

A significant attempt to make sense of these signs was made by Philippson 1921, 355–64. Thinking that *P. Herc.* 1098 and 1077 were consecutive fragments from different rolls, he shrewdly realized that there were too many extant columns following 1098 fr. 8 (in the ascending order of the *disegni*) to have fallen between the stichometric notations Λ and N (i.e. 2 × 200 = 400 lines or 13 columns, as opposed to the 18 extant columns following fr. 8 in the 1098 sequence alone). Perceiving the similarity of subject-matter of the earliest labelled fragments of 1077 and the earliest of 1098.[4] he theorized that 1077 was an epitome, or revised 'second edition', of 1098, both having their own independent stichometry.[5] He connected *P. Herc.*

and see Philippson 1921, 384. One of these points accompanies each stichometric letter, since these always represent multiples of 20 lines: see e.g. l. 1146.

[1] For the sake of a complete count, I give here all the known stichometric notations for all of *De pietate*, including the second part. All these letters have a line written suprascript over them, with the exception of N (on the early *O* apograph) and Φ (which is incompletely preserved, see n. 2). The suprascript line indicates that they are symbols.

[2] The letter is strangely written: a bowl with a descender from its right side, serifed at the bottom. It is compatible with Φ, and no other letter; one assumes that it has lost its top (together with the customary suprascript line) and the right side of its complete bowl.

[3] The Neapolitan apograph gives a very large, clear Є. Schober 1988, 70 n. 15 emends to Θ, in order to suit his arrangement of the fragments. Though the papyrus survives, the stichometric letter itself is no longer extant, the *scorza* having suffered damage at the left edge.

[4] See further (*c*) above. It seemed inconceivable to Philippson that the charge that Epicurus' philosophy went unknown at Athens could have been discussed twice in the same book, especially since on his reconstruction these would have been separated by an interval of 25 columns. On these grounds he hypothesized the existence of a 'second' edition of the treatise. Under the present reconstruction they are separated by only 4 columns (now cols. 49, ll. 1402–12 and 54, ll. 1545–56). The latter mention is simply the conclusion of the same discussion.

[5] On Philippson's theory of a 're-edition' of *De pietate*, see further (*h*) below.

229 with 1098 (the 'full' version), and in order to account for the two preserved stichometric notations in 229 under the transmitted order of the fragments, he supposed that O in 229 fr. 8 was a miswriting of the copyist for Ω. He then proceeded to calculate separate totals for both the 'full' version (*P. Herc.* 1098 + 229) and for 'der Abriß' (*P. Herc.* 1077).

The present reconstruction vitiates Philippson's ingenious theory of an epitome or re-edition of *De pietate*, since it demonstrates that the fragments of 1077 and 1098 were originally integrated, interlinking columns of the same papyrus roll. This accounts for the similarity of subject-matter of the successive columns of 1077 with those of 1098, for they are thus seen to be originally alternating columns of the same papyrus. As it happens, this also resolves the discrepancy in the stichometry. Because the fragments of both series have also been shown to be numbered in the reverse of their proper order, *P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 8 (containing Λ)[1] now falls substantally *before* 1077 fr. 2 with the letter N.[2] Once the columns of this series have been properly integrated according to textual and physical constraints, nine columns are extant between the notations Λ and N, out of a possible thirteen (four columns having perished in the process of opening the roll, or having been ignored by the copyists as too exiguous to merit copying).

The fragments of *P. Herc.* 229, likewise now reordered, have been joined (on grounds of content) to the earliest numbered fragments of the series 1077// 1098. As a result, the O of 229 fr. 8 properly precedes the Φ of 229 fr. 4. The letter Ξ, preserved in the margin of a column whose remains were too exiguous to be recorded by the copyists (*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 dext.), was recently recovered through the removal of a *sovrapposto* from the extant papyrus (Pl. 4, cf. Pl. 3).[3] It links *P. Herc.* 229 to the innermost part of the series 1077// 1098, bearing the preceding letter N, where no other physical link survives, though one had long been suspected since both discuss the fate of Socrates at the hands of the Athenians.[4] It also confirms beyond any doubt that the fragments of 229 are numbered in the reverse of their original order in the treatise: for it is the last numbered fragment in its series (it is for this

[1] Col. 40, l. 1146.

[2] That is to say, *O* 1077 fr. 2 = col. 50, l. 1430 (for *N* 1077 fr. 2 is a different fragment, col. 45).

[3] This was removed at my request using a warmed alcohol solution, and the reading of the stichometric letter verified, by K. Kleve and B. Fosse in May 1993. I am grateful for their assistance and advice.

[4] See (*c*) above, p. 51 with n. 1.

reason that it survives as an extant papyrus: because it was the last, i.e. outermost, bottom layer in the *scorza* stack and so was not destroyed after copying). Once the fragments of 229 are reordered in reverse sequence, their stichometric letters (fr. 8: O, fr. 4: Φ) fall neatly into place in ascending sequence. In spite of obcurities due to loss of text in the process of *scorzatura*,[1] one could hardly ask for a more economical demonstration of the principles of reconstruction.

Between N (*O* 1077 fr. 2) and O (229 fr. 8) now stand 9 preserved columns (out of a possible 13 columns or 2 stichometric blocks). Between O (229 fr. 8) and Φ (229 fr. 4) must have originally stood 6 stichometric blocks or 1,200 lines of text, roughly 40 columns, of which only 16 columns were transcribed by the copyists (or 25, if the fragments of 437 are counted as individual columns, rather than being the tops of any of the fragments of 242 or 452: now cols. 60–77). This represents the most substantial loss of text from this part of *De pietate*.

At the beginning of the treatise were the columns which preceded the stichometric letter Λ (i.e. those fragments of 1077 and 1098 which follow 1098 fr. 8 in the Neapolitan numbering).[2] These will therefore have occupied around 68 columns of which 40.5 are now extant. These results may be represented schematically as shown in Table 1.

After 229 fr. 4 with its label Φ come the remaining fragments of

[1] Four columns are lost (out of 6.5) between Ξ and O, which is not surprising given that the copyists did not always copy exiguous preserved columns (for examples see cols. 46 and 57), but simply removed them to get the the next layer underneath. But nearly 24 columns are lost (out of 40) between O and Φ. This would mean the copyists ignored at least one layer for every layer they copied. Even on the more optimistic counting of the fragments of 452 and 437 as separate columns, we are missing 17 columns out of 40 between O and Φ. Since the Φ is imperfectly preserved (see p. 64 n. 2) we should perhaps be wary. Could it perhaps be a misreading of P (two letters = 13 columns after O)?

[2] Allowing for the columns known to be missing in the 1077//1098 series, the earliest preserved column, *P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 29, would on this reconstruction fall 10–14 columns before the beginning of the treatise (l. 1). This was confirmed by examination of the *scorza* of this fragment, which, according to Dr Kleve and Mr Fosse, exhibits at least five (and perhaps as many as seven) layers of *sottoposti* underneath; each layer will have contained at least one column, as will those layers in the corresponding half of the roll, now lost. The last layer is the beginning of the roll. The original, reconstructed numbering of columns and lines could, of course, be introduced in the text, especially for those columns in the vicinity of the preserved stichometric letters which give us exact counts. But because recovery of these initial underlying layers is impossible given the currently available technology, and because the number of columns lost between this earliest exposed layer and the first preserved stichometric letter (Λ) in col. 40 is also indeterminate (due to at least five cases in that sequence where it is impossible to tell whether two columns join or do not join), it seemed best to begin numbering inclusively with the first extant line as 1, rather than introducing the reconstructed (but inexactly estimated) original lineation (l. 1 = originally *c.*300–600).

TABLE 1

(i) *The extant text as presented*

	68 cols. (40½ extant) (cols. 1–40)	13 cols. (9 extant) (cols. 40–50)	6½ cols. (6½ extant) (cols. 50–7)	6½ cols. (2½ extant) (cols. 50–9)	45 cols. (15½ extant) (cols. 59–6)	
[A]	Λ	N	Ξ	O	Φ	+ ?
[beginning of treatise]	*P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 8	*P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 2	*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9	*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 8	*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 4	
[col. 6,20] [l. 200]	col. 40,17 l. 1146	col. 50,10 l. 1430	col. 57,16 l. 1632	col. 59,13 l. 1686	col. 79,2 l. 2274	

(ii) *The original numbering reconstructed*

[A]	Λ	N	Ξ	O	Φ	[c.Ω]
[col. 6,20] [l. 200]	[col. 73] [l. 2200]	[col. 86] [l. 2600]	[col. 93] [l. 2800]	[col. 100] [l. 3000]	[col. 140] [l. 4200]	[col. 160] [l. 4800]

P. Herc. 229 (four columns), 1788 (one column), and those of 247/242 (one column) and 1610 (two columns)—to complete the fragments of first part of *De pietate*—i.e. eight transcribed columns plus two missing in between where they do not join with one another. These may be assumed to have occupied about two stichometric letters (X–Ψ, thirteen columns), or three (X–Ω, *c.*20 columns, assuming a greater degree of loss). This would bring the count for the first part of *De pietate* (i.e. up to col. 86, the extant transition to the catalogue of *θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταί*) to somewhere around the stichometric letters Ψ or Ω.[1] This would yield an approximate total for this part of *De pietate* of around 4,800 lines or 160 columns, of which 86 are preserved or recorded as apographs (roughly 50%).[2]

It has also been argued above that the discussion of the history of

[1] There is one additional sign recorded in the margin of *N* 242 fr. 7 at l. 4 (see l. 2237). Shaped like the arabic numeral 7, it is clearly outside the column of writing. It does not appear to be a stichometric letter, since it lacks a suprascript line and the characteristic stichometric point. Possibly it is a marginal correction (*τ*) required there in the text, perhaps by an ancient reader, because this is not a usual form of scribal correction. If a stichometric letter, it could only have been a T, Y, or X, thus placing it very late in the numerical alphabet, as we would expect here. But since it is not fully compatible with any of these, and may be a marginal correction of an omission in that line, I have not included it in the reconstruction of the stichometry.

[2] Cavallo 1983, 20–2 notes the number of severe discrepancies between stichometric bases and totals, and actual counts in well-preserved texts, and stresses that any analysis of the stichometry should be regarded as only a rough estimate of length and used only as secondary or corroborating evidence in the reconstruction of an individual treatise.

civilization in *P. Herc.* 229 was originally linked with the catalogue of poets in the second part of *De pietate*.[1] This link is consistent with, if not corroborated by the stichometry, for the only stichometric letter preserved from the catalogue comes early on, and is a very early one: *P. Herc.* 1088 contained the stichometric letter Ε.[2] This accords well with scribal procedure throughout the Herculaneum papyri.[3] After the scribes completed the sequence A–ω in an individual roll, they simply began again with A, without in any way differentiating the second series from the first; stichometric totals for all series were tabulated and recorded at the end of the treatise after the colophon.[4] In the case of *De pietate*, the scribe will have continued through this second set of stichometric letters and begun yet a third time; for the continuous columns of *P. Herc.* 1428 contain the notations B (col. 7,15) and Γ (col. 13,13). If this reconstruction is correct, this would yield approximate totals for the work as a whole: *c.*4,800 lines (roughly A–ω) for the first part of the work + 4,800 lines for the critique of poets and pre-Socratic philosophers (roughly A–ω)[5] + 600 lines from the continuous columns of *P. Herc.* 1428 (Γ = 3 × 200) + 77 lines (from 1428 col. 13,13 to the colophon)—i.e. roughly 10,277 lines or 343 columns.[6]

At one time these totals[7] could have been read in the colophon at the end of the treatise, viz. at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,23. By the time the Neapolitans had finished unrolling the *midollo* containing *P. Herc.* 1428, all that could be read, after the vestiges of the author's name and title,[1]

[1] Schober 1988, 69 was surely right to reject the only other alternative, namely that the sequence Λ–Φ came *between* the critique of poets and the catalogue of philosophers: 'necesse esset propter notas stichometricas Philodemum doctrinam Epicuri possuisse inter recensionem poetarum et refutationem ceterorum philosophorum, quo quid absurdius sit nescio.' He was wrong, however, to insist that these texts (Λ–Φ) must necessarily have come last in the treatise: see 3(*d*). [2] See p. 64 n. 3. [3] See p. 62 n. 1.

[4] Those in the colophon to *P. Herc.* 1428, are treated below.

[5] To be precise: the first continuous column of *P. Herc.* 1428 (col. 1, Henrichs 1974*a*, 12) starts 14 lines before A (the actual letter being now lost in a lacuna in the papyrus). Preceding this are fragments of at least 27 more or less connected columns of *P. Herc.* 1428 containing the criticism of the pre-Socratics. The first few fragments of 1428 were originally connected to the series 248, the end of the criticism of the poets (for the link see Schober 1988, 109; Henrichs 1975*a*, 18).

[6] This hypothesis presumes that, contrary to the traditional order, the 'dogmatic' part of *De pietate* originally preceded the 'critical' part. On this reordering see (*c*) above, 3(*d*) below.

[7] With the exception that in the *subscriptio*, the total number of lines would have been halved, since a στίχος was normally regarded as two lines of the length of those in the columns of *De pietate* (about half the length of a hexameter). This in no way affects the counts tabulated by the marginal stichometric numerals (which have 200 rather than 100 as a base), nor the σελίδες count; see e.g. Hammerstaedt 1992, 14.

were the vestigial beginnings of the totals for lines (*ἀριθμός*) and columns (*cελίδεc*):

APIΘ OC+X[
CEΛIΔ Y[.]T[

Although these numerals are incomplete, and their readings uncertain,[2] a confirmation of the totals for the entire treatise calculated above is provided by column counts recorded in alphabetic numeration in the lower margins of several fragments from the early part of *P. Herc.* 1428:[3]

fr. 1 *τι* = 320
fr. 9 *τκ* = 330

In the order in which these fragments were arranged by the early Neapolitan technicians, these numerals stand at an interval of ten columns, and so can be assumed to provide a running count of columns in the treatise. These notations stand within 10–20 columns from the end of the roll containing *P. Herc.* 1428, roughly confirming the above calculations of 343 columns for both parts of *De pietate* taken together.[4] Further, this demonstrates unequivocally that at this point in the treatise the stichometric alphabet A–Ω (= 4,800 lines or 160 columns) has been gone through nearly twice. We can conclude from this that the stichometric count contained at the end of the

[1] These are given and discussed below, 3(*d*).

[2] *O* reads APIΘ OC+X[| CEΛIΔ Y[.]T[, N reads APIΘ OCIX[| CEΛIΔ .C[. No clarification is to be gained from the extant papyrus (Pl. 8). If we trust the earlier witness *O* as far as it goes, Y[.]T might be interpreted as T[M]Γ (i.e. 343) for the *cελίδεc* count, which would require extracting MCOZ (10,277) from the traces after APIΘ.

[3] 0.6 cm. below the centre of columns of writing. To my knowledge these have never been noticed; they are not recorded on the apographs or in any edition. Almost cursive, they are written in a wiry, spindly hand, probably different than that of the main text ('anonimo XII'), certainly with a different pen stroke. Another appears about ten columns further on in fr. 15, but appears to be merely K. Still another may appear (again 0.6 cm into the centre of the lower margin) in the extant *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 dext. but is difficult to make out (MA?, MZ?, NAZ?; we ought to expect here ϘΓ, i.e. 93, on the basis of the stichometric letter Ξ, = 2,800 lines or 93 columns, which occurs in the left margin of this column). Perhaps they were not recorded throughout the text of *De pietate*, but are the jottings of a scribe or *διορθωτής* checking his stichometric counts. (Scribes were often paid by the number of lines they wrote, a fact to which stichometric marks and totals are partly due.) Such column counts appear elsewhere in the Herculanensia, e.g. *De signis*, *P. Herc.* 1065 in the upper margin at the intercolumnium between cols. 15 and 16 (I owe this reference to Daniel Delattre).

[4] We should perhaps not expect complete accuracy from the scribe's manual counting, either in the marginal stichometric letters or in the column totals.

treatise includes the columns of the first part of the treatise (rather than being a separate count for the second part, or for a second papyrus roll). This is important, for it shows that regardless of exactly where the division between parts (or their disposition into separate papyrus rolls) occurs, the stichometric labelling was continuous throughout. We have now to consider at what stichometric point the first part of *De pietate* will have ended, and how much of a papyrus roll it occupied.

Clearly this was an expansive work. The totals of lines and columns set out above exceed the outer margin of length for a work recorded in a single papyrus roll, the outer limits being fixed by conventions and physical constraints on the length of the roll (*c.*9 m., but up to 12–13 m. in exceptional cases).[1] Many of the Herculaneum rolls that preserve stichometric totals at the colophon contained as few as 2,500 lines (Philod. *De ira*[2]), and others between 3,000 and 4,000 lines, e.g. Epicurus, *De nat.* 14, 15, and 28,[3] individual books of Philodemus' *Rhetoric*.[4] The upper margin of length is reliably set by several recently examined examples. One copy of the third book of Philodemus' *Rhetoric* (*P. Herc.* 1426) contained a total of 204 columns.[5] Book 5 of *On Poems* contained more, but it became so long that one of the two copies of it had to be divided into two rolls (*P. Herc.* 1538); the exemplar containing the entire book was perhaps 245 to 269 columns in length.[6] These provide the two longest, reliably attested single rolls among the Herculaneum papyri. It is safe to say that the 343 columns of *De Pietate* required two papyrus rolls.[7]

As a result we are faced with the inevitability that the roll contain-

[1] Cavallo 1983, 14–16.

[2] According to the edition of Indelli 1988, 38 *De ira* contained 124 columns of 40 lines each, amounting to 2,735 lines in total. Cf. the edn. of Wilke (Leipzig, 1914), p. vi.

[3] See Sedley 1973, 10.

[4] See Sbordone, above, p. 62 n. 1. According to the edition of Olivieri 1914, p. vii, Philodemus' *Περὶ παρρησίας*, consisting of a single roll, contained 6,767 lines of text, cf. K. Ohly, *Archiv*, 7 (1924), 220, while *Περὶ κακιῶν* is said to have contained 9,093 lines: ibid. 208 (because the text is preserved under four separate inventory numbers, *P. Herc.* 1008/1424/1457/1675, it is impossible to know if this was a single roll). In both cases the editors have badly miscalculated, forgetting to divide by two as required by the methods of tabulation used by the scribes in these cases (two half-hexameter length lines are counted as one *στίχος*). For lengths of other Herculaneum treatises, see Bassi 1909; Dorandi 1987; Cavallo 1983, 14–16.

[5] Hammerstaedt 1992, 14. [6] Mangoni 1993; Janko 1991, 62 n. 346.

[7] Already Gomperz thought that *De pietate* as a whole consisted originally of at least two papyrus rolls (see his letter to Diels, cit. p. 32 n. 1), as did Philippson (1921) 356, 361–2. But this was based solely on their understanding of *παραγράφειν* at the conclusion of *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,23 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 26) and the fact that it is followed by the end of

ing the first part of *De pietate* simply ended at some point, and that a new roll likewise began again. This need not mean that it began with a new book.[1] We are unfortunately missing the complete entry in the *subscriptio*, in *P. Herc.* 1428 where *βιβλίον β'* (or simply *β'*) would have appeared following (or underneath) the title, if this were a second book. But there are no cross-references or other indications among the surviving fragments of a division into different books. At *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,14–19 Philodemus speaks of the treatise as divided into *μέρη*, not books.

So it remains to determine exactly where the new roll began, and which fragments should be assigned to it. In the one thematic division explicitly signalled in the text (see 2479–96, introducing the criticism of the poets), there can have been no division between two papyrus rolls. For *P. Herc.* 247/242 (which contain texts from the criticism of the poets) also contain texts from the discussion of justice and fear of the gods clearly belonging to the discussion of that topic in *P. Herc.* 1610 and 229 (from the first part of the work). This contextual coherence is confirmed by the physical links between 247/242 and 1610, and by the new join between *P. Herc.* 242 and *P. Herc.* 229 (cols. 74–5). On the other hand, the division cannot have fallen before the 229 sequence, because that would leave the first roll with less than 90 columns, which would be too few, leaving the second roll with a disproportionately greater number of columns. If the treatise had been divided proportionately, the division between rolls would fall 1.6 stichometric blocks after Ω, i.e. shortly after (the second) A.[2]

The exact stichometric point at which the catalogue of poets began can be determined with some precision (though as just demonstrated,

a roll (Philippson emended the stichometry to suit), and so carries no independent weight. But see 3(*d*) below.

[1] For the general equivalence roll = book see Canfora 1974, 9–11; Dorandi 1988*b*, 25 with n. 1. But there are exceptions to this rule, apparently generated, as in the present case, by exceptionally expansive works: e.g. Philodemus, *On Poems* 5 (*P. Herc.* 1538, discussed above); one recension of the the fourth book of Philodemus' *Rhetoric* was similarly divided into two rolls, without beginning a new book (see Dorandi, *ZPE* 82 (1990), 82–4; Scott 1885). So also Euclid. *Elem.* (see T. Dorandi, *Prometheus*, 12 (1986), 225). Still wider comparisons may be useful: Thucydides book 1 would run to roughly 13,000 lines (433 columns) if copied in the format of *De pietate*. But Thucydides 1. 1–88 (two-thirds of book 1 = 51 pages of OCT) is said to be 2,000 *στίχοι* long (Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* p. 339. 14–16 U.-R.). It had obviously been copied in a format that could accommodate the entire first book in a single roll.

[2] In this case the length of each papyrus roll would have been *c.* 13.5 m. (average column + intercolumnium width 7.2 cm. × 343). As Mario Capasso points out to me, a single roll twice this length would be inconceivable.

this cannot have been the beginning of a papyrus roll). For from the beginning of the catalogue, after its introduction in column 86, we have 1 column of 1610, the remaining columns of 247/242 (12 columns, with some lost columns of 1610 in between), 7 columns of 1088 (in reversed sequence, with some missing columns in between), plus 2 interleaved columns of 433—i.e. 20+ columns, before the stichometric E in 1088 fr. 6 (see vol. ii). This notation means that 5 × 200 or 1,000 lines = 33 columns have elapsed since the stichometric letter Ω. Given the 20+ columns that we know must have preceded the letter E, and allowing for some loss of text, this would place the beginning of the catalogue of poets at about the letter A (or slightly before, allowing for a greater degree of loss).[1] This coheres well with the evidence that the first part of the treatise (i.e. up to col. 86, the introduction to the catalogue of poets) ran to somewhere between Φ and Ω or slightly afterwards. Thus the catalogue of poets will have begun, at the conclusion of the first part of the treatise, near the end of the first roll containing *De pietate*, and continued through the end of the 247/242–1610 sequence, which has been shown to be physically part of that roll. *P. Herc.* 1088 (which exhibits no physical link with the 247/242–1610 sequence) will then be the earliest extant part of the second roll (see vol. ii). One would expect the new roll to begin with new stichometry (i.e. l. 1, then A, etc.), rather than that the stichometry should be continuous across both rolls. In this case the 247/242–1610 sequence will have been the *midollo* of the first roll of the treatise,[2] while 1088

[1] Schober 1988, 70 with n. 15, assuming the criticism of the poets to be both the beginning of a roll and the beginning of the treatise proper, wished to emend the E of 1088 fr. 6 to Θ, thus allowing two more stichometric blocks (= 13 columns) to accommodate the fragments of 247/242 and 1610 (which he called the 'praefatio' of the treatise) before the stichometric numeral zero. The textual constraints of the link (unknown to Schober) between the 247/242//1610 sequence and 229 now rule out this approach; in addition we know on the basis of the column-totals recorded in the lower margins of *P. Herc.* 1428 frr. 1 and 9 (see above, p. 69 with n. 3) that the stichometric count had already completed *two* stichometric alphabets at the end of *P. Herc.* 1428 (rather than only one, as Schober thought).

[2] Thus the entire sequence *P. Herc.* 229, 1610, 247/242 will have been a fragmented *midollo* from which the outer layers of the first papyrus roll (1077//1098) were detached. Not all the *midolli* survived as completely as that of e.g. *P. Herc.* 1428. No trace survives any notation that might have signalled the end of the roll that contained the first part of *De pietate* (without ending the treatise), as there is at the end of *P. Herc.* 1423, the first roll of *Rhet.* 4 (i. 147 Sudhaus) *τῶν εἰς δύο τὸ πρότερον* (however, in the second roll, *P. Herc.* 1007, the *subscriptio τῶν εἰς δύο τὸ δεύτερον* (reported by Scotti in *HV* XI) is not recorded on the original *disegno*, and is not visible on the extant papyrus). The parallels provided by Philod. *Rhet.* 4 and *Poem.* 5 (also single books divided into two rolls) show that the narrative itself

(which alternates with 433) will have been the outer layers of the second roll.

(*g*) *Orthography and Handwriting*

The text of *De pietate*[1] exhibits features of Hellenistic orthography (iotacism, lack of assimilation, etc.) found in most of the Herculaneum papyri of Philodemus.[2] For instance *ει* is commonly found for long *ι*: 1549 *ἐγ]εινώσκε[τ]ο*; *ι* sometimes (but not usually) for *ει*: e.g. 538 *ὑποτίνων*; 1562 *δινῶν*; Schober 1988, 96 *Μιρακίσκους*; *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 5,6 (Henrichs 1974, 15) *Ἰρήνην*. *Iota mutum*, consistently written adscript, is sometimes omitted (1685, 1689 *πάσῃ*). Similarly, it is occasionally written superfluously and in error: 1590 *ἔτη{ι}*, *οὕτωι passim* (but Schober 1988, 87: *Cαπ]φώι* apparently the original and primitive nominative). Lack of assimilation, e.g. *ν* followed by a labial or guttural (e.g. 1338–9 *cυνπερι[λαμ]|βάνειν*) is common; but sometimes we get assimilation according to classical conventions: 1954 *ὅλομ̣ βίο̣[ν*, 2498 *ἐμ παντί*. There is a deliberate attempt to avoid hiatus.[3] Elision is common, both in monosyllables and disyllables, a feature which must be taken into account in evaluating proposed restorations.

In syllabification at line-ends the scribe divides consistently before consonants. Two identical consonants are usually separated. In the case of two non-identical consonants: liquids cohere with the latter syllable in division, as in 824–5 *ὑπομι|μνήσκειν*; 2500–1 *ἐνηλ⟨λ⟩α|[γμ]μένον*. Labials or gutturals (but not liquids) before dentals cohere with the dental in division (except for *γδ*): e.g. 1280–1 *ἐ|[κ]τείνω*. When

will simply have run on continuously across the end and beginning of rolls, without conclusion or new introduction. *P. Herc.* 1538, the second of the two rolls containing one recension of *Poem.* 5, indicates in its *subscriptio* that the book was divided into two rolls: *Φιλοδήμου | Περὶ ποιημάτων | [το]ῦ ϵ′ | [τῶ]ν εἰc δύο | [τ]ὸ β′* (Mangoni 1993, 107, 164). Note that there is no trace of the beginning of such a notation in the *subscriptio* of *De pietate* in *P. Herc.* 1428 (see 3(*d*) below), which suggests that it was the end of a work or book, rather than the division between two parts of the same book or work.

[1] Since both rolls (see (*f*) above) containing *De pietate* were written by the same scribe in the same format following the same conventions, the observations in this and the following section pertain equally to both parts of the treatise.

[2] These are for the most part texts copied in the 1st c. BC. The rolls containing Epicurus' *Περὶ φύcεωc*, on the other hand, were probably produced at Athens in the 2nd c. BC and exhibit a different set of orthographical features: see Sedley 1973, 11. For treatments of orthography and syllabification in the Herculaneum papyri see *MGrHerc* and R. Philippson, *NJClPh* 12 (1909), 4–11.

[3] For the concept of hiatus, see 3(*c*) below. On Philodemus' avoidance of hiatus generally see Strathmann 1892 (15–18 on *De pietate*).

syllable-final c is followed by a syllable beginning with a consonant, it remains: 825–6 *ἀναμέc|του*. In composition (i.e compound words) division may occur after the prepositional element (2351–2 *ἀνα|κόπτοντεc*; 433–4 *cυν|αριθμεῖcθαι*). But the prepositional element itself may be divided (204–5 *πα|ραλείπεcθαc*), even when its final vowel is elided (2282–3 *π[α]||ρέδοcαν*). Finally occurring consonants, especially short prepositions and negatives with their following words, are regarded virtually as phonetic units in syllabification: 521–2 *ἐ]||κ τῶν ὄντων*; 1518–19 *κἀ{ι}|κ τῆc*; 1679–80 *οὐ|κ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ*; 2036–7 *ἐ|ξ αὐτῶν*; 2232–3 *ἐ|νοχλεῖν*. This includes consonants rendered final by elision: 1085–6 *πα|ρ' αὐτούc*; 1674–5 *διὰ τοῦ|τ' οὐκ ἔπειθεν*; 2039–40 *ἐ|φ' ἡμᾶc*. Short final vowels are regularly elided. Long final vowels are sometimes written in prodelision with a following short vowel, or, in the case of diphthongs, written in crasis.

The papyrus is written in a large, very round uncial hand of the first century BC.[1] The hand is carefully written with only a moderately rapid ductus.[2] Elegant, consciously stylized serifs appear occasionally (especially on descenders of iota and kappa); there are few ligatures between letters. The typology of the hand is virtually unique among the Herculaneum papyri. The most distinctive feature is its rotundity, as exhibited by the large, round epsilon and theta, the bulbous, slightly squashed phi with a long serifed cross-stroke, and the triangular-shaped alpha (often mistaken for delta by the copyists) with its broad, elongated loop on the lower left. The alpha is made in three strokes (cf. Turner and Parsons 1987, 2), starting with the long, almost horizontal

[1] The hand of the extant papyrus fragments of the first part of *De pietate* (e.g. *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9) is identical with that of *P. Herc.* 1428, which forms part of the same treatise. With the exception of 242 and 247, there is at least one extant fragment from each series (1077, 1098, 229, 437, 1610, 1788). For a sample, see Pls. 2–4, 8, and the photograph of three columns from *P. Herc.* 1428 published in Cavallo 1983, tav. 25, which exhibit the relevant features. For identifications of the other papyri see (*d*) above. Cavallo 1983, 37, 45, 53, 64 and Dorandi 1988*b* note that the two *scorze* catalogued as *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 (one under each number) and the *scorza* 1077 fr. 1 (=3) are writen in a hand ('anonimo XVII') different from that of *P. Herc.* 1428. Examination of these *scorze*, however, revealed that not only do these fragments not correspond with any of the known texts of 242 and 247, nor to any known part of *De pietate*, but also that they themselves are not written in the same hand. Since their content is also demonstrably different from that of *De pietate*, I conclude that these *scorze* were miscatalogued under the inventory numbers 242, 247, and 1077. See above, p. 53 n. 3, p. 54 n. 1.

[2] For a palaeographical description, see Cavallo 1983, 34–5, 51–2 (his 'anonimo XII' in 'gruppo H'). Comparable hands are *P. Berol.* 46 (BKT 5.1) and the documentary script employed in *BGU* 998 (Schubart, *Pap. Graec. Berol.* (1911), tab. 10), datable to 101 BC. The hand of *De pietate* is somewhat later, perhaps as late as the middle of the 1st c. BC.



FIG. 4. Formation of alpha, eta, epsilon, phi, and omega

bottom made from right to left, then the loop at the left rising to the apex, finishing with a curving descent to the lower right. Typical letters are illustrated in Fig. 4. The scribe writes eta in three strokes, adding serifs, and epsilon and omega in two separate strokes, lifting the pen after each; tau and upsilon in three strokes.[1] The size of the letters (*c.*0.6 cm. in average height and width) does not differ considerably, with the number per line varying from 11 to 15, but regularly maintaining 13–14.

Spacing between letters decreases towards line-ends. The columns exhibit moderate drift of the left-hand margin to the left (Maas's law). Average height of columns is 12.8 cm., with the number of lines per column varying from 28 to 35, though a majority are between 29 and 33. There is a lower number of lines (*c.*29) per column early in the treatise (1077//1098) than in the later part: the columns of *P. Herc.* 1428 range randomly from 31 to 35 lines per column. The widths of columns vary widely, together with the variation in number of letters per line. But column plus intercolumnium remains consistent throughout, *c.*7.2 cm.

Punctuation, when indicated, is marked by a blank space, sometimes accompanied by a paragraphos in the margin (especially for full stop), although it is uncertain how regularly and accurately and consistently the copyists represented both spacing and paragraphoi. (Only where these actually occur in the papyrus or apograph have I represented them in the diplomatic, left-hand text, and they are omitted in the right-hand text). Empty space at line-ends is sometimes occupied by an angular-shaped space-filler, several times by an asteriskos.[2]

Cavallo 1983, 35, 52 tentatively suggests that the hand of *De pietate* is identical with that of *P. Herc.* 1020 (Chrysippus, *On Dialectical Virtues*). As he notes, however, the latter exhibits additional features

[1] Cf. the illustration in Turner–Parsons 1987, 2. [2] See (*h*) below.

normally associated with later hands.[1] Further investigation into the typology of these ill-exampled and less studied first-century-BC hands remains a major desideratum.

(*h*) *Corrections and Scholia*

Interlinear and marginal corrections appear occasionally in the text.[2] Judged from those corrections preserved on extant papyrus fragments (e.g. 1599 = *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9,11) and their representations in the apographs, all corrections appear in the same hand as the main text. It is to be presumed that the scribe, after writing his text, checked his own work against the exemplar from which he copied. This he did rather thoroughly, judged from the preserved portion of the text.[3] There are few errors in copying which remain after correction as egregious as that at l. 2049 = *P. Herc.* 229 fr. 6,18 where the scribe left uncorrected the dittography *εὐδαι{δαι}μονίαν*. The presumed existence of an exemplar rules out the possibility of an autograph or transcription by dictation.

Two types of correction occur commonly: (1) the addition of omitted letters above the line for insertion, and (2) the correction of letters written in error by adding the correct letter(s) directly above the one(s) to be deleted. One additional form of correction deserves to be discussed, since it has escaped the scrutiny of previous editors: namely the use of a suprascript point of expunction in the papyrus to delete mistakenly written letters.[4] The point was so small that it was often overlooked by the copyists, and may have occured in more places than we know, without being represented on the apographs.[5]

[1] Cf. *P. Lit. Lond.* 27 (Kenyon, *Classical Texts* (1891), tab. 8), datable to the 2nd c. AD. The hand of *P. Herc.* 1020 may be as late as the 1st c. AD.

[2] I give a list of the location of each correction (in the first part of *De pietate* only): l. 166 (*N* 1098 fr. 27,22); 360 (*N* 1077 fr. 16,14); 450 (*N* 1077 fr. 17,19); 526 (*N* 1077 fr. 18,8); 582 (*N* 1098 fr. 16,4); 667 (*N* 1098 fr. 14,2); 729, 736 (*N* 1098 fr. 13,4 and 11); 813 (*N* 1077 fr. 10,3); 868 (*N* 1077 fr. 11,28); 889 (*N* 1098 fr. 9,19); 1004 (*N* 1077 fr. 7,18); 1059 (*N* 1098 fr. 9,15); 1174 (*N* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 3,15 bis); 1207 (*N* 1098 fr. 4,19); 1283, 1284 (*N* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 2,8, 2,9); 2237 (*N* 242 fr. 7,4).

[3] Judged, that is, from obvious uncorrected errors; but it is uncertain to what exact degree cruces in the text are due to errors in copying on the part of the scribe (as opposed to errors introduced by the *disegnatori*).

[4] 'Cancel dots' in the terminology of Turner–Parsons 1987, 8, 16 (with discussion); visible in pls. 13, 15, 16, 27, 34, 67, 72.

[5] Points of expunction appear in ll. 582 (in *N*, the only apograph, and HV^2 II) and 969 (in N^1 and HV^2 II, but not in N^2), where they delete obviously superfluous letters. Also at 840 (in N^1, HV^2 II, but not in N^2) as discussed below.

This was recently confirmed when a new fragment of *P. Herc.* 1077 (Neapolitan fr. 3 containing ll. 1–14 of the apograph) came to light (Pl. 2). The first apograph of this fragment (N^1) reads (in l. 1283) *cεμνοντατον*, manifestly a miswriting of the superlative *cεμνότατον* and rightly corrected with a point of expunction over the nu, which also appears in HV^2 II, but is omitted in N^2, the copy of N^1. In the absence of the papyrus, this might have been suspected to be a conjecture on the part of the *disegnatori* or the learned *accademici* advising them. When the new fragment was recently discovered among the unidentified *scorze* in the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi,[1] it vindicated the reading of N^1 and HV^2 II, for the expuction point over the nu is clearly visible on the papyrus.[2] This sheds significant light on the relationship of witnesses: N^1 was made directly from the papyrus, while the engraving HV^2 II was taken directly from N^1. Likewise N^2 was drawn as a fair copy of N^1, probably with minimal comparison with the extant papyrus, if any, and it introduced more omissions and careless errors. There are likewise duplicate apographs of *O* 1077 fr. 2 and 3 (but only one of *O* 1077 fr. 1). As a result, for *O* 1077 fr. 3 (= *N* fr. 1) no less than five witnesses must be collated: two separate copies of *N*, two of *O*, and the engraving of N^1 in HV^2 II. The papyrus itself has not existed since 1790. *P. Herc.* 1077 is the only part of *De pietate* for which we have multiple apographs of this sort (apart from *P. Herc.* 1428 for which we have *O* and *N*, the latter in two copies). The dependencies among these witnesses can only be determined, and the question of whether or not the copists of the copies or the engravers of HV^2 II had access to more of the papyri than survive today can only be answered only through careful collation. In the case of *P. Herc.* 1077, N^2 is an imperfect copy of N^1, HV^2 II a closer one. In the case of other papyri for which we do not have multiple apographs, but where its readings differ from *N* or *O*, HV^2 II deserves an extra degree of scrutiny, in case it was made from an original apograph which was later lost or discarded after the execution of the extant fair copy apograph.

A similar case can be seen at l. 840 where N^2 presents simply]ΘΕΝΟΛΙΑC, but N^1 has]ΘΕΝΟΛΙΑC with a point of expunction

[1] See above, p. 57 n. 1.

[2] Several other differences of detail confirm the dependence of HV^2 II on N^1, or less likely, upon the papyrus itself: at the end of l. 1280 the HV^2 II represents the full form of the asteriskos, drawn by N^1 and confirmed by the papyrus, where N^2 has simply a X.

over the nu, an omicron over the lambda, and a minute gamma over this omicron:

ΘΕ̇ΝΟ̊ΛΙΑC

The suprascript point indicates that nu is to be deleted; the suprascript omicron and gamma to be inserted after the original lambda. HV^2 II has represented the interlinear correction with precision, but has unfortunately corrupted the ΛΙ to N. In this case the papyrus unfortunately does not exist to confirm N^1, but it clearly represents the most primitive and accurate reading, *θεολογίαc*. HV^2 II, though it includes a corruption, is more precise than N^2, perhaps a clarification based on someone's autopsy of the papyrus (now lost).

The text of the first part of *De pietate* contains no extended scholiastic notation. The apparently anomalous placement of several paragraphoi may represent a reader's notation for change of topic, comparable to the use of the diple obelismene in *P. Herc.* 1428.[1] An asteriskos[2] sometimes, and a caret-shaped sign quite frequently, appear in the text of *De pietate* lest the scribe leave space at line-end,[3] but not as critical signs. By comparison with works such as Philodemus' *De dis* and *Rhetorica* 2–3, *De pietate* contains only very few scholia or extensive correction and revision. For one example see *P. Herc.* 243 fr. 3 (from the second part of the treatise) where in the lower margin another and rather cursive hand has penned two lines basically summarizing the references to *Il.* 2. 513 ff. and 16. 184 ff. in ll. 9–12 of that fragment.[4]

The absence of extended scholiastic comment in the text is hardly surprising, especially in the light of the scholarly, almost doxographic character of the work. There is, however, a kind of (secondary) scholiastic tradition connected with the text of *De pietate* as represented by a corrupt scholiastic report (probably from a doxographic source) cited by St Ambrose:[5]

[1] Cf. 1699, where the paragraphos seems to fall at the close of the discussion of Socrates, just as in *P. Herc.* 1428 the diple obelismene indicates a transition from one philosopher to the next (for which see Henrichs 1972*a*, 94–6 with n. 96). But the paragraphos almost always coincides with sentence-end, and so may be simply be a mark of punctuation here.

[2] See (*g*) above.

[3] 'End-fillers': Turner–Parsons 1987, 5 n. 12 with bibliography. See e.g. 2055, 2113.

[4] See Henrichs 1972*a*, 86 and n. 58 with critical apparatus on ll. 9–12; cf. 90 and n. 79.

[5] *Epist.* (classis I) 63.13 (= Epicurus spicilegium fr. 385a Us.). For the emendation, see the apparatus criticus in the edition of M. Zelzer, CSEL 82/3 (Vienna, 1982), 241–2 (part 14.13, ll. 133–7). Written to the church at Vercellae in 396, the letter exhibits considerable familiarity with the writings of Epicurus, Hermarchus ('Demarchus' codd.), and Philodemus,

atque hic (*sc.* Epicurus) quam alienus a vero sit, etiam hinc deprehenditur, quod voluptatem in homine deo auctore creatam adserit principaliter, sicut Philominus (filominus *aut* filuminus *codd.*, Philodemus *coni. editores Maurini*) eius sectator in epitomis suis disputat, et huius allegat Stoicos esse auctores sententiae.

And so far is Epicurus from the truth, that he also thinks that physical pleasure arises in humans with God as its source, as his follower 'Philominus' argues in his epitomes, and claims further that the Stoics are the originators of this idea.

Philippson was the first to perceive that this is very probably a confused reference to Philodemus' *De pietate*, since 'Philodemus' is a very likely correction for the name of Ambrose's corrupted source.[1] Philippson connected this observation with his theory (discussed above) that *P. Herc.* 1098 was originally an epitome or revision of 1077. However, there are now no longer any grounds to suppose that an epitome, second edition, or copy of the work ever existed.[2] Philodemus is not the only candidate for the corrupt *nomen*. Another possibility is Philonides, a second-century-BC Epicurean philosopher resident at the Seleucid court at Antioch,[3] who is at least known to have produced epitomes of Epicurean works for circulation there among 'idle youths'.[4] In Ambrose's text, *epitomis* may translate an original *ἐπιτομαῖς*. We have no other notice that there existed true epitomes of any of Philodemus' works, though some of the extant treatises are based on *σχολαί* of his teacher Zeno and incorporate this term in their

who are cited in order to refute them, and Ambrose expects his audience to know what he is talking about: see W. Schmid 1961, 787; Liebich 1954; Ferguson 1990, 2315–16.

[1] See Philippson 1921, 369–64, first suggested in *Hermes*, 51 (1916), 607; cf. id. 1938, 2463, Dorandi 1990, 2354; Ferguson 1990, 2315–16. On the fragment see further Liebich 1954, 116–31, though his treatment cannot be recommended in all respects: see below, p. 80 with nn. 1–2.

[2] As Philippson believed. His theory of the epitome of *De pietate*, directly controverted by the physical link between *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098, is discussed in (*f*) above. Dorandi 1988*b* compares Philippson's theory of the epitome of *De pietate* in noting that the two *scorze* catalogued as *P. Herc.* 242 and 247 are written in a hand different from that of *P. Herc.* 1428. Now that autopsy has shown that these *scorze* were miscatalogued under the inventory numbers 242 and 247, the existence of an epitome or second edition of *De pietate* can be laid to rest once and for all. See (*c*), (*d*), and (*g*) above.

[3] See P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, i (Oxford, 1972), 320–6; ii. 601–3.

[4] *Incerti auctoris Βίοι Φιλωνίδου* (*P. Herc.* 1044) in W. Crönert, 'Der Epikureer Philonides', *Sitz. Preuß. Akad. d. Wiss.* 1900/2, 942–9 (= Crönert 1975, 36–91); cf. id., 'Die Epikureer in Syrien', *JÖAI* 19 (1907), 145–7, and the new text by Gallo 1980, 23–166 at fr. 14, 3–10 (p. 46 Crönert, 68 Gallo): *πεπόηκεν | δὲ νέοις ἀργοῖς ὠφελίμους καὶ | [τ]ὰς ἐπιτομὰς τ[ῶν] | ἐπιστολῶν.*

titles. Philodemus' *Περὶ παρρησίας* (*P. Herc.* 1471), for example, bears the subscriptio: *Φιλο̣δήμο[υ] | τῶν κατ' ἐπιτομὴν ἐξειργαζ̣μένων περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίωι τῶν Ζήνωνο̣[ς σχο]λ̣ῶν | [.] | ὃ ἐστι π̣ερὶ π̣αρρ[η]σίας* (cf. *P. Herc.* 1389 *ἐκ τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν*, and see *Catalogo*, pp. 53–5). Might not Ambrose's *epitomis suis* characterize Philodemus' writings by their dependence on Zeno's teachings? This would support the thesis that St Ambrose does indeed refer here to Philodemus and his *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, at the same time as it explains the mystifying attribution[1] in Ambrose's text of the view of divine pleasure (a view that can only have been an Epicurean one) to the Stoics. A plausible explanation is that Ambrose mistook a reference in Philodemus' *De pietate* to his teacher Zeno of Sidon (the Epicurean) for a reference to Zeno of Citium (the Stoic), then generalized the point to the Stoics at large.[2] Zeno of Sidon himself wrote a treatise *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*.[3] Zeno's name appears prominently in Philodemus' *De pietate* at l. 1466, where a debt to him is indicated.[4] If this explanation is correct, the citation from St Ambrose could be a reference to the Herculaneum treatise, as dependent upon the *De pietate* of Zeno Epicureus.

A similar kind of secondary, commentary tradition connected with *De pietate* is, of course, Cicero's adaptation of the work in book 1 of *De natura deorum*,[5] which similarly served as a mediator between Philodemus and the use of its contents, especially for argumentation against the pagan gods, by the Christian apologists.

[1] Defended unconvincingly by Liebich 1954, 116–31.

[2] I owe this ingenious suggestion to Michael Wigodsky. Philodemus' history of philosophers (*Φιλοσόφων σύνταξις*) and perhaps other of his works were known to Diogenes Laertius (10. 3, cf. 24); Sextus Empiricus knew the books of Demetrius the Laconian: for the later tradition see Ferguson 1990; Castner 1988; Clay 1989; 1992; M. J. Edwards, *CQ*² 41 (1991), 563–66. For what it is worth, St Ambrose would not be the only reader of *De pietate* to have so confused the two Zenos (see commentary below on 1466).

[3] For which see Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 10,20 in Angeli 1988, 176 = Angeli–Colaizzo 1979, 75 fr. 12.

[4] Zeno himself is cited at 1465–8 for a debt to his works (see also on 60, 634–6); Philippson (1921) 388, 393. Zeno's name is preserved only in the first passage, and restored by Philippson (1921, 388, 393) in the other two (a very probable restoration at 634–6; only a possibility at 60).

[5] Reflections of the first part of *De pietate* in Cicero's *De nat. deor.* are treated in 3(*d*) below and in the commentary. For Cicero's adaptation of the second part, see Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 126–7; Philippson 1920, 363–6; id. 1939, 27–31; Pease 1955, i. 39–42; Henrichs 1972*a*, 81–2 with n. 37; 1974*a*, 8–10; 1975*a*, 6–8. For its parallel tradition in the Christian apologists, of which the citation from Ambrose discussed above may be considered one further example, see Münzel 1883, 2; Dietze 1896; Geffcken 1907, pp. xvii–xix, 69, 161, 226; W. Schmid 1961, 706, 807–9; Henrichs 1972*a*, 67 n. 51, 69 n. 71, 72 n. 88; id. 1975, 6–8.

3. The Work

(a) *Literary Form*

The form of the treatise is a prose discussion, of a type so ill-defined as hardly to merit description under the generic heading 'diatribe', though it certainly displays some of the formal and rhetorical features which have come, in modern times at least, to be associated with that term.

The author of *De pietate* himself refers to his work as a λόγος, a most general and colourless designation, which he further specifies as 'on behalf of Epicurus on the point of piety'.[1] The first part of *De pietate* consists of a series of apologetic arguments on this subject, the second part an attack on poetic and philosophical 'authorities' praised by Stoic opponents of the Epicureans. Since the author accepts as a literary fiction (for the purposes of argument) the possibility that Epicurus might actually have been tried on charges of impiety, it is hard to resist the supposition that the treatise (and especially its first part) has at least some generic and thematic affinity with the large body of popular Socratic literature of an apologetic type on this topic.

Another designation for the type of writing encountered in *De pietate* (as exemplified in the titulature of the Herculaneum papyri) is that of ὑπομνήματα ('notations', sometimes rendered 'commentaries'), which of course need not refer to a commentary in the modern sense, but may be used to describe the discussion of a philosophical topic under various heads and by way of discursive paraphrase of the work or thought of one or more authors.[2] Thus the author follows a characteristic method of composition by compilation,[3] enumerating as many *exempla* as possible, while elaborating only a select few. Thus the narrative in the first part takes the form of lists of instances in which Epicurus and his friends could be shown, for example, to have argued for the existence of gods, participated in traditional rites or worship, and avoided social and political prosecution, before embarking on an account of how suspicions against philosophers (for

[1] τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐ|cεβείας λόγον τῆς | κατ' Ἐπίκουρον (*P. Herc.* col. 15,23 Henrichs 1974*a*, 26).

[2] See below, p. 82 n. 4.

[3] See Henrichs 1972*a*, 67. Often associated with Alexandrian poetics, the method of suggesting the many while elaborating only one or two instances as typical is characteristic, for example, of Cicero's philosophical prose, especially the theological works. Cf. Pease 1955, vol. i, introd., pp. 12–13 n. 8.

their views on the gods) had developed in the course of human history. The detailed catalogues of the false views of poets[1] and philosophers[2] on the gods from the second part of *De pietate* may be compared in this respect, while in the first part the author quotes Epicurus' own *Paradebeispiel* of notorious atheists.[3]

The author knows his subject well, and cites from authors and works from memory (thus often without the benefit of direct quotation), and at times he may be loosely paraphrasing from another, similar treatise.[4] He refers with frequency to his opponents (though rarely by name), at least in part as a rhetorical or structuring device (see on 297–8). In composing, he carefully followed an outline of topics.[5] He employs a kind of popular or informal lexicon, at times colourful, which would not be out of place in the prose of Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius; he takes a certain delight in reeling off technical philosophical terminology when he comes to list the arguments offered by Epicurus and his friends about the gods. The treatise will have been addressed either to a programmatic reader or, more likely, an aristocratic patron.[6] At several points the author rises to a high pitch of emotion[7] and more than once mildly exhorts his reader to a studied observance of Epicurean doctrine, and of the divine.[8]

In genre, *De pietate* falls into that category of Greek monographs (*συγγράμματα*) termed '*περί*-Literatur' by F. Leo.[9] More specifically,

[1] Henrichs 1975*a*; Schober 1988. [2] Henrichs 1974*a*.

[3] Lines 519–30. On the Epicurean *index atheorum* and its transmission in antiquity see Winiarczyk 1976; 1984; Lefkowitz 1987; 1989; Davies 1989; Obbink 1989, and the commentary on 522–35. Hellenistic histories of philosophy often took the form of lists (*συντάξεις*) of teachers and their pupils, as the *Indices Stoicorum* and *Academicorum* from Herculaneum show. Cf. Rawson 1985, 80 who notes in this connection how frequently in our sources mention is made of whom a man had worked under.

[4] Probably by the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon in the first part of the treatise, cited by name at 1466; he also wrote a *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*. The second part is very likely derived from Zeno's attack on contemporary Stoics (Diogenes of Babylon's *Περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς* is named). There was other such Epicurean prose literature available: cf. the *Περὶ θεῶν* of the Epicurean Phaedrus; see Henrichs 1972*a*, 81 with n. 37 with further discussion.

[5] A *διαίρεσις* made up of multiple *μέρη*: see *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,13–23 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 25), and below, Introd. to commentary. For a clearly preserved transition see ll. 2479–82.

[6] As a reference to the 'good king' shows: see below on 2438–48: other direct allusions to the reader or addressee at 2043–58, 2496–2500.

[7] For similar shifts in registers of emotion, see esp. the highly rhetorical conclusion of Philodemus' *De Morte* 4, with the analysis of Gigante 1983, 115–234.

[8] See in particular 2043–58 (cf. 1277–1305).

[9] 'Didymos *περὶ Δημοσθένους*', *NGG* 1904, 254–61 = *Ausgewählte kleine Schriften*, ii (1960), 387–94. Cf. S. West, *CQ*² 20 (1970), 288–96; G. Arrighetti, 'Fra erudizione e biografia,' *SCO* 26 (1977), 13–67, esp. 43–5 (on *περὶ-Literatur*).

it is representative of a large category of writing on the gods, myth, and religion of which only scant traces survive. A treatise *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* is attested already for Pythagoras, a *Περὶ θεῶν* for Protagoras. Plato's *Euthyphro* passed in antiquity as *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*, while the second *Alcibiades* is concerned almost exclusively with the topic of prayer. Similarly Aristotle wrote a *Περὶ εὐχῆς*.[1] Theophrastus wrote the famous *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* transmitted by Porphyry; his successor Strato of Lampsacus wrote a *Περὶ θεῶν*. Such works—notoriously critical of traditional Greek religion—underwent a proliferation in the early Hellenistic period: e.g. Heraclides Ponticus' *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, Euhemerus' *Sacred History* and Daïmachus of Plataia's *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*.[2] Philodemus' *De pietate* attacks works of similar names by Chrysippus, Persaeus, and Diogenes of Babylon, as it recalls those of Epicurus and Zeno. Cicero turned it into Latin under the title *De natura deorum* (cf. *Περὶ φύσεως*, *De rerum natura*). Two common features are worth noting in this connection: first, the element of rationalism, which prevails even in the mythological (Apollodorus of Athens, *Περὶ θεῶν*) and perihegetical writers (in the historians one may compare Diodorus' use of Euhemerus and Dionysius Scytobrachion).[3]

This manifests itself in Philodemus' *De pietate* especially in the critical point of view adopted throughout the treatise. Second, many of these works take a historical or anthropological approach to their topics. In the present treatise this culture-historical aspect is formally reflected in the sequence of topics in certain parts of the narrative (e.g. in the discussion of the *πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι* in *P. Herc.* 1077 and of the origin of civilization in *P. Herc.* 229, or the chronological presentation of philosophers in *P. Herc.* 1428).

Finally, the general character of the treatise, like many of these Greek monographs, may be described as learned and scholarly and at times pedantic. Presumably this reflects a contemporary Greek milieu, in which writing on religious institutions and their history was almost

[1] J. Rist, *AJP* 106 (1985), 110–13 argues that such a work by Aristotle never existed. But his logic requires the postulated corruption in the hypothetical original of the Latin *De bona fortuna* to have occurred earlier than the sources of the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in D.L. which attests the title, and this seems unlikely at this date given the influence of Neoplatonism required for this reconstruction. The alternative title of *Alcib.* 2 is *Περὶ εὐχῆς*. Origen wrote one (ed. P. Koetschau, Leipzig, 1899).

[2] *FHG* 2.441–2; Plut. *Lys.* 12. 439E–440A.

[3] See Rusten 1982.

completely in the hands of professional scholars,[1] either *grammatici* or philosophers.[2]

(*b*) *Theme*

In view of the fragmentary state of the earliest preserved portions of the treatise, it would be pointless to speculate at length regarding the specific terms in which the author set forth the thesis of his work. Obviously this dealt with the concept of εὐσέβεια, together with its counterpart ἀσέβεια, probably as applied to the Epicureans themselves, since in the earliest columns of *De pietate* the author is already at pains to defend Epicurus and his followers against detractors on this point,[3] and to isolate examples in which true εὐσέβεια (or ἀσέβεια) could be ascertained through statements or actions regarding the gods. Thus the concluding words of the treatise describe the work as a whole as an account or defence (λόγος) according to (or on behalf of) Epicurus on the subject of piety.

Two concepts are recurrent in the treatise: 'right thinking' about the gods (ἀληθῆ τὰ δόγματα, νοήματα, βέβαιον, εἰκαῖος, παραλογώτατον, ἐπινοεῖν, δογματίζειν, δοξάζειν ὁσιώτατα περὶ θεῶν τῆι προλήψει—especially as reflected in language or commemorated in religious ritual)—and 'harm', both social and psychological (βλάβη, βλάπτειν, λύπη, λυπεῖν, ἀβλαβής, δυσμένεια, ταραχῶδες, ἀσύμφορα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δογματίζειν) stemming from the wrong kind of thinking about gods as against the ἀσφάλεια and other advantages provided by the right kind. Epicurus, the author argues, had right thinking about the gods; for his followers this manifested itself in a kind of sacred clarity of thought evident from their writing and acts (especially participation in cult). Thus they caused no harm to others through their views, and so were not harmed in return, unlike some philosophers. The theme of the work is simply that wrong thinking about the gods results in psychological, political, and cultural degeneration, as well as resulting in social unrest and violence, directed especially against intellectuals. The author elaborates this point both in the sphere of per-

[1] Cf. Rawson 1985, 93 who contrasts in this respect the situation at Rome, where members of the pontifical colleges (and therefore citizens of the highest nobility) commonly wrote on these subjects.

[2] Thus at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 91, Cotta is compelled to remark upon the character of Velleius' copious catalogue of philosophers on the gods (drawn by Cicero from *De Pietate*) and express wonder at finding 'so much learning in a Roman' (*in homine esse Romano tantam scientiam*).

[3] 'Purgabat auctorem sectae' (Usener 1887, 103).

sonal ethics and on the larger level of social institutions and their historical development. Ultimately this was intended to back up the claim that the Epicurean *πρόληψις* of the gods as perfectly blessed and immortal (though not provident towards humans) must be the true one. At the same time the author argues that gods do provide benefit to humans none the less, in the form of *ἀσφάλεια*, a kind of sacred indemnity acquired through understanding how false beliefs about the divine arose in the first place. This leads the author into an extended critical survey, consuming the second part of the treatise, of the earliest poets and philosophers (from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon), i.e. down to the author's (or rather his source's) contemporary rivals, the Stoics, who championed the poets and philosophers as vindicating (or at least not contradicting) their own views.

His purposes for embarking upon this critique, and his primary object of attack, are only understandable in the light of the first part of the treatise on which it is predicated. This is specifically stated at ll. 2479–96: to display as a *choros* of arch-enemies poets and early philosophers who were favourably cited (or might be so cited) by his opponents as according with their own views,[1] and in attacking the Epicureans for harming mankind by denying the gods of the myths. In this way the topical issues and polemics of the first (apologetic) part of the treatise are carried over into the second (critical) part.[2] After the poets the author turns to survey the views of the philosophers themselves (from Thales down to Diogenes of Babylon).[3] The author elegantly concludes the treatise with the argument that no one would refrain from wrongdoing out of fear of such gods as the poets and philosophers portray, as his opponents claimed that some people would.[4] The statements of the Stoics about the gods, in their attempt to 'accommodate' the poets and philosophers to their own views, are shown to be equally risible. This theme continues the author's interest in the role of religion in the development of civilization and justice as elaborated in the first part of the treatise (cols. 60–86).

[1] See the commentary on 2479–2510. This purpose in particular has been insufficiently appreciated. See e.g. the criticism of Chrysippus for appealing to the statements of the poets as *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι* in accord with Stoic views (*P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 6–7, Henrichs 1974*a*, 16–18).

[2] See vol. ii. For the prehistorical role of the poets in generating false beliefs about the gods, see especially cols. 11, 42, and 60–86; cf. Perelli 1955, 29–56.

[3] On the catalogue and its structure, see Henrichs 1975*b*, 94–6. For the poets, Schober 1988, 70–2; Henrichs 1975*a*.

[4] *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 14–15 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 24–5).

(*c*) *Style*

The prose-style of *De pietate* cannot be said to have won any more admirers in antiquity,[1] coming as it does during the decline of Asianic influence and the revival of classicizing tastes in balanced, artistic, and economical prose, than it has in modern times, when not only the appreciation of ancient Greek but also the development of modern Western languages has been even further conditioned by the canonization of those tastes. The diction and pre-Atticist style of the prose, given in particular to hyperbaton in sentence structure, in rhetoric to digression, ellipsis, excursus, circumlocution, and the occasional tirade, is not inconsistent with known writings of Philodemus. Such considerations, however, will scarcely substitute for an argument for authorship, especially in the light of the homogeneity exhibited among the writings of the school (apart from Demetrius of Laconia). Since Philodemus' style has been insufficiently studied,[2] and in itself exhibits no small degree of stylistic variation (especially when recapitulating the work of opponents, e.g. Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon in *P. Herc.* 1428, or aping a character-type, as in *De ira*), and in order not to prejudice the question of authorship at this point (see (*d*) below), I shall restrict my observations here to the text of *De pietate* alone.

One distinguishing feature of the style of *De pietate* is the avoidance of hiatus. Elision of short vowels is strictly observed. Long vowels are not elided. But they may induce prodelision of a following short or

[1] Cicero may be an exception, not only because he may be assumed to have read and absorbed the treatise with great interest, and may even reflect its style (e.g. *De nat. deor.* 1.93), but because he refers to Philodemus as *perpolitus* in the *In Pisonem* (68–72, cf. 74). He also mentions, however, poems by him in that speech, so the reference may be to his refinement as an epigrammatist.

[2] There is no systematic treatment, but see Monet 1993, Introd. 1.3, 'Le Style', for a detailed description, arguing that Philodemus is the author of the *De sensibus*, *P. Herc.* 19/698. For an eloquent if brief description and defence of Philodemus' style, see Sudhaus 1895, p. vi. An attempt to characterize Philodemus' style in particulars, and to distinguish it from that of other Epicureans, is to be found in W. Schmid 1963. Diels 1916*a* stresses the homogeneity of discourse among Epicureans, of the sort that makes it difficult to identify with any certainty the author(s) of the *Kuriai Doxai* or of the *Letter to Pythocles*. (Demetrius of Laconia, of course, is quite exceptional: see Romeo 1988.) See also Norden 1958, i. 123–5; A. Glatzel, *De optativi apud Philodemum, Strabonem, Pseudo-Longinum usu* (Diss. Trebnitz, 1913); H. Widmann, *Beiträge zur Syntax Epikurs* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 24; Stuttgart and Berlin, 1935); P. Linde, *De Epicuri vocabulis optima Attica alienis* (Breslauer philologische Abhandlungen, 36; Breslau, 1906); I. L. Thyresson, *The Particles in Epicurus* (Lund, 1977). Additional resources in Monet 1993, 85 n. 2.

undergo crasis (as may diphthongs: e.g. 461 *κἄν*). Such phenomena are graphic features, the result of scribal practice, rather than authorial style: in general I follow S. L. Radt, *ZPE* 38 (1980), 56–8 in reserving the term hiatus for the juxtaposition of vowels which cannot undergo *cυναλιφή* (thus e.g. 769–70 *πάντα | ἀνά* is not hiatus but *scriptio plena*; cf. 770 *cτόμ' ἔχειν*—both in the same citation of Epicurus, which points to inconsistency in scribal practice, not to variation in authorial style). Choice of words (e.g. *διότι* for *ὅτι*) is often influenced by a desire to avoid hiatus of this sort, and *collocatio verborum* is sometimes said to be a function of this avoidance in Philodemus: e.g. Schober 1988, 70, citing 247 fr. 8 (Schober 1988, 74) *φόβος ἀεὶ κατέχει δεινὸς αὐτούς*. But the author could as easily have written *δεινὸς φόβος αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ κατέχει*, so that this should instead be regarded as an example of hyperbaton.

The author is given to neologisms (e.g. abstract formations in *-μα*),[1] adopting in places a colourful or colloquial register of speech (e.g. 1181–2 *ὁμο[ία]c | τοῖc χυδαίοιc*; 2340 *οὐκ εἰc μακράν*), but at other times rises to a parenthetical rhetorical question or an emotional climax (see 2032–58, 2333–53). Sarcasm and irony are found not infrequently (e.g 696–705).

Sentences gravitate toward the longish side, often exceeding a column in length. In many cases therefore we do not have complete sentences from which to judge (though in this respect *P. Herc.* 1428 in Henrichs 1974*a* serves as a control); they are made to seem even longer by the lack of the antithesis, parallelism, and periodicity familiar from classical Attic prose. There is no postponement of the main verb until the thought is complete; often the main verb falls early, with subordinate clauses straying on. The writer avoids giving the impression of having cast the whole thought in his head before writing, as though the sentence were 'merely built up in the course of composition, as new thoughts and modifications ocurred to the writer' (Bailey 1926, 173, of Epicurus' *Letter to Herodotus*). The subject of the genitive absolute may appear elsewhere in another clause of the sentence in the same or a different case. The use of transitional particles is more casual, and more variegated, than in classical Attic prose. Hyperbata of various sorts occur, especially attributive adjectives separated from the nouns they modify, or genitives separated syntactically from the nouns they complete: e.g. 555–9 *το[ῦτο] | τῆι cπουδῆι περὶ | τῆς κοινωνί[ας τῶν] | Ἀθήνηcιν ἐμφαίνε|ται μυcτηρίων*; 225–30 *κἀν τῶι δω|δεκάτ[ω]ι*

[1] This was in fact an Epicurean hallmark: see Norden 1958, i. 123.

Περὶ φ[ύ]|c[ε]ω[c το]ὺc πρώτουc | φη[cὶν ἀ]νθρώπουc (where the effect is to place emphasis on *πρώτουc*). Unsignalled change of subject is common (e.g. 705–7), whether in the interests of *variatio* or to insinuate an impression of carelessness. There is ellipsis (on which see Indelli 1988, 159), with the result that the main verb is not always repeated at the beginning of each sentence (e.g. 928–40; 1087–9). Sometimes a clause subordinate in grammar is preposed in anticipation of the main clause (432–54). Rhetorical figures include repetition of key words, litotes (2340), *praeteritio* (364–8), chiasmus. Anaphora of the article appears frequently. The author is fond of a related construction in particular that is not familiar to classical Attic syntax: namely, the formation of indirect discourse in the form of an articular infinitive, i.e. as subject of a verb of speaking (sometimes understood), for example: *π]αρ' Ἀντιc|θένει δ' ἐν μὲν [τ]ῶι | Φυcικῶι λέγεται τὸ | κατὰ νόμον εἶναι | πολλοὺc θεοὺc κα|τὰ δὲ φύcιν ἕν[α*: 'According to Antisthenes in his *Physics* it is said that many gods exist by convention, but only one in reality'.[1] (For examples in the first part of *De pietate* see ll. 189–201, 489–500; the construction is also frequent in Epicurus.) The use of the articular infinitive is fairly habitual.

The author's method of 'composition by compilation' constitutes a stylistic trait in itself, since it presumes particular ways of introducing citations of the works of other authors, and of abbreviating their contents in paraphrase, stringing together those formations to constitute an argument.[2] Much of *De pietate* consists of lists of examples.

(*d*) *Title and Authorship*

Of the author and title of the treatise, the apographs of the papyrus record only:

Φ[---]
Π[---]

Traces of both letters can be read on the original papyrus today (Pl. 8). These are the vestiges of the colophon of a roll which contained at least a part of the treatise.[3] There is little reason for questioning the

[1] Philod. *De pietate*, p. 72 Gomperz (see vol. ii) = Antisthenes fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi = SSR V A 79 Giannantoni, cf. Cic. *ND* 1. 32.

[2] For examples of the catalogue style in the first part of the treatise see e.g. cols. 19 and 33.

[3] *P. Herc.* 1428 after col. 15,23. On the readings and their transmission, see Henrichs 1974*a*, 8–9.

restoration of the title (in the second line above) as *Π*[*ερὶ εὐcεβείαc*], since the work is called a *λόγοc* about *εὐcέβεια* in the preceding, final sentence (see the text, below). However, the most obvious supplement for the name of the author, Φ[ΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ], is entirely conjectural, since there is no evidence which might provide grounds for ruling out another very strong contender, namely Φ[ΑΙΔΡΟΥ].[1] Scholars have by and large been content with believing that either Philodemus or Phaedrus was the author of our text, and it is often assumed that nothing very important appears to turn on the question.[2]

In contrast to these relatively uninformative vestiges of the author and title, the concluding sentences of the text of *P. Herc.* 1428 are extremely enlightening, though they lead to another, different sort of quandary, especially with regard to the order of the two main parts of *De pietate*:

P. Herc. 1428 col. 15,13–23 (pp. 25–6 Henrichs)

13	ὥc-	So this part of the out-
	τε καὶ τοῦ μέρ[ο]υc	line set forth at the start
	τούτου τῆc δ[ιαι]ρέ-	having been sufficiently
16	cεωc τῆc κατ' ἀρχὰc	treated, it would now be
	ἐκτ[ε]θείcηc ἀπο-	the appropriate time to
	χρώντω[c ἐ]ξε[ι]ργαc-	*paragraphein* at this point
	μένου καιρὸc ἂν εἴ-	the Epicurean account of
20	η{ι} τὸν περὶ τῆc εὐ-	the topic of piety.
	cεβείαc λόγον τῆc	
	κατ' Ἐπίκουρον αὐ-	
	τοῦ παραγράφε[ι]ν.	

Several points deserve notice. First, the author composed the treatise from an outline (*διαίρεcιc*) which was summarized at the beginning of the treatise. At the close of *P. Herc.* 1428, he had just completed a division (*μέροc*) of the outline. Second, he explicitly refers to a subject of his treatise (and presumably a unit of composition) as 'the *λόγοc* about piety according to (or, perhaps, as regards) Epicurus'. The author, we are told, has decided to *παραγράφειν* this *λόγοc* here (*αὐτοῦ*). Gomperz and Philippson, following Hayter and the other early editors of *P. Herc.* 1428, believe that *παραγράφειν* here means 'to

[1] See Henrichs 1972*a*, 81 n. 37; 1974, 8–10. The authorship of Phaedrus, advanced by Hayter 1810, was defended by Petersen 1833 and Krische 1840.

[2] Throughout the present edition the name 'Philodemus' is used as purely conventional to designate the author of *De pietate*. Likewise the division into two volumes and the designation *τμῆμα πρότερον* for the first is purely editorial.

add on, to append',[1] and consequently take the direct object *λόγον* to refer to an additional section or book to be appended subsequently. They take this appended *λόγος* to be a positive defence of Epicurus' theology. For this reason they group the texts of the present volume as the second part of *De pietate*, following the conclusion of *P. Herc.* 1428 given above.

Hayter himself supports this view by adducing the parenthesis, which precedes the concluding argument of *P. Herc.* 1428, at cols. 12,33–13,1 (p. 23 Henrichs): *ἐν γὰρ | ἄ̣λ̣λ̣οις ὑπογραφήσε|τ̣αι τ̣ὰ ἄλλα*, where *τὰ ἄλλα* apparently refers to the Stoic and Epicurean positions on the perishability and eternal existence of the gods just mentioned in digression (col. 12,25–32). This might be construed as a reference (forward) to certain columns of *P. Herc.* 1077 and 1098 where the Epicurean position on this point is discussed in defence of Epicurus (1–636, though Hayter cannot possibly have known these passages, since they were not decorticated until after his departure from Naples). However, the phrase *ἐν ἄλλοις* (sc. *βιβλίοις*) is a general designation. Most probably the author means elsewhere in his own writings:[2] the reference may well be to the third book of Philodemus' *De dis.* While *ὑπογράφειν* is used in the sense *subscribere* (in the same book) in Philodemus (*De mus.* 87,22, 93,21), it commonly means simply *describere, exponere, adumbrare.*[3] Philodemus was in the habit of making vague references to his future work, even at what is demonstrably the end of a complete treatise.[4]

There are, however, several instances where Philodemus refers at the end of one section or division of a work to the addition of the next.[5] None of these examples employ the phrase *λόγον παραγράφειν*. But

[1] An interpretation found first in Hayter 1810, 4 (who translated 'adscribere iuxta'), and perpetuated by Spengel 1864, 147 (who paraphrased 'näher zu entwickeln'). The same view was maintained by Schober 1988 on the tenuous grounds of his reconstruction of the stichometry, and followed by Henrichs 1974*a*, 26 ('hieran anzuschliessen'), cf. 9 n. 24.

[2] For similar instances, see Cic. *De div.* 1. 127 *id quod alio loco ostenditur* with Pease ad loc.; ibid. 2. 19 *de quo alias*; Sen. *Quaest. nat.* 2. 38. 3; Min. Fel. *Oct.* 36. 2.

[3] See *Lex. Philod.*, s.v. *ὑπογράφειν*.

[4] Cf. Delattre 1992, 179–91, esp. 185–7; Puglia 1992, 175–8, and see e.g. near the end of *On Poems* 5, cols. 30,34–31,7 Mangoni (end of treatise): 'As for what kind of content is worthy to be included in verses, both these critics, and many of those who have been examined before, and who will be considered later, are far from specifying it.'

[5] See the instances cited by Henrichs 1974*a*, 9 n. 24. Perhaps most suggestive are the concluding lines of *De vit.* 43,22–7 (referring to the addition of yet another book): *καὶ τὸν ὑπομνημα[τις]μὸν δὲ | τοῦτον* (i.e. the present treatise) *αὐτοῦ καταπαύσομεν, | ἐπισυνάψομεν* (= *addemus*) *δ' αὐτῶι* (sc. to the present treatise) *τὸν | περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακιῶν ὧν | δοκιμάζομεν ποι[εῖ]σθαι λόγον.*

in one case Philodemus uses *παραγράφειν* in the sense of *describere*, 'write out',[1] namely at *De Stoicis* 18,1 ff.: *τὰ καλὰ τῶν [ἀνθρ]ώπων ἤδη παρα|γράφωμε[ν], ὅπως ἂν ὡς ὀλιγώ|τατον χρόνον ἐν ταῖς ἐπι|νοία[ι]ς διατρίβωμεν αὐτῶν*; i.e. the 'belle cose di questi signori' (Dorandi) are to be written out in addition in what follows, in order not to waste time in discussing them (these views being themselves self-refuting).[2] Another possible such use of *παραγράφειν* occurs in *P. Herc.* 176 (Scriptor incertus Epicureus) fr. 5 col. 17,10ff. (p. 40 Angeli, 43 Vogliano). The *Auctor* here quotes a brief passage from an Epicurean epistle concerning the death of one Apollodorus, and continues: 'and when I have written out the things he wrote to Epicurus there concerning his (sc. Apollodorus') death, even if they appear to anyone to be more than what is needful, I shall not appear to have done more than what is *καιρός*': *καὶ περὶ | τῆς ἐκλείψεως [α]ὐτοῦ πρὸς | Ἐπίκουρον ἃ ⟨γράφει⟩ παραγράψαι* (pap.: *παραγράψας* Vogliano) *καὶ εἴ τινι [[π ρα]] [φ]ανήσεται | πλείονα τῆ[ς] χρείας, οὐ φα|νήσομαι τοῦ κα[ι|ροῦ]*. He then proceeds to relate the contents of the letter in full (see Vogliano p. 112). If Wilamowitz's *κα[ιροῦ]* is correct, as seems likely, this expression bears a striking resemblance to the formulation in *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15, above (i.e. it would be *καιρός* for the author to *παραγράψαι*[3] the things that were said in the letter). Despite the textual difficulties in the passage (there are at least two other corruptions), the matter might appear to be settled by the linguistic parallel.[4]

On the other hand, the expression *παραγράφειν αὐτοῦ* (= 'here', 'at

[1] Following Dorandi, I take it so here because the sentence is in fact followed by a summary of their views. *Παραγράφειν* has this sense of *describere* ('write out') in certain works of Galen, who uses it to introduce additional citations, in the immediate context, of an author's words or views (which are then immediately appended): see e.g. Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, ed. Ph. De Lacy (CMG V 4,1,2), part 3: Indices (Berlin, 1984) s.v. *παραγράφειν*. Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 126–7 with n. 1 had argued against taking *παραγράφειν* at the close of *P. Herc.* 1428 in the sense of *adscribendi* (sc. *coronidem*), advocating instead the meaning *describendi* ('write out'), as at Simpl. *De cael.* p. 488²17 Br.; Hipparch. *Ad Phaen.* i, p. 173 Pet.; Plut. *Demetr.* 13.

[2] This instance was adduced and properly interpreted as ironical by Schober 1988, 69 n. 11.

[3] If *παραγράψαι* here meant *concludere*, the expression would convey precisely the wrong idea: i.e. 'it would be *καιρός* for the author to *stop* writing them out.' Cf. Philod. *Pragm.* cols. 13,6–7; 27,13 where in spite of difficulties in reconstruction the meaning is apparently 'write out.'

[4] So also Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 10.351 marks the transition from *Πρὸς φυσικούς* to *Πρὸς ἠθικούς*: *καιρὸς δ' ἂν εἴη μετελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀσπασαμένους* (end of book). The apparently parallel expression *καιρὸς ἂν εἴη* is deceptive, and will not, of course, decide the meaning of *παραγράφειν* here in *P. Herc.* 1428. Cf. [Plut.] *Vit. Hom. II* 218 *ἐνταῦθα καιρὸς καταπαύειν τὸν λόγον* (end of treatise).

this point') in the passage from *De pietate* ought to lead us to expect what is 'writtten out' to follow immediately in direct continuation (as in the passages just discussed), rather than being separated by a division between rolls or books.[1] And it is certain that the end of a roll coincides. Thus the early critics of Gomperz's edition are quick to point out[2] that *παραγράφειν* can in fact bear the meaning 'to conclude' (*finire, claudere*),[3] especially with reference to written units of composition, since it commonly means 'to place the *παράγραφος*' (*παράγραφον λόγῳ παρατιθέναι*).[4] On this view, the colophon at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15 indicates only the end of a unit of composition, or the *end* of the treatise as a whole.[5] This view receives linguistic support from the fact that the derivatives of *παραγράφειν* refer to limiting or conclusion in the Herculanensia, including *De pietate* itself (see vol. ii): Schober 1988, 94 *παράγραπτος*; *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 16,14: *δυσπαράγραφον*.[6] This can be further seen to involve a *topos* of which Philo-

[1] Cf. *De vit.* 43,23 *τοῦτον αὐτοῦ* (= *hic*) *καταπαύομεν* (end of book); Dem. Lac. *De poem.* col. 66,5–10 *ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἵνα μὴ καὶ τοῦτο | ἀσύμμετρον ποιήσω|μεν τὸ ὑπόμνημα, κα|θάπερ τὸ πρῶτον, αὐτοῦ | καταπαύσω{ι} τὴν γραφ[ήν* (followed by a brief address to the dedicatee Nero, the colophon, and the end of the book); Philod. *Poem.* 5, col. 29,7–18 (after declining to repeat criticism of Crates' theories, noting that these had been already covered in the second book) *ὥς[τε] τὰς παρὰ Ζήνωνι | δόξας ἐπικόψαντες ἤδη μεμηκυσμένον | τὸ σύνγραμμα κατπαύ|σομεν*; [Plut.] *Vit. Hom. II* 218 (quoted in the previous note). If *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15 were followed by a thematic division between books or rolls, we should expect not *αὐτοῦ* but *ἑξῆς* as at Philod. *Rhet.* 1 col. 7,23 p. 21 Longo (end of book 1) and often.

[2] Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* 508 s.v. *παραγράφειν* (cf. Gigante 1978, 19–20), a view arrived at independently by Crönert 1901, 620 (= 1975, 117), maintained by Bassi 1909, 503–4, and endorsed by W. Schmid 1939, 71 against Philippson 1920, 226 n. 2. It had been adopted already in Young 1810, 15 (see below, n. 5). A note of warning was sounded by Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 126: 'de qua me aliquantisper dubitasse fateor, cum virum quendam doctissimum ultima prioris libri *καιρὸς ἂν εἴη τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας λόγον τῆς κατ' Ἐπίκουρον αὐτοῦ παραγράφειν* sic explicare meminissem, ut *παραγράφειν* non adscribendi (sc. coronidem) sed describendi vim haberet.'

[3] For examples, see Wesseling's notes in Stephanus, *TLG* s.v. *περιγράφω* and ad Diod. Sic. 1. 41. The books of Diodorus consistently end with this formulation, though the MSS vacillate between *παραγράφειν* and *περιγράφειν*. In Philodemus: *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) fr. 34, 3–14; fr. 77; *Rhet.* 2, i. 120,6–10 Sudhaus p. 215 Longo *καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς διεξόδου | προσθέντες παρα[γράψαι]|μεν ἄ[ν] τὸν ὑπομνη[μ]α[τι]|σμόν* (the restoration *παρα[γράψαι]|μεν* is due to Usener in his edition of Dion. *Epist.*, p. 68, where further examples are given).

[4] Hephaest. *Poem.* 1; Harpocration s.v. *παραγραφή*.

[5] So first the anonymous translator (now known to be Thomas Young: McIlwaine 1988, 322–3; cf. Henrichs 1974*a*, 6 n. 8: 'Anon. I') in *Quarterly Review*, 3 (1810), 15: 'having sufficiently discussed this part of the division of our subject which was laid down in the beginning, it is now time to conclude this Treatise on Piety according to the doctrines of Epicurus.'

[6] 'vix definiendus' (so Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v.; cf. Gigante 1978, 19). The passage runs: *καὶ διὰ τὸ δυσπαρά|γραφον* (sc. vitae) *κλ[ί]νομεν ὁτ[ὲ] | μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ τάχα πρὸς τὸ | μήκιστον*

demus himself was fond, namely, the practice of alluding to finally occurring graphics (*παραγραφή, κορωνίς*, etc.) at the *close* of works or of units of composition, e.g. at the close of Philod. *De oec.* 38,47: *ὁρίζειν παραγραφαῖς τὰς ἐπιμελείας*. This *topos* also assumed a metaphorical form, perhaps drawing on the popular Hellenistic metaphor *curriculum vitae*, as in Horace's trope for death at the close of *Epist.* 1.16 (l. 79): *ultima linea rerum*.[1] Thus Philodemus at the close of *De morte* (39,18) calls death *ἡ τοῦ βίου παραγραφή*,[2] and in epigram 4 Sider (*AP* 11.41, 17 Gow–Page, 14 Gigante) he refers to the passing of the years as *ἤδη μοι βιότου σχιζόμεναι σελίδες*, as he beseeches the Muses to write a coronis (i.e. put an end) to his amatory plight: *αὐτὴν ἀλλὰ τάχιστα κορωνίδα γράψατε, Μοῦσαι / ταύτην ἡμετέρης, δεσποτίδες, μανίης*.[3]

In view of Philodemus' documented use of the *topos* and related meanings for *παραγράφειν*, the interpretation of *παραγράφειν* at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15 in the sense 'to conclude' (rather than *anschließen*, 'add on', or *describere*, 'write out') has a great deal to commend it. For otherwise we are forced to believe that at this point in the treatise the occurrence of *παραγράφειν*—accompanied in the text by the *παραγραφή*,[4] and a *subscriptio*—was totally fortuitous. And this seems almost

ἐκτενεῖν, ὁτὲ | δ' ἐπὶ τὸ καὶ κατόπιν οὐκ ἀ|δυναῖ̣ν ἐγλιπεῖν. Cf. Polybius 16.12,19; 17.13,3; 17.15,1.

[1] See W. Schmid 1939, 71–2; 1957, 326–7.

[2] Cf. 39,19, where *περ[ι]οδεύσαντες* completes the metaphor for having finished the course of life. So also *δυσπαράγραφον τοῦ βίου* in *P. Herc.* 1251 (cited above, p. 92 n. 6); Plut. *An seni* 789A *τὴν κορωνίδα τοῦ βίου*.

[3] The use of *κορωνίς* in the *final* epigram of Meleager's collection (*AP* 12.257 = 129 Gow) may also be compared in this respect (Bing 1988, 34). Philodemus' epigram may similarly have been designed to crown a collection (so A. H. Griffiths, *BICS* 17 (1970), 37–8; *contra*: Sider ad loc.). The most striking instance I know of the metaphorical use of the image occurs at the close of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*, where (immediately before the colophon of the novel) the author refers to the concluding wedding of the young lovers as *ἡ κορωνὶς τοῦ δράματος*; for the device see J. Winkler, 'The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the Narrative Strategy of Heliodorus' "Aithiopica"', *YCS* 27 (1982), 93–158 at 157–8. Contrary to Gow, D. Sider in his forthcoming edition of Philodemus' epigrams argues that *αὐτήν* means not '(write) this *same* coronis' but '(write) *her* (sc. Xanthippe) as the coronis (i.e. end) of my madness', though this reading does not alter the image of the finally occurring graphic, which may be thought to be visible in the text. For examples this kind of personification, and discussion of related poetic *topoi* drawn from Hellenistic book-production generally see further Bing 1988, esp. 33–6. For another Epicurean example see the elegant conclusion to D.L. 10 (Epicurus), where the author states his intention to append Epicurus' *Kuriai Doxai* as a graphic seal to his entire work (10.138): *τὸν κολοφῶνα, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἐπιθῶμεν*.

[4] Actually a diple obelismene, extending beneath *του* at col. 15,23, the final line of the roll; there is no *κορωνίς*, but its absence need not mean that this is not the end of a book or

too much to presume, especially in a writer attuned to the subtleties of Hellenistic literary discourse.[1]

As for the '*λόγος* about piety according to Epicurus', which the author indicates his intention to *παραγράφειν*, there is no reason why this designation should not extend to the work as a whole.[2] The phrase *ὁ περὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας λόγος τῆς κατ' Ἐπίκουρον* is as applicable to the criticism of poets and philosophers in that part of the treatise as it is to the defence of philosophical theology.[3] For this very reason the title of the work as a whole presumably took the traditional form (accepted by all modern scholars) of *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*.

If this account is correct, and the colophon of *P. Herc.* 1428 refers not to the addition of another portion of the work but to the conclusion of the treatise as a whole, then the texts of the apologetic exposition will have *preceded* the criticism of poets and philosophers in the original treatise. As it happens, we have already had occasion to anticipate this very conclusion on independent grounds of content, stichometry, and transmission of individual fragments from both parts of the treatise.[4]

We are now in a position to say something concrete about the

work. The final column of *P. Herc.* 1675 (*On Vices and Virtues*), preserved only in *disegno* at this point, did not have a *κορωνίς*, while that of 1008 (*De vitiis*) has only 'un piccolo trattino' under the last column—both ends of whole works (private communication from Mario Capasso, 16 Nov. 1993).

[1] I am not simply assuming the authorship of Philodemus. For Phaedrus' *elegantia*, see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93. A Cambridge colleague suggests to me that *παραγράφειν* here does mean *anschließen* or *describere* but is parallel with Lucretius' (unfulfilled) promise at 5. 155 to relate later on the true details about the Epicurean gods (cf. M. Bollack, *La Raison de Lucrèce* (Paris, 1978), 265 with n. 1). Both would on this view involve a *praeteritio* rhetorically equivalent to Lucian's bogus promise (at the end of his *Vera historia*) to relate his further adventures in the next book (non-existent)—an ending which the scholiast calls 'the biggest lie of all' (ad *Ver. Hist.* 2. 47 p. 24 Rabe: *τὸ τέλος ψευδέστατον*). But what would become of Lucian's joke, if serious authors had done the same?

[2] For *λόγος* = *liber* in the Herculanensia see Capasso 1981, 398 with notes. The specification *τῆς κατ' Ἐπίκουρον* makes it clear that the *λόγος* is not Epicurus' own (lest Epicurus be thought to have read Callimachus, Persaeus, Diogenes of Babylon, and the like), but that the subject of the treatise as a whole is the kind of *εὐσέβεια* that obtains in his case (*κατ' Ἐπίκουρον*).

[3] Even if it could be demonstrated that *παραγράφειν* in *P. Herc.* 1428 means *addere*, it would still not be certain that the phrase *τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας λόγον τῆς κατ' Ἐπίκουρον* designates the texts of the 'philosophical' part, rather than some lost continuation of the work.

[4] Above, 2(*c*), 2(*f*). Angeli 1988*a*, 198 envisages that *παράγραφειν* here might mean *dividere*, i.e. 'to place the paragraphos' as a mark of division between two parts or books ('è espressione tipicamente filodemea per indicare l'introduzione di una nuova sezione di un'opera'), but adduces no instances that exhibit this meaning.

outline (διαίρεcιc) followed by the author and its division into parts (μέρη). Both are explicitly mentioned in the concluding lines of *P. Herc.* 1428 discussed at the beginning of this section. This procedure has at its basis the practice of Greek philosophical dialectic, that is, the method of approaching a subject by means of a preparatory definition, and then dividing it into parts or aspects that are to be gone through in order.[1] Thus the author's division was set forth at the beginning of the treatise (so *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,16–17). This beginning is not itself preserved, though clearly much of the first part of the treatise is taken up with the definition of εὐcέβεια,[2] and with the defence of the Epicureans as having fulfilled the requirements of that virtue. We now have good reason for identifying a transition from this μέροc of the treatise to the next, namely in *P. Herc.* 229 and in the link between *P. Herc.* 1610 and 242 (now cols. 85–6). At the conclusion of the latter passage the author indicates his intention to 'start with the theologians and poets (2479–82: [κατάρ]|ξομαι δ' ἀπὸ τ[ῶν || cεμ]νῶν θεολόγων | [καὶ π]οητῶν), particularly those whom our opponents praise, on the grounds that they are setting forth opinions which are impious and disadvantageous to mankind'. This appears to be a transition from the account of religious beliefs in the development of civilization in *P. Herc.* 229 (where the poets, the theologians, and their myths are singled out for blame for the origin of false beliefs about the gods)[3] to the section of the treatise criticizing in detail the pronouncements of poets and philosophers about the gods. The discussion of the development of civilization may have itself constituted a separate μέροc of the treatise, and the transition from the defence of the Epicureans is also discernible.[4] Likewise the transition from the critique of poets to the critique of philosophers (*P. Herc.* 1428, cf. above, p. 17 n.2) is not preserved, though this would appear to be an obvious subdivision of θεολόγοι καὶ

[1] *De pietate* is a concrete example of a medium which served to transmit this (essentially Greek) dialectical method of composition and organization to the Romans: cf. M. Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch* (Göttingen, 1960), 122–4; Rawson 1985, 132.

[2] In particular cols. 40–1 are devoted to the definition of the 'pious man' (ὁ εὐcεβής); 1857–9 (the opponents have a ἕτερον . . . λό[γον] | εὐcεβείας); 2202–3 ὁ] δίκαιος; cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124; *P. Oxy.* II 215,4–16; Obbink 1984, 613–15; 1991.

[3] See 1202–5: ταῦτα [δ' ἐπομ]ένως | ἐποίο[υν οἱ δί]καιοι τῶν [θεολ]όγων | καὶ φιλοcόφων; 2158–61: [ο]ἱ δὲ | μύθους μὲν εἰcῆγον | ἀμέλει καὶ τερατεί[ας.

[4] The discussion of philosophers (like Socrates) who in historical times were prosecuted for impiety is pivotal (1330–1701), preceding the introduction to the discussion of the history of civilization. The introduction to the catalogue of poets comes at 2338–43: 'I shall now demonstrate, as I promised (ὡc ἐπηγγελάμην, . . . παραcτ[ή]|cω), not later on, but in the present discussion' (ϛ[υν]|αγωγῇ).

ποηταί (2480–2, cf. 1204–5, 1571–2, who originally introduced false stories about the gods for political control).

As for the authorship of the treatise, it is hazardous to say more than that its ascription to Philodemus, on the basis of the single Φ[preserved in the *s··bscriptio*, is little more than a 'time-honoured convention.'[1] There is no absolute proof of his authorship. The argument that the style, vocabulary, and content of the treatise are consistent with Philodemus' other treatises cannot be conclusive in the absence of examples of the prose of Phaedrus.[2] The fact that the Herculaneum library has so far produced no trace of a work by Phaedrus or Zeno is not necessarily probative, for Philodemus certainly knew and read their works, as did Cicero. As we have seen, in 45 BC Cicero asked Atticus for a copy of Phaedrus' *Περὶ θεῶν*.[3]

The fact that Cicero, who was at that time composing the first book of *De natura deorum*, wanted a look at Phaedrus' book is of potential relevance for the authorship of *De pietate*. For also in 46 BC Cicero closely consulted the latter text (perhaps even the copy at Herculaneum in the library of the Pisonian villa), or one that was so close to it in style, exposition, argument, and organization that it left on Cicero's work an imprint that cannot now be distinguished in certain portions from the text of *De pietate*.[4]

Cicero himself acknowledges this kind of debt to his Greek sources in writing to Atticus (*Att.* 12. 52): 'You will say, "What is your method in compositions of this kind?" They are mere transcripts (*ἀπόγραφα*)[5] and cost comparatively little labour; I supply only the words, of which

[1] Henrichs 1972*a*, 81 n. 37.

[2] Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 characterizes Phaedrus as a model of Attic *elegantia*, but excoriates Zeno as a mocker filled with *maledictio* (he attacked his own partisans, called Socrates the *scurra Atticus*, and never referred to Chrysippus except in the feminine gender). The authorship of Zeno of Sidon, apart from the evidence of Φ[in the *subscriptio*, is ruled out by the fact that he is referred to objectively at ll. 1465–7. He could still, of course, be a major source for parts of the treatise, as Diels thought and as is in fact suggested by that passage.

[3] *Libros mihi de quibus ad te antea scripsi velim mittas et maxime Φαίδρου Περὶ θεῶν et* †ΠΛΛΙΔΟC† (the MSS also have OCΩN, but the correction *θεῶν* seems sound); for the other title, mutilated in the MSS, see above, 1 *fin.* On Phaedrus see A. Olleris, *De Phaedro Epicureo* (1841); Philippson 1938, 1557–8; Raubitschek 1949 (= 1991); Pease 1955, i. 452; Dorandi 1991*b*, 53–4. He was dead by 51 (Cic. *Fam.* 13. 1. 2), though he had already retired, leaving Patro as head of the school in 70 (Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 97, p. 84 Bekker). Atticus was exceedingly close to him (*Fin.* 5. 3; *Att.* 16. 7. 4; *Fam.* 13. 1. 2).

[4] Particularly evident in the catalogue of the pre-Socratic philosophers and the criticism of the Stoics at *De nat. deor.* 1. 25–41. The correspondences are set forth by Krische 1840; Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 529–50; Henrichs 1974*a*, 8–10, and see above, p. 80 n. 5.

[5] I take this to be a touch of false modesty on Cicero's part.

I have a copious flow.' Elsewhere, however, Cicero indicates the direction in which he shaped his source-material. At *De off.* 1.6 he says: 'As my habit is, I shall draw from the fountains of the Greeks at my own judgement and discretion.' And at *De fin.* 1.6: 'I do not merely perform the office of a translator, but apply my own judgement and my own arrangement.'

If the present reconstruction is correct, we can glimpse Cicero at work as he *reversed* the order of topics as he found them in his source. His order is: the criticism of philosophers (from Thales down to Diogenes of Babylon: 1. 18–41), then the abbreviated invective against poets (1. 42–3), followed by a positive exposition of Epicurean theology (1. 43–56). Given his purpose in writing, it seems understandable that Cicero, who consistently portrays the Epicureans as cultural renegades bent on undermining the whole of traditional learning, should have given pride of place to the Epicureans' criticism of the philosophical and mythical tradition. By beginning with the philosophers, Cicero was able to survey the historical range of philosophical views on the gods at the outset of his treatise. The vehemence of the Epicurean critique imparted to his work what he took to be the rigour and topicality of the contemporary debate on the gods. Here Cicero's manipulations of his source become apparent, for in the case of the critique of poets he has reduced some 150 columns of the Herculaneum *De pietate* to a single paragraph.[1] In this respect Cicero's order of topics is even less problematic for the present reconstruction. The texts of the first part of *De pietate* do not in fact contain a systematic exposition of Epicurean theology (as in Cicero),[2] but rather lists of examples drawn from Epicurean contexts in defence of Epicureans on the point of piety. In Cicero's positive exposition there are no parallels with topics or order of presentation; there remain a number of lexical importations from the text of the first, 'philosophical' part of the treatise.[3] The clear structural disjuncture in Cicero's exposition at this point (*De nat. deor.* 1. 43) suggests

[1] Viz. *De nat. deor.* 1. 42, quoted above, p. 21 n. 1. In his adaptation Cicero clearly concentrated on the treatment of philosophers. But even Cicero's abridgement of Philodemus here suggests the compilation style of the catalogue of poets, and its manner of organization and argument.

[2] A fact already shrewdly discerned by Spengel 1864, 149–52.

[3] There are likewise compelling parallels with, perhaps even translations, of Philodemus, *De dis* 3: see Arrighetti 1958, 1961; Longo 1985; 1988*a* (*ND* 1.49 *quasi corpus, quasi sanguis* ~ ποιὸς ὕπνος). For parallels with the first part of *De pietate* see below, p. 98 n. 2 and the commentary ad loc.

that he in fact exhausted his Epicurean source at precisely this point and had to resort to still other Epicurean accounts for Velleius' description of Epicurean theology.[1] If Cicero had in hand a copy of *De pietate* as he composed Velleius' speech in the first book of *De natura deorum*, he rolled very quickly through the first half of the work to pore eagerly over the heated attack on philosophers in the second half.

Just as in the case of the catalogue of poets, the texts of the first part of *De pietate* are sporadically represented in *De natura deorum*.[2] But they cannot decide the debate over Cicero's precise source for Velleius' speech, namely whether this was the Herculaneum *De pietate* itself or some common source.[3] For the determination authorship we are left exclusively with factors internal to the text, especially style and diction. The diction and pre-Atticist style of the prose has a close affinity for some of the writings of Philodemus, as does the general avoidance of hiatus. Strathmann, however, detects a discrepancy between the fairly strict avoidance of hiatus observed in the first part of *De pietate*, and the less strict practice followed in the second, 'critical' part of the treatise.[4] This difference might mean that the two parts were written by different authors. But it may also be attributable to the tachygraphic, catalogue style of the second part, which consists almost entirely of strings of short, abbreviated paraphrases of *other* authors and the constant use of direct and indirect quotation.[5] In short, there is no

[1] Obbink 1992*b*, 194.

[2] See 1449–51 ὡς ἠβα[cκόντων ἢ] | ὀνειρωτ[τόντων] | καταφρονῶ[ν] (*De nat. deor.* 1. 34 *puerilibus fabulis*; 1. 42 *delirantium somnia*); 527–9 π̣α[ρα]|κόπτε̣ιν καὶ μ̣[αίνεc]|θαι (1. 94 *summos viros desipere, delirare, dementes esse dicebas*), and for a list of such passages, Philippson 1939, 15–40 esp. 29; 1940, 21–44. Cotta's attack on Epicurus' religiosity and use of religious language (e.g. at 1. 115–16 and 1. 123) betrays the almost certain influence of the first part of *De pietate*. See e.g. cols. 43, 71, and the commentary on 206–7. Cicero (1. 115) very likely knows about Epicurus' works on *On Holiness* and *On Piety* from the first part of *De pietate* (see ll. 205–7 with commentary). He notes that reading such works you might think you were listening to 'high priests' (*pontifices maximos*).

[3] Diels, who was among the first carefully to delineate the correspondences between *De pietate* and *De natura deorum* 1, preferred common Epicurean sources, both Zeno (for the catalogue of philosophers) and Phaedrus (*Dox. Graec.* 121–32, 529–50; *SB* Berlin 1893, 116 n. 2 = *Kleine Schriften* 254 n. 2), while R. Philippson, *RE* 7 (1939), 27–31 argued that Cicero used both the *Περὶ θεῶν* of Phaedrus (see Cic. *Att.* 13. 39. 2; Philippson 1938, 1153; Pease 1955, i, introd. 38–40) as well as the version of the first part of *De pietate* regarded by Philippson as the epitome (*P. Herc.* 1077).

[4] Strathmann 1892, 15–18. Schober 1988, 70 argues for a high degree of avoidance of hiatus in the second part of the treatise, seeing it as the primary stylistic feature.

[5] Hiatus is not avoided by the author in introducing citations (see e.g. 1849, 2255), or in direct quotations, and this practice tends to carry over into loose paraphrase as well. At

reason to doubt that both parts of *De pietate* were written by the same author. The question of the exact identity of that author, however, or the exact way to formulate that identity,[1] must remain open.

4. The Edition

(*a*) *System of Presentation*

The presentation of the text amalgamates readings of the papyrus (where extant) with those of the Oxonian and Neapolitan apographs. The characteristic features of this layout are as follows:

(i) Continuous roman numeration of the individual fragments. Portions of the same papyrus column that are transmitted separately in the *disegni* are counted as one fragment, but distinguished by the addition of capital letters. The primary textual witnesses (papyrus, Neapolitan *disegni*, Oxonian *disegni*) are indicated first in the critical apparatus for each column.

(ii) Continuous numeration of the lines in the papyrus; the line-numbers within the column or the individual fragment are given in parentheses. This system will make quotation considerably easier in the future, just as it greatly facilitates reference and cross-reference in the commentary. Where the relative order of fragments within a given thematic group is largely conjectural, it is therefore of no great consequence. For this reason, and because it is inconceivable that new fragments of *De pietate* will turn up, any future need for rearrangement of the fragments is unlikely.

ll. 2496–2510 Philodemus indicates his impatience with the catalogue of poets and philosophers, and warns his readers against possible errors in citation due to haste and carelessness.

[1] We should perhaps be prepared to consider a complex type of authorship typical of other productions of Hellenistic philosophical schools: namely parallel redactors (say, Philodemus, Phaedrus) simultaneously synthesizing the work of a series of compilers working from multiple sources (e.g. Zeno, Diogenes of Babylon, Apollodorus of Athens), with some degree of cross-contamination. Both the lists of of facts about Epicureans in the first part of the treatise, and the catalogues of poets and philosophers in the second part, may well have been compiled as much as a century previous by a series of such redactors. The work imitated by Cicero was the property of the school, and its style and authorship a resulting by-product. For style and diction in Epicurean writing as common property of the school and difficulties that result for stylistic analysis and determination of authorship see the remarks of Diels 1916*a*, 891 = 293. This does not, of course, resolve the question of whose name stood in the *subscriptio*. But it makes more precarious facile assumptions about the certainty of its conjecture.

(iii) A new critical sign, a sublinear asterisk,[1] is introduced to mark those instances (unique to Herculaneum papyrology) in which the nineteenth-century copyist obviously misread the letters in the papyrus, and the modern editor has conjecturally restored the original reading, where the papyrus does not survive or is in too deteriorated a condition to verify the correction. Thus a letter with a sublinear asterisk in the text represents the corrected letter as it must have stood in the papyrus, whereas the erroneous reading of the copyist is given in the apparatus.[2] The critical apparatus omits most conjectures of previous editors that are now ruled out on palaeographical grounds.

(iv) A format of presentation utilizing facing pages is adopted, allowing a diplomatic text to be consulted by specialists in the original columnar format in which it appears in the papyrus in close comparison with a text printed in modern layout with translation and basic exegetical notes for the use of the reader.[3]

Thus the text on the left-hand page preserves the original lineation of the papyrus and thus offers the visual benefit of comparative line-lengths for easier estimation of lacunae and evaluation of restored passages. Those columns of the text that are physically or conjecturally linked with their succeeding column are explicitly noted as such in the critical apparatus. A dotted line separating columns indicates that they cannot have originally been linked (i.e. at least one column is lost in between).

The text on the right-hand page presents *exactly the same text as that on the left*, but in the continuous lineation of a modern edition. Vertical bars | mark off increments of ten lines in the papyrus column, as

[1] As used, for example, in Henrichs 1972*a* (following the suggestion of R. Merkelbach); cf. the use of upper half-brackets (Sedley 1973, 36), marginal notations (in Schober's original dissertation of 1923, omitted in the 1988 printing in *Cronache ercolanesi*), or the easily overlooked slanting Greek letters in the text of Gomperz 1866, to designate editorially changed readings of the *disegni*. The majority of editors, however, unscrupulously treat such emendations as equivalent to the uncertain letters designated by sublinear dots (e.g. Philippson 1920; 1921), or relegate such changes to the apparatus; still others allow them to go entirely unremarked. The present system makes it possible to gauge and evaluate an editor's interference with the apographs at a glance.

[2] In the critical apparatus this designation is also used where previous editors have chosen to alter such readings of the apographs, whether or not they acknowledged their alteration. The readings of other editors are reported throughout according to the conventions of the present edition, whether or not these were the conventions of their own editions.

[3] The need for a text printed continuously was already perceived by Sudhaus, who printed the *Rhetoric* twice, first in a papyrological format and then in continuous form (Sudhaus 1895).

indicated in the right margin. The continuous text is necessitated as an aid in reading (and hence further reconstruction), and because the original columns of the papyrus and their layout have no *a priori* organizational value in the structure of the treatise. On this page the spelling is normalized,[1] and oddities like letters above the line are not noted; such details can instantly be obtained by consulting the opposite page. Wherever continuous sense can be made of the text, an English translation is included. Brief explanatory notes are keyed as footnotes to the translation. Independent of the commentary, they are intended to clarify basic aspects of the text such as the identity of an unexpressed subject or the general run of a missing sentence.

Otherwise the method of publication is that adopted in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* XLV (1977) and followed subsequently (summarized in (*b*) below). The text is printed in modern form, with accents and punctuation, while the lectional signs occurring in the papyri are noted in the apparatus criticus, where faults of orthography and the like are corrected (the corrected forms alone appear in the continuous text on the right-hand page). Iota adscript is printed where written, otherwise iota subscript is used. Square brackets [] indicate a lacuna, angular brackets ⟨⟩ a mistaken omission in the original papyrus, braces { } a superfluous letter or letters, double square brackets ⟦⟧ a deletion by the scribe, the signs ` ´ an insertion above the line. Dots within brackets represent the estimated number of letters lost or deleted, dots outside the brackets mutilated or otherwise illegible letters. A dot placed under a letter indicates that its reading is doubtful and therefore compatible with at least one other letter. The sign || marks the end of a column followed by a lower margin (and not just the end of an incomplete column). The sign // marks the union of two parts of the same line of writing preserved in separate fragments (or their apographs), and united by the editor.[2] The abbreviation *P. Herc.* is used

[1] Thus κειν̣εῖν in the left-hand page is replaced by κινεῖν in the continuous text on the right-hand page, and I have generally tidied up, so that e.g. ἐμ̣ παντί (2498) on the left-hand page appears on the right as ἐν παντί. But γινώσκω, γίνομαι, ποητής, and μηθέν, when such forms appear, remain even in the continuous text, as the standard forms of the day.

[2] For the introduction of this sign see Delattre 1989. In addition, I use the related designation 1077//1098 to indicate an entire series in which the columns from two sequences alternate or combine in this way. Similarly 247/242 indicates two series of which each contributes tops and bottoms respectively to form whole columns, whereas the convention 248—1428 indicates two series related in such a way that one runs continuously on after the end of the first. In this way the entire sequence of *P. Herc.* inventory numbers that make up the first part of *De pietate* can be represented modally as follows: 1077↓//1098↓—437/452↓—229↓//247/242↓//1610—1088↓//433↓. For the arrow (indicating that the

strictly to refer to an extant Herculaneum papyrus, whereas *N* and *O* refer to the Neapolitan and Oxonian apograph respectively, whether or not the papyrus itself still exists. In the commentary, bold arabic numerals are used for references to Herculaneum papyri as listed in *Catalogo dei papiri ercolanesi* (Naples, 1979) in cases where the distinction between transmission as an extant papyrus (*P. Herc.*) or in the form of an apograph only (*N, O*) is not a crucial one.

(*b*) *Conspectus Siglorum*

pap.	Papyrus Herculanensis
O	Apographum Oxoniense
N	Apographum Neapolitanum vel N^1 et HV^2 II una cum N^2 inter se convenientia
N^1	Apographi Neapolitani exemplar primum (*P. Herc.* 1077 solum)
N^2	Apographum istius apographi N^1 (*P. Herc.* 1077 solum)
HV^2 II	*Herculanensium voluminum, collectio altera*, tom. ii (Neapoli, 1863)
Quaranta	B. Quaranta, dissertatio supra laudata (pp. 27–8)
Spengel	L. Spengel, 'Aus den Herculanischen Rollen. Philodemus *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*', *Abh. d. Kg. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss.*, Philos.-philol. Cl. 10,1 (1864), 127–67
Bücheler	Fr. Bücheler, 'Philodemos *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*', *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, 91 (1865), 513–41 (= *Kl. Schr.* i. 580–612)
Gomperz	Th. Gomperz, *Philodem über Frömmigkeit* (Herculanische Studien, zweites Heft; Lipsiae, 1866)
Usener	H. Usener, *Epicurea* (Lipsiae, 1887)
Diels	H. Diels, 'Ein epikureisches Fragment über Götterverehrung', *Sitzungsberichte der Preuß. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1916, Nr. 37, 886–909 (= *Kl. Schr.* 288–311)
Diels 1917	H. Diels, 'Philodemus über die Götter, Drittes Buch',

original order of fragments in a given series has been determined to be the reverse of the order indicated by the apographs) see p. 47 n. 1.

	(Erläuterung), *Abh. d. Kgl. Preuß. Akad. d. Wiss.* 1916, Philos.-hist. Kl. Nr. 6 (Berolini, 1917)
Philippson	R. Philippson, 'Zu Philodems Schrift über die Frömmigkeit', *Hermes*, 55 (1920), 225–78, 364–72; 56 (1921), 364–410
Schober	A. Schober, 'Philodemi περὶ εὐσεβείας libelli partem priorem restituit Adolf Schober', diss. ined. (Regiomontii, 1923) = *CErc* 18 (1988), 67–125
Anon. A	adnotatio in Gomperzi editionis *Herculanische Studien* exemplari Neapolitano
*	ego
Henrichs	A. Henrichs (per litteras)

a̰	=	littera mutila vel dubia
a̤	=	littera apographi mutata ab editore
'a'	=	littera supra lineam scripta
{a}	=	littera ab editore expuncta
⟨a⟩	=	littera ab editore addita
||	=	finis columnae, margine inferiore sequente
a⌜ ⌝a	=	spatium, non lacunam, indicavit
[a]	=	littera ab editore suppleta
⟦a⟧	=	littera a librario expuncta
[.]	=	littera deperdita
[.(.)]	=	1–2 litterae deperditae
[ ]	=	0–1 littera deperdita
a//a	=	duae partes eiusdem versus coniunctae de fragmentis diversis

ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥCΕΒΕΙΑC

ΤΜΗΜΑ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ

1 *P.Herc.* 1098 fr. 29 = *N* 1098 fr. 29 (p. 140 G., 397 Ph.), *HI*^{2} II 126

Testimonia: 2–12 Metrodorus fr. 8 Körte 7–9 Epic. *Ep. ad Menoec.* 123 οἵους δ' αὐτοὺς (sc. deos) οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νομίζουσιν 1–14 Polyaenus *Adv. Aristonem* fr. 30 Tepedino

1–4 vestigia litterarum supraposita ad sinistram partem exhibet pap., deest *N* 1 Ἀ]ρίςτω[ν Philippson: ε *N*: Ἀ]ρίςτω[να Gigante ap. Angeli, *CErc* 23 (1993), 18 adn. 95 2–3 Gomperz: κ]αὶ *Μητρ*[όδω|ρος ὀ]νειδίζει Körte: ὀ]νειδίζει[ν Tepedino 4 ψυχ[ήν Körte: ψυχ[ῇι dubitanter Gomperz 4–5 τὴν θ[εί]αν οὐ φ]άν[τα ἀ]μεί[νω Philippson 6–7 προς-τί]θετ[αι θε|οὺς] Philippson 7–14 Bücheler 7 αι^{r} ου spatium, non lacunam, indicavit *N* 9 post ειν spatiolum *N* 10 init. πο, ο corr. ex υ *N* 11 corr. iam Bücheler: αριστον[*N* 12–13 fort. [ὁμολο|γ]εῖ vel λέ|γ]ει: [cφόδρ' ἀμέ|λ]ει Quaranta 14 ε⟨ὐ⟩ρ⟨η⟩μάτων Philippson τῶι Gomperz: των *N* 15 προc^{1} ^{1}δια *HI*^{2} 15–16 Πρὸς Δια[γόραν καὶ]|| πρὸς [Κ]ριτ[ίαν Anonymus A in Comp. editionis exemplari Neapolit.: Πρὸς δια[λεκτικοὺς]|| πρὸς Μι⟨θ⟩[ρῆν Philippson 16 [, i.e. ς[, ο[, ε[, θ[, vel ω[*N* 16–18 δια]|τεί[νεται τὴν θεί]|αν ἀ[ταραξίαν Philippson 19 post θειc pars sup. τ, π, γ, ξ 19–20 πί]|πτειν vel βλά|πτειν

I

..... Ἀ]ρίςτω[ν δὲ 1098 29
καὶ τὸ]ν Μητρ[όδω-
ρον ὀ]νειδίζει[...
....]ψυχ[..]την ε[..
..... .]αν[..]μει[... (5)
....]οετ[.. θε-
οὺc] ἄλλους εἶναι οὐ-
δὲ οὓc ὑπολαμβάνου-
cιν· τούτοις δὲ καὶ
Π[[υ]]ολύαινος ἐν τοῖc (10)
Πρὸc τὸν Ἀρίcτων[α
μάχεται [..... ..
.]ει δὲ περὶ πολλῶν
ἑρμάτων· καὶ ἐν τῶι
πρὸc δια[..... ... (15)
προc[.]μι.[..... .
τει[..... ....
ανα[..... ..... .
θειc.[..... ....πί-
πτειν [..... .... (20)
ονω[..... .....]ων
[..... ..... .]ocιc
ται καν[..... ...
ατον[..... ..... .
μαιον[..... .... (25)
θεον α[..... .]φ[..
ναι κ[..... .....
των[..... ..... .
καὶ τῶν [..... ...|| (29)
– – – – – – – – – – – –

||[..... *Ἀ*]*ρίς̣τω*[*ν δὲ καὶ τὸ*]*ν Μητρ*[*όδωρον ὀ*]*νειδίζει*[..... ..]*ψυχ* 1 I
[..]*την ε*[..... ...]*αν*[..]*μει*[..... ....]*ο̣ετ*[.. *θεοὺς*] *ἄλλους εἶναι*
οὐδὲ οὓς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· τούτοις δὲ καὶ | *Πολύαινος ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς τὸν* 10
Ἀρίστ̣ων[*α*] *μάχεται* [..... ...]*ει δὲ περὶ πολλῶν ἑρμάτων· καὶ ἐν τῷ̣*
πρὸς δια[..... ...] *προς*[.]*μι̣*.[..... .]*τει*[..... ....]*ανα*[..... .....
.]*θεις*.[..... .... *πί*]|*πτειν* [..... .....]*ονω*[..... .....]*ων*[..... ..... .] 20
ο̣σι̣σται καν[..... ...]*ατον*[..... ..... .]*μαιον*[..... ....]*θεον α*[..... .]
φ[..]*ναι κ*[..... .....]*των*[..... ..... .]*καὶ τῶν* [..... ...]||

(c.5 *columns or 400 words missing from beginning of treatise*) | Ariston[1] 1 I
reproaches Metrodorus (*one word missing*) soul (*several words missing*)
that the gods are different and not the ones they[2] think they are. And
with these | Polyaenus engages in his books *Against Ariston* (*several* 10
words missing) and concerning many foundations,[3] and in his book
Against ...[4] (c.*40 words indistinguishable, + 1 column or* c.*90 words missing*)

[1] The Stoic Ariston of Chios, mid-3rd c. BC.

[2] Probably people in general, not the Stoics. This seems to be part of Ariston's criticism of Metrodorus, recalling Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* 123: 'For there are gods—the knowledge of them is self-evident. But they are not such as the many believe them to be. For by their beliefs as to their nature the many do not preserve them.'

[3] Or 'boundary markers', 'cairns', perhaps a metaphor for 'foundations' of ideas about gods?

[4] Possibly *Against Dialecticians*.

2 *N* 1098 fr. 24 (p. 136 G., 393f Ph.), *HV*² II 121

Test.: 37–41 Epic. *Ep. ad Herod.* 40 42–50 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 46–9 *nec tamen ea species corpus est*; id. 1. 65, 67–8

33–4 *ἐκεῖ]νο* Philippson δ' *ἀλ|[λότριον* Philippson: δ' *ἀλ[ο|γώτατον* Scott, *JPh* 12 (1883), 235 34 Gomperz 35 Bücheler 36 [*κα]τα[λ]ȩ[ίπ]ει* Gomperz: [..]*τα*[.]*ν*[..]*ει N*: [*κα]τα[ρ]ɨ-θ̣[μ]εῖ* Gomperz app. crit., unde Philippson 37–41 Bücheler 38 [*καὶ τῶ*]*ν* Quaranta 44–5 fin. suppl. iam Quaranta 44 *cυ[νθέτους* Gomperz 45–50 suppl. Diels 1917, 31 adn. 1 45 vel fort. [*οἱ μὲν θεοὶ* 46 δ̣[*ι*]*αιῴ*[*νι*]*οι* Diels, quod spatii causa paulum immutavi; δ̣ tantum cauda, etiam ą vel ɣ possis ω circuli arcus sin. et sin. sup., ç, ǫ, θ̣, ȩ, pars sin. ω difficile 47 *φ*[*ύcειc* Gomperz 50 [...]*oca*[..]*ου N* 50–1 *ἀ*[*λλ'*] *οὐ*|*κ ἀναι*[*cθήτ*]*ο*[*υc* Philippson: *οὐ*|*κ ἀναχ*[*καῖ*]*ο*[*ν* Gomperz 53–4 *cυ*]*ντιθ*[*ε*| ...] Gomperz: ǫ̣ *τι θ*[*ε*|*όν*] Philippson 54–8 suppositum ex 1098 fr. 29 = vv. 23–29 *N* 54 *ται*ʳ *ʾκα N*

2

30 ....]εαν[.. 1098 24
....]δια[..
....]θεω-
[ρ..... ...]νοδαλ
.... τ]ὸ λέ[γ]ειν (5)
35 ὡc ο[ὐδ'] ἐν τοῖc cώ-
μαcιν [κα]τα[λ]ȩ[ίπ]ει
τοὺc θ[εούc, "τῶν c]ω-
μάτων" [λέγω]ν "τὰ
μὲν ε[ἶν]αι c[υνκ]ρί- (10)
40 cειc, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ cυν-
κρίcειc πεπόηνται·"
μήτε γὰρ ἀτόμουc
νομίζειν το̣[ὺc θε-
οὺc μήτε cυ[νκρίcειc, (15)
45 ἐπειδήπερ [οὗτοι μὲν
δ̣[ι]αιῴ[νι]οι τελέως,
αἱ δὲ πᾶcαι φ[θαρταί·
μηδὲν [δὲ cῶμ' ἔχειν
τοὺc θε[οὺc ἀφθάρ- (20)
50 τουc [ὄντ]ȩc· ἀ[λλ'] οὐ-
κ ἀναι[....]ο[..] μό-
νον εc[....] νομί-
ζοντας [..]ɴτιθ[..]
...] {ται κα} [..... ..] (25)
55 ...] {ατον} [..... ..]
...] {μαι} cω[..... .]
...] {θεονα} [..... .]
...] {ναικαιτων} [...]
...]των[..... ...|| (30)

||[..... ....]εαν[..... ..... .]δια[..... ....]θεω[ρ..... ...]νοδαλ[..... 30 2
.. τ]ὸ λέ[γ]ειν ὡς ο[ὐδ'] ἐν τοῖς cώμαcιν [κα]τα[λ]ε̣[ίπ]ει τοὺς θ[εούς,
"τῶν c]ωμάτων" [λέγω]ν "τὰ μὲν ε[ἶν]αι c[υγκ]ρί[cεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ 40
cυγκρίcεις πεπόηνται·" μήτε γὰρ ἀτόμους νομίζειν το̣[ὺς θε]οὺς μήτε
cυ[γκρίcεις,] ἐπειδήπερ [οὗτοι μὲν] δ̣[ι]αιῴ[νι]οι τελέως, αἱ δὲ πᾶcαι
φ[θαρταί·] μηδὲν [δὲ cῶμ' ἔχειν] τοὺς θε[οὺς ἀφθάρ]||τους [ὄντ]α̣c· 50
ἀ[λλ'] οὐκ ἀναι[....]ο[..] μόνον εc[....] νομίζοντας [..]ν̣τιθ[..... .....
....]cω[..... ....
...]των[..... ...]||

(*c.12 words indistinguishable*) . . . the claim[1] that he[2] does not allow for 2
the gods among bodies in saying 'of bodies some are | compounds, and 40
others those of which compounds are formed'; for he considers the
gods to be neither simple entities nor compounds, since those[3] are
completely eternal, while these[4] are destructible. So in no way can[5]
gods have bodies, since they are | indestructible. But not necessarily for 50
those thinking that only . . . (*gap of c.35 words, + 1 col., c.90 words missing*)

[1] Presumably preceded by a denial or statement of intention to refute this claim.
[2] Epicurus. [3] i.e. gods. [4] All compounds.
[5] Literally 'do they have bodies', an opponent's critical inference from Epicurus' classification of bodies. The opponent proceeds by accepting certain Epicurean premisses as true for the purpose of argument, then treats the Epicurean position as self-refuting.

3 *N* 1098 fr. 23 (p. 135 G., 393 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 120

Test.: 60–71 Epic. fr. 155 Us. 62–71 Epic. fr. 86 Us.

60 *ἐν δ' ἐπιστολῆι πρὸς*]|| *Μὴν* Usener, fort. *μνναις*[60–1 *Ζή*]|*νων* Philippson 62 e.g. Anon. A 66–7 *περιεστως̣ὼν* | *δοξ*[*ῶν* Gomperz 67–70 Anon. A: *δόξ*[*αν λαμβάνειν,*]| *καὶ πολ*[*λοὺς καὶ ἀϊ*]-*δίους* [*θεοὺς καὶ δυ*]|*νατο*[*ὺς εἶναι*] Usener 70 *ι*[*N* 71 *οὐ*]| *μὴν* [*ἀλλὰ* vel [*οὐδὲ* * 76 *τῶν μα*[*θημάτων* Philippson 79 *γεγυ*[*μνασμένοις* Philippson 82–8 deperierunt

3

60 *μυνακ*[..... .... 1098 23
νων π[..... .....
εἴ γ' εὐ[*σκοποῦσίν*
φησιν φύσιν τού-
των πραγμάτων (5)
65 *καὶ πολλῶν αὐ-*
τὴν περιεστώτων
δοξ[*άζειν ἐξεῖναι*
καὶ πολ[*λοῖς ἀϊ-*
δίοις [*θεοῖς κἀθα-* (10)
70 *νάτο*[*ις εἶναι· οὐ*
μὴν [..... ..... .
μεν[..(.)]*ει*[.....
οιδ[..... ....
φει[...]*ν*[..... ... (15)
75 *γραμ*[..... .....
των μα[..... ....
νον[..... ..... .
τηι γ' οὐ[..... ....
γεγυ[..... ..... (20)
80 *ϲειε*[..... ..... .
τε[...]*το*[..... ..
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (25)
85 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]|| (29)

|| μυνακ[..... ....]νων π[..... .....] εἴ γ' εὐ[σκοποῦσίν] φησιν φύσιν 60 **3**
τούτων πραγμάτων καὶ πολλῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων δοξ[άζειν ἐξεῖναι]
καὶ πολ[λοῖς ἀϊ]δίοις [θεοῖς κἀθα]|νάτο̣[ις εἶναι· οὐ] μὴν [..... 70
.]μεν[..]σι[.....]οιδ[..... ....]φει[...]ν[..... ...]γραμ[..... .....]
των μα[..... ....]νον[..... ..... .]τηι γ' οὐ[..... ....]γεγυ[.....
.....]|σειε[..... ..... .]τε[...]το[*desunt c.7 vv.*]|| 80

| (*c.6 words indistinguishable*) . . . if they inquire accurately, he[1] says, he 60 **3**
thinks that it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it,[2] and that it is possible even for many eternal and immortal gods | to exist. But (. . . not) . . . (*c.30 words indistinguishable,* 70
+ gap of c.20 words, + 1 col., c.90 words missing)

[1] Epicurus. [2] i.e. their nature.

4 *N* 1098 fr. 26 (p. 138 G., 395 Ph.), *HV*² II 123

Test.: 93–105 Metrodorus fr. 12 Körte

90 κ[ατὰ Philippson 90–1 ὁ|[μοιότ]ητος Gomperz 91 [τρόπον] spatio longius Philippson 93 ἕ[ν]κλιϛ[ν Philippson: ϵ[.]κλιω[ ] *N* 94–5 ἐκ |[γραφῶ]ν Philippson: λόγω]ν Quaranta 95 αυτων' 'και *N* 96–8 Bücheler, sed in v. 98 init. ται] spatio brevius, [....(.)] *N*: ποιεῖ |[κατὰ Quaranta 99–100 Gomperz 100 νο[εῖν Henrichs: ϛ, ο, ϵ, θ, ω *N*: φησιν ϛ[ἶν|αι dubitanter Gomperz, spatio longius: φησιν θ[εῶν aptum vestigiis sed non sensui Körte 101–2 μὴ κα|τ' ἀ]ριθμὸν Scott, *JPh* 12 (1883), 236: σύν]κρισιν τῶν [κα|τ' ἀ]ριθμὸν Bücheler 102–3 οὐ μόν[ον | ἄφ]θαρτον Gomperz 103–4 ἀλλὰ [καὶ | θεί]αν Gomperz: ἀλλὰ |[κἀϊδί]αν Philippson, sed forma femin. vix invenitur 104]αν' 'ορθως *N* 104–5 μέ]ν |[οὖ]ν sive μέ]ν|[το]ι Gomperz: μὲ]ν [λέ]γω]ν Körte spatio longius 106 vel]ενοις 107–16 deperierunt

4 ....]τω[...(.)]μεθα 1098 26
...]ους κ[...] τῆς ὁ-
μοιότ]ητος [....] καὶ
...(.)]πων[...]εμων
...]μεντος ἕ[ν]κλιϛ[ν (5)
καταφάσκοντας ἐκ
...(.)]ν αὐτῶν· καὶ
ὁ Μητρόδωρος δὲ
τὴν τοιαύτην ποιεῖ-
ται] διαστολὴν [ ] (10)
ἐν τῶι] Περὶ μετα[βο-
λῆς,] καί φησι νο[εῖν
σύν]κρισιν τῶν [μὴ κα-
τ' ἀ]ριθμὸν οὐ μόν[ον
ἄφ]θαρτον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ (15)
θεί]αν, ὀρθῶς [μέ]ν-
το]ι καὶ φιλαλήθω[ς
..(.)]εν οἷς ἂν μη[..(.)
[ ]
[ ] (20)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (25)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]|| (28)

||[....]τω[...]μεθα |[...]ους κ[...] τῆς ὁ[μοιότ]ητος [....] καὶ [...] 90 4
πων[...]εμων [...]μεντος ἕ[γ]κλιϛ[ν] καταφάσκοντας ἐκ [...]ν αὐ-
τῶν· καὶ ὁ Μητρόδωρος δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ποιεῖ[ται] διαστολὴν [ἐν τῶι]
Περὶ μετα[βο|λῆς,] καί φησι νο[εῖν σύγ]κριϲιν τῶν [μὴ κατ' ἀ]ριθμὸν 100
οὐ μόν[ον ἄφ]θαρτον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ θεί]αν, ὀρθῶϲ [μέ]ν[το]ι καὶ φιλαλή-
θω[ϲ ..]εν οἷϲ ἂν μη [*desunt* c.10 *vv.*]||

| (c.6 *words indistinguishable*) . . . of similarity (*several words missing*) affirming a swerve from (*one word*) these things. And Metrodorus makes such a distinction in *On Change*, and | says that he[1] thinks a compound made up of things that do not exist as numerically distinct[2] is not only indestructible, but also is divine; and at all events truly and sincerely . . . (*gap of c.35 words, + 1 col. c.90 words missing*)

[1] i.e. Metrodorus.

[2] i.e. a compound which exists by virtue of the similarity (not one-to-one identity, as in most solid objects) of its constituent parts. Metrodorus refers here to the similarity of images (εἴδωλα) constituting a mental picture or idea, in this case, of divinity. Gods, he suggests, must be compounds of this sort.

5 *N* 1098 fr. 28 (p. 139 G., 397 Ph.), *HI*^{2} II 125

Test.: 130–44 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 44–7

117–18 deperierunt 120 *μὴ τα[ραχθέντων* Philippson 121 *c[N: Ἐπί-[κουρον* Philippson 124 *κ]ατ' ἔν[νοιαν* Philippson, fort. *κ]ατ' ἐν[νοήματα*, cf. vv. 141–2 129–30 *ἀ]||πολείπε[cθαι οὐ]-|δ[ὲν] τοῖc [θεοῖc* Philippson: fort. *ἡ]||δ[ί-c]τοιc* 131 *μέγις[τον* Philippson: *μεπο[N* 133 *περιαιρ[εῖν* vel *περι-αιρ[εῖcθαι* Gomperz: *περιαιρ[οῦντος* Quaranta 133–4 *τὸ | θεῖο[ν]* Philippson: *θειc[.] N* 134–5 *[ὂν]||των* Philippson 135–6 *ἐπ[ι]ν[οοῦν|τα cωματι]κὸν [εἶναι **: *επ[.] tum pars sup. τ, π, γ N: ἐκ[θ[έντα cω|ματι]κὸν [εἶν' αὐτό* Philippson 137–8 *ἀ[πολεί]π[ον|τες τὴ]ν **: *]κ N: ἀ[πολεί]π[ομεν | αὐτῶι] κἄισθη[σιν* Philippson: *πάθος] κἄιθη[σιν* Quaranta 138–9 Gomperz 140 *τ[ιν' **: *τ[ὴν ἐσ]θλὴ[ν ἕξιν* Philippson: *τ[ὴν ἄ]θλη[cιν* Quaranta fin. exspectavisses *[φύσιν* sed spatio longius 141 *παρεcτήcαμεν* Gomperz: *καριcτηcαμεν N: κἀπεcτήcαμεν* Philippson: *εὐ]||χαριcτήcαμεν* Quaranta 142–3 Gomperz 143–4 f. *τῶν δια]-|μενόν[των] μὴ [φθαρ||τῶc φύcιν* Philippson: fort. *[τοῦ δια]||μενόν[τος*

5 [ ] 1098 28
[ ]
καὶ τῶν [..... ....
μὴ τα[..... .....
δ' ἐπε[..... ..... . (5)
την ιc[..... ..... .
ca [κ]ατ[..... ....
κ]ατ' ἐν[νο ....
εται καὶ τ[..... φύ-
cιν αὐτὴν [..... .. (10)
καὶ πρὸc τ[..... ..
διαμενο[..... . ἀ-
πολειπε[..... ...
δ[..]τοιc[....τοῦ-
τό φαcι μέγις[τον (15)
εἶναι τεκμήριον
τοῦ περιαιρ[εῖν τὸ
θεῖο[ν] ἐκ τῶν [ὄν-
των τὸν ἐπ[ι]ν[οοῦν-
τα cωματι]κὸν [εἶναι· (20)
ἀλλ' ἀ[πολεί]π[ον-
τες τὴ]ν αἴcθη[cιν
καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν,
καί τ[ιν' ἐc]θλὴ[ν ἕξιν
παρεcτήcαμεν κα- (25)
τὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα
πά]ντα τὴν [τῶν δια-
μενόν[των] μὴ [...(.)|| (28)

||[..... ....] καὶ τῶν [..... ....]|| μὴ τα[..... .....] δ' 120 5
ἐπε[..... ..... .]την ιc[..... ..... .]ca [κ]ατ[..... .... κ]ατ' ἐν[νο .....
..]εται καὶ τ[..... φύ]cιν αὐτὴν [..... ..] καὶ πρὸc τ[..... ..] δια-
μενο[..... . ἀ]πολειπε[..... ...]|δ[..]τοιc[.... τοῦ]τό φαcι μέγιc[τον] 130
εἶναι τεκμήριον τοῦ περιαιρ[εἰν τὸ] θεῖο[ν] ἐκ τῶν [ὄν]των τὸν ἐπ[ι]-
ν[οοῦντα cωματι]κὸν [εἶναι·] ἀλλ' ἀ[πολεί]π[οντεc τὴ]ν αἴcθη[cιν] καὶ
τὴν ἡδονήν, | καί τ[ιν' ἐc]θλὴ[ν ἕξιν] παρεcτήcαμεν κατὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα 140
[πά]ντα τὴν [τῶν δια]μενόν[των] μὴ [...]||

(c.*35 words indistinguishable*) ... to allow | (*several words missing*) they say 130 5
this to be the greatest proof that the person who conceives the divine
as bodily in nature eliminates[1] the divine from existing things. But in
allowing perception and pleasure,[2] | we have established, in accordance 140
with all conceptions,[3] that there is also an excellent disposition[4] of
things which endure if they are not[5] ... (*one word missing, + gap of 1 col.,*
c.*90 words*)

[1] By implication; another critical inference from Epicurean views.
[2] i.e. to the divine: we allow that divinity is capable of perception and pleasure.
[3] i.e. all conceptions of divinity.
[4] Understanding ἕξιν 'disposition' over again with the article τήν in l. 143.
[5] Perhaps continued e.g. 'if they are not subject to destruction'.

6 *N* 1098 fr. 27 (p. 139 G., 396 Ph.), *HV*² II 124

Test.: 165 Epic. *Nicocles* vel *De dis*

153–4 *ὁμ[οίας μό]|νον* Anon. A 156 *δυ]ναT[όν* Philippson 158–9 *τὴν δ̣[ιάθεcιν παρ]|εχόντων [τοὺc* Philippson 159 *[ὀνει]|δίζοντ-* Gomperz 160–1 *-τ[ας τὰc ἁ]|πλᾶc δια[ίτας* Philippson: fort. *δια[θέcειc* 162–3 *πυκ[νὰc χαρὰc]| ἀποτελού[cας* Philippson: fort. *πυκν[ότητα* 163–5 Gomperz 164 fin. *θ[N*, corr. suppl. Gomperz: *Θ[εόδο|το]c* Quaranta 165 *Ṇ[εοκλεῖ* Philippson, nisi fort. *Π̣[ερὶ θεῶν* 166 ante *c προ* sscr. *N* 168 fort. *ποι]ητῶν* 169–70 *ἁ]|cταθές* vel *εὖ]|cταθές* Gomperz 170–1 e.g. *(ἀν)νο]|εῖν*

6

145 ε[.] ἀ[φ]θαρτ[.... οὐ
μόνον ἐμ[..... ...
ται λαχ[..... ....
την ε[..... ..... .
λ[.]ν[..... .... (5)
150 των, ἀλλ[ὰ καὶ ... δι-
αίτας δ[..... . ἀλ-
λὰ τὰc ὁμ[οίας ...
νοντων [..... ...
την [..... ..... . (10)
155 των κα[..... ....
δυ]ναT[όν ..... .
ἐκ τῶν [..... ....
την λ̣[..... .. παρ-
εχόντων [τοὺc ὀνει- (15)
160 δίζοντ[ας τὰc ἁ-
πλᾶc δια[ίτας ....
ἀλλὰ πυκ[ν.....
ἀποτελού[cας· δι-
δάcκει δ' ὁ Ἐ̣[πίκου- (20)
165 ρο]c ἐν τῶι Ṇ[.....
.....] ˙πρὸ́c τοc[.. ἀναγ-
καῖα [..(.)]αυ[.....
.....]ητων[.....
...]ειν γ[..... .. ἀ- (25)
170 cταθὲc φα[..... .
ειν ὑπν[.]ο[..... ..
διὰ τῶν τ[..... ...|| (28)

|| ϵ[.] ἀ[φ]θαρτ[.... οὐ] μόνον ἐμ[..... ...]ται λαχ[..... ....]την ϵ[..... 6
..... .]λ[.]ν[..... ....]|των, ἀλλ[ὰ καὶ ... δι]αίτας δ[..... . ἀλ]λὰ τὰς 150
ὁμ[οίας ...]νοντων [..... ...]την [..... ..... .]των κα[..... .... δυ]να-
τ[όν ..... .] ἐκ τῶν [..... ....]την λ[..... .. παρ]ϵχόντων [τοὺς ὀνει]|δί- 160
ζοντ[ας τὰς ἁ]πλᾶς δια[ίτας ....] ἀλλὰ πυκ[ν.....] ἀποτελού[σας·
δι]δάσκει δ' ὁ Ἐ[πίκουρο]ς ἐν τῶι Ν[..... .....] πρὸς τος[.. ἀναγ]καῖα
[..]αυ[..... .....]ητων[..... ...]ϵιν γ[..... .. ἁ]|σταθὲς φα[..... .]ϵιν 170
ὑπν[.]ο[..... ..] διὰ τῶν τ[..... ...]||

(c.*15 words indistinguishable*) | ... but also lifestyles (*one word missing*) but 150 **6**
are similar (*several words missing*) possible ... of those providing ... for
those reproaching | the simple lifestyles[1] (*several words missing*) fully 160
completing them. But Epicurus teaches in his work ...[2] (*parts of* c.*21
words, + 1 col.,* c.*90 words missing*)

[1] Those assigned to the gods by the Epicureans.

[2] Possibly in a work called after Neocles (D.L. 10. 28), one of Epicurus' brothers, referred to below, 945.

7 *N* 1098 fr. 25 (p. 137 G., 394 Ph.), *HV*² II 122

Test.: 180–9 Metrodorus fr. 9 Körte 189–96 Epic. *De dis* fr. 32 Us., 17.2 Arr.³

175 οὐδ]αμῶc Philippson 175–6 διὰ [τοῦ|θ', ὥcτ'] *: [τού|των Gomperz, ὡc] Philippson: ὅτι] Diels 1917, 31 adn. 1 176–7 δια|[βαλεῖν Diels 178 cύμ-φ]αμεν Diels: πεποίθ]αμεν π[âcιν Scott, *JPh* 12 (1883), 235 179 ἐκείν]ωι (sc. Epicuro) Diels 179–80 εἰc|[φέρων ('beisteuernd') Diels: εἰc|[φέρει Philippson 180–1 Μητρό|[δωροc Bücheler 181 οὐ] τυγχάνει [δὲ spatio longius Philippson 182 παραι]τήcεωc Scott: τῆc ζη]τήcεωc Diels 183 φάναι ἐν] Diels: εἰπεῖν ἐν] Scott 184 ἔτι] δ' Diels: οὐ]δ' Gomperz 184–5 Πε|[ρὶ μετα]βολῆc Gomperz 185–6 τὸ μὴ |[μετέχον Gomperz 187 διαμένε]ιν Diels 188–9 δὲ cύ]νκριcιν φθαρ|[τήν Gomperz: δ' αὖ cύ]νκριcιν Diels 189–90 Ἐπι]κούρωι δ' ἐν |[τῶι Περὶ θ]εῶν Bücheler:]θων *N* 191 γε φύc]ει Philippson, unde Arr.² sed spatio brevius 191–2 α[ἰ]c|[θανομέν]ην *: post α spatiolum, tum c|[..... ..]ην *N*: ἀc|[ταθμήτ]ην (sed forma ipsa fem. numquam invenitur) vel ἀc|[θενοῦc]αν Philippson: ἀc|[θενῆ μ]ἐν Philippson 1918, unde Arr.² 192–3 cύνκρ[ι|cιν ἔχον] Philippson: cυνκ tum pars sup. τ, π, γ, ξ *N* 193 cύ[μφ]ω[νον *: cυ[..]ω *N*: cυ[ν]ώ[νυμον Philippson, unde Arr.² sed spatio brevius 194 [τῷ θείῳ] *: [τῆι θείαι] Philippson 1918, unde Arr.²: [δ' αὐτῆι] Philippson καὶ τὸ μὴ Philippson: καιτιμη *N*, unde καὶ τί μή, Usener 194–5 τῆc |[φύceωc Usener: καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆc |[φύceωc ὂν Philippson 195–6 μετεχού|[cηc τῶ]ν ἀλγηδό|[νων Gomperz: ἀλγηδο| *N* 197 ἐξ ἀ]νάγκηc Gomperz 197–8 μα|[λακίαc πολ]λὰc Philippson 199–200 [ἡ θεία] *: [ἀιδία φύ]cιc οὖcα |[φαίνεται Philippson 201 δαιμόνιοc] *: ἀμετάβλητοc] Philippson 202 μὴν Philippson περὶ ταύ]της *: καὶ περὶ] τῆc Philippson

---

7

... το]ύτων αν[... 1098 25
... κα]τατυγχάνου-
cιν οὐδ]αμῶc διὰ [τοῦ-
θ', ὥcτ'] ἀνόcιοι δια-
βαλεῖν] ἡμᾶc, εἰ μὴ (5)
cύμφ]αμεν π[âcιν·
ἐκείν]ωι δ' οὖν εἰc-
φέρων] καὶ Μητρό-
δωροc] τυγχάνει
παραι]τήcεωc τῶι (10)
φάναι ἐν] τῶι Περὶ θε-
ῶν, ἔτι] δ' ἐν τῶν Πε-
ρὶ μετα]βολῆc τὸ μὴ
μετέχον] τοῦ κενοῦ
διαμένε]ιν, ἅπαcαν (15)
δὲ cύ]νκριcιν φθαρ-
τήν. Ἐπι]κούρωι δ' ἐν
τῶι Περὶ θ]εῶν τὸ μὴ
τῆι φύc]ει τὴν α[ἰ]c-
θανομέν]ην cύνκρ[ι- (20)
cιν ἔχον] cύ[μφ]ω[νον
τῷ θείῳ·] καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆc
φύceωc ὂν] μετεχού-
cηc τῶ]ν ἀλγηδό[νων,
ὥcτ' ἐξ ἀν]άγκηc μα- (25)
λακίαc πολ]λὰc ποῆcαι,
ἡ θεία φύ]cιc οὖcα
φαίνεται] καί τιc
δαιμόνιοc·] ἀλλὰ
μὴν περὶ ταύ]της || (30)

||[... το]ύτων αν[...κα]τατυγχάνου[cιν οὐδ]αμῶc διὰ [τοῦθ', ὥcτ'] ἀνόcιοι, δια[βαλεῖν] ἡμᾶc, εἰ μὴ [cύμφ]αμεν π[âcιν· ἐκείν]ωι δ' οὖν εἰc|[φέρων] καὶ Μητρό[δωροc] τυγχάνει [παραι]τήcεωc τῶι [φάναι ἐν] τῶι Περὶ θε[ῶν, ἔτι] δ' ἐν τῶν Πε[ρὶ μετα]βολῆc τὸ μὴ [μετέχον] τοῦ κενοῦ [διαμένε]ιν, ἅπαcαν [δὲ cύ]νκριcιν φθαρ[τήν. Ἐπι]κούρωι δ' ἐν |[τῶι Περὶ θ]εῶν τὸ μὴ [τῆι φύc]ει τὴν α[ἴ]c[θανομέν]ην cύγκρ[ιcιν ἔχον] cύ[μφ]ω[νον τῷ θείῳ·] καὶ τὸ μὴ τῆc [φύcεωc ὂν] μετεχού[cηc τῶ]ν ἀλγηδό[νων, ὥcτ' ἐξ ἀν]άγκηc μα[λακίαc πολ]λὰc ποῆcαι, [ἡ θεία φύ]cιc οὖcα |[φαίνεται] καί τιc [δαιμόνιοc·] ἀλλὰ [μὴν περὶ ταύ]τηc ||

7

... of these (*one word missing*) they in no way succeed for this reason, so that in their impiety they calumniate us, if we do not agree with all. Moreover in opposition to this | Metrodorus too finds a defence in saying in *On Gods* and further in *On Change* that that which has no share of the void endures, but that every compound is destructible. And according to Epicurus in | *On Gods* that which does not have in its nature the sensitive constitution is consistent with its divinity; and divine nature appears to be that which is not of the nature that partakes of pains (so that it necessarily creates many weaknesses)[1] | and to be a kind of divinity. But surely concerning it ... (*1 col., c.90 words missing*)

7

180

190

200

[1] i.e. sharing in pains would necessarily be a source of weaknesses, so that an entity that did so could be neither imperishable nor divine.

8 *N* 1077 fr. 19[1-2] (p. 113 G., 377 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 83

Test.: 205–19 Epic. *De sanct.* fr. 39 Us. (vv. 205–11 solum), 19.3 Arr.[2] 225–31 Epic. *De nat.* 12 fr. 84 Us., 27.1 Arr.[2] (ad v. 231 vv. 261ff coaluisse credebat Philippson)

203 [....(.)]ιcτων *N*[1]:]ιc[..]ων *N*[2]]ιc[ ] των *HV*[2] II: πίcτε]ιc Philippson: πολλο]ῖc Anon. A τῶν iam Gomperz 204 ειδ *N*[1]: θιδ *N*[2] 205–11 Bücheler 205 cθαι[r] [1]γρα *N* 211 corr., suppl. Bücheler: cυντεχε[*N* 212 c[..(.)]και *N*: ᾗ[ν] καὶ Philippson sed spatio brevius: fort. ᾧ[c ἔν] καὶ 212–13 ταὐ[τὸν cυν]|εχῷ[c ὑπάρχον Philippson: |εχε *N* 213–14 καθ' ὁ]|μειλ[ίαν Philippson 214 [ἐνότητας] Philippson: [ἐνότητα] spatio brevius Arr.[2]: [φύcεις] Philippson 1918 214–15 possis e.g. ἡ]|μεῖν 215 προc-αγορεύε[cθαι καὶ Philippson sed spatio longius 216 ἐκ [τῶν ὄντων *: εἰ[δώλων ἐκ D. Delattre privatim: εἶ[ναι ἐκ Philippson 217 ατων *N* pro αὐτῶν ut saepe vid. e.g. 813 217–18 ἀπο- vel cυντε]|λεῖcθαι *: λεπθαι *N*[1]: αεπθαι *N*[2], π ex ιc perperam: καὶ κα]λεῖcθαι Philippson 218 τὰ[c δ' ἐκ τῶν Philippson 219 ομοιων[*N*[1]: ομοιων[r] [1][*N*[2] [λέγων δὲ Philippson 220 cαν[ ]υ[ ]κυ[*N*[2]: cαν[...]κυ *HV*[2] II, unde κυ[ρίαις (sc. δόξαις) falso Philippson 221–4 [τἄφθαρτον | πράγματ' οὔτ' ἔχειν | οὔτε παρέχειν] ταὐ|[τὸν Philippson 224–5 ἀ]πο|φαίνε|τ[αι Gomperz 225 κἀν Gomperz: κρ[.]ι vel κρν *N* 226–8 Bücheler 229 *: επιι[..(.)]μηταξω, post επι in lacuna manu secunda νοημ *N*[1]: επν[..(.)]μητα[ ]ξω *N*[2]: ἐπιν[οή]ματα Usener 29–30 τῶν ἕ- addidi, βα⟨ί⟩νειν *: λαμ|βάνειν Usener, unde edd. omnes 230 αφθαρτων *N*[1]: αφοαρτων *N*[2] 231 φυcεων[.]ειναι *N*, sed spat. vac. valde probabile

8

....(.)]ιc τῶν ἀναγ- 1077 19
καίων εἰδέναι πα-
ραλείπεcθαι· γράψας
δὲ] καὶ Περὶ ὁcιότη-
τος ἄλλο βυβλίον (5)
κἀν τούτωι διαca-
φεῖ τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀ-
φθάρτως, ἀλλὰ κ[αὶ
κα]τὰ cυντέλε[ιαν
ἕ[ν] καὶ ταὐ[τὸν cυν- (10)
εχῷ[c ὑπάρχον καθ' ὁ-
μειλ[ίαν ἐνότητας
προcαγορεύε[cθαι,
τὰc μὲν ἐκ [τῶν ὄντων
τῶν α⟨ὐ⟩τῶ[ν ἀποτε- (15)
λεῖcθαι, τὰ[c δ' ἐκ τῶν
ὁμοίων· [..... ...]
caν[ ]υ[ ]κυ[..... ..]
ν[..... ....
[ ] (20)
[..... ....] ταύ-
[τ..... .. ἀ]πο|φαίνε-
τ[αι·] κἀν τῶι δω-
δεκάτ[ω]ι Περὶ φ[ύ-
c[ε]ω[c το]ὺc πρώτους (25)
φη[cὶν ἀ]νθρώπους
ἐπὶ ν[οή]ματα ⟨τῶν ἔ⟩ξω
βα⟨ί⟩νειν ἀφθάρτων
φύcεων· εἶναι γὰρ || (29)

||[....]ιc τῶν ἀναγκαίων εἰδέναι παραλείπεcθαι· γράψαc [δὲ] καὶ *Περὶ* 8
ὁcιότητοc ἄλλο βυβλίον κἀν τούτωι διαcαφεῖ τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀ|φθάρτωc, 210
ἀλλὰ κ[αὶ κα]τὰ cυντέλ̣ε[ιαν] ἓ̣[ν] καὶ ταὐ[τὸν cυν]εχῷ̣[c ὑπάρχον καθ'
ὁ]μιλ̣[ίαν ἑνότητας] προαγορεύε[cθαι,] τὰc μὲν ἐκ̣ [τῶν ὄντων] τῶν
α⟨ὐ⟩τῶ[ν ἀποτε]λεῖc̣θαι, τὰ[c δ' ἐκ τῶν] ὁμοίων· [..... ...]|caν̣[ ]υ 220
[ ]κ̣υ[..... ..]ν[..... ....] ταυ[τ..... ..
ἀ]π̣οφαίνετ[αι·] κἀ̣ν̣ τῶι δωδεκάτ[ω]ι *Περὶ* φ[ύ]c[ε]ω[c το]ὺc πρώ-
τουc φη[cὶν ἀ]ν̣θ̣ρ̣ώ̣π̣ουc ἐπὶ ν[οή]μ̣ατα ⟨τῶν ἔ⟩ξω | βα⟨ί⟩νειν ἀφθάρ- 230
των φύcεων· εἶναι γὰρ ||

... to be neglectful of the things that need to be known.[1] And having 8
written another book *On Holiness*,[2] in it too he[3] makes clear that not
only that thing which exists | indestructibly, but also (that which) 210
continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity, are termed
in common usage 'unified entities', some of which entities are per-
fected out of the same elements[4] and others from similar elements ...
| (*14–16 words missing*) ... declares his opinion. And in Book 12 of *On* 220
Nature he[5] says that the first people[6] arrived at conceptions of | imper- 230
ishable external entities. For to be ... (*gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

[1] The view expressed must be that of Epicurus. The neglect may be that of early humans (as in the citation below from *On Nature* 12) or may refer to opponents of the Epicureans.

[2] Also cited below 362–4, 1208–9. We know it consisted of a single book (D.L. 10.27; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.123 *liber est Epicuri de sanctitate*; cf. 1.115 *de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus*).

[3] Epicurus.

[4] Literally 'out of same things' and 'out of similar things'.

[5] Epicurus.

[6] In human history.

9 *N* 1077 fr. 21[1–2] (p. 115 G., 378 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 85

232–3 supplevi 234 Gomperz 235–40 Bücheler 236 ζωια N^1, HV^2 II, unde edd.: χωια N^2 nescioqua re ⟨διὰ⟩ τῆc proposuit R. Janko privatim 237–8 ἐcτε[ρη]θ̣[ῆ]||ναι *: ecτε[..]c[N^1: ἐcτε-[ρηκέ]||ναι Bücheler: ἐcτε[ρῆc]||θαι Gomperz, unde edd. 238 π delevit, τα post του sscr. *N* 240 τ̣ὸν vel τ̣ῷι N^1: ¯[.]ι N^2 241 τοῦ θ]ανάτου Philippson fin. *: [.]cβω N^1: [φ]ό̣βω[ι] Anon. A: [.]c̣βω [ ]| *N*: [c]έ̣βω|[μα] (verbum non aliter repertum) Philippson 242 κα[θ]αρὰ Gomperz 242–3 * 243 διά]νο̣[ια Anon. A: ἐν]νο̣[ήματα δο]ῦν[αι Philippson 243–4 ε]ὐ|[πο]ητικὸν Gomperz 244–5 τ[αρ|βεῖ]ν Anon. A 247 cιονʳ ¹ε[ ]ν̣α [ ]| N^1: cιον[.]ε[.]ν̣α| N^2 248]αιεβρ[...| *N*: κ]αὶ ἔχρ[αφαν Philippson 250 τουcʳ ¹απα *N* 251 ἀβλ]αβ[εῖc Philippson: fort. βλ]άβ[ας ἐνα]ντίας 256–7 ὡc] ἐφανή|[ca]μεν possis 257 τοῦ ταῖc] π̣ο̣[μ]πα[ῖc *:]πω[.]πα[.. *N* 259–60 προc|[ιέναι *: προc|[ήκειν Philippson 260–1 τ̣οῦ [θ]ανά̣||[του *, τ̣ου[.]α̣ vel λ, tum νc|[*N*, coll. 9–10 coniunxi

9

ὅλως ἄδηκ]τον εἰc τὴν βλά]βη̣[ν, οὐ] καθίcαντ̣[ο] διαλογιcμόν· ἔτι δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲ τἆλλα ζῶια τῆc ἀν]αλογίας ἐcτε[ρη]θ̣[ῆναι τοῦ 'τα'[[π]]ράγματος καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀνθρώπων τ̣ὸν̣ τοῦ θ]ανάτ̣ου [φ]ό̣β̣ο̣[ν ἐχόντω]ν καὶ κα[θ]αρὰc ἐν]νο̣[ίας ..]υν[..]υ ..]ητικον [....]τ[.. ..]ν ἑκατέρου [.... ..] καὶ τῶι μεγέθει παραπλήcιον ε[ ]ν̣α[ ] τούτω[ι κ]α̣τ̣εβρ[... ..] περὶ τῆc εὐcεβείας καὶ τουc ἀπα[.. ...]αβ[.....]ν̣τ̣ιας ....]α[..]ω[... ....]τ̣ο̣[.... ....]ιρηcc̣[.] ....] ἐφανη- ...]μ̣ε̣ν̣[... ὑ]πὲρ τοῦ ταῖc] π̣ο̣[μ]πα[ῖc καὶ ταῖc θυcίαιc εἰc τὴν διάν̣ο̣ιαν προcιέναι] τ̣οῦ [θ]α̣νά̣- ||

1077 21 (5) (10) (15) (20) (25) (29)

||[ὅλως ἄδηκ]τον εἰς τὴν [βλά]βη[ν, οὐ] καθίσταντ[ο] διαλογισμόν· ἔτι 9
δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲ τἆλλα ζῶια τῆς ἀ[ν]αλογίας ἐστε[ρη]θ[ῆ]ναι τοῦ
ταράγματος καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τῶν | ἀνθρώπων τ̣ὸν [τοῦ θ]ανάτ̣ου [φ]ό- 240
βο̣[ν ἐχόντω]ν καὶ κα[θ]αρὰ̣[ς ἐν]νο̣[ίας ..]υν[..]ν[..]ητικον [....]τ
[....]ν ἑκατέρου [.....] καὶ τῶι μεγέθει παραπλήσιον ε[.]ν̣α τούτω[ι
κ]α̣τ̣εβρ[.....] περὶ τῆς εὐσεβεί|ας καὶ τους απα[.....]αβ[.....]ν̣τ̣ι- 250
ας[..... ..]α[..]ω[... ....]το̣[..... ....]ιρησ̣ς̣[..... .....] ἐφα-
νη[...]μ̣ε̣ν[... ὑ]πὲρ [τοῦ ταῖς] πο̣[μ]πα[ῖς] καὶ ταῖς θυσίαις εἰς τὴν
διάνο̣ιαν προς|[ιέναι] τ̣οῦ [θ]ανά̣- || 260

... entirely insusceptible[1] to harm, they[2] initiated no dispute.[3] Again, 9
because not even the other animals[4] had been deprived[5] of the analogy
of disturbance,[6] and because about this[7] | humans have the fear of 240
death and pure notions ... (*several words missing*) ... similar in extent to
this (*one word missing*) about | piety (*8–10 words missing*) because at pro- 250
cessions and sacrifices they | arrive at their view of death, (*continues on*) 260

[1] i.e. divinity as conceived by early mankind. [2] Early humans.
[3] Over the nature or existence of the gods.
[4] Including gods, according to the Epicurean view.
[5] i.e. deprived by early humans in their thinking.
[6] i.e. the other animals too were thought to have something similar to what in human beings is disturbance. [7] i.e. this disturbance.

10 *N* 1077 20[1-2] (p. 114 G., 377 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 84

Test.: 261–70 Epic. *De nat.* 12 fr. 27.1 + fr. 179 (p. 537) Arr.[2] (init. cum vv. 225–31 coaluisse credebat Philippson)

261 init. *: *olc*] Philippson *προστρέ[π]ε-τα[ι* Gomperz 262 *τιν'*] *, spatio aptius quam *καὶ τ]ἀνάξια*: *παν]ανάξια* (non alibi repertum) Philippson *τηε N* 262–7 Bücheler 263 *]υπενης N* *]αφθασια N* 264 *παντελο̣ῦ̣ς* Anon. A: *-λως N* 267 *παντα[χ]ό̣θε[ν* W. Schmid, *RM*[2] 94 (1951), 126, iam Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v.: *παντα[.]εθε[.] N*: *πάντα [τ]εθέ[ν* Philippson 268–9 *τ̣[ὴν δι]|άλυσι[ν* Philippson 269 *: *cι[...]δηκ[.]ι[...| *N*: *ἀ]δήκ[τως* spatio brevius ad init. Philippson 270 *ἔχο̣[ν* Philippson 271 deperiit 272–4 * 276–7 fort. *κε|ν]αὶς τ̣ου̣[* vel *ἑ|ξ]αισίου, υ* tantum rami sin. pars. extrema 278 *ἑ]κ νεό[τητος* Philippson 278–9 fort. *δι|ά]λυσιν* vel latet verbum, *μανθά|νο]υσιν* coni. Philippson 280–4 omnia incertissima, vestigia minima 280, 283 deperierunt 285–7 multa egregie restit. Philippson 287 *δαι[N*

10

του,] προστρέ[π]εται[ί 1077 20
τιν'] ἀνάξια τῆς̣ ν[ο-
ο]υμ̣ένης ἀφθα⟨ρ⟩σία[ς
αὐτῶν καὶ παντελο̣ῦ̣ς
μακαρι[ό]τητος· οὐδὲ (5)
γὰρ ἔτι τ[η]ρεῖται τὸ̣
παντα[χ]ό̣θε[ν] εὔδ[αι-
μον καὶ τ̣ὸ πρὸς τ̣[ὴν δι-
άλυσι[ν μὴ] δηκ[τ]ι[κῶς
ἔχο̣[ν .... (10)
[ ]
[ ]*α*[..... .... *τὴν*
καθ' ὁ̣[μοιό]τ[ητα διά-
λη[ψ]ιν ἐ̣[..... ...
διὰ τὰ π[οῖα .... (15)
προσδο[..... ...
.]*αισιου̣*[..... ...
..]*κνεο*[..... ...
..]*υσιν* [..... ...
[ ] (20)
..]*α*[..... ....
...]*ς*[..... ..... .
[ ]
..]*κρ*[..... ..]*τ*[...
....] *ὑπὲρ* [*δὲ* (25)
τοῦ ταῖς τ]ῶν θε[*ῶν*
ἐπιβο]λ̣αῖ[*ς τα]ραχ*[*θῆ-*
ναι ..]*νε*[..]*ντα*[..
..... .]*αφε*[.]*ονε*[..|| (29)

||[του,] προστρέ[π]ετα[ί τιν'] ἀνάξια τῆς ν[οο]υμ̣ένης ἀφθα⟨ρ⟩σία[c] 10
αὐτῶν καὶ παντελο̣ῦ̣c μακαρι[ό]τητος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι τ[η]ρεῖται τὸ̣
παντα[χ]ό̣θε[ν] εὔδ[αι]μον καὶ τ̣ὸ πρὸc τ̣[ὴν δι]άλυcι[ν μὴ] δηκ[τ]ι-
[κῶc]|| ἔχο̣[ν ....]α[..... .... τὴν] καθ' ὁ[μοιό]- 270
τ[ητα διά]λη[ψ]ιν ἐ̣[..... ...] διὰ τὰ π[οῖα ....]προcδο[..... ....]
αιcιου̣[..... .....]κνεο[..... .....]υcιν [..... ...|.. ....]α[..... 280
....]c[..... ....]κρ[..... ..]τ[..... ..... .] ὑπὲρ
[δὲ τοῦ ταῖc τ]ῶν θε[ῶν] ἐ̣πιβο]λ̣αῖ[c τα]ραχ[θῆναι ..]νε[..]ντα[.....
...]αφε[.]ονε[..]||

things unworthy of the supposed indestructibility and complete blessedness are sought in prayer;[1] for no longer are their[2] happiness stemming from every source and their insusceptibility to destruction preserved[3] . . . | (*7–9 words missing*) . . . an understanding according to 270
similarity . . . | (*30–2 words missing*) . . . on account of being terrified by 280
their conceptions of the gods (*6–8 words indistinguishable*)

[1] i.e. from the gods. [2] The gods'.
[3] i.e. by early humans in their ideas about the gods.

II *N* 1098 fr. 22 (p. 134 G., 392 Ph.), *HV*² II 119

II 290 υπαρ[..... .... 1098 22
εχει[..]αν[.....
μολ[.]αν[..... .
τωι κα[..... ...
λοις θ[.]ωμ[..... (5)
295 δι' ἣν [.]υ[..... .
καταγνώ[cεται φι-
λομαχία[ν τῶν δι-
αβαλλόντων [ἑκα-
τέραν ὁ cυν[ορῶν ἃ (10)
300 παρὰ τοῖc Ἀ[χαιοῖc ἠι-
νίτ[το]ντο κ[ατὰ τὰc
πό[λε]ιc Ἀ[θηναῖι καὶ
Ἄρε[ι οἱ θ]υόμ[ενοι·
ταῦ[τα δ' ἑπομένωc (15)
305 προ[cήγ]αγο[ν ἔνιοι,
δι'] ἃ γ' εἰκά[ζοντεc
ὁμ]οίοιc πάθ[εcι ταῦ-
τ' ἐδογμάτιζ[ον· οὔ-
τε γὰρ ἔζηc[αν ἐπι- (20)
310 βλέποντεc [εἰc τοὺc
πολλοὺc οὐδὲ [τἆλ-
λα δόξαc κατ[ὰ cυν-
περιφορὰν αὐ[τῶν ἐ-
ξέθηκαν, ὥc[τ' ἔχειν (25)
315 ταύτην ⟨τὴν⟩ ὑπό[ληψιν·
οὔθ' ὅλωc ἐπ[ίνοι-
αν ἐποιοῦ[ντο κα-
θάπερ οἱ λο[ιποί || (29)

290 ὑπαρ[χ- Gomperz: ὕπαρ [καὶ ὄναρ ἡμᾶc Philippson 291 ἔχει[ν φ]αν-[τacίαc Philippson 291–2 εὐδαι]-|μον[ί]αν valde probabile: αἰc]|| μόλ[ιc] ἂν [πειcθείμεν Philippson 293–4 τῶι κα[ὶ τέραcιν ἄλ]||λοις θ' ὠμ[οιῶcθαι Philippson: fort. θ[υ]ώμ[αcι 295 δι' ἣν [γ'] ὑ[πόληψιν Philippson: fort. δι' ἣν [c]υ[γγραφήν: δι' ἣν [ε]ὐ- Anon. A 296 καταγνώ[cεται Philippson: καταγνῶ-[ναι Anon. A 296–7 φι]|λομαχίαν *, cf. *P. Herc.* 1088 fr. 10,27 (p. 84 Schober) φι-λόμαχον:]δομαχια[*N*: fort. ψευ]δομαχία[ν vel παι]|δομαχία[ν (Philippson) non alibi reperta: τὴν ὀπ]|λομαχία[ν Anon. A 297–8 δι]|α- Gomperz 298–9 ἑκα]-|τέραν *: οὐδε]|τέραν D. Delattre privatim: τὴν ἡμε]|τέραν longius Philippson 299 cυν[ειδὼc vel cυν[ορῶν vel cυν[οικειῶν *: cυν[θεὶc ἃ Philippson 300 Ἀ[χαιοῖc *: ἀ[ρχαίοιc spatio longius Philippson: fort. ἀ[θέοιc 300–1 ἠι]|νίτ[το]ντο *: μιτ[..]ιτο *N*, ἠι]|νίτ[τ]ετο Philippson 301–2 Philippson 303 ante init. versus punctum stichometricum indicavit *N* οἱ θ]υόμ[ενοι *: Ἄρε[ι θ]υομ[ένοιc Philippson 304 [ἑπομένωc] *: ταῦ[τα καὶ ἄλλα Philippson 305 προ[cήγ]αγο[ν Philippson 305–6 [ἔνιοι] *, δι'] Anon. A spatio aptius: [πρότε|ρον] Philippson 306 ἃ γ' Philippson: fort. ἅτ':]αγεικα[, post ει ante κα spatiolum interposuit *N* εἰκά[ζοντεc *: εἴκα[ζον brevius Philippson 307 ὁμ]οίοιc Anon. A: παντ]οίοιc Philippson spatio longius: ἐπ' ἀν|ομ]οίοιc D. Delattre privatim 307–8 πάθ[εcι ταῦ]|τ' *: πάθ[εcιν ἃ]|τε Philippson 308–9 οὔ]|τε *: εἴ]|τε Quaranta 309 ἔζη-c[αν Gomperz 309–10 ἐπι]|βλέπον-τεc Philippson: ἀπο]|βλέποντεc Gomperz 310 [εἰc τοὺc Gomperz 311 Philipp-son 312–13 κατ[ὰ cυν]περιφορὰν Gomperz 313 αὐ[τῶν Philippson 313–14 ἐ]|ξέθηκαν Gomperz 314–15 ὥc[τ' ἔχειν D. Delattre privatim: ὥc[τε κατὰ Philippson post 315 in marg. paragraphus *N* την add. R. Janko privatim ὑπό[ληψιν Philippson: ὑπό[νοιαν proposuit D. Delattre privatim 316 ουθ *N*: οὐδ' falso Philippson 316–17 ἐπ[ίνοι]|αν *: fort. ἐπ[ίνοιαν]| ἂν· π sin. pars π *N*: ἐπ[ιμηχάνει]αν spatio longius Philippson: ἔγ[ωγε]|| ἂν ἐποίου[ν Anon. A 317–18 Gomperz

|| *υπαρ*[..... ....]*εχει*[..]*αν*[.....]*μολ*[.]*αν*[..... .]*τωι κα*[..... ...] *λοις* 290 II
θ[.]*ωμ*[.....] *δι' ἣν* [.]*υ*[..... .] *καταγνώ*[*σεται φι*]*λομαχία*[*ν τῶν*
δι]*αβαλλόντων* [*ἑκα*]*τέραν ὁ συν*[*ορῶν ἃ*]|| *παρὰ τοῖς Ἀ*[*χαιοῖς* 300
ἠι]*νίτ*[*το*]*ντο κ*[*ατὰ τὰς*] *πό*[*λε*]*ις Ἀ*[*θηναῖ καὶ*] *Ἄρε*[*ι οἱ θ*]*υόμ*[*ενοι·*]
ταῦ[*τα δ' ἑπομένως*] *προ*[*σήγ*]*αγο*[*ν ἔνιοι, δι'*] *ἃ γ' εἰκά*[*ζοντες ὁμ*]*οί-*
οις πάθ[*εσι ταῦ*]*τ' ἐδογμάτιζ*[*ον· οὔ*]*τε γὰρ ἔζης*[*αν ἐπι*]||*βλέποντες* 310
[*εἰς τοὺς*] *πολλοὺς οὐδὲ* [*τἄλ*]*λα δόξας κατ*[*ὰ συμ*]*περιφορὰν αὐ*[*τῶν*
ἐ]*ξέθηκαν, ὥς*[*τ' ἔχειν*] *ταύτην* ⟨*τὴν*⟩ *ὑπό*[*ληψιν·*] *οὔθ' ὅλως ἐπ*[*ί-*
νοι]*αν ἐποιοῦ*[*ντο κα*]*θάπερ οἱ λο*[*ιποί*]||

|(*16–18 words indistinguishable*) . . . Whoever is acquainted with the 290 II
things that among the Greek heroes[1] | those who were sacrificing for 300
the cities to Athena and Ares hinted at[2] will accuse of contentiousness
those who attack either view.[3] Then subsequently some introduced
these things,[4] by which indeed, because they likened them to similar
sufferings,[5] they formed these opinions. For they did not live with
a | view towards the many, nor in other respects did they set forth their 310
views in keeping with the social customs of those people,[6] so as to
acquire this notion.[7] And they did not at all achieve their understand-
ing[8] as the rest did . . .[9] (*gap of 1 col., c.80 words*)

[1] At Troy; literally 'Achaeans'.
[2] i.e. things which the opponents claim they 'expressed allegorically'.
[3] Understanding *ὑπόληψιν, δόξαν, ἔννοιαν*, or some similar word from the preceding lost lines with *ἑκα*]|*τέραν*.
[4] Sufferings of the gods as told in myths.
[5] i.e. sufferings experienced by humans.
[6] The many.
[7] Presumably the original idea that there exist imperishable, blessed natures (230–1).
[8] i.e. about the gods. Cf. 744 on the wise person's *ἐπίνοια* of divine nature.
[9] The rest of early mankind who, unlike these few, maintained the originally clear view of the gods held by the 'first people' (see 225–31).

12 *N* 1098 fr. 21 (p. 134 G., 391 Ph.), *HV*² II 118

Test.: 320–32 Epic. fr. 192 p. 545 Arr.² 330–2 Philod. *De dis* col. 9,26–28

319 δία[ιταν R. Janko privatim: διά[ληφιν Philippson spatio longius 320–1 Philippson 321]ηδε *N* 321–2 [cύ]c|[τακι]ν Philippson 322–3 τὰ[c] φύ|[cεικ] Philippson: τα[..]φυ| *N*: τα[ὶc] φύ|[caικ] Woodward, *CEπ* 19 (1989), 40 323 αὐ]τὸν (sc. Epicurum) Philippson, unde Woodward: αὐ]τῷν Arr.² fr. 192 p. 545 323–4 εἶ]δ[ώ|λω]ν Diels 1917.2, 30 324 ὁμοίαν Gomperz: ομοιαη *N* 324–5 λαμβα|[νόν]των Gomperz 325 ν delevi 325–6 -μεν]η⟨ν⟩ κ- Woodward, de orthographia vid. *MGrHerc* 64: γεγεννη|[μένη]ν Diels: γεγεννη|[....]η *N*: γεγεννη|[μέν]η Gomperz 326–7 ὑπερβά|[cεωc] Gomperz 328 *: αὐτ]ὴ[ν] Diels, sed articulus deest: τ]ὴ[ν] Gomperz: καὶ τ]ὴ[ν] Scott, *JPh* 12 (1883), 235 329 cύγκ]ριcιν Gomperz 330 τὴν τῶν] Philippson: τὴν ἐκ τῶν] Gomperz: ἐκ τῶν] Diels fin. καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν, ι add. Gomperz 330–1 τῶν] αὐτῶν καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν |[ὁτὲ δ]ὲ τὴν Gomperz 331–2 ἐκ τῶν [ὁ|μοίων] Scott, unde Diels coll. Philod. *De dis* col. 9,26–8: ἐκ τῶν |[ἄλλων] Gomperz 332–3 τὴ[ν], [τ]άξιν Gomperz, [ἐκεί]νων] *: τὴ[ν τού|των τ]άξιν Philippson: τὴ[ν ἐξ|ἧc τ]άξιν Woodward spatio brevius, etenim divisio ἐξ|ἧc quod sciam inaudita 333–4 οὐ [ταρατ-|τόν]των Woodward: οὐ[κ ἀποβαλ|λόν]των Philippson 334–5 ὥc[τε τὸ] πο|[τὲ *: ωc[....]˙ο| *N*: ὥc[τε καὶ] τὸ |[οὕτω] Philippson: ὥc[τε τό] γ' ο[ὕ|τω] Woodward 335 τα]ραχθὲν L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: π]ραχθὲν Gomperz 335–7 [ὅλον | μηκέτ'] ἀcταθὲ[c προ|πί]π[τει]ν. Woodward 337]μ *N* 339 deperiit 343 φθαρτόν vel ἄ]φθαρτον Gomperz 341–6 καὶ τῶν [ἐκ | τού]των κρίcεων |[τοῦ ἄ]φθαρτον |[εἶναι κ]αὶ πᾶν νο[η|τὸν τὸ] τῶν [θεῶν] εἰc |[ἄθροι]cμα coni. Philippson

12

...] προcδια[... 1098 21
320 εἶπο]ν δ' ἐγὼ [πρὶν ἤ-
δη τή]νδε τὴν [cύ]c-
τακι]ν καὶ τὰ[c] φύ-
cειc αὐ]τὸν τῶν [εἶ]δ[ώ- (5)
λω]ν ὁμοίαν λαμβα-
325 νόν]των ἢ γεγεν{ν}η-
μέν]η⟨ν⟩ κἂν ἐξ ὑπερβά-
cεωc] τῶν μεταξὺ [ἐ-
νότ]η[τα] κατ' ἀριθμὸν (10)
cύγκ]ριcιν ὁτὲ μὲν
330 τὴν τῶν] αὐτῶν καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν,
ὁτὲ δ]ὲ τὴν ἐκ τῶν [ὁ-
μοίων,] καὶ τὴ[ν ἐκεί-
νων τ]άξιν οὐ [ταρατ- (15)
τόν]των, ὥc[τε τὸ] πο-
335 τὲ τα]ραχθὲν [ὅλον
μηκέτ'] ἀcταθὲ[c προ-
πί]π[τει]ν. ἄλ[λ]ων
....] καὶ [.(.)]μη[.] (20)
[ ]
340 ....]αν κατα
....] καὶ τῶν [..
.....]των κρίcεων
..... . ἄ]φθαρτον (25)
..... .]αι πᾶν νο[ ]
345 ..... .]των[....]ειc
..... .]cμα[....]ου || (28)

||[...] προcδια[... | εἶπο]ν δ' ἐγὼ [πρὶν ἤδη τή]ν̣δε τὴν [cύ]c[τακι]ν 320 **12**
καὶ τὰ[c] φύ[cεις αὐ]τὸν τῶν [εἰ]δ[ώλω]ν ὁμοίαν̣ λαμβα[νόν]των ἢ
γεγενη[μέν]η⟨ν⟩ κἂν ἐξ ὑπερβά[cεωc] τῶν μεταξὺ̣ [ἐνότ]η[τα] κατ'
ἀριθμὸν [cύγκ]ριcιν ὁτὲ μὲν |[τὴν τῶν] αὐτῶν καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν, [ὁτὲ δ]ὲ τὴν ἐκ 330
τῶν [ὁμοίων,] καὶ τὴ[ν ἐκείνων τ]άξιν οὐ [ταραττόν]των, ὥc[τε τὸ]
π̣ο[τὲ τα]ραχθὲν [ὅλον μηκέτ'] ἀcταθὲ[c προπί]π[τει]ν̣. ἄλ[λ]ων [.....
..] καὶ [.]μη[..... ....|... ..... .]αν κατα[..... ..] καὶ τῶν [..... 340
..]των κρίcεων [..... . ἄ]φθαρτον [..... .]αι πᾶν νο̣[..... .]των[....]
εἰc[..... .]cμα[....]ου ||

(*several words indistinguishable*). | And I said before that he[1] called this 320 **12**
constitution[2] and the natures of the images which take on a similar constitution[3] or even one which may have become numerically a unity[4] as a result of the transcendence of the intervening gaps,[5] sometimes | that consisting of the same elements,[6] and sometimes 330
that[7] constituted out of things[8] that are similar and that do not disturb the order of the images, so that the thing at some time disturbed[9] no longer appears[10] unstable. Of others . . . | (*c.27 words indistinguishable*) 340

[1] Epicurus (above, 209–19).

[2] i.e. he referred to this constitution and the natures etc. sometimes as a constitution that is made up of material elements identical with each other, sometimes as one that consists of elements similar to each other.

[3] i.e. similar to the images (εἴδωλα) that make up the idea of divinity.

[4] Constituted as a distinct, countable entity.

[5] i.e. the mental leap over the gap between similar mental images, giving the impression of permanence or movement in the conceptual entity, as, for example, in a waterfall or successive images in film perceived as a single moving or static entity.

[6] i.e. an ordinary, tangible physical object.

[7] Presumably when talking about the gods.

[8] i.e. images.

[9] The mental image of divinity.

[10] Literally 'strikes one as'.

13 *N* 1077 fr. 16[1-2] (p. 110 G., 375 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 80

Test.: 350–75 Epic. *De sanct.* fr. 40 Us., 19.4 Arr.[2] (vv. 350–64 solum)

347 init. fort. τοῦ]||το vel latet verbum, tum vel κα[ί τις] vel κα[θό τις] vel κα[θάπερ] possis 347–8 στο⟨ι⟩χ[είω]||cις *: στολ[*N* 348–9 [οὖca] D. Delattre privatim, ὁμ[οίων εἶναι]| φαίνο[ιτ᾽] ἄ[ν ἐν]ότης Philippson: φαίνε[τ]α[ι ἰδι]ότης Gomperz 350–64 fere omnia Bücheler 351–2 ὑπάρ|χουcι, post ι ante δια spatiolum *N*, Bücheler, defendunt Diano, *Ethica*, 117, Woodward, *CEπ* 19 (1989), 41 adn. 54: ὑπάρ|χουcα Gomperz, unde edd. 354 νιαν[ ]ε| 356–7 αὐτῶν, ὁμοίων transposuit Scott, *JPh* 12 (1883), 232, sed defendit Woodward 358 ενοτη *N*[1]: ενο[.]η *N*[2], *HV*[2] II nescioqua re fin. ι delevit Bücheler 359 fort. potius ἀποτελεῖcθαι (sic emendavit Gomperz, unde edd.) 360 ν sscr. post γα *N* 364 αὐτότατα (verbum non alibi repertum) Gomperz post τατα [.]τ[..]ε *N*, fort. -τατα[c] τ[ὸ δ]ὲ Usener 365–6 ὑπε[ναν]||τιολογίαν Usener: ὑπα[ι]||τιολογίαν dubitanter Gomperz 366–7 πα|ρα⟨ιτη⟩τέον vel πα|ρι̣τέον L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: πει̣|ρατέον Gomperz, unde edd. 368 ειν[ ]ειωθε 369 πά]νθ᾽ ὁμῶc Anon. A: ante θομωc hasta una inclinata, pars dext. a, possis]ν: ο]ὐθαμῶc Gomperz: cυ]ντόμωc Philippson: ἀ]κόςμωc Anon. A 369–70 φύ|[cι]ν Gomperz 372 μὲ]ν Usener 373 ἄλλων seclusi 374 καὶ ἄλ]λων Usener: κἄλ]λων Philippson: fort. εἰδώ]λων 374–5 [ἐπι]cυνκρί[cε|ωc] (semel) Usener: fort. [καὶ] cυνκρί[cε|ωc] 375 ἀ]τόμ[ων γέ]νηται Usener: ¯οι.[..]. πταιπο *N*, possis]απται πο- fin. fort. πο||[εῖται

13

το, κα[....] στο⟨ι⟩χ[είω- 1077 16
cις ὁμ[οίων οὖca
φαίνο[ιτ᾽] ἄ[ν ἐν]ότης·
δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς
ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρ- (5)
χουcι διαιώνιον
ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν
εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐ-
πειδήπερ οὐχ ἧτ- (10)
τον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων cτοι-
χείων ἑνότητες {ι}
ὑποτελεῖcθαι δύ-
ναὐνται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ
Ἐπικούρου καταλεί- (15)
πονται καθάπερ ἐν
τῶι Περὶ ὁcιότη-
τος αὐτότατα· τ[ὸ δ]ὲ
μηδεμίαν ὑπε[ναν-
τιολογίαν εἶναι πα- (20)
ρα⟨ιτη⟩τέον ὑποδεικνύ-
ειν. εἴωθε τοίνυν
πά]νθ᾽ ὁμῶc ταῦτα φύ-
cι]ν ἀποτελεῖcθαι
λέγειν· τὰ πολλὰ (25)
μὲ]ν ἐπειδὰν ἐκ
τῆς ὁμοίων {ἄλλων}
κἄλ]λων [ἐπι]cυνκρί[cε-
ως ἀ]τόμ[ων γέ]νηται πο- || (29)

|| το, κα[....] στοιχ[είω]σις ὁμ[οίων οὖσα] φαίνο[ιτ'] ἃ[ν ἐν]ότης· 13
| δύναται γὰρ ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ὑπάρχουσι διαιώνιον ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν 350
εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐχ ἧττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοι-
χείων ἑνότητες ὑποτελεῖσθαι δύ|νανται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου κατα- 360
λείπονται καθάπερ ἐν τῶι Περὶ ὁσιότητος αὐτότατα· τ[ὸ δ]ὲ μηδεμίαν
ὑπε[ναν]τιολογίαν εἶναι παρα⟨ιτη⟩τέον ὑποδεικνύειν. εἴωθε τοίνυν
[πά]νθ' ὁμῶς ταῦτα φύ|[σι]ν ἀποτελεῖσθαι λέγειν· τὰ πολλὰ [μὲ]ν 370
ἐπειδὰν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοίων {ἄλλων} [κἄλ]λων [ἐπι]συγκρί[σεως ἀ]τόμ[ων
γέ]νηται πο- ||

(*one word missing*) its constitution out of things similar would obviously 13
be a unified entity. | For it is possible for beings constituted out of 350
similarity for ever to have perfect happiness, since unified entities can
be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements[1] | and 360
both kinds of entity are recognized by Epicurus as being exactly the
same things, for example in his book *On Holiness*.[2] The demonstration
that this involves no contradiction may be passed over. Therefore he[3]
was wont to say that | nature brought all these things to completion 370
alike. And that[4] for the most part they[5] come about when they are
formed from an aggregation of various similar particles, . . .[6] (*probably
continues on*)

[1] Perhaps the author means here: 'equally out of unchanging elements and out of similar elements'.

[2] Perhaps 'in *On Holiness* (he recognizes both kinds of entity) in exactly the same way'.

[3] Epicurus. [4] i.e. 'he (viz. Epicurus) was also accustomed to say that . . .'.

[5] Or 'that many things come about'.

[6] Perhaps continued: 'but (δέ) the gods come about from elements (i.e. images) that are similar to one another'.

14 *N* 1098 fr. 20 (p. 133 G., 390 Ph.), *HV*² II 117

Test.: 382–9 Epic. *De dis* fr. 34 Us. (vv. 382–6 solum), 17.4 Arr.²

378–80 τ[ὴν | τῶν θεῶ]ν ϛύνκρ[ιϲιν | οὐ φαιν]ομέν̣η[ν Philippson 379]νουνκρ[*N* 381 ὑπάρχειν *: υπαυλειν *N*: ὑπαυλεῖν Quaranta: ὑπαύχειν Philippson 382 vel ἐν] τῶι (Gomperz) vel ἐν δὲ] τῶι (Philippson): φηϲιν] suppl. et librum Epicuri intellexit iam Quaranta 382–3 Περὶ θε|[ῶν ἀν]α̣μφιλέκτως Gomperz 383 fort. e.g. κ]εκοι- 384 τίθε]ται Usener: fort. εἴρη]ται 385 fort. π]άνυ τὴν 388–9 μὴ νοεῖϲ|[θαι τοῖϲ] ὅλοιϲ Philippson 393 .[, pars sin. μ, possis ν̣ vel λ̣ 397, 400–2 deperierunt

14

.....]μενον [... 1098 20
.....] γ' αὐτο[...
.....]ν εἶναι τ[...
..... .]ν ϛυνκρ[ι ..
380 ..... .]ομενη[.. (5)
..... .]ν ὑπάρ̣χειν
....ἐν] τῶι Περὶ θε-
ῶν ἀν]α̣μφιλέκτως
.....]ται τὸ τὴν
385 ..... .]ανυ τὴν [ ] (10)
....] ἅπαν
....]ερμικα-
..... .] μὴ νοεῖϲ-
θαι τοῖϲ] ὅλοιϲ· ἢ πε-
390 ....]ην οἵαν (15)
....]ητιϲ ἐϲτι
....]την μὲν
....]εκοι.[..
....]ευ[..... .
395 ....] προϲδια- (20)
....]ποιαν [ ]
[ ]
....]και[ ]
....]μον[ ]
400 [ ] (25)
[ ]
[ ]|| (27)

||[.....]μενον [..... ...] γ' αὐτο[..... ...]ν εἶναι τ[..... ....]ν ϛυγκρ[ι .. **14**
| ..... .]ομενη[..... ...]ν ὑπάρχειν [....ἐν] τῶι Περὶ θε[ῶν ἀν]αμφιλέ- 380
κτως [.....]ται τὸ τὴν [..... .]ανυ τὴν [..... .....] ἅπαν [..... ...]ερ-
μικα[..... .] μὴ νοεῖϲ[θαι τοῖϲ] ὅλοιϲ· ἢ πε|[..... ....]ην οἵαν [..... 390
....]ητιϲ ἐϲτι [..... ....]την μὲν [..... ....]εκοι. [..... .....]ευ[.....
....] προϲδια[..... ....]ποιαν [..... ....]και[.....
....]μον |[..... ....]|| 400

(c.*12 words indistinguishable*) . . . constitution | (*several words missing*) in 380 **14**
his[1] book *On Gods* indisputably (*several words missing*) not to consider
among whole entities or | (*35–40 words missing*) 390

[1] Probably Epicurus'.

15 *N* 1098 fr. 19 (p. 133 G., 390 Ph.), *HV*² II 116

403–5 deperierunt 406–7 *πρ*]*οκλο-* [*γίζεσθαι λόι*|*γωι*] Philippson 409 *α*⟨*ὐ*⟩]*τῶν* probabile, vid. e.g. 813 410–11 [*αἰσθήκε*]|*κι* Philippson 411 *ἐπί-* [*νοιαν* Anon. A 412–13 [*αἰσθη*]|*τὸν* Philippson 413–14 *αἰκ*]|*θανόμενον* Bücheler 414 ante *θαν* punctum stichometricum in marg. indicavit *N* 415–16 *: *εμ*[..]*ημας N*, fort. superpositum: *στερέμ*[*νια* Bücheler: *στερέμ*[*νιο*]*ν πάς*|*χειν* Anon. A 415–16 fort. *ἔ*]*χειν* 416 *αὐτ*[*οὐς οἱ*] *δ*[*έ* Quaranta: *αὐτ*[*ὸ τοῦτο*] *δ*[*ια-* Philippson 416–20 Bücheler 420–1 *ἀπ*[*ὸ φύ*]|*σεως ἔγ*[*νως*]*αν* Gomperz 421–2 *ε*[*ἰκ*]|*αναπέμπεσθαι* Philippson 422–3 *κρί*]|*σιν ταύτ*[*ην λαμβά*|*νε*]*σθαι* Philippson: *αἴσθη*]|*σιν ταύτ*[*ην αἰσθά*|*νε*]*σθαι περ*[*ιληπτὴν* Anon. A 424–5 *περ*[*ὶ νοήμα*|*τα*] *πάντα* [*θεῶν καὶ*]| *τῶν ἄλλ*[*ων ἀδήλων*] Philippson 428–31 deperierunt

15

[ ] 1098 19
[ ]
405 [ ]
...]*οκλο*[..... ...
...]*πα*[..... ... (5)
...]*σ ν*[..]*σ*[.....
.]*των των* [.....
410 *νων μηδ*[..... .
σι παρεπι[..... .
μενον τὸ μ[*ὴ* .... (10)
τον εἶναι νοε[*ρὸν αἰσ-*
θανόμενόν τ' εἰς
415 *τὸ στερέμ*[..]*ημα ἔ-*
χειν αυτ[....] *δ*[*ια-*
νοουμένους τὴν (15)
παραισθήσει σαρκ[*ί-*
νηι περιληπτὴν αἴσ-
420 *θη*]*σιν, ἣν καὶ ἀπ*[*ὸ φύ-*
σεως ἔγ[*νως*]*αν ε*[*ἰσ-*
αναπέμπεσθαι, [*κρί-* (20)
σιν ταύτ[*ην λαμβά-*
νε]*σθαι περ*[..... ..
425 ..] *πάντα* [..... ...
των ἄλλ[*ων* ....
...] *γὰρ* [..... .... (25)
[ ]
[ ]
430 [ ]
[ ]|| (29)

||[..... ....]οcλο[..... 15
.]πα[..... ..... .]c ν[..]c[..... .]των των [.....]|νων μηδ[..... .]cι 410
παρεπι[..... .]μενον τὸ μ[ὴ ....]τον εἶναι νοε[ρὸν αἰc]θανόμενόν τ' εἰc
τὸ cτερέμ[..]ημα ἔχειν αυτ[....] δ[ια]νοουμένους τὴν παραιcθήcει
cαρκ[ί]νηι περιληπτὴν αἴc|[θη]cιν, ἣν καὶ ἀπ[ὸ φύ]cεωc ἔγ[νωc]αν 420
ε[ἰc]αναπέμπεcθαι, [κρί]cιν ταύτ[ην λαμβάνε]cθαι περ[..... ....]
πάντα [..... ...]των ἄλλ[ων ....] γὰρ [..... ....
...|.. ....]|| 430

(c.*30 words missing*) | ...held[1] the object of thought as a thing perceived 410 **15**
in relation to a solid body (?) (*one word uncertain*) understanding per-
ception that can be grasped by corporeal | sensation, which they[2] also 420
knew to be derived from a physical entity,[3] they made this judgement
concerning ... (c.*25 words missing*)

[1] A report in indirect discourse of Epicurus' account of the formation of ideas about the gods. Understand: 'Epicurus says that they held ...'.

[2] Early humans (cf. 225-31).

[3] Or 'from nature'.

16 *N* 1077 fr. 17[1-2] (p. 111 G., 375 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 81

Test.: 432 Epic. *Ep. ad Herod.* 39–40; Lucr. 1.426,954–5; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1112B; 'Aëtius' 1. 20. 2 Diels, *Dox. Gr.* p. 318,1

432 *τόπον* Usener adn. ad Epic. fr. 76 (p. 125,11): *τουτον N* 435–6 *: *τελε|ως* spatio brevius Gomperz 437 *τιν[ι] ⁱει N* 439 *κοινότητας* Gomperz: *-τητας*, α corr. ex ο *N*[1]: *-τητος N*[2] 440 *ἔνφρωνη N*, sed *η* superpositum esse indicavit *N*[1], delevit Philippson: *ἔνφρων χε* Scott 441 ⟨*τῶν*⟩ add. Usener post *τις* commate interpunxit Philippson 442 *εἰδῷ[ν* Philippson: *ειδε N*: *εἰ δὲ* Gomperz, qui post *νων* commate interpunxit: *οὐδὲ* Anon. A 443 *μνημονεύ[ceιν* *, post quod commate interpunxi: *μνημονεύ[ειν οὐ* Philippson: *μνημονεύ[εcθαι* Gomperz: *μνημονεῦ[cαι, ἀλλ' εἰ* Anon. A 444 post *δέον* commate interpunxit Philippson 446 *αὐτοῦ* (sc. *Ἐπικούρου*) Bücheler, Gomperz: *αὑτοῦ* (sc. *τοῦ ἐνφρονος*, ad se) Philippson *φάν[αι* Philippson: *φαν[έον* dubitanter Gomperz 447–8 Bücheler, sed fort. *ἆρ'* [*ἀλ*]|*λ'* Anon. A 448 init. versus *c* ante *ουχι* superpositum esse indicavit *N*[1]: |.]*ου N*[2] fin. *τοτε N*, corr. Bücheler 449–52 Bücheler 450 supra *θ παν* sscr. *N*[1]: *πα* sscr. *N*[2] 453 *φ]ύc[ε]ων* Gomperz: [.]*ες[.]ων N*: [*cτ*]*οι[χί*]*ων* Philippson 453–4 *cυν|[πε]φ[υ]κότων* Anon A.: [..]*ν* [.]*κοτων N*: *cυν|[ε]cτ[η]κότων* Philippson 454 *των[ι] ⁱωc N* ut interrogationem interpunxit Gomperz 455 *ἄλλ[ω]ν* Philippson 455–6 *ὧν . . . εὖ|δ[ηλ]ος* *: *ευ|δ[..(.)]ος N* 456 fin. spatium post *του* nota impletur 457–60 Gomperz 458 *ἀμέλ]ει* *: *ἐπ]εὶ* Gomperz: *c[.....]ει N* 460 *ὑφελήφεcαν*, *ὑπειλήφεcαν* coll. 16–17 coniunxi

16

cώματα καὶ τόπον, 1077 17
τοὺc θεοὺc δὲ μὴ cυν-
αριθμεῖcθαι, περιγρά-
φειν αὐτούc, τελε[ί-
ως ἀναλγήτων ἐc- (5)
τίν, εἰ μὴ τὰc ἀνω-
τάτω{ι} διαιρούμε-
νος κοινότητ[ο]ας ἔ-
μελλεν ἔνφρων {η}
τις ⟨τῶν⟩ ἐν ταύταις προ- (10)
ειλημμένων εἰδῷ[ν
μνημονεύ[ceιν, οὐ
δέον τοὺc θεοὺc
μόνον ἀναιρεῖcθαι
πρὸc αὐτοῦ φάν[αι (15)
τούτου χάριν, ἀλ-
λ']{c} *οὐχὶ καὶ τοὺc [ἀν-*
θρώπουc κ[αὶ τοὺc
ἵππουc [καὶ] 'πάν'θ' ἁπλῶc
τὰ κατὰ μέροc αἰc- (20)
θητά τε καὶ νοητὰ
φ]ύc[ε]ων εἴδη καὶ cυν-
πε]φ[υ]κότων· ὡc γὰρ
ἄλλ[ω]ν, ὧν οὕτωc εὖ-
δ[ηλ]οc, οὐδὲ τού- > (25)
τω]ν ἐμνημόνευ-
c[εν· ἀμέλ]ει δ' ἐν τοῖc cώ-
μ[α]cιν ἅπαντα τάτ-
τειν ὑφειλήφεcαν || (29)

|| *cώματα καὶ τόπον, τοὺc θεοὺc δὲ μὴ cυναριθμεῖcθαι, περιγράφειν* 16
αὐτούc, τελε[ί]ωc ἀναλγήτων ἐcτίν, εἰ μὴ τὰc ἀνωτάτω διαιρούμενοc
κοινότητας ἔ|μελλεν ἔμφρων τιc ⟨τῶν⟩ ἐν ταύταιc προειλημμένων εἰ- 440
δῷ[ν] μνημονεύ[cειν, οὐ] δέον τοὺc θεοὺc μόνον ἀναιρεῖcθαι πρὸc αὐ-
τοῦ φάν[αι] τούτου χάριν, ἀλ[λ'] οὐχὶ καὶ τοὺc [ἀν]θρώπουc κ[αὶ
τοὺc]|| ἵππουc [καὶ] πάνθ' ἁπλῶc τὰ κατὰ μέροc αἰcθητά τε καὶ νοητὰ 450
[φ]ύc[ε]ων εἴδη καὶ cυμ[πε]φ[υ]κότων· ὡc γὰρ ἄλλ[ω]ν, ὧν οὕτωc
εὔδ[ηλ]οc, οὐδὲ τού[τω]ν ἐμνημόνευc[εν· ἀμέλ]ει δ' ἐν τοῖc cώμ[α]cιν
ἅπαντα τάτ|τειν ὑπειλήφεcαν || 460

(*opening words missing*)[1] bodies and location, and not enumerating the 16
gods alongside of them[2], he[3] excludes these[4] altogether, is the mark of
utterly insensible persons, unless | any rational person distinguishing 440
the highest general classes were going to mention types already in-
cluded in them, since one ought not say on account of this that gods
alone were omitted[5] by him,[6] and not[7] also people and | horses and in 450
short all perceptible and thinkable classes of entities and substances.
For in his perfect clarity, as he[8] did not mention those others, so he did
not mention these.[9] But of course they[10] gladly[11] supposed that he
classed | all things as bodies, (*continues on*) 460

[1] Supply: 'To suppose that in saying all things are divided into . . .'.
[2] Bodies and location. [3] Epicurus. [4] viz. the gods.
[5] Literally 'destroyed, done away with'. [6] Epicurus.
[7] i.e. without including, or, without also saying that he omitted explicitly to mention people and horses, etc. [8] Epicurus.
[9] The gods. The point is that he did not single out for specific mention these others (people, horses, gods, etc.) as existing among the class of bodies, but nevertheless believed them to exist.
[10] Opponents of the Epicureans. [11] Or 'deliberately', 'willingly'.

17 *N* 1098 fr. 18 (p. 132 G., 388 Ph.), *HV*² II 115

461–2 ἑκο]ύσιοι, κἂν ἄ[λλοι | ἄνδρ]ες Philippson, sed spatio longius ἄ[ν|δρ]ες vel ⟨οἱ⟩ supplendum * 462 ἀξιόπ[ιστον *, ἀξιόπ[ιστοι Gomperz–Philippson in hiatu: fort. ἀξιοπ[ρεπεῖς 463 εἶν]αι Philippson:]αι *N*:]ν possis 463–4 Philippson 464–5 fort. ὑπ[ε|λίποντ]ο· ὑ[πώ|πτευ]σε Philippson qui post ε interpunxit, sed deest ν ἐφελκυστικόν (cf. 1351) 465 ἐκείνει Gomperz: κεινεῖ Philippson ἐκείνει, ἐκίνει 466 init.]ι *N*: τούτω]ν Philippson 466–7 ὥς|[τε ἂν Philippson, [κἂν] *: ἀλλὰ] μήν dubitanter Gomperz 468 Gomperz 469 ἔλεγε]ν Gomperz: ἔλεγο]ν Philippson 470–1 οὐκ], ἔ[φε|ρον] suppl. Philippson 471–7 omnia suppl. Gomperz 477 καὶ τοι]ούτων Gomperz:]αυτων *N*: fort. [τὰς δι'] αὐτῶν 478 [πίστε]ις Philippson 479–80 *: περὶ αὐ|[τοὺς Gomperz 480 συν]βαινόν[των Gomperz 481 ἐν Philippson, βυ]βλίοις Gomperz fin. ατυπης[ ]| manifeste corrupta vel superposita *N*, nisi αὐτῷ ε[ ]|: ἀτυχῆ Philippson 482–3 τὴν διάθ]εσιν ἔχ[ουσιν οἱ] σοφοί Philippson, sed 483 fort. φιλό]σοφοι 486 τῶν ποιημ]άτων Philippson

17

ἑκο]ύσιοι, κἂν ἄ[ν- 1098 18
δρ]ες ἀξιόπ[ιστον
εἶν]αι μετεωρ[ίζων-
ται· ἐκ]θεῖνα⟨ι⟩ γὰρ ὑ[.
.....]c· ἐκείνει δὲ (5)
τούτω]ν μηδέν, ὥσ-
τε κἂν] μήν, εἴ γε κα-
τὰ συν]περιφορὰν
ἔλεγε]ν εἶναι θεούς,
οὐκ] ἀποδείξεις ἔ[φε- (10)
ρον ο]ὐδ' ὑπεξαιρέ-
των ἀντιπειπτόν-
των, οὐ]δ' ἂν ἐπολέ-
μουν τ]οῖς ἀναιροῦ-
σιν, οὐδ]ὲ διὰ τοσού- (15)
των ἠργάζοντο
καὶ τοι]ούτων λό-
γων [πίστε]ις καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τ]ῶν περὶ αὐ-
τῶν συν]βαινόν[των (20)
ἐν βυ]βλίοις ατυπης
.....]οσιν ἐχ[....
... οἱ] σοφοὶ τ[....
....]ν εἰς τὰς [...
....] διασκ[.... (25)
....]ατων
....]οις μ[..
.. τὴν ἀνασκε]υὴν || (28)

||[ἑκο]ύσιοι, κἂν ἄ[νδρ]ες ἀξιόπ[ιστον εἶν]αι μετεωρ[ίζωνται· ἐκ]θεῖ- 17
να⟨ι⟩ γὰρ ὑ[..... .]c· ἐκίνει δὲ [τούτω]ν μηδέν, ὥc[τε κἂν] μήν, εἴ γε
κα[τὰ cυμ]περιφορὰν [ἔλεγε]ν εἶναι θεούc, |[οὐκ] ἀποδείξειc ἔ[φερον 470
ο]ὐδ' ὑπεξαιρέτων ἀντιπιπτόν[των, οὐ]δ' ἂν ἐπολέ[μουν τ]οῖc ἀναι-
ροῦ[cιν, οὐδ]ὲ διὰ τοcούτων ἠργάζοντο [καὶ τοι]ούτων λόγων [πί-
cτε]ιc καὶ τῶν [ἄλλων τ]ῶν περὶ αὐ|[τῶν cυμ]βαινόν[των ἐν βυ]βλίοιc 480
ατυπηc[.....]οcιν ἐχ[..... .. οἱ] cοφοὶ τ[..... ...]ν εἰc τὰc [..... ..]
διαcκ[..... ....]ατων [..... .....]οιc μ[....τὴν ἀνακκε]υὴν ||

even if the founders[1] extol him[2] as trustworthy. For that he set forth his 17
views (*one word missing*).[3] But he[4] called into question none of these
things, so that if he had said that gods exist for the sake of social
convention, | they[5] would certainly not have offered demonstrations,[6] 470
since there were not even any objections to tell against them, nor
would they have fought against those who do away with the divine,
nor would they have advanced proofs in such extensive argumentation
and in in the other matters connected with | them[7] in their[8] books 480
(c.*21 words indistinguishable*) refutation . . .

[1] Literally 'the men', a familiar designation for Epicurus' successors as heads (*kathegemones*) of the school.
[2] Epicurus.
[3] Probably 'for they (the opponents?) supposed that he (sc. Epicurus) publicly set forth his views' (i.e. explicitly about the existence of gods). Cf. 454-8.
[4] Epicurus.
[5] Epicurus and his earliest followers, the *kathegemones*.
[6] About the gods.
[7] The gods.
[8] Epicurus' and the *kathegemones*'.

18 *N* 1077 fr. 14[1-2] (p. 108 G., 374 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 78

Test.: 489–99 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 124 = Posidonius fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd

489 κ]αὶ Gomperz: φάντ]ας Philippson 490–2 Gomperz 491 init.]μ̣ vel]λ̣λ̣ *N* 492 init. [...]τ̣ῆν̣ *N*[1]: [.....]ι *N*[2] 492–4 Bücheler 493 {λc}a[ ]την *N*[1]: κ]a[ὶ] Gomperz, post]a spatiolum *N*: ἀλλ]ὰ Bücheler 494 ον[r] [1]και *N* 495 init. |..{c}[.]ων *N* 495–8 Gomperz 496 init. pars dext. η *N*: πε]π̣λα-cμένωc Gomperz: κε]κ̣λαcμένωc D. Delattre privatim col. Philod. *De mus.* col. 14,25 K. 497 ον[r] [1]αλ *N* 498 ἀ]π̣ὸ τύχηc Gomperz: ἀ]π̣ὸ ψυχῆc corr. Usener ap. *Gloss. Epic.*, unde Diels p. 893 (= 295) adn. 5: τυχηc *N* 498–9 ἐκτι|[θέ]ν̣α̣ι Usener ap. *Gloss. Epic.*, unde Diels p. 893 (= 295) adn. 5:]ν̣α̣ι *N*[1], sed librarius quid voluerit incertum:]λι vel]ν̣ vel]α̣ι *N*[2]: ἐκτί]|[θηcι]ν̣ Gomperz 499 α̣ι[r] [1]πλ *N* 501–2 οἱ πά]νc[οφοι] πεποή|[καcιν] Philippson 503–4 φά|[cκουc]ιν Philippson 505 vel οὐδὲ 505–9 vestigia minima 510–12 lacunam duorum tantum *N*[1], trium versuum indicavit *N*[2] 514 π]αραc[τήcαc] Philippson: π]αραc[τήcω] Gomperz 515–18 Gomperz, correxi paulum 515 τ]ῶν Gomperz:]αν *N*, fort. subter positum 516 fin. αὐ[*N*[1]: α[*N*[2] 517 [ἡ]μ[ῶc * 518 προcέχε[ιν, αὐτ]οῖc *: προcέχε[ι τ]οῖc Gomperz coll. 18–19 coniunxi

18

..]αι τὸ μὴ πεπεράν- 1077 14
θαι τ]ὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰc ἀρ-
χὰc ἀτό]μουc εἶναι καὶ
τὸ] τ̣ῆ̣ν̣ ἡδονὴν ἀγα-
θὸν κ]α[ὶ] τὴν ἀλγηδό- (5)
να κα]κ̣όν καὶ τῶν δο-
γμάτ]ων ἕκαcτον
πε]π̣λαcμένωc τὸν
Ἐπίκουρον, ἀλλ' οὐ-
κ ἀ]π̣ὸ τύχηc, ἐκτι- (10)
θέ]ν̣α̣ι· πλεῖον γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τούτων
...]νc[....] πεποη-
....]ι δ' ἐγὼ
....] τοῦθ' ὃ φα- (15)
..... .]ιν[..]τοιc
....]ου λε-
....]οφε[..
....]υc[...
....]ου[... (20)
....]κα[...
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
.....]τ̣α[..... ... (25)
.. π]αραc[τήcαc] ὡc
τοῖc μὲν [ὑπὸ τ]ῶ̣ν
ἀν]δ̣ρῶν αὐ̣[τῶν γε-
γραμμέν[οιc ἡ]μ[ᾶc
προcέχε[ιν, αὐτ]οῖc δὲ || (30)

||[..]αι τὸ μὴ πεπεράν|[θαι τ]ὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰς ἀρ[χὰς ἀτό]μους εἶναι καὶ [τὸ] τ̣ὴν̣ ἡδονὴν ἀγα[θὸν κ]α[ὶ] τὴν ἀλγηδό[να κα]κ̣ὸν καὶ τῶν δο[γμάτ]ων ἕκαστον [πε]π̣λασμένως τὸν Ἐπίκουρον, ἀλλ' οὐ[κ ἀ]π̣ὸ τύχης, ἐκτι[θέ]ν̣α̣ι· πλεῖον γὰρ | οὐδὲν ἐπὶ τούτων [...]νς[....] πεποη[..... ....]ι̣ δ' ἐγὼ [..... ..] τοῦθ' ὅ φα[..... .]ιν[..]τοις [..... .....]ου λε[..... ....]οφε[..... ..... .]υς[..... ....]ου[..... ....]κα [...|.. ....]τ̣α[..... ..... π]αρα- c[τήσας] ὡς τοῖς μὲν [ὑπὸ τ]ῶ̣ν̣ [ἀν]δ̣ρῶν αὐ̣[τῶν γε]γραμμέν[οις ἡ]μ[ῖν] προσέχε[ιν, αὐτ]οῖς δὲ ||

(*one word missing*) that[1] | Epicurus falsely, but not by chance,[2] set forth that the universe is unbounded and first bodies indivisible and that pleasure is good and pain bad and every one of his doctrines. For | no more on these points did he[3] (*several words missing*). But I (*c.35 words missing*) | disposing[4] us to attend to the things written by the men[5] themselves, while on the other hand (*continues on*)

[1] i.e., if the opponents' charges that Epicurus spoke insincerely about believing in gods were true, it would also be necessary 'that Epicurus falsely' asserted his other doctrines, etc., a *reductio ad absurdum*.

[2] i.e. intentionally, in order to deceive.

[3] i.e. Epicurus spoke as sincerely on theological matters as he did on these other subjects.

[4] Subject: Epicurus.

[5] Epicurus and his early followers, the *kathegemones*.

19 *N* 1077 18[1-2] (p. 112 G., 376 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 82

Test.: 522–35 Epic. *De nat.* 12 fr. 87 Us., 27.2 Arr.[2] (vv. 523–8 solum) 523–36 Prodicus, deest *VS*; Diagoras T 39 Winiarczyk; Critias, cf. *TrGF* 43 F 19 531–3 Epic. *KD* 1 533–41 Antisthenes, cf. fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi = *SSR* V A 79 Giannantoni 542–8 Hermarchus, *Adv. Emped.* fr. 29 Longo

519 μ[ανίαν *: μ[ονὴν Philippson 520–1 ἐμ[έμψα]|το *: ελ[*N*: ἐξ[είλε]|το Philippson 521 [θεῖον *: π̣ο[λλοῖς Philippson 522–3 ἀναι]|ροῦcιν *, cf. *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,10–12 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἁπλῶc τὸ θε[ί]ον ἀ[ν]αιρούντων: ἀλλ' ἀ]|ροῦcιν Usener, unde Philippson, *SO* 19 (1939), 24: φλυα]|ροῦcιν dubitanter Gomperz, unde Philippson 1921 524 δωδεκάτω[ι, sc. βυβλίωι Περὶ φύcεωc 526–9 Bücheler 526 Κ̓ριτίαι corr. ex τριτίαι, κ supra τ *N* κἄ[λλοιc Usener 527 μέμ̣φ̣[εται] φ̣ὰc fort. nimis audacter Usener: μενc[...]θαc vel θι[.]c vel θ .c (e.g. θηc) *N*, θαc *HV*[2] II, unde φὰc Usener π̣α[ρα- Usener, possis κα[ὶ παρα- (Gomperz), tametsi καὶ . . . καὶ coniunctio insolita in Philodemo: κα[...(.)| *N* 528 κοπτ̣ειν *N*[1], *HV*[2] II: κοπτ[..]ν *N*[2] καιμ̣[*N*[1] 528–9 μαίνεc]|θαι Gomperz 530 εἶ]κά[ζει Usener: fort. ἧι]κα[cε: τουc' ⁾κα spatium, non lacunam, indicavit *N*, sed fort. perperam 530–1 κε]|λεύc[ac *, εἶ]κά[cac ἐκέ]|λευc[ε μ]ὴ Anon. A: λευc[..]η *N*: δ̣ο̣ὺc [δὲ μ]ὴ Usener: μ]ὴ iam Gomperz, sed μ]ὴ . . . οὐ|δ' difficile 531–2 πρᾶγμα ἡ|μεῖν, η delevit manu secunda *N*[1]: πραγμα[.]|μειν *N*[2], *HV*[2] *II*, unde πράγμα[θ' ἡ]|μεῖν Gomperz, edd., sed spatio longius 533–4 κα[ὶ γὰρ]| παραγραμμίζ[ουcι *: κα[ὐτὸc (sc. Epicurus) | παραγραμμίζ[ει Usener: παραγραμμιζ[...(.)| *N*[1], *HV*[2] II (-γρανμ- *N*[2]): παραγραμμ⟨ατ⟩ίζ[ει Philippson: ν⟨ο⟩μίζ[ειν dubitanter Gomperz 535 τ̣[ῶ]ν̣ Gomperz: fort. π̣[ερ]ὶ 535–6 ὀνόμα]|τα *: δόγμα]|τα Anon. A: πράγμα]|τα Philippson 536 κα]θάπερ Gomperz 536–7 Ἀν̣[τιc]|θέ[νηc Anon. A: αι[*HV*[2] II: αγ[*N* 537 κοινό[τατον *: κοινὸ[ν| Gomperz spatio brevius 538 ὑποτίνων iam Anon. A: ὑπό τινων Gomperz: ὑπ' ἐκ⟨ε⟩ίνων Philippson ἀν̣[αφέρει L. A. Holford-Strevens: ἀν̣[αιρεῖ Obbink 1995*b*, 198: ἀλ[λὰ spatio brevius Gomperz: ν̣[vel λ[*N* 539–40 τῆι θέ]|cει *: πεί]|cει Philippson: fort. cυνέ]|cει vel αἱρέ]|cει 540–1 τι[νοc ἀπά]|της Philippson: τι[*N*[1], *HV*[2] II:

19

καὶ πᾶcαν μ[ανίαν Ἐ- 1077 18
πίκουροc ἐμ̣[έμψα-
το τοῖc τὸ [θεῖον ἐ-
κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι-
ροῦcιν, ὡc κἀ̣[ν τῶι (5)
δωδεκάτω̣[ι Προ-
δίκωι καὶ Δια[γόραι
καὶ Κ̓ριτίαι κἄ̣[λλοιc
μ̣έμ̣φ̣[εται] φ̣ὰc π̣α̣[ρα-
κόπτ̣ειν καὶ μ̣[αίνεc- (10)
θαι, καὶ βακχεύου-
cιν αὐτοὺc [εἶ]κά̣[ζει, κε-
λεύc[ac μ]ὴ πρᾶγμα ἡ-
μεῖν παρέχειν οὐ-
δ' ἐνοχλεῖν. κα̣[ὶ γὰρ (15)
παραγραμμίζ[ουcι
τὰ τ̣[ῶ]ν̣ θεῶν [ὀνόμα-
τα, [κα]θάπερ Ἀν̣[τιc-
θέ[νηc] τὸ κοινό̣[τατον
ὑποτίνων ἀν̣[αφέρει (20)
τὰ κατὰ μέροc [τῆι θέ-
cει καὶ διά τι̣[νοc ἀπά-
τηc ἔτι πρότ̣[ερον·
καὶ τοῦθ' Ἕ̣[ρμ]α̣[ρχοc
ἐν τῶι τελευτ̣[αίωι (25)
τ]ῶν Πρὸc Ἐμπεδο-
κλέα παραcημ̣[αίνε-
τ̣αι προcτιθεί̣[c· "πε-
ρ̣[ὶ] δὲ μεταφορᾶ̣[c ἐ-
χρήcατο κατὰ [τοὺc ||

[app. ad col. 19 cont. p. 144]

|| καὶ πᾶcαν μ[ανίαν Ἐ]|πίκουροc ἐμ[έμψα]το τοῖc τὸ [θεῖον ἔ]κ τῶν 520 **19**
ὄντων [ἀναι]ροῦcιν, ὡc κἀ[ν τῶι] δωδεκάτω[ι Προ]δίκωι καὶ Δια[γό-
ραι] καὶ Κριτίαι κἄ[λλοιc] μέμ̣φ̣[εται] φ̣ὰ̣c̣ π̣α[ρα]κόπτ[ει]ν καὶ μ̣[αί-
νεc]θαι, καὶ βακχεύου|cιν αὐτοὺc [εἰ]κά[ζει, κε]λεύc[ac μ]ὴ πρᾶγμα 530
ἡμεῖν παρέχειν οὐδ' ἐνοχλεῖν. κα[ὶ γὰρ] παραγραμμίζ[ουcι] τὰ τ̣[ῶ]ν̣
θεῶν [ὀνόμα]τα, [κα]θάπερ Ἀν̣[τιc]θέ[νηc] τὸ κοινό[τατον] ὑποτείνων
ἀν̣[αφέρει] τὰ κατὰ μέροc [τῆι θέ]|cει καὶ διά τι̣[νοc ἀπά]τηc ἔτι 540
πρότ[ερον]· καὶ τοῦθ' Ἑ[ρμ]α[ρχοc] ἐν τῶι τελευτ[αίωι τ]ῶν Πρὸc
Ἐμπεδοκλέα παραcημ̣[αίνε]̣ται προcτιθεί[c· "πε]ρ[ὶ] δὲ μεταφορᾶ[c
ἔ]χρήcατο κατὰ [τοὺc]||

those who eliminate[1] the divine from existing things Epicurus | re- 520 **19**
proached for their complete madness, as in book 12[2] he reproaches
Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias among others, saying that they rave like
lunatics, and he likens them to Bacchant revellers, | admonishing them 530
not to trouble or disturb us.[3] For indeed they[4] explain the names of the
gods by changing letters,[5] just as Antisthenes,[6] substituting the most
common,[7] ascribes the particular to imposition[8] | and even earlier[9]
through some act of deceit. Likewise Hermarchus in the final book of 540
his *Against Empedocles* also cites this passage, adding: 'Concerning
metaphor he[10] made use in (*continues on*)

[1] Either explicitly or by implication.

[2] Of *On Nature*, cited by title only in the first instance (above, 226–7) and by book number alone thereafter.

[3] i.e. with their ideas of the gods. The words echo the first of Epicurus' *Kuriai Doxai*: 'Blessed and immortal nature experiences no trouble itself nor causes trouble to any other.'

[4] Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias (524–6).

[5] Literally 'they respell the names of the gods' (in order to explain the origin of belief in them).

[6] Cf. p. 72 Gomperz (see vol. ii) Antisthenes fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi: 'By Antisthenes in his *Physics* it is said that by convention (*νόμοc*) there exist many gods, but in reality (*κατὰ φύcιν*) one (*ἕνα*).'

[7] The most common, most general conception (or name?) of the gods.

[8] i.e. to imposition by humans or conventional usage (*thesis*). (Possibly *thesis* could refer to the rearrangement of letters in the names of the gods.)

[9] i.e. he claimed that this happened even earlier in cultural history when, according e.g. to Critias, some people had tricked others into believing in gods for the purpose of political control. The point is expounded at length below 1189–1217, 2032–43, 2144–82.

[10] Empedocles.

19 (*cont.*)

τγ[vel τπ[N^2: διότι [Cωκρά]|της Anon. A 541 suppl. Gomperz post πρότ[ερον Krohn (Hermarchus fr. 34), post της interpunxit Gomperz, unde Philippson, Longo 543 τελ N^1, HV^2 II: τεα N^2 τελευτ[αίωι suppl. Gomperz (sc. βυβλίωι δευτέρωι καὶ εἰκοστῶι, D.L. 10.25) 544 εμπ- N^1, HV^2 II: θμπ- N^2 545–8 Gomperz 545 κλεα N^1, HV^2 II: κδεα N^2 545–6 παρασημ[αίνε]|ται *, μ[N^1: |και N: παραση[μαίνεται Longo, sed spatio longius: παραση[μαίνει Bücheler, unde Philippson, Krohn 546 προστιθεί[c Bücheler, Krohn: προστιθεῖ Philippson: cει[N 546–7 πε]|ρὶ Philippson μεταφορᾶ[c Longo: μεταφοβα[N: μεταφορα[ἰc Krohn: {μετα}φορᾶ[c Philippson 547–8 ἐ]|χρήcατο Gomperz 548 [τοὺc *: [τού||των Philippson coll. 19–20 coniunxi

20 N 1098 fr. 15 (p. 130 G., 387 Ph.), HV^2 II 112

Test.: 549–54 addendum ad Hermarchum, *Adv. Emped.* fr. 29 Longo 578 Polyaenus fr. 55 Tepedino

549 θνη]τοὺc *:]τοιc N, ι ex υ mutata vid. e.g. 1150, 1304, 1543, et saepe: θνη]τοῖc Philippson τ[ῆι *, τ[circuli arcus sin. inf. N, possis e.g. θ[εοῖc: ο[ὐcιν Philippson 549–50 cυν]|αφῆι Anon. A 551–9 omnia suppl. Bücheler, exceptis 551–2 τὸ [cέβεc]|θαι *: τὸ [εὔχεc]|θαι Bücheler, Gomperz 554 γείνεται, γίνεται 560–77 deperisse censeo, sed quot vv. perierint incertum

20

θνη]τοὺc τ[ῆι cυν- 1098 15
αφῆι τῆc φύcεωc
πρὸc ἣν τὸ [cέβεc-
θαι καὶ λο[γοθ]ε-
ραπείας ποιε[ῖcθαι (5)
γείνεται". παρ' Ἐπι-
κούρωι δὲ το[ῦτο
τῆι cπουδῆι περὶ
τῆc κοινωνί[ac τῶν
Ἀθήνηcιν ἐμφαίνε- (10)
ται μυcτηρίων [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (15)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (20)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (25)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
καὶ Πολύαινοc [ ]|| (30)

|| θνη]τοὺς τ̣[ῆι συν]|αφῆι τῆς φύσεως πρὸς ἣν τὸ [σέβες]θαι καὶ λο[γο- 550 **20**
θ]εραπείας ποιε[ῖσθαι] γίνεται"· παρ'Ἐπικούρωι δὲ το[ῦτο] τῆι σπου-
δῆι περὶ τῆς κοινωνί[ας τῶν] Ἀθήνησιν ἐμφαίνεται μυστηρίων | (c.50 560
words missing) | καὶ Πολύαινος || 570

human fashion of the | connection with the (divine) entity[1] for which 550 **20**
worship and verbal attendance in cult take place'; and in Epicurus' case[2] this is shown by his eagerness for sharing in the mysteries at Athens . . . | (c.50 *words missing*) | And Polyaenus . . . (*gap of 1 col.*, c.90 560/70
words)

[1] For this sense of φύσις see above, 231; literally 'of the connection with nature', i.e. divine nature, or perhaps: 'of the natural connection'. [2] Or 'in Epicurus' writings'.

21 *N* 1098 fr. 16 (p. 130 G., 388 Ph.), *HV*² II 113

nondum sanata, multa incerta 579 Philippson: *κεκ*]*ύλιcται* Gomperz 580 Philippson 580–1 *ἐπ*[*ι*|*νοίας*] Philippson 582 *α*]*υτ*[[*α*]]*ῆc*, α puncto supra posito deletur *N*, *HV*² II 582–3 *οὐδὲ* |[*τῶι c*]*υνέπεc*[*θαι* Quaranta: *οὐδὲ* |[*γὰρ τὸ c*]*υνέπεc*[*θαι* | *τῶν* Philippson 584 *με-τὰ βα*]*ρβάρων* iam Quaranta, spatio aptius quam *τῶν βα*]*ρβάρων*:]*ρ* pars dext. circuli parvi *N* 584–6 [*τι*|*cὶν ἔcτιν*] *ἐπιτείμη-*|[*cιc τῶν*] Philippson 587 fort. *ὀνομ*]*ά-των*: [*ὡc καὶ τ*]*ὰ τῶν* Philippson 588 Gomperz 591–2 Philippson 592]*ῳ* pars dext. circ. *N*, possis *ǫ* 594 fort. *εἶ*]*cενεγ*[*κέναι* 595 fin. *ǫ*[, pars sin. circ. *N*, possis *ῳ* 599 Philippson 599–600 fort. *τοὺc* |[*θεοὺc* 601 Philippson coll. 21–2 coaluisse credebat Philippson

21

πεφα]*ύλιcται* [.]*τι*[. 1098 16
580 *τῶν ἀρχ*]*αίων ἐπ*[*ι-*
.... *ἔ*]*πακούειν ἐ-*
.....*α*]*υτ*[[*α*]]*ῆc, οὐδὲ*
..... *c*]*υνέπεc*[*θαι* (5)
τῶν βα]*ρβάρων* [..
585 ....] *ἐπιτείμη-*
cιc τῶν] *ὁμοφώνων*
....]*ατων ἀρχαί-*
ων δι]*ατιθέcθω*{*ι*} (10)
.....]*ια καὶ τὸ τὸν*
590 .....]*ον ἀντιμε-*
ταλαμβ]*άνειν θἀτέ-*
ρου προc]*θέντα το*
..... .]*ὡc καὶ ἐπιτη-* (15)
..... .]*cενεγ*[....
595 ..... .] *κάλλιcτο*[*ν*
..... . *μ*]*έντοι λε-*
....]*ι δυναμε-*
..... .] *μὴ προνο-* (20)
εῖν πάν]*των τοὺc*
600 ..... .] *περιγραφ*[.
.... *γε*]*λωτα παν-*
..... .]*cιν, εἰ μὴ β*[.
....] *καὶ του*[.. (25)
.....]*co*[...]*μεν*
605 ....]*των ἀλ-*
.....]*μητ*[...]*υι* || (28)

||[πεφα]ύλιcται [.]τι[. | τῶν ἀρχ]αίων ἐπ[ι.... ἔ]πακούειν ἐ[..... α]υ- 580 **21**
τῆc, οὐδὲ [..... c]υνέπεc[θαι τῶν βα]ρβάρων [..... ....] ἐπιτίμη[cιc
τῶν] ὁμοφώνων [..... ..]ατων ἀρχαί[ων δι]ατιθέcθω [.....]ια καὶ τὸ
τὸν |[.....]ον ἀντιμε[ταλαμβ]άνειν θἀτέ[ρου προc]θέντα το[..... .]ὡc 590
καὶ ἐπιτη[.....]cενεγ[..... .....] κάλλιcτο[ν ..... . μ]έντοι λε[.....
...]ι δυναμε[..... .] μὴ προνο[εῖν πάν]των τοὺc |[..... .] περιγρα- 600
φ[..... γέ]λωτα παν[..... .]cιν, εἰ μὴ β[..... ...] καὶ του[..... ..]co
[...]μεν[..... ...]των ἀλ[.....]μητ[...]νι ||

... has been devalued ... | of the ancients ... to follow upon ... of 580 **21**
foreigners ... censure of those in agreement ... of ancient ... let him/
it be disposed ... | to exchange ... the proposition of the other ... finest 590
... not to have foreknowledge of all things | ... laughable ... if not ... 600
(gap of 1 col., c.90 words)

22 *N* 1098 fr. 17 (p. 131 G., 388 Ph.), *HV*² II 114

multa incerta 606–7 *μήτ[ε Κρο]νί-||ωνα* Philippson 607–8 *ἡ[μερώ]||τατον λειτ[ουργίαν* Philippson 609 *δ' ἔξοντ[α* Philippson 610 *τίς οὐ[ν ἂν ἐνόμιζε* Philippson 611 *θεὸν* Gomperz: fort. *ἅ]||θεον*: *ἀ[ΐδιον εἶ]|* spatio brevius Philippson 612–13 *μηδὲ [ἄφθαρτον αὐ]||τὸν* Philippson 613 ϛ[circuli arcus sin. *N*, ο, ε, θ possis: *ὥϛ[ετο καθάπερ]* Philippson 614 *ἔνιοι* Gomperz *τῶ[ν Στωικῶν]* Philippson 615 Gomperz 616 ϛ bis, circuli arcus sin. sup. *N*, i.e. ϛ, ε, θ, ο 620–1 Philippson 622–5 *τὰς ἀπορ]||ροί[ας νοητὰς ἐν]|| ὕπ[νοις προσλαμβάνο]||μεν* Philippson 626 *πᾶν τὸ* Gomperz 626–7 *δυ[νάμενο|ν] ἕπεσθαι* Gomperz: |.]επεσθαι *N*: *δυ-[νάμενον | τρ]έπεσθαι* Philippson 627 *πρ[ὸς τὴν* Philippson: ρ[tantum hasta, possis ι, η 628–9 suppl. iam Quaranta, Gomperz: fort. *θ[είου* 629 *: *προσέλ[θοι* Philippson 630 manifeste corrupta: omnino improbandum quod coni. Philippson *[τις ἅ]θεος*, spatio longius: *μνημονεύ|σαι* Gomperz fort. recte 631–3 Bücheler 632 *ἀξίως ὁ μὲν* Anon. A 633–4 *τὰς δὲ]|| νῦν φάσεις* Philippson: *καὶ τὰς]|| Νύνφας εἰς[* Quaranta 634 *[Ζήνωνι]* Philippson 634–5 *ἐξ]|ἔθηκεν* Gomperz 635 fort. *ὁ[σίας*, sc. *φάσεις* 635–6 post *εθηκεν* spatiolum *N*: *ὁ [ἐξηγη]||τὴς ἡμῶν* Philippson, *ὁ [μαθη]||τὴς* Quaranta, spatio brevius: fort. *ὁ [καθηγη]||τὴς*

22

ωνα καὶ η[..... .. 1098 17
τατον λειτ[.....
δεξοντ[..... ...
610 *τις ου[..... .....*
θεον α[..... .... (5)
μηδε[..... .....
τον ωϛ[..... .....
ἔνιοι τῶ[ν ....
615 *καὶ τὴν [..... ...*
μ[..]ϛας[..... .. (10)
τ[....]ϛ[..... ...
π[..... ....
πο[..]ϲ[..... ....
620 *[..... .... μα-*
καρι[..... ..... . (15)
πον[..... ..... .
ροι[..... ....
ὑπ[..... ....
625 *μεν[.]αν[..... ...*
πᾶν τὸ δυ[νάμενο- (20)
ν] ἕπεσθαι πρ[ὸς τὴν
ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θ[εοῦ· τά-
χα δ' ἂν προσέλ[θοι ..
630 *ολοσμνημωνη[ ]*
σαι νομισθησόμε- (25)
νον ἀξιώσομεν [ ]
καθάρσεως, [τὰς δὲ
νῦν φάσεις [... ἐξ-
635 *έθηκεν ο[..... .]*
της ἡμῶν [.....|| (30)

|| ωνα καὶ η[..... ..]τατον λειτ̣[.....] δεξοντ[..... ...]|τιc ου[..... .....] 610 **22**
θεον α[..... ....]μηδε[..... .....]τον ωc̣[..... .....] ἔνιοι τῶ̣[ν ....]
καὶ τὴν [..... ...]μ[..]c̣ac̣[..... ..]τ[....]c̣[..... ...]π[..... ....]
πο[..]c[..... ..... | .... μα]καρι[..... ..... .]πον[..... 620
.]ροι[..... ....] ὑπ[..... ....]μεν[.]αν[..... ...]πᾶν τὸ δυ[νάμε-
νον] ἕπεcθαι πρ̣[ὸc τὴν] ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θ[εοῦ· τά]χα δ' ἂν προcέλ[θοι ..]|
ολοcμνημωνηcαι νομιcθηcόμενον ἀξιώcομεν καθάρcεωc, [τὰc δὲ] νῦν 630
φάcειc [... ἐξ]έθηκεν ο[..... .]της ἡμῶν [.....]||

(*one word missing*) the most . . . obligation (*several words missing*) | god 610 **22**
(*several words*) some of those (*16–18 words missing*) | blessed (*16–18 words* 620
missing) everything that may logically follow for the existence of God.
But perhaps might approach (*several words missing*), | that which will be 630
customary we shall think worthy of purification, but those expressions
presently before us (*one word missing*) he set forth (*one word*) of us (*one word missing*)

23 *N* 1077 fr. 15[1-2] (p. 109 G., 374 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 79

637–8 ἐναργεί[αι γ' ἀ]γαμενοῦντος Philippson: fort. δ]ιαμενοῦντος 639 πλα]-νᾶ⟨ι⟩ Philippson να[ ]και *N*, *HV*[2] II 639–40 πάντ|ας *N*, cf. vv. 642, 645: πάν|τες Gomperz, unde Philippson, sed rationem reddere nequimus cur mutata sit lectio, nisi fort. init. 640 superpositum fuit 641 οἳ ταὐτὸ]γ Philippson: vel]γ vel]αι *N*: ὧν συ]γγράψαν Anon. A 641–2 ἄ|[ξίους * (in oratione obliqua): ἄ|[ξιοι τῆς Gomperz 643 Bücheler 645 ἀ add. Bücheler ἀνοσίου[ς *: σιοι[| *N*, ι ex υ mutata vid. e.g. 1304, 1543, et saepe: ἀνόσιοι Bücheler, edd. omnes 647–8 ὥρα (sc. ἐστί, i.e. tempus est), ι delevit Bücheler: ω|ραι *N*: ⟨μ⟩ω|ρ⟨ί⟩α Gomperz 651 τ[οῦ Philippson: τ[οὺς Gomperz θ]εούς Gomperz:]εους *N*[1]: εους *N*[2] fin. spatium post υπαρ impletur nota 651–2 ὑπ-άρ|χε[ιν Anon. A: ὑπάρ|χε[ι Gomperz 652 [τὰς] Philippson ἀπο]δείξεις Gomperz 653 εὐπ[όρης]εν Anon. A ante Philippson ut vid.]εν[ ]ομως *N* 654–6 suppl. egregie Gomperz app. crit. 654 δὲ Gomperz: δ' ε[ἰ Anon. A 655 [εἰ μὴ] Gomperz: [ἂν] Anon. A 656 [αὐτούς] Philippson: ἦσαν κα]θάπερ Anon. A 657 ἡμ[εῖς Philippson 658 ἐκ-θ]λῖψαι Philippson 661 α, hasta inclinata ad dext. part., possis λ 665 ὁ πρὸς τά [γ' ὑ]πάρ||[χοντα μαχόμενος coni. Philippson

23

...]μενη[.] ἐναργει- 1077 15
.. ἀ]γαμενοῦντος
.....]να, καὶ πάν-
τας [κ]α[τ' ἀνάγκας
οἳ ταὐτὸ]γ ἔγραψαν ἀ- (5)
ξίους] γε προαιρέ-
c[εω]c ἕνεκα θαυμά-
ζεcθαι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὴν
⟨ἀ⟩δυναμίαν ἀνοσίου[c
νομίζεcθαι· πάντας (10)
δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὥ-
ρα{ι} λέγειν ἀνοσίους, ἐ-
πειδήπερ οὐδεὶc
εἰκνουμένας πε-
ρὶ τ[οῦ θ]εοὺc ὑπάρ- > (15)
χε[ιν τὰc ἀπο]δείξειc
εὐπ[όρης]εν· ὅμωc
δὲ [cέβ]ονται πάν-
τε[c εἰ μὴ παρ]άκοποί τι-
νε[c αὐτούς, κα]θάπερ (20)
ἡμ[εῖc· ....]κ[.]α
με[..... .....]λιψαι
το[..... ..... .]νη
τ[..... ....]
κα[.]μεν[....]νωc (25)
οὕ]τωc [..... .....
.]ω γ[..... ....
οὐ]χ ὑπ[..... .....
.]ο πρὸc τα[...]παρ- || (29)
– – – – – – – – – – – – – –

||[...]μενη[.] ἐναργει[.. ἀ]ναμενοῦντος [.....]να, καὶ πάν|τας [κ]ατ' ἀνάγκας [οἳ ταὐτὸ]ν ἔγραψαν ἀ[ξίους] γε προαιρέσ[εω]ς ἕνεκα θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ διὰ τὴν ⟨ἀ⟩δυναμίαν ἀνοσίου[ς] νομίζεσθαι· πάντας δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὥρα λέγειν ἀνοσίους, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδεὶς | ἱκνουμένας περὶ τ[οῦ θ]εοὺς ὑπάρχε[ιν τὰς ἀπο]δείξεις εὑπ[όρης]εν· ὅμως δὲ [σέβ]ονται πάντε[ς εἰ μὴ παρ]άκοποί τινε[ς αὐτούς, κα]θάπερ ἡμ[εῖς· ....]κ[.]α με[..... .....]λιψαι το[..... ..... .]νη|τ[..... ....]κα[.] μεν[....]νως [οὕ]τως [..... ..... .]ω γ[..... .... οὐ]χ ὑπ[..... ..... .]ο πρὸς τα[...]παρ- ||

(*one word missing*) clear (*one word missing*) of that which will endure (*one word missing*) and that[1] | of necessity all who have written in this same fashion deserve to be admired because of their intentions and not, on account of their inability, to be regarded as impious. It would be fitting[2] to describe all men as impious, inasmuch as no one | has been prolific in finding[3] convincing demonstrations for the existence of gods; nevertheless all men, with the exception of some madmen, worship them, as do we | (*c.28 words indistinguishable, + gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

23 640 650 660

[1] A dependent construction. Understand: 'It is necessary that . . .'.
[2] Literally 'it is time to describe . . .'.
[3] i.e. no one furnishes in abundance.

24 *N* 1098 fr. 14 (p. 129 G., 387 Ph.), *HV*² II 111

665–72 [φλυαροῦcι δὲ λέγοντεc θε]||οῖc θ' ὑπά[ρχειν τού]|των [οὐδὲν καὶ τάδε]|| κατ' ἀλή[θει]α[ν μόνον]|| ἀποφα[ίνεcθαι ὡc]|| ὑποζώμ[ατα τῆc]|| ὅλης αὐτ[ῶν κατ' ἐκεῖ]||να restit. Philippson 667 supra ο, ω sscr. *N* 672 πράγμα[τα καὶ Gomperz: πραγμα[τείαc Philippson 673–4 Gomperz 675 fin. ἅμ[α δὲ]| ἀπ' spatio brevius Philippson 676 Gomperz 677 *: παρπλοον *N*: παρὰ δ̣έ̣ον Philippson 679–80 Philippson 681 χ[, γ vel π *N* verbum latet, ἐπ[ήρ-κε]cε Philippson 681–2 fin. ο̣[, pars sin. circ. *N*, possis τῷ̣[ν]|| ἀν[δρῶν 682–3 ἀν[αcτ]ή̣c[αι πρὸc φ̣|πε[ιλί]αc (non alibi repertum, quasi ἀπειλάc) Philippson 683 post ac spatiolum *N* 683–4 με[μπ]|τῶc D. Delattre privatim: με[τα-θε]|τῶc Philippson 684–5 Gomperz 684 ante τωc punctum stichometricum in marg. indicavit *N* 686 fort. ἐ[κ]ε̣[ίνουc: φ̣[όβ]ο[υ Philippson 686–7 ἀ]|πο- *: ὑ]|πο[γ]ραψάτωcα[ν Gomperz 688 ὡc] Philippson: fort. οἱ] 688–9 τ̣[οὺc οὕ]τ]ωc ἀναcτραφ[έντας] *: fin. χ[*N*: τ̣[ῶν οὕ]τ]ωc ἀναcτραφ[έντων Philippson: ἀναcτρα[φῆναι Gomperz 689–90 ὑ]|πελάμβαν[ον Gomperz 690 [τοίνυν *: [δὲ brevius Philippson 691–2 ἀν[αγκαc]|τῶc Philippson: ἀν[αποδείκ]-|τωc D. Delattre privatim col. *Rhet.* 2 p. 105, 10 L., ii. 266,13 S., sed contra divisionem: ἀν[αμφιλέκ]|τωc dubitanter Gomperz, spatio brevius 692–4 Gomperz 695 fort. ἐν τ[ῶι sc. ποcτῷ βιβλίῳ vel τ[ῇι sc. ποcτῇ βίβλῳ

24

οιcθ' ὑπα[ρχ..... . 1098 14
τ[[ο]]ὼν [..... ....
κατ' ἀλή[θει]α[ν ...
ἀπεφα[ιν..... ...
ὑποζωμ[..... ... (5)
ὅλης αυτ[..... ..
να πραγμα[..... .
τὰc φαντας[ίαc ἀλη-
θεῖc εἶναι κ[αὶ τὸ πᾶν
ἄπειρον αμ[..... . (10)
ἀπ' εὐφημιc[μοῦ
παρῆλθον· οὐ γὰρ
παρὰ τὸ μὴ ταῦτα
πεποηκέναι ⟨τ⟩οὐ[c εἰ-
ρημένουc [ἄ]νδρα[c (15)
ἐγ[.....]cε παρὰ το̣[.]
αν[...]ηc[..] προcκ[.]
πε[...]ac· εἰ δὲ με[μπ-
τῶc ἀνεcτράφηc̣[αν,
ὥcτε καὶ παρacχ[εῖν (20)
ὑποψίαν ε[.]ο[.., ἀ-
πο[γ]ραψάτωcα[ν
οἱ] κατήγοροι τ̣[οὺc οὕ-
τ]ωc ἀναcτραφ[έντας· ὑ-
πελάμβαν[ον τοίνυν (25)
ἁπλῶc καὶ ἀν[αγκαc-
τῶc ζῶια μ[ακάρια
καὶ διαιώνια [κατα-
λείπειν· οὐ γ[ὰρ ....
γε μὴν ἐν τ[..... ..|| (30)

|| οιcθ' ὑπα[ρχ..... .]των [..... ....] κατ' ἀλή[θει]α[ν ...] ἀπε- **24**
φα[ιν..... ...]| ὑποζωμ[..... ...] ὅλης αυτ[..... ..]να πραγμα[..... .] 670
τὰc φαντας[ίας ἀλη]θεῖc εἶναι κ[αὶ τὸ πᾶν] ἄπειρον αμ[..... .] ἀπ'
εὐφημιc[μοῦ] παρῆλθον· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸ μὴ ταῦτα πεποηκέναι ⟨τ⟩οὐ[c
εἰ]|ρημένουc [ἄ]νδρα[c] ἐχ[.....]cε παρὰ τ̣ο̣[.]αν[...]ηc[..] προcκ[.]πε 680
[...]ac· εἰ δὲ με[μπ]τῶc ἀνεcτράφηc̣[αν,] ὥcτε καὶ παραcχ[εῖν] ὑπο-
ψίαν ε[.]ο[.., ἀ]πο[γ]ραψάτωca[ν οἱ] κατήγοροι τ̣[οὺc οὕτ]ω̣c ἀνα-
cτραφ̣[έντας· ὑ]||πελάμβαν[ον τοίνυν] ἁπλῶc καὶ ἀν[αγκαc]τῶc ζῶια 690
μ[ακάρια] καὶ διαιώνια [κατα]λείπειν· οὐ γ[ὰρ ....] γε μὴν ἐν τ[.....
..]||

(c.6 *words indistinguishable*) . . . in truth declared | (*several words missing*) 670 **24**
affairs[1] (*one word missing*) that the images were true and the universe
infinite (*one word missing*) from auspicious speech they moved. For it is
not because the | aforesaid men[2] had not done these things that he[3] 680
. . . (*several words missing*). And if they have conducted themselves in
a blameworthy fashion, with the result that they also aroused suspicion
(*one word missing*), let the accusers formally charge those who have
conducted themselves in this way. | Therefore they[4] simply and neces- 690
sarily supposed that he[5] left unquestioned[6] the existence of blessed and
eternal beings. For not indeed . . . (*one word missing*)

[1] Or 'troubles'. [2] i.e. the Epicurean founders, the *kathegemones*.
[3] Past tense verb missing, subject singular. [4] i.e. the *kathegemones*.
[5] Subject must be supplied: possibly 'he' (Epicurus), or 'they' (early humans?).
[6] Or 'posited', 'allowed the existence of'.

25 *N* 1077 fr. 13[1-2] (p. 107 G., 373 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 77

Test.: 696–725 Socrates [I C] 503 Giannantoni, *Test. Socr.* 38 Acosta–Angeli 696–708 Metrodorus *Adv. Euthyphr. Plat.* fr. 14 Körte 702–5 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 707 Plat. *Euthyphr.* 5 C 8–D 7, 6 DE

698 *N*: τοῦτον τὸν Bücheler 698–9 ἀ|[γνεύ]οντα Gomperz, confirmavit *N*[1] manu secunda]ευ vel]ξυ ante οντα:]οντα *N*[2], *HV*[2] II: ἀ|[cεβ]ο⟨ῦ⟩ντα Bücheler: ἀ|[ληθῆ] ὄντα in hiatu Acosta–Angeli 701 ειν' 'ως *N* 703 αυτον *N*: αὐτὸν (sc. *Cωκράτην*) Bücheler, Gomperz, Duening: αυτον corr. in ἐν τῶι (sc. Metrodori *βυβλίῳ Πρὸς τὸν Εὐθύφρονα* cuius mentio fit infra 959–60, *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44) Körte, sed ante *Εὐθύφρονα* articulus hic deest nec rationem reddere possumus cur mutata sit lectio 706–7 καταμέμ[φε]|ται Gomperz: μελ{ει}|ται *N*[1] indicans ει fuisse subter positum: μολ[..]|ται *N*[2] 707–8 *, cf. Plat. *Euthyphr.* 5 C 8–D 7, 6 DE, 9 C, 11 AB, 15 C et passim: c[.....]cηλ[.]|γον *N* (i.e. in η mutatum est τι): fort. 707–8 possis λ[ό]|γον (iam Philippson) [προcθέμ]ενο[c] 709–10 περὶ [θεῶν κ]ατὰ φ[ύ]|cιν Philippson: fin. dext. pars λ vel α ante τα *N*: cυγκ]ατατ[ίθη]|cιν dubitanter Gomperz 711 τ[ὴν ἀcφ]άλεια[ν Philippson 712 ἐξ ἀ[νθρώπω]ν Philippson: ἐξ ἀ[νάγκης Gomperz 713 init. post ου pars sup. τ, π, ξ]λ' vel]δ' 713–14 Gomperz 714 ν[tantum hasta, possis μησαι 716 λ vel α *N*[1]: α *N*[2] 718–19 πλησίον Gomperz 718–21 αὐτ[ῶν τὴν τ]ῶν πλη|cίον κά[θαρcι]ν πρά[τ]|τει[ν καὶ τὰ] μέγιc|τα προ[νοεῖν ἴ]διον Philippson, sed suspicor πρὸ[c τὸ ἀΐ]διον in v. 721 supplendum esse 724 τοινυν *N*[1], *HV*[2] II: -νυμ *N*[2] nescioqua re γ' οἶομαι coni. Diels ap. Anon. A: γινομαι *N*, *HV*[2] II: οἶμαι Philippson vix credibile, cf. Crönert, *MGrHerc* 271 coll. 25–6 coniunxi

25

[..]μεν[.]ν οὕτω{ι} δὲ μακρὰν ἀφεστήκαcι τοῦ μὴ τὸν ἀγν]εύοντα λόγον ἐν τοῖc περὶ θεῶν λέγειν, ὥcτε καὶ Cωκράτην Μητρόδωρος αὐτὸν πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλάτωνος, εἴπερ ἐποέι τοῦτο, καταμέμ[φεται τί ὃ[cιόν ἐ]cτι λ[έγον[τα .....]ενο[. περι[.....]ατατ[. cιν [..... ..]οναι[. ας τ[ὴν ἀcφ]άλεια[ν ἐξ ἀν[.....]ν εὐc[. ου . αι[....]λ' οὔτ' ἐ[τίμηcαν [...]ην c[... φανε[..... ..... την λ[..... ..... καλῶc [..... .... καὶ αὐτ[....]ιν πλησίον κα[.....]ν πρα[τ-τει[..... . τὰ] μέγιcτα προ[....]διον εἰ μὴ διοικεῖται καὶ παντελῶc· μάλιcτα τοίνυν γ' οἶομαι δεῖν μειcεῖν τοὺc ||

1077 13
(5)
(10)
(15)
(20)
(25)
(30)

||[..]μεν[.]ν. οὕτω δὲ μακρὰν ἀφεστήκαcι τοῦ μὴ τὸν ἁ[γν]ε̣ύοντα 25
λόγον | ἐν τοῖc περὶ θεῶν λέγειν, ὥcτε καὶ Cωκράτην Μητρόδωροc 700
αὐτὸν πρὸc Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλάτωνοc, εἴπερ ἐπόει τοῦτο, καταμέμ-
[φε]ται "τί ὅ̣[cιόν ἐ]cτ̣ι̣;" λ̣[έ]γον[τα .....]ενο̣[.] περι[.....]α̣τατ[.]|cιν 710
[..... ..]ονα̣ι̣[.]ac τ[ὴν ἀcφ]ά̣λεια[ν] ἐξ ἀν[.....]ν εὐc̣[.]ου . αι[....]λ̣'
οὔτ' ἐ[τί]μηcαν̣ [...]ην c̣[...] φανε[..... .....]την λ̣[..... .....] καλῶc
[..... ....]καὶ αὐτ[....]ι̣ν πληcίον κα[.....]ν̣ πρα[τ]|τει[..... . τὰ] μέ- 720
γιcτα προ[....]διον εἰ μὴ διοικεῖται καὶ παντελῶc· μάλιcτα τοίνυν γ'
ο̣ἴ̣ομαι δεῖν μιcεῖν τοὺc ||

(*one word missing*) And so far are they[1] from giving the pure account 25
| in their writings about the gods that Metrodorus reproaches even 700
Socrates himself for saying, if indeed he did this,[2] to Plato's Euthy-
phro:[3] 'what is holy?'[4] (*6-8 words missing*) | safety from . . . nor did they 710
honour . . . (*12-14 words missing*) | the greatest things . . . if it[5] is not 720
administered in every way. Therefore I think it is especially necessary
to despise those (*continues on*)

[1] Non-Epicurean philosophers (cf. 520-45).

[2] i.e. Metrodorus said that Socrates was at fault if Plato's report (that Socrates said this) were true.

[3] i.e. the character Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue.

[4] Socrates' repeated request for a definition of holiness; see Plato, *Euthyphro* 5 C 8–D 7, 6 DE, etc.

[5] Or 'they', i.e. 'the greatest things'.

26 *N* 1098 fr. 13 (p. 128 G., 386 Ph.), *HV*² II 110

Test.: 730–47 Epic. *De gen. vitae* fr. 13 Us., Epic. Incertae sedis fr. 134 Arr.²

726 ἄλλην] Philippson: κατὰ τὴν] Anon. A: fort. ἑορτῶν] vel ἡμῶν] fin. ὡ[c Anon. A 727–37 fere omnia Bücheler, multa iam Quaranta (731, 733–7) 729 γε sscr. *N* χ ex λ *N* 730–1 φανε̣ί[ται voluit Diels p. 907 (= 309), spatio aptius 734 ωc[.]ου *N*, sed spat. vac. valde probabile: [κ']οὐ Quaranta 736 post δια, c puncto supra posito delevit *N* fin. supra c sscr. κα *N* 737 [αἰτίας suppl. Gomperz, iam Quaranta 737–8 προc-εύχεc|θαι Bücheler, unde edd.: -ευχοιc|θαι corr. in ευχειc|θαι *N* ut vid., ο interscribitur hastis duabus declinatis ex circuli arcu sup., fort. ε significat vel ο delevit 738–9 ἐν τῶι Περὶ |[βίων tit. suppl. Usener, unde Philippson, Schmid, recte opinor, cf. 896: ἐν τῶι Περὶ |[θ|εῶν Gomperz, θεῶν] iam Quaranta–Bücheler, sed divisio θ|εῶν quod sciam inaudita et βίων spatio aptius quam θεῶν 740 ἡμεί]ᾳ̣ Gomperz app. crit.:]αι *N*: coφί]αι Bücheler, unde edd. omnes 741 δυc]μενῶν Quaranta, spatio aptius quam ἀχθο]μένων Usener: λυπου]μένων Gomperz: μειου]μένων Bücheler: ὀργιζο]μένων vel θυμου]μένων Westman 1955, 201 n. 1: | ...]μενων *N* 742 init. suppl. Quaranta–Bücheler–Gomperz 748 ἵνα] *: ὧν] Diels p. 908 (= 310) 748–9 τά]c τε τελ{λ}ε̣[ι|ότητας Diels: γράψ]ας τε Philippson:]αστετελλο *N* vix sanata; parum veri similia πε̣ρὶ θε̣[ῶν coni. Philippson 749–50 χε̣ιν̣ώcκω|[μεν, γιγνώ-cκωμεν χε̣ιν̣ώcκω|[μεν καὶ *: χε̣ιν̣ώcκω |[καὶ τὰc Diels: ἀc]τε̣ικῶc *K*ω|[λώτης Philippson:]τοικωcκω|[..... .] *N* 751 cυνπερι]φοράc Diels fin. προc⟨τάττει⟩ add. Philippson vix credibile 751–3 * 753 ἐ]ᾳ̣ *:]αι male lectum pro]ν *N* τῶι πε|[ρὶ Philippson coll. 26–7 coniunxi

26

ἄλλην] θεωρίαν ὡ[c τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα ἱερ]ὰ παραβαίνοντας] ἢ διαγε̣λ̣ῶντας· ὁ δ'] Ἐπίκουρος φανήcεται] καὶ τετηρηκὼc ἅπαν]τα καὶ τοῖc φίλοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεγγυηκ]ώς, οὐ μόνον διὰ τ]οὺc νόμους ἀλλὰ διὰ [[c]] φυcει̣κὰ̣c αἰτίας·] προcεύχε{ι}cθαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ βίων] οἰκεῖον εἶναι ἡμεῖ]ᾳ̣ φηcιν, οὐχ ὡc δυc]μενῶν τῶν θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιήcομεν,] ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν ὑπερβ]αλλουcῶν δυνά]μει καὶ cπουδαιότ]ητι φύcεων ἵνα τά]c τε τελ{λ}ε̣[ι-ότητας] χε̣ιν̣ώcκωμεν καὶ] τοῖc νόμοις cυνπερι]φοράc· πρὸc τῶι γράφ]ειν δὲ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐ]ᾳ̣ τῶι Πε[ρὶ ||

1098 13 (5) (10) (15) (20) (25) (28)

||[ἄλλην] θεωρίαν ὡ[c τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα [ἱερ]ὰ παραβαίνον[τας] ἢ **26**
διαγελ̣ῶντας· |[ὁ δ'] Ἐπίκουρος φανή[cεται] καὶ τετηρηκὼc [ἅπαν]τα 730
καὶ τοῖc φί[λοις τ]ηρεῖν παρεγ[γυηκ]ώc, οὐ μόνον [διὰ τ]οὺc νόμουc
ἀλλὰ διὰ φυcικὰc [αἰτίας·] προcεύχεcθαι γὰρ ἐν τῶι Περὶ [βίων]
οἰκεῖον εἶναι |[ἡμεῖ]ν̣ φηcιν, οὐχ ὡc [δυc]μενῶν τῶν [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ 740
ποιή[coμεν,] ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν [ὑπερβ]αλλουcῶν [δυνά]μει
καὶ cπου[δαιότ]ητι φύcεων [ἵνα τά]c τε τελ{λ}ε̣[ιότητας] χιγγ̣ώcκω-
|[μεν καὶ]| τοῖc νόμοιc [cυμπερι]φοράc· πρὸc [τῶι γράφ]ειν δὲ καὶ 750
[τοῦτ' ἔ]ν̣ τῶι Πε[ρὶ]||

who transgress or mock other observance as they do the traditional **26**
rites. Furthermore, | it will appear that Epicurus loyally observed all 730
the forms of worship and enjoined upon his friends to observe them,
not only on account of the laws but for physical reasons[1] as well. For
in *On Lifecourses* he says that to pray is natural[2] | for us, not because the 740
gods would be hostile if we did not pray, but in order that, according
to the understanding of beings surpassing in power and excellence, we
may realize our[3] fulfilments | and social conformity with the laws. And 750
besides writing this as well, in *On Gods* (*continues on*)

[1] Literally 'for physical causes'.
[2] Or 'it is fitting (οἰκεῖον) for us to pray'.
[3] Or 'their', i.e. the gods'.

27 *N* 1077 fr. 12[1-2] (p. 106 G., 373 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 76

Test.: 753–73 Epic. *De dis* = fr. 386 Us., deest Art.[2]

754 *θεῶ*]*ν* *:]*η* *N* 754–5 *μέγιc*|[*τον* Gomperz 756 *τὸ*] *: *τι*] Usener]*καθη* *N*, iam *HV*[2] II: *κ*]*αθ' ἡγεμονίαν* Usener: *τὴν κ*]*αθηγεμονίαν* Gomperz 757 *ὑπερ*]*έχον* Usener: *cυνπερι*]*έχον* dubitanter Gomperz, spatio longius *εχον*[r] [1]*εχειν* *N* *ἔχειν* Gomperz: *ἐκεῖν*[ο Usener 758 *πᾶ*]*ν* *: [..]*αι* *N*: *εἶν*]*αι* Usener: *κ*]*αὶ* Gomperz: *ἔτι κ*]*αί* Tepedino 1991, 108 758–9 *cο*|[*φὸν* Gomperz 759–60 *ἁ*|[*γίο*]*υc* Diels p. 909 (= 311): *ἁ*|[*γν*]*ὰc* Usener: *ἁ*|[*κάκο*]*υc* spatio longius Bücheler–Gomperz 761–70 Bücheler 765 *cιν*[r] [1]*εν* *N* 770–1 *πί*[*c*]|*τει* *: *πᾴ*|*θει* Usener: *πι*| *ει* *N*, ut ante *ε* circuli arcus sin. sup. appareat nec quicquam obstet quin *θ* vel *c* sit, tamen vestigia superpositi vel supposititi adsunt, fort. *πί*|*c*⟨*τ*⟩*ει* legendum 771 *cφοδ*[*ρο*]*τέρως* Bücheler–Gomperz: *cφοδ*[*ρο*]*τέρωι* Usener: *cφοδ*[. .]*τερως* *N* 772 *κατα*-[*cχεῖν* Usener: *κατ' ἀ*[*νάγκη*]*ν* Gomperz: fort. *κατά*[*ληψι*]*ν* 772–3 fort. *τὴ*[*ν* | *θεοῖc* vel *αὐτῆι* (sc. *φύcει*) *cυνο*]*υc*[*ί*]*αν* *: *τὴ*[*ν* | *τῶν θεῶν*] (Gomperz) *ἀ*]*φθαρ*|[*cίαν* Usener 773 *ν* interscribitur hasta *N*[1], fort. delendum 774 *π*, pars dext. *π* *N*[1]:]*το* *N*[2] 778 fin. vel *πον* vel *πολ* *N* 781]*ταυτην* *N*[1]:]*ταυτη*[*N*[2] 781–2 *κα*]*τὰ τὴ*[*ν ἀρί*]*cτη*[*ν* | *καὶ*] *τὴν ἀληθινὴν* ||[*ὑπόληψιν* Philippson

27

θεῶ]*ν καὶ τὸ μέγιc-* 1077 12
τόν] *φηcι καὶ οἱονεὶ*
τὸ] *καθ' ἡγεμονίαν*
ὑπερ]*έχον ἔχειν*
πᾶ]*ν· πάντα γὰρ cο-* (5)
φὸν] *καθαρὰc καὶ ἁ-*
γίο]*υc δόξας ἔχειν*
περὶ] *τοῦ θείου καὶ*
μεγ]*άλην τε καὶ cε-*
μν]*ὴν ὑπειληφέ-* (10)
ναι] *ταύτην τὴν*
φύcιν· ἐν δ[*ὲ*] *ταῖc*
ἑορταῖc μ[*ά*]*λιcτ' ε*[*ἰ*]*c*
ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆc
βαδίζοντα διὰ τὸ (15)
τοὔνομα πάντα
ἀνὰ cτόμ' ἔχειν πί[*c-*
τει cφοδ[*ρο*]*τέρως*
κατα[*cχεῖ*]*ν τὴ*[*ν*
....]*νθ*[[*υ*]]*αι* (20)
....]*πο*
cε[..... ....] *καὶ*
π[..... ..... .] *καὶ*
χ[..... ....]*α*
λ[..... ..... .]*πολ* (25)
....]*ειγη-*
....]*τ*[.....]*ωι*
...]*ταυτην*[...]*ιτη*
...]*την ἀληθινὴν* || (29)
– – – – – – – – – – – –

|| θεῶ]ν̣ καὶ τὸ μέγιc[τόν] φηcι καὶ οἱονεὶ [τὸ] κ̣αθ' ἡγεμονίαν [ὑπερ]έ- **27**
χον ἔχειν [πᾶ]ν̣· πάντα γὰρ cο̣[φὸν] καθαρὰc καὶ ἁ|[γίο]υc δόξαc ἔχειν 760
[περὶ] τοῦ θείου καὶ [μεγ]άλην τε καὶ cε[μν]ὴν ὑπειληφέ[ναι] ταύτην
τὴν φύcιν· ἐν δ[ὲ] ταῖc ἑορταῖc μ[ά]λιcτ' ε[ἴ]c ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆc βαδί-
ζοντα διὰ τὸ τοὔνομα πάντα | ἀνὰ cτόμ' ἔχειν πί[c]τ̣ει cφοδ[ρο]τέ- 770
ρωc κατα[cχεῖ]ν̣ τὴ[ν ....]ν̣θαι[..... ....]π̣οcε[..... ....] καὶ
π[..... ..... .] καὶ χ[..... ....]αλ[..... ..... .]πολ[..... ..... .]
ειγη|[....]τ[.....]ωι̣[...]τατην̣[...]ι̣τη[...]την ἀληθινὴν || 780

he[1] says that as being both the greatest thing, and that which as it were **27**
excels in sovereignty, it possesses everything: for every wise man holds
pure and | holy beliefs about the divine and has understood that this 760
nature[2] is great and august. And it is particularly at festivals that he,
progressing to an understanding of it,[3] through having its name the
whole time | on his lips, embraces[4] with conviction more seriously ... 770
(*c.20 words missing*) | true ... (*gap of 1 col., c.90 words*) 780

[1] Epicurus. [2] Or 'this entity'. [3] i.e. of this 'nature' or 'entity'.
[4] Or 'embraces it', i.e. divine nature (the object may be supplied from above, or lost in what follows).

28 *N* 1098 fr. 12 (p. 127 G., 386 Ph.), *HV*² II 109

Test.: 785–810 Epic. *Ep. ad Physonem* fr. 169 Us., 93 Arr.²

783–4 fort. δυcκα[τ]ạν[οή]|⟨τ⟩ων 784–5 ẹ[ἰ]δέ[ναι ἐπινοί]|ας suppl. Philippson 785–6 Usener 786 [τῶι Philippson: [καὶ Usener 786–7 φυλάτ]|τειν Usener 787 suppl. Gomperz ante τειν punctum stichometricum in marg. indicavit *N* 788 iam Quaranta, Gomperz 789 τ[ινων Gomperz: π̣[ολλῶν Quaranta, fort. recte 790 νων^{r} ¹ου *N* 790–1 iam Quaranta 791–5 fere omnia suppl. Bücheler 793 fin. c[*N* 795 fin. spatium post ταιc impletur nota 796 fin.]τ[*N* 797 ec^{r} ¹επ *N* 797–8 de magistratu (289/8) vid. Dorandi, *ZPE* 84 (1990), T 19 802 [φησι] Bücheler: [αὐτῶι] suppl. Usener, Arr.² 803–4 με[τεcχηκέ]|ν̣[αι Bücheler: init. 804 init. αι[*N* 804–6 [κ]αὶ με[τὰ φίλων] | με[τεῖχε] γὴ Δ̣[ία καὶ]|| το[ύτων] suppl. Philippson, cf. 802–6 τῶν ἑορτῶν [καὶ vel φησι]|| πacῶν με[τέcχεν ἐν]|| αἷ[c] κ[oc]μί[ωc ἤcθη]|| με[γάλη]ν ἡδ[ονὴν]|| το[ῖc νέοις] τὴν τῶ[ν τούτοις] Χοῶν restit. Nilsson ap. Anon. A 806–10 fere omnia suppl. Bücheler 807 Χọ̣ῶν Bücheler: χεων *N* ante χεων punctum stichometricum in marg. *N* 808 init. ecυ *N* 809–10 τά[cτι]|κὰ *: μυcτήρια τὰ [ἅcτι]-|κὰ (sc. Διονύcια?) Usener, Arr.², Festugière: μυcτήρια τὰ [Ἄττι]|κὰ (sc. Ἐλευcίνια?) Bücheler, Gomperz, Philippson: τὰ [Ὀρφι]|κὰ Quaranta 810 ἄλ[λαc || τελετὰc μυούμενοc coni. Festugière, *Dieux*² 75 adn. 2, 88 adn. 6 coll. 28–9 coniunxi

28

οὐ]||κ ἐκ δυcκα[ ]λι̣[... 1098 12
ων c[.]δε[..... ...
ac τινων ἀμε[ίνο-
νας ἢ [τῶι φυλάτ-
τειν ἐνε[ρ]γε[ίαι (5)
τὰc ἐπινο[ίαc τῶν
θεῶν διά τ[ινων
χρόνων· οὐ [μόνον
δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδ̣ọ̣[γμάτι-
cεν ἀλλὰ καὶ δι[ὰ τῶν (10)
ἔργων αὐτῶν ε̣[ὑρίc-
κεται πάcαιc ταῖc
πατρίοιc ἑορταῖc >
καὶ θυcίαιc κε[χ]ρ̣[η-
μένοc. ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιcτ]ω- (15)
νύμου μὲγ γὰ[ρ] Φύρ-
cωνι περί τινοc αὐ-
τοῦ πολείτου Θεο̣-
δότου γράφων καὶ
τῶν ἑορτῶν [φηcι (20)
πacῶν με[τεcχηκέ-
ν̣[αι] κ[..]με[.....
με[...]ν̣ηα[.....
το[...] τὴν τω̣[ν
Χọ̣ῶν ἑορτὴν [cυν- (25)
εὸ̣ρτάζων καὶ [τὰ
μυcτήρια τἀ[cτι-
κὰ καὶ τὰc ἄλ[λαc || (28)

[οὐ]||κ ἐκ δυσκα[ ]λι[...]ων c[.]δε[..... ...]ας τινων ἀμε[ίνο]νας ἢ **28**
[τῶι φυλάτ]τειν ἐνε[ρ]γε[ίαι] τὰς ἐπινο[ίας τῶν] θεῶν διά τ[ινων]
| χρόνων· οὐ [μόνον] δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδο[γμάτι]σεν ἀλλὰ καὶ δι[ὰ τῶν] ἔργων 790
αὐτῶν ε[ὐρίς]κεται πάσαις ταῖς πατρίοις ἑορταῖς καὶ θυσίαις κε-
[χ]ρ[η]μένος. ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστ]ωνύμου μὲν γὰ[ρ] Φύρσωνι περί τινος αὐ|τοῦ 800
πολίτου Θεοδότου γράφων καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν [φησι] πασῶν με[τεσχηκέ]-
ν[αι] κ[..]με[.....]με[...]νηα[.....]το[...] τὴν τῶ[ν] Χο[ῶν ἑορτὴν
[συν]εορτάζων καὶ [τὰ] μυστήρια τά[στι]||κὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλ[λας]|| 810

... not from things[1] (*several words missing*)[2] of some things better than **28**
by effectively preserving one's conceptions of the gods during certain
| times.[3] And not only did he[4] teach these things but also by his very 790
deeds he is found to have taken part in all the traditional festivals and
sacrifices. In the archonship of Aristonymus,[5] for instance, writing to
Phyrson about a countryman of | his,[6] Theodotus, he[7] says that he 800
shared in all the festivals (*several words missing*), and that while he[8]
was joining in celebrating the festival of the Choes[9] and the urban myster-
ies[10] | and the other festivals[11] (*continues on*) 810

[1] Perhaps '(Epicurus says that) not from things (or: gods?) badly conceived ...'.

[2] Feminine accusative plural noun missing: possibly continues 'does he know the *causes* (*αἰτίας*) of some (things? gods? rites?) to be better (i.e. *φυσικάς*: see 736–7), as he does by effectively preserving ...'.

[3] i.e. at festivals and religious celebrations.

[4] Epicurus.

[5] 289/8 BC.

[6] Phyrson's. Both were originally from Colophon.

[7] Epicurus.

[8] Epicurus.

[9] At the Anthesteria, on which day (12 Anthesterion) the wife of the Archon Basileus was united in sacred marriage to Dionysus, and everyone got a personal *chous* or wine jar.

[10] i.e. the Attic Dionysia, probably either the Lenaea (in the month Gamelion) or the Lesser Mysteries celebrated during 20–6 Anthesterion, both in honour of Dionysus.

[11] Feminine plural: festivals (*ἑορτάς*), cf. 802, 807; possibly rites (*τελετάς*) or sacrifices (*θυσίας*).

29 *N* 1077 fr. 10[1-2] (p. 104 G., 371 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 74

Test.: 821–40 Epic. *Ep. ad Colotem* fr. 142 Us., 66 Arr.[2]

29

ἐπὶ τὸν τε]θλιμμένον 1077 10
δεῖπν]ον, αὐτόν τε
δεῖν τ]αὔτην ἄγειν
τὴν ταῖc] εἰκά⟨c⟩ι διαφό-
ροις εἰλ]αṗινα[c]ταῖc, (5)
τῶν κατὰ] τὴν οἰκίαν ὅ-
λως ὁcί]αν ἐπιλαμπρυ-
νάντω]ṿ, καὶ καλέcαν-
τα πάντ]ac εὐωχῆcαι·
μετ]ὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν (10)
ὅτι μ]ὲν ὅρκοις καὶ
θεῶν ἐπιρρήcecιν
ἐδοκίμαζον χρῆc-
θαι γελοῖον ὑπομι-
μνήcκειν, ἀναμέc- (15)
του τῆc πραγματεί-
ac τῶν τοιούτων
οὔcηc· προcῆκον
δὲ λέγειν ὅτι παρῆ-
νει ṭὰc δι' αὐτῶν καὶ (20)
τῶν ὁμοίων πε̣[ίc-
τειc φυλάττειν καὶ
μάλ[ι]cτα πάντων αὐ-
τῶι χ[ε] Δι[ὶ] φυλάττειν
τόνδε̣ τ̣[ὸν] φανερὸν (25)
τ̣ρόπ̣[ον,] καὶ οὐ γράφων
"ναὶ τ[ὼ] ὄζω{ι}" καὶ "τί γάρ;"
ἔμελε δὲ] καὶ Κωλώτηι
πάντω]ṿ τε ὅρκων καὶ
πάcηc] θε[[ν]]ολ⟨ο⟩γίαc· ἐπὶ || (30)

811 *ἐπὶ* vel *καὶ τὸν τε*]*θλιμμένον* *:]*ελιμ-μενον N*: *ἀλ*]*γλιμμένον* Diels p. 894 (= 296), sed vid. *Lex. Philod.* s.v. 812 *ἐπὶ δεῖπν*]*ον* spatio longius Diels: *Ἐπίκουρ*]*ον* Vogliano 812–13 *αὐτόν* (sc. Theodotum, vid. 800–1) *τε* |[*δεῖν* *: *αὐτὸν τε*|[*λε-τὴν* Vogliano: *αὐτόν* (sc. Epicurum) *τε* |[*ἑορτὴν* Diels, sed articulus deest 813 *τ*]*αύτην* sc. *ἑορτήν* (807) Gomperz, *υ* sscr. *N* 814 suppl. corr. Diels: fort. *cὺν τοῖc*] *εἰ καὶ κτλ.* 815 suppl. corr. Diels:]*τ*[ ]*ι-να*[ ]*ταιc N* 816 *τῶν κατὰ*] D. Sider privatim: *ἀξίως*] Diels: fort. *ἑορτὴν*] *τὴν οἰκίαν . . . ἐπιλαμπρυ*|[*ναντ*]*ᾳ* sc. Theodotum 816–17 *ὅ*|[*λως ὁcί*]*αν* *: fort. *ᾗ*|[*πὶ τὴν ὥρ*]*αν*: *ο*|[.....]*αν N*: *ὁ*|[*πώρ*]*αιc* Diels 817–18 *ἐπιλαμπρυ*|[*νάντω*]*ṿ* *, vestigio aptius quam *ἐπιλαμπρύ*|[*ναντ*]*ᾳ* (Gomperz): *ἐπιλαμπρύ*|[*ναντά τ*]*ᾳ* Diels: |[..... (.)]*ι N* 818–19 *καλέcαν*|[*τα πάντ*]*ac* Gomperz, unde Diels 820 *μετ*]*ὰ ταῦτα* *: *κατ*]*ὰ ταῦτα* Bücheler, Diels: *κατ*]*ὰ ταὐτὰ* Gomperz, Philippson 821 *ὅτι μ*]*ὲν* Gomperz: *ὅτι*] *ἐν* Bücheler 823 *ἐδοκίμαζ̣ον* voluit Diels 828 *cηc*[r] *ⁱπροc N* 830 corr. Bücheler: *νεγ-γαc N* 831–2 *πε̣*[*ίc*]|*τειc* Diels: *πc*[*N*: *πί*[*c*]|*τειc* Gomperz 834 *χ*[*ε*] *Δι*[*ὶ*] Diels: *τ*[.]*δι*[.] *N*: *τ*[*ῷ*] *δι*[*α*]*φυλάττειν* Bücheler, Gomperz: *αὐ*|*τῶ̣ δια-* Usener 835 *τόνδε̣ τ̣*[*ὸν*] Diels: *τονᾳ*[ ]*οι*[..] *N*[2]: *τονᾳ*[ ]*cι*[..] *N*[2], *HV*[2] II 836 *τ̣ρόπ̣*[*ον,*] *: *προτ*[.] *N*: *ὄρκο̣υ̣* Diels vix credibile, unde Philippson: *προτ*[*ρέψαc* Usener, spatium excedit 837 *τ*[*ὼ*{*ι*}] *ὄζω*{*ι*} (Dioscuri) Henrichs coll. Eur. *Hec.* 123f, cf. *Il.* 1. 235f: *ναιτ*[..]*οζωι N*[2]: *ναιτ*[..]*οξωι N*[1], *HV*[2] II, unde *ναὶ τ*[*ὴν Λ*]*οξώ*{*ι*} Usener, *ναὶ τ*[*ὼ φ*]*οξώ*{*ι*} Gomperz, *ναὶ—τ*[*ί λ*]*έξω*{*ι*} Diels, unde Philippson, Arr.[2] 837–8 *τί γάρ;* |[*ἔμελε δὲ*] Robert ap. Philippson: *τί γὰρ* |[*οὔ; ἀλλὰ*] suppl. Usener: *τί γὰρ* |[*ὅcιον*] Diels, unde Philippson, Arr.[2] 839 [*πάντω*]*ṿ* Diels: [*τὰc τῶ*]*ṿ* vel *δι*]*ᾳ̣* Usener (sc. *πίcτειc φυλάττειν*, cf. vv. 801–3) 840 *πάcηc*] Diels: *γράφων*] manu secunda *N*[1], vacat *N*[2], *HV*[2] II]*θενολιαc N*[1] (*θενονac HV*[2] II) primum *ν* puncto supra posito deletur, tum inter *λ* et *ια* conspicitur sscr. *ο* parvum, supra quod *γ* parvissimum scriptum est in *N*[1] et *HV*[2] II:]*θενολιαc* nullis punctis neque litteris superscriptis *N*[2]: *cυνθήκαc* coni. Usener fin. *ac*[r] *ⁱεπι N* coll. 29–30 coaluisse credebat Usener Epic. fr. 100 cf. 142: *ἐπι*|[*μελεῖcθαι cυνεβούλει* coni. Diels

|| ἐπὶ τὸν τε]θλιμμένον [δεῖπν]ον, αὐτόν τε [δεῖν τ]αύτην ἄγειν [τὴν ταῖc] εἰκά⟨c⟩ι διαφό[ροις εἰλ]απ̣ινα[c]ταῖc, [τῶν κατὰ] τὴν οἰκίαν ὅ[λως ὁcί]αν ἐπιλαμπρυ[νάντω]ν̣, καὶ καλέcαν[τα πάντ]ας εὐωχῆcαι· |[μετ]ὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν [ὅτι μ]ὲν ὅρκοις καὶ θεῶν ἐπιρρήcεcιν ἐδοκίμαζον χρῆcθαι γελοῖον ὑπομιμνήcκειν ἀναμέcτου τῆc πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων οὔcης· προcῆκον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι παρῄ|νει̣ τ̣ὰc δι' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων πί[c]τειc φυλάττειν καὶ μάλ[ι]cτα πάντων αὐτῶι χ̣[ϵ] Δι[ὶ] φυλάττειν τόνδ̣ε̣ τ̣[ὸν] φανερὸν τ̣ρόπ̣[ον,] καὶ οὐ γράφων "ναὶ τ[ὼ] ὄζω" καὶ "τί γάρ;" [ἔμελε δὲ] καὶ Κωλώτηι [πάντω]ν̣ τε ὅρκων καὶ |[πάcης] θεολογίαc· ἐπὶ ||

at a meagre dinner, and that it was necessary for him[1] to celebrate this feast of the twentieth[2] for distinguished revellers, while those in the house decorated it most piously, and after making invitations[3] to host a feast for all of them. | Now it would be absurd to relate in addition that they[4] thought it right to make use of oaths and epithets of the gods, since their philosophical writing is filled with them. But it is proper to say that he[5] advised | them to retain asseverations made by means of these and similar expressions, and above all to preserve those made by Zeus himself in this open manner,[6] and not writing 'by the twin shoots!'[7] or merely 'it must be so'. Moreover to Kolotes he took pains with regard to all forms of oaths and | speaking about the gods. And in the (*continues on*)

[1] Probably the Colophonian Theodotus (see 800–1).

[2] Epicurus' birthday, on which the school's most important festival celebrations were held.

[3] The same person celebrating the feast of the twentieth above, perhaps Theodotus (800–1). [4] Epicurus and his early followers. [5] Epicurus.

[6] lit. 'to preserve them for Zeus himself', i.e. to maintain the practice of swearing by Zeus (e.g. *νὴ Δία*).

[7] i.e. 'the twin offspring', a euphemistic reference to the Dioscuri by whom the oath was sworn without actually naming them.

30 *N* 1077 fr. 11[1-2] (p. 105 G., 372 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 75

Test.: 840–1, 865–70 Epic. *Ep. ad Polyaenum* fr. 157 Us., 86 Arr.[2] 841–64 Epic. *Ad Physonem* 2 sine numero (= Epic. Ep. *Ad ignotum* fr. 100 fr. 100 Us., 107 Arr.[2]) 841–5, 865–70 Polyaenus fr. 50 Tepedino

841 *Χαρί*[*νου* Gomperz de magistratu (291/0) vid. Dorandi, *ZPE* 84 (1990), T 15 842 *Διοτίμ*[*ου* Usener (285/4) Dorandi, *ZPE* 84 (1990), T 22: *διότι* Gomperz [*παραινεῖ*] suppl. Philippson: aut nomen latere amici quem litteris Epicurus adhortatus esset aut participium quale *παραινῶν* vel *παρεγγυῶν* censebat Usener 843–5 suppl. Usener: *τὴν κα*[*θαρᾶς τρα*]|*πέζης* Tepedino 847–8 *εὐω*]|*χήσει* Philippson: fort. *εὖ*]|*χῆς· εἰ δὲ* 850–1 *συν*-|*βι*]|*ώτας* Philippson: *ωταcαλ*[*N*[1]: *ωταοαν*[*N*[2] 852 *φ*[, pars sin. circuli *N*, possis *c*[854–5 fort. *οὐ μό*]|*νον*, respondet 865 *ἀλλὰ κα*[*ὶ* 856–7 *cω*]|*τὴρ* vel *μή*]|*τηρ*, *πα*]|*τήρ*, *Δημή*]|*τηρ* possis,]*τ* circuli arcus sup. *N* 860 fin. *ε*, tum sup. pars *τ*, *π*, *ξ*, *γ* *N* 865–6 *κα*[*ὶ πρὸς* Usener, *Πο*]|*λύαινον* Gomperz: *κα*[*ὶ κατὰ Πο*]*λύ*-|*αινον* Bücheler 866–7 *cυνεορτας*]|*τέα* Usener: *Πο*]|*λύαινον* [*καὶ Λεον*]|*τέα* iam Anon. A, Tepedino 867–8 *κἀν*-[*θεστήρι*]|*α* Philippson: *κἂν* [*Ἀνθεστήρι*]|*α* Usener 868 *γ* parvum sscr. post *και* *N* fin. *τῷ*[*ν θεῶν* Philippson: fin. *τῳ*[, una hasta, tum pars inf. circ. *N*, possis *ῳ*[*N* 869 *ἐπιμνηcτέ*[*ον* Philippson: fin. *κε*[*N* 870 *πολλῶν* [*ἀγαθῶν* Philippson

30

δὲ *Χαρί*[*νου καὶ ἐπὶ* 1077 11
Διοτίμ[*ου παραινεῖ*
τὴν κα[*θ' ἱερᾶς τρα*-
πέζης [*cυνθήκην μὴ*
παραβαί[*νειν· καὶ* (5)
μὴν τι[..... .....
πολλα[..... . *εὐω*-
χήσει δὲ [..... ...
νων κα[..... ....
ογμωνο[.... *cυνβι*- (10)
ώτας ἀλ[..... ....
μεγαλοφ[*ρ*..... .
φιλοcο[*φ*..... ..
ταὐτὸν [..... ....
νον τη[..... ..... (15)
τωι θελ[..... ..
τηρ φη[..... ....
τ' ἔcεcθα[*ι* ..... .
τηι κατ[..... ....
θεῶν ἐπ[..... ... (20)
των καὶ δ[..... ...
νεναι τ[..... ...
κατατρ[..... ...
ναι cυντ[..... ..
ἀλλὰ κα[*ὶ πρὸς Πο*- (25)
λύαινον [*cυνεορτας*-
τέα κἀν[*θεστήρι*-
α· καὶ γ'ὰρ τῷ[*ν θεῶν*
ἐπιμνηcτέ[*ον* .....
τον πολλῶν [.....|| (30)

|| δὲ Χαρί[νου καὶ ἐπὶ] Διοτίμ[ου παραινεῖ] τὴν κα[θ' ἱερᾶς τρα]πέζης [συνθήκην μὴ] παραβαί[νειν· καὶ] μὴν τι[..... .....] πολλα[..... . εὐω]χήσει δὲ [..... ...]νων κα[..... ....]|ογμωνο[.... συμβι]ώτας ἀλ- [..... ....] μεγαλοφ[ρ..... .] φιλοσο[φ..... ..] ταὐτὸν [..... ....]νον τη- [..... .....]τωι θελ[..... ..]τηρ φη[..... ....] τ' ἔσεσθα[ι ..... .]τηι κατ[..... ....]|| θεῶν ἐπ[..... ...]των καὶ δ[..... ...]νεναι τ[..... ...]κατατρ[..... ...]ναι συντ[..... ..]ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ πρὸς Πο]λύαινον [συνεορτας]τέα κἀν[θεστήρι]α· καὶ γὰρ τῶ[ν θεῶν] ἐπιμνηστέ[ον .....]|τον πολλῶν [.....]||| 30 850 860 870

in the archonship of Charinus[1] and in that of Diotimus[2] he warns against violating the covenant of the sacred festival table. | (*about 55 words, syntax unclear*) But also writing to Polyaenus that the Anthesteria too must be celebrated and that it is necessary to make mention of the gods (*one word missing*) | of many . . . 30 850 870

[1] i.e. in a letter of Epicurus', dated 291/0 BC.
[2] In another letter of Epicurus', dated 285/4 BC.

31 *N* 1098 fr. 11 (p. 126 G., 385 Ph.), *HV*² II 108

Test.: 879–96 Epic. fr. 387 Us., 114 Arr.² (Ep. ad ignotum) 896–8 Epic. *De gen. vitae* fr. 12 Us., 10.3 Arr.²

31

γ[..... .... 1098 11
ρα[..... ....
δη φύc[ιν τὴν κατὰ
τὸ κρ[ιτήριον ποι-
ουμένη[ν ὀρθῶc ἐπί- (5)
νοιαν ὠ[φελείας νομί-
ζεcθαι· [ἵνα δὲ μὴ
ἐκτείνῳ [τὸν λόγον,
πάλιν· "ἡμ[εῖc θεοῖc
θύωμέν" φηcιν ["ὁcί- (10)
ως καὶ καλῶc οὗ [καθ-
ήκει κα[ὶ κ]αλῶ⟨c⟩ πάν-
τα πράττωμεν [κα-
τὰ τοὺc νόμουc, μ[η-
θὲ[ν] ταῖc δόξαιc α[ὐ- (15)
τοὺc ἐν τοῖc περὶ
τῶν ἀρίcτων κ[αὶ
cεμνοτάτων δια-
ταράττοντ᾽ε[c· ἔτι
δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι θύω- (20)
μεν ἀφ᾽ ἧc ἔλε[γον δό-
ξηc· οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν-
δέχεται φύc[ιν θνη-
τὴν ὁμοίω[c τῶι Διῖ
νὴ{ι} Δία ⟨διά⟩χειν, [ὡc φαί- (25)
νεται·" κἀν [τοῖc Πε-
ρὶ βίων δὲ π̣[ερὶ τῆc
προcκυνή[cεωc ..|| (28)

873–5 Philippson 876 ὠ[φελείας suppl. * 876–7 *νομί*]|*ζεcθαι* *: *ὀνομά*]-|*ζεcθαι* Philippson 877–8 *ἵνα μὴ*]|*ἐκτείνῳ* in hiatu Gomperz: [δέ] * 878 [*τὸν λόγον* *: [*ἐν ταὐτῶι* Philippson 879 *πάλιν ἡμ*[*εῖc* iam Quaranta, Bücheler [*θεοῖc*] Diels p. 895 (= 298): [*μὲν οὖν*] Bücheler: [*γοῦν*] Usener: [*δ᾽ ἄν*] Quaranta 880–2 [*ὁcί*]|*ωc* Diels 881–9 omnia iam Bücheler 882 *κα*[*ὶ κ*]*αλῶ*⟨*c*⟩ Bücheler, unde Arr.²: *κα*[..]*αλωπαν* *N*: *κα*[*ὶ τ*]*ἀλλ̣α* Gomperz, unde Usener, Diels, Philippson 885 *α*[*ὐ*]|*τοὺc* Usener, unde Diels: *α*[*ὐ*]|*τοὺc* Bücheler, Gomperz, unde Philippson, Arr.² perperam pro *α*[*ὐ*]-*τοὺc* ('turbarci') 886 fin. *περη* *N* 887 fin. *γ*[*N*: *κ̣*[*αὶ* Bücheler–Gomperz, unde edd.: *ἢ* [*τῶν* vestigio aptius Quaranta 889 post *τ*, ante lacunam *ε* sscr. *N*, quo *εcετι* correctum fuisse pro *εcτι* putavit Usener 889–91 *ἔτι*]| *δὲ καὶ δίκαιο*[*ι ὡ*]|*μεν* suppl. Usener, spatio brevius: *θύω*]-|*μεν* vel *θύο*]|*μεν* *: *ἔτι*] (*εἶναι*] Philippson) | *δὲ καὶ δίκαιό*[*ν φα*]|*μεν* Diels 890–2 *ἀφ᾽ ἧc ἔλε*[*γον δό*]|*ξηc* Usener, unde edd., sed non *δόξηc* sed *ὑπολήψεως* aut *λόγου* expectaveris: *περὶ*]| *μὲν ἀφῆc ἔλε*[*γεν ἔ*]*ξῆc* Bücheler: fort. *θύω*]|*μεν ἀφ᾽ ἧc* (sc. *δόξηc*, vid. 885) *ἔλε*[*γον ἔ*]|*ξῆc* 892 fin. Bücheler 893 *φύc*[*ιν* Diels: *φύc*[*ιc* Bücheler: *φυc*[*ικῶc* Usener 893–4 *θνη*]|*τὴν* Diels 894 *την* *N*: *ζῆν* coni. Usener *ὁμοίω*[*c* Usener, *ὁμοίω*[*c Διῖ* spatio brevius Diels: *ὁμοίω*[*c θεῶι* Diano 895 *νὴι*, *νὴ* *νὴι Δία* ⟨*διά*⟩*χειν* *: *νηιδια-ξειν* *N*: *νὴι Δία ζ̣ῆν* Diels, unde Philippson, Arr.²: *κοι*]|*νῆι διάξειν* Gomperz: *διάγειν* aut *διαζῆν* coni. Usener app. crit. 895–6 *ὡc φαί*]|*νεται* Diels, *φαί*]|*νεται* iam Usener 896 *ται*[.]*καν* *N*, sed spat. vac. valde probabile *κἀν* [*τοῖc* *: *κἀν* [*τῶι* Bücheler 896–7 *Πε*]|*ρὶ βίων* Bücheler 897 *δὲ π̣*[*ερὶ τῆc* Diels: *δετ*[*N*: *δέ φ*[*ηcι περὶ*] Philippson, unde Arr.²: *δευ*[*τέρωι*] spatio brevius Bücheler, unde Usener 897–8 *τῆc*]| *προcκυνή*[*cεωc*] Diels: *τὴν*]| *προcκύνη*[*cιν* Bücheler: *περὶ*]| *προcκυνή*[*cεων*] Philippson, Arr.²: *προcκυνή*[*cεcθαι θεούc φηcι τὸν cοφόν*] Usener incertum num verba 882 *καὶ*, 889–92 *ἔτι* ... *δόξηc*, et 895–6 *ὡc φαίνεται* Epicuro tribuenda sint

|| γ[..... ....]ρα[..... ....]δη φύc[ιν τὴν κατὰ] τὸ κρ[ιτήριον 31
ποι]ουμένη[ν ὀρθῶc ἐπί]νοιαν ὠ[φελείας νομί]ζεcθαι· [ἵνα δὲ μὴ]
ἐκτείνῳ [τὸν λόγον,] πάλιν· "ἡμ[εῖc θεοῖc]| θύωμέν" φηcιν ["ὁcί]ωc 880
καὶ καλῶc οὗ [καθ]ήκει κα[ὶ κ]αλῶ⟨c⟩ πάντα πράττωμεν [κα]τὰ τοὺc
νόμουc, μ[η]θὲ[ν] ταῖc δόξαιc α[ὐ]τοὺc ἐν τοῖc περὶ τῶν ἀρίcτων κ[αὶ]
cεμνοτάτων διαταράττοντε[c· ἔτι]| δὲ καὶ δίκαιο[ι θύω]μεν ἀφ' ἧc 890
ἔλε[γον δό]ξηc· οὕτω γὰρ [ἐν]δέχεται φύc[ιν θνη]τὴν ὁμοίω[c τῶι Διΐ]
νὴ Δία ⟨διά⟩χειν, [ὡc φαί]νεται·" κἀν [τοῖc Πε]ρὶ βίων δὲ π[ερὶ τῆc]
προcκυνή[cεωc ..]||

(c.*6 words missing*)[1] to conceive of their[2] nature as accurately constitut- 31
ing the notion of benefit according to the epistemological standard.
And, lest I extend my discussion, again: 'Let us sacrifice | to the gods', 880
he[3] says, 'devoutly and fittingly on the proper days, and let us fittingly
perform all the acts of worship in accordance with the laws, in no way
disturbing ourselves with opinions in matters concerning the most
excellent and august of beings. Moreover, | let us sacrifice justly, on the 890
view that I was giving. For in this way it is possible for mortal nature,
by Zeus, to live like Zeus, as it seems.' And concerning obeisance[4] in
On Lifecourses[5] . . .

[1] Probably from a letter to Polyaenus (see 865). Understand: 'Epicurus said that it is necessary for us to conceive', etc.

[2] The gods'.

[3] Epicurus, probably in the same work.

[4] Commonly in the form of kisses thrown to statues of gods when passing temples.

[5] A quotation from Epicurus followed.

32 *N* 1077 fr. 9[1–2] (p. 103 G., 370 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 73

899–925 multa restit. Diels p. 908 (= 310) 902–3 Philippson 904–5 οἱ]|*κεῖα* Anon. A 905–6 Anon. A 907–8 *τοῖς νό[μοις cυμπε]|ριφορὰ c[ύμφωνος* Anon. A 909 *περὶ τελε̣ c[τῶν καθαρ]|μοῦ* spatio longius Philippson *περιγελος N*[1]: *περιγελ[ ]c N*[2] 910–11 vel *θεί]|ων ἀγαλμάτ[ων* 911 *ἀγαλμάτ[ων* Gomperz *cέ]|βε[c]θα̣ι* Philippson: *βε[(.)]ε[ ]ν* vel *[ ]α̣ι N* 913 *μ[ὴ τε]τ̣ε[λεcμένον]* Philippson 917–18 ***: *ἀ[ληθεῖ]| θεωρίαι* spatio brevius Philippson 919 *πacαν N*[1], *HV*[2] II: *πaoαν N*[2] 920–1 Philippson 922 *νοιαι*[r] [1]*κα N*: *ἐπί]νοιαν* Gomperz 922–3 Philippson 923 *Ἐπί[κουροc* Philippson 923–5 *δαι]|μονίως* Gomperz, *ὠ[φέλειαν* Philippson: *τῶι δαι]|μονίῳ C ω[κράτης εὐ]|φημεῖν* Anon. A, tamen in v. 925 possis *ἐ]|φ' ἡμεῖν* vel *]|ν ἡμεῖν* 927 *μ[* vel *ν[N*

32

καὶ ἀπὸ τῆc [..... 1077 9
δόξης οὐ[.... .
νομενο[..... ..
τεθεώρηται [...ce-
μνωματ[..... ... (5)
τωι τῆς [..... .. οἰ-
κεῖα περι[... τοῦ
τελεῖν [τὰ ἱερὰ ...
τον νο[.... cυμπε-
ριφορας[..... .. (10)
περὶ τελε̣c[τῶν ....
μου καὶ [..... . θε-
ῶν ἀγαλμάτ̣[ων cέ-
βε[c]θα̣ί φη[cι....
μ̣[...]χε[..... .. (15)
.....]ιμ[..... ...
.....]φυc[....ερ-
γαζομ[..... ....
μένην α[ὐτὴν τῆι
θεωρίαι [χρῆcθαί φη- (20)
cιν εἰc πᾶcαν [....
τὴν cυνή[θειαν τῆς
τοῦ δαίμονος [ἐπι-
νοίας κα[ταλαμβά-
νων ἐπι[..... . δαι- (25)
μονίως ω[..... . εὐ-
φημεῖν ο[..... ...
ειν προcφερ[.....
ὅcην δημ̣[..... ..|| (29)

|| καὶ ἀπὸ τῆc [.....]| δόξης οὐ[..... .]νομενο[..... ..] τεθεώρηται [... 900 **32**
cε]μνωματ[..... ...]τωι τῆc [..... .. οἱ]κεῖα περι[... τοῦ] τελεῖν [τὰ
ἱερὰ ...]τοῠ νο[.... cυμπε]ριφορας[..... ..] περὶ τ̣ε̣λ̣ε̣c[τῶν ....]|μου 910
καὶ [..... . θε]ῶν ἀγαλμάτ̣[ων cέ]β̣ε[c]θ̣αί̣ φη[cι....]μ̣[...]χ̣ε[..... .....
..]ιμ[..... ....]φυc[....ερ]γαζομ[..... ....]μένην α[ὐτὴν τῆι]
θεωρίαι [χρῆcθαί φη]cιν εἰc πᾶcαν [....]| τὴν cυνή[θειαν τῆc] τοῦ 920
δαίμονος [ἐπι]νοίας κα[ταλαμβά]νων ἐπι[..... . δαι]μονίως ω[..... .
εὐ]φημεῖν ο[..... ...]ειν προcφερ[.....] ὅcην δημ̣[..... ..]||

... and from the (*one word missing*) | opinion (*several words missing*) has 900 **32**
observed divinity (*several words missing*) natural[1] things concerning the
enactment of sacred rites (*one word missing*) social convention (*one word*
missing) concerning initiates[2] | (*two words missing*) statues of the gods he 910
says that he reveres (*several words missing*) he says that he employs
observance in every | natural conception of god taking up (*one word* 920
missing) divinely (*one word*) to speak auspiciously (*several words missing*)

[1] Or 'fitting'. [2] Or 'priests'.

33 *N* 1098 fr. 10 (p. 125 G., 384 Ph.), *HV*² II 107

Test.: 929–45 Epic. fr. 99 Us., 115 + 106 Arr.² (Ep. ad ignotum) 932–45 Polyaenus fr. 51 Tepedino 945–57 Epic. fr. 168 Us. (adn.), 95 Arr.²

928 δ *Μ̣η*[τροδώρωι spatio brevius Philippson, fort. *Μ̣η*[τροδώρωι δὲ: οαλη[*N* 929–32 suppl. corr. Gomperz 930–1 ουκαθεc *N*: ἃ⟨ν⟩ θέc|θαι Usener, unde Arr.²: οὐ καθ⟨ί⟩ec|θαι Anon. A 931 fin. ειλο[*N* post 932 paragraphus in margine *N* των[ ]και fin. καὶ *Π̣*[ολυαίνωι Tepedino: καὶ *π̣*[άλιν spatio brevius Gomperz, *Hermes*, 5 (1871), 394, unde edd.: καιη[*N*: καὶ *Η*[ροδότωι Philippson 933–7 Gomperz 934 fin. μ[*N* 938–9 Gomperz, de magistratu (291/0) vid. Dorandi, *ZPE* 84 (1990), T 16 939 τῆ[ι] φ[ιλί]|αι Philippson post 940 paragraphus in margine *N* φί[λων] αὐτῶν dubitanter Gomperz app. crit. 941–5 nondum sanata: omnino improbandum quod coni. Usener longius spatiis nec aptum vestigiis 941 μεν[όντων Philippson qui corr. θεcτω (*N*) in θεῷ̣ν vix credibile: [τὸ ἀπα]θὲc Usener 942–3 ἅπαν [χαρίεν] κε[κυ]|ρίωτ[αι παντὸ]c Philippson: ἅπαν[τος τοῦ] κε[χα]|ριc̣μ̣[ένον τι ἢ ἄλγο]c Usener 943–5 ἔ]ξωθ[εν iam Gomperz, ἔ]ξωθ[εν ἐ]πιφέρον|[τ]ός [τι] Philippson, ἐ]πιφέρον|[τ]ος iam Usener 945 [ὁ δ᾽] *: [ὁ δὲ] Usener ἀ]δελφὸc iam Bücheler 945–51 fere omnia Bücheler 945–6 ἀ]δελφὸc (sc. Neocles), α[ὐτ]οῦ (sc. Epicuri) 950–1 ἀρ[γυ]|ρείου Diels p. 896 (= 298) 951 init. θείου proposuit Gomperz fin. [θεοῖc Diels: fort. [θεῶν vel [ἡμεῖν 952 Diels p. 896 (= 298) 953 post ιδιω spatiolum *N* 953–4 γρά]|φων (sc. ἀδελφός) 954–6 Bücheler 955 init. ante cω punctum stichometricum in margine *N* fin. Κολοφ[ώ|νιον dubitanter Usener, Bücheler, Gomperz app. crit.: Κολος[cι|κὸν Gomperz: [.. circuli pars sin. aptior ad φ quam c *N* 956 ἄν]δρα Gomperz 956–7 καὶ οὐ[δε|νὸc κατὰ] τὰ πολ[ιτι||κὰ δεύτερον] Usener: [δεύτερον ὄντα] Diels p. 896 (= 298)

33

οαλη[..... ..... 1098 10
"κἂν πόλ[ε]μ[oc ἦι,
δεινὸν οὐκ ἃ⟨ν ἔ⟩c̣εc-
θαι, θεῶν εἱλε̣[ων ὄν-
των". καὶ *Π̣*[ολυαίνωι· (5)
"καθαρὰν τ̣[ὴν ζωὴν
διηχέναι κ̣[αὶ διά-
ξειν cὺν αὐτ[ῶι
Μάτρωνι, θε[ῶν εἱ-
λεων ὄντων". [καὶ (10)
πρὸc τὸν αὐτὸν [ἐ-
πὶ Χαρίνου· "τῆ[ι] φ[ιλί-
αι φί[λων] αὐτῶν·"
μεν[....]θεcτω[ ]
απαν[....]κε[..] (15)
ριωτ[..... ...]c ἔ-
ξωθ[εν ἔ]πιφέρον-
τ]oc· [ὁ δ᾽ ἀ]δελφὸc
α[ὐτ]οῦ [κ]αὶ ζηλωτὴc
καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐcχη- (20)
κὼc ἐν τοῖc λόγ[οις
π]ροκοπὴν φη[cιν
"εἶναι τὴ[ν] ἀπ᾽ ἀρ[γυ-
ρείου β[ο]ήθειαν [θεοῖc
ὁcίωc δέον [ν]έμ[ειν", (25)
οὐ πρὸc ἰδιώτη[ν γρά-
φων ἀλλὰ πρὸc Φ[ύρ-
cω[να] τὸν Κολοφ[ώ-
νιον, ἄν]δρα καὶ οὐ[δε-
νὸc κατὰ] τὰ πολ[ιτι- || (30)

|| οαλη[..... .....] "κἂν πόλ[ε]μ[ος ᾖι,]| δεινὸν οὐκ ἂ⟨ν ἔ⟩ςεσθαι, θεῶν 930 **33**
ἱλε̣[ων ὄν]των"· καὶ Π̣[ολυαίνωι·] "καθαρὰν τ̣[ὴν ζωὴν] διηχέναι κ̣[αὶ
διά]ξειν σὺν αὐτ[ῶι] Μάτρωνι, θε[ῶν ἵ]λεων ὄντων"· [καὶ] πρὸς τὸν
αὐτὸν [ἐ]πὶ Χαρίνου· "τῆ[ι] φ[ιλί]|αι φί[λων] αὐτῶν·" μεν[....]θεστω 940
απαν[....]κε[..]ριωτ[..... ...]c ἔξωθ[εν ἐ]πιφέρον[τ]ος· [ὁ δ' ἀ]δελ-
φὸς α[ὐτ]οῦ [κ]αὶ ζηλωτὴς καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐςχηκὼς ἐν τοῖς λόγ[οις
π]ροκοπήν φη[σιν]| "εἶναι τὴ̣[ν] ἀπ' ἀρ[γυ]ρίου β[ο]ήθειαν [θεοῖς] 950
ὁςίως δέον [ν]έμ[ειν",] οὐ πρὸς ἰδιώτη[ν γρά]φων ἀλλὰ πρὸς Φ[ύρ]-
cω[να] τὸν Κολοφ[ώνιον, ἄν]δρα καὶ οὐ[δενὸς κατὰ] τὰ πολ[ιτι-]||

(*several words missing*) 'Even[1] if there should be war, | it would not be 930 **33**
terrible, if the gods are propitious'; and to Polyaenus:[2] that he has 'lived
and would continue to live a pure life with Matron himself,[3] if the
gods are propitious'; and to the same in the archonship of Charinus[4]
that 'in friendship | with these being friends' (*several words missing*) 940
imposing/applying (it) from without. And his brother,[5] an admirer
and advanced student of his,[6] says | 'it is necessary to distribute piously 950
assistance from our money for the gods', writing not to a layman but
to Phyrson the Colophonian, a man (*one word missing*) than no one[7] in
political affairs.

[1] Epicurus quoted from a letter to Metrodorus. Supply 'he said, "even if . . ."'.
[2] Understand 'and he writes to Polyaenus'.
[3] A slave-chaperon (*παιδαγωγός*) in the Epicurean community at Athens.
[4] 291/0 BC. [5] Neocles: see above 165, D.L. 10. 3.
[6] Literally 'having achieved miraculous or marvellous (*δαιμόνιον*) advancement in his (presumably Epicurus') teachings'.
[7] Presumably 'a man second to none in political affairs'.

34 *N* 1077 fr. 8[1-2] (p. 102 G., 370 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 72

Test.: 959–77 Metrodorus, *Adv. Euthyphr. Platonis* (deest Körte)

958 Philippson 959 *κἀν τῶι*] suppl. Philippson 959–60 *πρὸς τὸν Εὐ*|[*θύ-φρο*]*να* Gomperz, sed titulum non intellexit, ut vid. 961 *: *φηcὶν*] Philippson 961–2 *: *προcη*|[*νεῖc* Philippson 963 Philippson 964 init. Gomperz fin. non liquet, fort. supra vel subter positum 965 una hasta inclinata ad dext. sup., *κ* aptius quam *ς N*: *καὶ* Philippson 966 *νοήμα*]*τι* Philippson 966–7 Philippson 968–70 Bücheler 968 *ο*, circuli arcus sup. 969 fin. *υ* puncto supra posito deletur *N*[1], *HV*[2] II: *υ* sine puncto *N*[2] 970 *μνημηντης N*[1]: *μνημη*[.]*της HV*[2] II: *μνημη*[.]*υης N*[2] 971 *φύ*]*cεως* Bücheler: *αἱρέ*]*cεως* Philippson spatio longius: fort. *ῥή*]*cεως* 972 post *κα* spat. vac. *N* 973 init. *ι*, *τ*, *π*, *ν N* fin. *ν N*[1]: *ι N*[2] 975–7 Philippson 975 fin. *τςα N* 984 vel *γν*]*ηcίως* Gomperz app. crit. 986 *τὸ*]*ν θ*[*εὸν*] *ὑμν*[*εῖ*] Philippson

34

καὶ περὶ] *τῶν θεῶν* 1077 8
ἐν τῶι] *Πρὸς τὸν Εὐ-*
θύφρο]*να λέγων*
ὁcίους] *ἡμᾶc προcή-*
κειν γ]*ίνεcθαι καὶ* (5)
μνήμ]*ηι τῶν ἀγα-*
θῶν τῶν] *ἀπὸ διεντη*
.....]*.αι τοῦ θεοῦ*
..... .]*τι καὶ πράτ-*
τοντας] *κατὰ τὸ διὰ* (10)
τῆc] *θεολογία*[*c*] *οὐ-*
cιῶδεc ἔργον καὶ [[*υ*]]
μνήμην τῆς ἀρίcτης
φύ]*cεως κατὰ φύcιν*
....]*υ κα*[ ] (15)
. [..... ..]*ν τοῦ α*[ ]
ρ[..... .]*ν καὶ πρὸc*
τὸ cέ]*μνωμα τὸ ἅ-*
γιον καὶ] *τὸν cεβαc-*
[*μόν*] (20)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (25)
[..... ..]*κ*[..... .]
.. *παραπλ*]*ηcίως* [..
....] *καὶ c*[...
..]*νε*[...] *ὑμν*[...|| (29)

||[καὶ περὶ] τῶν θεῶν [ἐν τῶι] *Πρὸς τὸν Εὐ*|[*θύφρο*]να λέγων [ὁςίους] 960 **34**
ἡμᾶς προσή[κειν γ]ίνεσθαι καὶ [μνήμ]ηι τῶν ἀγα[θῶν τῶν] ἀπὸ διεντη
[.....].αι τοῦ θεοῦ [..... .]τι καὶ πράτ[τοντας] κατὰ τὸ διὰ [τῆς]
θεολογία[ς] οὐσιῶδες ἔργον καὶ | μνήμην τῆς ἀρίστης [φύ]σεως κατὰ 970
φύσιν [..... .....]υ κα . [..... ..]ν τοῦ αρ[..... .]ν καὶ πρὸς [τὸ σέ]-
μνωμα τὸ ἅ[γιον καὶ] τὸν σεβασ[μόν ....
.... | ....]κ[..... ... 980
παραπλ]ησίως [..... .....] καὶ ς[.....]νε[...] ὑμν[...]||

. . . concerning the gods in *Against the* | *Euthyphro*, saying[1] that it is 960 **34**
fitting for us to become holy and in memory of goods from (*one word missing*) of the god (*one word missing*) according to its essential effect, through speech about the divine, and | recollection of the finest being 970
according to nature (*several words missing*) toward holy divinity and its worship (*18-20 words missing*) | similarly (*several words missing*) hymn 980
(*gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

[1] i.e. Metrodorus. Cf. above, 703-8.

35 *N* 1077 fr. 7[1-2] (p. 101 G., 369 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 71

Test.: 993–1001 Hermarchus fr. 30 Longo

987 Philippson 988–9 Gomperz 990–1 deesse videtur titulus, κἀ]ν τῶι πε|[ρὶ αἰcθήcεω]ν Philippson 992 δεῖν cέβεc]θαι· κα[ὶ Philippson: θαι[ ]και *N*[1]: θαι[.]και *N*[2] 993 init. [βίβλον] Philippson Ἕρμα]ρχός γε Gomperz:]ρκοcγε *N*: γά|[γραφε Philippson 994]μ *N*, possis]ν vel η: πε]ρὶ τιμῆc Gomperz 994–5 θε|[ῶν cυνέ]γραψεν Gomperz: θε-|[ῶν· δc] ἔγραψ' ἐν Philippson 995–6 ἄλ|[ληι ὑπὲρ ἑ]κε[ί]νηc Philippson 997 [ταὐτό] Philippson 997–8 πε]ρὶ γὰρ Ἐπι|[κούρ]ου [πο]λλὰ λέ⟨γ⟩ων Gomperz 999 ἐν] τῶι Gomperz 1000 τ]ῶι Philippson, Longo: [.]ωι *N*: τ]ῶ̣ι falso Gomperz, Krohn 1000–1 Πρὸ[c Ἐ]μπεδο̣|[κλ]έα̣ egregie Gomperz:]μπεδc |[..]cδ *N* 1001 [κ]α̣ὶ Philippson: [.]ν possis 1002–3 verbum dicendi et infinitivus latent: μ]ὴ κε[ναῖc δόξαιc | φηcὶ cυνέχ]εc[θαι Philippson, sed post εc lacunam non indicavit *N*, *HV*[2] II 1004]τ̣, hastae pars τ sup., non c *N*]α̣ὶ̣ν[, post α supra lineam hastae pars inf., velut litt. ι̣ vel τ̣ vel υ̣ inter lineas scr. *N* 1006 deperiit 1007 post μ lunulae vestigium apparet, velut]μc̣[, fort. με̣ vel μο̣ *N* 1008 [κ]άν [τῶι] Philippson spatio brevius 1010–12 Philippson 1010–11 fort. τηλι̣-κ[ού]|του 1011 cεμνότη|τι Gomperz: cεμνότη|τα̣ Bücheler 1012 τιμ̣[ήcεω]c̣ Philippson: τιτ[*N*],᾽ circuli arcus dext. inf.,]c̣ fin. post ουδεν spat. vac. *N* col. 35, primum denominata fr. 6 sed in fr. 7 correcta a *N*[1], et col. 36, primum denominata fr. 7 sed in fr. 6 correcta a *N*[1], coniungendae sunt ut τοιού|των legas, in eodem apographo in ordine delineatae

35

..... ἑ]κεῖν[ο]c κα- 1077 7
....]ν τῶν ἀγα-
θῶν τὰc] ἐλπίδαc
.... ἑ]ν τῶι πε-
ρὶ ....]ν ὁcίωc (5)
....]θαι· κα[ὶ
.... Ἕρμα]ρχός γε
....].. τιμῆc θε-
.....ἑ]γραψεν ἄλ-
ληι ὑπὲρ ἑ]κε[ί]νηc (10)
ταὐτό· πε]ρὶ γὰρ Ἐπι-
κούρ]ου [πο]λλὰ λέ⟨γ⟩ων
ἐν] τῶι τελευταίωι
τ]ῶι Πρὸ[c Ἐ]μπεδο̣-
κλ]έα̣ [κ]α̣ὶ τὸ τοῦτον (15)
μ]ὴ κε[..... .....
....]εc
...]τ̣οcε[.]α̣ὶ̣ν[.]λ̣ων
...]ρικτ[...]ε[.]εικ
[ ] (20)
....]μο̣[.....
....]αν[.....
.]ν[.....]μαν προc-
εδοξάζετο τὴν κ[.]
τοῦ θ[εο]ῦ cεμνότη- (25)
τι τ[....]. οὐδέν
τινος [.....]ν νομί-
ζειν τ̣[....] τοιού- || (28)

||[..... ἔ]κεῖν[ο]c κα[..... ..]ν τῶν ἀγα[θῶν τὰc] ἐλπίδαc |[..... ... ἔ]ν τῶι πε[ρὶ ....]ν ὁcίωc [..... ....]θαι· κα[ὶ .... Ἕρμα]ρχόc γε [..... ..] .. τιμῆc θε[.....ἔ]γραψεν ἄλ[ληι ὑπὲρ ἑ]κε[ί]νηc [ταὐτό· πε]ρὶ γὰρ Ἐπι[κούρ]ου [πο]λλὰ λέ⟨γ⟩ων [ἐν] τῶι τελευταίωι |[τ]ῶι Πρὸ[c Ἐ]μπεδο[κλ]έα [κ]αὶ τὸ τοῦτον [μ]ὴ κε[..... ....]εc[...] τοcε[.]αιν[.]λων [...]ριcτ[...]ε[.]εις[..... ....]μο[..... ....]αν[..... .]ν[.....]μαν προc|εδοξάζετο τὴν κ[.] τοῦ θ[εο]ῦ cεμνότητι τ[....]. οὐδέν τινοc [.....]ν νομίζειν τ[....] τοιού- ||

... he (*one word missing*) expectations of goods | (*one word missing*) in his *On* (*title missing*) piously (*2–3 words missing*). Indeed, of honour (*several words missing*) Hermarchus also wrote the same thing about it elsewhere. For saying many things concerning Epicurus in the final book of his | *Against Empedocles*, also that he is not (*20–5 words missing*) | to believe in addition the holiness of the god in no respect of some honour (*one word missing*) to think (*one word missing*) of such things (*continues on*)

990 **35**

1000

1000/1010

36 *N* 1077 fr. 6$^{1-2}$ (p. 100 G., 369 Ph.), *HV*^{2} II 70

Test.: 1031–5 Epic. *Ep. ad Men.* 123–4 1043–9 Epic. *De dis* (desunt Us., Arr.^{2})

36

1015 των ἀλλ[..... ... 1077 6
οἰκεῖον ἐ̣[..... ...
ἑορταῖc .[..... ..
πᾶcθαι κ[..... . ἐ-
πινοια[ ]c[..... ... (5)
1020 cυνπερι[λαμβά-
νουca μα[..... ..
κατὰ τὸ c[έμνωμα·
τὸ δὲ περ[αίνεcθαι ὠ-
φελ̣είας ἐκ [θεῶν τοῖc (10)
1025 ἀγαθοῖc κα̣[ὶ βλάβας
τοῖc κακ[οῖc κατα-
λείπουci[ν· καὶ τοῖc
μὲν φρον[ίμοις καὶ
δικαίοις τ̣[ὸ τελει- (15)
1030 οῦcθαι νοη̣[τέον
καὶ τὰc ὠφ[ελίας καὶ
τὰc βλάβα̣[c οὐ κατα-
δεεcτέρα̣[c ἢ καὶ
μείζους ὦ̣[ν ἄνθρω- (20)
1035 ποι cυνάπ[τουcιν,
ο]ὐ κατ᾽ ἀcθέ[νειαν, οὐ-
δὲ καθάπερ [ἡμεῖν ἐκ
το[[.]]῟ῦ̓ θεοῦ τι[νος δέ-
ον κἂν ἐπα[ναχω- (25)
1040 ρήcει τῆc [ὀνήceως
αὐτοῦ, καὶ τ[αὐτά
φ]ακι cεμνό̣[τατα.
ἔν τε γὰρ τ[ῶι Περὶ
θεῶν ποία [τίc ἐc- || (30)

1016 Philippson: fort. ε[ἶναι 1017 .[una hasta inclinata ad dext. sup. μ̣[vel ν̣[vel τ̣[*N* 1017–18 fort. ἀγα]||πᾶcθαι 1019 post πινοια spatiolum *N*, possis ἑ]||πινοία[ι]c 1020–1 Gomperz: cυνπερι-[λαμβα]||νούca⟨c⟩ Philippson 1021 μᾶ[λλον ἢ Philippson 1022 *: τὸ c[έβεcθαι Philippson post 1022 paragraphum indicavit *N*^{1} 1023 περ[αίνεcθαι Philippson 1022–35 virorum doctorum supplementa exscripsit Longo, *Vichiana*, 14 (1985), 239 1023–4 ὠ|φε-λ̣είας Gomperz: φενας *N* 1024–7 Gomperz 1027 -cι[ν * 1027–8 Philippson 1029–30 τ̣[ὸ τελει]||οῦcθαι *: τ̣[ελει]||οῦcαι W. Schmid, *RM*^{2} 94 (1951), 104, unde Longo: ο̣[μοι]||οῦcθαι spatio brevius Philippson, unde Diano, *SIFC*^{2} 12 (1935), 71: fin. post δικαιοις ante lacunam una hasta paulum inclinata ad dext. in sup. part. *N*, possis λ, minus probabile α, δ, ν 1030 Philippson 1031 ὠφ[ελίας καὶ Bücheler, Gomperz, unde Diano, *Ethica*, 106: ὠφ[ελίας ἀλλὰ Philippson, Diano, *SIFC*^{2} 12 (1935), 71: Schmid, qui post ὠφ[ελίας interpunxerunt: ὠφ[ελίας]| τὰc Longo 1032 βλάβα̣[c κατα- Gomperz, unde edd., [οὐ] L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: post βλάβας commate interpunxit Diano, *Ethica*, unde βλάβα̣[c δὲ κατα- Longo, obstat tamen v. 1031 init. καὶ, cum καὶ . . . καὶ expectares 1033 κατα]||δεεcτέρα̣[c Gomperz [ἢ καὶ Philippson, edd. omnes: fort. ἀλλὰ καὶ 1034–5 ὦ̣[ν ἄνθρω]||ποι *: τ̣ο̣[ῖc κα]|ποί⟨c⟩ spatio brevius nec aptum vestigiis Philippson, unde edd. coll. *Ep. ad Men.* 124 1035 cυνάπ[τουcιν Philippson: cυνάπ[τεcθαι Diano, Longo: cυνάπ[τειν proposuit Schmid 1036 Philippson 1037 [ἡμῖν Philippson, [ἡμεῖν ἐκ * 1038 litteram a librario deletam, fort. ν, tum sscr. υ indicavit *N*^{1} τοῦ θεοῦ Gomperz, post το spatium inepte interposuit *N*^{2} θ, οεου *N* 1038–9 τι[νος δέ]||ον Philippson 1039–40 ἐπα[ναχω]||ρήcει *: ἐπ᾽ ἀ[πο]||ρήcει fort. spatio brevius Philippson: ἐπα[πο]||ρήcει D. Delattre privatim 1040 [ὀνήceως vel [χάριτος vel [ὠφελίας * 1041 τ[αὐτά *: τ[οῦτο Philippson 1042 φ]ακι Gomperz cεμνό̣[τατα *: cέμνω[μα spatio brevius Philippson: ω̣[ut post ν lunulae sin. vestigium appareat, ο̣[, ε̣[possis 1043–4 τ[ῶι Περὶ]| θεῶν Gomperz ποία [τίc ἐc]||τιν suppl. et coll. 36–7 coniunxi

|| *των ἀλλ*[..... ...] *οἰκεῖον ἐ*[..... ...] *ἑορταῖc* .[..... ..]*πᾶcθαι κ*[..... 36
. *ἔ*]*πινοια*[ ]*c*[..... ...]|| *cυμπερι*[*λαμβά*]*νουca μα*[..... ..] *κατὰ τὸ* 1020
c[*έμνωμα·*] *τὸ δὲ περ*[*αίνεcθαι ὠ*]*φελίαc ἐκ* [*θεῶν τοῖc*] *ἀγαθοῖc κα*[*ὶ βλάβαc*] *τοῖc κακ*[*οῖc κατα*]*λείπουci*[*ν· καὶ τοῖc*] *μὲν φρον*[*ίμοιc καὶ*] *δικαίοιc τ*[*ὸ τελει*]|*οῦcθαι νοη*[*τέον*] *καὶ τὰc ὠφ*[*ελίαc καὶ*] *τὰc βλά-* 1030
βα[*c οὐ κατα*]*δεεcτέρα*[*c ἢ καὶ*] *μείζουc ὦ*[*ν ἄνθρω*]*ποι cυνάπ*[*τουciν, ο*]*ὐ κατ' ἀcθέ*[*νειαν οὐ*]*δὲ καθάπερ* [*ἡμεῖν ἐκ*] *τοῦ θεοῦ τι*[*νοc δέ*]*ον κἀν ἐπα*[*ναχω*]||*ρήcει τῆc* [*ὀνήcεωc*] *αὐτοῦ, καὶ τ*[*αὐτά φ*]*αci cεμνό*[*τατα*]. 1040
ἔν τε γὰρ τ[*ῶι Περὶ*] *θεῶν ποία* [*τίc ἐc-*]||

(*several words missing*) fitting[1] at festivals (*several words missing*) a notion 36
| encompassing (*one word missing*) in keeping with its divinity. And for 1020
the production of benefits from the gods for good people and harms for bad people they[2] allow. And for the wise and just it must be conceived | that benefits and harms which are no feebler[3] or even 1030
greater[4] than people in general suppose[5] are made complete,[6] not out of weakness or because we have need of anything from God, even in | return for his benefit,[7] and these things they[8] say most piously. And in 1040
On Gods what kind of (*continues on*)

[1] Or 'natural'.
[2] Epicurus and his earliest followers, the *kathegemones*, rather than Epicureans in general.
[3] Literally 'more deficient', 'weaker'.
[4] Literally 'no weaker or even greater', perhaps in chiasmus with 'benefits and harms', i.e. 'no weaker (harms) or even greater (benefits)'.
[5] Literally 'attribute', 'attach', i.e. to the gods.
[6] i.e. 'are accomplished', 'fulfilled'.
[7] Possibly 'of (his) benefit here' (*αὐτοῦ*).
[8] The *kathegemones*.

37 *N* 1098 fr. 9 (p. 124 G., 383 Ph.), *HV*² II 106

Test.: 1045–9 Epic. *De Nat.* 12 fr. 85 Us., 135 Arr.² 1050–4 *De Nat.* 13 fr. 88 Us., 28 Arr.² 1055–63 *De Nat.* 35 fr. 91 Us., 33 Arr.² 1062–7 Epic. *De fat.* fr. 23 Us., 14 Arr.², Diog. Laert. *Vitae* 10. 28 1066–72 Epic. *Epp. ad Magn.* fr. 104 Us., 100 Arr.²

1045 *: *τιν' αἰτίαν* [*βλάβης* Usener: [*ὠφελίας* Bücheler 1046–51 Bücheler 1051–2 *περ[ὶ* ⟨*φύσε|ως λέγει περὶ*⟩ *τῆς*] Philippson, sed numerus libri solus sine titulo in 523–4, 1708–9 1052 *ἧ[ν πρός* Gomperz 1053 Bücheler 1054 Gomperz 1055–6 *πέ[μπτωι καὶ* L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: *πε[ντεκαι]-|τριακ[ος]τῶ[ι* Usener: *με[* *N* 1056 init. *κρ-* *N*, corr. Usener 1057–8 suppl. Sedley, *CErc* 4 (1974), 91 1059–62 *νομί||ζον[τες* dubitanter Usener: *σώι]-|ζον[τες αὐτοὺς] καὶ | τῶν ἄλλω[ν σωτῆ-ρες]|| γ[ίνοντ]α[ι* (sc. di sese tuentes hominum rerumque tutores fiunt) coni. Philippson satis subtiliter ratiocinatus 1062–3 [*κ*]*ἀν* | *τ*[*ῶι*] Bücheler 1063 [*γε*] Usener 1063–4 *Π*]*ερὶ τῆς εἰ-|μ[αρμέ]νης* Bücheler 1065 *ἐκ[είν]ων* Gomperz app. crit. *συνεργία*[*ς*] corr. Bücheler: *εργιδ*[*N* 1066 post *ται* spatiolum *N* 1067–9 Bücheler 1068 fin. *τρο*[*N* 1069 fin. *ον*[*N* 1070–2 *αὐ*[*τ*|*ο τ*]*οῦτο* Gomperz, at divisio quod sciam inaudita: *αυ*|[.]*ουτο* *N* 1072 f. *πρὸς τοὺς* |||[*φίλους* Anon. A: *πρὸς τοὺς* |||[*μεγάλους αὐτὸν πεπλασμένως λέγειν*] coni. Usener: *πρὸς τοὺς* |||[*ἔξω πεπλασμένως εἰπεῖν, προσθήσω*] Philippson

37 1045 *τιν αἰτία ν[εμέσεως* 1098 9
καὶ σωτηρία[ς ἀνθρώ-
ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα-
ταλειπτέον ὑπ[ογρά-
φει διὰ πλεό[νων· (5)
1050 *ἔν τε τῶι τρε[ισκαι-*
δεκάτωι περ[ὶ τῆς
οἰκειότητος ἧ[ν πρός
τινας ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ
τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος· (10)
1055 *ἐν δὲ τῶι πέ[μπτωι καὶ*
τριακ[ος]τῶ[ι φησι,
σὺν τῶι τι [ταύ]της
τῆς ὠφελ[ίας] δια-
σ[α]φεῖν, κ[α]ὶ διότ[ι νομι- (15)
1060 *ζον[..... ...] καὶ*
τῶν αλλα[..... ..
γ[..... .]α[...κ]ἀν
τ[ῶι δὲ Π]ερὶ τῆς εἰ-
μ[αρμέ]νης ὑπὲρ τ[ῆς (20)
1065 *ἐκ[είν]ων συνεργία[ς*
ἀποφαίνεται· κἀν
ταῖς ἐ[πι]στολα[ῖ]ς
μ]έντοι ταῖς Πρὸ[ς
τοὺς μεγάλους ὁμ[ο- (25)
1070 *λογεῖν ἔοικεν αὐ-*
τ]ό· ⟨το⟩ῦτο δ' ἵνα μή τ[ις
εἴπῃ πρὸς τοὺς || (28)

|| τιν αἰτία ν[εμέσεως] καὶ σωτηρία[ς ἀνθρώ]ποις διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ κα]τα- 37
λειπτέον ὑπ[ογρά]φει διὰ πλεό[νων·]| ἔν τε τῷι τρε[ισκαι]δεκάτωι 1050
περ[ὶ τῆς] οἰκειότητος ἣ[ν πρός] τινας ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει καὶ] τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ό-
τητος·] ἐν δὲ τῶι πέ[μπτωι καὶ] τριακ[ος]τῶ[ι φησι,] σὺν τῶι τι
[ταύ]της τῆς ὠφελ[ίας] διασ[α]φεῖν, κ[α]ὶ διότ[ι νομι]|ζον[..... ...] 1060
καὶ τῶν αλλα[..... ..]γ[..... .]α[...κ]ὰν τ[ῶι δὲ Π]ερὶ τῆς εἱμ[αρμέ]-
νης ὑπὲρ τ[ῆς] ἐκ[είν]ων συνεργία[ς] ἀποφαίνεται· κἀν ταῖς ἐ[πι]στο-
λα[ῖ]ς [μ]έντοι ταῖς Πρὸ[ς] τοὺς μεγάλους ὁμ[ο]|λογεῖν ἔοικεν αὐ[τ]ό· 1070
⟨το⟩ῦτο δ' ἵνα μή τ[ις] εἴπῃ πρὸς τοὺς ||

source of retribution and preservation for humans through the deity 37
must be accepted he[1] outlines in some detail. | And in book 13[2] he 1050
speaks concerning the affinity or alienation which God has for some
people. And in book 35,[3] in addition to clarifying somewhat this
benefit, he says that even on account of | thinking (*5–7 words missing*). 1060
And in his book *On Destiny* there is an exposition concerning the
assistance[4] provided by them.[5] And in his letters to important indi-
viduals he is seen to pronounce | consistently on this point; but in 1070
order that someone may not say this to the[6] (*probably continues on*)

[1] Epicurus. [2] Of *On Nature*. [3] Of *On Nature*.
[4] To humans. [5] The gods. [6] Or 'against the'.

38 *N* 1077 fr. 4$^{1-2}$ (p. 98 G., 368 Ph.), *HV*^{2} II 68

Test.: 1077–87 auct. inc. op. inc. liber 6; 1087–99 auct. inc. op. inc. liber 8 1089–99 Polyaenus *Adv. De philosophia Aristotelis* (cf. fr. 29 Tepedino) 1099–1108 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.93, Hermarchus *Adv. Emped.* fr. 27 Longo,

1074 vestigia minima: ἀ]βλ[αβεῖc Philippson 1077 ὁμοί]ωc Philippson: fort. παραπλησί]ωc 1078–9 numerum libri intellexit Bücheler 1079 Philippson: κ pars extrema dext. *N*^{1}:]c *N*^{2}: κο]λάζε-c[θαι Anon. A 1080].[, inf. sin. pars arcus, e.g. ọ, ẹ, ῳ, θ 1080–2 fort. τοὺc π]ονη[ρ]ο[ὺc] καὶ |[βλάβας παρα]cτήcα̣γ-|[τας spatio et sententiae aptum:].[, ῳ vel ọ 1082–90 omnia Bücheler 1087 νουc^{r} ^{1}[.]αι *N*^{1} 1088–9 ante καί interpunxi 1090 fin. Gomperz 1091 fin. *: [καὶ ὂν Gomperz 1092–3 ἐ[ν τῶι]| πρώ[τωι Gomperz: ἐ[ν τῆι]| πρώ[τηι] πρ[αγματείαι spatio longius Philippson 1093–4 Πρ[ὸc τὸ D. Delattre privatim: πρώ[τηι] χρ[αφῆι Longo, *Vichiana*, 14 (1985), 238: πρ[*N*: πρ[αγματείαι spatio longius Philippson Πε]|ρὶ φιλο-coφί[ac Bücheler: φι[*N*^{2}: φ[nescioqua re *N*^{1} 1094–5 Ἀριc]|τοτ[έλ]ουc R. Janko privatim: αὐ]|τοτ[ελ]οῦc[αν Philippson 1095–6 τὴν τού]|των *: ἡδο]νῶν Philippson 1096 τ]ῶν Philippson ἀ[γαθῶν *: α̣[, λ̣[, δ̣[vel pars. sin. μ *N*: μ̣[εγίcτων Philippson 1097 ἡμε[ῖν vel ἡμε[ῖc Gomperz 1097–8 ἀπε]|φήν[α]τ̣' εἶνα[ι] τ[ὴν suppl. Philippson, sed fin. 1098 τ[....| 1099 cιν^{r} ^{1}ε[*N* 1099–1100 nomen Hermarchi intellexit et Ἑ[ρ-μαρ]|χός θ' ὁμ[οί]ωc suppl. Diels, *Dox. Gr.* p. 127 1100–1 penitus obscurum, latet veritas: fort. ε̣[ὐερ]|⟨γ⟩έτη[c]αν (Anon. A): θ[εὶ]|ο̣τ̣έ[ρ]αν conieci *CQ*^{2} 38 (1988), 430 1101 ψυχὴν ἐκ Diels: ψυχηι[ ]ςκ *N*, ς ut circuli arcus extrema sin., possis ψυ-χῆι [τ'] ἐκ coll. 38–9 coniunxit Diels, iam in eodem in ordine delineavit *N*^{1}, in duobus apographis disiunxit *N*^{2}, *HV*^{2} II

38

..... .]ιτ[..... . 1077 4
..... .]βλ[αβ ....
..... .]ο[....]τουc
..... .]ατουc μο-
..... . ὁμοί]ωc καὶ (5)
ἐν τῶι] ἕκτω[ι π]ερὶ
τοῦ δι]κ̣άζεc[θαι
.....]ονπ[.].[.]και
....]ctηcδα[.]
..... κ]αὶ εὐόρκουc (10)
καὶ δι]καίουc ταῖc ἀ-
ρ]ίcταιc διαδόcε-
cι] κινεῖcθαι καὶ πα-
ρ' αὐτοὺc καὶ παρ' ἐ-
κείνουc· [κ]αὶ παρα- (15)
π]ληcίωc ἐν τῶι ὀγ-
δόωι· καὶ τὴν ὠφε-
λίαν τ[ί]θενται [τὸν αὐ-
τὸν τ[ρ]όπον, [ὅνπερ
Πολύ[αι]νοc ἐ̣[ν τῶι (20)
πρώ[τωι] Πρ[ὸc τὸ Πε-
ρὶ φιλοcοφί[ac Ἀριc-
τοτ[έλ]ουc [τὴν τού-
των [τ]ῶν ἀ̣[γαθῶν
αἰτίαν ἡμε[ῖν ἀπε- (25)
φήν[α]τ̣' εἶνα[ι] τ[ὴν
θείαν φύcιν, Ἑ[ρμαρ-
χός θ' ὁμ[οί]ωc c̣[...
ετη[.]αν ψυχὴν ἐ̣κ || (29)

||[..... .]ιτ[..... ....]βλ[αβ ....]ο[....]τουc[..... .]ατουc 38
μο[..... . ὁμοί]ωc καὶ [ἐν τῶι] ἕκτω[ι π]ερὶ [τοῦ δι]κ̣άζεc[θαι | .....] 1080
ονπ[.].[.]και[..... ..]cτηcδα[..... κ]αὶ εὐόρκουc [καὶ δι]καίουc ταῖc
ἀ[ρ]ίcταιc διαδόcε[cι] κινεῖcθαι καὶ παρ' αὐτοὺc καὶ παρ' ἐκείνουc·
[κ]αὶ παρα[π]λησίωc ἐν τῶι ὀγδόωι· καὶ τὴν ὠφε|λίαν τ[ί]θενται [τὸν 1090
αὐ]τὸν τ[ρ]όπον, [ὅνπερ] Πολύ[αι]νοc ἐ[ν τῶι] πρώ[τωι] Πρ[ὸc τὸ
Πε]ρὶ φιλοcοφί[ac Ἀριc]τοτ[έλ]ουc [τὴν τού]των [τ]ῶν ἀ[γαθῶν] αἰ-
τίαν ἡμε[ῖν ἀπε]φήν[α]τ' εἶνα[ι] τ[ὴν] θείαν φύcιν, Ἑ[ρμαρ]|χόc θ' 1100
ὁμ[οί]ωc ς̣[...]ετη[.]αν ψυχὴν ἐκ ||

(*10–12 words indistinguishable*) similarly in Book 6[1] concerning adjudi- 38
cation[2] | (*6–8 words missing*) and that those[3] who are oath-keeping and 1080
just are moved by the most virtuous influences[4] both from their own
selves and from those.[5] And similarly in book 8;[6] and they[7] define the
notion of | benefit[8] in the same way as Polyaenus in the first book of 1090
his *Against Aristotle's On Philosophy* declared his opinion that divine
nature is the cause for us of these goods; and | similarly Hermarchus 1100
that[9] (*two words missing*) soul from (*continues on*)

[1] Probably of Epicurus' *On Nature*.
[2] Or 'forensic speaking'.
[3] A reported statement. Understand '(he says) that oath-keeping and just persons are ...'.
[4] Literally 'vibrations' or 'repercussions', used of earthquakes, hence 'tremors': Epic. *To Pythocles* 105–6, cf. Lucr. 6. 546–7.
[5] The gods.
[6] Understand '(He speaks) similarly in Book 8' (probably Epicurus in *On Nature*: see n. 1).
[7] Epicurus' early followers, the *kathegemones* (see above, p. 139 n. 1).
[8] i.e. benefit from the gods to humans.
[9] i.e. 'declared that', supplied from 1097–8 above.

39 *N* 1077 fr. 5[1-2] (p. 99 G., 369 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 69

Test.: 1099–1108 Hermarchus fr. 27 Longo

1102–3 *: πο̣[λλῆι χρῆς]|θαι cυνέ̣[cει Krohn Hermarchus fr. 32: fort. πο̣[λλὴν ἔχες]|θαι cυνε̣[ργίαν 1103 [κἀν] Philippson 1104–5 Πρὸ̣[c Krohn: πρω[*N*: [ἐν]| τῆι πρώ[τηι Πρὸς Ἐμπεδο]-|κλέα Bücheler, spatio longius, unde Diels (*Dox. Gr.*, p. 127), Longo: ἐν]| τῆι πρώ[τηι Πρὸς Πυθο]|κλέα dubitanter Gomperz 1105 πρ[ώτηι (sc. ἐπιστολῆι) Krohn: πρ[*N*: χρ[αφῆι Longo: πρ[αγματείαι Bücheler 1106–7 ο̣ἰ[κειότ' ἔ]|χειν *: εἰ[ρήνην παρ-ἔ]|χειν Philippson: εἰ[δῆcιν παρέ]|χειν Krohn vix credibile 1107 χουν *N* 1107–8 suppl. Gomperz–Krohn, valde probabile: ἐν[ίοις καὶ τὸ Krohn 1108 ἐναντί[ον Gomperz [ἄλλοις] Krohn: ἐναντί[ων λόγων Quaranta 1109–29 nihil hic discerni potest nisi verba singula 1114 γ[vel pars sin. π 1117–18 προc[κυ]|νήcειc iam Quaranta 1118–19 Bücheler: καὶ [πάcας]| τὰc τιμὰc [cιγῶ Quaranta 1119–20 [θεοῖc προcή]κειν οὐδὲ Philippson: ἔ]|κείνου δὲ iam Quaranta, Gomperz 1121 δεῖν αἰ[τεῖν Philippson: δ' εἶναι Gomperz 1122–3 κ̣[ἀν τῶι Πρὸc]| διαλεκτ[ικοὺc Philippson 1123–4 *: τὰc ἀρ- Philippson 1124 vel]μοc εἰc ἐ̣ρ[τὰc fin. εc[*N*[1]: εο[*N*[2] 1127 εμο[*N* 1127–8 ἐγὼ]| δὲ Philippson 1128–30 supplevi 1129 ἡγοῦμαι Gomperz, *N*[1]: ηγουμαγ[*N*[2] [τόνδε τὸν suppl. e.g. et columnas 39–40 coniunxi

39

θεῶν πο̣[λλὰ κἀγα- 1077 5
θὰ{ι} cυνέ̣[χειν, κἀν
τῆι Πρὸ̣[c Ἐμπεδο-
1105 κλέα πρ[ώτηι γραφῆι
τὴν ο̣ἰ̣[κειότητ' ἔ- (5)
χε̣ιν ἐν̣[ίοις καὶ τὸ
ἐναντί[ον ἄλλοις.
τω[..... ....
1110 τα[..... ....
τ[..... .... (10)
ω[..... ....
[ ]
οιγ[..... ....
1115 .]ν[..... ....
τας κα[..... .... (15)
δ' εὐχὰc καὶ προc[κυ-
νήcειc καὶ [τοιαύ-
τας τιμὰc [θεοῖc προcή-
1120 κειν οὐδε[..... ..
δειναι[..... .... (20)
ταύτας α[..... ..
διαλεκτ[.... ἐφαρ-
μόcειc ἐ̣ρ[τῶν ...
1125 μόνον οὐ̣[..... ..
ουμεν [..... .... (25)
αν ο̣μο[..... . ἐγὼ
δὲ τοὐναντίον [οὐχ
ἡγοῦμαι [τόνδε τὸν || (28)

|| θεῶν πο[λλὰ κἀγα]θὰ συνέ[χειν, κἀν] τῆι Πρὸ[ς Ἐμπεδο]κλέα 39
πρ[ώτηι γραφῆι] τὴν οἰ[κειότητ' ἔ]χειν ἐν[ίοις καὶ τὸ] ἐναντί[ον ἄλ-
λοις.] τω[..... ....]|τα[..... ....]τ[..... ....]ω[..... 1110
....]οιγ[..... ....]ν[..... ....]τας κα[..... ....]
δ' εὐχὰς καὶ προς[κυ]νήσεις καὶ [τοιαύ]τας τιμὰς [θεοῖς προσή]|κειν 1120
οὐδε[..... ..]δειναι[..... ....] ταύτας α[..... ..] διαλεκτ[.... ἐφαρ]μό-
σεις ἐρ[ρτῶν ...] μόνον οὐ[..... ..]ουμεν [..... ....]αν ὁμο[..... ..ἐγὼ]
δὲ τοὐναντίον [οὐχ] ἡγοῦμαι [τόνδε τὸν]||

gods derives many goods, and, in the first book of his *Against Em-* 39
pedocles, that they[1] have affinity for some and the opposite for others.[2]
| (c.*30 words missing*) that prayers and obeisances and such honours for 1110
the gods are fitting, | and not to (*several words missing*) adaptations of 1120
festivals (*several words missing*) But I by contrast do not think that this
(*continues on*)

[1] The gods (the subject must be supplied from context).
[2] Compare Epicurus' *Letter to Menoeceus* 124.

40 *N* 1098 fr. 8 (p. 123 G., 383 Ph.), *HV*² II 105

Test.: 1130–56 Epic. fr. 38 Us.

40

τρόπον [διὰ τὰ τοι- 1098 x
αῦτ' ἀνο[cίως ἐ]ξελέc-
θαι τὴν πᾶcαν ὁcιό-
τητα cὺν τῶι [τὰ κοι-
νὰ φυλάττειν, ὡ[c (5)
δ' οἱ λεγόμε[νοι δει-
cιδαίμονες, εἰ[c ἀνυ-
πέρβλητον ἀ[cέβει-
αν ἐκβάλλειν. [ὅcιοc
γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[acίαν (10)
κα[ὶ τ]ὴν ἄκραν μα-
κα[ριότητ]α τοῦ θ[ε]οῦ
cῴ[ιζων cὺ]ν ἅπαcι[ν
τ[οῖc cυ]ναπτομ[έ-
νο[ιc ἡμῖν· ἀ]cεβὴc δὲ (15)
περ[ὶ θεὸ]ν ὃc ἑκά[τε-
Λ· ρον [ἐξορ]ί̣ζει μέν,
ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶc
ὀργῆ̣[c καὶ] χάριτοc
ἀcθενούcηc τὰc ἐ- (20)
ξ αὐτοῦ παρακε̣[υὰc
τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ
τῶ̣[ν κακ]ῶν ἀπο[φαί-
νετ' [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν ἀν-
θρω̣[πείω]ν μηδ[ε- (25)
νὸ[c προc]δεῖcθαι [ ]
.....c]υντε[λ....
..... .]μουc[....
....]οπα[.....
cιν [.....]υγ[....||

1130–1 διὰ τὰ τοι]|αῦτ' ἀνο[cίως Usener: τοι]|αῦτα νο[εῖ Philippson: -αυτα νό[μουc Quaranta 1131–2 ἐ]ξελέc|θαι Bücheler ap. Usener:]ξ pars sup., τ, π, γ, ξ: τε]τε-λέc|θαι iam Quaranta, Gomperz: ἀποτε]τε-λέc|θαι Bücheler 1133 των[*N*, corr. Bücheler 1133–4 τὰ κοι]|νὰ suppl. Bücheler 1134 ὡ[c suppl. Usener: fin. τειν[.]ω[. *N*, sed fort. post τειν spat. vac. 1135–7 Gomperz 1135 ο̣ vel c, ε̣, θ 1137–8 ἀ[cέβει]|αν Usener 1138 ἐκ-βάλλειν Gomperz: εκβαλλειν[*N*: ἐκβάλ-λο̣υ̣c̣ιν Philippson fin. [ὅcιοc D. Delattre privatim: [οὐ spatio brevius Usener 1139–41 Bücheler 1142 cῴ[ιζων cὺ]ν ἅπαcι[ν Usener 1142–4 τ[οῖc cυ]ναπτομ[έ]|νο̣[ιc Usener: ἁ]|| τ[αύταιc (sc. ἀθανακίᾳ καὶ μακαριότητι) cυ]ναπτο-μ[ενι]|| ἀ(ι)c[εβής Philippson: τ[..... .]ν̣ vel]α̣ι vel]λι et init. 1144]αιc[*N*, illius fragmina, pro hoc duas litteras αι dat apographum ut saepe 1144 [ἡμῖν] * ἀ]cεβὴc δὲ *: εὐ]cεβὴc δ' ὁ̣ Bücheler, Gomperz unde Philippson: fin. ο̣ circuli arcus sin. ε̣, c̣, ο̣, θ̣: εὐ]cεβὴc δὲ̣ Usener, sed vid. *Lex. Philod.* s.vv. 1145 περ[ὶ θεὸ]ν ὃc Usener, cf. 1141: περ[ὶ δαίμο]νοc Philippson 1145–6 ἑκά[τε]|ρον Usener 1146 ante ρον punctum et notam stichometricam λ, lineola supra posita *N* ἐξο-ρ]ί̣ζει μέν | Usener: [.....]ο̣ζειμεν| *N*,]ο̣ circuli arcus inf. dext.,]ω̣ vel]ο̣ possis: δοξ]α̣ζό̣{ι}μεν[οc Philippson spatio longius ad finem 1147 ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν Philippson 1148 corr. supp. Bücheler: ορν[*N* 1150 Usener: αιτου, cκο[*N* 1151 ἀ[γα]θῶν Gomperz 1151–2 κα[ὶ]|| τῶ̣[ν κακ]ῶν Usener: κἀ[ν]|| τῶ̣[ι Περὶ θε]ῶν Gomperz spatio longius 1152–3 ἀπο[φαί]νετ' [αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν δαί-μονα) Philippson: |νει[*N*: ἀπο[φαί]|νετ[αι Gomperz, Usener 1153–5 [δὲ τ]ῶν ἀν|θρω̣[πείω]ν μηδ[ε]|νὸ[c προc]δεῖcθαι Us. 1155–6 κατὰ c]υντέ[λειαν Bücheler: [ἀλλὰ κατὰ c]υντέ[λειαν Usener, unde προc]δεῖcθ', ἀλ̣[λὰ | κατὰ c]υντέ[λειαν | εἶναι Philippson 1158–9 [κἂν | τῶι Περ]ὶ̣ πα[θῶν φη]|cιν [αὐτὸν ἄλ]υπ̣[ον restit. Philippson

|| τρόπον [διὰ τὰ τοι]αῦτ' ἀνο[σίως ἐ]ξελέσθαι τὴν πᾶσαν ὁσιότητα σὺν τῷ̣ι [τὰ κοι]νὰ φυλάττειν, ὡ̣[ς] δ' ο̣ἱ λεγόμε[νοι δει]σιδαίμονες, εἰ̣[ς ἀνυ]πέρβλητον ἀ̣[σέβει]αν ἐκβάλλειν. [ὅσιος] γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀθαν[ασίαν] | κα[ὶ τ]ὴν ἄκραν μακα[ριότητ]α τοῦ θ̣[ε]οῦ σ̣ώ̣[ιζων σὺ]ν ἅπασι[ν] τ[οῖς συ]ν̣απτομ[έ]ν̣ο̣[ις ἡμῖν; ἀ]σεβὴς δὲ̣ περ[ὶ θεὸ]ν ὃς ἑκά[τε]ρον [ἐξορ]ί̣ζει μέν, ὁ δ' [ἐπινο]ῶν χωρὶς ὀ̣ρ̣γ̣ῆ̣[ς καὶ] χάριτος ἀσθενούσης τὰς ἐ|ξ αὐτοῦ π̣αρασκ̣ε̣[υὰς] τῶν ἀ̣[γα]θῶν κα[ὶ] τῶ̣[ν κακ]ῶ̣ν ἀπο- [φαί]νε̣τ' [αὐτὸν τ]ῶν ἀ̣ν̣θρ̣ω̣[πείω]ν μηδ[ε]νὸ̣[ς προς]δεῖσθαι [..... c]υντε[λ..... .....]μους [..... ..... .]οπα[.....]σιν [.....]υγ[....]||

| manner[1] on account of these things impiously does away with the whole notion of holiness together with the preservation of common traditions,[2] and that, as those who are said to be religious think, it hurls us[3] into insurpassable impiety. For pious is the person who preserves the immortality | and consummate blessedness of God together with all the things included[4] by us; but impious is the person who banishes either[5] where God is concerned. And the person who sees also that the good and ill sent us by God come without any unhealthy anger or benevolence, | declares that God has no need of human things ... (*10–12 words indistinguishable, probably continues on*)

[1] i.e. this manner of conducting oneself in religious matters.
[2] Or 'common beliefs'.
[3] Or 'one' (the object must be supplied).
[4] Literally 'attached', i.e. characteristics attributed to the god by us (cf. 1035).
[5] Blessedness and immortality (1139–41).

41 *N* 1077 fr. 3[1–2] (p. 97 G., 368 Ph.), *HV*[2] II 67

1160 init.]ωντο *N* 1161 Philippson 1162 εὐcεβ]εῖαι *:]εται *N*: ἀληθ]εῖαι Philippson 1162–3 τιμῶμε|[ν Gomperz 1163 [ἡμεῖc] Philippson 1163–4 Bücheler 1165–6 [οὐ|δαμ]ῶc *: οὔπ]ωc Philippson: ἄλλ]ωc Bücheler, Gomperz 1167–9 Bücheler 1167 cυγγνωη *N*, fort. recte 1170 πολ]λὴν Gomperz: ἄλ]λην Bücheler 1170–1 Gomperz 1174 suppl. Gomperz: ωθυ[..]μ̣υ̣η̣[..][..]cιν *N*[1], i.e. ante et post μ binas litteras delevit librarius, qui supra μ υη[scripsit 1175 [τοιούτ]ων Anon. A, spatio aptius quam [τού]των Bücheler, edd. 1176 ς pars sup. circuli *N* 1177 ς pars sup. circuli *N* fin. εἰπε[ῖ]ν Gomperz: ειπε[ ]λι vel αι *N* 1178 Bücheler 1179 corr. Gomperz: ειρηκε *N* 1181 fin. μο[ ]c *N* 1181–3 Gomperz 1183 init. πε[..]τας *N* 1184 corr. Gomperz: καιπας *N* 1184–5 [ἔνι]|οι Bücheler, unde Philippson: [πολλ]|οὶ dubitanter Gomperz, divisione inaudita 1185–7 Bücheler 1186 ολο[ ]c *N* 1187 ὡcαύτως corr. Bücheler, Gomperz: ωcαυτοις *N* 1188 τοῦ Bücheler: του vel τοῦ Gomperz 1188–9 τού||[των, sc. ὠφελιῶν καὶ βλαβῶν ex 1183–84 supplevi et cols. 41–2 coniunxi: τού||[τους (sc. θεούς) dubitanter Henrichs

41 1160 ...].ντο. [τ]οιοῦτον 1077 3
οὖν ἄ]νθρωπον ἐν
εὐcεβ]είαι τιμῶμε-
ν ἡμεῖc,] τοῦ δ' ἐμφαι-
νομ]ένου ταπεινοῦ (5)
1165 καταφρονοῦμεν· [οὐ-
δαμ]ῶc δὲ καὶ κατ' ἐ-
κεῖν]ο cυγγνοίη τις
ἂν τὴν ἀ]πεχθημο-
cύνη]ν, τάχα δὲ καὶ (10)
1170 πολ]λὴν δυcαιcθη-
cία]ν τοῖc κατηγο-
ροῦcιν, ὅτι μόνουc
τοὺc Ἐπικούρου λό-
γους εὐθῦν[ου]cιν (15)
1175 ὡc ἕνεκα [τοιού]των
ἀνοcίουc ὄντας· οὐ-
δεὶc γὰρ ὡc εἰπε[ῖ]ν
τῶν ὠφε[λ]εῖν καὶ
βλάπτειν εἰρηκό- (20)
1180 των φιλοcόφων
τοὺc θεοὺc ὁμο[ία]c
τοῖc χυδαίοιc ὑπ[ὲ]λι-
πε[ν] τὰc ὠφελ[ί]ac
καὶ τὰc βλάβας· [ἔνι- (25)
1185 οι δ' οὐδὲ βλάπ[τει]ν
ὅλως ἔφαcαν αὐτούc,
ὡcαύτως δ' [οὐ]δὲ
προcδεῖcθαι τού- || (29)

||[...].ντο. [τ]οιοῦτον [οὖν ἄ]νθρωπον ἐν [εὐcεβ]εί̣αι τιμῶμε[ν ἡμεῖc,] 1160 **41**
τοῦ δ' ἐμφαι[νομ]ένου ταπεινοῦ καταφρονοῦμεν. [οὐδαμ]ῶc δὲ καὶ
κατ' ἐ[κεῖν]ο cυγγνο̣ί̣η τιc [ἂν τὴν ἀ]πεχθημο[cύνη]ν̣, τάχα δὲ καὶ
|[πολ]λὴν δυcαιcθη̣[cία]ν̣ τοῖc κατηγοροῦcιν, ὅτι μόνουc τοὺc Ἐπικού- 1170
ρου λόγουc εὐθύν[ου]cιν ὡc ἕνεκα [τοιού]των ἀνοcίουc ὄντας· οὐδεὶc̣
γὰρ ὡc εἰπε[ῖ]ν̣ τῶν ὠφε[λ]εῖν καὶ βλάπτειν εἰρηκό̣|των φιλοcόφων 1180
τοὺc θεοὺc ὁμο[ία]c τοῖc χυδαίοιc ὑπ[έ]λιπε[ν] τὰc ὠφελ[ί]ac καὶ τ̣ὰc
βλάβαc· [ἔνι]οι δ' οὐδὲ βλάπ[τει]ν ὅλω̣c ἔφαcαν αὐτούc, ὡcαύτω̣c δ'
[οὐ]δὲ προcδεῖcθαι τού- ||

| (*one word missing*) Such a person we honour for his piety, whereas the 1160 **41**
other we despise as manifestly depraved. Moreover in no way could
one on that point forgive our accusers their hostility and | perhaps also 1170
quite substantial lack of sense, because they censure only the words[1] of
Epicurus for these reasons as impious. For virtually none of the | phi- 1180
losophers who have said that the gods do good and harm represented
that good and harm as similar to base conceptions,[2] whereas some said
that that they[3] do no harm at all, and similarly that they[4] have no need
at all of these (*continues on*)

[1] Or 'teachings'.
[2] i.e. similar to the ideas of the many about the gods and harm from the gods.
[3] The gods.
[4] Taking the gods, already named in 1181 (θεούc) and 1186 (αὐτούc), as subject of the infinitive.

42 *N* 1098 fr. 4 (p. 119 G., 381 Ph.), *HV*² II 101

1189 παρ' ἄδει̣α[ν Philippson: υ *N* post ἄδει̣α[ν interpunxi 1190–1 [ἀπά]τ̣ην δὲ με[γά|λην] *:]γην *N*, sed possis]τ̣,]π̣,]ξ̣: ὀλί]γην δὲ με[λέ]την Philippson 1191 κα]τ̣ὰ τῶν [ἄλλων *:]τ̣ pars sup. τ, π, γ, ξ: κα]τ̣ὰ τῶν [θεῶν Philippson 1192 παρ]έχοντες Philippson: με[λέ]την . . . οὐκ] ἔχοντες D. Delattre privatim: ε[ἰc δει]νὰc *: ἐ[πί τι]|νας D. Delattre privatim: ο̣[ὐδὲ δι]|νὰc Philippson 1193 Philippson 1194 ἄιττου[cι *, de verbo (= commoventur) vid. Philod. *De mus.* col. 3,16; p. 12,7 K.: φρίττου[cι Philippson 1195 fin. α seclusi: fort. α⟨ὐ⟩|τὸν, cf. 813 1196–7 α[ὐ]|τὸν ⟨τὸν⟩ Philippson 1198 post κειν spatiolum *N* 1198–9 φο|βού-μενοι Gomperz: -νοι[ ] *N*, sed fort. spat. vac.: φο|βούμενο[ν] Quaranta 1199 δι' ὃ {ν} (= propterea) Henrichs, potius quam δι' ὃν (sc. θεόν) Quaranta: *Δί'* ὃν Bücheler 1201 Gomperz 1202 δ' Philippson ἑπομ]ένως *, cf. Gomperz app. crit.: ἀcμ]ένως Philippson 1203 ἑποίο[υν Bücheler 1203–4 οἱ δί]καιο|οι D. Delattre privatim: οἱ εἵ]καιο|οι Bücheler: ὡc] καὶ [ἕνι]|οι dubitanter Gomperz 1204 θεο-λ]όχων Gomperz:]οπων *N*: μυθολ]όχων Quaranta: ἀνθρ]ώπων Bücheler 1206 iam Quaranta, Bücheler 1207 supra στα sscr. ἀλλὰ *N* 1209 μύθ̣ων Bücheler: μυεων *N* 1211 corr. Gomperz, των *N*, fort. iam in pap. perperam 1212 πικρ- Bücheler: χ *N* 1213 ἀνοη⟨το⟩τέροις Gomperz 1214 [ἵ]να Gomperz: [ ]δια *N*: *Δία* Bücheler: διὰ Anon. A fin. τὸν Gomperz: τοδι *N* 1215 ὅλον] Philippson βί]ον [θ]ηριώδη Bücheler: βίοτ]ον Anon. A 1216–17 παρ]έχωμεν [κ]ἄλ|[λως Philippson: ἀλ|[λὰ Gomperz μεν[ ]|[κ]αλ *N* 1217 τ]ὸ̣ δυcμενὲc Gomperz:]ε *N*

42

των] παρ' ἄδει̣α[ν. 1098 4

ἀπά]τ̣ην δὲ με[γά-
λην κα]τ̣ὰ τῶν [ἄλλων
παρ]έχοντες ε[ἰc δει-
νὰc ἀδικίας ἐ̣[πο- (5)
μένως ἄιττου[cι
τὰc κρυφαίους, {α}
τὸν ὑ̣ποκρούμε-
νον ἅπαντα γινώc-
κειν οὐκέτι φο- (10)
βούμενοι. δι' ὃ {ν}
cιωπᾶν ἀcφαλέc-
τερον ἐ[τύγ]χαν[εν.
ταῦτα [δ' ἑπομ]ένως
ἐποίο[υν οἱ δί]καιοι (15)
τῶν [θεολ]όχων
καὶ φιλοcόφων· οὐ
γὰρ ἐλά[νθα]νεν τἀ-
ληθὲc αὐτούc, ἀλλὰ τὰc
κακουργίαc ὑπὸ (20)
τῶν μύθ̣ων ἀνα-
cτελλομένας θε-
ωροῦντες τῷ̣ ἐ-
πικρέμαc[θ]αι τοῖc
ἀνοη⟨το⟩τέροις τὴν ὑ- (25)
ποψίαν, [ἵ]̣να μὴ τὸ̣ν
ὅλον βί]ον [θ]ηριώδη
παρ]έχωμεν, [κ]ἄλ-
λως τ]ὸ̣ δυcμενὲc || (29)

||[των] παρ' ἄδει̣α[ν. | ἀπά]τ̣ην δὲ με[γάλην κα]τ̣ὰ τῶν [ἄλλων παρ]έ- 1190 **42**
χοντες ε[ἰς δει]νὰς ἀδικίας ἐ̣[πο]μένως ἄιττου[σι] τὰς κρυφαίους, τὸν
ὑπονοούμενον ἅ̈παντα γινώσκειν οὐκέτι φοβούμενοι. δι' ὃ | σιωπᾶν 1200
ἀσφαλέστερον ἐ̣[τύγ]χαν[εν.] ταῦτα [δ' ἑπομ]ένως ἐποίο[υν οἱ δί]καιοι
τῶν [θεολ]όγ̣ων καὶ φιλοσόφων· οὐ γὰρ ἐλά[νθα]νεν τἀληθὲς αὐτούς,
ἀλλὰ τὰς κακουργίας ὑπὸ τῶν μύθ̣ων ἀνα|στελλομένας θεωροῦντες τῷ̣ι 1210
ἐπικ̣ρέμας[θ]αι τοῖς ἀνοη⟨το⟩τέροις τὴν ὑποψίαν, [ἵ]ν̣α μὴ τὸ̣ν [ὅλον
βί]ον [θ]ηριώδη [παρ]έχωμεν, [κ]ἄλ[λως τ]ὸ̣ δυσμενὲς ||

things[1] out of freedom of fear. | And preparing an immense deception 1190 **42**
against the rest, they subsequently rush into terrible, hidden injustices,
since they no longer feared anyone[2] believed to be all-knowing.
Therefore it was | safer to keep silent. Consequently that was what 1200
those of the theologians and philosophers who were just did.[3] For the
truth did not escape them,[4] but, since they observed that evil deeds
were held | in check by the tales[5] because foreboding[6] hung over the 1210
more foolish of mankind, in order that we might not render life as
a whole a beastly form of existence, and since otherwise the hostility
. . . they . . .[7] *(gap of 1 col., c.90 words)*

[1] Harms and benefits (1183–4).
[2] i.e. any god.
[3] i.e. were silent about the true nature of the gods.
[4] Theologians and philosophers.
[5] Or 'myths' about the gods.
[6] Of punishment by the gods for wrong-doing.
[7] The main verb of the sentence is lost.

43 *N* 1098 fr. 6 (p. 121 G., 382 Ph.), *HV*² II 103

1223 Quaranta 1224 *, cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 3. 53 *i qui theologi nominantur*: φιλοσόφ]ων Quaranta: ἐναντί]ων Philippson 1225 καὶ *, το]ὺς Philippson: πολλο]ὺς spatio longius ut vid. Quaranta 1226 *: εἶναι Quaranta 1228 init. *, fort. ὡcανεὶ]: εἶναι] Philippson φ delevit, π sscr. *N* 1228–9 τε]τυφωμέ[νους Philippson 1229 fin. spatium post λου impletur nota 1229–31 Philippson 1232–3 *: θε|[ῶι βλ]αμμάτων Gomperz 1234 μηδ' ἀπ]αγόρευμα Philippson, fort. προc]αγόρευμα, cf. Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 239,20 1235]αγλου *N*, corr. Gomperz 1236–46 vid. comm. 1237 nisi]α θεὸc 1238 δόξη (sic) Gomperz, fort. δόξῃ 1240 οὕτ]ωc Philippson fin. post finem versus κατα inseruit *N* 1241–2 τὰ περὶ |[θεῶν Philippson 1243]χαριον *N*, corr. Bücheler 1245 Gomperz 1246]οντα *N* coll. 43–4 coniunxi

43

....]νον 1098 6
.... ὁ]μοι-
....]ναι
....]ζεc-
θαι ...]εντ[.]δε (5)
ὥc φαcιν] ἔνιοι τῶν
θεολόγ]ων· τινὲc δὲ
καὶ το]ὺc προγόνουc
ὄντας] αὐτῶν αἱρε-
τέον ἡ]μᾶc μόνουc (10)
ὥcπερ τε]τυ[π]φ́ωμέ-
νουc διαc]τέλλου- >
cιν· ὁ δ'] οὖν Ἐπίκου-
ροc δοξῶν] κενῶν ε-
....]ει τῶι θε- (15)
ῶι τῶν γρ]αμμάτων
ἢ τῶν ἀπ]αγορευμά-
των ....] αἰδ̣ουμε-
ν..... φο]βοῦμαι
..... .] ἄθεοc ε- (20)
....] δόξῃ τῶν
....]ενοντων
..]ωc ἅπαντα κατα
....]ντα περι
....]τοφαινε- (25)
.... μα]κ̣άριον
....] καὶ ἀφθαρ-
.... μ]ηδὲν
....]ον τῷ̣- || (29)

||[..... ..... .]νον[..... ..... ὁ]μοι|[..... ..... .]ναι[..... ..... .]ζες[θαι 1220 **43**
...]εντ[.]δε [ὥς φασιν] ἔνιοι τῶν [θεολόγ]ων· τινὲς δὲ [καὶ το]ὺς προ-
γόνους [ὄντας] αὐτῶν αἱρε[τέον ἡ]μᾶς μόνους [ὥσπερ τε]τυφωμέ[νους
διας]τέλλου|[σιν· ὁ δ'] οὖν Ἐπίκου[ρος δοξῶν] κενῶν ε[..... ...]ει τῶι 1230
θε[ῶι τῶν γρ]αμμάτων [ἢ τῶν ἀπ]αγορευμά[των ....] αἰ̣δ̣ουμεν[.....
φο]βοῦμαι [..... .] ἄθεος ε[..... ..] δόξῃ τῶν [..... ..]ενοντων |[..]ως
ἅπαντα κατα[..... ..]ντα περι[..... ..]τοφαινε[..... .. μα]κ̣άριον [..... 1240
..] καὶ ἀφθαρ[..... .... μ]ηδὲν [..... ....]ον τῷ̣- ||

(*12–15 words indistinguishable*) | as some of the theologues say. Moreover 1220 **43**
some enjoin that we alone are to be thought the demented authors of
these things. | Epicurus, however, of empty opinions (*one word missing*) 1230
for the deity by his writings and pronouncements (*one word*) revere
(*one word*) I fear (*one word*) atheist[1] (*one word*) opinion | (*several words* 1240
missing) blessed and imperishable (*several words missing*) nothing (*contin-
ues on*)

[1] Or 'godless'.

44 *N* 1098 fr. 7 (p. 122 G., 382 Ph.), *HV*² II 104

Test.: 1248–62 Epic. *De dis* fr. 33 Us. (vv. 1259–64 solum), 17.3 Arr.² 1263–75 Epic. *De sanct.* fr. 38 Us., 19.2 Arr.² (vv. 1263–9 solum)

1247 τῷ||χλημα *: τῶ||χλημα Philippson: χαημα *N* 1247–54 plane dubia 1247–8 Philippson 1249–51 τῶν [θεῶ]ν κ[ατ' εἶ]|δο[c πᾶν ἀ]νυπό[πτευ]||τον suppl. Philippson 1251–4 μᾶλλ[ον ἡμεῖν]|| πρὸc [ταραχὴν εἶναι]|| καὶ ἅπαν [καθαρὸν]|| τοῦ παντὸc [δεινοῦ restit. iam Quaranta, Philippson de Quarantae supplementis certior a nescioquo factus, unde Arr.² 1255–6 παρακκευ[αζόμε]||νον Quaranta 1256–7 Philippson 1258 [κο]cμῆ[cαι] Philippson 1258–60 *: κ[ατι]cχύον[τας οὐ]|δ[ὲ spatio aptum Usener potius quam [πᾶν]|| κ[ατι]-cχῦον [οὐ]|δ[ὲ spatio brevius Philippson 1260 κ]ωλυόμε[νον iam Quaranta, Philippson: κ]ωλυομέ[νους Usener 1261–3 Usener, titulum libri intellexerunt Quaranta, Bücheler 1262 [φηcι Usener 1263 κα[λεῖ Usener fin. τῶν *N*, corr. Usener 1264–5 τ[ελειό]τητος *: τ[*N*: θ[ειό]τητος Usener, unde edd. [βίον] Usener ἥ]|δ̣ιcτον Bücheler: αιcτον *N*: κάλ]|λ̣ιcτον Anon. A: ῥ]|ᾶιcτον Usener, dubitanter Gomperz, divisione inaudita 1265–7 Bücheler 1266–7 titulum intellexit iam Quaranta 1268 κ]αταξιοῖ Bücheler πᾶ[ν Usener τὸ μι]|αρὸν Gomperz: καθ]|αρὸν Usener contra divisionem 1269 φυλάτ[τεcθαι Gomperz: φυλάτ[τειν Bücheler, Usener 1270–2 Usener exceptis 1271 τὰ[c καλὰc vel τε-λεὰc *: τὰ[c τούτου] Philippson 1272 |διαθεcθη[*N*, corr. Usener 1272–3 τοῦ πάν]||τα χ' οἰκε[ιοῦν τὰ Philippson: ταποικε[*N* 1274–5 Gomperz 1274 fin. fort. [ἡμῖν vel [ὅλως 1275–6 supplevi e.g., coll. 44–5 fort. coniungendae

44

χλ̣ημα πᾶν τ[ῶν 1098 7
θεῶ[ν .....]ου[..
γὰρ τῶν [θεῶ]ν κ[..
δο[.... ἀ]νυπο[..
τον μᾶλλ[ον ..... (5)
προc[..... .....
καὶ ἅπαν[..... ...
τοῦ παντὸc [..... .
παρακκευ[αζόμε-
νον καὶ τὸ [ἀλλότρι- (10)
ον δ[ια]λῦ[caί τε
καὶ [κο]cμῆ[cαι τὸ
κ[ατι]cχῦον [πᾶν, οὐ-
δ[ὲ κ]ωλυόμε[νον
ταῦτα πράτ[τειν ἐν (15)
τῶι Περὶ θεῶν [φηcιν·
κα[λεῖ] δὲ καὶ τὸ̣ν
τ[ελειό]τητοc [βίον ἥ-
δ̣ιcτον καὶ μ̣[ακαρι-
ώτατον ἐν̣ [τῶι] Πε- (20)
ρὶ ὁcιότητ[οc καὶ
κ]αταξιοῖ πᾶ[ν τὸ μι-
αρὸν φυλάτ[τεcθαι,
νοής]εωc cυ[νορω-
μένης τὰ[c καλὰc (25)
διαθέcε̣ι̣c̣ [τοῦ πάν-
τα χ' οἰκε[ιοῦν τὰ
γειν[ό]μεν[α ἡμῖν
πρ[ὸc] μ̣ακ[αριότη- || (29)

|| χ̣λ̣ημα πᾶν τ[ῶν] θεῶ[ν .....]ου[..] γὰρ τῶν [θεῶ]ν κ[..]|δο[.... ἀ]νυπο[..]τον μᾶλλ[ον ....] προc[..... .....] καὶ ἅπαν[..... ...] τοῦ παντὸc [..... .] παρασκευ[αζόμε]νον καὶ τὸ [ἀλλότρι]ον δ[ια]λῦ[σαί τε] καὶ [κο]cμῆ[cαι τὸ] κ[ατι]cχῦον [πᾶν, οὐ]|δ[ὲ κ]ωλυόμε[νον] ταῦτα πράτ[τειν ἐν] τῶι Περὶ θεῶν [φηcιν·] κα[λεῖ] δὲ καὶ τ̣ὸν τ[ε-λειό]τητος [βίον ἥ]δ̣ιστον καὶ μ̣[ακαρι]ώτατον ἐ̣ν̣ [τῶι] Περὶ ὁcιό-τητ[ος καὶ κ]αταξιοῖ πᾶ[ν τὸ μι]αρὸν φυλάτ[τεcθαι | νοής]εωc cυ[νορω]μένης τὰ[c καλὰc] διαθέcει̣ς̣, [τοῦ πάν]τα χ̣' οἰκε[ιοῦν τὰ] γιν[ό]μεν[α ἡμῖν] πρ[ὸc] μ̣ακ[αριότη-||

1250 **44**

1260

1270

...all lack of annoyance from the gods (*several words missing*) for of the gods | (*one word missing*) exceeding (*several words missing*) towards (*one word missing*) and complete (*one word missing*) furnished from all (*one word missing*) and to dispel what is foreign to its nature,[1] and to marshal all its overpowering strength, nor | in *On Gods* does he[2] say anything conflicting with one's doing these things. And in *On Holiness* he calls the life of perfection[3] the most pleasant and most blessed, and instructs us to guard against all defilement, with our intellect | comprehensively viewing the best psychosomatic dispositions, for the sake of fitting all that happens to us to blessedness (*continues on*)

44

1250

1260

1270

[1] Or 'foreign to us' (the referent must be supplied).
[2] Epicurus.
[3] Or 'completeness'.

45 *P. Herc.* 1093 corticulus sin. = *N* 1093 (vv. 1276–89 solum) = *N* 1077 fr. 2^{1-2} (p. 96 G., 368 Ph.), *HV*² II 66

1276–89 exstant in pap., quam M. Arman depinxit anno 1912 1276–7 || ..]ᾳ vel λ vel ᾳ cauda tantum, tum αιᾳπ- *N*¹: || ..]αι̣[.]π̣ *N*²,]π̣ pars dext. *π*: deficit pap.: *κ*]αὶ [ἀ]*πηρτισμένα* |[*ἐ*]*χε*[*ιν* Gomperz 1278 δ]*ὲ* Bücheler: *τ*]*ε* vel δ]*ὲ* Gomperz 1279–81 suppl. Bücheler 1281 fin. asteriscus pap., *N*¹, *HV*² II: *χ* *N*² 1282 fin. *τον* *N*¹, *HV*² II, confirmavit pap.: YON *N*² 1283 *cεμνοντατον* *N*¹: *ν* ultima puncto supra posito deletur pap., *N*¹, *HV*² II, omisit *N*² 1284 *τοτα* sscr. pap., *N* 1291 *κ*[αὶ Gomperz 1293–1303 Bücheler 1292 *ων*ʳ ᾽*διο* *N* *μόνο*[*ι* Gomperz: *μόνο*[*ν* Bücheler 1297 *ᾳλλων* *N*¹, *HV*² II: *ᾳλαων* *N*² 1304 *ιcχιοc* *N*, *HV*² II, corr. Gomperz 1304–5 *θε*[*ί*]|*ου* Gomperz potius quam *θε*|*οῦ* Bücheler 1305 *τῆc τ̣ελειό*||[*τητοc* corr. Philippson: *πελειc*[*N*

45

τα] *κ̣αὶ ἀ̣πηρτισμένα* 1077 2 = 1093
γ' ἔ]*χε*[*ιν·*] *διατελοῦcιν*
δ]*ὲ πᾳ*[*ν*]*ταχῇ λέγον-*
τε]*c, ἵνα μὴ cυγγράμ-*
μ]*ατα παρατιθεὶc ἐ-* (5)
κ]*τείνω, πάντων ※*
τ]*ῶν ὄντων ἄριcτον*
κ]*αὶ cεμνό*[[*ν*]]*τατον*
καὶ ἀξιοζηλω̣τότα̣τον καὶ
π̣άντων [*τ*]*ῶν ἀγα-* (10)
θῶν] *κυριεύοντα κἀ-*
πραγ]*μάτευτον καὶ*
ὑψηλὸν καὶ μεγαλό-
φρονα καὶ μεγαλό-
ψυχον καὶ ἅγιον καὶ (15)
ἁγιώτατον κ[*αὶ*] *ἵλε-*
ων. διὸ καὶ μόνο[*ι*
μεγίcτην εὐcέβει-
αν ἐζηλωκέναι φα-
cὶ [*καὶ*] *δοξάζειν ὁ-* (20)
cι[*ώ*]*τατα περὶ θεῶν*
κα[*ὶ*] *τῷ*[*ν*] *ἄλλων τἀναν-*
τ[*ία κατ*]*αγεινώcκου-*
c]*ιν ὡc ἂν ὑπεναντί-*
α] *τῇι προλήψει δογμα-* (25)
τιζόντων, καὶ κα-
θα[*ρώτα*]*τα τὴν ἄ-*
φραcτον ὑπεροχὴν
τῆc ἰcχύ̣ος τοῦ θε[*ί-*
ου καὶ τῆc τ̣ελειό||[*τητοc*] (30)

|| τ]α καὶ ἀ̣π̣ηρτισμένα [γ' ἔ]χε[ιν·] διατελοῦσιν [δ]ὲ πα̣[ν]ταχῆ λέγον- 45
[τε]ς, ἵνα μὴ συνγράμ|[μ]ατα παρατιθεὶς ἐ[κ]τείνω, πάντων [τ]ῶν 1280
ὄντων ἄριστον [κ]αὶ σεμνότατον καὶ ἀξιοζηλωτότατον καὶ π̣άντων
[τ]ῶν ἀγα[θῶν] κυριεύοντα κἀ[πραγ]μάτευτον καὶ ὑψηλὸν καὶ μεγα-
λόφρονα καὶ μεγαλό|ψυχον καὶ ἅγιον καὶ ἁγιώτατον κ[αὶ] ἵλεων. διὸ 1290
καὶ μόνο[ι] μεγίστην εὐσέβειαν ἐζηλωκέναι φασὶ [καὶ] δοξάζειν ὁσι-
[ώ]τατα περὶ θεῶν κα[ὶ] τῷ̣[ν] ἄ̣λλων τἀναντ[ία κατ]αγινώσκου[σ]ιν
ὡς ἂν ὑπεναντί|[α] τῆι προλήψει δογματιζόντων, καὶ καθα[ρώτα]τα 1300
τὴν ἄφραστον ὑπεροχὴν τῆς ἰσχύ̣ος τοῦ θε[ί]ου καὶ τῆς τ̣ελειό̣||[τητος]

and especially having it in good order. And they[1] are continually saying 45
everywhere,[2] lest | I go on too long by adding treatises by them,[3] that 1280
of all existing things it[4] is the best and most holy, most worthy of
emulation, having dominion over all good things, unburdened by
affairs, and exalted and great-minded and great-spirited | and ritually 1290
pure and purest and propitious. Therefore they say that they alone
strive after the greatest form of piety and that they hold the most pious
views about the gods, and they charge the rest with holding the
opposite views, in as much as they[5] teach | contrary to the naturally 1300
acquired generic conception,[6] and (*verb missing*)[7] the purest views as
regards the ineffable pre-eminence of the strength and perfection of
the divine . . . (*gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

[1] Epicurus and the *kathegemones*.
[2] i.e. in their books.
[3] i.e. to put it briefly.
[4] The divine.
[5] Other, non-Epicurean philosophers.
[6] *πρόληψις* (sc. of the divine).
[7] e.g. 'and claim to perceive most clearly the purest views . . .'.

46 *O* 1077 fr. 3$^{1-2}$ sin. (p. 95 G., 367 Ph.), desunt *N*, *HV*^{2} II (*O*^{1} = Bodl. MS Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 962, *O*^{2} = fol. 961)

1306–7 Gomperz 1307 post *θεον* spatiolum *O* fin. δ| *O*, fort. ą- 1307–8 δ[ε|ήcει Philippson 1308 *π]αραινεῖ μὴ* Gomperz 1309 *νοεῖ]cθαι* Philippson: fort. *ποεῖ]cθαι* 1309–10 δύcκ[ο|λον Gomperz 1310 init. [*οἷον*] Philippson 1310–11 *π]αρὰ τῶν πο|[ητῶν* Gomperz:]*αρατων O*^{1}:]*ραιτων O*^{2} 1312–13 Philippson 1312]*λοcοφει[O*^{1}:]*κοcοφευ[O*^{2} 1313 fin. *ωνc̣α|* *O*, c̣ circuli arcus sup. sin., corr. Philippson 1314 nisi *μηδέν' αὐτῶν* 1315 *ὠφέ]λιμον* *:]*λ* tantum cauda, possis etiam *κ*, *χ* *O*^{1}:]*c* in rasura *O*^{2}: *μά]χιμον* Philippson 1316–17 Gomperz 1318 fin. post *τες* nota quam librarius saepe ne spatium in fine relinqueret apposuit conspicitur 1318–21 Philippson 1321–5 manifeste corruptum, fort. *τῶν τ̣αραγμά|[των: τ]ῶν γὰρ λυπη|[ρῶν,] ὅτι καὶ τὸ πρὸc |[ἡμᾶc ἀ]ποβαίνο[ν | κακὸν ἐ]φρόντιcαν, |[αὐτοὺc ἀπο]λύωμεν* coni. Philippson 1322 fort.]*η*:]*π O* 1324 *ἐ]φρόντιcαν* Gomperz 1325 fin. post *μεν* nota quam librarius saepe ne spatium in fine relinqueret apposuit conspicitur 1326 *καὶ οὕτω]c ἐχόντων* Philippson 1329 *ἐφύλ]αξεν* Philippson 1330 *φαίν]εται* Philippson *τοί[ν]υν* Gomperz 1331 *παρεc]κευάcθαι* Philippson:]*c O* 1331–2 [*ἐ|ναργῆ γν]ῶcιν* *: [*πολ|λὴν ἀξί]ωcιν* Philippson 1332–3 non liquet: *αιδο|* *O*^{1}: *αιδο[.]|| O*^{2}: *αἰ δ̣ὲ̣* proposuit D. Armstrong privatim, fort. *αἰ δ̣ὲ̣ |[δόξαι* vel *αἱ δ' ἓ[ν|νοιαι* (sc. *εἰcί*) *λυ]μαντικαὶ* etc.: ⟨*κ*⟩*αὶ δό|[ξαιc λυ]μαντικαῖ[c* Philippson 1334–5 *: *καὶ π]ρὸc ἀλλ[οφύ]||λουc* longius spatio Philippson post col. 46 sequitur col. 47 in apographo

46

	.....]*ον ὑπολαμ-*	*O* 1077 3
	βάνε]ιν τὸν θεὸν δ[ ]	
	....π]αραινεῖ μὴ	
	νοεῖ]cθαι δύcκ[ολον	
1310	*οἷον π]αρὰ τῶν πο-*	(5)
	ητῶν· κα]ὶ τῶι καθα-	
	ρῶc φι]λοcοφεῖ[ν	
	κατ]αιcθανώμε̣-	
	θα] μηδὲν αὐτῶν	
1315	*ὠφέ]λιμον ἡμᾶc cυν-*	(10)
	ταρ]άττειν· καὶ μη-	
	δ' ἐπιβ]ολαῖc ἀνοήτοις	
	ἀκολ]ουθοῦντεc >	
	ἀηδ]εῖc καθ' ἡμῶν	
1320	*ὑπ]ολαμβάνω-*	(15)
	μεν· τ]ῶν γὰρ αυπα	
	....]ην καὶ τὸ πρὸc	
	ἡμᾶc ἀ]ποβαινο[ν	
	..... *ἐ]φρόντιcαν*	
1325	..... .]*λυημεν >*	(20)
	..... .]*c ἐχόντων*	
	..... .]*η[..]ac ου*	
	....]*ων[..*	
	....]*αξεν·*	
1330	*φαίν]εται τοί[ν]υν*	(25)
	παρεc]κευάcθαι [ἐ-	
	ναργῆ γν]ῶcιν αιδο	
	..... . *λυ]μαντικαὶ*	
	τῆc τῶν π]ρὸc ἀλλ[ήι- ||	(29)

||[.....]ον ὑπολαμ[βάνε]ιν τὸν θεὸν δ[....π]αραινεῖ μὴ [νοεῖ]cθαι δύς- 46
κ[ολον | οἷον π]αρὰ τῶν πο[ητῶν· κα]ὶ τῶι καθα[ρῶc φι]λοcοφεῖ[ν 1310
κατ]αιcθανώμε[θα] μηδὲν αὐτῶν [ὠφέ]λιμον ἡμᾶc cυν[ταρ]άττειν·
καὶ μη[δ' ἐπιβ]ολαῖc ἀνοήτοις [ἀκολ]ουθοῦντεc [ἀηδ]εῖc καθ' ἡμῶν
|[ὑπ]ολαμβάνω[μεν· τ]ῶν γὰρ αυπα[....]ην καὶ τὸ πρὸc [ἡμᾶc ἀ]πο- 1320
βαινο[ν..... ἔ]φρόντιcαν [..... .]λυημεν [..... .]c ἐχόντων [..... .]η
[..]ac ου[..... ....]ων[..... ....]αξεν· |[φαίν]εται τοί[ν]υν [παρε- 1330
c]κευάcθαι [ἐναργῆ γν]ῶcιν αιδο[..... .λυ]μαντικαὶ [τῆc τῶν π]ρὸc
ἀλλ[ή-]||

(*one word missing*) to conceive of God (*one word missing*) he[1] advises not 46
to think him[2] bad-tempered as (he is thought), | for example, by the 1310
poets. And by philosophizing in a pure manner let us understand that
nothing helpful of theirs[3] disturbs us. And let us not, adhering to
foolish notions, | unpleasantly form opinions in conflict with our- 1320
selves. For of the (*several words missing*) and the result for us (*one word
missing*) they considered[4] (*one word missing*) we (*10–12 words missing*). It
appears therefore that he[5] has procured | clear knowledge (*two words* 1330
missing)[6] harmful to the (*continues on*)

[1] Probably Epicurus. [2] God.
[3] Probably poets. [4] Or 'cared', 'worried'.
[5] The subject must be supplied, probably Epicurus or his philosophy on this point.
[6] Perhaps 'but his views were (or seemed) harmful to the civic relations . . .'.

47 *O* 1077 fr. 3^{1-3} dext. = *N* 1077 1^{1-2} (p. 95 G., 367 Ph.), *HV*² II 65 (*O*¹ = Bodl. MS Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 962, *O*² = fol. 961)

Test.: 1335–63 *Test. Socr.* 37 Acosta–Angeli

1334–5 ἀλλ[ή]||λους * 1335 fin. suppl. Gomperz: ηω[*O*: ᾳ[*N* 1336 δια[*O*: δ[*N* [τε suppl. * 1337 οὐκ εὐ[cεβεῖc (sc. 1333 δόξαι) *: ουκευ[*O*: ουκε[*N*: οὐκ ἐᾳ[τῆcαι dubitanter Gomperz, οὐ κεχ[ρῆcθαι Philippson falso 1338–41 Bücheler 1338 fin. περι[*O*: πε[*N*¹: πc[*N*² 1339 βαίνειν *O*: βανειν *N* fin. ενη[*O*: εν[*N* 1342–6 Gomperz 1343 ⟨εὖ⟩ποιοὺc Gomperz: χοιρεῖc coni. Anon. A, fort. recte: ποιοὺc (sc. τοὺc θεούc) Acosta–Angeli, *Test. Socr.* 37 1344 δαc' ¹αμε *O*: δαcταμε *N* 1345 γαρω *N*: ξαροι *O* ητ[.]ιω[*O*: ητιιc[*N* 1346 μοι[*O*: μc[*N*¹: μ[*N*² 1347–8 -κώτερόν τι τι|μῶcιν spatio brevius Gomperz: κωτε[.]ρο *N*, *O* ρο[...]τι *N*¹: ρο[....] *N*²: ρον[..]ητι *O*²: ρον[..]ηπ[*O*¹: [ἥδ]η Acosta–Angeli 1348 ἡμεῖc δὲ π[άν]|τεc Henrichs: ημειcλεχ[.]|τεc *N*: με[..] λεγ[*O*²: με[.]μεγ[*O*¹: ἡμεῖc λέγ[ον]τεc Bücheler: ἡμεῖc ⟨οἱ⟩ λέγ[ον]|τεc Gomperz: ἡμε[ῖ]c λέγ[ον]|τεc Philippson 1349 post ὡc spatiolum *N* fin. τα *O*¹: τ[*O*² *N* 1350–1 παρ[α]|cκευαc[τικ]ὰ Gomperz: παρ[α]|cκευάc[ματ]α Bücheler 1351 fin. τηcη[*O*: τηc[*N* 1352–3 Bücheler 1353 πολλο[*N*: πολλ[*O* 1354 fin. αcε *N*¹: αcθ *N*²: ac[.| *O* 1355 fin. πε[*O*: π[*N* 1357 init. μ *N*: λλ *O* ante μεν in marg. punctum stichometricum *O*, deest *N* fin. ου| *O*, *N*¹: θυ| *N*² 1358 fin. ναιο[*O*: ναιον[*N* 1359–61 Bücheler 1361 fin. εὖ corr. Bücheler: λωνετ *N*: λωνθ *O* 1363 ἀν||[θρώπων coni. Bücheler, Gomperz coll. 47–8 fort. coniungendae

47 1335 λους ἀνθρώπω[ν *O* 1077 3 = *N* 1077 1
πολειτείας διά [τε
τοῦτ' οὐκ εὐ[cεβεῖc,
ἐπειδὴ cυνπερι[λαμ-
βάνειν ἔοικεν ἡ [εὐ- (5)
1340 cέβεια καὶ τὸ πρὸ[c
ἀνθρώπους ἀβλα-
βὲc καὶ μάλιcτ' [εἰc
τοὺc ⟨εὖ⟩ποιοὺc καὶ τ[ὰc
πατρίδας· ἀμέ[λει (10)
1345 γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἠπιώ[τε-
ρον καὶ κηδεμον[ι-
κώτε{.}ρον [ἥδ]η τι-
μῶcιν, ἡμεῖc δὲ π[άν-
τεc ὡc ἀληθῆ τὰ (15)
1350 δόγματα καὶ παρ[α-
cκευαc[τικ]ὰ τῆc ἡ-
μῶν αὐτῶν ἀτα[ρα-
ξίαc· ἀλλ' οἱ πολλο[ὶ
νομίζοντεc ἀcε- (20)
1355 βεῖc τοὺc οὕτω{ι} πε-
ρὶ θεῶν ἀποφαινο-
μένουc κολάζου-
cιν, ὡc Ἀθηναῖοι
C]ωκράτην καί τι- (25)
1360 νας ἑτέρους καίτο[ι
γε τ[ῶ]ν ἄλλων εὖ-
παιδευτότατοι
λεχθέντεc ἀν- || (29)

|| λους ἀνθρώπω[ν] πολιτείας, διά [τε] τοῦτ' οὐκ εὐ[cεβεῖc,] ἐπειδὴ 47
cυμπερι[λαμ]βάνειν ἔοικεν ἡ [εὐ]||cέβεια καὶ τὸ πρὸ[c] ἀνθρώπους 1340
ἀβλαβὲc καὶ μάλιcτ' [εἰc] τοὺc ⟨εὖ⟩ποιοὺc καὶ τ[ὰc] πατρίδαc· ἀμέ-
[λει] γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἠπιώ[τε]ρον καὶ κηδεμον[ι]κώτερόν [ἤδ]η τιμῶcιν,
ἡμεῖc δὲ π[άν]τεc ὡc ἀληθῆ τὰ | δόγματα καὶ παρ[α]cκευαc[τικ]ὰ τῆc 1350
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἀτα[ρα]ξίαc· ἀλλ' οἱ πολλο[ὶ] νομίζοντεc ἀcεβεῖc τοὺc
οὕτω περὶ θεῶν ἀποφαινομένουc, κολάζουcιν, ὡc Ἀθηναῖοι [C]ωκρά-
την καί τι|νας ἑτέρουc, καίτο[ι] γε τ[ῶ]ν ἄλλων εὐπαιδευτότατοι 1360
λεχθέντεc ἀν- ||

civic relations among people with one another and for this reason not 47
pious, since | piety appears to include not harming both other people 1340
and especially one's benefactors and homeland. To be sure they[1] hon-
our something[2] rather kindly and propitious, whereas we[3] all regard
our views[4] | as the true cause of our own tranquillity. But the populace, 1350
regarding as impious those who declare their opinion in this fashion
about the gods, punish them, as the Athenians did Socrates and | cer- 1360
tain others, even though they[5] were reported to be the most educated
of all.

[1] People in general? Or philosophers like Socrates?
[2] i.e. believe in something divine, viz. a god who is benevolent etc.
[3] Epicureans. [4] Or 'doctrines', 'teachings' (δόγματα).
[5] The Athenians.

48 *N* 1098 fr. 5 (p. 120 G., 382 Ph.), *HV*² II 102

1364 φυγόντες ἔκ]αμον Philippson 1365–7 ἵνα δὲ μή] διὰ τοῦ[θ' αὑτοῖς ἐπ]ιτείμη|[σις ἦι, κακ]ῶς restit. Philippson 1368 Bücheler qui post Ἐπίκουρον interpunxit 1370–2 Philippson 1369 [οὐδέ] *: [καί] Philippson: [οἱ δὲ τ]οιαύτας Bücheler 1370 ὑπο[νοι|ας Anon. A: ὑπο[λήψεις Bücheler 1371 supra ν sscr. κ *N* fin. ου[*N*: τ]οῖς κα{ι}ταμελοῦ|[ci]ν Anon. A 1373–83 Bücheler–Gomperz 1374–5 iam Quaranta 1375 πον *N* 1375–6 ἐμ|[φαί]νειν Bücheler: ἐμ|[μέ]νειν Quaranta 1377 [.]χω[..]εν *N* 1379 χρ]ῆ Bücheler: δέο]ν Quaranta, vestigiis aptius sed iam in v. 1375 legitur:]ν̣ pars extrema dext. ν *N*: δε]ῖ Gomperz 1380–3 iam Quaranta 1383–4 Gomperz 1385 θεό]ν *: λόγο]ν Philippson: νοῦ]ν Anon. A χε Philippson: τε *N* fin. χρηνλιτε *N* 1385–6 τε|[θεῖ]cθαι Gomperz: τε[ι|μᾶ]cθαι D. Delattre privatim 1386–7 Gomperz 1388 τιμώ|μ]ενον *: κείμ]ενον Philippson: ἐπόμ]ενον Diels p. 906 (= 308) 1388–9 θε|[ω|ρί]α[ι Gomperz 1389 [ὡς] *: [οἷαν] Philippson 1389–90 Ἐπίκου|[ρος *: τοῦ] Ἐπικού|[ρου Diels p. 906 (= 308) 1390 προ[φέρει D. Delattre privatim: fort. προ[καλεῖ: προ[λέγων Anon. A 1391]. arcus circuli inf. dext.: ὑπὸ τῶν Philippson 1392 fin. τc[*N*, vel ε vel ο vel ω: πά]ντας τε Philippson 1393 π]άcας ἔχει[ν Philippson

48

1098 5 ....]αμον

1365 ....] διὰ του

..... .ἐπ]ιτειμη-

....]ωc τοῖc

περὶ τὸ]ν Ἐπίκουρον, (5)

οὐδὲ τ]οιαύτας ἐνε-

1370 κε]ίνηcαν ὑπο[ψίας

τἀcεβ]εῖν κ̔αὶ τἀμελεί̣[ν

θεῶ]ν οἵας ἀπηγόρευ-

ca]ν οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὰ (10)

κοι]νὰ τῶν ἀνθρώ-

1375 πων ἔθη, δέον ἐμ-

φαί]νειν τούτοις ἀ-

π]λῶ̣[c τ]ὸν αὐθεκαc-

τό]τερον λόγον ὅτι (15)

χρ]ὴ πάντα πείθεc-

1380 θαι] τοῖc νόμ[οι]c καὶ

τοῖ]c ἐθιcμοῖc ἕωc

ἂν μ]ή τι τῶν ἀcεβῶν

προ]cτάτ[τ]ωcιν. ὑ- (20)

περ]άνω γὰρ οἶμαι τὸν

1385 θεό]ν χε χρῆναι τε-

θεῖ]cθαι πάντων, λέ-

γω δ]ὲ τὸν ἀληθῆ{ι} καὶ

τιμώμ]ενον ἐν τῆι θε- (25)

ωρί]α[ι, ὡc] Ἐπίκου-

1390 ροc] προ[φέρει·] τῶν γὰρ

...]λ̣[.....] .πὸ τῶν

..]ω̣[.....]ν̣τας το̣[ ]

....]α̣cας ἔχει || (30)

– – – – – – – – – – – – –

||[..... ...]αμον [..... ..] διὰ του[..... .ἐπ]ιτιμη[..... ..]ωc τοῖc [περὶ 48
τὸ]ν Ἐπίκουρον, [οὐδὲ τ]οιαύτας ἐνε|[κ]ίνηcαν ὑπο[ψίας τἀcεβ]εῖν καὶ 1370
τἀμελεί[ν θεῶ]ν, οἵας ἀπηγόρευ[cα]ν οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὰ [κοι]νὰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ἔθη, δέον ἐμ[φαί]νειν τούτοις ἁ[π]λῶ[c τ]ὸν αὐθεκαc[τό]-
τερον λόγον ὅτι [χρ]ὴ πάντα πείθεc|[θαι] τοῖc νόμ[οι]c καὶ [τοῖ]c 1380
ἐθιcμοῖc ἕωc [ἂν μ]ή τι τῶν ἀcεβῶν [προ]cτάτ[τ]ωcιν. ὑ[περ]άνω γὰρ
οἶμαι τὸν [θεό]ν χε χρῆναι τε[θεῖ]cθαι πάντων, λέ[γω δ]ὲ τὸν ἀληθῆ
καὶ [τιμώμ]ενον ἐν τῆι θε[ωρί]α[ι, ὡc] Ἐπίκου|[ροc] προ[φέρει·] τῶν 1390
γὰρ [...]λ[.....] .πὸ τῶν [..]ω[.....]ντας το[..... ..]acac ἔχει ||

... (*6–8 words missing*) blame (*one word missing*) for Epicurus, nor have 48
they[1] stirred up such suspicions | of being impious and neglecting the 1370
gods, such as the laws and common customs of people forbade, since
it is necessary to declare to them simply and in a fairly direct manner
that every person must observe | the laws and the customs as long as 1380
they[2] do not command any element of impiety. For the deity, I think,
ought to have been deemed surpassing all things, that is to say, the deity
that is evident and honoured in ritual observance,[3] as Epicurus | pro- 1390
claims. For of the (*9–11 words missing + at least 1 col.*, c.*90 words*)

[1] Probably philosophers who, like Socrates, were punished by the Athenians (see 1358–63): i.e. they have not caused the Epicureans to be suspected of impiety.

[2] The laws and the customs.

[3] Or perhaps 'in intelligent contemplation'.

49 *O* 1077 fr. 2^{1-2} sin. (p. 94 G., p. 365 Ph.) = *O* 1077 fr. 1 subter positum, desunt *N*, *HV*² II (*O*¹ = Bodl. MS Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 960, *O*² = fol. 959)

1394 [κατατρέχουcι μὲν ἡμᾶc εἰπόντεc ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὠφέλιμα καταλείπεcθαι καὶ τὴν εὐργε]|cίαν quae praecedunt hunc in modum supplenda putamus, εὐεργε]|cίαν Henrichs 1395 Gomperz 1396 χ *O*, corr. Gomperz 1397 fin. μυ[*O*²: μυcετ[dubitanter *O*¹ 1399 δ⟨ι'⟩ οὓc γεί̣νο̣[ν]|τα[ι vel γεί̣νε|τα[ι Henrichs, de hoc loco desperavit Gomperz: δουcγcινε[ ]|τα[ ] *O* 1400 *: λ[.]τομενων vel -ο̣ν *O* 1402 εαι[.]και *O*, sed spat. vac. valde probabile fin. τ[ ]ον *O*¹: τ[.]ον *O*² 1404 Gomperz, init. χ[supplendum et corrigendum ex ν in v. 1486 (supposito) 1405 Philippson, init. ο[confirmat v. 1487 (suppositum): de forma ο vid. ποικ ap. v. 1507: δῆμ]ον Gomperz: μῶμ]ον Diels in Gomp. editionis exemplari Neapolit. fin. ε[...] *O* 1406 init. τηοχ[vel τηοπ[ex v. 1488 (supposito) εcοντc tum ην dubitanter *O*¹: εcοντc[*O*²: fort. -τηc πεcόντο̣[c τὰc ἥτ]τον: Ἐπί]κο̣υ̣ρο̣c ὄντω̣[c Philippson, sed nomen Epicuri iam v. 1403 1406–9 Gomperz 1407 init. -τον supplendum ex v. 1489 (supposito) 1409 π perperam per η *O* 1410 init. λ supplenda ex 1492 (supposito) 1411 | .]ην ex 1493 (supposito): [..]c *O* 1412 corr. Gomperz: init. .]ευ[.]προc *O*, spat. vac. valde probabile 1413 init. cλλ *O* 1420 Philippson: καλνερ *O*: καλὰ̣c ῥήceιc dubitanter Gomperz post col. 49 sequitur col. 50 in apogr. *O*

49

cίαν, οἷc ὁ βίοc ἡ[μ]ῶν — *O* 1077 2
διαcώζεται, φ[λ]υ-
αρίαν δὲ νο̣μίζεc-
θαι καὶ τὰ μυ[cτήρι-
α καὶ τὰc ἑορτὰc ἅ- (5)
τε τῶν δ⟨ι'⟩ οὓc γεί̣νο̣[ν-
τα[ι] λ[ε]χο̣μένω̣ν μ[η-
δενὸc ἐπιcτρέφε[c-
θαι. καί φαcι τὸν
Ἐπίκουρο̣ν ἐκπεφευ- (10)
γ̣[έν]αι τὸν Ἀττ[ι]κ[ὸν
ὅ̣[χλ]ον οὐχ ὅτι ε[...
τηογ̣εcοντο̣[... ἧτ-
τον ἀcεβεῖc εἶχ[εν
ὑπολήψειc, ἀλ[λὰ τῶι (15)
διαλελη̣θέν̣α[ι πολ-
λοὺc ἀνθ[ρ]ώπου[c
τ]ὴν φιλοcοφί̣[α]ν α[ὐ-
τ]ο̣ῦ. προcεπιφέρου-
cι̣ν̣ δὲ καὶ διότ[ι (20)
τ[ῶ]ν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν
καὶ δικαίων παραι-
ρούμεθα τὰ̣[c] καλὰc
ἐλπίδαc ἃc ἐν τοῖc
θ]εοῖc ἔχουcι καὶ δι- (25)
ὰ] τοῦτο μετὰ τὰc
καλλι̣ερήceιc καὶ || (27)

[εὐεργε]||cίαν, οἷc ὁ βίοc ἡ[μ]ῶν διαcώζεται, φ[λ]υαρίαν δὲ νομίζεcθαι καὶ τὰ μυ[cτήρι]α καὶ τὰc ἑορτὰc, ἅτε τῶν δ⟨ι'⟩ οὐc γίνο[ν]||τα[ι] λ[ε]χομένων μ[η]δενὸc ἐπιcτρέφε[c]θαι. καί φαcι τὸν Ἐπίκουρον ἐκπεφευχ[έν]αι τὸν Ἀττ[ι]κ[ὸν] ὄ[χλ]ον οὐχ ὅτι ε[...]τηογεcοντο[... ἧτ]τον ἀcεβεῖc εἶχ[εν] ὑπολήψειc, ἀλ[λὰ τῶι] διαλελῃθένα[ι πολ]||λοὺc ἀνθ[ρ]ώπου[c τ]ὴν φιλοcοφί[α]ν α[ὐτ]οῦ. προcεπιφέρουcιν δὲ καὶ διότ[ι] τ[ῶ]ν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ δικαίων παραιρούμεθα τὰ[c] καλὰc ἐλπίδαc ἃc ἐν τοῖc [θ]εοῖc ἔχουcι καὶ δι[ὰ] τοῦτο μετὰ τὰc | καλλιερήcειc καὶ ||

49

. . . and benefit, by which things[1] our life is preserved, but that the mysteries and festivals are regarded[2] as foolishness, since those[3] for whose sake they[4] take place | are said[5] to pay no attention to anything. They also claim that Epicurus escaped[6] from the Athenian masses not because (*2–4 words missing*)[7] he held less impious views, but because his philosophy had escaped the notice of many | people. And they charge in addition that we deprive good and just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods, and that therefore, after | propitious offerings and (*continues on*)

49

1400

1410

1420

[1] Context suggests that something like the following preceded: 'Our opponents object that Epicurus allows for assistance and benefit from the gods, by which our life is preserved, but . . .'.

[2] By Epicurus or Epicureans, according to opponents.

[3] The gods.

[4] Mysteries and festivals.

[5] By Epicureans.

[6] i.e. escaped prosecution or banishment by the Athenians.

[7] Missing is an explanation of how or why Epicurus held views less impious than those reputedly charged with impiety.

50 *O* 1077 fr. 2^{1-2} dext. (p. 94 G., 366 Ph.), desunt *N*, *HV*² II (O^1 = Bodl. MS Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 960, O^2 = fol. 959)

1421 cπου[δαίαc Gomperz 1421–2 κεὐ]|φώνουc Philippson 1422 λ̣[ι-τὰc *: λ̣[vel ι̣[*O*: ι̣[ὑχὰc Philippson 1422–3 supra ω scribitur o in *O*, [ἀναι]-|ροῦμεν Gomperz 1423–5 Philippson 1425 fort. εἰκ[αῖοι: εἰ κ[αὶ Philippson 1427–8 μεταβολ[ὰc ἠπό]|ρηcαν Philippson 1430 ante εις in marg. nota *N* et punctum stichometricum *O* αὐτ̣οὺ[c Gomperz nisi αὐτοῦ vel αὐ- 1430–2 Gomperz, nonnulla correxi 1433–4 ὁ]|ρίζ̣ειν *: PIZΦIN *O* 1434 μη[δὲν Gomperz 1434–5 ὁ]|μ̣ολ̣ογεῖν Gomperz: νουογειν *O*: και]|νολ̣ογεῖν D. Delattre privatim 1435 [φαcι] Philippson 1436–7 Philippson, fort. ἱ̣ε̣ρ̣[, nisi]χάcαcι cπ[1438–9 κε[χρήμε]|θα Philippson 1440 λεcν *O*: fort. ἴ]|λεο̣ν vel ἀπο]|λέcα̣ι 1440–1 e.g. ἐλαμ|β]άνετο vel ἐλαν|θ]άνετο 1443–4 ἑ]|ξ̣ ἐναντ[ί]ο[υ *: init. 1444 γ *O*: Ἐπικού[ρωι τό]| γ' ἐναντ[ί]ο[ν Philippson 1444–5 ἐλέ]|χθη καὶ ἐπ[ράχθη Gomperz 1446–7 ἔρ]|γων ἀπέβ[η Gomperz: λό]|γων Philippson fort. recte 1448 ρω^{r} ^{1}των *O*

50

τὰc cπου[δαίαc κεὐ- *O* 1077 2
φώνουc λ̣[ιτὰc ἀναι-
ρ[ω]῾ο[ῦ]῾μεν [τὴν παρα-
μυθίαν [τῶν εὐω-
1425 χιῶν. εικ[..... .. (5)
παῖδεc κ[..... ...
μεταβολ[..... ..
ρηcαν [.]κ[..... .
δὲ καὶ τα[..... ..
1430 N· εις αὐτ̣οὺ[c .... κε- (10)
ναῖc δόξ[αιc κατα-
χρῆcθαι κ[.....
περὶ θεῶν [..... ὁ-
ρίζ̣ειν μη[δε.... ὁ-
1435 μ̣ολ̣ογεῖν [..... . (15)
τὸ πάτρι̣[ον ... εὐ-
χὰc ἃc ιcπ[..... .
χρόνῳ κε[..... .
θα μηδὲν [..... .
1440 λεο̣ν καὶ το[..... (20)
.]άνετο λε[..... .
.]. ω δὲ τα[.....
τ' Ἐπικουρο[... ἐ-
ξ̣ ἐναντ[ί]ο[υ .....
1445 χθη καὶ ἐπ[..... . (25)
καὶ ἐκ τῶν [..... .
γων ἀπεβ[..... ..
ρῳ. τῶνδ[.....|| (28)

|| τὰc cπου[δαίαc κεὐ]φώνουc λ̣[ιτὰc ἀναι]ρο[ῦ]μεν [τὴν παρα]μυθίαν 50
[τῶν εὐω]χιῶν. εικ[..... ..] παῖδεc κ[..... ...] μεταβολ[..... ..]ρηcαν
[.]κ[..... .] δὲ καὶ τα[..... ..]|ειc αὐτο̣ὺ[c .... κε]ναῖc δόξ[αιc κατα]- 1430
χρῆcθαι κ[.....] περὶ θεῶν [..... ὁ]ρίζ̣ειν μη[δε.... ὁ]μ̣ο̣λ̣ογεῖν [..... .]
τὸ πάτρι̣[ον ... εὐ]χὰc ἃc ιcπ[.....] χρόνω κε[..... .]θα μηδὲν [.....
.]|λε̣ον καὶ το[..... .]άνετο λε[..... ..] . ω δὲ τα[.....]τ'Ἐπικουρο[... 1440
ἔ]ξ̣ ἐναντ[ί]ο[υ .....]χθη καὶ ἐπ[..... .] καὶ ἐκ τῶν [..... .]γων ἀπε-
β[..... ..]ρῳ. τῶνδ[.....]||

sincere and sonorous prayers, we do away with the excuse for sacri- 50
ficial feasting. (*several words missing*) children . . . change . . . moreover
the . . . | to employ empty opinions concerning the gods . . . to define 1430
nothing . . . to agree . . . one's country . . . prayers which . . . time
. . . nothing | . . . sacred . . . he/it appeared . . . and Epicurus . . . out 1440
of opposition . . . and from those (*6–8 words indistinguishable, then continues on*)

51 *N* 1098 fr. 3 (p. 118 G., 381 Ph.), *HV*² II 100

Test.: 1449–68 Zeno Sidonius fr. 22 Angeli–Colaizzo 1449 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 34 *puerilibus fabulis refersit libros* 1450 Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 18 *Chrysippus, qui Stoicorum somniorum vaferrumus habetur interpres*; ibid. 1. 42 *delirantium somnia*

1449 Philippson coll. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 34 1450 Gomperz: ὀνειρωτ[ικῶν Quaranta 1451 καταφρονῶ[ν Gomperz dubitanter: καταφρονῶ Pease ad Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 34 fin. [περί Bücheler 1452 fin. suppl. Bücheler 1453–4 πάντων] (iam Quaranta) | καθόλου το[ιούτων Bücheler 1454 δ *N* 1455 ἀκολούθω[c Bücheler 1455–6 ἔπρα]|ξεν Gomperz: |τεν *N*: ἔπρατ]|τεν Anon. A: εἶ]ᾱεν Bücheler 1456–7 ἐδογ[μάτι]|cεν iam Quaranta, Bücheler 1457 κα[τεχρῆτο *: fort. κἀ[χρῆτο: κα[τὰ τῆς (sc. πίστεως) τοῖς Quaranta: κα[ὶ τῆς (sc. πίστεως) ἐν τοῖς] S. Stephens privatim [τοῖς] Philippson 1458–9 cημί]|οις D. Delattre privatim: ὁμοί]|οις Philippson: ἄλλ]|οις Gomperz, sed divisio inaudita 1459 ὅλ[ως *: ὅμ[ως (olim Henrichs dubitanter) vestigiis paulum aptius 1459–60 [ὑ]|πονο[η]-τ[έον] * 1460–3 exempli gratia *, 1460 καις, possis φ[υ]|λατ[post 1461 paragraphus *N*, fort. perperam posita, cf. 1460 καί 1462 ποις[.]δ[...]c[*N* 1463–4 Anon. A 1463 η[pars sin. η, sed alia littera esse non potest 1464 βολαις [...]υ[..]νθε *N* 1464–5 cυ]νθε|cίαν Philippson 1465 α⟨ἰ⟩ (sc. cυναγωγαί) πε[ρὶ τ]ούτ[ων Angeli–Colaizzo *CEπ* 9 (1979), 110, βί]ου *: α .ε[...]ουπ[..(.)|, inter α et ε pars sup. π, τ, ξ, γ: ἀπε[πο]ξίτ[ο Philippson fin. π[..(.)|, post part. sin. π nulla vestigia litterarum depinxit *N*: [αἱ Bücheler 1466 ad fin. versus με *N* 1466–7 γενόμε|ναι Bücheler–Gomperz: γενομέ[νη]|ν αἱ proposuit D. Delattre privatim, sed spatii ad finem v. 1466 parum 1468 cιν[ ]το *N* 1468–72 Gomperz, nisi 1471 γ[εγον]έναι iam Quaranta 1473 γενέ[τα]c *: γενε[..]c *N*: γονε[ί]c Gomperz 1473–4 ἴca [θε]|οῖς Henrichs 1474–6 Gomperz 1474–5 fort. κη]|δεμον[ίᾳ 1476 ἑρῳ[τή|μαcι Quaranta: fort. pergit [ἀλλὰ καὶ etc. coll. 51–2 fort. coniungendae

51

δ' ὡc ἡβα[cκόντων ἢ 1098 3
ὀνειρωτ[τόντων
καταφρονῶ[ν· περί
τε γὰρ ἑορτ[ῶν καὶ
θυcιῶν καὶ [πάντων (5)
καθόλ̣ου το̣[ιούτων
ὡc ἀκολούθω[c ἔπρα-
ξ̣εν οἷc ἐδογ[μάτι-
cεν κα[τεχρῆτο τοῖc
ὅρκοιc καὶ τοῖc [cημί- (10)
οιc πίcτεωc ὅλ̣[ωc ὑ-
πονο̣[η]τ[έον,] καὶ ἐ̣[φύ-
λατ[τε· τοῖc δ' ἀν]θ̣ρ̣[ώ-
ποιc [τ]α̣[ύτην] κ̣[υριω-
τάτη[ν ἐν] τοῖc c̣[υμ- (15)
βολαίο̣[ιc τῇ]ν̣ [cυ]νθε-
cίαν α⟨ἰ⟩ π̣ε[ρὶ βί]ου π̣[αρὰ
Ζήνωνι γενόμε-
ναι cυναγωγαὶ δια-
caφοῦcιν· τοcοῦ̣[το (20)
τοίνυ̣[ν ἀ]πέcχε [τοῦ
βλαπ[τικ]ὸc ἀνθ[ρώ-
πων γ[εγον]έναι τι-
νὸc ὧ̣[cτε ο]ὐ μό̣[νον
τοὺc γενέ[τα]c ἴca [θε- (25)
οῖc ἐτίμηcεν [οὐ-
δὲ μόν[ον] πρὸc [τοὺc
ἀδελ̣[φο]ὺc ἐρῳ[τι||κῶc, (28)

|| δ' ὡc ἠβα[cκόντων ἢ]| ὀνειρωτ[τόντων] καταφρονῶ[ν· περί] τε γὰρ 1450 **51**
ἑορτ[ῶν καὶ] θυciῶν καὶ [πάντων] καθόλ̣ου το̣[ιούτων] ὡc ἀκολούθω[c
ἔπρα]ξ̣εν οἷc ἐδογ[μάτι]cεν κα[τεχρῆτο τοῖc] ὅρκοιc καὶ τοῖc [cη-
μεί]οιc πίcτεωc ὅλ̣[ωc ὑ]|πονο̣[η]τ[έον,] καὶ ἐ̣[φύ]λατ[τε· τοῖc δ' 1460
ἀν]θ̣ρ̣[ώ]ποιc [τ]α̣[ύτην] κ̣[υριω]τάτη[ν ἐν] τοῖc c̣[υμ]βολαίο[ιc τὴ]ν̣
[cυ]νθεcίαν α⟨ἰ⟩ π̣ε[ρὶ βί]ου π̣[αρὰ] Ζήνωνι γενόμεναι cυναγωγαὶ δια-
caφοῦcιν· τοcοῦ[το] τοίνυ[ν ἀ]πέcχε [τοῦ]| βλαπ[τικ]ὸc ἀνθ[ρώ]πων 1470
γ[εγον]έναι τι]νὸc ὥ̣[cτε ο]ὐ μό̣[νον] τοὺc γενέ[τα]c ἴcα [θε]οῖc ἐτίμη-
cεν [οὐ]δὲ μόν[ον] πρὸc [τοὺc] ἀδελ̣[φο]ὺc ἐρῳ[τι||κῶc,

. . . but despising them[1] as puerile or | as dreaming. And with regard 1450 **51**
to festivals and sacrifices and all such things generally, it must entirely be acknowledged that he[2] acted in accordance with what he believed and taught and that he faithfully employed oaths and tokens of good faith, | and he kept them; and the demonstrations[3] about his life which 1460
are in Zeno[4] make clear to people this most important testament among his agreements.[5] So far in fact was he from being | harmful to 1470
anyone of mankind that not only did he honour his parents as much as the gods, nor was he fondly disposed only towards his brothers, (*continued on*)

[1] Certain philosophers who theorized about the gods. The subject is singular, presumably Epicurus himself. [2] Epicurus. [3] i.e. in Zeno's writings.
[4] Zeno of Sidon the Epicurean, one of Philodemus' teachers, who taught at Athens in the second century BC. [5] i.e. Epicurus' will.

52 *O* 1077 fr. 1 sin. (p. 365 Ph.), desunt *N*, *HV*² II (*O* = Bodl. MS Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 958 apographum solum)

nihil hic discerni potest nisi verba singula 1478–9 τοῖc φί]|[λοιc Philippson 1479 α]ὐτὸν Philippson 1480 ο]ὐδὲ Philippson 1486–93 subter positum = *O* 1077 fr. 2 sin., vv. 11–18 init., de loco vero vid. supra, 1404–11 1486 χ, vid. v. 1404: λ, μ, ν *O* 1487 ο, vid. v. 1405: θ *O*, sed de forma vid. ποικ ap. v. 1507 1488 vel π[, vid. 1406 1493 φ[ex *O* 1077 fr. 2,18, vid. supra, 1411: ϕ[vel θ ut vid. *O* 1494 deperiit 1495–6 ψυ|[χαγωγεῖν Philippson 1497 vel]λ *O* 1501 vel]ϛ *O* 1502 vel]π̲ vel]ι *O* 1504 vel]π̣εοc *O*: νομιc]τέοc Philippson post col. 52 sequitur col. 53 in apographo

52

....]δεc ἐν *O* 1077 1
....]τοιc φι-
....]υτον
1480 ....]τδε
....]ν̣και (5)
....]τα πάν-
τα ....]ο̣δο
....]φα
1485 ....]αν
....]{χ̣}εν (10)
....]{ο̊[} [..]
....]{τηογ̣[}
....]{τον ἀc[}
1490 ....]{ὑπολή[}
....]{δι̣αλελ[} (15)
....]{λοὺc ἀ[}
....]{[τ]ὴν φ̣[}
[ ]
1495 ....]οψυ
....] ὥcτε (20)
....]απα
....] ἀ̣cε-
β..... ....]cαι
1500 ....]ν̣ετο
....]κ̣αι (25)
....]η̣cου
....]ocου
....]τ̣εοc || (28)

||[..... ....]δεc ἐν[..... ....]τοιc φι[..... .....]υτον ||[..... ..... .]τδε 1480 **52**
[..... .....]ν̣και[..... ....]τα πάν[τα ....]ο̣δο[..... ....]φα[.....
....]αν[..... ....]εν[..... ....
.... | 1490
....]οψυ[..... .....] ὥcτε [..... .....]απα[..... .....] ἀ̣cε[β.....
....]cαι |[..... .....]ν̣ετο [..... ..... .]κ̣αι[..... .....]η̣cου[..... .....] 1500
ocου[..... .....]τ̣εοc ||

(*traces of c.90 words, then continues on*)

53 *O* 1077 fr. 1 med. (p. 93 G., 365 Ph.), desunt *N*, *HV*² II (*O* = Bodl. MS Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 958 apographum solum)

Test.: 1505–32 *Test. Socr.* 36 Acosta–Angeli

1507 ποικίλως Acosta–Angeli, *Test. Socr.* 36 1508 πος^{r} ˀως *O* 1511 fin. τι| *O* 1512 ναι^{r} ˀτοι *O* 1513 Gomperz 1514 θελι^{r} ˀτων *O*, spatium inepte interpositum apogr., corr. Gomperz 1516 fin. φων^{r} ˀε *O* 1518–19 και|κ, κάκ 1520, 1524–8 suppl. Gomperz 1525 ως^{r} ˀcυν *O* 1526 init.]υτων *O* fin. μεγαλο̣με|[ρῶ]c aptius vestigiis quam μεγαλο̣π̣ρε|[πῶ]c vel μεγαλο̣π̣ρε|[πῆ]c, vid. 1817: μεγμωνε[*O*, corr. Gomperz 1528 αμο[*O*, corr. Gomperz 1529 χρηελτον, λ sscr. *O*, corr. Gomperz 1530–1 suppl. Gomperz 1531 επεεεε *O* 1532 ας^{r} ˀουδε *O* apographum litteras primas columnae tertiae (*O* 1077 fr. 1 dext.) descripsit, de loco vero vid. 1543–60 coll. 53–4 coniunxi

53 1505 οὖcι καὶ κατὰ τὰc αἱ-
ρέcειc τῶν βίων οὕ-
τω{ι} ποικίλοις ἄλυ-
πος, ὥcτε πρὸc
μηδένα μηδεμί- (5)
1510 αν οὐχ ὅτι δίκην ἀλ-
λὰ μηδ' ἀντιλογί-
αν ἐcχηκέναι. τοι-
γ]αροῦν ἐνίων μὲν
ἐνκληθέντων ἐπὶ (10)
1515 τῶι βίωι καὶ τοῖc λό-
γοιc φιλοcόφων, ἐ-
νίων δὲ κἀκ τῆc πό-
λεωc, τινῶν δὲ κἀ{ι}-
κ τῆc cυμμαχίαc ἐ- (15)
1520 ξοριcθέντων καὶ θ[α-
νατωθέντων, ἁπάν-
των δὲ κωμωιδη-
θέντων, μόνος Ἐπί-
κ]ουροc ἅμα τοῖc γνη- (20)
1525 cί]ωc cυνβιώcαcι[ν
α]ὐτῶι μεγαλο̣με-
ρῶ]c διεφύλαξεν αὐ-
τ]όν, ἀλλ' ο[ὐ]δ' ὑπὸ τὸ
μιcόχρηcτον cτό- (25)
1530 μα καὶ πάντα [cι]νό-
μενον ἔπεcε τ[ῆc
κωμῳδίαc· οὐδὲ || (28)

|| *οὖσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν βίων οὕτω ποικίλοις ἄλυπος, ὥστε* **53**
πρὸς μηδένα μηδεμί|αν οὐχ ὅτι δίκην ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἀντιλογίαν ἐσχηκέναι. 1510
τοι[γ]αροῦν ἐνίων μὲν ἐγκληθέντων ἐπὶ τῶι βίωι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις φι-
λοσόφων, ἐνίων δὲ κἀκ τῆς πόλεως, τινῶν δὲ κἀκ τῆς συμμαχίας 1520
ἐ|ξορισθέντων καὶ θ[α]νατωθέντων, ἁπάντων δὲ κωμωιδηθέντων, μό-
νος Ἐπί[κ]ουρος ἅμα τοῖς γνη[σί]ως συμβιώσασι[ν α]ὐτῶι μεγαλο|με-
[ρῶ]ς διεφύλαξεν αὑ[τ]όν, ἀλλ' ο[ὐ]δ' ὑπὸ τὸ μισόχρηστον στό|μα καὶ 1530
πάντα [σι]νόμενον ἔπεσε τ[ῆς] κωμῳδίας· οὐδὲ ||

. . . as diverse as they were even in their chosen styles of life he[1] was **53**
inoffensive to them,[2] so that not only did he not engage in any | law- 1510
suit against anyone, he did not even have a quarrel. In fact, while some
philosophers were prosecuted for their way of life and for their teach-
ings, and some were | exiled from city, some even from league, and put 1520
to death, and all became the butt of writers of comedy, only Epicurus
magnificently secured protection for himself together with those who
dwelt with him according to the genuine precepts of the school,
without falling prey to the virtue-hating and all-harassing | mouth of 1530
comedy. And he did not even (*continues on*)

[1] Epicurus. [2] The Athenians.

54 *O* 1077 fr. 1 dext. (desunt *N*, *HV*² II) // *N* 1098 fr. 2 (p. 117 G., 380 Ph.), *HV*² II 99

1533–4 *: ἔρ]ρηξεν |[φωνὴν Philippson: inf. et sup. partes ξ descr. *N* 1534–6 *: co|[φιστῶι (sic) Anon. A: εἰ τ]ῶν co|[φῶν λόγων ἐ]μνημό|[νευcεν Philippson 1536–7 το|[coῦ]τον Gomperz 1538 ἡ π]ά[ν]των L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: ἡ] α[ὐ]τῶν Philippson sed nec spatio nec sensui aptum 1538–9 ἐπ[ιτ]ε|[λ]ῆc Philippson, cf. Hor. *Ep.* 1. 1. 34–7 *certa piacula*: ἐπ[ιμ]ε|[λ]ῆc P. Parsons privatim 1540–3 Gomperz, 1540–8 plurima iam Quaranta 1540 init. pars dext. ν vel α̣ι vel δ̣ι *N* 1543–60 primam quamque litteram ex *O* 1077 fr. 1 dext. (vid. col. 53 app. crit.) supplevi 1543 fin. τοῦ̣ Gomperz: τοι *N* 1544 θέ]λειν Philippson, confirmavit *O* 1077 fr. 1 dext. init. ε[apogr. *O*: μέλ]λειν Gomperz 1545 fin. των[.]ο *N*, sed spat. vac. valde probabile 1545–8 Gomperz 1545–6 vel ὃ|τ[ι δ']// αὖ 1549–50 Philippson 1550 init. vel ν̣[apogr. *O* 1551–5 Gomperz 1552 init. vel λ̣[apogr. *O* 1554 init. vel ν̣[apogr. *O* fin. εχο *N* 1555–6 [αὐτῶ]ι δη|[λοῖ Philippson 1556–9 exempli gratia * 1558 init. κ̣ι[apogr. *O* δ̣ι[ά *: pars dext. ν[vel α̣ι[vel δ̣ι[*N* 1559 κ̣αι vel ς̣αι *N*, fort. μ[α-το]// ς̣ αιδε[1560 τ̣ i.e. τ̣ vel π̣, fort. τ̣ὸν β[ίον: τοῦ]τον β[λάπτειν Philippson

54

φωνὴν ἔρ]ρηξέν *O* 1077 1 // *N* 1098 2
τινα κατὰ τ]ῶν co-
φιστῶν οἳ ἐ]μνημό-
νευca]ν αὐτοῦ· το-
coῦ]τον ἴcχυcεν (5)
ἡ π]ά[ν]των ἐπ[ιτ]ε-
λ]ὴc φυλακὴ τῶν
δι' ἐνεργείας ἢ δι-
ὰ] λόγου τινὰc λυ-
πηc]όντων ἢ φαν- (10)
τ̣[α]//cίαν μόνον τοῦ̣
θ̣[έ]//λειν βλάπτειν
π̣[α]//ρεξόντων· ὃ
γ[ὰρ]// αὖ τινες ἐ[τ]όλ-
μ̣[ηc]//αν εἰπεῖν ὅτι (15)
τ[οῖc]// ἀνθρώποις οὐ-
κ [ἐγ]//εινώcκε[τ]ο, πρῶ-
τ̣[ο]//ν τὸ μὴ γ[εγο]νέ-
ν̣[αι]// τῶν cυνπολε[ι-
τ̣[ευ]//ομένων βλα- (20)
π̣[τι]//κὸν μήτ' αὐτὸν
μ̣[ήτ]//ε [τ]οὺc cυνς̣χο-
λ̣[άζ]//οντας [αὐτῶ]ι δη-
[λοῖ, ἔπειτα δὲ δια-]
βο[λὴ]//ν πικρ̣[ὰν ἢ δί- (25)
κη̣[ν]// δ̣ι[ὰ] κυρίου̣ δό[γ-
μ[ατος]// κ̣αιδc[.]θιη
τ[..... .]//τ̣ον β[... ‖ (28)

||[φωνὴν ἔρ]ρηξέν [τινα κατὰ τ]ῶν co[φιστῶν οἳ ἐ]μνημό[νευca]ν αὐτοῦ· το[coῦ]τον ἴcχυcεν [ἡ π]ά[ν]των ἐπ[ιτ]ε[λ]ὴc φυλακὴ τῶν | δι' ἐνεργείας ἢ δι[ὰ] λ̣όγου τινὰc λυ[πηc]όντων ἢ φαντ̣[α]cίαν μόνον τοῦ θ̣[έ]λειν βλάπτειν π̣[α]ρεξόντων· ὃ γ[ὰρ] αὖ τινεc ἐ[τ]όλμ̣[ηc]αν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τ[οῖc] ἀνθρώποιc οὐκ [ἐγ]ινώcκε[τ]ο, πρῷ|τ̣[ο]ν τὸ μὴ γ[ε-γο]νέν̣[αι] τῶν cυμπολ[ι]τ̣[ευ]ομένων βλαπ̣[τι]κὸν μήτ' αὐτὸν μ̣[ήτ]ε [τ]οὺc cυc̣χολ̣[άζ]ονταc [αὐτῶ]ι δη[λοῖ, ἔπειτα δὲ δια]βο[λὴ]ν πικρ̣[ὰν ἢ δί]κη[ν] δ̣ι̣[ὰ] κυρίου δό[γ]μ[ατοc] κ̣αιδc[.]θιη|τ[..... .]τ̣ον β[...]||

utter a word against the sophistical orators who made mention of him;[1] so great was the strength of the effective precaution against all things | that could possibly annoy anyone in deed or word, or even give the impression of intending[2] to inflict harm. For what some have ventured to say, namely that he went unknown to people,[3] shows | first of all that neither he nor his followers[4] were harmfully disposed towards their fellow citizens; and then that no bitter slander or lawsuit on account of a major doctrine | . . . (*continues on*)

54 1540 1550 1560

[1] Epicurus.
[2] Or 'wishing'.
[3] See above 1408–12.
[4] Or 'fellow philosophers'.

55 *N* 1098 fr. 1 (p. 116 G., 380 Ph.), *HV*² II 98

multa incerta 1561–2 [θε|ῶν] Philippson 1562–3 [βου|λό]μεθα Philippson 1563 μη[δέ]ν[α Philippson: μη[δέ]ν Gomperz 1564 ν̣[vel λ̣[vel μ̣[*N*: ὃ ἄλ̣[λ]ον Philippson: δ ἄλ[ογ]ον Anon. A 1566–7 ἀν[υπο]|μνήστους Gomperz (verbum non aliter repertum, sed cf. ἄμνηστος) 1567 εἶν̣α[ι corr. Gomperz: μα[.] *N* 1569–70 Gomperz 1571–2 θεολ]|όγ[ων ἢ Gomperz, sed divisio quod sciam inaudita: οπ[vel ογω̣[*N* 1572–4 Gomperz 1573 το̣[ῖς, ̣ circuli arcus inf. sin. *N*: τ̣ι̣ [τῶν]| παραδεδομέν[ων] Anon. A 1576–7 *:]ενο[.]| *N*: ἐ[πι]δεί-[κ]νυ[μ]εν ὅ|τι Philippson 1577–8 Philippson 1581 γνη[σί|ως Philippson 1582 vel c]υνῆν (Gomperz) vel δικαιος]ύνην 1584 Gomperz 1585 κατεκ]τύπησα[ν Anon. A: περὶ] τύχης coni. Philippson 1586–8 deperierunt

55

το]ῖς πολλοῖς [.. 1098 1
..]ο̣υ δινῶ̣ν [...
..]μεθα μη[δέ]ν[α
ποιεῖν οαν̣[..]ον[.
ἢ μὴ τῶν ἰδιωτ[έ- (5)
ρων, ὅλως τε ἀν[υπο-
μνήστους εἶν̣α[ι
πλὴν ὅσον ἀναγ-
καῖον ἐς τ[ὸν] βίον·
οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶ[ν δια- (10)
βληθέντων [θεολό-
{ο}γω̣[ν ἢ] φιλο̣[σόφων
ἐνεκύρησε το̣[ῖς
παραδεδομέν[οις,
ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὄχλοις (15)
ἐ̣[πι]δει[κ]νύ[μ]ενό[ς
τι [..... ... οὐ]δέ-
ν' ἐλύ]πη[σεν ..]ν[.
[ ]
ο[.....]ου[..... (20)
μᾶλλον ὅτι γνη[...
....-ς]υνην
μετακ[..... ..]τε
π[άνδ]εινοι λόγοι
....]τυπησα[... (25)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]|| (28)

||[το]ῖc πολλοῖc [....]ọυ δεινῶ̣ν [.....]μεθα μη[δέ]ν[α] ποιεῖν οαν̣[..] 55
ον[.] ἢ μὴ τῶν ἰδιωτ[έ]ρων, ὅλως τε ἀν[υπο]μνήστους εἶ̣ν̣α[ι] πλὴν
ὅcον ἀναγκαῖον ἐc τ[ὸν] βίον· | οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶ[ν δια]βληθέντων [θεολό]- 1570
γω̣[ν ἢ] φιλο̣[cόφων] ἐνεκύρηcε το̣[ῖc] παραδεδομέν[οιc,] ἀλλὰ τοῖc
ὄχλοιc ἐ̣[πι]δει[κ]νύ[μ]ενό[c] τι [..... ... οὐ]δέν' [ἐλύ]πη[cεν ..]ν[.....
....]|ο[.....]ου[.....] μᾶλλον ὅτι γνη[..... ....-c]υνην μετα- 1580
κ[..... ..]τε π[άνδ]ειvοι λόγοι [....]τυπηca[..... ....
....]||

... towards the many (*one word missing*) of clever orators we (*one word* 55
missing) to do or not (*word missing*) than those who are not members of
the school,[1] and to be entirely unmentioned, except in so far as it is
necessary to live. | For he[2] did not at all come into contact with the 1570
traditions[3] of the theologians or philosophers discredited in the mass
mind, demonstrating to the crowds that (*one word missing*) he harmed
no one (*several words missing*) | rather because (*one word missing*) justice 1580
(*one word missing*) clever speeches (*10–12 words missing, then continues on*)

[1] i.e. Epicureans, literally 'of (or than) those who are private persons' (or 'laymen').
[2] Epicurus. [3] Literally 'things handed down', thus possibly 'teachings'.

56 *P.Herc.* 229 fr. 9 sin. = *N* 229 fr. 9 (p. 151 G., 405 Ph.), *HV*² II 31

1589–1616 columna in duas partes ad iuncturam (κόλλημα) fissa est, contulit M. Arman 1915 1589 καθ]εσταμέν[ο]ν Anon. A 1590 ἔτη{ι} Henrichs, iota sc. muto perperam adscripto: ετην *N* 1591 καθ' ἕ]καστα Anon. A cχ[ό]ντα *, cχ[*N*, χ deest pap.: δι]καστὰc ⟨c⟩χ[ό]ντα Philippson 1592 περι] *: κἀπὸ] Philippson τῆς πόλ[εω]c Anon. A 1592–3 οὐ|[κ ἀ]πραγμον[ῶ]ς *: οὐ |[τετα]ραγμέν[ον Philippson 1593 δι'*, δι pap., dispexit M. Arman 1594–5 ἀν]ειμένη[c ὦ]cπερ |[δι]αίτης Philippson 1595 ἄ[γον]τ'*, una hasta inclinata ad dext., fin. τα vel γα 1596 Ἀ|[θη]ναίων Anon. A: δι]αιων[ί]ου Gomperz: init. ν vel αι *N*, deperiit pap. νων⌜ ⌝ουκ[..]θα pap., ου[..]α *N* 1596–7 fort. ἀ|[ναι]δῆ 1597]δητου *N*, ητ deperiit pap. 1597–8 διαλα|[βεῖ]ν iam Quaranta, Gomperz: διαλα|[θεῖ]ν Philippson 1598]θι[pap., dispexit M. Arman:]ειαν *N*: κα[ὶ θ]ίαν |[φύcιν] ταῦτα Quaranta 1599 pars sup.]τ,]χ,]π,]c, tum ad fin. ων pap.: ωc *N* 1600 ποῖά τιν[α Gomperz 1601 fin.]ρου *N*: pars. sup.]τ,]χ,]π,]c, tum ου pap. 1603 init.]της pap.:]επε, fort. suppositum *N* 1604 πον]ηρίας R. Janko privatim: cωτ]ηρίας Philippson 1604–5 fort. ὅχ|[λου, quamquam ὅ]χλου expectares 1605 δι'] ἀφρο[cύνη]ν Philippson 1606 fin. fort. κ]αίτο[ι 1607 οὖν Philippson: ουι[*N* 1608 fin.]τ,]π, vel]χ pap. 1611]κλο pap.: λ[.]ο *N* 1612 cυνβέ[β]ηκεν dispexit Henrichs: cυνβε[..]κεν pap.: cυνβc[.]ηκcν *N* 1613 επι{c}[...]ιοτα pap.: επιcτομετα *N* 1613–14 ἀ|[ρί]cτων Philippson 1614–15 ἀπάν|[τω]ν Gomperz 1615–16 ἀ|[φ]θόνου[c Philippson: ἀ|[γα]θόν spatio aptius Gomperz:]θονου[*N*, deperiit pap. 1616–17 τους||ν[pap., τους|| *N* post col. 56 sequitur col. 57 in pap.

56

...]εcταμέν[ο]ν 229 9
διὰ] τοcαῦτ' ἔτη{ι}
καθ' ἕ]καcτα cχ[ό]ντα
περὶ] τῆς πόλ[εω]ς οὐ-
κ ἀ]πραγμόν[ω]ς, δι' (5)
ἀν]ειμένη[c ὦ]cπερ
δι]αίτης ἄ[γον]τ' Ἀ-
θη]ναίων οὐκ [.]θα
..]δη τοῦ διαλα-
βεῖ]ν ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ] θίαν (10)
....] ταῦτα [.]cων
...]ποια τιν[..]φρο
.....]αλλε[.] .ου
...] ἐπιcτη[μ.]εικαι
...]της π[.....]λ[(15)
...]ηρίας [..]coχ
....] ἀφρο[....]νεν
...]νceις[....]αιτο
....]ουν[..... .]ν
....]ων[.....]το (20)
....]αιcιου[..]εναι
...]ωτacc[..]ανη
...]ceινα[. .]κλο
..]c cυνβέ[β]ηκεν
..]επι{cτομε}ιοτα (25)
....]cτων ἀπάν-
τω]ν καὶ δι' ἀ τοὺc ἀ-
φ]θόνου[c τού]τους || (28)

|||[...]εcταμέν[ο]ν |[διὰ] τοcαῦτ' ἔτ̣η [καθ' ἕ]καcτα cχ[ό]ντα [περὶ] τ̣ῆc 1590 **56**
πόλ[εω]c οὐ[κ ἀ]π̣ραγμόν̣[ω]ς̣, δι' [ἀν]ειμένη[c ὥ]cπερ [δι]αίτηc
ἄ̣[γον]τ̣' Ἀ[θη]ν̣αίων οὐκ [.]θ̣α[..]δη τοῦ διαλα[βεῖ]ν̣ ἀλλὰ κα̣[ὶ] θείαν
[....] ταῦτα [.]ς̣ων|[...]π̣οια τιν[..]φρο[.....]α̣λλε[.].ου[...] ἐπι- 1600
cτη[μ.]εικαι[...]τηc π[.....]λ̣[...]ηρίαc [..]coχ[....] ἀφρο[....]νεν
[...]ν̣ceιc̣[....]αιτ̣ο[....]ουν̣[..... .]ν[....]ων[.....]τ̣ο[....]αιciου[..]ε-
ναι |[...]ωτacc[..]ανη[...]ceινα[..]κλο[..]ς̣ cυμβέ[β]ηκεν [..]επιιοτα 1610
[....]cτων ἁπάν[τω]ν καὶ δ̣ιὰ τοὺc ἀ[φ]θόνου[c τού]τ̣ουc ||

...having proved to be | in each case after conducting himself[1] so many 1590 **56**
years in a manner not inactive towards the city,[2] as though because the
lifestyle of some Athenians was dissolute, acting not ... of grasping, but
also divine ... | (c.*60 words indistinguishable*) | of all and because of these 1600/1610
who were ungrudging (*continued on*)

[1] viz. Epicurus. [2] i.e. playing his full part in public life.

57 *P.Herc.* 229 fr. 9 dext.; desunt *N*, *HV*² II

nihil hic discerni potest nisi litterae exiles 1619 τ̣[vel π̣[pap. 1623 ϵ̣[vel θ̣[pap. 1630–1 φυ]|λαττ̣[valde probabile 1632 fort. ψήφ[ισμα ante ψηφ[nota stichometrica ξ, lineola supra posita, et punctum stichometricum conspiciuntur post v. 1632 paragraphus pap. 1644–5 in marg. inf. litterae stichometricae aegre legi possunt, fort. μᾳ

57

υ[229 9
τ̣[
τ̣[
1620 α̣[
.[(5)
[
ϵ̣[
ν[
1625 κ[
cϵ[(10)
[
[
τοc̣[
1630 δϵ.[
λ̣ατ.[(15)
Ξ. ψηφ[
μεν̣[
.]π̣ο .[
1635 α̣ειφ[
τωιφ̣[(20)
τ̣ο[
ἀφθ[αρτ..... ...
c .̣ναια[..... ....
1640 ..... .]α̣π̣[..... ..
[ ] (25)
..... .]ντ̣ο[..... .
δϵ[..]ϵca[..... ..
διαμϵινα[..... ... || (28)
– – – – – – – – – – –

|| υ[..... ....]τ̣[..... ....]τ̣[..... ....]|α̣[..... ....] . 1620 **57**
[..... ....]ε̣[..... ....]ν̣[..... ....]κ[.....
....]cε[..... ....]τοc̣[..... ....]|δε[..... 1630
...]λατ̣.[..... ....]ψηφ[..... ....]μεν̣[..... ....]πο̣.[..... .....
..]α̣ειφ[..... ....]τωιφ̣[..... ....]το̣[..... ....] ἀφθ[αρτ.....
...]c .ν̣αια[..... .... | ..... .]α̣π̣[..... ....]ντο̣[..... 1640
.]δε[..]εca[..... ..]διαμεινα[..... ...]||

58 *N* 229 fr. 7 (p. 149 G., 404 Ph.), *HV*² II 29

Test.: 1645–1701 *Test. Socr.* 39 Acosta–Angeli

1645 ἀμύκτηρες Philippson 1646 ὅτι γ]ὰρ *: οὐ γ]ὰρ Philippson 1647–51 Philippson 1652–8 ὅσα κοι]νοῦν ἐνό|[μιζεν] τοῖς μετ' [αὐ|τοῦ καὶ c]ὠσαι δι-ά|[φυγον] τὸ περαίτε|[ρον καὶ] ἐπίτηκτον, |[τό τε π]ροσοργίζε|[σθαι καὶ τὸ] χλευάζον Philippson 1652 una hasta sup.,]τ,]γ,]c possis *N* 1654 cαι' 'διε *N* 1658 init. χ, κ, ς, χλευάζον Philippson: ἐ]χλεύα-ζον Quaranta 1659–64 παρήινει] δὲ τούτοις |[μηδ' ὡς οἱ λο]ιποὶ διω[ρ|γίσθαι τισὶ]ν [τ]οῦ τε σώ|[ζειν, ὅσον π]αρήσετα[ι, τὴν πάντω]ν φιλίαν |[ἐφίεσθαι restit. Philippson 1661]ν vel]αι *N* ν' 'ουτε *N* 1661–2 οὔτε Cω|[κράτης Bücheler 1664–7 Philippson 1668 δ]αιμόνιον Bücheler:]ημονιον, init. pars dext. η ut vid. *N* 1669 ἐκθέντε]ς *: ἐκθεί]ς spatio brevius Philippson:]ς, ut tantum duo rami extremi dext., vel ς vel χ vel κ *N*, οὐ]κ ἀνήρουν proposuit Henrichs, ἀνήρουν iam Bücheler–Gomperz, de orthographia vid. *MGrHett* 222–3: ἀνῆρε{ι}ν Philippson 1670 τὸν θεό]ν Philippson: καινό]ν Anon. A, ν certum, angulus inf. et pars extrema dext. *N* μ[ὲν Philippson: fort. μ[ό|νον] 1671 οὗτος] *: ἐκεῖνος] Philippson 1671–3 Philippson: οὐ μαχόμε|[νον], γείνε|[σθαι Anon. A 1672]ν angulus inf. et pars extrema dext. ν *N* 1672–3 γείνε|[σθ' ἀσεβὴς spatio longius Philippson: fort. γείνε[ς|θ' αἴτιος 1673–4 ἐφαί||νετο, coll. 58–9 coniunxit Bücheler

58

1645 ....]α μυκτῆ-
ρες· ὅτι γ]ὰρ ἠξίω-
θησαν ἐπὶ] πολὺ τοῦ
καθηγ]εμόνος
..... . ἀ]ποβεβη-
1650 κέναι, ὥιο]ντο δέον
καταλαμ]βάνειν
..... .] . ουν ἐνο-
..... .] τοῖς μετ' [αὐ-
τοῦ ....]ωσαι διε-
1655 ....]το περαίτε-
ρον καὶ] ἐπίτηκτον
..... π]ροσοργιζε-
....]χλευαζον·
..... .]δε τούτοις
1660 ..... . λο]ιποὶ διω-
..... .]ν οὔτε cω-
..... .π]αρήσετα[ι
..... .]ν φιλίαν
....] ὅθεν ἔ-
1665 δοξέν τισιν] αὐτῶν
ὁ Cωκράτ]ης κέν-
τρον τι συ]λλέγες-
θαι, ὅτι τὸ δ]αιμόνιον
ἐκθέντε]ς ἀνήρουν
1670 τὸν θεό]ν· εἰπὼν μ[ὲν
οὗτος] οὐ μαχόμε-
να οἷς ὥιο]ντο, γείνε[σ-
θ' ἀσεβὴς] ἅπαν ἐφαί- ||

229 7 (5) (10) (15) (20) (25) (29)

||[..... ..]α μυκτῆ[ρες· ὅτι γ]ὰρ ἠξίω[θησαν ἐπὶ] πολὺ τοῦ [καθηγ]ε- **58**
μόνος [..... . ἀ]ποβεβη|[κέναι, ὤιο]ντο δέον [καταλαμ]βάνειν [..... .] 1650
ουν ἐνο[..... .] τοῖς μετ' [αὐτοῦ ....]ωσαι διε[..... ..]το περαίτε[ρον
καὶ] ἐπίτηκτον [..... π]ροσοργιζε[..... ..]χλευαζον· [..... .]δε τούτοις
|[..... . λο]ιποὶ διω[..... .]ν οὔτε σω[..... .π]αρήσετα[ι ..... .]ν φιλίαν 1660
[..... ...] ὅθεν ἔ[δοξέν τισιν] αὐτῶν [ὁ Σωκράτ]ης κέν[τρον τι συ]λλέ-
γεσ[θαι, ὅτι τὸ δ]αιμόνιον [ἐκθέντε]ς ἀνῄρουν |[τὸν θεό]ν· εἰπὼν μ[ὲν 1670
οὗτος] οὐ μαχόμε[να οἷς ὤιο]ντο, γίνε[σθ' ἀσεβὴς] ἅπαν ἐφαί- ||

. . . (*one word missing*) over-proud. For because they were regarded to **58**
have proved far . . . than the leader (*one word missing*) to have resulted,
they thought it necessary to grasp (*several words missing*) | to those fol- 1650
lowing him (*several words missing*) immoderate and dissimulating (*one
word missing*) incite to anger (*one word missing*) scoffing, (*one word miss-
ing*) but to those (*one word missing*) | the rest (*one word missing*) and not 1660
(*one word missing*) he/it will be present (*one word missing*) friendship (*one
word missing*). Whereby Socrates seemed to some of them[1] to incur
a sting, because by exposing the divinity, they did away with | the deity; 1670
while by saying nothing in contradiction with the things they thought,
he appeared entirely guilty of the charge of impiety (*continues on*)

[1] The Athenians.

59 *N* 229 fr. 8 (p. 150 G., 404 Ph.), *HV*² II 30

Test.: 1679–81 *EGF* F dub. 5 Davies = *PEG* Cypria 16 Bernabé; Diog. Laer. *Vitae* 2. 117, Bion F 25 Kindstrand; Athen. 1. 4b = Clearchus Soleus fr. 90 Wehrli 1674–1701 *Test. Socr.* 39 Acosta–Angeli

1675 θεν^{r} ¹[*N* 1675–6 ἑ]|τ[ι] δ' Bücheler ὅ]|τ[ι] δ' Gomperz 1679–81 multa egregie Bernabé, *Emerita*, 50 (1982), 81–7 1681 ὄχλον add. *, cf. Diog. Laer. *Vitae* 2. 117, Athen. 1. 4b 1682 ειν^{r} ¹και 1682–5 Bücheler 1684 πολειτι[.]ει[*N*, corr. Bücheler: τ[ότε Acosta–Angeli: fort. πολειτι[κ]εί[ας perperam 1685–6 τ[ὰς, Acosta–Angeli, δ[υς]|μενείας Bücheler–Gomperz 1686 ante init. versus nota stichometrica ο, lineola supra posita, et punctum stichometricum conspiciuntur 1686–7 ὧν[περ *, τῷ[ι Acosta–Angeli: εἶ]|τα [χ]ρόνωι Gomperz: una hasta sup., τ, χ, π, ξ, tum una hasta inclinata ad dext., λ, α, δ sed possis etiam ω ante [..] *N*: δῆ]|τα D. Delattre privatim: μα]|κρ[ῶι χ]ρόνωι Bücheler 1687–8 μ[ί]|c[ος] Bücheler 1688 cυνηθροίcθ[η] iam Quaranta, Bücheler 1690–1 χρ]ῆ[c]|θαι Bücheler, dubitanter Gomperz app. crit.: ἀν]ῆ[φ]|θαι Gomperz in text.: ἀν]η[ιρῆc]|θαι contra spatium Philippson 1691–2 τοι-|αύτην Gomperz: τοι[c | τ]αύτην Bücheler 1692 τἀκεῖνα Gomperz: τἀκεῖνα [τε Bücheler 1694 [δηλοῖ *: [cυμφορὰν Philippson 1695 μοι τὸ *, μοιτο *N* δεδι[έναι *: δεδι[έναι καὶ spatio longius Philippson: post δε spatiolum *N* 1696–7 iam Quaranta, Bücheler 1699 λωc^{r} ¹αλ *N* post 1699 paragraphus *N* 1701 γε τὸ Bücheler: γετο|| *N*: γεχο||-[νότα] Gomperz

59

νετο καὶ διὰ τοῦ- 229 8
τ' οὐκ ἔπειθεν· [ἔ-
τ[ι] δ' ἦν πολὺc ἐν
τοῖc ὄχλοιc Cωκρά-
της, δέον καὶ τοῖc (5)
ἐπάγουcιν τὸν "οὐ-
κ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ cκε[δ]ά-
cειc ⟨ὄχλον⟩;" λόγον πρόχει-
ρον ἔχειν· καὶ π[ολ-
λοὺ[c] διηρέθιζε (10)
καὶ πολειτι[κὰ]ς τ[ότ'
ἐπανῃρεῖτο τ[ὰc δυc-
Ō. μενείας, ἐξ ὧν[περ
τῷ[ι χ]ρόνωι τὸ μ[ῖ-
c[oc] cυνηθροίcθ[η, (15)
πάcῃ προφάcει
δυ[ν]άμενο[ν χρ]ῆ[c-
θαι· καὶ διότι τοι-
αύτην τἀκεῖνα
πάντα π[α]ρομο- (20)
λογοῦcιν [δηλοῖ
μοι τὸ δεδι[έναι
διὰ τὸ καινὰ [δαι-
μόνια [πα]ρεισάγειν
προcκεκόφθαι καὶ (25)
παντελῶc· ἄλ-
λωc δὲ καὶ παρα-
λογώτατόν γε τὸ || (28)

|| νετο καὶ διὰ τοῦ[τ'] οὐκ ἔπειθεν· [ἐ]τ[ι] δ' ἦν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις 59
Cωκράτης, δέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν τὸν

οὐ|κ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ σκε[δ]άσεις ⟨ὄχλον⟩ . . . ; 1680

λόγον πρόχειρον ἔχειν· καὶ π[ολ]λοὺ[ς] διηρέθιζε καὶ πολιτι[κὰ]ς τ[ότ'] ἐπανηρεῖτο τ[ὰς δυς]μενείας, ἐξ ὧν[περ] τ[ῷ][ι χ]ρόνωι τὸ μ[ῖ]σ[ος] συνηθροίσθ[η,] πάσῃ προφάσει | δυ[ν]άμενο[ν χρ]ῆ[ς]θαι· καὶ 1690
διότι τοιαύτην τἀκεῖνα πάντα π[α]ρομολογοῦσιν [δηλοῖ] μοι τὸ δεδι[έ-
ναι] διὰ τὸ καινὰ [δαι]μόνια [πα]ρεισάγειν προσκεκόφθαι καὶ παντε-
λῶς· ἄλ|λως δὲ καὶ παραλογώτατόν γε τὸ || 1700

and for this reason he did not persuade them. Moreover, Socrates was 59
always among the crowds, since even those who adduce[1] the argument:

Will | you not disperse the crowd from me . . . ?[2] 1680

must have it ready to hand.[3] And he offended many people and incurred political enmities, from which indeed in time hatred grew, | capable of employing any excuse[4] whatsoever. And that they admit[5] 1690
that all these things are such an excuse is made clear to me (and entirely so) from his fear of giving offence through introducing strange new divinities. And | it is very odd, to say the least, that . . . 1700

[1] With reference to Socrates.

[2] A hexameter line spoken by Menelaus to Nestor in the lost epic *Cypria*, quoted here as though spoken by Socrates. The nuance is mock-heroic. In the original, ὄχλος meant 'grief' not 'crowd', and the sentence may have been a statement, not a question.

[3] i.e. the line and the fact they need to adduce it shows that Socrates was often in trouble with crowds.

[4] Or 'pretext' (for condemning Socrates).

[5] i.e. 'allow' or 'provide'.

60A *N* 437 fr. 7 (p. 409 Ph.), *HV*² IX 120 (continet sup. part. rot.)

1702–3 φ]αύ[ο|μεν, τ]όν Philippson
1703–9 Philippson 1703 fin. ν[.| *N*
1704 fin. λο[..| *N* 1705 init. τ *N*
1706 fin. μο[.| *N* 1709 τοις *N*
ὀγ[κώδε]ι[c Philippson, longius ut vid. fin.]υ super- vel suppositum ut vid.
1710 περὶ τού]του Philippson, sed τ deletum esse videtur puncto supra posito *N*
1710–11 c[υ]νθέ[ν|τες λόγους Philippson
1714–15 φιλο|[cόφων Philippson post v. 1714 desunt ca. 16 vv. et marg. inf.

60A

κ]αὶ περὶ ὧν [..]αυ- 437 7
...]ον ἁρμο[cτὸ]ν
πα]ρηcόμε[θ]α λό-
γο]υ· ἡμεῖc μὲν οὖν
πάντω]ν ἐμνημο- (5)
νεύο]μεν γραμμά-
των καὶ κατὰ cύν[ε-
cιν] καὶ τοὺc ογ[...]υ
.....][τ]ου c[υ]νθε[..]
....] εἰ δέ τιc (10)
ἕτε]ροc καὶ παρατι-
θεὶc] καὶ ἄλλα [.....
....]ι τῶν φιλο- (13)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

60B *N* 452 fr. 8 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

1725–31 * 1726 fin. με[*N* 1728 nisi ἂν ἐπι-, fin. μ[vel ν[*N*
1730 προπιημα[fort. subter positum
1731 fin. γηρ *N*, fort. γηρ[εῖν

60B

διαλο[γίcματα ... 452 8
cυλλογιcμὸ[ν ...
τὸ δὲ ἐπιλόγ[ιcμα
τῶν ἀνεπιν[οήτων
τῆι διανοία[ι .... (5)
ciων προπιημα[...
cων καὶ γηρ[.....|| (7)

||[κ]αὶ περὶ ὧν [..]αυ[...]ον ἁρμο[στὸ]ν [πα]ρησόμε[θ]α λό[γο]ν· 60
ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν [πάντω]ν ἐμνημο[νεύο]μεν γραμμάτων καὶ κατὰ σύν[ε-
σιν] καὶ τοὺς ογ[...]υ|[.....]ου ς[υ]νθε[..... ....] εἰ δέ τις [ἕτε]ρος 1710
καὶ παρατι[θεὶς] καὶ ἄλλα [..... ....]ι τῶν φιλο[..... ....
.... | 1720
....] διαλο[γίσματα .....]
συλλογισμὸ[ν ...] τὸ δὲ ἐπιλόγ[ισμα] τῶν ἀνεπιν[οήτων] τῇι διανοία[ι
....]|σιων προπιημα[...]σων καὶ γηρ[.....]|| 1730

. . . and concerning which things (*one word missing*) we shall reach 60
a consistent account. Therefore I made mention of all their writings
both within comprehension and the[1] | (*several words missing*), if some- 1710
one else citing in addition still other things[2] (*several words missing*) of
the[3] (*c.35 words missing*) | discussion (*word missing*) inference (*word* 1720
missing) reflection (*word missing*) of things inconceivable in thought
| (*several words missing, then gap of 1 col., c.90 words*) 1730

[1] Masculine accusative plural. [2] i.e. other examples?
[3] Probably 'of the philosophers'.

61A *N* 437 fr. 6 (p. 408 Ph.), *HV*² IX 119 (continet sup. part. rot.)

1732–4 ὁ]‖ δὴ πευ[cόμενοc οὐcί]|αν ταύτην πο[λλὴν ὀ- Philippson 1735 νομίζ̣ε[ιν Philippson: fort. νομίζ̣ε[cθαι 1735–6 πάν]τα * 1736 *: τὸν καὶ τ[ὸν πλὴν spatio longius Philippson, fort. καιν̣[ὸν ἢ]‖ ὀλιγο̣ν, sc. θεόν 1737 *: παρα[θῶμεν Philippson 1739–40 κ]ἀντ[α]|ριθμοῦντεc *: κ]ἀν ᾰ̣|ριθμοῦντεc spatio brevius ad fin. 1739 Philippson 1740 fin. ᾰ̣[ν θᾶττον *: μ[*N*: μ[ὲν spatio brevius Philippson 1741 fin. post καὶ spat. vac. *N* 1742 init. χὰρ *: ταρ *N*: πάν]|τα̣ς Philippson ἐπεχείρη[cαν *: ἐπεχείρη[cεν Philippson 1743 [πίcτιν *: [λόγους Philippson 1746–7 ὑπολ[αμβά]|νει *: ὑπο[μέ]|νει spatio brevius Philippson 1747–8 ὑ[ποψί|αν] τὴν *, nisi ὑ[πόνοι|αν] crederes: ὑ[φη|γη]τὴν spatio brevius Philippson 1748 δα[ιμόνων vel δα[ήμονα Philippson 1749–50 ἧc] ἔδει post quod interpunxi: οὐδ]ὲ δεῖ τὰc [δόξαc] μὲν καὶ Philippson post v. 1750 desunt ca. 12 vv. et marg. inf.

61A

cεν ε[..... ..... . 437 6
δη πευ[..... ..... .
αν ταύτην πο[... ὀ-
1735 φείλει νομίζ̣ε[ιν· πάν-
τα γὰρ τὸν καὶ τ[ῶν (5)
ὀλίγων παρὰ [τοὺc
ἄλλουc ἅπαντα[c ἀν-
θρώπουc [κ]ἀντ[α-
1740 ριθμοῦντεc ᾰ̣[ν θᾶττον
φθάνοιμεν· καὶ (10)
χὰρ ἐπεχείρη[cαν
εἰcευπορεῖν [πίcτιν
ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοὺc [εἶναι·
1745 τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλω̣[ν
πλῆθοc ὑπολ[αμβά- (15)
νει μόνον ὑ[ποψί-
αν] τὴν δα[ιμόνων
ἧc] ἔδει· τὰc [.....
1750 ....]μεν καὶ [.... (19)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

61B *N* 452 fr. 7 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

1755 λομιζ[*N* 1759–60 ειπερτ[*N*, fort. τ[οῖc ἐναν]|τιωτάτοιc sed spatio longius, ut vid.

61B

τουc και[..... .. 452 7
1755 νομιζ̣[..... .....
τουc τῶν καὶ δι[ὰ τὴν
κενὴν ὄχ[ληcιν ....
τὴν φύcιν το[..... . (5)
ἄλλωc εἴπερ c̣[υνεc-
1760 τιωτάτοιc δι[.....
των πρὸc μ[..... ..‖ (8)

|| cεν ε[..... ..... .]δη πευ[..... ..... .]αν ταύτην πο[... ὀ]φείλει νομί- 61
ζε̣[ιν· πάν]τα γὰρ τὸν καὶ τ[ῶν] ὀλίγων παρὰ [τοὺc] ἄλλους ἅπαντα[c
ἀν]θρώπουc [κ]ἀντ[α]|ριθμοῦντεc ἄ̣[ν θᾶττον] φθάνοιμεν· καὶ γ̣ὰρ 1740
ἐπεχείρη[cαν] εἰcευπορεῖν [πίcτιν] ὑ̣πὲρ τοῦ θεοὺc [εἶναι·] τὸ δὲ τῶν
ἄλλω̣[ν] πλῆθοc ὑπολ[αμβά]νει μόνον ὑ̣[ποψίαν] τὴν δα[ιμόνων ἧc]
ἔδει· τὰc [..... | ....]μεν καὶ [..... 1750
..]τουc και[..... ..] ν̣ομιζ[..... .....]τουc τῶν καὶ δι[ὰ τὴν] κενὴν
ὄχ[ληcιν ....] τὴν φύcιν το[..... .] ἄλλωc εἴπερ c̣[υνεc]|τιωτάτοιc 1760
δι[.....]των πρὸc μ[..... ..]||

... ought to regard. For we should sooner even count up every one,[1] 61
even that of the few, | in correlation with all other humans.[2] And 1740
indeed they attempted to furnish in abundance demonstrations[3] for
the gods' existing. But the great part of the others just understand the
suspicion of the divinities that was necessary. | (c.*20 words missing*) ... of 1750
the ones even by empty annoyance (*word missing*) nature (*word missing*)
otherwise if even towards one's | closest associates[4] (*traces of several* 1760
words, then gap of at least 1 col., c.*90 words*)

[1] i.e. every god.
[2] i.e. until the number was equal to that of all other humans.
[3] Or 'conviction'.
[4] Or 'relations'.

62A *N* 437 fr. 5 (p. 407 Ph.), *HV*² IX 119 (continet sup. part. rot.)

1762 φυλάτ]||τειν [τὰc προλήψειc restit. Philippson 1763 δεῖται *: fort. ἐν]||δεῖται: δειτας *N* 1763–4 π[ερὶ τού]||των Philippson 1764 των[ ]ουδ *N*, sed καί difficile post 1762 si δεῖ τὰc legendum 1764–5 Philippson 1766–7 Philippson 1767 *: ᾧ[αυτοῖc Philippson 1768 ἀπό]νωc Philippson 1770 init. οις *N* ὅ[λωc *: ὁ[μοῦ καὶ Philippson 1771 κατωντων *N*, corr. * 1771–2 π[ερι]||οῦcαν Philippson 1772–3 δια]||μέν[ειν] διὰ Philippson: μεν[.(.)]δια *N* 1773–4 πε]||ριαλλο̣ν ὃ̣ν[τ]α Philippson, cf. Philod. *AP* 5.132,5–6 ὧ περιάλλων / γλωττισμῶν: ριαμενεν[*N* 1775–6 ἀπό|πλ]ηξιν Philippson post 1777 desunt ca. 13 vv. et marg. inf.

62A

τειν [..... ..... . 437 5
δεῖται, καὶ π[ερὶ τού-
των, οὐδ[ὲ παρεcκευ-
1765 αcμένων κατ̣[έχειν
τὰ[c] ταρα[χὰc ἀλ- (5)
λ[ότ]ριον θ[ατέροις
ἀπό]νωc καὶ δι[ὰ
π[άντω]ν οἰκε[ίαν πο-
1770 ε̣ἰc[θαι] τὴν ὅ̣[λωc
κατ' ὄ̣ντων π[ερι- (10)
οῦcαν φύcιν καὶ [δια-
μέν[ειν] διὰ τὸν [πε-
ρίαλλο̣ν ὄ̣ν[τ]α ν[ό-
1775 μον καὶ τηων[....
..]ηξιν τῆc [..... (15)
..]την π[..... ... (16)
[ ]
[ ]
1780 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

62B *N* 452 fr. 6 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

Test.: 1786–91 Epic. *Symp.* (cf. fr. 21.1–5 Arr.²)

1784–91 * 1784 θατ[*N* 1788 init.]cιωι *N*, nisi]cτ̣ῶι (i.e. ἰδίῳ) legendum fin. vel e.g. [θυcιῶν 1790 θεπ[pars dext. π *N*, possis θεγ[, fort. θεί̣α 1791 init. ευτ *N*

62B

καθάπ̣[ερ 452 6
1785 διὰ τῶν [πάντων αὐ-
τοὺc τοὺc cι[.....
ἐν δὲ τῶι C[υμπο-
cίωι περὶ τῶν [ἱερῶν· (5)
"τὰc ἑορτὰc [cυνάγω-
1790 μεν" καὶ "θεῷ̣[ι καλλι-
θ̣υτεῖν ειλ[..... .. || (8)

|| τειν [..... ..... .] δεῖται, καὶ π[ερὶ τού]των, οὐδ[ὲ παρεσκευ]ασμένων **62**
κατ[έχειν] τὰ[c] ταρα[χὰc ἀλ]λ[ότ]ριον θ[ατέροις ἀπό]νωc καὶ δι[ὰ]
π[άντω]ν οἰκε[ίαν πο]|ε̣ῖc[θαι] τὴν ὅ[λωc] κατ' ὄ̣ντων π[ερι]οῦcαν 1770
φύcιν καὶ [δια]μέν[ειν] διὰ τὸν [πε]ρίαλλο̣ν ὄ̣ν[τ]α ν[ό]μον καὶ τηων-
[..... .]ηξιν τῆc [..... ..]την π[..... ....
..... | ....]καθάπ̣[ερ 1780
....] διὰ τῶν [πάντων αὐ]τοὺc τοὺc cι[.....]. ἐν δὲ τῶι C[υμπο]cίωι
περὶ τῶν [ἱερῶν·] "τὰc ἑορτὰc [cυνάγω]|μεν" καὶ "θεῷ̣[ι καλλι]θ̣υτεῖν 1790
ειλ[..... ..]||

...to do (*word missing*) it is necessary in the case of these[1] that have not **62**
even been produced, that the disturbances possess (them)[2] differently
than the others, (that) effortlessly and for ever is effected | a surviving 1770
nature[3] entirely fitting among existing things, and (that) it endures[4]
because of the supreme law and ... | (c.35 *words missing*) ...just as (*word* 1780
missing) these (*word missing*) in every case. And in his *Symposium* con-
cerning the rites[5] (he says): 'Let us celebrate the festivals', | and 'Make 1790
fine sacrifices to a god', ... (*word missing, then gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

[1] The antecedent is unknown. Perhaps the reference is to anticipated 'disturbances' (cf. 1766) or 'pleasures' (cf. 2207).

[2] Object supplied. Perhaps the 'unjust and wicked' (cf. below, 2227–9).

[3] Or 'existent'. See on 231.

[4] i.e. 'continue to exist', remain'.

[5] Understand 'he (viz. Epicurus) says ...'.

63 *N* 452 fr. 5 (p. 410 Ph.; continet inf. part. rot.)

Test.: 1820–1 Epic. *Ep. ad Diodorum*

primus edidit Crönert, *RM*[2] 56 (1901), 620–1 = *Studi*, 117–18 1815 *διὰ πό[λεωc* Philippson 1816 *ἐ[κάc]των* spatio longius Philippson *τε[λετῶν* * 1817 *ἱ̣ερῶν* L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: *μερων N* 1817–18 *ἐ[πὶ τὰc εὐ]|χὰc* *: *ἐ[πευ]|χὰc* spatio brevius Philippson 1818 *καιαυτων N* fin. *[τῶν* Crönert 1819 *ειcθην* fort. supra vel subter positum 1820 de magistratu (279/8) vid. Dorandi, *ZPE* 84 (1990), T 29–31, de *ἐπὶ 'ναξικράτουc* in *ἀφαιρήcει* vid. T 31 Dorandi, coll. *Hesp.* 17 (1948), 1 l. 1, Threatte, *Grammar of Attic Inscriptions*, i. 426, de modo citandi vid. e.g. Philod. *Pragm.*, col. 32,15–16 1821 perrexisse *τὸν ἐπὶ τῆc οἰ[κίαc || cεβαcμόν* censuit Philippson

63

– – – – – – – – – – – –
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
δωc[..... ..... . 452 5
ουcιν [..... ....
καὶ διὰ πό[..... ..
ταc ἐ[κ] τῶν τε[λετῶν
τῶν ἱ̣ερῶν ἐ[πὶ τὰc εὐ-
χὰc κατ̣' αὐτῶν [τῶν
δήμων ειcθην[....
ἐπὶ 'ναξικράτ[ουc δέ·
"τὸν ἐπὶ τῆc οἰ[κίαc ||

]δωc[..... ..... .]ουcιν [..... ....]καὶ διὰ πο[..... ..]τας ἐ[κ] τῶν τε- **63**
[λετῶν] τῶν ἱερῶν ἐ[πὶ τὰc εὐ]χὰc καᾳ̣ αὐτῶν [τῶν] δήμων εἰcθη-
ν[....]|| ἐπὶ 'ναξικράτ[ουc δέ·] "τὸν ἐπὶ τῆc οἰ[κίαc]|| 1820

(*top of col., c.70 words missing*) ... from the holy rites in prayers against **63**
these cities (*several words missing*). | And in the archonship of Anaxi- 1820
crates (he says):[1] 'The (*word missing*)[2] in the house ...' (*gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

[1] A quotation from an attested letter of Epicurus, written in the archonship of Anaxicrates (279/8).

[2] The nouns are missing, but perhaps the quotation begins 'The worship in the house ...'.

64

\- - - - - - - - - - - -
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
εχω̣[..... ..... . 452 4
προϲ[ήκει πρὸϲ εὐ-
ϲέβεια[ν ....
τοῦ πατει[.....
τὸν γενόμεν[ον ϲυνε-
παινεῖ[ν.] μητα[....
ροϲ δέ· "οὐ μό[νον τὰϲ
θυϲίαϲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
ἱερῶν] ὑμνήϲει θ̣ε̣[οὺϲ ||

64 *N* 452 fr. 4 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

1843–51 * 1843 fin. ω̣[pars dext. ω *N*, minus aptum vestigio possis ο̣, ε̣, θ̣ 1846 πατει[*N*, nisi ex poemate e.g. [τὸν υἱὸν αὐ]|τοῦ πατέρ̣[οϲ Διὸϲ 1848 νει[.] *N*, sed fort. spat. vac. post νει 1848–9 latet nomen, e.g. Μητρ̣[όδω]|ροϲ 1850 θυϲια[ ]ϲ *N*, possis θυϲία[ι]ϲ 1851 ὑμνήϲει (cf. 986), sc. ὁ ϲοφόϲ, cf. 2203 ὁ δίκαιοϲ fin. ϲειεθ[*N*, possis ὑμνήϲειε θ[εοὺϲ, fort. θ̣ε̣[ίουϲ coll. 64–5 coniunxi

]εχῳ[..... ..... .] προc[ήκει πρὸc εὐ]cέβεια[ν ....] τοῦ πατει[.....] **64**
τὸν γενόμεν[ον cυνε]παινεῖ[ν.] μητα[....]ροc δέ· "οὐ μό[νον τὰc]| θυ- 1850
cίαc, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν [ἱερῶν] ὑμνήcει θ̣ε̣[οὺc]||

(*top of col.*, c.*60 words missing*) . . . fitting for piety (*several words missing*) **64**
to praise. And (*name missing*) (says): 'Not only will he[1] sing praises[2] of
| the sacrifices, but also, at the rites, of gods (*continues on*) 1850

[1] Perhaps the sage, ὁ cοφόc. [2] i.e. commemorate.

65 *P. Herc.* 437 fr. 4 = *N* 437 fr. 4 (p. 407 Ph.), *HV*² IX 118 (continet sup. part. rot.)

1852–67 cf. 'Aëtius' 1. 7. 34. 8 Diels, *Dox. Graec.* p. 307,15 1852 *, de collocatione vid. e.g. Demosth. 23. 70: [ἐγκαλοῦσι δ' Ἐπικούρῳ δαίμονας καὶ]|| ἥρωας [οὐ νομίζειν]|| ὃν τρόπον Philippson 1853 -πων *, ἄνθρωπον Crönert, *RM*² 53 (1898), 595 adn. 2 = *Studi*, 25 n. 36: αντροπον *N*, quod idem etiam pro ἄνθρωπον nonnumquam exhibet 1853–7 Philippson 1856 fin. π[, sed vestigio aptius ν[*N* 1857 init. γ *N*, deficit pap. 1858 *: περιτιθέμεν⟨οι⟩ Philippson 1859–60 Philippson 1859 fin. ε[*N* 1861 init. ποι *N* φθ[όνου *, cf. Isocr. 5, 68: φε[*N*: φε[νακίαι Philippson 1862 *: δυcμενεῖ spatio brevius Philippson 1863 *: τ[οὑ]|τοις Philippson 1864–5 χα-ρι]|έντων [καὶ *: χαρι]|έντως κ[αὶ Philippson: εντων[.] *N* 1865–6 ψευδ[ο|μ]ένας ἐνν[οίας τὰς *: ψευδ[ο|δ]ο̣ξ̣[ί]ας ἐνδ[όντες Philippson: |[.]εν [..]ασενδ[*N* 1867 μᾶλλο̣ν Crönert, *RM*² 53 (1898), 595 adn. 2 = *Studi*, 25 adn. 35: μαλλων *N*, quod idem etiam alibi nonnumquam exhibet, vid. Crönert loc. cit. fin. και[*N* post v. 1867 desunt ca. 14 vv.

65

ἥρωάς [τε," ἅπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπω̣ν ἔ[νιοι πράττουσιν ἀποκρυ[πτόμενοι τὰ δοκο[ῦντα τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐπ̣[ίκουρον, ἕτερον αὐτ[οῖς περιτίθεμεν λό[γον εὐcεβείας ἀποδό̣[ντα φαντασίαν ἄ[τοπο̣ν, τὰ μὲν φθ̣[όνου, τὰ [δ]ὲ δυcμενεί[ας, καὶ διανοίαι το[ιούτοις ἀνδράcιν [χαρι-έντων [καὶ] ψευδ[ο-μ]ένας ἐνν̣[οίας τὰς καὶ μᾶλλο̣ν κατ̣[... 437 4 (5) (10) (15) (16)

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]||

|| *ἥρωάς [τε," ἅπερ τῶν] ἀνθρώπων ἔ[νιοι πράτ]τουσιν ἀποκρυ[πτό]-* 65
μενοι τὰ δοκο[ῦντα] τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐπ[ίκου]ρον, ἕτερον αὐτ[οῖς] περι-
τίθεμεν λό[γον] εὐσεβείας ἀποδό[ν]|τα φαντασίαν ἄ[το]που, τὰ μὲν 1860
φθ[όνου,] τὰ [δ]ὲ δυσμενεί[ας,] καὶ διανοίαι το[ιού]τοις ἀνδράσιν [χα-
ρι]έντων [καὶ] ψευδ[ομ]ένας ἐνν[οίας τὰς] καὶ μᾶλλον κατ[...] (c.45
words missing)| 1870

and heroes', just as some people do who conceal[1] things that Epicurus 65
considers true–to these[2] we ascribe another definition of piety which
gives | a strange[3] impression, partly of jealousy, and partly of hostility, 1860
and by the intention of some clever people towards such men[4] also
giving false notions which even rather . . . | (*bottom of col.*, c.45 *words* 1870
missing, then gap of 1 col., c.90 *words*)

[1] i.e. those who intentionally conceal their true views about the gods from people in general out of hostility or for the purpose of maintaining social or political control.

[2] i.e. things, statements, or people who regard such truths as vestigially and imperfectly concealed in the writings of early poets and philosophers; cf. above, 300–1, where such truths are said to be 'hinted at' (*αἰνίττεσθαι*); below, 2480–9. [3] Or 'bizarre', 'absurd'.

[4] i.e. towards the Epicurean founders, *οἱ ἄνδρες* (see on 461–2).

66A *N* 437 fr. 3 (p. 407 Ph.), *HV*² IX 118 (continet sup. part. rot.)

Test.: 1888–98 Epic. *De nat.* 32 (= lib. inc. fr. 39 Arr.²)

1882 *πο*[*λλοὺς* Philippson 1883–4 *λή*[*ςεται τοιοῦτον*]|| *ὄν* Philippson 1885–98 Philippson 1888 fin. pars sin. *ν HV*²: *λ*[*N* 1888–90 numerum libri intellexit Philippson, *εἰκοσ*]*τῶι* possis 1898 *τὴ*[*ν αἴσ*|*θησιν οὐχ ἧκον* coni. Philippson post v. 1898 desunt ca. 12 vv. et marg. inf.

66A

τῶν καὶ πο[..... .. 437 3
λη[..... ....
ον· πᾶν γὰ[*ρ* ..... .
οἴεται καθάπ[*ερ ὁρί-*
ζεται χρό[*νος, εἶναι* (5)
πρόληψιν· [καὶ κα-
θάπερ κἀν [*τῶι δευ-*
τέρωι καὶ [*τριακος-*
τῶι, καὶ τῶν [*θεῶν ἐ-*
ναργείαι φησ[*ὶν καται-* (10)
λαμβάνεσθα[*ι τὸ ὄν,*
καίπερ ἓν τῶν [*ἐν ὑπο-*
κειμένοις ὄν, [*τὴν δὲ*
φύσιν διανο[*ητὴν*
ἧ]*ττον ἔχον* [*τῶν* (15)
ἄλλων ὄντων [*καὶ κα-*
θόλ]*ου πρὸς τὴ*[*ν* ... (17)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

66B *N* 452 fr. 3 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

1906–11 * 1910 *αὐτοτελῆι*, sc. *φύσει* (?) fin. *τηλ*[, minus aptum vestigio *ν*[vel *μ*[

66B

αμειω[..... .... 452 3
ριεν ὃς προσμε[...
νον ἀλλὰ τῶν πολ[..
αὐτὸ πάντων καὶ [*τῆι*
αὐτοτελῆι τηλ[.... (5)
πᾶν· καὶ γὰρ πολ[...|| (6)

|| *τῶν καὶ πο*[..... ..]*λη*[..... ....]*ον· πᾶν γὰ*[*ρ* ..... .] *οἴεται* **66**
καθάπ[*ερ ὁρί*]*ζεται χρό*[*νος, εἶναι*] *πρόληψιν·* [*καὶ κα*]*θάπερ κἀν* [*τῶι*
δευ]*τέρωι καὶ* [*τριακος*]|*τῶι, καὶ τῶν* [*θεῶν ἔ*]*ναργείαι φης*[*ὶν κατα*]- 1890
λαμβάνεσθα[*ι τὸ ὄν,*] *καίπερ ἓν τῶν* [*ἐν ὑπο*]*κειμένοις ὄν,* [*τὴν δὲ*]
φύσιν διανο[*ητὴν ἧ*]*ττον ἔχον* [*τῶν*] *ἄλλων ὄντων* [*καὶ καθόλ*]*ου πρὸς*
τὴ[*ν* .... | 1900
....]*αμειω*[..... ....]*ριεν ὃς προσμε*[...]-
νον ἀλλὰ τῶν πολ[..] *αὐτὸ πάντων καὶ* [*τῆι*]| *αὐτοτελῆι τηλ*[....] *πᾶν·* 1910
καὶ γὰρ πολ[...]||

...for of the (*several words missing*). For all[1] (*one word missing*) is thought **66**
of, just as time is defined,[2] as being a naturally formed generic conception;[3] and just as also in book 32,[4] he | says that because the existence 1890
of the gods is apprehended with clarity,[5] although as a unified entity among underlying existents, and their[6] nature is less able to be perceived by thought than other existents, and generally towards[7] | (*c.25* 1900
words missing) who towards (*one word*) but of all those (*word missing*) | self-completing (*one word*) all. Indeed (*one word, then gap of 1 col., c.90* 1910
words)

[1] Neuter singular; perhaps 'infinity'. [2] Or 'divided', 'distinguished'.
[3] Or 'preconception'.
[4] Of *On Nature* (cited here by book number alone: cf. 523–4, 1050–1).
[5] i.e. vivid knowledge of the gods; cf. Epic. *Letter to Menoeceus* 123: *ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν* (sc. *θεῶν*) *ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις*. [6] The gods'. [7] Probably a feminine singular noun.

67A *N* 437 fr. 2 (p. 406 Ph.), *HV*² IX 117 (continet sup. part. rot.)

1912 διατ[ριβὴν Philippson 1920 ρας' ˈρη *N*: ρας[.]ρη *HV*² 1923–4 cυμπε]||ριφορὰ[ν Philippson 1924 φοια *N* πό[νον Philippson 1925 διαθέ[ν]-των Philippson 1926 λ]οίcθας ε[ἰc nimis poetice Philippson: fort. ἐ[πὶ 1928 Philippson post v. 1928 desunt ca. 12 vv. et marg. inf.

67A

προcδιατ[..... ... 437 2
πιες[..... ..... .
νοcω[..... .....
1915 νηνο[..... .....
ουκε[..... .... (5)
τηι καθάπερ [.....
α τὴν καὶ πολ[....
μοτε[ρ....]ων[...
1920 φορας ῥητορ[ικ ..
περε[..]ωεωco[.. (10)
μοιν[....]των [...
τοια[....]τοις [cυμπε-
ριφορα[.] καὶ πο[..
1925 διαcε[.]των καὶ [κα-
θάπ[ερ .]οιcθαcε[. φι- (15)
λοcοφίαν τὴν ῥητο-
ρικὴν] μὲν τοῖc [... (17)
[ ]
1930 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

67B *N* 452 fr. 2 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

marg. sin. incertissima 1934–41 * 1934 fort. αὐλ̣ὸc vel φί[λ]αυλ̣οc 1939 init. ακαλ *N* 1939–40 fort. τραπέ[ζ̣ας: τραπε|δης *N* 1941 f. fort. ἱκε||[cίαν vel ἱκε||[τείαν

67B

[ ]αυδοc φ̣[....τοῖc 452 2
1935 δόγμαcι [..... ...
ὅ]ρκουc καὶ δι[αθήκας
καὶ cπονδὰc καὶ cυν-
θ]ήκας καὶ κοινωνί- (5)
ας̣ ἄλλων καὶ τραπέ-
1940 ζ̣ης καὶ cτέμμα-
τα καὶ πᾶcαν ἱκε- || (8)

|| προcδιατ[..... ...]πιεc[..... ..... .]νοcω[..... .....]νηνό[..... .....] 67
ουκε[..... ....]τηι καθάπερ [.....]α τὴν καὶ πολ[....]μοτε[ρ....]ων
[...]|φορας ῥητορ[ικ..]περε[..]ωεωco[..]μοιν[....]των [...]τοια[....]
τοις [cυμπε]ριφορα[.] καὶ πο[..]διαcε[.]των καὶ [κα]θάπ[ερ .] οιcθα-
cε[. φι]λοcοφίαν τὴν ῥητο[ρικὴν] μὲν τοῖc [..... .... | ....
....]αυδοc φ[....τοῖc]
δόγμαcι [..... ... ὅ]ρκουc καὶ δι[αθήκαc] καὶ cπονδὰc καὶ cυν[θ]ήκαc
καὶ κοινωνίας ἄλλων καὶ τραπέ|ζης καὶ cτέμματα καὶ πᾶcαν ἱκε- ||

(*25–7 words indistinguishable*) | . . . rhetoric (*several words missing*) social customs (*several words missing*) philosophy, while rhetoric to those . . . | (*c.20 words missing*) . . . in teachings (*one word missing*) oaths and contracts and agreements and associations with others and at table | and garlands and all . . . (*gap of 1 col., c.90 words*)

68A *N* 437 fr. 1 (p. 405 Ph.), *HV*² IX 117 (continet sup. part. rot.)

Test.: 1947–9 Epic. *Sent. Vat.* 39

1942 τοῦ]το μ[ὲν οὐ δεινόν Philippson 1943 μὴ τη[ρήςωςιν Philippson 1944 εἰ νοο[ῦςιν Philippson 1946–7 fort. ἰδι]ωτῶν: ὥτων ἀποδέχ[εcθαι Philippson 1948 * 1949 ἱ]ερῶ[ν *: μ]ερῶ[ν Philippson: [.]ερω[..| *N* 1951–2 Philippson 1952 λεια[...]και *N*, sed fort. spat. vac. post λεια[c vel fort. -λεία[c νομ]ίζαι: λεία[c τε] καὶ vix recte Philippson 1953–4 κ[α]|θ' ὅλον Philippson, paulum correxi: θολου *N* 1954–5 Philippson 1956 fort. πιστῶν]: λόγων] τοὺc ἕξει[ν Philippson εχεθ[*N* 1957–8 δυνάμεις] καὶ διὰ [τού|των νομίζοντας coni. Philippson post v. 1957 inf. pars columnae deest, ca. 13 vv. et marg. inf.

68A

το μ[..... .... 437 1
μητη[..... ..... .
εἰ νοc[..... ..... .
τεχν[..... ..... .
ἐξῆc καὶ τῶν [.... (5)
ωτων ἀποδεχ[....
τοὺc καὶ εἰc θυc[ίας
καὶ κόcμον [ἱ]ερῶ[ν
δεδαπανηκότας
τὰc πολλὰc ἐπιμ[ε- (10)
λεία[c ..] καὶ ἅπαν[τα
ποιο[υ]μένους κ[α-
θ' ὅλομ βίον εὐελ[πιc-
τίας] τὰc διὰ τῶν
.....]τους θ' ἕξει[ν (15)
....] καὶ δια[... (16)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

68B *N* 452 fr. 1 (continet inf. part. rot.) primus edidi

1968–9 vel τοῖc πολειτ[κοῖc λό]|γοιc

68B

ρας[..... .... 452 1
χε διατ[..... ....
καὶ πᾶcι μὲν [τοῖc λό-
γοιc πολειτ[..... .
γοιc ἐν ἐπιδη[..... (5)
.. ἐ]πὶ πολει[.....
....]τε τον[.....|| (7)

|| το μ[..... ....]μητη[..... ..... .]εἰ νοc[..... ..... .] τεχν[..... ..... .] ἐξῆc καὶ τῶν [....]ωτων ἀποδεχ[....] τοὺc καὶ εἰc θυc[ίαc] καὶ κόcμον [ἱ]ερῶ[ν]| δεδαπανηκότας τὰc πολλὰc ἐπιμ[ε]λεία[c ..] καὶ ἅπαν[τα] ποιο[υ]μένους κ[α]θ' ὅλομ βίον εὐελ[πιστίαc] τὰc διὰ τῶν [.....]τους θ' ἕξει[ν ....] καὶ δια[..... ....| ....]ραc[..... ....]χε διατ[..... ....] καὶ πᾶcι μὲν [τοῖc λό]γοιc πολειτ[..... .]γοιc ἐν ἐπιδη[..... | .. ἐ]πὶ πολει[..... ....]τε τον[.....]|| **68**

(*15–17 words indistinguishable*) . . . receive, and those who even on sacrifices and beautiful offerings | have expended a good part of their cares, and who for themselves do everything, throughout their life, would have hopes of good through | (*c.30 words missing*) . . . for all arguments civic . . . | (*several words missing, then gap of 1 col., c.90 words*) **68**

69 *N* 242 fr. 9a (sin. pars) (p. 8 G., 240 Ph. 1920, 75f Schober), *HV*² II 36 (continet part. inf. rot.)

1996–2001 *ἡμᾶ[c δὲ κ]ακίζου|[cι,] ὅτι τῆc [ἀ]λ̣ο̣[γ]ίαc |[ἐπε]τ̣ηδευce[ν* (sc. Epicurus) *ἅ]ξ ἀπε[ι|ρίαc· ἀ]λ̣λ̣' ἐὰν ἄλλωc |[coφ]οὶ δοκῷcιν* (Academici), *|[οὐ τὴ]ν̣ μὲν ἡμε||-[τέραν coφίαν ἔχουcιν]* restit. Philippson 1998 *ἐπι]τ̣ηδεύce[ω]ς* Schober 1998–9 *ἀπέ|[cτη* Schober 1999 *αν' 'αλλ N* 2001–2 post col. 69 sequitur col. 70, columnae coniunctae ad marg. inf. *N*

69

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1975 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1980 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1985 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
1990 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

.....]κοc̣ω[....]και 242 9a
1995 ....]ν̣ουντ[....]ξ̣ει
....]ς̣ ἡμᾶ[c κ]ᾰκίζου-
cιν,] ὅτι τῆc [ἀ]λ̣ο̣[γ]ίαc
ἐπι]τ̣ηδεύce[ω]ς ἀπε- (5)
..... .]μεαν ἄλλωc
2000 .....]οι δοκοῦcιν
.....]ν μὲν ἡμε- || (8)

|| .....]κοϛω[....]και[....]νουντ[....]ξει[....]ϛ ἡμᾶ[ϲ κ]ακίζου[σιν,] **69**
ὅτι τῆϲ [ἀ]λο[γ]ίαϲ [ἐπι]τηδεύϲε[ω]ϛ ἀπε[..... .]μεαν ἄλλωϲ |[.....]οι 2000
δοκοῦϲιν [.....]ν μὲν ἡμε- ||

(*top of col., c.70 words missing*) they revile us because from their habit of **69**
irrationality (*several words missing*) otherwise (*one word missing*) they
seem, on the one hand our ... | (*physically linked with following col., which* 2000
is missing its top half)

70

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
περι[..... ..... . 242 9b
καὶ μηδ[..... ...
γοντος η[..... .
νοι πάντ[*εс εἰсὶν*
ἀβλαβεῖс, [*ὅτι οὐδὲ*
βούληсιс [*τῶν κακι-*
ῶν κινεῖ [..... ...
νουсιν τ[..... ... ||

70 *N* 242 fr. 9b (dext. pars) (p. 8 G., 240 Ph. 1920, 76 Schober), *HV*² II 36 (continet inf. part. rot.)

sup. pars columnae deest, ca. 21 vv. 2024–6 *ὁμολογοῦντεс*] *περὶ* [*τοῦ εὐνοεῖν*]| *καὶ μηδ᾽* [*ἀντιλέ*]|*γοντεс* (Stoici de providentia disserentes) *ἡ*[*μῖν, ὡс ἐκεῖ*]|*νοι* restit. Philippson 2027–9 Philippson 2030–1 *θεοὺс ἀφρο*]|*νοῦсίν τ*[*ε* Philippson

περι[..... ..... .] καὶ μηδ[..... ...]γοντος η[..... .]νοι πάντ[ες εἰσὶν] **70**
ἀβλαβεῖς, [ὅτι οὐδὲ] βούλησις [τῶν κακι]|ῶν κινεῖ [..... ...]νουσιν 2030
τ[..... ...]||

(*top of col.*, c.*60 words missing*) ... concerning (*one word missing*) and not **70**
(*several words missing*) all are harmless, because not at all does the
intention of vicious | behaviour move ... (*several words missing*) 2030

71 *N* 229 fr. 6 (p. 148 G., 404 Ph.), *HV*² II 28

2032 δεινοὺc, sc. τοὺc θεοὺc 2039 post ουτω spatiolum *N*, οὕτω[{ι}] valde probabile 2039–40 τό γ' ἐ|φ' ἡμâc Spengel: τοῦ ἐ|φ' ἡμâc Anon. A: τό γε | φήμας Quaranta–Bücheler 2043 οιεν^{r} ^{l}οι *N* 2043–4 fin. θ[*N*: fort. πειc[θέν]|τεc, edd. 2046 ων^{r} ^{l}πρω *N* 2049 δαι del. Spengel 2050 cιν^{r} ^{l}ωcτ *N* 2055 fin. post αυ nota quam librarius saepe ne spatium in fine relinqueret apposuit conspicitur 2057 suppl. Bücheler 2058 τοιc^{r} ^{l}επ *N* 2059–60 με[γαλο]πρε-|πεῖc iam Quaranta, Gomperz: με[γαλο]-πρε[πῶc Spengel, unde Philippson sed spatio longius ad finem 2060 θής[ουcι]ν (sc. ἑαυτοὺc) ἀν- Quaranta, fort. ἀν||[θρώ-ποιc ὥcτε: πειcθής[οντ]αι ἂν Spengel: ἑ]|πείcθης[αν Philippson

71

δεινοὺc ὑπολή-
ψονται τυράννους.
καὶ μάλιcτ' αὐτοὶ
δι' ἃ cυνοίδαcιν
αὑτοῖc μεγάλας ἐ-
ξ αὐτῶν cυμφο-
ρὰc προcδοκήcου-
cιν· οὕτω δὲ τό γ' ἐ-
φ' ἡμâc εἶναι δι' ἣν
οὐκ ἐcχήκαcι πίc-
τιν οὐδὲν ἂν πράτ-
τοιεν. οἱ δὲ πει⟨c⟩θ[έν-
τεc οἷc ἐχρηcμῳ[ι-
δήcαμεν περὶ θε-
ῶν πρῶτον μὲν
ὡc θνητοὶ μειμε[ῖc-
θαι τὴν ἐκείνων
εὐδαι{δαι}μονίαν
θελήcουcιν, ὥcτ', ἐ-
πειδήπερ ἐξ ἀβλα-
βίαc ἐθεωρεῖτο το[ῖ]c
πâcιν ἐρχομένη,
μάλιcτα φιλοτιμή-
cονται πâcιν αὖ- >
τοὺc παρέχειν ἀ-
λύπουc, ὅc[ον ἐφ'] ἑ-
αυτοῖc, ἔπειτα δ'
οὕτω με[γαλο]πρε-
πεῖc θής[ουcι]ν ἀν- ||

229 6
(5)
(10)
(15)
(20)
(25)
(29)

|| δεινοὺς ὑπολήψονται τυράννους. καὶ μάλιστ' αὐτοὶ δι' ἃ συνοίδασιν 71
αὑτοῖς μεγάλας ἐξ αὐτῶν συμφορὰς προσδοκήσουσιν· οὕτω δὲ τό γ' ἐ|φ' 2040
ἡμᾶς εἶναι δι' ἣν οὐκ ἐσχήκασι πίστιν οὐδὲν ἂν πράττοιεν. οἱ δὲ πει-
⟨σ⟩θ[έν]τες οἷς ἐχρησμῳ[ι]δήσαμεν περὶ θεῶν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς θνητοὶ
μιμε[ῖσ]θαι τὴν ἐκείνων εὐδαιμονίαν | θελήσουσιν, ὥστ', ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ 2050
ἀβλαβίας ἐθεωρεῖτο το[ῖ]ς πᾶσιν ἐρχομένη, μάλιστα φιλοτιμήσονται
πᾶσιν αὑτοὺς παρέχειν ἀλύπους, ὅσ[ον ἐφ'] ἑαυτοῖς, ἔπειτα δ' οὕτω
με[γαλο]|πρεπεῖς θήσ[ουσι]ν ἀν- || 2060

they[1] will suppose that the gods are terrifying tyrants, and most of all 71
because of their own bad consciences they will expect great misfortunes from them. Thus, as far as we | are concerned, on account of the 2040
belief[2] which they do not have, they would accomplish nothing.[3] But those who believe our oracles about the gods will first wish to imitate their[4] blessedness in so far as mortals can, so that, since it[5] was seen[6] to come from doing no harm to anyone, they[7] will | endeavour most of 2050
all to make themselves harmless to everyone as far as is within their power; and second to make themselves so | noble . . . 2060

[1] People manipulated by philosophers or rulers by means of the poets' false tales about gods. [2] Or 'demonstration'. [3] i.e. no proper conception of the gods.
[4] The gods'. [5] i.e. the gods' happiness.
[6] i.e. in the past experience of humans in cultural history (hence the imperfect tense).
[7] People who are convinced by the author's arguments, i.e. readers.

72

\- - - - - - - - - - -

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
....] {α̣ι̣πολ} 242 10
ογι̣ϲ̣[.....] {ι̣ϲπερι}
μεταβαίνειν· καὶ
μὴ μαθόντα χάριν
ἔχειν τοῖϲ προγεγο-
νόϲιν ἀγαθοῖϲ καὶ
πρὸϲ τὰϲ ἀλγηδόναϲ
τὰϲ φυϲικὰϲ εὐρωϲ-
τεῖν καὶ τοῦ θανά- ||

\- - - - - - - - - - -

72 *N* 242 fr. 10 (p. 6 G., 241 Ph. 1920, 73 Schober), *HV*² II 33b (continet inf. part. rot.)

2082–3 ad fin. iam Philippson illatos esse ex 242 fr. 7 suspicatus est (vid. vv. 2234–5) 2082 init. ν̣ vel α̣ι̣ *N* 2083 init. fort. ὅπ̣ε̣[ρ 2084 *νειν⸢ ⸣και N* 2090 *θα-νά||[του* iam Bücheler, *θανά||[του κατα-φρονεῖν* Schober

|| ογι̣ς[..... .....] *μεταβαίνειν καὶ μὴ μαθόντα χάριν ἔχειν τοῖς προγε-* 2080 **72**
γονόσιν ἀγαθοῖς καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀλγηδόνας τὰς φυσικὰς εὐρως|τεῖν καὶ 2090
τοῦ θανά- ||

(*top of col., c.60 words missing*) | ... to change sides and, not having learnt[1] 2080 **72**
to be grateful for past goods and to bear up against natural pains | and 2090
of death[2] ... (*gap of 1 ⅓ col., c.100 words*)

[1] The subject must be masculine accusative singular.
[2] Probably continued '(and not to have fear) of death'.

73 *N* 242 fr. 8a (p. 8 G., 239 Ph. 1920, 73 Schober), *HV*² IX 36 (continet inf. part. rot.)

2113–15 ἐφ' αὐ|[τοῦ Philippson, sed v. 2113 in fine post φα nota quam librarius saepe ne relinqueret spatium in fine posuit conspicitur; quae praecedunt hunc in modum supplenda putat Philippson [ἔστιν γὰρ κατα|λῃπτι]κὸν ἐφ' αὐ|[τοῦ γε] τὸ μᾶλλον |[μὲν ἰc]χύειν 2115 fort. ἐπιδεικ]νύειν: κατακω]λύειν Schober:]ι *N* 2116 Philippson: φιλοcοφί]αν Schober: fort. ὑποφί]αν 2117 Philippson: κακουρ-γ]ίας Schober 2118–19 αἰ|[τίας Philippson 2119 circuli parv. arcus in alto, fort.]ρ: τὸ] δ' ἐπιcχεῖν Philippson 2120 κατ' ἄλλα] Philippson col. 73 sequitur col. 74, columnae coniunctae ad marg. inf. *N*

73

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2095 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2100 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2105 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2110 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
..... .]κον ἐφα- > 242 8a
.....]το μᾶλλον
2115 .....]νύειν τὴν
cοφί]αν πρὸc τὰc
ἀδικ]ίας δι' ἃc ἀ- (5)
πεδεικνυ]όμην αἰ-
τίας ..]. ἐπιcχεῖν
2120 ..... .] καὶ ταυ- || (8)

[..... .]κον ἐφα[.....]το μᾶλλον [.....]νύειν τὴν [cοφί]αν πρὸc τὰc 2110 **73**
[ἀδικ]ίαc δι' ἃc ἀ[πεδεικνυ]όμην αἰ[τίαc ..]. ἐπιcχεῖν |[..... .] καὶ
ταυ- || 2120

(*top of col., c.50 words missing*) | rather to (*infinitive missing*) their[1] wis- 2110 **73**
dom towards injustices for the reasons which I demonstrated (*one word missing*) to suspend judgement[2] | (*one word missing*) and this . . . (*physically linked with following col., which is missing its top half*) 2120

[1] Or 'his', or 'its'. [2] Compare below, 2145-6 ἐ]|ποχήν.

74 *N* 242 fr. 8b (p. 8 G., 240 Ph. 1920, 73 Schober), *HV*² II 36 (continet inf. part. rot.)

ante v. 2142 desunt ca. 20 vv. 2142 init. ῥ vel ᾳι, sed αι et 2142–3 illatos esse ex 242 fr. 7 intellexit Schober, vid. infra 2234–5 2144 Gomperz fin. [οὔcης Philippson 2145–6 ἐ]|ποχὴν Philippson: ἀ]|ποχὴν Bücheler–Gomperz 2146–9 Bücheler 2149 π *N*, corr. Bücheler coll. 74–5 coniunxi

74

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2125 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2130 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2135 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2140 [ ]
[ ]

.] {ᾳιπολ} 242 8b
ω{cπερι}α[..... .
cης ἀδι[κ]ίας [...
2145 διόπερ οὐ τὴ[ν ἐ-
ποχὴν ἀνάιρ[οῦν- (5)
τες ἀδικίαν ἀ[ν-
τεισάγουcιν ἀ[ν-
τὶ τῆς δικαιο[cύ-
2150 νης, μόνην δ' [ἐ-|| (9)

[....]ω[....]α[..... .]cης ἀδι[κ]ίας [...]| διόπερ οὐ τὴ[ν ἐ]ποχὴν ἀναι- 2145 **74**
ρ[οῦν]τες ἀδικίαν ἀ[ν]τεισάγουσιν ἀ[ν]τὶ τῆς δικαιο[cύ]|νης, μόνην δ' 2150
[ἐ-]||

(*top of col., c.50 words missing*) ... of injustice (*one word missing*) | for this 2145 **74**
reason they substitute injustice for justice not by eliminating scepti-
cism,[1] | and (*continues on*) 2150

[1] Literally 'suspension of judgement' (ἐποχή) concerning the criterion of knowledge.

75 *N* 229 fr. 5 (p. 147 G., 404 Ph.), *HV*² II 27

2158 ἐ[πιτρέποντ]ες Philippson: fort. ἐ[πικρύπτοντ]ες vel ἐ[πιτρέχοντ]ες: ε[ἰςά-γοντ]ες Bücheler: ἐ[πιφέρον]τες Gomperz]ες[..]ιδε *N*, sed spat. vac. post]ες ante [ο]ἱ valde probabile 2159 corr. Spengel: ειςπιον[*N* 2160 post λει tantum spatiolum *N* 2161 post ας spatiolum *N* 2164 αἰ̣τ̣[ια Bücheler: αν[*N*: fort. χά̣[ριν 2165 αις[ ]συν *N* 2165–6 σὺν | δὲ ⟨τῶι⟩ *: σὺν [τῶι]| δὲ Bücheler 2167 τ̣αῖς [τότε vel [ἀεὶ Gomperz: τ̣αῖς τ̣[ότε vel π̣[οτε Philippson: τ[αύταις, sc. πολιτείαις Diels p. 908 (= 310): ωις[*N*: fort. μέντ̣ο̣ι 2168 Gomperz 2169 ἅμ̣α Diels p. 908 (= 310): ἄλλα sc. ἐπινοεῖν D. Delattre privatim: ἀλλὰ edd. 2170–1 τὴν μανί̣]αν *: τὸ λί̣]αν Gomperz: τὸ ἀcέβει]αν Bücheler 2171 *: π *N*: ἐπιποεῖν edd. 2171–2 ο[ὐκ ἀ]|cεβεῖc Spengel–Gomperz 2174–5 [καὶ τἀ-να]ν|τία̣ Bücheler, qui interpunxit post φενακισταί: [*c.* 6]ν|τιδ spatiolo interposito ante ει *N*, possis -τιδ[ι] ει-: [cυνελό]ν|τι δ' Spengel–Gomperz 2175 εἶπ̣ον Bücheler: ειπcν *N*: εἰπ̣ε̣[ῖ]ν Spengel–Gomperz 2176 φιλοc̣όφω[ι Bücheler: φιλοc̣όφω[ν Quaranta 2177–8 οὐδε|νός Bücheler: οὐδὲ|ν ὡc Gomperz 2181 ον[ ]ουδ *N*

75

ξεργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀcφάλειαν ἢ τὴν ἑ-
αυτῶν παρὰ τῶν
πολλῶν ἢ τὴν ἐκεί-
2155 νων παρ' ἀλλήλων, (5)
ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμε-
νον ἕκαστοι πᾶcιν
ἐ[πιτρέποντ]ες· [ο]ἱ δὲ
μύθους μὲν εἰcῆγον
2160 ἀμέλει καὶ τερατεί- (10)
ας, οὔτε δὲ τοῖc πρό-
τερον ἐδόκουν ἐοι-
κότα ταῦτ' εἰcφέρειν
οὔτε cωτηρίας αἰ̣τ̣[ια
2165 πολειτείας· cὺν (15)
δὲ ⟨τῶι⟩ cυμπεριφέ[ρεc-
θαι μὲν τ̣αῖc τ̣[ότε
ἐνιcχυούca[ιc δόξαιc,
ἅμ̣α διὰ τὴ[ν ἀνω-
2170 μαλίαν καὶ [τ̣ὴν μανί- (20)
αν ἐπιν̣οεῖν ο[ὐκ ἀ-
cεβεῖc ἐδόκουν
μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φε-
νακισταί, [καὶ τἀνα]ν-
2175 τία̣ εἶπ̣ον, τῆc παρ- (25)
ρηcίαc φιλοc̣όφω[ι
πρεπούcηc, οὐδε-
νός, οὐδ' ἐξ ἀπόπτου
τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ θε-
2180 ῶν Ἐπικούρωι cυν- (30)
εἶδον, οὐδ' ἔλεγον.
καὶ διεπράττοντο || (32)

||ξεργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀcφάλειαν ἢ τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἢ τὴν ἐκείνων παρ' ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἕκαστοι πᾶcιν ἐ[πιτρέπον-τ]εc· [ο]ἱ δὲ μύθους μὲν εἰcῆγον | ἀμέλει καὶ τερατείας, οὔτε δὲ τοῖc πρότερον ἐδόκουν ἐοικότα ταῦτ' εἰcφέρειν οὔτε cωτηρίας αἰ̣τ̣[ια] πολι-τείας· cὺν δὲ ⟨τῶι⟩ cυμπεριφέ[ρεc]θαι μὲν τ̣αῖc τ̣[ότε] ἐνιcχυούca[ιc δόξαιc,] ἅμ̣α διὰ τὴ[ν ἀνω]||μαλίαν καὶ [τὴν μανί]αν ἐπιν̣οεῖν ο[ὐκ ἀ]cεβεῖc ἐδόκουν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φενακιcταί, [καὶ τἀνα]ντία̣ εἶπ̣ον, τῆc παρρηcίαc φιλοc̣όφω[ι] πρεπούcηc, οὐδενός, οὐδ' ἐξ ἀπόπτου τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ θε|ῶν Ἐπικούρωι cυνεῖδον, οὐδ' ἔλεγον. καὶ διεπράτ-τοντο ||

securing mere safety either for themselves from the multitude or for the latter from each other, but by each leaving to everyone else what was evident.[1] But the others | of course introduced fabulous and terrible stories,[2] and did not seem to be introducing these things either in the same way as their predecessors[3] or as the sources of security to states; and what with, on the one hand conforming to currently prevailing opinions, on the other hand at the same time conceiving | inconsistency and madness, they seemed not only impious but also dishonest; and they spoke in opposition (though a philosopher should speak freely) to no one at all; and they did not remotely perceive Epicurus' opinion about the gods, | nor state it: and they obtained ... (*top half of following col. missing*)

[1] Concerning the true nature of the gods (especially that they do not intervene in human affairs).
[2] About the gods.
[3] Those who promulgated false tales to secure their own personal security.

76 *P. Herc.* 1610 fr. 2 = *N* 1610 fr. 2 (p. 141 G., 399 Ph., 75 Schober), *HV*² II 136 (cont. inf. part. rot.)

Test.: 2198–9 Epic. ap. D.L. 10. 27, 136 (liber Epicuri *Περὶ αἱρέσεων καὶ φυγῶν*), *Ad Menoec.* 128–9 2206–7 Epic. *KD* 12, Lucr. 3. 40f 2208–11 Epic. *Ep. ad Menoec.* 127–8, *KD* 29, Cic. *De fin.* 1. 45

2195 δου esse superpositum putat Philippson, cf. infra 2254 2196 init. ἐπ' [ἐκεί]ν̣ω[ν Philippson:]ν̣ vel]ᾳι *N* fin. Philippson, fort. ἄνθρω]|ποι 2197–8 Gomperz 2198 ρ[tantum cauda inf. sin. 2199 Schober: ἱκα[νὰ μὴ spatio brevius Philippson 2200–1 Philippson: fort. κοι[νοῦντες 2202 περιφ[ορᾶι δὲ Gomperz, ὁ δὲ Philippson 2203–5 Philippson 2205–6 δὲ περιτ]|τῶς Philippson 2206–7 [χρῆται ἀκε]|ραίοις Philippson sed collocatio verborum vix recta, fort. κατ[αχρῆται, si hiatum toleres 2207 ἡ[δοναῖς Philippson 2207–8 κάπό]|νοις *: κάκέ]|νοις (vocabulum non aliter repertum) Philippson: ἀφθό]|-νως dubitanter Schober post 2208 in marg. paragraphus *N* νοις[ ]και *N* fin. [τοιαύτης D. Delattre privatim: [μὴν τῆς Jensen ap. Schober spatio brevius et contra sensum: [μόνον τῆς Philippson 2209 Gomperz 2210–11 δ[dispexi: δ[ιαγνως]|θείσης Schober: α[*N*: ἀ[ναγνως]|-θείσης Philippson 2211 Philippson 2212 ἀναγκαί[αις χρῆται *: ἀναγκαί[ας καὶ τὰς φυσικὰς διώκει] Philippson coll. 73–4 coniunxi

76

[ ]
[ ]
2185 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2190 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2195 .]{δου}[..... ..... 1610 2
επ[...]ν̣ω [οἱ δὲ λοι-
ποὶ διαπ[ίπτουσιν
ἐν ταῖς αἱρ[έσεσι καὶ
φυγαῖς, ἱκα̣[νὰ μηδὲ (5)
2200 παρ' ἓν ἄγ[οντες
μήτε κοι[μώμενοι
τῆι περιφ[ορᾶι· ὁ δὲ
δίκαιος [περὶ θεῶν ἀ-
ρίστας ἔ[χει προσδο- (10)
2205 κίας, ἅμα [δὲ περιτ-
τῶς καὶ [χρῆται ἀκε-
ραίοις ἡ[δοναῖς κἀπό-
νοις. καὶ [τοιαύτης
διαφορᾶς [τῶν ἐπι- (15)
2210 θυμιῶν δ[ιαγνως-
θείσης, κα[ὶ ταῖς
ἀναγκαί[αις χρῆται || (18)

[.]δου[..... ..... .]επ[...]ν̣ω [οἱ δὲ λοι]ποὶ διαπ[ίπτουσιν] ἐν ταῖς **76**
αἱρ[έσεσι καὶ] φυγαῖς, ἱκα̣[νὰ μηδὲ]| παρ' ἓν ἄγ[οντες] μήτε κοι- 2200
[μώμενοι] τῇι περιφ[ορᾶι· ὁ δὲ] δίκαιος [περὶ θεῶν ἀ]ρίστας ἔ[χει
προσδο]κίας, ἅμα [δὲ περιτ]τῶς καὶ [χρῆται ἀκε]ραίοις ἡ[δοναῖς κἀ-
πό]νοις. καὶ [τοιαύτης] διαφορᾶς [τῶν ἐπι]|θ̣υμιῶν δ[ιαγνως]θείσης, 2210
κα[ὶ ταῖς] ἀναγκαί[αις χρῆται]||

(*top of col., c.30 words missing*) and the rest go astray in their choices and **76**
avoidances, neither thinking these things | in any respect sufficient, nor 2200
resting peacefully on account of disturbance in society with people.
But the just person has noble expectations concerning the gods, and
at the same time exceedingly enjoys pleasures that are unalloyed
and effortless. And once such a distinction between | desires has been 2210
grasped, he[1] enjoys even necessary ones,[2] (*continues on*)

[1] sc. the just person, ὁ δίκαιος (2202–3). [2] i.e. necessary pleasures.

77A *N* 247 fr. 8 (p. 21 G., 239 Ph. 1920, 74 Schober), *HV*² II 49

Test.: 2213–42 Epic. *KD* 34–5; Lucr. 3. 1014–22; Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1090 C

ante v. 2213 [*πολλαῖc cυνέχονται ταραχαῖc*]| *ὧν οὐκ κτλ.* coni. Philippson 2213 Gomperz 2215–16 Bücheler 2222–3 Schober:]*μυ N*: *λανθά|νω[cι διὰ τ]ο̣ὐ* (= *τὸ οὐ*) Gomperz 2224–5 *περὶ* [*τοῦ*]|*του* Gomperz, i.e. *τοῦ διὰ βίου λανθάνειν* 2226 Bücheler *βειν*ʳ ¹*αλλ N* *δε* apogr.: *τε* Diano, *Ethica*, 106 2233 fort. *ἄλλα* fin. *ρ*[*N*, corr. Philippson 2234–5 fragmenta coniunxit Philippson, sed non recte duas interisse lineas putat: *πε̣|θοντ̣α̣*[*ι πολλ*]*άκιc* |[*ἀδικοῦντας περι*-|*ιδεῖν, ἧττον δο*|*κοῦcι*]*ν πολ*[*λαῖc καὶ*]| *αἰωνίοιc κτλ.*, fragmenta recte coniunxit Schober

77A

ὧν οὐκ εἰcὶν ἕτερα[*ι* 247 8
μείζους, οὐδ' ἀλλα-
κ]*τὸν αὐτῶν κέ*[*ρ-*
δος οὐδὲν λαβεί[*ν*
δυνατὸν ἐξ οὐδε- (5)
μιᾶc ἀπολαύcεωc.
περὶ δὲ τούτων καὶ
φόβος ἀεὶ κατέχει
δεινὸc αὐτοὺc, ἂν
καὶ διὰ βίου λανθά- (10)
νω[*cι, διὰ τὸ*] *μ̣ὴ̣ δύ-*
νacθαι περὶ [*τού-*
του πίcτιν λ[*α-*
βεῖν. ἄλλωc δὲ καὶ
πάντεc οἱ πράτ- (15)
τοντεc ἄδικα καὶ
πονηροὶ κοινῶc οὐ-
κ εἰ μὴ βλάπτουcιν
οἱ θεοί, καὶ δὴ νομί-
ζουcιν αὐτοὺc οὐκ ἐ- (20)
νοχλεῖν, ἀλλὰ πε̣ί-

77B

θονţ//ą̣ι πολ//[*λ*]*άκιc* 242 7
αἰωνί̣οιc περι{*α*}[*βα-*
λεῖν cυμφορα[*ῖc,*] *ὡc-*
7 ⟨*τ'*⟩ *οὐκ ἐλάττονας ἀ-*
*ναδέχονται τα*ρα- (5)
χὰc ἥπερ εἰ κατ' ἀ-
λήθειαν περιεβάλ-
λοντο τοιαύταιc,
πρὸc τῶι καὶ κατ' ἀν- || (9)

77B *N* 242 fr. 7 (p. 8 G., 239 Ph. 1920, 74 Schober), *HV*² II 35

Test.: 2234–42 Epic. *Ep. ad Herod.* 81; Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1104 B; Cic. *De fin.* 1. 51

2234]*ą̣ι* vel]*ν̣ N* 2235 *αἰωνί̣οιc* corr. Philippson: *τ N* 2235–6 *περι*[*βα*]||*λεῖν* Gomperz: *περι*[*βάλ*]||*λειν* Bücheler: *περι*{*α*}[*N*, *α* esse superpositum puto, vid. supra v. 2143: *περια*[*ντ*]||*λεῖν* Schober: *περι*[*πί*]|*π̣τ̣ειν* Philippson 2236 *cυμφορα*[*ῖc* Philippson 2236–7 *ὡc* Bücheler, init. v. 2237 ante *ουκ* nota in marg. conspicitur qua *τ* indicari Philippson censet, unde *ὡc*|⟨*τ'*⟩ *οὐκ*, minus probabilis diple obelismene vel nota stichometrica *τ̣*, *υ̣*, *χ̣* significatur 2242 *ἀν*||[*θρώπ̄ους δυcφη-*|*μεῖcθαι* Philippson: *ἀν*||[*άγκας* Bücheler–Gomperz sed divisio quod sciam inaudita

78 *N* 1610 fr. 1 (p. 141 G., 400 Ph., 74f Schober), *HV*² II 135 (continet inf. part. rot.)

Test.: 2255–60 Himerius apud Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 243 (Epic. fr. 511 Us.) contra adversarii Epicureis obiciebant *οἴχεται δικαστήρια καὶ κρίσεις* etc.

sup. pars columnae deest, ca. 10 vv. 2254 init. *τούτωι*] *δ' οὐ*[*χ* Philippson, vid. 2195 2254–5 Philippson 2256 *τ*]*ἀρ*[*χ*]*εῖον* Schober: *οὐ*[*χ ὡς* | *κ*]*αὶ* [*ὅ*]*σιον* dubitanter Philippson: circuli pars inf. sin., possis *κ*]*αθ' ὅ*]*σιον* 2256–7 Schober 2257–8 *ἂν ἐ*[*νίων* | *κ*]*ακῶν* Schober: *ἄνε*[*υ* spatio aptius ad finem Anon. A: *ἀνέχ*[*ειν* | *ἀ*]*δ*⟨*ι*⟩*κων* Philippson 2258–9 *ἀξιο-λ*[*ό*|*γω*]*ς* *: init.]*λ*,]*α*,]*ς* *N*: *ἀξιολ*[*ό*|*γω*]*ν* Philippson 2259 fin. *-πῶ*[*ν* Philippson: *-πα*[*N* 2260 *ἀνέχως*[*ι*] Philippson: *ανεκωσι N*: *δι*]*ανθίσως*[*ι* Schober:]*νανεκως*[ ]*την N* 2261 *νην*[.]*και*, sed fort. spat. vac. 2261–2 [*δι*|*κ*]*αιοσύνην* Gomperz 2262–3 Philippson 2269 Philippson: *τηρημονον N* 2271 Gomperz *ὅλομ, ὅλον*

78

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

..... .]*δου*[.] *ἀ*[*ρ*- 1610 1
μ[*ό*]*ςει κ*[*αὶ*] *τὸ* "*οὐ*[*κ εἰς*
τ]*ἀρ*[*χ*]*εῖον ἔρχοντα*[*ί*
τ]*ινες ὅπως ἂν ἐ*[*νίων*
κ]*ακῶν οὐκ ἀξιολ*[*ό-* (5)
γω]*ς αὐτὰς ἀγαπῴ*[*ν-*
τω]*ν ἀνέχως*[*ι*] *τὴν* [*δι-*
κ]*αιοσύνην.*" *κα*[*ὶ*
μ]*ὴ θεωρήσαντ*[*ες*
ὅ]*τι σχεδὸν ταὐτ*[*ὸ* (10)
φαίν]*εται τὸ ὅσιο*[*ν καὶ*
δί]*και*[*ον* ....
...]*αμι*[.....]*τε*[...
.]*ων*[..... ....
.]*αυτ*[..] *δια*[..... . (15)
.*τε*]*τηρημένον α*[..
...]*κε*[.] *πάντα καὶ*
..]*τη* [*τὸ*]*ν ὅλομ βίο*[*ν*
.....]*ντον αις*[....||

[..... .]δου[..] ἁ[ρ]μ[ό]ϲει κ[αὶ] τὸ "οὐ[κ εἰc τ]ἀρ[χ]εῖον ἔρχοντα[ί 78
τ]ινεc ὅπωc ἂν ἐ[νίων κ]ακῶν οὐκ ἀξιολ[όγω]ϲ αὐτὰc ἀγαπῷ[ν|τω]ν 2260
ἀνέχωc[ι] τὴν [δικ]αιοcύνην". κα[ὶ μ]ὴ θεωρήcαντ[ec ὅ]τι cχεδὸν
ταὐτ[ὸ φαίν]εται τὸ ὅcιο[ν καὶ δί]κ̣αι[ον ....]αμι[.....]τε[...
.]ων[..... ....]αυτ[..] δια[..... ..τε]τηρημένον α[..|...]κε[.] 2270
πάντα καὶ [..]τη [τὸ]ν ὅλον βίο[ν .....]ντον αιc[....]||

(*top of col.*, c.*40 words missing*) ... is[1] this fitting: 'Some people do not go 78
to law in order that, if some evil people do not notably like | these,[2] 2260
they might enforce[3] justice.' And not realizing that piety and justice
appear to be almost the same thing (*15–17 words missing*) | having 2270
observed[4] (*one word missing*) all their lives . . . (*originally linked with following col., which is missing its top half,* c.*50 words*)

[1] Context suggests that a negative is to be supplied: 'Nor is this fitting', and that the following quotation should be understood as a reported criticism of the Epicurean view under discussion.

[2] Feminine accusative plural antecedent. Perhaps ταραχάc, 'disturbances'.

[3] i.e. 'uphold', perhaps an allusion to the good king at *Od.* 19. 11 who enforces justice, εὐδικίαc ἀνέχηcι.

[4] Or 'guarded'.

79 *N* 229 fr. 4 (p. 146 G., 403 Ph.), *HV*² II 26

2273 corr. Philippson: *τ* nescioqua re *N* 2274 ante init. v. in marg. hasta et pars sin. litterae *φ*, lineola subter posita, et punctum stichometricum *N* 2280–1 *ὁ|μοιοτρό-πων* coniecit R. Janko privatim 2282 *θ̣* Bücheler: *χ N* nescioqua re, fort. iam perperam in pap. 2283–5 fort. *ὡc ἐγὼ |[προεῖπο]ν· ἐγὼ |[πρότερον] παρα[δέ-|δειχα* Philippson: *ἐγὼ |[προβαίνων] παρα-|[cτήcω* Bücheler–Gomperz 2286 ***: *δοῦνα[ι* iam Philippson 2287 fin. pars sup. *υ[N*, fort. corrigendum in *ὠφε̣[*, *ὠφε̣-|[λεῖν* Quaranta: *ὠφε̣|[λιμον* Philippson 2289 *τοὺc ῆ|[ρωαc* Quaranta 2290 *τῆι π]όλει* Quaranta 2293–4 *μ]ικρὰ ἢ μ̣[ε|γάλα* Philippson 2294 fin. utrum ultima nota pars sin. litterae *χ* sit an illa quam librarius saepe ne relinqueret spatium in fine posuit dubium mihi quidem videtur 2296–2302 nullum vestigium legi potest, nec papyrum hic ostendit *N*, quamquam in *HV*² II materies papyri nescioqua re depicta est

79

εὔδηλον ὅτι τὸ ἐπ̣[ι- 229 4
Φ. ορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐcτ[ι
καὶ προcέτι ψεύδε[c-
θαι, ταραχῶδεc δὲ [ἑ-
κάτερον. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ (5)
καὶ περὶ τῶν θυcιῶ̣[ν
καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν κα[ὶ
τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁ-
μοίων τρόπων διε-
νοήθ̣ηcάν τε καὶ π[α- (10)
ρέδοcαν, ὡc ἐγὼ [ ]
....]ν παρα[ ]
....]ντα γὰ[ρ
..... .ἀπο]δοῦνα[ι
....] καὶ ὠφ̣υ̣[ ] (15)
....]α τιμ̣[ ]
....]τουcη̣[ ]
....]ολει[ ]
....] ἀναιρεῖν̣
....]ωι τι βου- (20)
....].κρα η̣ι̣[ ]
....]ειν >
....]νει[ ]
[ ]
[ ] (25)
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]||| (30)

|| εὔδηλον ὅτι τὸ ἐπ[ι]ορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστ[ι] καὶ προσέτι ψεύδε[c]θαι, **79**
ταραχῶδες δὲ [ἕ]κάτερον. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν θυσιῶ[ν] καὶ τῶν
ἑορτῶν κα[ὶ]| τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμοίων τρόπων διενοήθησάν τε καὶ 2280
π[α]ρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐγὼ [..... ...]ν παρα[..... ...]ντα γὰ[ρ ..... . ἀπο]-
δοῦναι [..... ...] καὶ ὠφυ[..... ....]α τιμ[..... ...]τουcη|[..... ....] 2290
ολει[..... ..] ἀναιρεῖν [..... ...]ωι τι βου[..... ...] . κρα ηι[..... .....]
ειν[..... .....]νει[(*18–20 words missing*) ||

. . . was exceedingly clear, because to break one's oath is to be unjust **79**
and also to lie, and both are disturbing. And they[1] held and taught[2] the
same kind of things as well about sacrifices and festivals and other
| similar types,[3] as I[4] (*bottom of col., 45–50 words missing*) 2280/90

[1] Epicurus and the *kathegemones*? Or early humans?
[2] Literally 'passed down'.
[3] Or 'types of practices', 'customs', 'manners' (τρόποι).
[4] Perhaps 'as I said earlier'.

80 *N* 1610 fr. 5 (p. 142 G., 400 Ph., 75 Schober), *HV*² II 139 (continet inf. part. rot.)

Test.: 2320–8 Hermarchus fr. 31 Longo

sup. pars columnae deest, ca. 9 vv. 2313 *: τ[ὸ τὴν κρί]|cιν spatio brevius Philippson 2314 post cιν spatiolum 2314–15 Schober: ὑπ[ειλήφα]|μεν Gomperz 2315–20 Gomperz 2317 τοιc⌜ ⌝και *N*, punctum post τοιc Philippson πά[ντα, sc. διά (vid. 2313) 2318 τοῦ * post 2320 in marg. paragraphus *N* μεν⌜ ⌝ου *N*, neglexit Philippson οὐ μό[νον Philippson: ουμc[*N*: ο[ὐ]μᾳ[ι nimis temere Schober, unde Longo 2320–1 δ' ἐκεῖ]|νό γε Schober: ἐκεί]|νου Philippson falso 2321 ἄ[δικον Philippson: ἀ[νόητον Schober 2322 ὑποτρέχει Gomperz: ὑποτρέχει[ν Schober [ὅπερ δέ] *: [ὅπερ Schober spatio brevius: [καὶ ὁ Philippson 2323–7 Philippson, Ἔρ[μ]αρχός iam Bücheler 2326 fin. κ[vel ν[*N* 2326–7 κ[ατὰ τὸν]| λόγον 'secundum ea quae supra exposui' (Schober) 2327 post τοῦτ[ον interpunxit Philippson 2328 Gomperz 2329 fin. suppl. Schober: [ἐξ ἀρχῆc Philippson post 2329 paragraphus *N* 2030 Schober: [πᾶcιν Philippson 2331 οὐ δεχόμενα *: οὐδ' ἐχόμενα Philippson 2331–2 Philippson 2332 κόλ[ακιν L. A. Holford-Strevens privatim: κολ[άκευc Philippson

80

[ ]
[ ]
2305 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
2310 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]

διὰ τ[ὸ τὴν κόλα- 1610 5
κιν, ὡc ὑπ[εδείξα-
μεν, cυνπ[επλέ-
χθαι τοῖc κα[κίc-
τοιc, καὶ πά[ντα (5)
ὅca διὰ τού[του τοῦ
λόγου παρ[εστήσα-
μεν. οὐ μό[νον δ' ἐκεῖ-
νό γε τὸν ἄ[δικον
ὑποτρέχει, [ὅπερ δὲ (10)
Ἔρ[μ]αρχός [φηcιν, ὡc
βλάπτειν [οὐ δοκεῖ
θεὸc τοὺc ἀ[δικοῦν-
τας, ἄ⟨ν λά⟩θω{ι}cι κ[ατὰ τὸν
λόγον τοῦτ[ον καὶ (15)
οἱ φαυλότατ[οι τῶν
ἀνθρώπων. [καὶ οἱ
νόμοι παρὰ [μικρὸν
οὐ δεχόμενα [προ-
φέρουcιν κόλ[ακιν || (20)

διὰ τ[ὸ τὴν κόλα]cιν, ὡc ὑπ[εδείξα]μεν, cυμπ[επλέ]χθαι τοῖc κα[κί- 80
c]τοιc, καὶ πά[ντα] ὅca διὰ τού[του τοῦ] λόγου παρ[εcτήca]||μεν. οὐ 2320
μό[νον δ' ἐκεῖ]νό γε τὸν ἄ[δικον] ὑποτρέχει, [ὅπερ δὲ] Ἕρ[μ]αρχόc
[φηcιν, ὡc] βλάπτειν [οὐ δοκεῖ] θεὸc τοὺc ἀ[δικοῦν]τac, ἂ⟨ν λά⟩θωcι
κ[ατὰ τὸν] λόγον τοῦτ[ον καὶ] οἱ φαυλότατ[οι τῶν] ἀνθρώπων. [καὶ
οἱ]| νόμοι παρὰ [μικρὸν] οὐ δεχόμενα [προ]φέρουcιν κόλ[acιν]|| 2330

(*top of col., c.25 words missing*) for the reason that punishment, as 80
I[1] have shown, has been bound up with[2] the worst people,[3] and
because of all that I[4] have set forth | in this argument. And not only 2320
does that[5] indeed occur to the unjust man, but, as Hermarchus says,
that the god does not seem to harm wrongdoers, even if the worst of
mankind escape notice according to this argument. And the laws
| advance measures only just not admitting of punishment . . . (*gap of* 2330
1 col., c.90 words)

[1] Literally 'we'.
[2] Or 'associated with'.
[3] Or 'worst things'.
[4] Literally 'we'.
[5] i.e. that the gods do not seem to harm wrongdoers (?)

81 *N* 229 fr. 3 (p. 145 G., 403 Ph), *HV*² II 25

2334 ποιά τινα Philippson: ποῖά τινα Bücheler 2336 πατρί⟨δ⟩ων Gomperz, sed nil mutandum esse recte censebat Philippson 2341 τη[..]ϛτ[.]ηι[. . | *N*, fin. una hasta inclinata ad dext., possis ι, λ, δ: παρ]-ο̣ύ̣[c]η ε̣[π]|αγωγῇ Bücheler: cυνε]ϛτ[ώc]η ϛ[υν]|αγωγῇ Philippson: ἐνε]ϛτ[ώc]η δ̣[ι]|-αγωγῇ Gomperz dubitanter in text., c[υν]|αγωγῇ in app. crit.: ε̣[ἰc]|αγωγῇ Quaranta 2343 cω⌜ ⌝τηc *N* 2344 ἐλπίδ[oc (edd.) μὲν spatio aptius Quaranta 2345 τοῦτον add. Henrichs 2346–7 edd.: ἀποστερούμενοι Quaranta 2347 fin. α[*N*, corr. iam Quaranta, Gomperz 2348 suppl. Gomperz 2349 Bücheler 2352 α[ὐτοῖc iam Quaranta, Bücheler 2354–6 de hoc loco desperavi 2354 fort. τοῦτ' ἐ̣κ̣κρού[coμ]εν: τοῦτ' ἐκκρού[o-μ]εν dubitanter Gomperz 2355 καὶ ἀγαθὰ{ι} ζ̣η[τῶμεν vel ἀγάθ' ἀ̣ντὶ coni. Anon. A: fort. καὶ ἀγαθὰϛ π̣[ρὸc]| τὸν αἰ-ῶνα δό̣[ντεc χάρι]|τac legendum 2355–6 fort. εἰc]| τὸν αἰῶνα 2356 δό̣[ντεc corr. Philippson 2356–7 ζῶν]|τac Anon. A: πιc]|τάc Philippson 2357–60 Gomperz 2357 τac⌜ ⌝αντ *N* 2358 fin. [ἀπὸ dubitanter Gomperz 2359–60 fin. fort. supra vel subter positi, τοῦ μηδὲ[ν θείαν εἶ]|ναι τὴν φύc[ιν οὐχ]| ὡc Quaranta 2360–1 ὅ]|[π]ωc Philippson 2361–2 δυcεκκ[αρ]τέ|[ρη]τόν Anon. A, cf. Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 12,6: δυcεκκ[..]τε|[..] τον *N*: δυcέκκ[ρο]υ̣ϛ|[{c}]τόν Philippson, cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7. 23 2362 δε̣[ι]ν̣ὸν ||[φεύγωμεν coni. Philippson

81

ἐκείνους ἀφ' ὧν εὖ- 229 3
χονται ποιά τινα
καὶ πρὸc cωτηρί-
αν τῶν πατρίων
καὶ πρὸc εὐδοκίαν (5)
ἐλογοποίηcαν, ὡc
ἐπηγγειλάμην,
οὐκ εἰc μακρὰν ἀλ-
λ' ἐν τῇ [παρ]ο̣ύ̣[c]η ϛ[υν-
αγωγῇ παραcτ[ή- (10)
cω. τῆc ἀγαθῆc
τοίνυν ἐλπίδ[oc
τοὺc εὐcεβεῖc ⟨τοῦτον⟩ τὸν
τρόπον ἀποστεροῦ-
μεν οἱ καὶ μεγίcτη[ν (15)
αὐτοῖc ὠφέλειαν [ἐκ
τῶν θεῶν ὑ̣[πογρά-
φοντεc καὶ τὴν πο-
νηροτάτην ἀνα-
κόπτοντεc α[ὐτοῖc (20)
προcδοκίαν; υ[...
τουτηκρου[...]εν
καιαγαθαιτη[....
τὸν αἰῶνα δε[....
τας, ἀντε[ιcάγον- (25)
τεc δὲ πίcτ[ιν ἀπὸ
τοῦ μὴ δε[ινοὺ]c ε[ἶ-
ν̣αι τὴν φύc[ιν,] ὅ-
π]ωc δυcεκκ[αρ]τέ-
ρη]τόν τι δε̣[ι]ν̣ὸν || (30)

|| *ἐκείνους ἀφ' ὧν εὔχονται ποιά τινα καὶ πρὸς cωτηρίαν τῶν πατρίων* 81
καὶ πρὸς εὐδοκίαν ἐλογοποίηcαν, ὡc ἐπηγγειλάμην, | οὐκ εἰc μακρὰν 2340
ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ [παρ]ο̣ύ̣[c]η̣ c̣[υν]αγωγῇ παραcτ[ή]cω. τῆc ἀγαθῆc τοίνυν
ἐλπίδ[oc] τοὺc εὐcεβεῖc ⟨τοῦτον⟩ τὸν τρόπον ἀποcτεροῦμεν οἱ καὶ
μεγίcτη̣[ν] αὐτοῖc ὠφέλειαν [ἐκ] τῶν θεῶν ὑ[πογρά]|φοντεc καὶ τὴν 2350
πονηροτάτην ἀνακόπτοντεc α[ὐτοῖc] προcδοκίαν; υ[...]τουτηκρου-
[...]ενκαιαγαθαιτη[....] τὸν αἰῶνα δε[....]τac, ἀντε[ιcάγον]τεc δὲ
πίcτ[ιν ἀπὸ] τοῦ μὴ δε[ινοὺ]c ε[ἶ]|ν̣αι τὴν φύc[ιν,] ὅ[π]ως δυcεκκ[αρ]- 2360
τέ[ρη]τόν τι δε̣[ι]ν̣όν ||

. . . those[1] from whom[2] they prayed for things of some kind or other 81
with regard to the preservation of their ancestral customs and their good reputation,[3] they discoursed,[4] I shall demonstrate, as I promised, | not later on[5] but in the present discussion. Do we then in this way 2340
deprive the pious of their fine hope—we who sketch | out the greatest 2350
benefit for them[6] from the gods and remove the worst expectation? (*8–10 words missing*) while adducing in response a demonstration on the ground that they[7] are | not terrible in their nature, so that a source 2360
of unbearable terror . . . (*gap of at least 1 col., c.90 words*)

[1] Context suggests that something like the following should be supplied: 'that people, without preserving their correct concepts of those from whom they prayed (i.e. the gods) . . . , discoursed . . .' etc. [2] The gods.

[3] Possibly 'with regard to the safety of their country and its good reputation' (reading *πατρί⟨δ⟩ων*). [4] Or 'reasoned' (i.e. about gods).

[5] Literally 'not a long way off'. [6] The pious. [7] Gods.

82 *P. Herc.* 1114 = *N* 1788 fr. 9 (p. 409 Ph.), *HV*² VIII 62 (continet sup. part. rot.)

nihil pro certo 2363 κυρι]εύων παρῆ-[ται Philippson 2364 καθά]περ Philippson 2364–5 με[ιρα|κιῶδες Philippson: μὲ[ν ἄ|τοπον Bignone, *SIFC*² 10 (1933), 110 2366–7 καὶ τ]ὴν ἄλλην [πρό|νοι]αν Philippson 2369 κ]αὶ μέχρι⟨c⟩ αἰ[ῶνος Philippson 2370 init. fort. infinitivus latet ut possis]ε⟨ι⟩ν, e.g. λέγ]ε⟨ι⟩ν Philippson, cf. 330 2371–3 τ[ὰ κα|κὰ τ]ὰ μικρὰ τ[ὰ ἡμῖν | προcμ]έ-νοντα Philippson 2373–4 ποιεῖν τὸ[ν ἄνθρω|πον] ἐξ ἀφροc[ύνης Philippson 2375 Philippson 2379–83 exstant in *P. Herc.* 1114 fr. sin. supra vel subter positum in hoc loco, ut vid. 2381]c λογο{νca} legi in pap.: cλογοαλ *N* 2381–2 ο]ὐδὲ τύ[χης κύρι|ος] ὁ λογοδα[ίδαλος Philippson 2382 τὸ]ν κρόνον legi in pap., post quod spat. vac. vel finis versus:]ν κρονοτ[*N* 2384–7 *N*, deperiit pap., sed fort. superpositum vel subter positum, cf. comm. ad 2379–83 2384 αἱ δίκαι Philippson 2386 ἀλλὰ [κα]τ' ὄ[χλου Philippson post v. 2387 desunt ca. 4–5 vv. et marg. inf.

82

....]ετων παρη[... 1788 9
καθά]περ ἐcτὶ με[...
2365 .....] τὴν τύχην [ ]
....]ην ἄλλην [....
..]αν κυριεύει[.... (5)
..]δ' ὅλως ἀφαι[....
..]αι μέχρι αι[....
2370 ..]εν ἀλλα τ[....
..τ]ὰ μικρὰ τ[....
...]ενοντα[..... (10)
...]ποιεῖν τ̣ο̣[....
...] ἐξ ἀφροc[ύνης
2375 τῆ]c κακῶν λ[όγων
..]ι[..]δηc[.]c[....
.....]ηλ[.]α[..... (15)
....]ε[..]υca[....
..... .]{ιc}εγ[.....
2380 .....]{c δὲ τυ}[....
...]{cλογο}αλ[....
..{τὸ]ν Κρόνον} (20)
....]{cηc ἦρχε}[
..]ταιαι και τ̣[....
2385 ..]αυτον ε[..... .
..] ἀλλα [..]το[....
...]τη[..... ..... (25)
[ ]
[ ]
2390 [ ]
[ ]
[ ]||

||[....]ετων παρη[... καθά]περ ἐστὶ με[..... ...] τὴν τύχην [....]ην **82**
ἄλλην [..... .]αν κυριεύει[..... .]δ' ὅλως ἀφαι[..... .]αι μέχρι αι[....|. 2370
.]εν ἀλλα τ[..... .τ]ὰ μικρὰ τ[..... ..]ενοντα[..... ...]ποιεῖν το[.....
..] ἐξ ἀφροc[ύνηc τῆ]c κακῶν λ[όγων ..]ι[..]δηc[.]c[..... ....]ηλ[.]α
[..... ....]ε[..]υca[..... ....]εγ[.....| ....]αλ[..... 2380
....]ταιαι και τ[..... .]αυτον ε[..... ...] ἀλλα
[..]το[..... ..]τη[..... .....] (c.*12 words missing*) ||

...(*several words missing*) just as it is (*one word missing*) for fortune and the **82**
other (*one word missing*) dominate, but entirely (*several words missing*)
until | (*several words missing*) insignificant things (*several words missing*) to 2370
do (*several words missing*) from the foolishness of bad arguments | (c.*25* 2380
words missing, then c.*12 words indistinguishable, + gap of at least 15 words*)

83 *N* 229 fr. 1 (p. 143 G., 401 Ph.), *HV*² II 23

nihil hic discerni potest nisi verba singula 2395 Gomperz 2398–2400 τ]οῦ τὴν μὲν |[ἡμετέρ]αν εὐελπις|[τίαν εἶ]ναι βέβαιον |[ἅτε καθ]ισταμένην |[δόξαις] ἀ̣λ̣ηθέ̣σιν Philippson qui interpunxit post σιν: εὐελπίς|[τους εἶ]ναι βέβαιον |[διὰ τὴν] ἱσταμένην |[αἰτίαν] ἀ̣λ̣ηθέ̣σιν |[ἐλέγχοις ἕ]κείνων, ο[ἷς | δηλοῦμεν,] γείνεται Quaranta 2399 παρ]ισταμένην Anon. A 2401–2 ἕ]κ̣είνων ὁ [βί]ος παρα]τ̣είνεται Philippson:]χ vel]τ̣ *N*: γείνεται Quaranta 2403 fin. φε[.]| *N* 2404 πό]νοις Philippson 2404–5 ἀνυ[ποπτ- vel ἀνυ|[στ- 2407]οῦμεν vel]ου μὲν 2409 ποιοῦν]τες κα[ὶ τ]ῷι Philippson 2412 ἐπιφέρον]τες Philippson 2413]υσηcαν *N*, fort. -ο]υσης αν: δυστ]υχήσαν-|[τες Philippson 2415 Philippson 2416]υσηcαν *N*: ἡκολο]ύθησαν Philippson 2417 οὕ]τως ζῆν Philippson 2418 θεοὺς νο]οῦσιν Philippson fin. ε vel θ 2419 fort. παραμυθ[ία 2420 ὑπό]-πτως Anon. A 2421–2 δυστυ]χεῖς χρε[ι|ῶν] Philippson 2422 fin. κα[..(·) || *N*, suppositum censet Henrichs: κα[ὶ κα]||ταλέλοιπε, coll. 83–4 coniunxi

83

....] ἀ̣λ̣λὰ 229 1
....]ήσεσθαι
2395 ....δι]αφορας
....τ]οῦ τὴν μὲν
..... .]αν εὐελπις- (5)
τίαν εἶ]ναι βέβαιον
οὐ καθ]ισταμένην
2400 ....] ἀ̣λ̣ηθέσιν
....ἕ]κ̣είνων ο
....]τ̣είνεται [ ] (10)
..... .]λ̣ως ὑποφε-
ρ-.... δει]νοῖς ἀνυ-
2405 π-.....]ου καὶ τῶν
....]λ̣ον ἀντι
..... .]ουμεν πλε- (15)
....]ν ἕτερον
..... .]τες κα[ὶ τ]ῷι
2410 ....]ντα καὶ
....] δεινὰ
....]τες κα- (20)
....]υσηcαν
....]δὲ μέχρι
2415 ..... μεγ]ίστους η
....]υσηcαν
....]τως ζῆν (25)
..... .]ουσιν [.]ε[.
..... .] παραμυθ[.]
2420 .... περι]ττῶς ἐπου-
....]χεις χρε[ι.]
....]ες κα[ὶ κα- || (30)

||[..... .....] ἀλλὰ [..... ...]ήcεcθαι [..... ...δι]αφορας [..... ...τ]οῦ 83
τὴν μὲν [..... .]αν εὐελπιc[τίαν εἶ]ναι βέβαιον [οὐ καθ]ιcταμένην
|[..... ..] ἀ̣λ̣ηθέcιν [..... ..ἔ]κ̣είνων ο[..... ..]τ̣είνεται [..... .]λ̣ωc 2400
ὑποφε[ρ.... δει]νοῖc ἀνυ[π .....]ου καὶ τῶν [..... ...]λ̣ον ἀντι[.....
.]ουμεν πλε[..... ..]ν ἕτερον [..... .]τεc κα[ὶ τ]ῷ̣ι |[..... ...]ντα καὶ 2410
[..... ....] δεινὰ [..... ....]τεc κα[..... ...]υθ̣ηcαν [..... ..]δὲ μέχρι
[..... μεγ]ίcτουc η[..... ....]υθ̣ηcαν [..... ....]τωc ζῆν [..... .]ουcιν
[.]ε[..... ..] παραμυθ[.|.... περι]ττῶc ἐπου[..... ..]χειc χρε[ι .....
....]ec κα[ὶ κα-]||

... (*several words missing*) but (*several words missing*) difference(s) (*several* 83
words missing) good expectation not established | as firm (*one word miss-* 2400
ing) true (*one word missing*) of those (*several words missing*) | terrifying[1] 2410
things (*several words missing*) the greatest ones (*several words missing*) to
live (*several words missing*) consolation (*one word missing*) | exceedingly 2420
(*several words missing, continues on*)

[1] Or 'clever'.

84 *N* 229 fr. 2 (p. 144 G., 402 Ph.), *HV*² II 24

Test.: 2148–52 cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 2. 167, 3. 86, 90

2423 κα]||ταλέλοιπε Gomperz 2423–4 κ[αὶ θε]||ῶν ἐγγόνους Philippson: εγ tum una hasta sup., χ, τ, π, ξ ante ενους *N* 2424–5 κ[αὶ δαί]||μονας iam Quaranta, Philippson: κ[ακοδαί]||μονας Gomperz 2425–6 Gomperz: ἐπι]||τυχοῦντας Quaranta 2426 fin. πα[*N*: παρα *HV*² II nescioqua re, unde 2426–7 παρα|στήσας Gomperz 2427 ὅτι Gomperz fin. νε[ίκη *: νέ[ον ἀεὶ Philippson, sed ἀεί spatio longius: νε[κρὰς Anon. A: ὅ τινε[ς spatio brevius Quaranta 2428 fin. με[γάλα vel μο[ῖραν D. Delattre privatim: μό[χθον Philippson: μ et pars parv. circ. inf. sin., ε[vel ο[*N*: λα[μ[ίας] Anon. A: μά[λα Quaranta 2429 αἰσχύνον[ται Quaranta–Bücheler–Gomperz 2430 κατηγοροῦντε[ς Bücheler–Gomperz: -τα[*N* 2431 fin. ο[*N*, corr. Bücheler post 2431 paragraphus *N* 2432 προ-ε[ῖπον Anon. A: πρὸς [τίσιν Philippson 2433–4 ἐπικο[υφι]||ζώμεθα *: ἐπικο[μι]-||ζώμεθα iam Quaranta, Philippson: Ἐπί-κο[υρον Anon. A 2434 το[ῦτον τὸν *, sc. τρόπον: τὸ[ν πόνον vel τὸ[ν βίον vel τὸ[ν καί, sc. τρόπον D. Delattre privatim: τὸ [μῖ-σος Philippson: τὸ[ν λόγον Quaranta 2435–8 iam Quaranta, Gomperz 2435 κρατούν[των Gomperz: κρατούν[των καὶ spatio longius Philippson 2436 κε-στω[ ]συ[*N* 2437–8 περιβαλ[λό]-|μ[ε]νον D. Delattre privatim: περιβάλ[λο]-|μεν ὂν Gomperz 2438 ε[ῖ] Philippson, ε circuli arcus sin., possis σ 2439 ἐ[πί-σ]τωσαν Philippson: ε vel σ 2441–3 fin. iam Quaranta 2444–7 Philippson 2444 vel ε[ἴσ] πᾶσαν 2445 init. arcus sup. circuli *N*, tum partes extremae duarum hastarum sup., possis σιτ vel σιχ 2447 fin. ν[pars sin. ν, possis λ 2447–8 εἴ]|τ[ινε]ς et post [ἠ]δ[ίκ]ησαν interpunxit D. Delattre privatim: ὅ|[τι δ]ὲ [ἠ]δ[ίκ]ησαν καὶ Philippson: fort. ἕ]|τ[ι δ]ὲ 2450 Philippson 2450–1 δυσ||[τυχούντων Philippson

84

ταλέλοιπε κ[αὶ θε- 229 2
ῶν ἐγγόνους κ[αὶ δαί-
μονας αὐτοὺς [δυσ-
τυχοῦντας παρα-
στήσας, ὅτι νε[ίκη (5)
φοβοῦνται με[γάλα,
οὐδ' αἰσχύνον[ται
κατηγοροῦντε[ς
ἀσέβε[ι]αν ἡμῶ[ν·
ὥσπερ προε[ῖπον, (10)
ἵν' ἡμεῖς ἐπικο[υφι-
ζώμεθα το[ῦτον τὸν
τῶν κρατούν[των
ἀνηκέστο[ις] συ[μ-
φορα[ῖ]ς περιβαλ[λό- (15)
μ[ε]νον τρόπον, ε[ἴ
τι ἐ[πίς]τωσαν οἱ τ[υ-
χόντες, ἧττον [ ]
κακίζουσι τοὺς σ[ο-
φοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἀγα- (20)
θοὺς τῶν βασιλ[έ-
ων ἐ[πὶ] πᾶσαν κ[α-
κί[α]ν ἀ]παντ[ήσειν
με[λλόντων] ἢ πολλ[οὺς
τ[ῶν τιμω]ρουμένων [εἴ (25)
τ[ινε]ς [ἠ]δ[ίκ]ησαν· καὶ
τῶν ἀνθρώπων [ ]
τ[ῶ]ν [τὰ ὅ]μοια δυσ- || (28)

|| ταλέλοιπε κ[αὶ θε]ῶν ἐγγόνους κ[αὶ δαί]μονας αὐτοὺς [δυς]τυχοῦν- 84
τας παραστήσας, ὅτι νε[ίκη] φοβοῦνται με[γάλα,] οὐδ' αἰσχύνον[ται]
| κατηγοροῦντε[ς] ἀσέβε[ι]αν ἡμῶ[ν·] ὥσπερ προε[ίπον,] ἵν' ἡμεῖς ἐπι- 2430
κο[υφι]ζώμεθα το[ῦτον τὸν] τῶν κρατούν[των] ἀνηκέστο[ις] συ[μ]φο-
ρα[ῖ]ς περιβαλ[λό]μ[ε]νον τρόπον, ε[ἴ] τι ἐ[πίς]τωσαν οἱ τ[υ]|χόντες,
ἧττον κακίζουσι τοὺς c[o]φοὺς ἢ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῶν βασιλ[έ]ων ἐ[πὶ] 2440
πᾶσαν κ[α]κί̣α̣[ν ἀ]παντ[ήσειν] με[λλόντων] ἢ πολλ[οὺς] τ[ῶν τιμω]-
ρουμένων [εἴ] τ[ινε]ς [ἠ]δ[ίκ]ησαν· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων | τ[ῶ]ν [τὰ
ὅ]μοια δυς- || 2450

...allowed[1] ...while representing both the gods' children and the gods 84
themselves as suffering misfortunes because they[2] are afraid of great
quarrels, nor are they[3] ashamed | to accuse us of impiety. As I said 2430
before, it is in order that we might lighten this mode of life of those
who have power,[4] a mode of life enveloped in irremediable misfor-
tunes,[5] that, if ordinary people | offer a demonstration on this point, 2440
they[6] reproach not so much the wise[7] as they do the good kings who
are prepared to stand in opposition to every offence or to many of
those seeking to exact vengeance[8] if any have done wrong. | And with 2450
people suffering misfortunes similar[9] ... *(joins with following col., which is missing its top portion, c.30 words)*

[1] Singular subject. Supply 'It is absurd to suppose that anyone allowed the existence of gods, while representing the gods as ...'. [2] The gods and their children.
[3] Detractors of Epicureans.
[4] i.e. the mode of life of the gods, and by analogy, of human rulers.
[5] i.e. with the duties of punishing wrongdoers or the threat of being punished themselves, as depicted in myths (see 2036–8, 2235–6, cf. 2158–65). [6] People in general.
[7] = philosophers. [8] Or 'punishment'.
[9] Probably continued, e.g.,'because people suffer misfortunes similar to those depicted in myths, wrongdoers may refrain from injustice ...'.

85 *N* 1610 fr. 4 (p. 142 G., 400 Ph., 76 Schober), *HV*² II 138 (continet inf. part. rot.)

pars sup. columnae deest, ca. 11 vv. 2463]χ vel]ῥ *N* 2463–4 *οὐ μόνον* d]γα[*θοὺς* | *αὐτούς, ἀλ*]λ᾽ *εἰς το*[*ῦ*|*το*] Philippson 2464 fort. *π*]λειστο[2464–5 *τοὺς π*]λείστο[*υς* | *θεοὺ*]ς *δε*[*νο*]*τάτους* D. Delattre privatim 2466–7 Anon. A 2468 *ἐν*]ό[*ηcε*]ῳ Philippson: *ἐν*]ό[*ου*]ῳ Anon. A fin. corr. Philippson: *ουκουτ*[*N* 2468–9 *ἐ*|*ν*]*ίωῳ* Schober: *αἰcχ*]*ίωῳ* Philippson 2469 *κατ᾽ ἰδία*[*ν* Gomperz 2470 *φ*]*αίνεται* Anon. A: *περ*]*αίνεται* Gomperz 2470–1 *cυκο*|[*φαντ*]*ία* Gomperz: divisionem corr. Anon. A 2471 *μό*[*νον οὐ* Jensen apud Schober: *μό*-[*νον* Philippson 2472–3 Philippson–Schober 2473 init. *τ*, pars dext. *π* *N* fin. *γ*[*N*/ 2473–4 *τ*[*ὰ*]|*βλ*⟨*αβ*⟩*ῆ* *: *θ*[*εὸν ἀ*]|*βλ*⟨*αβ*⟩*ῆ* Schober, sed longius ut vid. 2474–5 Philippson, divisionem correxi: *παρεισαγό*[*μ*|*εν*]*ον καλῶνται* Gomperz: init. 2475 pars dext. circuli, i.e. *ο* vel *θ* *N* 2475–6 *μ*[*η*|*δ᾽* iam Quaranta, Gomperz: *μ*[*όνους* Philippson 2476–7 *κατηγ*[*ορη*]|*θήcεcθαι* iam Quaranta, Bücheler 2478–9 *προνομ*[*ί*]|*ας* Bücheler, fin. 2478 *μ*[vel *ν*[*N*, init. 2479]*δε* *N*: *προνοίας οὐ*]|*δὲ* Quaranta 2479 fin. *ν*[sscr. *N* 2479–80 *κατ*|*άρ*]*ξομαι* suppl. Henrichs, divisionem correxi: *ἄρ*]|*ξομαι* Bücheler, sed vid. *Lex. Philod.* s.vv. 2480 *τ*[*ῶν*] et coll. 85–6 coniunxit Schober

85

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

....]*γα*[.... 1610 4
....]*λειστο*[..
..]*εδε*[..]*τάτους*
νομίζων, εἰ το[*ῦ-*
το] *καὶ περὶ θεῶν* (5)
ἐν]*ό*[*ηcε*]*ῳ, οὐκοῦν* [*ἐ-*
ν]*ίωῳ ἢ κατ᾽ ἰδία*[*ν*
φ]*αίνεται cυκο*[*φαν-*
τ]*ία, τούς γε μό*[*νον οὐ*
παναγῆ δοξάς[*αν-* (10)
τας, ἂν μηδ᾽ οἱ τ[*ὰ-*
βλ⟨*αβ*⟩*ῆ παρεισάγο*[*ντες*
ἐγκαλῶνται, μ[*η-*
δ᾽] *αὐτοὺς κατηγ*[*ορη-*
θήcεcθαι, κἂν μ[*η-* (15)
δεμιᾶς προνομ[*ί-*
ας τυγχάνωcιν. κατ᾽ἀρ-
ξομαι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τ[*ῶν* || (18)

[..... ...]γα[..... ....]λειστο[....]εδε[..]τάτους νομίζων, εἰ το[ῦτο] καὶ περὶ θεῶν [ἐν]ό[ηcε]ν, οὐκοῦν [ἐν]ίων ἡ κατ' ἰδία[ν | φ]αίνεται cυκο[φαντ]ία, τούς γε μό[νον οὐ] παναγῆ δοξάς[αν]τας, ἂν μηδ' οἱ τ[ἀ]βλ⟨αβ⟩ῆ παρεισάγο[ντες] ἐνκαλῶνται, μ[ηδ'] αὐτοὺς κατηγ[ορη]θήcεcθαι, κἂν μ[η]δεμιᾶς προνομ[ί]ας τυγχάνωcιν. [κατ]άρ|ξομαι δ' ἀπὸ τ[ῶν ||

85

2470

2480

(*top of col., c.40 words missing*) ... thinking these to be ..., if he[1] thought this even concerning the gods, therefore the privately motivated quibbling of some[2] is | made obvious in particular, that, if not even those who introduce harmless doctrines are prosecuted, then those[3] who have expressed ones all but sacrosanct will not be accused either, even if they get no special political exemption. But I shall | begin with the (*continues on*)

85

2470

2480

[1] Presumably Epicurus.
[2] Some people, i.e. detractors of the Epicureans.
[3] The Epicureans.

86A *N* 247 fr. 7 (p. 20 G., 237 Ph. 1920, 76 Schober), *HV*² II 48

2481 Schober: fort. *εἰκ]ᾰ̣ίων* 2482 Gomperz: *γ]οήτων* Bücheler 2483 Bücheler 2484 *ἐγκω]μιάζουcιν* Gomperz: *παρο]ιμιάζουcιν* Bücheler 2485 *κατ]α[τρ]έχοντεc* Jensen: *cφόδρ᾽] ἀ[ντ]έχοντεc* Philippson: *μάλ᾽] ἀ[ντ]έχοντεc* Schober 2485–6 *ἡ|[μῶ]ν* Bücheler: *ἡ|[μί]ν* Gomperz, unde Philippson, Schober 2487–9 iam Quaranta, Bücheler 2489 *ἀξιῷ* Philippson: *ἄξιοι N*, Gomperz 2489–90 *δ᾽ ὅ̣|[τι* Schober: fin. 2489 *δε[N* 2490 *π]αν[ε]χθίcτουc* *: *π]αν[έ]χθιcτον*, sc. *χορόν* Schober 2491 *[αὐτοὺc]* *: *[αὐτῶν]* Schober: *[θεοῖc]* D. Delattre privatim *ὡς χορὸν* *, cf. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 237,6: *]λι̣χορον* vestigiis aptius *N*: *τὸ]ν̣ χορὸν* Schober: fort. *ἐ̣ς χορὸν* 2492 *δια-δ]οῦναι* *: *παραδ]οῦναι* Philippson: *πᾶcιν θ]ε̣ῖ̣ναι* coni. Schober 2492–3 *ὅ|[λον* Philippson 2493–4 *οὐ π̣ό̣|[νοc* Schober: *ουτιc N*: *οὔτ᾽ ἴc|[ωc* Bücheler 2495 init. *]αι N* corr. suppl. Quaranta–Bücheler 2496 *μα]κρόc* Bücheler: fort. *πι]κρόc* vel etiam *μι]κρόc*: *αἰc]χρὸc* Quaranta *οc[.]εν N*, sed spat. vac. valde probabile 2496–7 *ἐντυγχά|[νω* Schober: *ἐντυγχά|[νει* Quaranta–Bücheler: *τὸ] ἐντυγχά|[νειν* Philippson 2498 Bücheler 2498–9 *μη|[δὲν* dubitanter Gomperz: *μή |[με* Schober: *μη|[δὲ* Bücheler, unde Philippson 2499–2500 Schober: *εὕρω[με]ν* Philippson 2500–1 *ἐνηλ⟨λ⟩α|[γμ]ένον* Bücheler: *ἓν* (sc. *ὄνομα*) *ἠλλ̣[α|γμ]ένον* D. Delattre privatim 2501 *μα᾽ δια N* 2502 *γὰρ]* Schober: *τε]* Bücheler–Gomperz, unde Philippson *πλ[ῆ]θο̣ς* Quaranta–Bücheler 2502–3 *ἐκ[δό]|cεω̣[ν* *: *cει*, tum arcus circuli inf. sin. *N*, possis *ε̣*, *ο̣*, *ω̣*: *τῶν] εἰ̣[λεγμένων θεῶν* Philippson fragmenta coniunxit Schober

86A

cεμ]νῶν θεολόγων 247 7
καὶ π]οητῶν, ἐπει-
δὴ μ]άλιcτα τούτουc
ἐγκω]{ι}μιάζουcιν οἱ
2485 *κατ]α[τρ]έχοντεc ἡ-* (5)
μῶ]ν ὡc ἀcεβῆ καὶ
ἀcύ]μφορα τοῖc ἀν-
θρώ]ποιc δογματι-
ζόν]των. ἀξιῶ δ᾽ ὅ̣-
2490 *τι π]αν[ε]χθίcτουc* (10)
αὐτοὺc] ὡ̣ς χορὸν
διαδ]οῦναι πρὸc ὅ̣-
λον] χρόνον οὐ π̣ό̣-
νοc] ἀνωφελὴc ἔcται
2495 *πα]ν̣τάπαcιν οὔτε* (15)
μα]κρόc. ἐντυγχά-
νω] δὲ καὶ τοῖc ἀκρει-
βέcι]ν ἐμ παντὶ μη-
δὲν] cυκοφαντεῖν, ἐ-
2500 *ἀ]ν̣ εὕρω[cι]ν ἐνηλ⟨λ⟩α-* (20)
γμ]ένον ὄνομα. διὰ
γὰρ] τὸ πλ[ῆ]θο̣ς ἐκ̣[δό- (22)

86B

cεω̣[ν, μᾶλ]λον δ᾽ εἰκ̣[ό- 242 6
τωc διὰ τὸ cπεύδε̣[ιν
2505 *μ᾽ ἵν]α π̣ου μὴ φανῶ [τὸν*
πο]λὺν̣ προcεδρεῦ-
cαι] τοιούτοιc χρόνον (5)
οὐκ] ἀπώμοτον ὃ λέ-
γ]ω γεγονέναι· τὸ
2510 *γὰρ ἀ[ν]ε̣ιμένον ||* (8)

86B *N* 242 fr. 6 (p. 7 G., 238 Ph. 1920, 77 Schober), *HV*² II 35 (continet inf. part. rot.)

2503–4 *μᾶλ]λον δ᾽ εἰκ[ό]|τωc* Schober: *εφι[* *N*, sed *φ* fort. *ο* corr. in *ι*: *ὅ]λον δὲ ψι̣|λῶc* Philippson 2504 Gomperz 2505 *μ᾽ ἵν]α π̣ου* *: *πρὸ] ὁ̣δοῦ* Philippson, Schober: *]αδου N* fin. *[τὸν* *, *πο]λὺν̣* Schober: *[πάν|πο]λυν* proposuit D. Delattre privatim 2506–7 *προcεδρεῦ|[cαι* dub. Henrichs: *προcεδρεύ|[ειν*

||[cεμ]νῶν θεολόγων [καὶ π]οητῶν, ἐπει[δὴ μ]άλιστα τούτους [ἐγ- **86**
κ]ωμιάζουcιν οἱ [κατ]α[τρ]έχοντεc ἡ[μῶ]ν ὡc ἀcεβῆ καὶ [ἀcύ]μφορα
τοῖc ἀν[θρώ]ποιc δογματι[ζόν]των. ἀξιῶ δ' ὅ̣|[τι π]αν[ϵ]χθίστουc [αὐ- 2490
τοὺc] ὡc̣ χορὸν [διαδ]οῦναι πρὸc ὅ[λον] χρόνον οὐ π̣ό̣[νοc] ἀνωφελὴc
ἔcται [πα]ν̣τάπαcιν οὔτϵ [μα]κρόc. ἐντυγχά[νω] δὲ καὶ τοῖc ἀκρι[βέ-
cι]ν ἐν παντὶ μη[δὲν] cυκοφαντεῖν, ἐ|[ὰ]ν̣ εὕρω[cι]ν ἐνηλλα[γμ]ένον 2500
ὄνομα. διὰ [γὰρ] τὸ πλ[ῆ]θοc ἐκ̣[δό]cεω̣[ν, μᾶλ]λον δ' εἰκ̣[ό]τωc διὰ τὸ
cπεύδ̣ϵ[ιν μ' ἵν]α π̣ου μὴ φανῶ [τὸν πο]λὺν̣ προcεδρεῦ[cαι] τοιούτοιc
χρόνον [οὐκ] ἀπώμοτον ὃ λέ̣[γ]ω γεγονέναι· τὸ | γὰρ ἀ[ν]ε̣ι̣μένον || 2510

self-important theologians and poets, since they[1] are the ones who are **86**
especially praised by those who attack us, on the grounds we are
setting forth views impious and disadvantageous to mankind. And
I think | it would not be a useless labour in general nor a long one to 2490
display them as arch-enemies for all time in a *choros*.[2] And I appeal to
those[3] concerned with accuracy under all circumstances not to raise
any quibbles against me, in case | they find instances of names[4] which 2500
have been changed.[5] For owing to the multitude of editions, or more
likely because of my anxiety that I should not appear to have spent
much of my time on such matters, I cannot swear that what I say has
not happened. | For that which has been allowed . . .[6] 2510

[1] The theologians and the poets. [2] i.e. *in toto*, altogether as a group.
[3] Among my readers. [4] Of authors or titles cited. [5] Mistakenly.
[6] The criticism of poets and philosophers follows. Cf. Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1. 25–41 (philosophers), 1. 42–3 (poets).

Philippson 2508 Schober: μηδ'] Philippson: καὶ] Quaranta ἀπώμοτον (= ἀδύνατον) Philippson
2508–9 Gomperz ὃ λέγω, sc. τὸ τὰ ὀνόματα ἐνηλλάχθαι 2510 ἀ[ν]ε̣ι̣μένον Schober: α[.]ημενον
N: ἀ[ρν]ημένον Quaranta: η[ὐξ]ημένον Philippson 2510 adsequitur pars altera

COMMENTARY

THE organization of *De pietate* falls into six well-defined sections:

Part 1			
(1)	1–723	Arguments for the gods	(cols. 1–25)
(2)	723–1022	Observance of cult and ritual	(cols. 26–36)
(3)	1023–1701	Harms and benefits from gods	(cols. 36–59)
(4)	1702–2510	The origin of atheism and justice	(cols. 60–86)
Part 2 (see vol. ii)			
(5)	Poets and mythographers		(ii; Schober 1988, 77–110; Henrichs 1972*a*; 1975*a*, etc.)
(6)	Philosophers		(ii; Schober 1988, 111–16; Henrichs 1974*a*; 1975*b*, etc.)

Sections 1–4, presented in this volume, are followed immediately by the criticism of poets cited by opponents (5), which is in turn followed by (6) the criticism of philosophers from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon. Philodemus himself refers to the parts (μέρη, not books) of his discussion and its outline of organization (διαίρεσις) at the end of the work (*P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,13–17 in Henrichs 1974*a*, 25). Sections 1–4 and 5–6 are designated as *De pietate*, parts 1 and 2 respectively. The second part, in turn, has its own structure, reflected in Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 42–3 and 25–41, as follows (cf. Schober 1988, 71–2):

5. Criticism of the Poets and Mythographers
   (*a*) Poets' representation of the gods: cosmogonies, births, and battles (Schober 1988, 77–9)
   (*b*) Bodily weaknesses and improprieties of the gods (Schober 1988, 79–94)
   (*c*) Improprieties of the gods in interaction with humans (Schober 1988, 94–104)

(*d*) (i) 'Euhemeristic' views that the gods were originally humans
(ii) 'accommodations' (*συνοικειώσεις*) of divinities to other divinities, elements, principles (Schober 1988, 104–10)

6. Philosophers' views on gods: Thales to Diogenes of Babylon (*P. Herc.* 1428)
(*a*) Pre-Socratics to Peripatetics (Schober 1988, 111–16; Henrichs 1975*b*)
(*b*) Stoics (Henrichs 1974*a*)

The treatise concludes with the criticism of the Stoics. The order of topics within each of the sections 1–4 is set forth in the commentary. At the beginning of the commentary on each of the four major sections I try to indicate, as far as can be ascertained, the breakdown and connection of arguments within each section. The division of the treatise into two main parts (sections 1–4 and 5–6) is based solely upon the structure and organization of material in the existing texts, and on the fact that the treatise was divided into two papyrus rolls at roughly this point. There is no certain evidence of a division into separate books (see Introd.). On the *μέρη* or sequence of topics in the treatise see below, introd. to col. 17, and Introd. § 3(*d*).

In the commentary that follows I sketch out an approach to the constitution of the text and reconstruction of the argument or topic under discussion, with a particular view towards (1) its philosophical or historical importance, and (2) its interpretative significance for a reading of the work as a whole or of Epicurus' central doctrine on the subject. I then proceed to a line-by-line discussion of the text, especially textual and linguistic *cruces* as they have emerged in the editorial tradition and come to bear on the interpretation adopted or its alternatives. For the less crucial, though often uncertain aspects of the text, especially in the long stretches of shipwrecked text (*apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto*), the reader is referred to the apparatus criticus. In moving from column to column I try to give some indication in the commentary (at the end of the commentary on each column) of the principles which led to the placement of each column in the reconstructed order.

The commentary is keyed by continuous lineation throughout for ease of reference; references by column-number are avoided as far as possible. Column divisions are indicated, and prefaced by introductory discussions, since circumstances of preservation in this text make the individual column the textual unit initially faced by the editor. I have introduced new column numbers, reflecting the original order

of columns in the treatise. This numbering is consecutive and integral, so that col. 1 is the first extant column from the treatise: i.e. for the sake of simplicity and in order to minimize confusion, I do not assign numbers to missing columns. 'Fragment' numbers in the apparatus criticus are those of the original Neapolitan numbering of the pieces. (For equivalences with these and the numeration of other editors see the concordances.) The order of columns presented in previous editions was conjectural and, in part, reversed. The reconstruction of the present edition is presented and defended column by column as forming part of the editorial process and on the understanding that context provided by narrative sequence is essential to the process of interpretation and textual constitution. Each column occupies a single page, so that the main principle of reconstruction, based on the approximate alternation (in descending order) of columns from the 1077 and 1098 halves of the roll may more clearly emerge. At the same time, it would be well to observe that the original column divisions have no thematic or organizational importance. They might as well have been printed continuously, connected bottom to top where I have been able to join them.

Section 1: Arguments for the gods (1–723)

In order to 'mitigate a little of the disappointment that will be felt during an examination of the present work' (E. G. Turner on *P. Oxy.* XXXI 2536 (1966), 17, Theon's commentary on Pindar, *Pythians*), it should be acknowledged that in this section Philodemus is compiling a catalogue of instances in which Epicurus and his friends could be shown to have produced arguments which implied a belief in the existence of gods. He is not, however, giving a systematic exposition of Epicurean theory on the subject. He is sometimes engaged in drawing out the theoretical implications of some of the arguments for the gods, or criticisms of Epicurean views. But this is not his primary objective (cf. ll. 689–94). His objective is rather to provide, from as many examples as possible, a cumulative argument to the effect that allegations of impiety on the part of his opponents must be false. In this section this requires showing that Epicurus and his friends 'offered demonstrations, engaged those who made it impossible for gods to exist, and advanced proofs in discussions' (470–81). While some of the details are therefore covered by Philodemus in passing, it nevertheless emerges as

a result that a formal, systematic summary of the Epicurean theory of the gods, such as that set out by Velleius at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.44–50 did not exist in *De pietate*.

The order of entries suggests that Philodemus may have been selecting and excerpting from the works of the school as he composed: he took what he wanted or remembered from the Epicurean works he consulted and felt no obligation to copy it whole or verbatim or set it in context. Not only the works to which he responds, but also the Epicurean works he cites in evidence, are subject to a process of epitomizing and abstracting, much in the nature of learned commentaries like Theon's. The resulting impression is that of a series of extracts of Epicurean works (cf. Turner on Theon, op. cit., p. 16, or the Berlin Didymus commentary on Demosthenes' *Philippics*). An echo of the compilation style of *De pietate* may be glimpsed in Cic. *De nat. deor.*, e.g. 1. 93 *Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt* (cf. below on 703–5). Philodemus' exegesis of these extracts is restricted to an abbreviated explanation of how the citation supports his argument, often unfortunately obscured by the state of the text. As elsewhere in the papyri from Herculaneum, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish Philodemus' view from his report of his opponent's. Those who take a different view are often left unnamed, especially in this first, philosophical part of the treatise. Philodemus' references to their views constitute scholia-like lemmata which, taken together, may reflect the content and sequence and even some of the wording of the works to which Philodemus is responding (for an example see 1394–1425).

Nevertheless there is a kind of progression of argument to be discerned in the newly reconstituted order of columns in the present edition, which I summarize as follows: Epicurus and his early followers were attacked by opponents (the Stoic Ariston of Chios is named: ll. 1 and 11) in particular for holding that all compounds must be subject to dissolution; if that is so, then gods cannot consist of bodies (48–50), if they are to be suitably imperishable. But everything in the Epicurean universe must consist of bodies, and it is thus alleged by the opponents that the two positions are incompatible; this objection is reported (34–51, 432–4), and met (95–104, 180–202, 320–37, 437–58) more than once. Metrodorus for instance held that some compounds could exist imperishably: namely, those made up of things not numerically distinct, i.e. probably as images (96–105). Epicurus himself held this view (189–201), and arrived at it by speculating (225–31) that

originally the first humans had held such conceptions of the gods as insusceptible to destruction, but later contaminated their conceptions with ideas foreign to divinity (232–70). Some people maintained the originally clear view of the gods, while many did not (296–318); but all people now regularly form ideas of gods out of images that can take on a kind of divine unperturbed existence (320–37). Such entities can be thought of as possessing perfect happiness for ever (350–60). The opponents of Epicurus faithfully represent his position, at least in so far as they acknowledge that he classed all things as bodies (458–65), including gods. Epicurus and his followers would not have offered proofs and other arguments for the existence of gods (467–81), if they had allowed the existence of the gods simply for reasons of social convention, as was alleged by their opponents. Such critics would have to assume that Epicurus put forth all his other doctrines insincerely as well (489–500). In addition Epicurus criticized notorious atheists of the fifth century (Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias are named), whose obscure interpretations of the names of the gods would have made it impossible for the traditional gods to exist as they are normally conceived (519–41). Epicurus and Hermarchus reported that Empedocles relied on natural connections in his poetry between language and cult and ritual (542–59). The early Epicureans deserve to be admired for their intentions with regard to the gods, not simply evaluated on the logic of their argumentation. For no one yet has produced irrefutable proofs for the gods' existence, except that all humans continue to worship them as existing, the Epicureans included (639–56)—a consideration which leads directly into the next section: Epicurean observance of ritual and cult.

Col. 1 (Pl. 7)

1 **Ἀ]ρίςτω[ν:** presumably Ariston of Chios, pupil of the Stoic Zeno of Citium, who flourished around the middle of the third century BC. His *floruit* matches most closely that of Epicurus' younger contemporaries whom he appears from this passage to have attacked. (Ariston of Ceos is ruled out on chronological grounds; the only other plausible candidate is the later Ariston the younger Peripatetic with whom Philodemus engages at *Rhet.* i. 328,4–15; 360,4–15; 361; see further Dorandi in *CPF* vol. 1*, p. 23.) From the fragmentary context can be gathered something of the grounds on which he attacked the Epicureans: not because they denied the divine to exist (as Philodemus is probably pointing out), but because they

denied the gods as conceived by many people, a point explicitly acknowledged at *Ad Menoec.* 123, echoed in Ariston's criticism reported here. The testimony is valuable because the Epicureans are usually supposed to have attracted little attention from the other Athenian philosophical schools of the fourth century (while in numerous instances the Epicureans can be seen to be explicitly attacking other schools, as e.g. Polyaenus, see below on 10–11). See further A. M. Ioppolo, *Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico* (Elenchos, 1; Naples, 1980), 249–52; Tepedino on Polyaenus fr. 30; Angeli 1993, 18. The last two take the Epicureans to be the subject of *ὑπολαμβάνου|σιν* (8–9). The text requires a minor correction in l. 1, but the name seems likely in the light of what follows (10–11). Ariston was very likely attacked later in the treatise (see vol. ii) in the lost column before col. 1 of *P. Herc* 1428 (Henrichs 1975*b*, 95), preserved at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 37 (see below on 4). For Ariston of Chios in the Herculanensia see Philod. *Ind. Stoic.*, *P. Herc.* 1018, col. 10, 8–13 (= *SVF* 1. 39); col. 33, 4 ff. (= *SVF* 1. 335). Against his presence in *De poem.* 5 (*P. Herc.* 1425 and 1538, col. 13, 28–21, 22) see M. Isnardi Parente, 'Una poetica di incerto autore in Filodemo', in *Filologia e forme letterarie: Studi offerti a F. Della Corte* (Università degli Studi di Urbino, 1987), v. 81–98; Dorandi in *CPF* vol. 1*, p. 23, and in general on Aristo's thought: E. Asmis, 'The Poetic Theory of the Stoic "Aristo"', *Apeiron*, 23 (1990), 147–201. A work *Πρὸς Ἀρ[ίστωνα* by Metrodorus was posited by Körte 1890, 546 in *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44, 10 (the complete text is given below on 205–6), though the spacing of the *disegno* is against this (*Πρὸς Ἀρ[ιστοτέλη* Crönert 1906, 24 n. 136; other names are possible: Aristippos, Aristonymos, Arcesilaos, Archelaos). Polyaenus in any case wrote against him (ll. 10–11).

4]ψυχ[: what Metrodorus (perhaps in his work *On Sensations*, cf. Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1087 D, fr. 6 Körte) could have said about the soul (presumably of humans) is a puzzle. The word was used in a theological context by Hermarchus (below, 1101). The process by which ideas about the gods become distorted for most people (7–9) takes place in the soul. Metrodorus wrote a work *Περὶ μεγαλοψυχίας* (D.L. 10. 24). A better clue to the Epicurean debate with Ariston is provided by Velleius ap. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 37 (= *SVF* 1 Aristo fr. 378; cf. Min. Fel. *Octav.* 19. 3) *qui* (sc. *Ariston*) *neque formam dei intellegi posse censeat neque in deis sensum esse dicat, dubitetque omnino deus animans necne sit*, 'Ariston thinks the form of the deity cannot be comprehended, and he denies the gods sensation, and in fact is uncertain whether god is a living being at all.' (Cicero's report derives from the doxographical section of *De Pietate*; it would have fallen immediately before the beginning of the preserved sequence of continuous columns of *P. Herc.* 1428, for which see Henrichs 1974*a*, 1975*b*, 95.) Ariston may have criticized Metrodorus' view that the gods were anthropomorphic and equipped with something like a human soul (the seat of sensation and a necessity for life—both of which Ariston denied the gods), since for this reason they, like humans,

ought to be subject to destruction and death, and in this respect unlike the gods credited by certain others (as stated in 7–8).

7–9 A. Henrichs suggests to me that *ἄλλους εἶναι* is predicative: 'that the gods are different', rather than attributive: 'that other gods exist' ('the argument is not about the existence of the gods but about their nature').

10 Πολύαινος ἐν τοῖς: it seems unusual that his *Against Ariston* extended to more than one book, not for lack of material or inclination (this is probably how the *kathegemones* busied themselves in the years following Epicurus' death), but because most of them declined (as did e.g. Polystratus) to attack their opponents by name, in part to avoid attracting undue attention and advertisement for them.

11 Ἀρίστ̣ων[α: the *disegno* requires a minor alteration, but the correction is virtually certain. For parallels for the (possibly original) orthography *Ἀρίστονα* see *MGrHerc* 108, 188–9.

14 ἑρμάτων: Philippson's correction *ε⟨ὐ⟩ρ⟨η⟩μάτων*, while making excellent sense, seems palaeographically and mechanically implausible. Assuming the text is sound, Polyaenus may have intended *ἕρματα* as a metaphor for foundations of belief in the gods or for the 'limits' or 'signposts' of perception (cf. Lucr. 1.77 *alte terminus haerens*). L. A. Holford-Strevens points out to me that since the word used here is *ἕρμα* 'prop', 'post', 'pile', 'boundary marker' (LSJ s.v.), not the divine name *Ἑρμῆς*, we have no warrant for conceiving them as 'herms', the aniconic monuments dedicated to the god which often served as boundary markers and associated with acts of civic impiety in the historical tradition. Note however that later in the treatise (see vol. ii) Philodemus has no difficulty with Hermes being so represented—such representations having been traditionally 'passed down' and thus being in some sense fundamental (Schober 1988, 84):

τὸν | [δ' Ἑρ]μῆν ὅτι τετρά|[γω]νον ἄνωθεν πα|ραδεδώκασιν θεω|ροῦμεν, καίτοι τὸ | μὲν ἢ γεννηθῆναι | τὴν μορφὴν ἄτο|πον ἢ τῶν μερῶν | ὕστερόν τινι δυσ|τυχῆσαι τὴν κακί|αν ἐκφεύγειν δύνα|ται, τὸ δὲ [πο]νηρο|τάτους ε[ἰσάγ]ειν θε|οὺς ἄνωθ[εν] ἐκ γε|νετῆς ὑπερβολὰς | ἔστιν οὐκ ἀπολει|πόντων ἀσεβείας. | [ἆρ'] οὐχ Ὅμηρος μὲν | [Δι]ὸς υἱὸν ὄντα τὸν Ἄ|[ρη] καὶ ἄφρονα καὶ ἀ|[θέ]μιστον καὶ μιαι|φόνον καὶ φίλεριν | καὶ φιλόμαχον εἰσ|[ή]γαγεν καὶ καθόλου | [τοι]οῦτον οἷον οἱ συν|[γεν]έστα|τ[οι ψ]έγου|[σιν;

And we observe that people have traditionally represented Hermes as rectangular (i.e. as a herm). And yet to be born with an odd shape, or suffer mutilation to any of one's parts later, need not involve any wickedness; but to represent the gods as most depraved right from their birth is a sign of those who lack nothing (i.e. are second to none) in their insurpassable impiety. Or does Homer not represent Ares, the son of Zeus, as foolish, lawless, murderous, a lover of strife and battle, and generally such a one as his closest relations disparage?

15 Perhaps *Πρὸς δια[λεκτικούς*, a common title (Metrodorus wrote one: D.L. 10. 28), though one of course would have preferred to have the article.

29–30 *Order of Columns.* Missing before col. 1 cannot be more than 10 columns and possibly as few as five (about 400 words), which contained a brief preface to the work, probably with an address to the reader or dedicatee, and an outline or summary of its parts, together with the beginning of the present section cataloguing Epicurean arguments for the gods. No two columns of cols. 1–7 can join with one another, for the reason that they all come from the same half cylinder of the broken papyrus roll (i.e. *N* 1098: see Introd. § 2(*c*)). Their adjoining columns were contained in the other half, which also contained the 24 columns recorded as the sequence *N* 1077, but is deficient beyond that point (the sequence *N* 1098 contains a total of 29 columns). After each of the extant cols. 1–6 is therefore a gap which alternates between one column (about 90 words) and two columns (about 180 words). Col. 1 is most probably the earliest extant column from *De pietate* (apart from the *sovrapposti* still lying beneath it: see below) because it bears the highest number in the 1098 sequence (see Introd. § 2(*c*)); the content of no other preserved column of *De pietate* requires or even suggests that it preceded this one in the present column in the original treatise.

The papyrus of this column is extant as a *scorza* in Naples (Pl. 7; in addition we have the witness of the Neapolitan apograph). The text is only barely legible, though better in the lower half of the column. That the column was not destroyed after copying supports the hypothesis that this was the last (and lowest) layer of papyrus as the *disegnatori* worked through the broken half of the roll, from inside outward, that is, from the middle of the roll to the outside of the roll (the beginning of the treatise). The present column must have stood very close to the beginning of the roll. Examination of the *scorza* reveals at least five layers of *sovrapposti* underneath the one on which the present column is inscribed, but after consultation with experts in conservation these layers were deemed too fragile to attempt removal by any of the methods available at the present time. The last layer in this stack of congealed layers (*scorze*) is the outside layer of the roll containing the first part of *De pietate*.

Also extant in Naples are 12 fragments catalogued under the inventory number 1077. These were recently reexamined by Dorandi (1988*a*, 43–8; cf. Dorandi and Spinelli 1989, 12) who observes that that all but two had been mistakenly assigned to 1077 and actually belong to other known Herculaneum treatises (*De rhet.* 4 and *De aviditate*). Of the remaining two, one (fr. 11, Dorandi 1988*a*, 50 for the text) is extremely fragmentary and not, in my judgement, written in the same hand as *P. Herc.* 1428 (though it exhibits some similarity in features, in particular its rotundity). The other (fr. 1 = 3) is written in a hand (Anonimo XVII in the description of Cavallo 1983) agreed by all parties to be different from the main hand of *De pietate* (Anonimo XII). Though the text of this fragment does not correspond to any known part of *De pietate*, and is written in an alien hand, Dorandi suggests that it may belong to the treatise, but from a different recension written by a different scribe. While I think this unlikely, and have shown above (Introd. § 2(*d*)) that the other two fragments thought by Dorandi to belong to the 'riedizione' of *De Pietate* were mistakently catalogued under the inventory numbers of known fragments of *De pietate*, but actually derive from a yet to be indentified 'trattato etico', I have nevertheless collated the fragment and made some headway on its text, which I present here in case it sheds light on the question. As already stated, the text does not form any part of *De pietate* (there is no apograph):

P. Herc. 1077 fr. 1 (= 3)

```
 1      [.].ομον[
        [.]ναμ . [
        [.]ανα̣ρα[--- e.g. ποι-
        ητικὸν ω̣[
 5      δ...ν cω̣[
        οὐκ ὀλίγας [--- ὕ-
        βριν καὶ παι̣[
]/./__  μυθητω[
        ἴcως δὲ κ̣α̣[
10      φ..ιc' ἀλλο̣[
   __   κ̣ηcαν caιτ[
   __   θα γὰρ τ[
        οὐ μὲν ὑ̣πο[
15      c̣τ̣ι̣κην ι̣αν[
        δοκ̣οῦν δια[
        [..] ἰχω̣ὰρ . ειφ[
        [..]δ̣ελω .[.] π̣ρο[
        ..ρο.τ[.]εκρ[
20   __ τερι̣.η̣κ̣[.]coι[
        μα̣τ̣[.]νο[.]ιπ[
        μεc̣[..]ε[
```

margo
cm. 1

On the basis of l. 17 *ἰχώρ* (the 'blood' of the gods, e.g. Hom. *Il.* 5. 340), now apparently perished in the papyrus, and l. 8 (*μυθητω*) Dorandi suggests that the fragment may have come from the second part of the treatise, which criticized the poets' representations of the gods. We can be certain that *P. Herc.* 1077 contained no part of that section of the treatise. We now know that the fragment was mistakenly catalogued under that number, since a recent discovery of an extant papyrus fragment of **1077**, the text of which was already known from the *disegno* (see the commentary on col. 45 and above, Introd. § 2(*d*), (*h*)), proved beyond any doubt that the texts of **1077** which appear on the Neapolitan apographs were written in the same hand as the rest of the fragments of *De pietate* (i.e. that of *P. Herc.* 1428, 'anonimo XII'), and so cannot be from a different recension written by a different scribe. See also Introd. § 2(*g*).

Col. 2

An opponent undertakes to refute Epicurus' belief in gods by accepting certain premises in his classification of bodies as true, then isolates a contradiction internal to the basic division. The opponent is shown to be quoting Epicurus' actual words (38 *λέγω*]*ν*), then drawing out the implications. It would be interesting to know who the opponent was (if he were named, which is not certain). He must have been later than Epicurus himself. All the criticisms answered in 1–460 concern

the material constitution of the gods and in particular their place in the classification of bodies. In several instances Epicurus' earliest followers are said to have undertaken the task of defending Epicurus' views against these criticisms: 180–2 (Metrodorus), 12 (Polyaenus). Only in the last-named case is the name of the opponent (Ariston) preserved, but by the second century (the era of Philodemus' teacher Zeno), there must have been other opponents: the Stoic doxography in the second part of the treatise (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*) runs down through Diogenes of Babylon and his pupil Apollodorus of Athens.

32–4 The opening is almost entirely lost, but something like the following is possible: *θεω|[ρητέον, ἐκεῖ]νο δ' ἀλ[ο|γώτατον τ]ὸ λέ[γ]ειν*, '(*x*) must be thought to be the case, but that other thing would be most unreasonable: namely, saying . . .' i.e. 'what would be most unreasonable would be to say . . .'. D. Delattre suggests to me: *ἀλ[ο|γώτερον ἢ τ]ὸ λέ[γ]ειν*.

36 κα]τα[λ]ε̣[ίπ]ει: the verb *καταλείπω* is common Hellenistic philosophical parlance in the sense of 'allow (either explicitly or implicitly) to exist (or be the case)', see 693–4; 361–2 (passive); 1047–8 *κα]ταλειπτέον* (mistranslated by Sedley 1974, 91 'men must abandon'). Often used in connection with matters likely to be difficult or controversial or involving possible contradiction with other tenets, the term is often deployed when drawing out the negative implications of someone's views, as below at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,26–8 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 23) of the Stoics: *τὰ θεῖα τοιαῦτα κα|[τ]α̣λείπουσιν καὶ γε|[ν]ητὰ καὶ φθαρτά*. For other instances in Philodemus and esp. Epic. *De nat.* see *Lex. Philod.*, Usener, *Gloss. Epic.*, Arr.[2] Indice s.vv. Further on the semantics of *καταλείπειν, ἀπολείπειν* (opp. *ἀναιρεῖν*) see Henrichs 1974*a*, 30–1.

37–41 *τῶν c]ω|μάτων τὰ | μὲν ε[ἶν]αι c[υνκ]ρί|cεις, τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ cυν-|κρίcεις πεπόηνται* is an exact quotation from Epic. *Ad Herod.* 40 (with *εἶναι* in reported speech for *ἐcτι*). But the scholium on that passage says that 'the exact same thing' appeared in the *Μεγάλη ἐπιτομή* and in books 1, 14, and 15 of *Περὶ φύcεωc*, so it is impossible to tell from which of these Philodemus (or the critic) is quoting. For Epicurus' classification of bodies, see *Ad Herod.* 40. It is treated in further detail at 432–60, where 'place' (*τόποc*, alternatively 'void') is added to 'bodies' (35–6, 37–8 *cώματα*) and 'compounds' (40–1, 44 *cυνκρίcειc*), as here. Here, however, the critic has centred on the issue of how the gods can be materially constituted (composed of atoms, which are material) yet themselves be indestructible, without being an exception to the basic classification (either bodies or void). According to Epicurean atomic theory, all compounds are perishable. Though the text breaks off, it appears doubtful that Philodemus formulated his own response to the criticism. (He certainly does not claim that the gods constitute an exception to

the classification: see 443–60, where it is implied that they were included under the categories of bodies and compounds, just like people and horses.) Instead, in the following columns we get several responses by Metrodorus to this criticism.

48–50 The opponent's conclusion is not that the gods for Epicurus must be without body, but that Epicurus' view on the existence of gods is incompatible with his basic ontology: there is simply no room for the gods in Epicurus' classification of existing things.

51 It is tempting to restore a form of *ἀναιρεῖν*, rather than either of the supplements proposed by Gomperz or Philippson; but the context is almost entirely lost.

59–60 *Order of Columns.* This column must have been the next layer (upward and thus later in the treatise) after col. 1 in the 1098 sequence, since ll. 23–9 of that column (where they appear in their proper alignment with the left-hand margin of the column) were mistakenly copied first here as ll. 54–8. (The original lower portion of the present column must thus have been lost in process of *scorzatura*, see on 88.) In other words, when the *disegnatore* copied this column, ll. 54–8 were not actually on the same layer as the rest of the column (30–53), but on a *sottoposto*, that is actually written on the layer underneath that on which 30–53 were written, but easily mistaken for the same surface of writing and were therefore copied first as part of this column. When this column was peeled away they thus remained as the lower left-hand portion of col. 1, which lay underneath (i.e. 23–9), where they appear again in their proper alignment with the left margin of that column (a fact that can be asertained from the papyrus itself, which is extant: see on 29–30). Since for this reason no other column can have intervened, this column must have been (mistakenly) numbered as fr. 24, rather than 28, as might have been expected. The *disegnatori* were simply not always careful to maintain in their numbering of fragments the exact order in which they transcribed successive layers (see Introd. § 2(*c*), (*e*)). At the same time the present reconstruction confirms that, within certain limits, the descending order of fragment-numbers (from highest to lowest) represents roughly the original order of columns. When this kind of disordering in the descending sequence is discovered, as in the present case, it never extends beyond a range of 2–4 columns in either direction (ascending and descending). Cf. col. 18, where a similar disordering has occurred.

Col. 3

Building on the several continuous lines and an approach suggested by Usener (who thought this passage cited a text addressed to Epicurus' learned slave Mys in a letter which has since disappeared from the Epicurean repertoire), enough can be recovered to reveal at least the topic under discussion, namely how the gods can survive eternally as material entities.

60 The accusative *Μῦν* is not an impossible reading, but it is hard to accommodate what follows it (Usener corrected to *ἀπ̣[ό*; rather: *-αι̣ς̣[? δύνατ̣[ον?*). Of the four fragments of the supposed letter *Πρὸς Μῦν* printed by Usener (frr. 152–5, including the present passage, all of them dependent on restorations in the Herculanensia), none appear in Arr.[2] after more circumspect examination of their papyri. Of Mys we know only that he was Epicurus' *δοῦλος* (Epicurus freed him in his will, D.L. *Vitae* 10. 21); that (like Epicurus' brothers) he took part in philosophical discussions (10. 10); and that Epicurus enjoined him to undertake study with him (so D.L. *Vitae* 10. 3 on the authority of one Myronianus in a work called *Ὅμοιοι ἱστορικοὶ κεφάλαιοι, Historical Parallels*; cf. *FHG* iv/6. 455).

63 φησίν: apparently tucked in parenthetically. Otherwise, we must posit a clear colon-break after *εὐσκοποῦσιν*, taking *φύσιν κτλ.* as *oratio obliqua* governed by *φησιν*: 'he says that he thinks . . .'.

φύσιν: it seems clear enough from the context that the nature in question is not nature in general but divine nature. *τούτων* (sc. *θεῶν*) must be taken with *φύσιν*, for it would require the article to be taken with *πραγμάτων* (64) which are here the normal sort of disturbances which assail materially existing things, occasion dissolution of compounds etc. But *φύσιν* without the article is difficult in the sense of 'nature' in general. It could be taken as denoting an indefinite 'entity' (for which sense of *φύσις* see below on 231 and 321–3; cf. 125–6, 550). In this case *τούτων* should be a genitive of composition: 'an entity made up of these things' (sc. *τῶν ἀτόμων*?).

67–70 In view of the exiguous remains, the restorations should be considered *exempli gratia*.

68–9 Whether we restore *ἀϊ̈]|δίοις* or *ἴ]|δίοις* it is very likely that the subject of the lost infinitive in indirect discourse will have been the gods.

88–9 *Order of columns.* This column and the next, although slightly out of (reverse, descending) order in the 1098 sequence, fall here because they can be seen to have lost their lower halves in the process of *scorzatura*. This will have exposed a lower layer visible to the *disegnatore* as a *sovrapposto* (viz. 54–8 = 23–9), and for this reason not copied here. I suppose this *sovrapposto* to be that already identified as 23–9 (also mistakenly copied as 54–8). This hypothesis is supported by coherence of their subject matter with the surrounding context.

Col. 4

89–95 The opening lines are intriguing but textually very difficult. 95–105, however, cite an important point from Metrodorus, *On Change*, which is central for our knowledge of the Epicurean gods: although material compounds, they exist not as numerically distinct and individuated entities (as do most material objects), but 'through similarity' (90–1 *τῆς ὁ|[μοιότ]ητος*), i.e. by analogy in thought to numerically distinct and individuated

entities. The point is taken up and expounded at greater length at 209–18 and 320–75.

90–1 The restoration seems secure, but it is difficult to decipher the syntax. ὁμοιότης 'similarity' is treated further in conjunction with how we form concepts of the gods below, 205–19 (esp. 218–19), 273–4, 320–37, 347–75 with commentary; 'Aëtius', *Plac.* 1. 7 in *Dox. Gr.* 307 (quoted below on 349)

93 There is no reason to doubt the correction ἔ[ν]κλιϛ[ν; the impossibility of construing what precedes increases the likelihood of difficulty encountered by the *disegnatori* in making out this passage and hence of miscopying. The relevance of the 'swerve' of atoms to the process of forming concepts of the gods lies in the province of psychology. Epicurus discussed the two in conjunction in Περὶ φύσεως in books 25 and 35. See Sedley 1973, 1983*a*, 1989*a*.

98 διαστολήν: under discussion in the immediately preceding passage was the 'distinction', here said to have been made by Metrodorus in *On Change*, between two different modes of existing for material compounds: one κατ' ἀριθμόν or one-to-one identity as in the case of most solid objects (houses, cars, and the like), and the other καθ' ὁμοιότητα or by virtue of the similarity or near (but not exact) identity of its constituent parts, which coalesce to give the *impression* of a distinct individuated whole (discussed further 320–49). Into the latter category fall those images which make possible thoughts and concepts, such as my recollection of a house or a car in motion, including, by virtue of imagination, many things we have never 'seen' in the way we see houses and cars. In so far as they are made up of equally material εἴδωλα images given off by all solid objects, such purely 'mental' entities for Epicurus are just as material and as compound as all solid objects. Metrodorus' claim was that only compounds of the latter sort could exist indestructibly; all compounds which exist κατ' ἀριθμόν (as well as most that exist καθ' ὁμοιότητα) must always, in the Epicurean view, be subject to destruction. The gods, the claim entails, must be compounds of the sort which exist καθ' ὁμοιότητα. The point is cited to counter the critic's argument retailed at 34–50. For διαστολή in the sense of 'distinction' see Epic. *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 16.12 Arr.^{2} ἐπα|γωγή τις ἐκ τῆς διαστολῆς | γίγνε[τ]αι εἰς τἀληθές; cf. ibid. 14 fr. 29. 27.17 τινὰ δ[ιαστολὴ]ν πο[ι]ήςηται. Bücheler's ποιεῖ|[ται] διαστολὴν leaves the gap in l. 98 a letter or two short. Dr Holford-Strevens contemplates a doubly prefixed form to fit.

100–1 An infinitive is required, and cannot conceivably fall anywhere else before the syntax breaks at 105 καί. In any case the restoration proposed by Körte, φηςιν θ[εῶν | cύν]κριςιν, 'deorum concretionem', is not an acceptable expression, since the genitive with the term cύνκριcις (which can mean 'compound' or 'constitution') always specifies a thing's component parts,

not the constituted entity considered in its totality. There may be some confusion in the Latin tradition on this point: so apparently Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 18 *ex deorum concilio*; 1. 49 *infinita simillumarum imaginum series ex innumerabilibus indiviuis existat et ad deos adfluat*; cf. Epic. *Σ KD* 1 οὗς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς cυνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύcεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεcμένους (for the text, see on 212–13).

101–2 [μὴ κα|τ' ἀ]ριθμόν: the key to this entire passage, the supplement of the negative, was shrewdly discerned by Scott 1883, 236–7. As he noted, there is no reason why a *cύνκριcιc τῶν κατ' ἀριθμόν* (Gomperz) should be imperishable, as 102–4 would entail without the supplement of the negative. All are by definition destructible (47). [μὴ κα|τ' ἀ]ριθμὸν not only fits the space on the apograph better, but seems now to be born out by 328–37 and 350–3 (where see commentary). Körte 1890 (who in any case believed the Epicureans to be completely insincere in stating positive views about the gods) followed Gomperz's reading, and was forced to the hasty conclusion (p. 545) that the Epicureans were simply wrong and their opponents right. At best, he thought that 'facere non potuerunt [sc. Epicurei] quin ad tuendam deorum aeternitatem alteramutram sententiam arteficiose interpretarentur'.

105 φιλαλήθω[c: 'honestly', 'frankly': D.S. 2. 32; Cic. *Ad Q. Fr.* 2. 15(16). 5.

116–17 *Order of Columns.* See on 88.

Col. 5

This fragment preserves an important argument (Philodemus ranks it as highest in his opponents' estimation) for the belief that Epicurus denied the gods, and contains a rejoinder to it. Philodemus points out that while for the Epicureans the gods exist materially (136 [cωματι]κόν), they are not without their regularly conceived attributes: sensation (138), pleasure (139), and a disposition (140). The discussion makes it clear that the central concern of this section was the gods' existing in bodily form.

124 Very possibly [κ]ατ' ἔν[νοιαν] (Philippson), 'in conception' (for the term, see *HPh* 39 EF), an expression which in reference to the gods coheres well with the preceding column, especially if [μὴ κατ' ἀ]ριθμόν (101–2) is to be taken as a reference to the gods' manner of existing in the form of compound images and mental events, i.e. how the gods may be thought of as existing.

125–6 φύ]cιν αὐτήν: presumably 'divine nature itself'. Following in 128 and 129 are references to its endurance through time (διαμένειν) and to

a position 'accepted' or 'allowed' (*ἀπολείπεcθαι*). For the meaning of *φύcιc* see further on 63 and 231, where it means 'entity' (often in plural).

130–1 τοῦ]ιτο must have referred to the opponents' objection, namely that a god consisting of bodily nature (136) could not exist. Hence the Epicureans are said to 'eliminate the divine from existing things' (*περιαιρ[εῖν τὸ] | θεῖο[ν] ἐκ τῶν [ὄν]||των*). For this expression, standard in Hellenistic theological parlance, see 521–3 with commentary. Here the Epicurean provision of perception, pleasure, and an ethical disposition for the divine is supposed to disarm the objection.

131 φαcι: who these people are is not clear; presumably not Stoics, since they similarly held the gods to be of material constitution (see Plut. *De comm. not.* 1085 BC). Possibly they are Academics, but *τεκμήριον* (132) could have the implications of an appeal to public, non-philosophical views, since it often occurs in rhetorical contexts in the loose sense of 'proof' (Thuc. 2. 39, Andoc. 4. 25). It is certainly not an Epicurean term, in view of the overwhelming preference for *cημεῖον* in Epicurean discussions of logic (e.g. Philod. *De sign.*).

133 περιαιρ[εῖν: Epicurus himself had used the term: *De nat.* 15 fr. 30. 35. 3 Arr.^{2} = fr. 34 Millot, *CErc* 7 (1977), 32–3 *ὑπο]|λήψεω[c] π[ε]ρὶ τῆc τοῦ [δα]ι|[μ]ονίου φύcεωc γινόμενοι | περ[ι]αιρεθήcecθαι ἤμελ|λον*. For the construction of *ἀναιρεῖν* and its compounds with *τὸ θεῖον ἐκ τῶν ὄντων* as object, see below, 521–3 with commentary (Epic. *De nat.* 12 fr. 27. 2 Arr.^{2} with new readings) *τοῖc τὸ [θεῖον ἐ]|κ τῶν ὄντων [ἀναι]||ροῦcιν*. It is clear here that *περιαιρεῖν* denotes an alleged *implicit* denial of the gods, an inference on the part of critics, not an explicit position denying the gods formulated by Epicureans. Hence for Philodemus there is some argumentative value in mentioning his opponents' inference, even if it implies some hostility to the Epicurean position, and refuting it. As Philodemus says, this is the best the critics could do.

137 For *ἀπολείπειν* (= *καταλείπειν*, see on 36), see esp. below (vol. ii): *P. Herc.* 1088 fr. 10, 20–1 (vol. ii; Schober 1988, 84), *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10, 9–13, 18, 32 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 20–1). Its antonym is *ἀναιρεῖν* (cf. 133 *περιαιρ[εῖν*, but *παραλείπειν* is to 'neglect', 'ignore'), Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1111 B (fr. 368 Us.) *καὶ γὰρ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν* (Colotes) *εὐcέβειαν ἀπολιπεῖν λέγει*.

138 αἴcθη[cιν: specifically said to be denied to the gods by Ariston: Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 37 (quoted above on 4), to whom Philodemus attributes criticism of the Epicureans (above, 1, 10–11). Corporeal sensation was regularly included as an attribute of the gods in Epicurean accounts as part of their thoroughgoing anthropocentrism. For this reason its explicit or inferred denial to the gods is often mentioned in the criticism of philosophers later in the treatise (see vol. ii) in *P. Herc.* 1428; hence also Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 26 *nec sensum omnino* (Anaxagoras), 28 *neque sensum* (Parmenides), 29 *quem sensum habere potest* (Diogenes of Apollonia), 30 *careat enim sensu necesse est*

(Plato). At *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 13,17–22 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 24) Philodemus complains that the divinities of the Stoics have about as much sensation as 'sandbanks or thistle-down.'

141–2 κα|τὰ τὰ ἐννοήματα: 'in accordance with (existing) conceptions' (for the term, see *HPh* 17 C, 30 *passim*), i.e. those of ordinary people (as contrasted with ἔννοιαι, see on 124).

144–5 *Order of Columns.* In general I follow the principle (Introd. §2(*c*)) that, where there are no physical or contextual indications to the contrary, the *descending* order of fragments in **1098** (later interleaved with those of **1077**) represents the original order of columns in the papyrus roll. Thus the present column (fr. 28) falls next after col. 1 (fr. 29), allowing for the interpolation of (the misnumbered) cols. 2–4 (frr. 27, 24, 26). In general this column coheres in subject matter with cols. 1–5, namely how the gods can exist as bodies, with the added allegation that this would be tantamount to a denial of their existence.

Col. 6

The matter of this column must have concerned how we conceptualize the lifestyles (150–1, 161) of the gods, particularly in defence of the point that they are like our own (152) in some respects, with the exception that the gods are invulnerable to destruction (145).

150–1 δι]|αίτας: these are almost certainly those of the gods, as they are said to be 'indestructible' (145). Philodemus treated the matter at considerable length and more sytematically in *De dis* 3. The treatment here must have been summary by comparison.

159–60 τοὺς ὀνει]|δίζοντ[ας: possibly Stoics, but judged from *De dis* 3, Philodemus was in particular exercised by Carneades attacks on this point, as known from Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 139–93 (see esp. 140, 182, 190–2).

161 δια[ίτας: since these may also be the lifestyles of the gods, Philippson's restoration δια[ίτας ἡμῶν is open to doubt; perhaps δια[ίτας αὐτῶν should stand. It would make little sense for the critics to be attacking the lifestyles of humans, as similar as they may be held to be to those of the gods.

162 ἀλλὰ πυκ[νὰς χαρὰς (or ἡδονὰς)] | ἀποτελού[σας (Philippson) may well be right.

163–4 δι]|δάσκει: often said of Epicurus, e.g. at Philod. *Rhet.* i. 121,28.

165 ἐν τῶι Ν[.....]: Philippson proposed ἐν τῶι *Ν*[εοκλεῖ, one of Epicurus' three brothers (the others were Chaeredemus and Aristobulus), all of whom studied with him (D.L. 10. 3 citing Philodemus' *Syntaxis of Philosophers*; Neocles was also the name of their father, himself a schoolmaster: Cic. *ND* 1. 72, D.L. 10. 4, Obbink 1995*a*, 191 n. 9). No letter to Neocles is known. Epicurus did write one to Aristobulus (frr. 44–5 Arr.²). But this cannot in fact be a citation of a letter *To Neocles.* Although Philodemus

commonly quotes Epicurus' letters with the recipient/addressee named in the dative (for an example see below, 798–9), for the titles of letters (often in the formula *ἐν τῶι κτλ.*) the form *Πρὸς* plus accusative is used. Thus *ἐν τῶι Ν[εοκλεῖ* (Philippson's supplement) means 'in the *Neocles*', i.e. a title like the *Timocrates* (in at least three books: D.L. 10. 28) or the *Καρνεΐσκου Φιλίστα* preserved on papyrus from Herculaneum (for which see the edition of Capasso 1988). On books titled after the names of men and women (not as recipients of the epistle), see Usener 1887, 95 and Capasso 1988, 37–53, esp. 104 n. 123. Thus Epicurus wrote a *Χαιρέδημος* and an *Ἀριστόβουλος* (D.L. 10. 27, 28). Diogenes (10. 28) also lists a title *Νεοκλῆς πρὸς Θεμίσταν*. It is tempting to attribute the present passage, such as it is, to that work, here cited entitled simply the *Neocles*, to match the other two books called after Epicurus' other two brothers, but by Diogenes in the familiar double titulature of the Hellenistic period: e.g. *Φαῖδρος (ἢ) περὶ ψυχῆς, Pius (aut) de pace.* Alternatively, if N[(which appears clearly on the apograph) could be assumed a miswriting of the *disegnatore* for Π[(not a common mistake), then we could have a citation of the sort *ἐν τῶι Π̣[ερὶ θεῶν*, which would better suit the technical context here.

169–70 Instead of *εὖ]|σταθές*, which would entail a reference to the division of pleasures (here enjoyed by the gods) as at Plut. *Contra Ep. beat.* 1089D (Epic. fr. 22.3 Arr.²) *τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα*, we should rather expect here *ἀ]|σταθές*, or rather *οὐκ ἀ]|σταθές*, in reference to the continuous streams of images of the gods creating the impression of a stable (not unstable) compound. (For the term see further *De ira* col. 8,33–4 *κι|νήσεις ἀσταθεῖς*.) The process is described in greater detail at 320–37, where see 336 *μηκέτ'] ἀσταθέ[ς*. This must be the case if 171 *ὑπν[* is part of a discussion of images of the gods received in dreams during sleep, for which see Clay 1980, 342–65; Asmis 1981, 138–45; cf. also 290 below.

172–3 *Order of Columns.* See on 144.

Col. 7

Philodemus undertakes to defend the Epicureans on the charge of impiety by citing two passages of Metrodorus and Epicurus concerning the imperishability of divine nature. Both are part of arguments as to how the gods can exist as material compounds, yet be indestructible.

176 The nominative *ἀνόσιοι* cannot designate the Epicureans (in view of 177 *ἡμᾶς*); rather, it must be in apposition with the subject of *κα]τατυγχά-νου|[σιν*, and thus likewise the subject of the infinitive in a result clause.

177–8 εἰ μὴ | [σύμφ]αμεν π[ᾶσιν: Philippson took *π[ᾶσιν* (Scott) to be 'wohl den Glaubensvorstellungen der Menge'. And though this at first

sounds at odds with the readiness of the Epicureans to claim that their beliefs about the gods were in accord with popular opinion and their commitment to arguments from *consensus omnium* (see e.g. below, 1133–4, 1344–53, etc.), on other occasions they made no pretence about how far their beliefs differed from those of many people, as *Ad Menoec.* 123 (attacked e.g. above, 7–9) shows (Obbink 1992*b*).

180–1 Μητρό|[δωρος] τυγχάνει: Metrodorus is cited as providing support to Epicurus' position on this point (179 ἐκεί*ν*]ωι, or perhaps τού*τ*]ωι); the exact verb cannot be recovered with certainty, but there are no strong objections to Diels's εἰc|[φέρων ('beisteuernd'). Not only is Philippson's restored negation of this statement ruled out on papyrological grounds (his supplements in 180–1 being far too long), but to suppose that Philodemus bothered to cite Metrodorus (and cite him twice) in specific works as having *failed* to provide support to Epicurus' position on this point is simply misguided. Besides, Metrodorus has already been cited positively to this effect (95–105) and it is possible that more of the unidentified citations in cols. 1–7 derive from him.

182 παραι]τήcεωc (Scott): 'a way out', he gets 'off the hook' i.e. of the dilemma sketched out at 35–50, namely that the gods cannot be both material compounds and at the same time imperishable. According to Philodemus, Metrodorus 'gets off' by making the distinctions which follow. With the expression cf. 366–7 πα|ρα⟨ιτη⟩τέον. Diels's τῆc ζη]τήcεωc in the sense of 'inquiry' is not impossible, occupying virtually the same space, though in this case we should have expected ποιεῖcθαι plus the accusative.

185–9 What Metrodorus said was that every material compound is in fact perishable. The individual materially compound images which make it possible to conceptualize the gods are constantly undergoing dissolution and destruction. According to Metrodorus only 'that which has no share of the void endures lastingly'. This refers of course in the first instance to simple bodies or atoms (see 42 and esp. 45–6, they are διαιώνιοι), but here it must also be taken to refer to the gods as conceived καθ' ὁμοιότητα and 'not as numerically distinct' (101–4 and see esp. 320–37). Philippson was simply wrong to say that this 'trägt . . . so wenig zur Lehre Epikurs von dem Wesen der Götter bei'. The highly relevant implication of Metrodorus' statement is that the gods, like atoms, can be themselves materially based entities which are invulnerable to destruction, for the reason that the process of conceptualizing them is facilitated by constantly dissipating compounds, namely the succession of images which make thought possible.

189–90 For Epicurus' treatise Περὶ θεῶν see on 753–4, also cited below, 1255–62 (very probably at 382–3).

190–4 Philippson's reconstruction of this section, followed rather closely in Arr.[2] (with the substitution of several alternatives from Philippson's 1918 attempt), is vitiated by over-restoration at line-ends, in a column in which

almost all line-ends are in fact preserved. We are thus in a better than usual position to judge line-lengths. What Epicurus said is clear within broad limits. (The construction of *oratio obliqua* with the neuter article and participle is common in Epicurus' works and Philodemus himself uses it.) Accepting a minor correction in 191 (*τῆι φύc*]*ε̣ι*, though I could not rule out e.g. *τῆι γενέc*]*ε̣ι*) and rejecting Philippson's ungrammatical restoration *ἀc*-|[*ταθμήτ*]*ην* (see on 191–2), we are in a position to utilize an advance gained from a new textual reading in 193. Gomperz mistakenly read *cυ*[.]*ω*[, which Philippson supplemented as *cυ*[*ν*]*ώ*[*νυμον* (a word never used by Epicurus; and its sense here is strange: why should the existent be 'synonymous' with anything?). But the original *disegno* reveals here a space of at least two letters (*cυ*[..]*ω*[ ), for which the supplement *cύ*[*μφ*]*ω*[*νον* immediately suggests itself, a word often used by Epicurus, as e.g. in the well-known expression *cύμφωνον τοῖc φαινομένοιc* (see Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v.). What this was 'consistent' or 'harmonious' with was not *τῆι θείαι*] (Arr.², which requires understanding *φύcιc* over again from 191 in quite a different sense—a difficult manœuvre, nor Philippson's *δ' αὐτῆι*] (a characteristic case of trying to make the passage say too much), but rather some equivalent dative (I suggest e.g. *τῶ θείῳ* 'compatible with divinity'; *ἀ*|*φθαρcίαι* 'with its indestructibility' exceeds the available space). Thus the whole passage will have read: *τὸ μὴ* | [*τῆι φύc*]*ε̣ι τὴν α*[*ἰ*]*c*|[*θανομέν*]*ην cύγκρ*[*ι*|*cιν ἔχον*] *cύ*[*μφ*]*ω*[*νον* | *τῶ θείῳ*, '(According to Epicurus in *On Gods*) that which does not have in its nature a sensitive constitution is consistent with (its) divinity.' The 'thing which does not have a sensitive constitution' will be the 'the divine' as conceptualized in the process described at 320–37 (where see commentary). Note that Epicurus does not say that this *cύγκριcιc* of the gods (here the process whereby they are conceptualized through materially compound images) is imperishable, only that it is not sensitive, *μὴ . . . α*[*ἰ*]*c*|[*θανομέν*]*ην* (i.e. in the way normal percipients are), and that this is not incompatible with its being divine (*vel sim.*: the dative must be restored).

191–2 α[ἰ]c|[θανομέν]ην: not passive, although anything divine would necessarily be constituted in such a way as to be imperceptible by the normal means in which we notice numerically distinct, individuated entities. For this notion in Epicurean theology see e.g. Demetrius of Laconia, *De dis*, col. 22,4–5 Renna *διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ*|*δὲν αἰcθητὸν ἀθάνα*|*τον*. Philippson's restoration *ἀc*|[*ταθμήτ*]*ην* cannot stand: the Herculaneum papyri do not exhibit any compound adjectives in the positive degree with separate feminine forms (*MGrHerc* 181). Philippson's other suggestions are too short for the available space and require violent changes to the apograph, which exhibits a small space between *α* and *c* at the end of 191 (with *c* at line-end), and 6–7 letters missing at the beginning of 192.

194–201 In this section I have followed the lead of a key restoration by Gomperz (in 195–6), though the concept for the larger syntactical

construction was an insight of Philippson, whose restorations I have corrected at several points.

194–6 Note that *τὸ μὴ τῆς | [φύσεως ὂν] μετεχού|[σης* plus genitive is an exact parallel to Metrodorus' statements at 185–6 and 190–3, a strong argument for the syntactical soundness of the reconstruction. *μετέχειν* 'to have a share in' does occur elsewhere in Epicurus' writings (*De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 12, 11 Arr.^{2}) though Philodemus, who uses it rather more frequently, may be paraphrasing here.

197–8 *μα|[λακίας* (Philippson) is not in all respects satisfactory, but I have despaired of a suitable alternative (perhaps *μα[ρτυρίας*?). Philodemus uses the term *μαλακία* at *De mus.* 30,7. 14. *πολ]λὰς*, however, is an easy change (Λ mistaken for Δ), and lends some plausibility to at least the syntax of the reconstruction.

199 ἡ θεία φύ]σις: see on 1098–9 for parallels. 'The divine nature' refers unambiguously to 'divinity', i.e. god: cf. 231 and see Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1112E for Epicurus' habit of referring to a thing as that thing's nature.

202–3 *Order of Columns.* See on 144.

Col. 8

The means by which humans form concepts of the gods are treated at further length. Some of the points made earlier in the treatise regarding imperishable entities are corroborated by further citation from the works of Epicurus, in particular from his book *On Holiness*. The author then adduces Epicurus' view expressed in *On Nature* 12 that the earliest humans (*πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι*) formed conceptions of at least one type of imperishable entities (*φύσεις*). The view that the earliest humans already did so substantiates the enduring, regular nature of this process through time, and hence its reliability.

204–5 παραλείπεσθαι: 'to neglect, ignore' (cf. on 36), here deponent, completed by an infinitive, as at *De oec.* col. 16,29. Following a suggestion of Dr Holford-Strevens's I take *εἰδέναι* as complementary to *ἀναγ|καίων* (rather than to *παραλείπεσθαι*).

206–7 Περὶ ὁσιότη|τος ἄλλο βυβλίον: here *ἄλλο βυβλίον* cannot mean 'another (i.e. second) book' of the work *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* (also cited at 362–4, 1263–77), for we know that work consisted of a *single* book: D.L. 10. 27; cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 123: *liber de sanctitate.* Most likely Philodemus means 'having written a different book [i.e. different from the book, probably *Περὶ θεῶν* which he has just cited at l. 190, namely], *On Holiness*', though it is not entirely impossible that he means 'another book about holiness', or even 'a book *On Holiness* as well' (i.e. apart from Philodemus' present work on the

same subject). This form of citation is unique and unusual, a fact which suggests that this is the first citation of *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* in the treatise. The other citations of *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* in *De pietate* and elsewhere in the Herculanensia (see below), and most Epicurean works cited in in *De pietate* (except letters) follow the usual formula *ἐν τῶι* (sc. *βυβλίωι τῶι*) *Περὶ κτλ.* (The first citation of *Περὶ φύσεως*, for which see on 225–7, is similarly a unique form of citation, which is at least consistent with this also being the first citation of *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* in the treatise.)

At *De nat. deor.* 1. 115 Cicero makes Cotta say *at etiam de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros scripsit Epicurus*, and that reading these books you would think you were listening to *pontifices maximi*. It is remotely possible that this preserves a reference to more than one book by Epicurus about holiness or piety. Usener 1887, 100 assumed the existence of two distinct works by Epicurus (a view not accepted by subsequent editors): (1) the attested *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*, to which he assigned the present passage, and (2) an otherwise unattested *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*. This conclusion he reached by comparing the definitions given at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 116: *est enim pietas iustitia adversum deos . . . sanctitas autem est scientia colendorum deorum*, with the definitions at D.L. 7. 119 *εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας*; Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 9. 123 *ἔστι γὰρ εὐσέβεια ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας*; ibid. 9. 124 *ἡ ὁσιότης, δικαιοσύνη τις οὖσα πρὸς θεούς*, a correlation which suggests that *sanctitas* = *εὐσέβεια* and *pietas* = *ὁσιότης*. (For the derivation of these Stoic definitions, from Zeno via Diogenes of Babylon, see Schofield 1983, 31–58; for other definitions of piety and holiness, see Pease 1955, 506–7, Obbink 1992*b*, esp. 210–16). But Cicero's use of the singular *liber de sanctitate* at 1. 123, suggests that at least in that passage he intended *sanctitas* to stand for *ὁσιότης* (for we know from the list of Epicurus' works given by Diogenes Laertius that Epicurus' *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* was in one book). And in any case J. C. Bolkestein, *Ὅσιος en εὐσεβής* (Amsterdam, 1936), 210 considers these terms, as well as the Latin words *sanctitas* and *pietas*, more or less synonymous and interchangeable. It seems highly unlikely, if Epicurus wrote a work *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*, that we should not hear of it, all the more so since Philodemus' teacher Zeno wrote a well-known one, on which Philodemus drew (see Introd. § 2(*h*)). *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* is probably the title of the present work (see Introd. § 3(*d*)), but that would not preclude Philodemus' implying here that it was concerned with *ὁσιότης*, especially if the two terms were more or less synonymous. Epicurus of course like Philodemus did write a *Περὶ θεῶν*; but judged from the citations of its content in *De pietate*, and from Philodemus' work by this title, it was probably more technical than the work *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*. Given the fluidity of ancient book-titles (see Obbink 1988*a*, 433 n. 27; id. in *CPF* vol. 1* (Florence, 1989), 106–9) it is not surprising that there may have been some confusion over the exact form of titles of books (cf. below on 703–5). But it would be very odd, to say the least, if

Philodemus meant 'a different book about holiness by Epicurus' (i.e. other than the *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*), that he would in that case not simply cite this work by the title under which it circulated; if it went under the title *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* but was in fact a 'another book', we should expect to find it cited as the second book of the attested *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*.

If *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* is taken here at 206–7 as the title of Epicurus' book, or at any rate a citation of the attested *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*, then this is the earliest notice of that work. The title next appears (paired with a book *Περὶ θεῶν*) in the list of Epicurus' books at D.L. 10. 27 (cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 115 and 123 on which see above, both perhaps derivative solely from these citations in *De pietate*) and at Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102 C, where the same two works are also cited in the same order. Philodemus will cite from it again (in the standard form *ἐν τῶι Περὶ κτλ.*: 362–4, 1263–77, at least in the preserved portions of the treatise, always in close proximity to a citation of Epicurus' *Περὶ θεῶν*: 189–90, (probably) 382–3, 1255–62 (were they companion volumes?). Philodemus may have had the book in front of him, and certainly had its text in mind. There is otherwise no trace of a copy at Herculaneum, but the work was undoubtedly known to the Epicurean circle at Naples, for it is also cited by Philodemus in *De dis* 3 fr. 6,4 (= Epic. fr. 19.1 Arr.²) *ἐν τῶι Περὶ* [ὁ|σιό]*τητος ἀποφαινομένου τὸ θεῖ*[ο]*ν μήτε* | [*σάρκι*]*νον εἶνα*[*ι κα*]*τ' ἀναλογίαν* [*ἔχ*]*ον τι* | [*σῶμ' ὅπερ*] *ἡγεῖται* (on which see Arrighetti 1958, 83 ff.; id. 1961, 112–21), and Cicero (*De nat. deor.* 1. 115, 123) intended his readers to hear of it. The other surviving citation is in *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44,1–15 (Epic. fr. 41 Us., 19. 5 Arr.²), a fragment of otherwise unedited doxography of uncertain authorship (new text prepared on the basis of the sole witness, the Neapolitan apograph; the papyrus itself no longer exists):

δης [..... . *ἐπιστο-*
λῆι κἀν [*τῶι Περὶ ὁ*
σιότη{*ι*}*τ*[*ος κἀν τῶι*
δωδεκά[*τωι καὶ τῶι*
τρεισκα[*ιδεκάτωι*
Περὶ φύσ[*εως κἀν τῶι*
πρώτω[*ι καὶ τρίτωι*
Τιμοκρ[*άτει· καὶ ἐκ*
τῶν Μητ[*ροδώρου οἷ-*
ον ἐν [*τῶι Πρὸς τὸν*
Εὐθύφρο[*να κἀν τῶι*
Πρὸς Ἀρ[*ιστοτέλην,*
μάλιστα [*δὲ Ἕρμαρ-*
χος [*ἔ*]*ν τ*[*οῖς λεγομέ-*
νοις Ἐρι[*στικοῖς ἐκεί-*
νην ἐκ[*τίθεται γνώμην.* ||

N 1111 fr. 44 (Crönert 1906, 24 n. 136, 69 n. 338; 1898, 593; Körte 1890, 546 = Metrodorus fr. 14, Epic. fr. 41 Us., 19. 5 Arr.², Longo 1988*a*, 47; Angeli 1988*a*, 294; 1993, 16) 5 cf. *N* 1111 fr. 45,4 τρεισκα[6 *Περὶ φύς*[εως Crönert: ΠΕΡΙCΥΝ[*N* 7–8 *πρώτω*[ι *καὶ τρίτωι*] | *Τιμοκρ*[*άτει* dubitanter Angeli 1993, 16 n. 72, cf. 15 n. 64 coll. D.L. 10. 28 *Τιμοκράτης* Epicuri in libris tribus: *πρώτω*[ι *τῶν περὶ*] | *Τιμοκρ*[*άτους* Us.: *πρώτω*[ι *τῶν Πρὸς*] | *Τιμοκρ*[*άτη* Crönert, Arr.² 12 *Πρὸς Ἀρ*[*ιστοτέλην* Crönert 1906, 124 : *Ἀρ*[*ίστωνα* Körte 14 corr. Crönert: ΚΩC *N*

The grouping of *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* in this list with *On Nature* 12 and 13 is striking, since the latter two books also dealt at least in part with theological matters (see on 225, 523–4, 1050), and because the next citation in the present column comes from *On Nature* 12 (225–7). On the text of *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44 see further Angeli 1988, 294, who outlines the similarities between this list and the catalogue of Epicurean works in Diogenes Laertius, the latter possibly dependent on Philodemus' *Syntaxis of Philosophers*.

207 βυβλίον: for the orthography of this word see E. Puglia, '*βιβλίον* e *βυβλίον* in Filodemo', *CErc* 16 (1986), 119–21, who demonstrates that while the forms *βίβλος* and *βιβλίον* are found in the Herculaneum papyri of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* (all rolls produced at Athens?), the works of Philodemus and Demetrius Lacon exhibit exclusively the forms *βύβλος* and *βυβλίον*. Cf. Capasso 1981, who also has a useful discussion of the different terms for 'book', 'treatise', 'commentary', etc. in the papyri.

208–9 διαca|φεῖ: a characteristic word in Philodemus for introducing exegesis of texts (cf. 1058–9). Although this verb usually takes an accusative (or genitive) direct object (sometimes an articular infinitive), at *Rhet.* i. 114,15 it introduces indirect discourse with *ὅτι* and at *De lib. dicendi* 8b,9 with the infinitive, as here (215 *προcαγορεύε*[*cθαι*).

209–19 A brief summary of the doctrine that uniquely existing, individuated entities can be formed from the coalescence of similar as well as identical elements (hereafter referred to as the 'doctrine of unities'). The view is alluded to in a citation from Metrodorus at 100–4 and expounded at greater length at 320–75. Epicurus' clarification (208–9 *διαca|φεῖ*) consists in the following: existents are conventionally termed 'unities' when they (1) exist indestructibly, like atoms, or (2) come into perfection of formation continuously as one and the same entity. Such unities can be formed (as in the case of ordinary solid objects) from identical elements, or, in the case of some mental entities formed from images, from similar entities, i.e. images. See further below on 320–75, and the comparanda cited by Philippson 1918, 377.

209–10 τὸ μὴ μόνον ἀ|φθάρτως, ἀλλὰ κ[αί etc.: cf. Metrodorus fr. 12 Körte, cited by Philodemus above, 102–4 *οὐ μόν*[*ον* | *ἄφ*]*θαρτον, ἀλλὰ* [*καὶ* | *θεί*]*αν*, where the antecedent is *cύν*]*κριcιν τῶν* [*μὴ κα*|*τ' ἀ*]*ριθμόν*. There the 'things which do not exist according to numerical identity' correspond to 'unities formed from similar things' (218–19 *τὰ*[*c δ' ἐκ τῶν*] | *ὁμοίων*) in the present passage. What is missing here is the specification that in this case the resulting entity must be a concept, formed out of images, and not an

ordinary solid object, a 'unity' formed from identical things (216–17 *τὰc ἐκ* [*τῶν ὄντων*] | *τῶν α*⟨*ὐ*⟩*τῶ*[*ν*). This hypothesis is confirmed in the fuller exposition of the doctrine at 323–4 (*τῶν* [*εἰ*]*δ*[*ώ*|*λω*]*ν*).

211 κα]τὰ cυντέλ̣ε[ιαν: 'in perfection', 'perfectly.' For *cυντέλεια* see *Rhet.* ii. 86,18 *τ*]*ῶν τελῶν cυντελείας*; *De poem.* 5. 13,5 *ἁρμονίαν ἣ cυν*|[*τέλεια*]*ν*; cf. Plat. *Leg.* 905 B *τὴν πάντων ἀμέλειαν θεῶν, οὐκ εἰδὼc αὐτῶν τὴν cυντέλειαν, ὅπῃ ποτὲ τῷ παντὶ ξυμβάλλεται.* The verb *cυντελεῖν* (cf. 217–18) is used of material formation commonly in Epicurus, usually in the middle. Lucretius' description of atomic natures at 1. 609–12 *HPh* 9c should be compared for its terminology:

> sunt igitur solida primordia (= *cτοιχεῖα*) simplicitate (= *ἑνότηc*)
> quae minimis stipata cohaerent partibus arte
> non ex ullorum conventu conciliata (= *cυντέλεια*)
> sed magis aeterna (= *διαιώνιοc*) pollentia simplicitate
>
> So [since there are inseparable parts] the primary particles are of a solid unity
> for they cohere together in a dense conglomeration of minimal parts
> not put together out of a union of those parts
> but rather prevailing in everlasting unity.

Here the description is of primary bodies *per se*. But the same description of their existing eternally as 'unities' also appears as applied to the gods in the present and related passages. The gods are composed materially of a configuration of bodies, yet like atoms maintain their existence eternally. On *conciliata* see further Lucr. 1. 575.

212 ἓ̣[ν] καὶ ταὐ[τόν: cf. Aristot. *Metaph.* 4. 4, 1015^a12 *ἤδη καὶ ὅλωc πᾶca οὐcία φύcιc λέγεται*, 1014^b23 *ἐν δὲ τοῖc cυμπεφυκόcιν ἐcτί τι ἓν τὸ αὐτὸ . . . , ὃ ποιεῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἅπτεcθαι cυμπεφυκέναι καὶ εἶναι ἓν κατὰ τὸ cυνεχὲc καὶ ποcόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν*; Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 10,16–18 esp. *τὸ γεγεννημένον οὐχ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν κατ' ἀριθμὸν πρὸc τὸν αἰῶνα*, and see the discussions of Philippson 1918, 378–80 and Woodward 1989, 40–2.

212–13 cυν|εχῷ̣[c: cf. Aristotle *Met.* 4.4 1014^b23 (quoted in previous note) *ἓν κατὰ τὸ cυνεχέc*. The fact that such entities are perceived exist 'continuously', i.e. the fact that they are continually perceived over time (e.g. all human history) with such great regularity, qualifies them for the status of *ἑνότητεc*, 'unities', 'uniquely individuated entities'. For parallels in Epicurus see Usener, *Gloss. Ep.* s.v. *cυνέχειν*. Things formed *cυνεχῶc* stand in contradistinction to natural formations *κατ' ἀριθμόν* at *De ira* col. 30,15–18 (see Indelli's note ad loc.). In this connection should be compared the *Σ KD* 1 (*τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥcτε οὔτε ὀργαῖc οὔτε χάριcι cυνέχεται· ἐν ἀcθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον*, 'That which is blessed and imperishable neither suffers nor inflicts trouble, and therefore is affected neither by anger nor by favour. For all such things are the marks of weakness'), which glosses this passage as follows:

ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένους (Kühn, *-ων* codd.), *ἀνθρωποειδεῖς.*

In other works he [Epicurus] says that the gods are seen by reason, some numerically distinct, others with formal unity, resulting from a continuous influx of similar images to the same place, and human in form.

(On the constitution of the text see the remarks of Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. *ἀποτελεῖν*, and further below on 325–6 and 370.) For the distinction drawn in *κατ' ἀριθμόν . . . καθ' ὁμοείδειαν* between numerical identity and formal identity cf. Galen *Meth. med.* 10.135, Simplicius, *In Aristot. De caelo* 310,5 ff. A summary of views and bibliography on the history and interpretation of *Σ KD* 1 can be found in Lemke 1973, 60–6; Mansfeld 1993.

It may be added to the discussion that the division *οὓς μὲν . . . οὓς δέ*, that is between numerical identity and formal identity, is directly reflected in *De pietate* at 216–19, 329–32, and 356–8, where *ἑνότητες ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν = οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας* in the scholium, and similarly *ἑνότητες ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων = οὓς δὲ κατὰ ὁμοείδειαν* etc. As a result it is clear that *οὓς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμόν* should not be emended or negatived with Gassendi (cf. J. P. Elder, *AJP* 77 (1956), 82–4). It is true that for Epicurus (contrary to what the scholium seems to allow) nó god should exist *κατ' ἀριθμόν*, since all *κατ' ἀριθμόν* compounds are perishable (see 100–3). (And this would seem to follow for a divine sage like Epicurus, as it does for divinized rulers.) The parallel divisions made in *De pietate* (cited above) distinctly suggest that the entire scholium has mistakenly equated *θεοί* with *ἑνότητες*, instead of making the former a subclass of the latter (not all *ἑνότητες* are divine or necessarily imperishable, see 349–54)—an easy confusion. It is also possible that the scholium refers to Epicurean passages that discussed the combinatory role played by solid objects (like stars, statues, humans, and sages) that exist *κατ' ἀριθμόν*, or more specifically the role played by images of these, in the formation *καθ' ὁμοείδειαν* of gods, for which see below on 329–32, 348.

213–14 καθ' ὁ]μειλ̣[ίαν: *in sermone familiari*, 'in common usage', = *κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν*, though it perplexes how Epicurus could have said that anything was called 'in common usage' by as technical a designation as *ἑνότης* 'unity.' Perhaps a less technical term should be restored in 214; but Epicurus may simply have meant that it is conventional in speech to refer to such entities as though they were *ἑνότητες*, 'unified entities.' Cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 67, Philod. *Rhet.* i. 288,13, Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 1. 1, LSJ, Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v., Colotes *Adv. Lys. Plat.* col. 2 (Crönert 1906, 164; *P. Herc.* 208) *ἀλ]λὰ μὴν ἥ γε κοι|νὴ πάντων ἡμῶν ὁμι|λία ἦν τ̣[η]ρεῖν τοὺς φ[θ]ό̣γ|γου[ς] κα̣[τ]ὰ τὸ ἐν[α]ργές, | [οὐ] τ̣ὸ δοξαζόμενόν | γ' ἐκ[ε]ῖνο καὶ οὐχὶ ὃ ο[ὐ|τό]ς̣ φ[ησι]ν.* In other words, we conventionally speak of as single, individuated entities both things which are truly imperishable, as well as things that have a kind of imperishability because they endure in more or less the same form

continuously. Gods, it will be suggested, may be of the latter sort, whereas atoms and void are of the former. The point of adding *καθ' ὁμιλίαν* is to imply, by a kind of argument from *consensus omnium*, that there is something veridical about both classes being called 'unities'. Though the two classes may be distinguished in philosophical inquiry, the gods as the Epicureans think of them have as much claim to individual existence as ordinary physical objects, and as much claim to existing permanently as the fundamental entities of nature.

214 [*ἑνότητας*] = *simplicitas* (Lucr. 1. 609–12). See the discussion of Philippson 1921, 376–80; Woodward 1989, 40–2; and below on 349.

217–19 Here *τὰς μὲν . . . ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* and *τὰς δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων* both refer to the formation of 'unities', except the latter, those formed *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων*, have the capability (though not necessity) of existing 'continuously as one and the same thing' as specified in 209–13. Whereas the former, those formed *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*, are presumably ordinary objects and are thus quite perishable. See further below on 349 ff.

217 α⟨ὐ⟩τῶ̣[ν: it is possible that the scribe intended to write *ἀτῶν* since the demonstrative and reflexive pronoun are sometimes written in this fashion in later Greek and in papyri, including the Herculanensia (e.g. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 213,21): see *MGrHerc* 126. Sometimes the upsilon is squeezed in above the line in correction, as at 813 *τ]α̣ὔ̈την*. In 217 the letters of *ατων* are spaced rather widely, and a suprascript upsilon would be easily missed by the copyist.

217–18 ἀποτε]|λεῖ̣ς̣θαι: for the terminology and parallels see below on 359, 370, cf. 1029–30.

224–5 ἀ]π̣ο̣φαίνε|τ[αι: what is asserted or by whom cannot be known for certain since the preceding lines are entirely missing; but the term is common in reference to the exposition of philosophical views: it is merely 'to declare one's opinion', as at 1353–8 *οἱ πολλο̣[ὶ] | νομίζοντες ἀσε|βεῖς τοὺς οὕτωι πε|ρὶ θεῶν ἀποφαινο|μένους κολάζου|σιν*, 'the many, regarding as impious those who pronounce in this way about the gods, punish them' (Socrates is adduced as an example); 1097–8 (Polyaenus); Epic. *De nat.* 14 fr. 29. 23,5 *οἱ ταῦ[τα] | ἀποφαινόμενοι*. The break in the syntax before *κἀν* should be regarded as provisional. D. Delattre points out to me that we need not presume a sentence break after *ἀποφαίνεται*, if we restore e.g. *τοῦτο δ' ἀ]π̣ο̣φαίνε|τ[αι* and *φή[σας* in 228: 'he asserts this also in *On Nature*, saying that . . .'. For *κἀν* in mid-sentence see above, 208, cf. 523, 1888. *κἀν* occurs at the beginning of a sentence in *De pietate*, but usually in correlation with a following particle, as at 1066–8.

225–7 κἀ̣ν τῶι δω|δεκάτ[ω]ι Περὶ φ[ύ]|σ[ε]ω[ς: Epicurus' *magnum opus* is cited here by the full form of the title plus the book-number; in all other extant citations of *Περὶ φύσεως* in *De pietate*, the work is cited by the book-number alone (e.g. 523–4), and the title *Περὶ φύσεως* must be sup-

plied. No other work cited in *De pietate* is treated in this way (cf. *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* cited in this column at 206, but in full form also at 362–4 and 1266–7; so also in the citations of Epicurus' *Περὶ θεῶν*). This manner of citing Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* by book number alone may be parallelled in part at *P. Herc.* 998 fr. 12 (Polyaenus fr. 27 Tepedino; cf. *CErc* 17 (1987), 79) ἀ]ποδιδόνα[ι] κριτή[ριον | τ]ῶν ἀδήλων, ὡς [ἔλεγ]εν ἐ[ν] | τῆι λ καὶ δ (sc. γραφῆι Περὶ φύσεως). καὶ παρὰ Πολυαίνωι | δ' ἐν τῶι Περὶ ὅρων τόνδε συν|[(authorship and work unknown, apparently a *de anima*, partly doxographical). The preceding (or following?) fragment 11 in *P. Herc.* 998 contains the citation ἐν τῶι β καὶ λ (= Epic. *De nat.* 32 Arr.², with pp. 624, 709). Cf. *P. Herc.* 558 fr. 11,2 (Crönert 1975, 149; *MGrHerc* 199–200) ἐν τῶι ἕ]κκα[ι]δε|[κάτωι. In these cases *Περὶ φύσεως* was written out in full at the first citation, and cited by book alone thereafter (though we do not know if this convention continued throughout the work, with citations of other works intervening, as in *De pietate*). This convention is not exampled elsewhere in the Herculanensia, in which there are in any case embarrassingly few citations of Epicurus' most important work, even though multiple, relatively old copies of it (second century BC) were found at Herculaneum. As it stands, 7 out of the 10 citations of *Περὶ φύσεως* in the Herculanensia come exclusively from *De pietate*. Apart from these, and *P. Herc.* 998 (just cited), there is only *De nat.* 4 fr. 25 Arr.² from Philod. *De morte* inc. lib. at *P. Herc.* 807 fr. 6 (the title written out in full: τὰ | ἐν τ]ετάρτωι Περὶ φύ[σεως), together with the mention of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 and 13 in the list of works in the anonymous *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44 (quoted above on 205–6), where the title also appears in the full form. This lack of attention in the books from Herculaneum to Epicurus' most important work is an oddity for which I can unfortunately suggest no explanation. (Nor have any copies of the books cited been recovered from Herculaneum. We know that within *De nat.* Epicurus made cross-reference to other books by book number alone: *De nat.* inc. lib. fr. 36. 24,4–5 Arr.² ἐν τῆ̣[ι] πρώ|τη[ι] γραφῆ̣[ι] εἴρη|τα[ι].) In any case, what made Philodemus (who cites frequently from Epicurus' letters) an Epicurean in Italy in the first century BC was not the number of times he could declare his dependence on the master's most important work (a point on which he may be contrasted with Lucretius): *De pietate* stands virtually alone in even being aware of it. See also Capasso 1987, 40–50.

The most important ramification of this for the reconstruction of *De pietate* is that the appearance of the full form of the title *Περὶ φύσεως* here at 225–7 demonstrates that this was in fact the first citation from Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* in the treatise. Therefore the present column must have preceded the other citations of *Περὶ φύσεως* (all of them by book number alone: see 523–4, 1050–1, 1055–6, 1888–9, very likely also 1078, 1088, cf. 1787–8 with commentary) in the original order of columns, as it did not in

all previous editions. (Philippson, for example, simply assumed that the full title *Περὶ φύσεως* was in each of these cases lost in a preceding lacuna.)

For the date of composition and publication of *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 see on 523–4. Something of the content of book 12 can be gathered from 519–41 (cf. 1050–4), *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,1–8 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 25), Epic. *Ad Herod.* 73–7, *Ad Pyth.* 93–8, Lucr. 5. 571 ff., 1161 ff., Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 62–4, 117 ff., Σ Epic. *Ad Herod.* 74, Σ *Ad Pyth.* 96—all known or admitted to be closely dependent on Epicurus' account of mankind's cultural development in *De nat.* 12. It is also cited (together with *Περὶ φύσεως* 13 and Epicurus' *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*) in *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44, quoted above on 205–6. It has been overlooked that Diog. Oen. frr. 16–20 Smith, esp. fr. 16, which deal with the gods and atheism, immediately following as they do on the account of the origin of language in human history in fr. 12 Smith (Smith, *CQ*² 22 (1972), 160), must have also derived from book 12 of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως*. Individually these sources give widely differing impressions of the character of the book: the scholiasts of an astronomical account, Lucretius of an anthropological one, Diogenes of an attack on scepticism (from Colotes?), Philodemus of a defence of Epicurus' positive views on the existence of gods and an attack on non-believers (see below, 519–30 with commentary). The focus of the present citation was identifiably anthropological, though Philodemus uses it to apologetic ends. Probably all these elements were present to varying degrees in the book, which treated in general the origins of civilization. For the *index atheorum* contained in *Περὶ φύσεως* and cited by Philodemus see below on 523–4: if the present citation of *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 is combined with that one, it looks very likely that the criticisms of Prodicus, Critias, and possibly Diagoras and the rest, came in the context of a critique of their anthropological views (i.e. how men first came to believe in and worship the gods). In *Περὶ φύσεως* 13 (cited below, 1050–4) Epicurus turned to treat the correct attitude to be adopted toward the gods.

225–31 The first men (*πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι*), having received images of the gods in dreams (cf. 171, 290), came to believe that they existed and so formed an understanding of divine nature. As noted above (p. 6 n. 1), this fragmentary account can be supplemented from Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 25 (Epic. fr. 356 Us.), which records that according to Epicurus people originally derived the conception of god from presentations received in sleep (*ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φαντασιῶν οἴεται τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἔννοιαν ἐσπακέναι θεοῦ*), and quotes Epicurus' explanation: 'For when great images of human shape impressed them during sleep, they supposed that some such gods of human shape really existed' (*μεγάλων γὰρ εἰδώλων, φησί, καὶ ἀνθρωπομόρφων κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους προσπιπτόντων ὑπέλαβον καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις ὑπάρχειν τινὰς τοιούτους θεοὺς ἀνθρωπομόρφους*); cf. 9. 43 (like 9. 25 a standard account of concept formation) and Lucr. 5. 1168. Sextus' report

should not be taken to imply that, in Epicurus' view, divine nature did not in some sense really exist (*ὑπάρχειν*); and the present citation from *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 corroborates this: the earliest humans formed ideas through natural processes of concept formation and reflection of independently existing divine entities, and in this respect they were not in error, on the Epicurean view. The point of reconstructing the earliest human thinking on the gods for Epicurus was probably to stress the *regularity and consistency* of the way in which people have always formed conceptions of gods: the same process has been going on since earliest times and continues to do so, thus guaranteeing that the process must be to some extent a reliable one, having a sound, causal origin in natural processes of analogical reasoning and the deliverances of sense perception; cf. 416–22: 'understanding perception that can be grasped by corporeal sensation (*παραισθήσει σαρκ[ί]|νηι*), which they also knew to be derived from a physical entity (*ἀπ[ὸ φύ]|σεως*)'. False accretions to the correct understanding of divine nature can be accounted for by positing subsequent stages of increasing contamination of human thinking about gods (232–89). The 'duration' of the Epicureans' 'imperishable' gods is also probably conterminous with human conceptualization of them (see below on 336–7). Of considerable importance for our understanding of Epicurus' reconstruction of human history is the discovery, yielded by recovery of the original order of columns, that (1) the discussion of early humans' views on gods constituted a *digression* in Philodemus' defence of Epicurus: i.e. the historical development of belief in the gods was treated by Philodemus (and perhaps also by Epicurus) in order to illustrate or clarify the doctrine of 'unities' (discussed at the beginning of this column) and the account of their formation *καθ' ὁμοείδειαν*; and (2) this clarification of the doctrine of 'unities', provided by Epicurus' discussion of early prehistory, consisted in explaining how early mankind had originally formed ideas of the gods. In other words, Philodemus' reference to the first human beings forming concepts of immortal beings makes it almost certain that the contrast between 'sames and similars' just above at 216–19 is a contrast between images from sames and similars (i.e. images that for Epicurus combine in complex ways to form our ideas).

229 ν[οή]μα̣τα: it is not certain whether Epicurus will have guaranteed to the earliest humans a necessarily correct *πρόληψις* of the gods, or merely something approaching it (*νόημα* 'concept', 'idea', more general than *ἔννοια*): so Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 43 *anticipationem quandam deorum*, and cf. Kleve 1963, 99 with n. 6. As noted above (p. 7), he will have effectively denied the pre-anthropomorphic stage of thinking about the gods that Theophrastus had assigned to early humans: Theophr. *De piet.* F 548 A Fortenbaugh ap. Porph. *De abst.* 2. 5; cf. Reiche 1971, 331 n. 50; Bernays 1866; Obbink 1988*b*, 272–95.

⟨τῶν ἔ⟩ξω: this line has clearly suffered corruption. Lines 217–31 exhibit an extraordinarily higher than usual number of discrepancies among the apographs. Here as often in *De pietate* the original papyrus does not survive to confirm or correct their readings. We could regard the half-line]*μηταξω* as a *sottoposto* or *sovrapposto*, and restore 229–31 as *ἐπι[νοήματα λαμ]|βάνειν ἀφθάρτων | φύcεων*. However, the absence of articles in the resulting phrase raises suspicions, and there are no indications that the offending sequence of letters was written on an upper or lower layer, which would be unusual (though of course not for that reason impossible) in this transcription. I have therefore ventured a palaeographical explanation for the letters as transmitted, by supplying ⟨*τῶν ἔ*⟩ before *ξω* (assuming a haplography from the long, high top horizontal stroke of T to that of Ξ). This makes it possible to take *ἔξω* as adverbial modifier with *ἀφθάρτων φύcεων* (sc. *ὄντων*). The earliest humans formed conceptions of externally existing imperishable entities, i.e. they thought of them as existing independently and imperishably and formed an idea of them analogously to the way in which they formed conceptions of ordinary external objects (viz. through images).

ἔξω (= *ἔξωθεν*) should not be taken here as evidence that Epicurus thought that for early humans the gods existed as something other than their ideas of them (as though *ἔξω* stressed the external existence of the gods, as separate from human thinking) for the following reasons: (1) the information processed by humans to form all concepts comes from without, in the form of *εἴδωλα*: cf. the Epicurean definition of a *πρόληψιc* given at D.L. 10. 33 as 'the memory of a frequent appearance from the outside' *τουτέcτι μνήμη τοῦ πολλάκιc ἔξωθεν φανέντοc*; (2) the gods are in any case on the Epicurean view always to be thought of as existing 'externally', apart from our world. It may be said in addition that, however the text is restored, it can be taken for certain that Epicurus in *On Nature* 12 discussed how early humans formed ideas of 'imperishable entities'. There is no evidence in *De pietate* that Epicurus discussed the gods' manner of existing apart from anyone's idea of them.

230 βα⟨ί⟩νειν: for the orthography see *MGrHerc* 246 with n. 3. The expression *εἰc* or *ἐπὶ νοήματα βαίνειν*, in the sense 'to form an understanding of something', is well exampled: see 766–8 *ε[ἰ]c | ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆc* (sc. *φύcεωc τοῦ θείου*) | *βαδίζοντα*; Epic. *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 21,16–17 Arr.² *οὐ βαδιεῖ|[τ]αι ἐπὶ τῶμ ψευδῶν*; Plat. *Leg.* 793 B *βαίνειν ἐκτὸc τοῦ καλοῦ*; *Resp.* 380 D *ἐκβαίνειν τῆc ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέαc*. There will be little difference in sense if we contrive a way of reading ⟨*λαμ*⟩*βάνειν* here; but the text as printed is palaeographically closer to the paradosis (see above on 229).

230–1 ἀφθάρτων | φύcεων: 'imperishable entities.' Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1112 EF complains about Epicurus' habit of referring to a thing as that thing's nature, saying that when Epicurus says 'the nature of existing things is atoms and void' (fr. 76 Us. 149 p. 494 Arr.² *ἡ τῶν ὄντων φύcιc cώματά ἐcτι καὶ*

τόποc), it is impossible to tell if he means that 'nature' exists distinct from existing things, or whether he simply means that atoms and void are the (only) existing things, and that he habitually used the expression 'the nature of void' for 'void', and 'the nature of the universe', but in reality meaning not that there were two different things, void and the 'nature of void', the two differing only in manner of speaking (cf. Epic. fr. 29. 5 Arr.² where 'air's nature' = 'air'). Plutarch's criticism is superficial, for in Epicurus' usage φύcιc denotes a thing the way it is, as opposed to its qualities and relations (cυμπτώματα, cυμβεβηκότα, cυcτάcειc), so that 'a thing's nature is what it is, as opposed to what merely happens to be true of it only by virtue of its relation to something else' (Annas 1989, 149). For φύcιc in the sense of 'entity', see below, 1098–9 (Polyaenus) τ[ὴν] | θείαν φύcιν, also at Epic. *De nat.* 2 fr. 24. 48,7, 17–18 Arr.²; *Ad Pyth.* 92, 113; *Vat. Sent.* 24; cf. above, 63, 104. For the plural in the sense of 'entities' see *De nat.* 2 frr. 24.49,4–9 Arr.² (where εἴδωλα are said to be φύcειc: they are 'full of void'); *Ad Herod.* 40, 48, 68, 71; below, 322–3 with commentary there. The point here is that already the πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι in the Epicurean view came to realize that there were imperishably existing *realia*. The point is fundamental for establishing, for example, that even for those of us with a now defective conception of divinity, the true view can be recovered through philosophical inquiry.

231–2 *Order of Columns.* This is fr. 19 in the sequence *N* 1077. Some slight disordering of the last three columns copied by the *disegnatori* is apparent, since the chronologically progressive content of **1077** frr. 20 and 21 (the last in the **1077** series) must follow the introduction of the views of early humans in this column. For this kind of disordering see on 59. In the present column the unique form of citation at 206–7 περὶ ὁcιότη|τοc ἄλλο βυβλίον seems to be the first citation of that book by Epicurus in the treatise (so also the unique citation of Περὶ φύcεωc by the full form of its title in 225–7: see on 206–7). These considerations confirm the early placement of this column on independent grounds, both codicological and contextual: it thus falls suitably before the other citations of Epicurus' Περὶ ὁcιότητοc (see 362–4, 208–9). The present column cannot, however, join with the following column (9), since that column also comes from the 1077 sequence, and links with its own following column (10), which also comes from the 1077 sequence. The present reconstruction presumes that in no instance were three columns sufficiently preserved on any one layer of papyrus from either half of the broken roll to have merited transcription by the *disegnatori* (with the exception of *O* 1077 fr. 1, the first layer transcribed); there are a few cases of two columns appearing on the same layer (e.g. cols. 9–10) but copied by the *disegnatori* as separate columns. Thus (at least) one column from the 1098 sequence will have been lost between cols. 8 and 9.

Col. 9

These two columns continue the discussion of early civilization introduced in the preceding column (with the loss of perhaps one column).

Conceiving the gods as external divine entities, early humans formed views of them as imperishable (230–1) and so insusceptible to harm. The present column went on to describe the stage in which this conception became distorted. First the gods came to be thought of as subject to disturbance like other organisms. Following closely upon this was the fear of death, similarly experienced by all animals and so mistakenly attributed to gods as well. In yet a third stage, the constant association of the understanding of divinity with ritual events like processions and sacrifices led to the attribution of such human characteristics as gratitude and favour to the gods. Between this account (from Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* 12) and Lucretius' version in *De rerum natura* 5. 1168–93 there are numerous affinities.

232–3 ἄδηκ]τον εἰς τὴν | [βλά]βη[ν: cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 81,1; *De morte* col. 34,11; Marcus Antoninus 11. 18; below, 268–70 *τὸ πρὸς τ[ὴν δι]|άλυσι[ν μὴ] δηκ[τ]ι[κῶς]* | *ἔχο[ν* (where, however, see commentary), with which cf. *De lib. dicendi* 17a,9; *De ira* col. 38,7; at Plut. *De malign. Herod.* 864 C *οὐκ ἄδηκτον* has the different, more literal meaning 'not unbitten', 'not unmaligned'.

233–4 καθίστανι̣τ̣[ο: the subject here must be early humans. (The imperfect tense is a stylistic feature typical in ancient accounts of the history of mankind: cf. 305, 306, 308, 317, and in the account of cultural history below: 1203, 1206, 2159, 2162, 2172, 2181, though both the aorist and historical present tenses occur in conjunction.) They 'initiated no quarrel', either some people against others, or perhaps against the view of the gods as imperishable. Could the specific point at issue (missing in the intervening lost column) have been the attribution to the gods of the characteristics of human form: body, voice, etc.? If so, at this stage early humans still regarded the gods as insusceptible to harm, and so 'initiated no dispute' on the question.

234 διαλογισμόν: 'discussion', or 'dispute', here apparently on the subject of the gods. It was his *διαλογισμοί* with Idomeneus, for example, that were a source of great joy for Epicurus on his deathbed (D.L. 10. 22). For the term in the sense of 'discussion' see Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 84; Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 15,21; *P. Herc.* 1251 (col. 9,12, referring to arguments over goods derived from the gods.

234–5 ἔτι | δέ: the particle, marking the succession from one stage of development to another, suggests a chronological account of cultural history (cf. 265–6 *οὐδὲ | γὰρ ἔτι*; 1193–4 *ἐ̣[πο]||μένως*; cf. 1202 *ταῦτα [δ' ἑπομ]ένως*). *ἔτι δέ* need not begin a new sentence, but may simply introduce a new part of a period, as it does for example at Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 116; in *KD* 10 and 11 it introduces additional considerations leading to the intro-

duction of false belief. Here it introduces an additional consideration (the role of analogical thinking) about the earliest stage in human history, described at 225–31. The role played by analogy in concept formation is often stressed in Epicurean accounts (see e.g. Philod. *De sign.*, *passim*). By analogy with humans, the other animals are thought of as subject to various kinds of disturbance. The point is that early humans generalized this to the point where even the gods, originally *νοήματα* of *ἄφθαρτοι φύσεις*, were thought to be subject to such disturbance: *ὁ θεός* is explicitly stipulated to be an 'animal', *ζῷον*, in Epicurean accounts (e.g. Epic. *KD* 1; *Ad Menoec.* 123).

235–8 ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲ | . . . ἐστε[ρη]θ̣|[ῆ]|ναι: 'on account of (or: concerning) the fact that not even the other animals had been deprived of the analogy of disturbance', i.e. of analogously being subject to disturbance. The fact that all humans are subject to, for example, the fear of death was extended to, or not withheld from (*μὴ στερῆσαι*) even other animals, the first step towards regarding the gods as destructible and placable. Such an analogy is erroneous in the case of gods; for they are *ἄφθαρτοι* (230). Cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 13,2–5 *τάχα δὲ κ(αὶ) διὰ ποιᾶς ἐναργεί|ας δ̣η̣[λ]όταton ὅτι̣ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας στοχα|σαμένο̣υς σ[τ]ερῆσαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὐ|[τοὺς] στερητέον.*

238 τάράγματος: only here in Philodemus; cf. Eurip. *HF* 1091 (cf. 907 in lyrics); Dion. Hal. 8. 52, and compare *ταραγμός*. The normal prose word (especially in but not restricted to ethical contexts) is *ταραχή*, as below, 2237–41 *οὐκ ἐλάττονος ἀ|ναδέχονται ταρα|χὰς ἥπερ εἰ κατ' ἀ|λήθειαν περι|εβάλ|λοντο τοιαύταις*; *De ira* col. 26,16, 42,10 and 4; *De dis* 1 col. 5,12, 11,20, 19,27; *De dis* 3 col. 12,13; fr. 43,6. The scribe originally wrote *πράγματος* here, then thought better of it and corrected to *ταράγματος* by writing TA in the space above Π. The original reading *πράγματος* might well have been defended on the basis of *KD* 1 *οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει* (cf. below, 531), though *τάραγμα* (probably Epicurus' word) here makes the point rather more strongly. For abstract formations in *-μα*, for which the Epicureans had a penchant, see Norden 1958, i. 123; *σέμνωμα* at Epic. *Ad Herod.* 1. 123, *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,30, below, 902–3 (where see commentary), 975, 1022.

239 τοῦτο: the reference may be to *ταράγματος* (238): 'on this point about their being subject to disturbance' (in which case we should punctuate after *ταράγματος*). The disturbance caused by the anticipation of death or destruction was combined with the pure conceptions of gods, resulting in a deterioration of the original entities. On the Epicurean view (e.g. *KD* 1) both the divine, and humans' idea of the divine, must be free of all disturbance.

256–60 ὑ]πὲρ | [τοῦ] . . . εἰς | τὴν διάνοιαν προσ|[ιέναι: for the expression used of concept-formation with verbs of motion, see the parallels

listed above on 230; literally: 'because of their reaching their understanding', 'because they formed their idea', i.e. of death in association with processions and sacrifices, they came to believe that gods would obligingly bother themselves to remove the threat of death from humans in response to their prayers. But such a response would be unworthy of a god's indestructibility and complete happiness (see 261–70). We have already had one reason for the abandonment of the original idea of indestructible beings introduced by *ὑπέρ* above at 235. The presence of a third *ὑπέρ* at 285 suggests that this column is linked with the following one: a list of causes for humankind's abandonment of the idea of imperishable divinities.

260–1 τοῦ [θ]ανά||[του: cf. 240–1. Death was the principal *πάραγμα* (238) leading to the corruption of early humans' notions of imperishable beings (230–1). Cf. also 285–8. The resulting picture would be as follows: early humans, frightened by death, seek reprieve from extinction from beings traditionally recognized and celebrated on religious occasions as being immune to destruction. Expecting the imperishable natures to make them similarly imperishable, humans succeed only in increasing the mortality rate among the gods.

260–1 *Order of Columns.* See below on 289.

Col. 10

261 προστρέ[π]εται[ι: *προστρέπεσθαι* = 'to turn towards', often towards a god as suppliant, i.e. 'approach with prayer', 'supplicate' (LSJ), but the occurrences are almost all poetic. I think here the sense must be that things unworthy of divinity were 'made a matter of reverence or worship' (cf. Plat. *Leg.* 866 B). In later prose it can mean 'revere', 'celebrate', with an accusative object: Plut. *Cleom.* 39; *Adv. Col.* 1117 A; Ael. *NA* 15. 21. The word is not attested for Epicurus. Philodemus uses it twice, once at *Rhet.* ii. 74,3 in misquotation of Pindar (fr. 43 S.–M., who adopt the better-attested *προσφέρων*) and again *Rhet.* ii. 94,10, where the meaning may be simply 'apply to'. If so here, the meaning could be: 'things unworthy (of divinity etc.) are applied, added' (i.e. to the understanding of death, *εἰς | τὴν διάνοιαν . . . τοῦ [θ]ανά||[του* 259–61). This assumes that *προστρέπεται* is passive; but an active and transitive use of the deponent with *ἀνάξια* as direct object and a *πρῶτος εὑρετής* as subject cannot be ruled out.

262 ἀνάξια is a familiar locution; with the gentive, e.g. *De vit.* col. 8,10. Philippson's *παν]ανάξια* (mistranslated by Arr.[2]: 'del tutto degni . . . come loro propria') would be a *hapax legomenon.*

262–3 τῆς ν[ολο]υμένης ἀφθα⟨ρ⟩σία[ς: i.e. the attribution of such qualities was contrary to characteristics of divinity as originally conceived by the earliest humans (see 227–31). Cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77 (above on 231–2). This

is a pretty clear reference to the *νοήματα ἀφθάρτων φύcεων* of early humans at 227–31. It was up to them to maintain the gods' *ἀφθαρcία* and *μακαριότηc* in their thinking.

264 παντελῶc is clearly the reading of the best witness, N^1, but impossible to construe after *καί*. The apograph shows *ωc*, together with *δε* below it at the end of the following line (which appears syntactically sound), both written off the edge of the fragment as originally drawn by the *disegnatore*. If the reading is right, the ending *-ωc* may have been corrupt already in the papryus, and I have accordingly corrected to the genitive in agreement with *μακαρι[ό]τητοc*.

265–6 οὐδὲ | γὰρ ἔτι: the temporal expression indicates the transition to a new stage in the history of culture; so also 234, 1193–4 *ἐ[πο]|μένωc*, 1202 *ταῦτα [δ' ἑπομ]ένωc* with see commentary; later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 3,8–9 *μ[ε]τὰ δὲ ταῦτα* (Henrichs 1974*a*, 14). See e.g. Norden 1923, 370–7; Henrichs 1975*b*, 117 with n. 86: 'series of words which express progression in time are a conventional stylistic device in ancient accounts of the origin of culture'.

266 τ[η]ρεῖται: cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77 *ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα τηρεῖν*; i.e. they did not 'guard against' the contamination of their idea of gods by false beliefs. A closely related locution is *φυλάττειν*, as e.g. at Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123.

267 παντα[χ]όθε[ν: 'from every source', Usener's brilliant correction and supplement (*Gloss. Epic.* s.v.) first printed by Schmid 1951, 126 and carried over by Arr.^{2} fr. 179, p. 537 (apparently overlooking the fact that a differently restored text of this same column appears earlier as *De nat.* 12 fr. 27.1). Epicurus uses this adverb in comparable substantive formations in *KD* 10 and at *De nat.* 11 fr. 26. 43 in ll. 1, 7, 10, 20, and 25, of the air surrounding the earth in some pre-Socratic theory (probably Anaximander's); it is restored, probably correctly, by Luppe 1986*b* in a later passage of *De pietate* (see vol. ii; Schober 1988, 94). The occurrence of the otherwise rare word in the present passage virtually guarantees that that Philodemus is still quoting or paraphrasing closely from Epicurus, *De nat.* 12. Philippson's proposal *τὸ | πάντα [τ]εθὲ[ν] εὖδ[αι]|μον* ('the happiness that had previously been accorded', i.e. to the gods) preserves the reading of the apograph (ΠΑΝΤΑ[.]ΕΘΕ[.]) but strains the sense of the participle and makes of *πάντα* an awkward intrusion.

268–70 τὸ πρὸc τ[ὴν δι]ἀλυcι[ν μὴ] δηκ[τ]ι[κῶc] | ἔχο[ν: literally: (not preserving) 'their being subject to destruction'. The impossibility of the gods' *διάλυcιc* is frequently mentioned: Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 18,13; *De dis* 3 col. 6,11; 12,10; 13,1, and cf. above, 231–2, app. crit. on 279. The sense of *μὴ] δηκ[τ]ι[κῶc* is not entirely satisfactory, being active ('biting': Philod. *De lib. dicend.* 17a,9; *De ira* 38,7). But Philippson's *ἀ]δήκ[τ]ω[c*, which otherwise affords impeccable sense, is too short both for the space both before and after. Dr Holford-Strevens reasonably suggests that we ought to expect *μὴ]*

δεκτικόν (the accusative preserving the parallel with εὔδ[αι]|μον): cf. Philod. *De ira* 43,33; 44,1 θυμ[οῦ] δεκτικός εἶναι ῥηθή|cετα[ι] ὁ cοφός.

272–4 τὴν] | καθ' ὁ[μοιό]τ[ητα διά]|λη[ψ]ιν: for the mode of existence or formation καθ' ὁμοιότητα see above, 90–1, 209–19 and below on 320–75. This may be an abbreviated way of saying cύγκριcις or ἑνότης ἐξ ὁμοίων (see further on 348).

286–7 ταῖc τ]ῶν θε[ῶν | ἐπιβο]λαῖ[c: in connection with fear of the gods in particular see Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 14,12 ἀλλὰ τὴν [γ' ἐκ] τῶν ἐπιβολῶν ἔχει ταραχὴν διαμέ[νου]cαν; *De dis* 3 col. d2,26.

289–90 *Order of Columns.* Cols. 9 and 10 preserve successive columns from the 1077 sequence. Thus they were both preserved on the same layer of papyrus from the 1077 half of the broken roll. The two columns were depicted separately (i.e. on separate apographs, as was the almost the rule when two columns appeared on the same layer of papyrus) by the *disegnatori*, and their inventory numbers were reversed (whether intentionally or not I cannot say), since otherwise we should expect fr. 20 (col. 10) to come after fr. 21 (col. 9) in the descending order necessary for the recovery of the original order of columns. In any case, both must have followed upon fr. 19 (col. 8)—on grounds of content, since only in that text is the discussion of early humans first introduced—and this fact shows that in following the descending numbering of the *disegni* we may on a very few occasions expect minor disordering (i.e. within a range of 1–3 columns).

Col. 11

This column posits a fourth stage in the early history of religious belief: some people maintained the originally clear views about the gods but allowed others to persist in the defective ones described above, 235–87, especially regarding the gods' response to sacrifices. Some details in this stage are unclear; the opening of the column, for example, is mostly lost. But sacrifices (303) have already been mentioned in this connection (258); so also the misrepresentation of gods as subject to sufferings (307, cf. 238, 241, 263). With this column should be compared the passage 1852–67 below, introducing the section on the origin of justice.

296–7 φι]|λομαχία[ν: an easy correction. Philodemus uses the adjective form (of Ares) later in the treatise at *P. Herc.* 1088 fr. 10,27 (vol. ii; p. 84 Schober), quoted above on 14. Philippson's παι]|δομαχία[ν would occur only here. Other possibilities include ψευ]|δομαχία 'faux combat' (D. Delattre), also a *hapax*, but Philodemus favours compounds in ψευδο- (*Lex. Philod.* s.v.). Cf. Epic. *Sent. Vat.* 45 τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖc πολλοῖc παιδείαν, 'culture that is the source of rivalry among the many', opp. to φυcιολογία. In any case it is clear that -μαχία[ν is accusative of the charge,

with δι]|αβαλλόντων being genitive of the person charged (see LSJ s.v. καταγιγνώσκω II.1–2). The accusative in -τέραν (299) thus becomes the direct object of δι]|αβαλλόντων: someone will accuse those who charge/accuse -τέραν with disreputable -μαχία. Who then is the subject, ὁ συν- κτλ. (299)? In *P.Herc.* 1428 below (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*), opponents, mainly Stoics, are portrayed as having to resort to allegory and bizarre forms of interpretation, συνοικειοῦν (= *accommodare*), in order to see their own views as validated, or at least not contradicted, in the writings of early poets and philosophers there criticized in that part of the treatise. Both Stoics and Epicureans agreed that true views on the gods were present in later thinking only in a disguised or distorted form. The controversy between them thus turns in part upon whether or not there had been, as the Epicureans held, a stage of originally clear beliefs about the gods, and about how the true view about the gods was to be reconstituted from the mass of erroneous opinions. Also at issue, and advocated by the opponents yet stridently resisted by the Epicureans, is the advisability of exploiting false views and myths about gods as a method of social control to keep injustice in check through fear of punishment by the gods (see below, 1184–1217, 2032–43).

Here Philodemus thus attempts to force agreement from his Stoic opponents: anyone who, like the Stoics, thinks that the early poets spoke allegorically about the heroes' sacrificing to Ares and Athena at Troy (299–303) will be to this extent in agreement with the Epicurean position (that the true view of the gods had been distorted in the course of human history) and so forced to concede that those attacking either view (298–9 ἑκα]|τέραν), Stoic or Epicurean, are guilty of παι]|δομαχία, ψευ]|δομαχία, or some similar form of contradiction. The opponents will find support for the Epicurean view on this point even in their own position.

If views on the gods had undergone a general corruption in human history, some people (like the Epicureans) had managed to maintain over time clear views about them. The present account on this point is abbreviated and allusive. The full exposition on this point is postponed (see introd. to col. 60 at 1702) until after the full defence of Epicureans' participation in cult and the exposition of the Epicurean position on harms and benefits from the gods have been completed.

297–8 τῶν δι]|αβαλλόντων: the restoration κατ]|αβαλλόντων is prohibited by rules of syllabification followed in word-division (Introd. § 2(*g*)). The identity of these critics is unknown. Other direct assaults by the author's opponents are specifically mentioned at:

3 ὀ]νειδίζει (Ariston reproaches Metrodorus).

131 φασι ('They' say that the greatest sign of atheism is our saying that the divine exists in bodily form).

159–60 τοὺς ὀνει]|δίζοντας (They criticize the lifestyles of the Epicurean gods).

176–7 δια|[βαλεῖν] ἡμᾶc (Being themselves ἀνόcιοι, they impugn us).
496–7 They would have to claim that Epicurus put forth all his doctrines insincerely.
688 κατήγοροι (Accusers who themselves create suspicion that they are impious).
1402 φαcι ('They' say that Epicurus managed to escape being exiled from Athens only because his philosophy was unknown there; repeated at 1545–9).
1412–13 προcεπιφέρου|cιν ('They add the charge' that we deprive good and just people of the hopes they have in the gods; reiterated at 2343–7).
1996–7 ἡμᾶ[c κ]ακίζου|[cιν (context lost).
2430–1 κατηγοροῦντε[c] | ἀcέβε[ι]αν ἡμῶ[ν (They represent the gods as afraid of being overthrown, yet are not ashamed to accuse us of impiety, while their position offers a defective model for political rule.)
2485–6 οἱ | [κατ]α[τρ]έχοντεc ἡ|[μῶ]ν (They attack us on the grounds that we are impious and setting forth views disadvantageous to mankind.)

There is no necessary guarantee that these are all the *same* opponents. Possibly some are not even actual, existing opponents, but rival positions assumed for the purpose of argument, with the polemical pose adopted as a device of rhetoric. Indeed δι]|αβαλλόντων here at 297–8 seems to be of just such a general type, constructed for the purposes of argument and actually contrasted with the allegorizing opponents identifiable from the second part of the treatise as Stoics. On the other hand there is evidence that Epicurus' philosophy did come under attack for its views on the gods, not in Epicurus' own lifetime, but certainly in the century preceding the composition of *De pietate* (see Introd. § 1). There are no direct attacks on Epicureans mentioned in the criticism of poets and and philosophers in the second part of *De pietate*. See, however, below, ll. 2480–9, which inaugurate that section. Here the opponents are obviously Stoics, since the reference is to those authors (Chrysippus, Persaeus, and Diogenes of Babylon are later named) who are criticized in *P. Herc.* 1428 for attempting to 'accommodate' the poets and early philosophers to their own views. These opponents are thus said 'especially [to] praise the revered theologians and poets' (2481–4 cεμ]νῶν θεολόγων | [καὶ π]οητῶν, ἐπει|[δὴ μ]άλιcτα τούτουc | [ἐγκω]μιάζουcιν, where see commentary). There is no good reason to suppose that all Philodemus' potential opponents are Stoics. But there is good reason to suspect a Stoic target for Philodemus' response: the Stoic Ariston has already been named (1, 11), while Posidonius is very likely the opponent criticized at 489–518. And the present passage at least has close connections to the Stoic-

directed section on poets at 2480–2510: it introduces the question of how and to what extent true views about the gods were present (in some hidden, allegorical form) in early statements of poets and others regarding sacrifices (303), the gods' manner of existing (307 *πάθ[εσιν*, the *πάθη* of the gods, as depicted in poetry, all taken up in the section on poets in the second part of the treatise), and other customs (312–14).

298–9 ἑκα]|τέραν: the adjective to be restored must be resumptive, since syntax suggests that it is object of *δι]αβαλλόντων* and there is not space for the introduction of a noun, or even an article (Philippson's *τὴν ἡμε]|τέραν* is demonstrably too long), so that *ἑκα]|τέραν* or *οὐδε]|τέραν* seems inevitable. Its antecedent noun (*διάληψιν, ὑπόληψιν, δόξαν, διάνοιαν*, vel. sim.: cf. 312, 315–17), describing the view that the understanding of the gods was corrupted or hidden (cf. 300–1) early in human history, will have been lost in the preceding lacuna.

299 ὁ συν[ορῶν: the one who 'realizes', 'comprehends' (or perhaps *συν-[ειδώς*?). Because this would imply a concession on Philodemus' part to Stoic *συνοικείωσις* of the poets, perhaps *συν[θείς* should be considered: *De poem.* 5 col. 25,7, 34,5, 11, 12, cf. 25, 36,4; *Rhet.* i. 5,28 (of *ἀπόδειξις*), often used of a fabricated account: *μῦθος, ποίησις, λόγος, αἴνιγμα*, etc. (see LSJ s.v. 3), and implying that there may be something fictitious about such allegorical explanations as are proposed by the Stoics. Outside the present treatise, Philodemus gives a good idea of what he has in mind here at *De poem.* 2 (Sbordone 1976, 223) *P. Herc.* 1676 fr. 2 + *N* 1081 fr. 12, where he says that Crates and *ἔνιοι*, who claim that Homer's two poems were composed about the cosmos and laws and customs among humans, *φ[α]νερῶ[ς]* | *μαίνονται* when they say that Agamemnon is the sky, and Achilles the sun, Helen the earth, Alexander the air, Hector the moon, *καὶ τοὺς ἄλ|[λου]ς ἀναλόγως ὠνομάς|[θαι] τούτοις.*

300 τοῖς Ἀ[χαιοῖς: not the earliest humans (227–8 *πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι*), but the succeeding stage in cultural history, exemplified here by the early Greeks who sacrificed at Troy or the poets who sang of them. For the force of *παρά* plus the dative ('among', 'with') cf. *παρ' ἡμῖν.*

299–301 ἃ . . . ἠι]|νίτ[το]ντο: The verb is regularly transitive: poets (or their speakers or narratives) are said to 'riddle' or 'hint at' their 'true' meanings, consciously or not. Cf. later in the treatise (see vol. ii) where Philodemus says (Schober 1988, 87): 'Some, whom Menander hints at (*παραινί[ττε]|ται*), say that Hecate was a servant of Artemis, or of Demeter as Euripides has it, and Homer in his *Hymns* makes her an attendant and nurse' (for the continuation of this passage with a recently recovered quotation of the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* see Luppe 1985*a*, 34). Cf. *παραινίττεσθαι* also at *De poem.* 5 col. 32,9; *De mus.* 34,12. Both are related terms in ancient philological interpretation which mean that while the surface level of a text is a mythical narrative, what the allegorist takes to be its real

meaning is only to be found at a deeper hidden level, in a concealed philosophical doctrine, often dealing with natural phenomena (compare the exegetical use of *φυσικός* and *φυσιολογεῖν* as treated by G. Most, 'Alcman's "Cosmogonic" Fragment [fr. 5 Page, 81 Calame]', *CQ*² 37 (1987), 1–19 at 7). See e.g. Cornutus *De nat. deor.* 27,19 Lang: 'One should not conflate myths, nor should one transfer names from one to another; and even if something has been added to the transmitted genealogies by people who do not understand what the myths hint at (*αἰνίττεσθαι*) but who handle them as they handle narrative fictions, one should not regard them as irrational' (*δεῖ δὲ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς μύθους μηδ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ' ἕτερον μεταφέρειν μηδ' εἴ τι προσεπλάσθη ταῖς παραδεδομέναις κατ' αὐτοὺς γενεαλογίαις ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ συνιέντων ἃ αἰνίττονται, κεχρημένων δ' αὐτοῖς ὡς καὶ τοῖς πλάσμασιν, ἀλόγως τίθεσθαι*; on the text, cf. A. A. Long, 'Stoic Readings of Homer', in R. Lamberton and J. J. Keaney (edd.), *Homer's Ancient Readers* (Princeton, 1992), 41–66 at 55 with n. 32); see further in general D. Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria*; N. J. Richardson, 'Homeric Professors in the Age of the Sophists', *PCPS* 201 (1975), 65–81 at 67–8; id., 'Literary Criticism in the Exegetical Scholia to the Iliad: A Sketch', *CQ*² 30 (1980), 265–87; Pfeiffer, 1968, 35 ff. For examples with *αἰνίττεσθαι*: Plat. *Theat.* 194 C, *Lysis* 214 B, [Plat.] *Alcib. II* 147 B ff. In Philod. see also: *Rhet.* i. 90,7; middle: *De poem.* 5 col. 22,8; *Rhet.* ii. 171,4; *De mus.* 17. 30,7; 80. 15,10: So here *ἃ . . . ᾐνίττοντο* will be (allegedly) true things about the gods encoded in poetic form, and accessible only to the learned through philosophical interpretation (cf. also below, 1852–79 with commentary).

301–2 κ[ατὰ τὰς] | πό[λε]ις (Philippson): *κατά* here = 'in search of'? i.e. Achaeans at (or after) Troy 'in search of' (their) cities?

302–3 Ἀ[θηνᾶι καὶ] | Ἄρε[ι οἱ θ]υόμ[ενοι: the reference to sacrifice (already introduced at 258 as having had a causal role in the corruption of the idea of divine natures) seems appropriate enough here in the context of early poets' myths about the gods. In the Homeric poems the gods are frequently said to delight in sacrifices, particularly relevant here in the light of early humans' generalizations about 'similar *πάθη*' (307). But why should Athena and Ares be singled out for mention? The reference would make excellent sense if the author has in mind allegories in poetry about Ares and Athena (compare Zeus at 1846), such as are retailed in the section on poets in the second part of *De pietate*. Poetry about Athena and Ares is explicitly treated in the criticism of poets in *De pietate* (vol. ii): Athena: **242** fr. 3 (Henrichs 1975*a*, 30); **1088** frr. 5,21–2 (Schober 1988, 91); **1088** fr. 6,28–9 (Schober 1988, 88); **1088** fr. 9 + **433** fr. 6a,12–13 (Luppe 1986*c*, 76); **1648** frr. 1, 6 (Schober 1988, 94, 96); Ares: **1088** frr. 4,9–10 (Luppe 1985*c*); **1088** fr. 10,23–5 (Schober 1988, 84); **1609** fr. 1 (Schober 1988, 94). At the same time, the criticism of Chrysippus' interpretation of poetry about gods as pre-

figuring Stoic views in *P. Herc.* 1428 includes separate critiques of his interpretations of Ares (col. 5,16: Henrichs 1974*a*, 16) and Athena (col. 8,14ff.: Henrichs 1974*a*, 19); cf. col. 10,3–8, where Chrysippus is said to have 'appropriated as "wisdom" her epithets and representations very deceptively' κα[ὶ τ]ὰc ἄλλαc | δ' αὐτῆ[c] π̣ρ̣[ο]c̣ηγορί|ac κα̣[ὶ] τὰ φορή{ι}ματα | μάλ[α] καταχ[ρ]ύcωc τῆι | φρονήcει cυ[ν]οικει|οῖ. Cf. Diogenes of Babylon's influential book *On Athena*, cited at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 8,14ff. (see esp. col. 9,4 on Athena's epithets) = Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 41, cf. *Ad Att.* 13. 39. 2. Likewise Galen in his *De plac.* shows Chrysippus' thoroughgoing reliance on poetic texts for his arguments (see Obbink 1992*b*, 216–24; Tieleman 1992). In the present passage Philodemus' reference to things 'that those who were sacrificing for the cities to Athena and Ares hinted at' may be negative in its tone or even sarcastic or ironical, since from the second part of *De pietate* it is clear that such attempts at interpretative appropriation by the Stoics of the early poets and philosophers were rejected outright by the Epicureans (for the text see Henrichs 1974*a*, 15–20). An important passage (below, 1852–67) from the full exposition on cultural history below reveals that 'some people concealed Epicurus' views on the gods' (1854–5 ἀποκρυ[πτό]|μενοι) for the purpose of social and political control. Philodemus implies there that this view is wrong (a ἕτερος λόγος περὶ εὐcεβείαc, 1857–9), saying that it gives an absurd impression and has been the source of hostility against the Epicureans and has incurred for them the suspicion of trickery. A similar consideration is at play in the present passage, intelligible in the light of the later discussion.

305–6 Philippson restored προ[cήγ]αγο[ν πρότε|ρον, intending the supplement as a first-person reference (backwards) to the critique of poets which he believed to have preceded the present section in the treatise. I take προ[cήγ]αγο[ν as third person plural referring to the introduction of false belief in cultural history.

306–7 ἃ γ' εἰκά[ζοντεc | ὁμ]οίοιc πάθ[εcι: the point is that those early figures who expressed views about gods in disguised form (300–1 ἠι]|ν̣ίτ-[το]ν̣το) likened the dispositions of the gods to human πάθη, 'feelings', 'sufferings' (cf. 235–41), and on this basis formed their views (308 ἐδογμάτι-ζ[ον) about the gods. That the poets made the gods the agents or sufferers of human maladies in particular is a complaint made at length against the poets and their philosophical interpreters later in *De pietate* and reflected in Cicero's adaptation in *De nat. deorum* 1.25–41: on the theme in *De pietate* and in general see esp. Barchiesi 1978; Henrichs 1983; Luppe 1984; 1985*f*.

308 ἐδογμάτιζ[ον: probably drawn from Hellenistic administrative vocabulary for the declaration of ordinances (attested, for example, for Naples: *IG* xiv. 759,13), this word regularly denotes the development of positive views, as opposed to the holding of uninformed opinions or none at all. It is prominent in *De pietate*: see 791–2, 1300–1, 2488–9; *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12

(vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 23) ἀϊ|δίους (sc. θεοὺς) κἀφθάρτους | ε[ἶ]ναι δογματίζομεν. It usually (like δοξάζειν) denotes approved views held by Epicurus or Epicureans (though for an exception see 1297–1301, against those ὑπεναντί|[α] τῆι προλήψει δογματιζόντων). The word also occurs at *Rhet.* i. 322,9, ii. 58,9; Epict. 3. 7. 18, often with the extended sense 'to teach (a view)'; thus in Galen and Sext. Emp. it denotes methodists and dogmatists respectively.

308–18 Since these people had no concern over whether or not the mass of mankind held similarly true views about the gods (307–8), nor did they publicly set forth what they really thought about their social conformity (311–14, in contrast with what was later Epicurean practice), they formed a false view of the gods as subject to human sufferings, unlike the rest.

309 ἔζης[αν: for this verb constructed with the participle: Andoc. 1. 99 ζῆν cυκοφαντῶν; Aristot. *Pol.* 1292^{b}27 ζῆν ἐργαζόμενοι.

309–10 ἐπι]|βλέποντες [εἰc: 'look attentively, favourably upon or after'; perhaps 'look out for'. Cf. *De dis* 3 fr. 39d,5 and often in Philod. and Epic. *De nat.*

312–13 κατ[ὰ cυμ]|περιφοράν: a catchword (together with its verbal counterpart *cυμπεριφέρεcθαι* = 'to go about with someone [or people in general]', 'to have intercourse with', 'to live in society [with]'), here probably with the sense 'social conformity' or 'social practice'. Below, 750–1, the author boasts that Epicureans observed traditional religious customs in keeping with *cυμπεριφορά* upon *οἱ νόμοι*. For *cυμπεριφοραί* see below, 468, 750–1, 907–8, 2166–7 (*cυμπεριφέρεcθαι*); Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 114, of stars 'accompanying' other stars: cf. *cυμπεριπολε[ῖν* at *De dis* 3 col. 9,22 (quoted below on 329–32) with the observation of Woodward 1989, 43 that Philodemus implies that it is beneath a god's dignity to attend upon a star and accompany it on its travels like a Roman *cliens* accompanying his *patronus* (cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1. 5. 31; 2. 6. 42–3); *Rhet.* ii. 49,6 *cυμπερ[ι]ενε|χθέντι [τ]οῖc πολιτικοῖ[c π]ρά|γμαcιν*; *De ira* col. 28,2–3 *κατὰ | [cυμ]περιφορὰν φίλοις*; *De bono rege* col. 18,7, where the Phaeacians preserve decorum not only when enchanted by Odysseus' narrative, *ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην cυμπερι|φοράν* 'but also in the rest of their social life'. (Philodemus adds: '*even the suitors* listen to heroic exploits mostly in silence', with the implication that even they exhibit *cυμπεριφορά* under the influence of poetry.) Also worthy of note is *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,8: 'attend to your own religious observance, while enjoying innate bodily pleasures which are appropriate *καὶ τῆι τῶν νόμων cυμπε|ριφορᾶι χρωμένου*, and engaging in social life according to the laws' (and see commentary in Obbink 1992*a*); *P. Herc.* 346 (ed. Capasso) col. 13,6. In some cases the word verges on meaning 'civility', 'in a civilized manner', as *P. Oxy.* XII 1590,5 (a private letter of the fourth century AD in which an individual is pressed to pay his debts out of respect for *cυμπεριφορά*). Closely related concepts include *cυνουcία* (Xen. *Oec.* 9. 11 *ἀν-*

δρῶν cυνουcίαc, cf. *Anab.* 2. 5. 7); κοινωνία as at 557 below (where see commentary).

313–14 ἐ]|ξέθηκαν: Philodemus regularly uses this term to describe the publicly setting forth of philosophical views; cf. e.g. 464, 498–9, etc.

314–15 ὥc[τ' ἔχειν] | ταύτην ⟨τὴν⟩ ὑπό[ληψιν: the ὑπόληψιc 'supposition' was that the gods can experience πάθη 'feelings', 'sufferings' (according to the myths read literally). The point is that if the few wise persons had done these things they might have acquired the false notion of the gods, but as it was they did not. The restoration ὥc[τ' ἔχειν] was suggested to me by Daniel Delattre. It is necessitated by the fact that a paragraphos follows in the margin after 315, a mark of punctuation articulating the syntax: a new sentence must begin in or immediately after 315.

316–17 ἐπ[ίνοι]|αν ἐποιοῦ[ντο: for the expression see Polyb. 1. 20. 12 οὐδ' ἐπίνοιαν ποήcacθαί τινοc.

318 οἱ λο[ιποί: the rest maintained the originally clear view of the gods as imperishable natures, in contrast with those (ἔνιοι, implied if not to be restored in 305) of 305–15 who believed that the gods were really subject to human πάθη. The sentence probably continued on into the following column, apparently lost.

318–19 *Order of Columns.* Col. 11 comes from the **1098** sequence and may well have linked with the preceding col. 10. But it cannot have linked with the following col. 12, since that column also comes from the **1098** sequence and the context (a return to the discussion of how concepts of the gods are formed, from 205–19) is fairly dissimilar, though it begins with a return to the treatment of how we form concepts of the gods after the digression on how early humans did so. Probably one column is lost between cols. 11 and 12.

Col. 12

This column and the next contain a rare account of the process by which, according to Epicurus, we form concepts of the gods, in contrast to the way we conceptualize ordinary objects (as well as some ideas and other imaginables: see on 326). By way of explanation the author introduces a known quotation of Epicurus (from his Περὶ ὁcιότητοc). It is likely that Philodemus had Epicurus' own account before him. The explanation runs as follows: the gods do not have a constitution (cύcταcιc) like ordinary objects, which have a one-to-one (κατ' ἀριθμόν) identity with themselves (see on 100–4, 209–19). Rather, the cύcταcιc of a god results from things which have identity only by virtue of their similarity to each other. In Epicurus' account, as related by Philodemus, the 'same things' are thus ordinary objects, whose constitutions have numerical identity with themselves. By

'similar things', Epicurus means εἴδωλα, 'images', the thin atomic films which are given off by all compound entities, are received by the soul, and facilitate visual perception and, analogously, thought. (Such images are similar, though not identical, to each other and to the object whose perception they facilitate.) So in the present explanation the point is that unlike ordinary solids, which endure continuously in a numerical, one to one identity with themselves, gods are constituted of εἴδωλα 'images'; and each εἴδωλον constituting a god is different from any of its other εἴδωλα, though they are similar in certain respects, and regularly and consistently coalesce in the human mind to form the appearance of an individuated entity. Thus, because of the mental lapse involved in failing to perceive each image individually in sequence, they appear to take on a configuration which is undisturbed. For this reason Epicurus referred to such natures resulting from images (322–4) sometimes as though a constitution made up of material elements identical with each other, sometimes as one that consists of elements similar to each other (329–32). A necessary consequence of the account is that, unlike ordinary objects, gods do not have an existence independent of the coalescence of the images by which we perceive them: their existence consists fundamentally in that coalescence. They are not only 'perceived by thought' (*Σ KD* 1 λόγῳ θεωρητοί) but in this mental process their very existence is constituted, though they are for that reason no less material or 'real'. (Their material constitutions as psychological realities can even have an influence of sorts on us and our world: 1023–65.) Thus they can potentially assume a σύστασις that is identical, i.e. has a supervenient numerical identity, beyond that which exists by virtue of the similarity of the images which constitute them. In this respect they differ not only from our ideas of ordinary objects, but also from other concepts and imaginables which likewise do not have independently existing counterparts (as, for example, a centaur, or the concept of justice) in that they are always formed by humans regularly and consistently throughout time in the same way—a fact which Epicurus thought could be observed in the history of the human species: 225–31, with a few embarrassing exceptions: 519–30, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,10–12 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 22), and allowing as well for typical accretions of false views about gods: 234–89. Their formation is dependent upon us, but comes to assume an existence and causal influence that is to some extent beyond our control (hence during sleep: Clay 1980, Asmis 1981) according to environment (especially during prayer: 737–9, at

religious festivals: 765–7) and conditions (including the ethical disposition of the percipient, which may determine the type of divinity 'perceived' and its effects on the individual: 1023–5). The text of this column is partly a critical composite of those of Diels and Scott, both of whom drew on Gomperz. A decided advance towards constitution and comprehensive interpretation of the passage was made by Woodward 1989, though his construction cannot be maintained in all details. Diels was the first to spot Epicurus' words (known from Philodemus' *De dis* 3 col. 9) at 216–19.

320 εἶπο]ν: a first-person verb of speaking or thinking must be supplemented. For the adverbial use of *πρίν* see LSJ s.v. A.II.2. *ἐγώ* is emphatic and adversative, perhaps expressing aversion to the views of an opponent's position misrepresenting Epicurus' statements about gods as treated in the preceding lost column.

321 φύ|[cεις: for *φύσις* in the sense of 'entity' see above on 231. Cf. Woodward 1989, 40, according to whom *φύ|[cεις* together with 330 *καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν* forms the predicate: 'he called this configuration (consisting of the two types listed at 329–34) "the natural entities" as well' (322 *καί*, i.e. in addition to other entities). Woodward argues further, however (wrongly, I think), that since the plural of *φύσις* usually means 'natural entities' in Epicurus and Philodemus, *τῶν εἰδώλων* cannot be a possessive genitive with *φύσεις*, nor a defining genitive, 'natural entities consisting of *εἴδωλα*' (as at Epic. *De nat.* 24.45), but rather forms part of a genitive absolute phrase (Woodward 1989, 41 n. 54). *τὰ[c] φύ|[cεις* he takes as predicate (with 330 *καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν*) in apposition with 321–2 *τή]νδε τὴν [cύ]c|[cτασι]ν*, which doubles as the object of the genitive absolute *εἰδώλων λαμβανόντων*: thus 'he called this constitution 'the natural entities' as well, since the images take on one (i.e. a constitution) that is similar, as a result of . . .'. The word-order, though mystifying at first, and the interposition of *αὐ]τὸν* (sc. *Epicurum*, in *oratio obliqua* controlled by 330 *καλεῖν*) and the predicate *τὰ[c] φύ|[cεις*, are explained on the assumption that the intervening genitive absolute phrase gives the grounds for Epicurus' terminological identification.

However, as A. Henrichs points out to me, if *φύσεις* in 322–3 were predicate, as assumed by Woodward, we should expect it to lack the article, as in the parallel citation from Epicurus at Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 9,18–28 (quoted in full below on 329–32) *Ἐπίκ[o]υ[ρον φύσεις | κα]λε⟨ῖ⟩ν*.

Woodward correctly notes, however, that according to Philodemus' report of Epicurus here 'the natures of the images' and 'this constitution' are capable of two different types of formation (329–34, from similar elements and from identical ones): as Woodward puts it (loc. cit.) 'a distinction not between two types of *εἴδωλον*, but between two types of entity, one consisting of (outwardly) changing material [but forming an individuated entity]

and one constituted out of successive εἴδωλα that resemble each other (though they coalesce into an imagined numerically identical being as a result of ὑπέρβαcιc' (described at 326–9). 'The gods are entities of the latter sort, so, since the supply of fresh εἴδωλα is endless, they are indestructible, unlike *true* numerically identical objects.'

325–6 γεγεν{ν}η|[μέν]η⟨ν⟩ κἄν: though the copyist has already mistaken η for ν twice in this column (321, 324), both certain corrections, ν sometimes drops out in the Herculaneum papyri before gutturals and nasals: Philod. *De poem.* 1 (?) (Hausrath 1889) fr. 64,5 νῦ⟨ν⟩ μοί; *Rhet.* i. 134,11 μικροῦ δεῖ⟨ν⟩ καί; *MGrHerc* 64 for further examples. The scribe's γεγεννη- (edd. and Woodward), which would mean 'has been begotten/born', must also be corrected to γεγενη- (for the gemination, probably graphic rather than phonetic, see *Mem. Gr. Herc.* 74–5). The reverse occurs later in the treatise (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 23) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,27–8 γε|[ν]ητά καὶ φθαρτά; *N* 242 fr. 2b,6–7 (Schober 1988, 82) γενητο[ὺc θε]οὺc καὶ τικτο[μέ]|νουc ὑπὸ θεῶ[ν; Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 9, 42–3 γενητοῖc | κ(αὶ) διαλυτο̣ῖ[c, and for the division cf. ibid. col. 11, 1–2 τῶν γεν|νητικῶν. The confusion was Hellenistic or early Roman. The perfect tense has significance for interpretation, as noted by Woodward 1989, 42: such configurations of images (as constitute a god), though constructed of similarities (i.e. similar images), *have become* constitutions with numerical identity (like ordinary objects) during the process described. With the perfect tense here should be compared that of ἀποτετελεcμένουc in the *Σ KD* 1 (see above on 212–13 and below on 370).

326 κἄν: the καὶ here is in correlation with 325 ἤ; the retained ἄν represents an original potential optative in *oratio recta*: 'or even one which *may have* become numerically a unity (328 ἑνότ]η[τα)'. There is no expectation, in other words, that just any random similar images will spontaneously coalesce to form such concepts. But the potentiality for the process is always there. This adds a significant new twist to our understanding of Epicurus' theory: if the cύcτατιc of a god has the potential to have become αὐτή 'same, identical' (rather than just ὁμοία 'similar': 324, i.e. by virtue of its composition from images that are ὅμοια, which is apparently the case for ideas and imaginables), then the gods have the capacity to take on a numerical identity supervenient upon both the intellectual and material world. Though built up causally from the material building blocks of nature, they are therefore able to exert causal influence back downward, e.g. through the διαθέcειc 'dispositions' of humans on whose thinking their existence noetically depends.

326–7 ἐξ ὑπερβά|[cεωc] τῶν μεταξύ: 'as a result of a leaping-over of the things (which are) in the interval'. (Note however that in the parallel passage at *De dis* 3 col. 9,18–28, quoted below on 329–32, the expression is ὑπέρβαcιc τοῦ μεταξύ—and that there the τοῦ has been added in *supra*

lineam by the ancient corrector.) Woodward 1989, 41–2 takes this intervening space leaped over to be that between individual images. But the ὑπέρβαcιc or leap is that which takes place with the focusing activity of the mind (ἐπιβολὴ τῆc διανοίαc), and it stands to reason that the space transcended should be that between the mind and those objects whose εἴδωλα make up the components that coalesce to form our ideas of the gods: e.g. humans (since gods are anthropomorphic), happy beings, etc. It is unlikely that the term ὑπέρβαcιc itself describes the process of coalescence, as Woodward's view entails. *Contra* Woodward p. 41, 'over-leaping' is not the same thing as 'over-*looking*', nor does ὑπέρβαcιc, as opposed to ἐπιβολή or cυμπλοκή, necessarily involve the 'unconscious mental suppression of the minute spatial intervals and qualitative differences between successive members of a stream of εἴδωλα which enable them to merge and create the illusion of a continuously existing and moving object', though in general the coalescence envisaged by Woodward must be what Epicurus thought took place. (This interpretation of the present text in no way turns on Woodward's interpretation of the passage he treats from *De dis*, with which I cannot deal here, though see above, p. 8 n. 5.) The older view advanced by Scott 1885, 193 and Diels 1917, 27–9 and now widely accepted was that the interval in question was that between *independently existing gods* and the sentient receiver; the ὑπέρβαcιc was thought to be the traversal, by εἴδωλα thrown off from intermundial gods, of the space between the gods and our world. Diels in particular conceived it as a specially privileged 'overleaping' of the intervening space whereby the εἴδωλα remain uncontaminated by surrounding matter. This theory's defenders postulate a division of divine εἴδωλα into two classes, those which are damaged by their flight through space and give us an approximate view of the gods, and those which remain magically undamaged and perfectly replicate the gods in our world for our perception. The present passage would then mean 'the εἴδωλα possessing a similar constitution (to the gods') or one that is numerically identical with them thanks to the overleaping of the intervening space' (Diels), or 'identical with them even after traversing the intervening space' (Arrighetti). In addition to the objections of Woodward 1989, 42, that this rendering is invalidated by the occurrence of 325–6 γεγενημένην 'which have *become* identical' where the theory would require διατελοῦcαν 'remaining numerically identical', it may also be urged that it is simply impossible in Epicurean theory for εἴδωλα to maintain numerical one-to-one identity with the objects that emit them (cf. Woodward 1989, 42 with n. 62, who notes that in Aristotle 'numerical identity is something which an enduring, separately countable object has in relation to itself: not even a perfectly preserved εἴδωλον would be numerically identical to a god'; cf. Aristot. *Met.* 4. 6, 1016^{b}32–3; *Meteo.* 2. 3, 357^{b}27–9). Kleve 1963, 50, however, notes that μεταξύ regularly denotes the space between a perceiver and the object

perceived. All kinds of images are constantly making this passage all the time; only those selectively focused or 'tuned in' by the mind (a natural and unavoidable feature of human thought) adopt the constitution described. So it remains possible that it is the model of a perceptual transaction that is followed in the present passage (rather than *cυμπλοκή*, mental attachment, as in *De dis* 3 col. 9,20–2), and that the 'space' is that between the perceiver and the original objects—not, however, the gods themselves (as Diels maintained), but rather the external objects (a human, a very long-lived star, a happy thing, etc.) whose images may selectively coalesce in focusing to form our composite idea of a god: in the space between the two the coalescence of images commences. In any case the present passage is impossible to understand on the explanation of the older view (of Diels), but is entirely consistent with the formulation by Woodward 1989, 42: 'Behind this lies the theory that the swift succession of *εἴδωλα* as they stream into the mind causes them to merge with each other and create the illusion of a continuously existing object.... According to Philodemus, then, Epicurus believed that a stream of *εἴδωλα* had as much right to be called a "natural entity" as any ordinary tangible physical object for the reason that in the mind it *appears* as an entity as a result of the overlooking of the intervening gaps' (his emphasis).

329–32 The parallel passage from Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 9,18–28 runs as follows:

πα]|ραβεβλῆcθαι τὴν [ν]ό[ηcι]ν, οὐκ ὀρθὸν λέγειν πα|ραβεβλῆcθαι τούτοις οὕτω cμικ[ροῖc] ὑπάρχ[ου]|cι, καὶ κατὰ [τ]ὸν ὑπ[ϵ]ρβά[cεωc] δὲ 'τοῦ' μεταξὺ τρό[πον] | ἀποδοτέον τὰc cυμπλοκάc, καὶ μάλιcτα κατὰ | τοῦτον· οὐ γὰρ ἀχωριcτεῖν καὶ cυμπεριπολε[ῖν] | τοῖc ἄcτροιc ὑπολη[π]τέον τοὺc θεούc, ἀλλὰ [κἂν] | ὁπόcον βούλε-ταί τιc ἀπέχη⟨ι⟩ τὰ [γ]εννητικά, τῆc [μ]ϵ|[τ]αξὺ διαcτάcεωc ὑπερβαινο[μέ]ν[ηc] cυνημμέ|[νο]υc προπί[π]τειν· ὅθεν κ(αὶ) τὸν Ἐπίκ[ο]υ[ρον φύcειc | κα]λε⟨ῖ⟩ν ὅτε μὲν ἐ[κ] τῶν αὐτ[ῶν ὅτε δ' ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων | cυνεc]τῶ[τα.

(As for the idea that) the mental image (of gods) is permanently superimposed (on the visible stars), it is not right to say that it is permanently superimposed on these things which are so small, and the entwinements (of gods with stars) should be accounted for as resulting from the transcendence of the intervening gap, and most emphatically so. For it must not be supposed that the gods are inseparable from the stars and accompany them in their orbits but that, be the generative factors as widely separated as you please, it is as a result of the intervening gap's being transcended that (the gods) come before the mind as united (to the stars). Hence Epicurus gave the name 'natural entities' sometimes to things constituted out of the same elements, sometimes to things constituted out of similar elements (new text based on autopsy and translation of Woodward 1989, 34–5; cf. Diels 1917, 28–9).

Philodemus appears to be explaining here how the stars came to be mistaken for gods and eventually worshipped as divine. For the present text it is necessary to underscore the fact that ll. 26–8 are virtually a copy of 329–32

in the present passage (though in l. 27 φύcειc was supplied by Woodward 1989, 35, 43), with close resemblences in the vocabulary of the entire passage to the lines preceding 329, similarities which can only be due to its common source in a quotation from Epicurus (probably the one from *On Holiness* cited at 216–19). The context in the present passage may assist in the understanding of the end to which Philodemus quotes Epicurus at *De dis* 3 col. 9,27–8. In particular the interpretation by Woodward 1989, 43 of ll. 26–8 seems misguided. Woodward claims that 'Philodemus implies that the imagined cohabitation of god and star would have had Epicurus' blessing as just such a union but he must be wrong: Epicurus would not have consented to the description of a god and a star as "similars".' It is true that the god and the star are not 'similars'; but nevertheless they are *images* of stars, and other mental images which in the minds of some coalesce to form gods, certainly are. According to Philodemus, star-gods arise as do all gods through the superimposition of images in ὑπέρβαcιc. These are not images identical to one another (as, for example, a star is identical with itself) but composite images similar to one another in some essential respect worthy of a divinity conceived for the most part *a priori*: e.g. in this case images of living but short-lived humans combined with images of exceptionally long-lived entities, i.e. stars. The similarity at issue is not of gods with stars, which are highly dissimilar, or of images of stars with each other only, but also of images of stars with the component images that produced the supervenient divine φύcειc. The disparity between the *a priori* notion of god, on the one hand, and stars may of course to some extent be a measure of whether star-gods are 'true' gods; but Philodemus is on solid theoretical foundation in claiming Epicurus' support for the proposition that these mental entities, produced like gods from images similar but not identical to one another, none the less constitute φύcειc, entities, even if these are not in all respects 'true' gods, i.e. proleptically divine. A centaur or Medusa, for instance, likewise constituted through the superimposition of (similar) images, is no less a ἑνότηc. This is confirmed below, 350–5 where Epicurus says that it is possible (but not necessary) for a ἑνότηc, 'unity', to have immortality and divine blessedness. Therefore in the passage from *De dis* Philodemus quotes Epicurus' distinction in order to warn against the confusion of φύcειc formed from identical elements (i.e. stars themselves) with those formed κατὰ ὁμοείδειαν (i.e. gods).

330 καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν: the identical omission at Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 9,27 (quoted above), though remarkable, must be coincidental. Woodward 1989, 43 implies that the identical orthographies are due to their appearance in an original text of Epicurus. But one would expect Attic εν to be supplanted by Ionic ειν after 404/3. εν lingers on into the second half of the fourth century BC: 'und die letzten Spuren der monophthongischen Schreibweise lassen sich verfolgen bis in die zweite Hälfte des IV. Jahrhunderts: ἀποδώcEν

(Infinitiv, 334 v. Chr)' (E. Schwyzer, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften* (Berlin, 1900), 20, cf. 6 n. 21). E. Mayser, *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit*, i/1 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1923), § 10 II p. 70 gives a few examples of the apparently Old Attic *e* for spurious *ei* from third-century papyri (e.g. *P. Magd.* 12,11 *laben*), but argues that this appearance is deceptive, suggesting that these spellings are due to phonetic influence or scribal error. Epicurus could have written *kalen*. But according to *MGrHerc* 219–20, the Herculaneum apographs consistently misrepresent the papyri in some way whenever they read *en* for *ein*; hence the instances cited there in Philod. *Rhet.* where the ancient scribe wrote *en* but corrected to *ein* by the addition *supra lineam* of an iota, often overlooked by the modern copyists. In the present passage *en* may have been similarly corrected: an omitted iota was probably supplied *supra lineam* but missed by the *disegnatore* also at 813, 840, 889, 1004. As it is here, the tiny letters *en* are crowded in at the very end of 330, exceeding the line-ends of the surrounding lines. D. Delattre suggests to me that *kalen* may be the *disegnatore*'s mistake for *kalei* followed by an asteriskos, for which see below, 1281, Introd. §§ 2(*g*)–(*h*).

331–4 It is worth noting that the configuration under discussion is not a phenomenon unique to the gods in the Epicurean theory. Ordinary concepts and other imaginables (including false gods of myth), are formed by a similar process of focusing (*ἐπιβολὴς τῆς διανοίας*) and similarly constitute *φύσεις*, entities. Nevertheless, these occur less regularly and predictably than do gods in the Epicurean theory; they lack a certain stability, change over time and from individual to individual, and they cannot of course be thought of as 'for ever having perfect happiness' (350–5).

336 ἀcταθέ[c: cf. 169–70.

336–7 προ|πί]π[τει]ν̣ (Woodward): for this verb in the sense 'to strike one (as)' see Woodward 1989, and its occurrence in the passage from *De dis* 3 (quoted above on 329–32; cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9.25, quoted above on 225–31, where *προcπιπτόντων* is used of images received in sleep, giving rise to notions of the gods). After this point the text of the column breaks off. It is not certain that *ἄλλων* in 337 begins a new sentence rather than continuing the *ὥcτε* clause. The passage must have gone on to explain that it is because the *cύcτατιc* of the gods arises from similars which maintain their configuration that such an entity can be *ἄ]φθαρτον* (343; cf. 352 *διαίωνιον*). In this respect such configurations must be different not only from ordinary objects with *κατ' ἀριθμόν* identity but also from all other mental constructs—a centaur, a four-legged man, the idea of justice: some of these may achieve a *καθ' ὁμοιότητα* identity in arising from similars but maintaining stability of imaging; nevertheless these ultimately perish. (Was there, e.g., a time in human history before the *πρόληψιc* of justice existed?) By contrast each individual person and human cultures generally throughout time are constantly and regularly forming concepts of gods.

This consideration answers the objection raised by an opponent at 34–50 (cf. 187–9): namely, how the gods can have bodily existence but be indestructible (all compounds being destructible in theory): the answer is that the εἴδωλα which gave rise καθ' ὁμοιότητα to the cυcτάcειc of gods are for ever collapsing and perishing. Even the compound configurations of the gods which take on a κατ' ἀριθμόν identity 'as a result of the transcendence of the intervening gaps' must perish with every individual act of comprehension. But the infinite supply of images and human nature guarantee that that there will always be such acts of comprehension going on (the νόηcιc of the gods is κοινή, Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123) and constantly influencing the psychosomatic διάθεcιc of individual humans. The gods endure as ἄφθαρτοι, but owe their existence to material compounds which are constantly perishing as all must. In this way, it is claimed, the gods can have bodily existence as compound entities, yet, in a sense, be imperishable.

346–7 *Order of Columns.* It is not impossible that this column (12) originally linked with the following col. 13. Each came from a different half of the split papyrus roll, possibly from the same layer. The contexts are very similar (the process for the assemblage of images constituting the gods as special entities); certainly not more than a single column is missing. Col. 13 begins in mid-sentence with a clause of comparison, but there is too little preserved at the end of the present column to be certain about the link.

Col. 13

In this column another citation from Epicurus' book *On Holiness* is adduced to back up the contention introduced in col. 12 (where see introd.): the gods are 'unified' entities, in significant respects like ordinary material entities, and thus can be equally said to possess certain qualities or states. In particular, it emerges, even when such unities 'exist out of similarity', they can be thought of as possessing 'perfect happiness for ever'. The author then passes over as unnecessary the opportunity of presenting a defence that this involves no contradiction (perhaps that mentioned at 34–6, 130–2). After all, he argues, all things in the Epicurean universe are fashioned from an aggregation of particles of some sort; the gods are no exception. For the philosophical background of the doctrine of unities see Philippson 1918, 377–9.

347–8 cτο⟨ι⟩χ[εί̣ω]ιcιc: cf. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 104,32, where the sense must be 'teaching' or 'principles'. But Epicurus' use of the word at *Ad Herod.* 37 cτοιχείωcιν τῶν ὅλων δοξῶν, in the sense of a summation or aggregate of the whole doctrine suggests that it could be used simply to mean 'systematic

grouping' or 'constitution'. Cf. *Σ Ad Herod.* 44 *ἐν ταῖς Δώδεκα στοιχειώσεσι*, where the sense of the title was probably 'the Twelve Principles'. On *stoicheoseis* see Clay 1983*b*, 60–3.

348 ὁμ[οίων: 'out of similar things', i.e. images similar but not identical to each other (as ordinary objects are identical with themselves). These are thus images that figure in the process of forming concepts and imagining hypothetical states of affairs. Here the claim is that such formations 'appear as unified entities' no less than do ordinary objects.

349 ἑν]ότης: in *De dis* 3 Philodemus likewise describes the gods as 'unified entities' (col. 11,6) which consist of 'similar elements' (10,38) and contrasts them with numerically identical beings like us humans (10,22–3, cf. Scott 1883, 236–7). Epicurus' use of the concept of 'unities' in the discussion of sound formation at *Ad Herod.* 52 is instructive for the present passage: in that passage it is related that hearing results when a current (*ῥεῦμα*) is carried off from the object making a noise and causing the sensation of hearing. This current is split up into particles, each like or similar to the whole (*ὁμοιομερεῖς*), which at the same time preserve both a correspondence of qualities with one another (*ἅμα τινὰ διασῴζοντας συμπάθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους*) and a unity of character (*ἑνότητα ἰδιότροπον*) which stretches right back to the object which emitted the sound (*διατείνουσαν πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαν*). In most cases this produces comprehension of the sound in the recipient (*τὴν ἐπαίσθησιν τὴν ἐπ' ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ποιοῦσαν*), though sometimes it simply makes manifest the existence of some external entity (*τὸ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἔνδηλον παρασκευάζουσαν*). The present passage seems to suggest that gods too also are *ἑνότητες* consisting of similar but not identical images that are *ὁμοιμερεῖς* with a whole entity (i.e. a god, who has taken on an *σύστασις* that is 'identical', 328); they have a similarity of qualities with one another. In the case of gods, this unity (*ἑνότης* unity) extends 'all the way back to an original source' (in this case our idea of god, including the sources of the *εἴδωλα* which constitute it). The *ἑνότητες* that constitute gods produce comprehension of themselves, in the same way that unities of sound produce comprehension of the sound (which is not of course the same thing as the object that produced it, though it is traceable 'all the way back to it'). And just as in the case of sound, the 'unities' may alternatively indicate the existence of external entities from which our concepts of gods are formed: e.g. humans, since all gods are anthropomorphic; or happy creatures, since they are blessed; or stars, since they seem to have endlessly long lives—though the 'sources', taken individually, of these unities are of course not gods, any more that a speaker is the sound of his words. In a related but garbled account, 'Aëtius' *Plac.* 1.7 in *Dox. Gr.* 306–7 (*HPh* 23m) these are called not *ἑνότητες*, but rather *ὁμοιότητες*, 'similarities' (see 351, and cf. 218–19, 357, 373), and these are said to have been included by Epicurus as a unique class in list of imperishable existents that includes gods and atoms:

Ἐπίκουρος ἀνθρωποειδεῖς μὲν πάντας τοὺς θεούς, λόγῳ δὲ πάντας τούτους θεωρητούς, διὰ τὴν λεπτομέρειαν τῆς τῶν εἰδώλων φύσεως· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς ἄλλως (Gassendi, ἄλλας codd., Diels) *τέσσαρας φύσεις κατὰ γένος ἀφθάρτους τάσδε, τὰ ἄτομα, τὸ κενόν, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὰς ὁμοιότητας· αὗται δὲ λέγονται ὁμοιομέρειαι καὶ στοιχεῖα.*

Epicurus says on the one hand that all the gods are human in form, and that all of them are perceptible by thought on account of the fineness of the constitution of their images. Moreover he says elsewhere [or: in addition to these] that there are four types of imperishable entities: atoms, void, infinity, and the similarities; and these last are called entities similar in their parts and elements.

Cf. Lucr. 5. 351–63, where the fourth immortal nature is omitted. Here *ὁμοιότητες* 'similarities', may be an abbreviated expression for *συγκρίσεις* or *ἑνότητες ἐξ ὁμοίων*, as opposed to *συγκρίσεις* or *ἑνότητες ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν* (so already Scott 1883, 321–32: 'i.e. beings formed of successions of similar combinations of atoms, and not, like other objects, of more of less permanent combinations of the same atoms.' The compiler has slightly garbled the doctrine, for not all *ὁμοιότητες* are imperishable (sounds, for instance: *Ad Herod.* 52); but some are. And all such entities (also called gods) consist of *ὁμοιότητες* or, more correctly, *ἑνότητες ἐξ ὁμοίων* (so also 355–60, 212–19). In this way both *ὁμοιότητες* and *ἑνότητες* describe the physical nature of the gods in a way that accounts for the possibility of their being immortal. For their status as 'unities' consisting of 'similarities' separates them ontologically from their physically deteriorating 'sources'. For unlike these, the supply of their material components is inexaustible. The unities that constitute the gods are formed by human cultures with a regularity and consistency not encountered in the case of objects or sounds or merely imagined objects (see on 352–4), and this, as exceptional as it is in Epicurus' system, is understood to be a fact about the world. The final statement in the Aëtius passage, that the similarities are similar in their parts and elemental may be, as Scott 1883, 232 suggests, a gloss by an exegete who did not fully understand the theory; but the correspondence of *ὁμοιομέρειαι* in Aëtius to *ὁμοιομερεῖς* in the passage on sound from *Ad Herod.* 52 suggests that this term—possibly of Anaximandrean origin—also figured in Epicurus' explanation of gods. For Anaximander's use of *ὁμοῖος* and *ὁμοιότης* in connection with the earth's position in the cosmos (Aristot. *De cael.* 295^{b}11–16; cf. Plat. *Phaed.* 108E–109A) see Furley, 1987, 23–30 and 1990, 14–26.

351–2 ὑπάρ|χουσι: the dative participle (the reading of *N*), sc. *θεοῖς* (or simply *τοῖς*: 'for beings constituted out of similarity') constructed with with *δύναται* was maintained by Bücheler and Diano, and followed in the paraphrase of the passage by Woodward 1989, 41 n. 54. We might have expected the article, however, in this sense (otherwise: 'for [them] when constituted out of similarity') and Gomperz followed by Usener, Philippson, Arr.^{2} (against Bücheler and the *disegno*) emend to *ὑπάρ|χουσα*, sc. *ἑνότης*. In the text I have adhered rigidly to the transmitted reading (unanimously *-χουσι*,

though a small space awkwardly intervenes between ι and δια, so that the ι is all but compatible with α).

352 διαιώνιον: adverbial, possibly with the participle ὑπάρχουσι: 'existing for all time out of similarity, they are able to possess complete happiness'; but the syntax makes it more likely that διαιώνιον here modifies ἔχειν: 'for ever to have it'. In 692–3 ζῶια μ[ακάρια] | καὶ διαιώνια (the only other occurrence in Philodemus) the adjective expresses a quality attributable to the gods themselves, rather than, say, to their happiness (so also 46). Whatever they do in this passage they do so as διαιώνιοι.

353–4 ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν | εὐδαιμονίαν: for the phrase and the technical concept of 'complete happiness' see above, 264–5; Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 83,2 τῆς ἄκρας [τελει]ώσεως with Diels 1917, 5 n. 2; Schmid 1951, 104–5; Angeli 1988, 282 on Πρὸς τοὺς [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 10,5 with the comments of Angeli–Colaizzo 1979, 95 n. 327. This introduces a new point: it is the first indication in the surviving fragments of the treatise that part of the debate concerns not just whether some sort of imperishable entity can exist, but also whether it could possess special ethical characteristics, i.e. be a *god*: this seems to involve (1) possessing complete happiness (probably defined negatively, i.e. freedom from disturbance through dissolution, as in Epic. *KD* 1) and (2) possessing it eternally (see on 352), i.e. being eternal. The problem is, of course, that normal compounds (and our ideas of them), which ὑπάρχουσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, must all be subject to corporeal dissolution. Unlike them, in the the Epicurean theory, the gods and our ideas of them, because they ὑπάρχουσιν ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος and, because the supply of similar images is inexhausible, are not subject to such dissolution. Of course in one sense they are always undergoing such dissolution, viz. in the minds of individual thinkers; but they are constantly and eternally being reformed, their constitutions out of similars being constantly replenished. Of course my own idea of the gods (while it includes the aspect of imperishability) cannot *guarantee* them a form of existence throughout all time. It is unknown how Epicurus might have proposed to get around this difficulty. On the one hand, regularity of human nature guarantees that it has been going on since the earliest humans (a view specifically attributed to Epicurus below, 225–31) and can be expected to do so as long as there are humans, the aberrant counter-examples posed by notorious atheists in human history (519–30) notwithstanding. Epicurus, impressed by the regularity and consistency with which we form conceptions of the gods, concluded that there must for this reason be something basically and naturally right about the idea (see Obbink 1992*b*, especially 199–202). While humans as a lot will not of course exist eternally (a view argued, for example, by Lucretius) to think about the gods for ever, nevertheless, since there exist now and will in the future exist worlds both like and unlike ours (*Ad Herod.* 45), there will on this reasoning always be

something around which thinks more or less like humans to conceive them into existence for all eternity. On the other hand, Epicurus may have chosen to locate their immortality not in their physical persistence throughout all time, but rather in the way we are to think of them as existing (i.e. as immortal).

355–8 οὐχ ἧττον ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν | ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων στοι|χείων: literally: 'no less out of identical elements than out of similar elements can unities be formed'. But Philodemus seems to mean the opposite: that they can be formed 'just as easily out of similar elements as out of identical elements'. And this clearly must be so, since there is nothing unusual about ordinary objects (whose existence is not in question) being formed out of identical elements (i.e. atoms). All such entities likewise have a 'unity of character' or one-to-one correspondence to themselves and thus automatically possess *ἑνότης* unity; therefore it is hard to see why objects formed 'out of identical elements' (i.e. ordinary objects) should demand the special explanation provided in the text. Believing it to be necessary for the sense, Scott 1883, 233 suggested a transposition of the two phrases; he was followed by Philippson. I have retained the transmitted order, for which see Woodward 1989, 41 n. 54, who, following Bailey 1928, 453 n. 3, defends the transmitted text as a *hysteron proteron* inverting the logical order, of the type found at Seneca, *Ep.* 90. 42 *tam interdiu quam nocte*, 'as much at night [owing to their sleeping in the open] as during the day'. As Bailey notes (ad loc.), the emphasis in a comparison often falls on the second member. This will not, as Dr Holford-Strevens notes, justify translating *οὐχ ἧττον* in the sense of *οὐ μᾶλλον* in the present passage. But Philodemus' point may be simply that unities can be formed equally from sames or similars, so that the order of comparison is not significant. This is supposed to explain (354–5 *ἐ|πειδήπερ*) how 'it is possible for things existing out of similarity to have perfect happiness for ever', as a god does, apparently on the assumption that, in order to exist, a god must be a in some sense a 'unity'.

359–60 For *ὑποτελεῖσθαι* (a legal term from taxation, possibly a miswriting for *ἀποτελεῖσθαι*) see the app. crit. and below on 370 *ἀποτελεῖσθαι*. The scribe corrected his original *δύ|ναται* to the plural by the insertion of a suprascript *ν*. Perhaps he was misled by the the similar construction above (if the dative *ὑπάρ|χουσι* is the correct reading at 351–2) or by the preceding singular *δύναται* (350), at a point where Philodemus varied the construction.

361–2 καταλεί|πονται: this does not, it is true, mean that Epicurus himself in his *Περὶ ὁσιότητος* actually gave the explanation Philodemus has just related, but only that his views there were consistent with it. But we know that Epicurus himself discussed *ἑνότητες* in connection with the gods (see above on 349 and parallel testimony in Philippson 1918, 377). And elsewhere Philodemus attributes to him the doctrine about divine entities

being formed from similar elements (quoted on 329–32, from *De dis* 3). So it seems more than likely that Philodemus' account here is not simply of his own devising. For *καταλείπεσθαι* in the sense of 'to accept, allow for, admit the existence of something' see on 36, 1047–8.

362–4 ἐν | τῶι Περὶ ὁσιότη|τος: for this book by Epicurus and the form of its title see above on 206–7 (cited again 1266–7).

364 αὐτότατα: *ipsissima*, only here. Cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 9,4 *ὡσαυτότατα*, also a *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον* (*ὡς αὐτότατα* Arrighetti, but see Woodward 1989, 39). For the superlative of *αὐτός* (and other examples, such as *μονώτατος*) see *MGrHerc* 192. Here *αὐτότατα* is most easily taken as part of the predicate *καταλεί|πονται* in 361–2: 'Both kinds of entity (i.e. one formed out of unchanging things and the other out of similars) are accepted by Epicurus as exactly the same thing (*αὐτότατα*)', (i.e. as the same kind of thing with respect to their potential for possessing *εὐδαιμονία*), with the *καθάπερ* clause that follows giving an example of where Epicurus did so. Alternatively, *αὐτότατα* could be the superlative adverb: 'just as in *On Holiness* (unities are accepted by Epicurus) in exactly the same way' (i.e. as that described above, 351–60).

364–7 Philodemus seems somewhat reluctant to go into further technical details regarding the *ἑνότητες*. He may be abbreviating sections of *On Holiness* in which Epicurus adduced analogical arguments showing that the theory involved no contradiction (365–6 *ὑπε[ναν]|τιολογίαν*) with other parts of the Epicurean system. The terminology, as well as the method of proof by ruling out potential conflicts with other, more fundamental tenets (see Furley 1971, 607–19) is peculiarly Epicurean. (*ὑπεναντιλογία* = *ἀντιμαρτύρησις*: see Philod. *Rhet.* i. 64,10.) In this connection Epicurus had employed the term *ὑπεναντιότης*, as at *Ad Herod.* 77: *τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον . . . αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει*; so also *De nat.* inc. lib. 34. 30,26 *c]τάσεως ἐμ[πιμ]πλάμενον | διὰ τ[ὴν] ὑπεναντιότητα τῶν | [ἔργ]ων καὶ [τῆς δόξη]ς*; cf. *Ad Herod.* 77 *ἵνα μηδ' ὑπεναντίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν* (sc. *τῶν ὀνομάτων*) *⟨γένωνται⟩ τῷ σεμνώματι δόξαι*; ibid. 81 *ἐν τῷ ταὐτὰ* (*caelestia*) *μακάριά τε δοξάζειν ⟨εἶναι⟩ καὶ ἄφθαρτα καὶ ὑπεναντίας ἔχειν τούτοις βουλήσεις ἅμα καὶ πράξεις καὶ αἰτίας*. The term *ὑπεναντιολογία* (not attested for Epicurus) may be a Philodemean formation: *Rhet.* i. 64,10 *βλέπονταί τινες ἐκ | φ[ύσε]ως καὶ παρακειμέ|[νων] ὑπεναντιολογίαι* 'certain contradictions are seen arising from nature and circumstances'.

366–7 παρα⟨ιτη⟩τέον: on the orthography see *MGrHerc* 104–7. Philodemus regularly uses *παραιτέομαι* in the sense of *praetermittere* 'to pass over': *De poem.* 5 col. 24,8; *Rhet.* i. 24,8 = ii. 80,5; i. 370,7; ii. 293,7; *De mus.* 29,5; *De ira* 35,33. Cf. Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 14,16–17 *τὴν ἐν τοῖς βυβλί[ο]ις | ἀ[νε]νεργησίαν* [*ἀ*]*παραίτ*[*η*]|*το*[*ν*, the opponents' 'inattention to actual texts cannot be passed over', 'pardoned'. In 368 *τοίνυν* 'apologizes' for the author's abridgement or reluctance to elaborate.

368–71 For the idea, cf. Lucr. 3. 23: *omnia suppeditat porro natura*; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 111 *suppeditatio bonorum nullo malorum intervento.*

370 ἀποτελεῖcθαι: for the sense here ('produce', often of atomic formation in Epicurus: *Ad Herod.* 64 *cύμπτωμα αἰcθητικὸν εὐθὺc ἀποτελοῦν*, and Usener, *Gloss. Ep.* s.v.; Marcus Antoninus 10. 16; perhaps also above at 217–18 and 359). For interpretation of the present text the most significant parallel is in *Σ KD* 1 (above on 212–13), where it is said that gods that exist with formal unity (*οὗc δὲ κατὰ ὁμοιείδειαν*) '*result* from a continuous influx of similar images to the same place', *ἐκ τῆc cυνεχοῦc ἐπιρύcεωc τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεcμένουc* (*-ων* codd.). The present text suggests that it is the production of gods *per se* out of *εἴδωλα*, here 'similar things' (and not the production of similar *εἴδωλα* individually) that is being described in the scholion. (This lends excellent support to Kühn's emendation, which makes *ἀποτετελεcμένουc* agree with *θεούc* rather than with *εἰδώλων*. For the perfect tense of *ἀποτετελεcμένουc* in the scholion see the perfect *γεγενημένην* in 325–6 above with commentary.) Compare 359, where the *ἑνότητεc* (mistaken for divinities themselves by 'Aëtius' above on 349) are said to be able to 'be produced'.

371 λέγειν: we are entitled to ask in what work Epicurus 'was accustomed to say this'. For the author's working method in *De pietate* is such that he would not let such an assertion go unsupported without documentation (cf. 1048–9). Presumably this was supplied in the lost portions of the following column.

374–5 ἐπι]cυνκρί[cειωc: only here, but no other supplement seems possible. Philodemus, often accused exhibiting little interest in Epicurean physics, in fact employs a wide lexicon of terms for this kind of atomic 'formation' or 'constitution'; cf. 39–41, 101, 192–3 *cύνκριcιc*, 321–2 *cύcταcιc*, 333 *τάξιc*, 347–8 *cτοιχείωcιc*.

375–6 *Order of Columns.* This column may well have originally linked with the following, very fragmentarily preserved col. 14; there is at least some similarity of content (cf. 379 *cυνκρ*[*ι-*). A citation from another, different work of Epicurus (his *De dis*) probably begins at 382, whereas Philodemus suggests that in the passage immediately preceding 360 he has been summarizing or extrapolating from Epicurus' *On Holiness* rather than quoting a specific work. See on 329–32, apparently a quotation from Epicurus' *Περὶ ὁcιότητοc*, though it is clear that it was not cited by title there.

Col. 14

There exist only scant remains of this column; but 379 *cυνκρ*[*ι-* may be enough to presume a connection with the discussion in col. 13.

378–80 Perhaps τ[ὴν | τῶν θεῶ]ν cύνκρ[ιcιν | φαιν]ομέν̣η[ν could be restored.

381 ὑπάρχειν: the correction seems more likely than *ὑπαυλεῖν* ('canere' Quaranta) or Philippson's *ὑπαυγεῖν*.

382–3 ἐν] (Gomperz) **τῶι περὶ θε̣ί[ῶν:** very probably a title, the book by Epicurus cited previously (at least) at 189–90, and below at 1255–62; for its content see on 753–4. Metrodorus wrote one too, but this seems to come in the middle of a run of citations from Epicurus.

383 ἀν]αμφιλέκτως: Philodemus uses the adverb at *De poem.* 5 col. 15,3, *Rhet.* i. 102,20 (p. 171 Longo); see also Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7. 5. It ought to mean something like 'indisputably'. At Longinus 7. 4 it is used in reference to a *πίστις*, 'argument'; probably here of something Epicurus said about divinity in his *De dis.*

385 ἀνυτήν: the word is very rare (if the articulation is correct): a legal term (= Lat. *exactor*). *ἀνυτικός* means 'effective' (Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 182); *cf. ἀνύcιμος* in Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* and Lex. Philod.; *ἀνύειν, ἀνύτειν* in Philodemus.

387 For *N*'s ερμικα[I suspect *ἔργα* {ι} κα|[τ- (i.e. ΓΑ misread as Μ).

388–9 μὴ νοεῖc|[θαι τοῖc] ὅλοιc: in the context of the preceding col. 13 and 379 c̣υνκρ[ι- it may be worth noting that this phrase may form part of the account of conceptualizing gods: 'that they not be thought among whole entities'. Cf. 334–7 ὥc[τε τὸ] π̣ο|τὲ τα]ραχθὲν [ὅλον | μηκέτ'] ἀcτα-θὲ̣[c προ|πί]π[τει]ν; Philod. *De dis* 3 col. g and 5,30. The word ὅλοc occurs frequently in Epicurean writings synonomously or in close connection with *φύcειc*, entities. Elsewhere in Philodemus (e.g. *Rhet.* ii. 135, 19 Sudhaus) *οὐ . . . τοῖc ὅλοιc* has the force of 'not at all'.

402–3 *Order of Columns.* This column from **1098** may have originally linked with the following column also from **1098**, because they come from successive fragments and preserve the right- and left-hand sides of their columns respectively, so it is quite possible, but not certain that they were successive columns (like e.g. cols. 46–7) on the same layer of papyrus, but copied separately as usual by the *disegnatore* (cf. cols. 38–9).

Col. 15

The discussion in this fragmentary context has as its basis the fact that the gods are *λόγῳ θεωρητοί*; their images are perceptible only by *διάνοια*, not by ordinary sensation. But since the process is at least analogous to the way in which other sensibles (viz. *cτερέμνια*, which by all accounts the Epicurean gods are not) are perceived, the gods can be known to have existence as physical entities.

416–17 δ[ια]|νοουμένουc: the verb *διανοεῖcθαι*, and its substantive

counterpart *διάνοια*, are employed to characterize thought more general than *ἐννοεῖν/ἔννοια*, which involve specific conceptions. Operating upon those conceptions, we can in this case think of the gods as existing. Hence Epicurus' choice of verb when he said to Colotes (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117 C) *καὶ ἡμᾶc ἀφθάρτουc διανοοῦ* 'think of us too as imperishable.' The retort may illustrate the process of thinking the Epicurean gods into existence, or at least the way in which their recognition is dependent upon a certain mode of thought. Compare Philod. *De dis* 3 cols. 12,12, 15,6 where *τὰ πρ(όc)φορα κ(αὶ) γεννήcει περι|ληπτὰ μὲν διανοίαι* are contrasted with *τοῖc δ' αἰcθητηρίοιc οὐχ ὑ|ποπίπτοντα*. On *διάνοια/διανοεῖcθαι* see further Diels's note in *De dis* 3 (Diels 1917, 40 n. 1; cf. on *ἔννοια/ἐννοεῖcθαι* p. 78 n. 3).

418–19 παραιcθήcει cαρκ[ί]νηι: *παραίcθηcιc* is apparently a *hapax*. It is not certain whether it means here 'misperception' (*παραιcθάνομαι* means 'to be subject to illusory perceptions' at Plat. *Theat.* 157 E, Iambl. *Protr.* 2) or simply 'incidental perception' (the verb means 'hear by the way', 'overhear' at Xen. *Cyr.* 4. 2. 30; Theocr. 5. 120). The adjective *cάρκινοc*, however, is common in Epicurean epistemology, in reference to the processes of the body (especially involving sensation). Later in the treatise (see vol. ii) it is used to describe the conception entailed by the poets' representation of the gods as subject to corruption of the flesh (Schober 1988, 89 with Henrichs 1975*a*, 21–2 on *N* 433 fr. 4,21); of physical processes of perception: *De sign.* 27,25; and 34,4 Gomperz. I think here the entire phrase must mean: (those people who were) 'understanding that their perception (of the gods) was able to be grasped by incidental bodily sensation (i.e. natural faculties of perception)'.

419 περιληπτήν: cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 15,5–6 *περι|ληπτὰ μὲν διανοίαι*.

420–1 ἀπ[ὸ φύ]cεωc: either 'from a physical entity' or 'from nature'.

421 ἔγ[νωc]αν: the subject may be early humans, or possibly early Epicureans, including Epicurus, who held that the gods existed as external physical entities, analogous to other *cτερέμνια*: cf. 225–31. (The aorist tense, if it has past significance, might suggest placement of this column in the account of early humans at 225–89.)

431–2 *Order of Columns.* The column has been placed here in its sequence in the descending order of fragments in the 1098 series. It could have originally linked with the following col. 16 from the 1077 sequence.

Col. 16

Philodemus returns to the objection that Epicurus classified things into body and void (here the alternative designation 'place'), without including a third category for the gods. This is essentially a variation on the objection considered at 34–50, attempting to force the

conclusion that Epicurus needs a third category (in addition to bodies and void) to accommodate gods. Philodemus responds here with a *reductio ad absurdum*, saying that under this reasoning he should have created separate categories for *all* types of thinkable and perceptible entities. Epicurus' view is that the gods are of course in some sense material entities (cf. 225–31, 415–24), and have thus already been included under the category of bodies. On the syntax of the passage see on 443–4.

432 cώματα: Gomperz supposed with reason that something like the following must have preceded: [*τὸ δὲ ὑπολαμβάνειν τῶι τὰ πάντα μὲν ἡγεῖcθαι*] *cώματα καὶ τόπον* etc., 'to suppose that in on the one hand saying all things are divided into bodies and location, but on the other hand not enumerating the gods alongside of them (that is, not putting the gods in a class apart, distinct from bodies), Epicurus excludes gods altogether, is sheer stupidity' (Scott 1883, 233 with modifications). See further on 434–5 *περι-γρά|φειν*.

τόπον: Usener's correction of the *τουτον* of the apograph should be regarded as certain (a broken Π having been mistaken by the *disegnatore* for ΥΤ). This is an alternative designation for *κενόν* in the basic division. The terms were virtually interchangeable: see below, *Ad Herod.* 40 *τόποc δὲ εἰ μὴ ἦν, ὃν κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῆ φύcιν ὀνομάζομεν*, Lucr. 1. 426 *locus ac spatium quod inane vocamus* and cf. 954–5, 'Aëtius' 1. 20. 2 (p. 318, 1 Diels) *Ἐπίκουροc ὀνόμαcιν παραλλάττειν κενόν τόπον χώραν. κενόν* appears in the basic division at Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1114A and Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 333 and was translated by Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 2. 82 and Lucr. 1. 420. But *τόποc* in the basic division is attested at Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1112E, on which see Westmann 1955, 135–6. The relatively early and authoritative testimony of Philodemus might be thought to favour the required supplement advocated by Usener at *Ad Herod.* 40 *ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐcτι* ⟨*cώματα καὶ τόπον*⟩ over Gassendi's ⟨*cώματα καὶ κενόν*⟩ (the latter accepted in Arr.² and *HPh* 5A). According to *Σ Ad Herod.* 39 Epicurus also said this at the beginning (*κατ' ἀρχήν*) of the *Μεγάλη ἐπιτομή* and in *Περὶ φύcεωc* 1, so again (cf. on 37–41) it is impossible to tell which version Philodemus is following. Another alternative appears in the division into bodies and the intangible at *Ad Pyth.* 86 *τὸ cώματα καὶ ἀναφὴc φύcιc* (on this term see further Sedley 1989a, 316 with n. 37). This designates space in the broadest sense, whether occupied or not; whereas 'void', 'place', and 'room' (*χώρα*) are the terms by which we refer to it in specific contexts: 'void' when it is unoccupied, 'place' when it is occupied, and 'room' when bodies move through it. Epicurus uses its various names indifferently, because the difference between them is one of context, not of essence. Thus he fluctuates in his usage between 'void' (*Ad Herod.* 44), 'place' (*De nat.* inc. lib. 34. 19,9 and now the present passage), 'room' (Sext.

Emp. *Adv. Math.* 10. 2, fr. 271 Us., backed up by a *figura etymologica*) and 'intangible substance' (*Ad Pyth.* 86). On the subject, see the invaluable discussion in *HPh* 1, 28–31; further Westman 1955, 135–6; D. Sedley, 'Two Conceptions of Vacuum', *Phronesis*, 27 (1982), 175–93 and 183–4 (with B. Inwood, *CPh* 76 (1981), 273–85); F. Adorno, *Elenchos*, 1 (1980), 245–75; id., *Syzetesis*, i. 53–72. It is true that in the *later* tradition void gets most emphasis.

434–5 περιγράλφειν: here 'exclude', i.e. from the sum of existing things. Cf LSJ s.v. I.4 and III.1 and *De lib. dicendi* 21,9 in this sense (though *Lex. Philod.* s.v. classes the present occurence as 'describo' as e.g. at *De ira* col. 29,1). Perhaps 'delineate in a class apart', i.e. from existing things (which would be closer to LSJ I.2) is the sense here (Philodemus prefers *ἀναιρεῖν* when he means 'do away with by implication').

435–6 τελε[ί]ως: for the orthography, well attested in the Herculanensia, see *MGrHerc* 107–8. The supplement is required by space at line-end.

436 ἀναλγήτων: for this predicate use of the genitive of belonging, see Smyth §1304; Schwyzer ii. 122–3; Kühner–Blass i. 371–3. What this has to do with pain or its absence *per se* is not clear. Surely Philodemus means such people are 'anaesthetized', 'insensible' to truth, and thus callous and unreceptive. Kleve 1977, 60 translated 'ruthless'. For comparable instance of *ἐστι* with the genitive of characteristic see later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1088 fr. 10,16–21 (Schober 1988, 84) *τὸ δὲ [πο]νηρο|τάτους ε[ἰσά-γ]ειν θε|οὺς ἄνω[θεν] ἐκ γε|νετῆς ὑπερβολάς | ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπολει|πόντων ἀσεβείας*, 'to represent the gods as most depraved right from their birth is a sign of those who lack nothing in their insurpassable impiety'.

440 ἔνφρων: for the word, see Plat. *Leg.* 769 A and often; in Philodemus: *De mus.* 95,19. The unassimilated form is comparatively rare (*MGrHerc* 61), but there is no reason to doubt the reading of the apograph (with Gomperz), just because the *η* at line-end is extraneous or in error. The possibilities for accounting for it include (1) corruption in the papyrus, (2) misreading by the *disegnatore* of the wedge-shaped space filler (>) or the asteriskos (see on 1281) occasionally inserted by the scribe lest he leave space at the end of the line, or (3) a similar misreading of an original ΓΕ (Scott, who prints the particle *γε*). The last may well be correct, but since we cannot be sure, I have simply excised it.

443–4 οὐ] | δέον: this is the linchpin of the reconstruction. Since *δέον* must be an accusative absolute (*contra* Scott; *δέον* with *ἐστι* understood would be otiose, for which we should simply have *δεῖ*), it cannot be introduced by *εἰ δὲ*, ostensibly the reading of the apograph in 442. I have therefore accepted Philippson's correction and supplement *εἰδῷ̣[ν*, which suits the context well. Thus the accusative absolute *οὐ δέον . . . φάναι* will have been explanatory to the apodosis of the condition *ἀναλγήτων ἐστίν* (436–7), the contrafactual protasis of which is *εἰ μὴ . . . ἔμελλεν* (437–40).

Philippson, however, punctuates after τις in 441, making the accusative absolute δέον parenthetically interrupt the εἰ μὴ clause, and takes μνημονεύ[ειν as complement to δέον, rather than to ἔμελλεν as in the present punctuation; he puncutates again after δέον, and takes φάναι (446) as complementary to ἔμελλεν. This syntax is ruled out by 446 πρὸς αὐτοῦ (αὐτοῦ Philippson), since on his punctuation this must refer self-reflexively to the ἔμφρων of 440: he would translate, 'unless any rational person (there being no need to mention classes already included in them) were going *to say to himself* (πρὸς αὑτοῦ) that only the gods were being done away with, and not also *x*, *y*, and *z*'. Philippson's punctuation thus presumes the syntax [τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν] ἀναλγήτων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἔμελλεν ἔμφρων τις . . . , (μνημονεύσειν οὐ δέον) τοὺς θεοὺς μόνον ἀναιρεῖσθαι πρὸς αὑτοῦ φάναι. But with φάναι (446) we should have expected πρὸς αὐτόν, instead of πρὸς αὐτοῦ. Thus πρὸς αὐτοῦ must mean 'by him' (sc. Epicurus, the subject of περιγράφειν at 434–5; for πρός with the genitive after passive verbs see LSJ s.v. II.1), i.e. as necessitated by the logic of his own argument that 'only the gods alone were being done away with (on the supposition stated in the apodosis 432–7), and also not *x*, *y* and *z*', *a reductio ad absurdum*. In this case the subject of φάναι (446) cannot be the ἔμφρων of 440 (as Philippson's reconstruction presumes), because the ἔμφρων represents not the *opponent* but rather any reasonable person in *Epicurus'* position of making the basic division; the subject of φάναι is thus unstated and indefinite, but putatively the critic of Epicurus. Therefore the correct skeletal syntax of the entire sentence is as follows: [τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν κτλ.] ἀναλγήτων ἐστίν, εἰ μὴ ἔμελλεν ἔμφρων τις μνημονεύσειν, οὐ δέον φάναι, 'supposing *w* is characteristic of insensible people, unless any sensible person were going to mention *x*, since it would not be necessary to say *y*, without also saying *z*'. For the sake of clarity in a difficult passage, I summarize as closely as possible to the syntax as follows: 'supposing that Epicurus excludes the gods because he did not include them in his basic ontological division is characteristic of insensible people—unless any rational person making the basic division were going to mention types already included in the basic classes [which is absurd]; for [in this case, i.e. if it *were* necessary to mention classes already included, then] it would not be necesary [for such a person] to say that Epicurus omitted just gods, but rather [that he also omitted] people, horses, and all the other subclasses as well.' For οὐ δέον = ἐπεὶ οὐ δεῖ see also 1375.

445 ἀναιρεῖσθαι: here apparently passive. On the term, see above on 133 περιαιρ[εῖν and below on 522–3.

446 πρὸς αὐτοῦ φάν̣[αι: the apograph clearly shows the left upright of a N, followed by its diagonal descending to the right. Gomperz's tentative φατ̣[έον would require an editorial change of the apograph. For the subject of φάν̣[αι and the breathing and referent of πρὸς αὐτοῦ, see on 443–4.

447 τούτου χάριν: Philippson takes *τούτου* to be the opponent voicing the objection of 432–7: 'um dieses (des Gegners)'; but since Philodemus has generalized this to the plural (436 *ἀναλγήτων*, resumed in the plural at 460 *ὑφειλήφεσαν*) it seems more reasonable to understand *τούτου* as referring to the objection itself (sc. *λόγου*).

448–50 οὐχὶ καὶ τοὺς [ἀν]|θρώπους κ[αὶ τοὺς] | ἵππους: the descent through the classes of existence (gods, humans, horses) complements the *reductio ad absurdum*. According to Epicurus they are all members of the class 'bodies' (432) in the basic division.

451 τὰ κατὰ μέρος: literally 'individually', 'one by one', i.e. literally a class for each entity taken one by one would be needed, according to the logic of the critic's argument. For the technical force of the expression see on 539; Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v.; Epic. *Ad Herod.* 35–6. 68, 82–3; Angeli 1985, 67–9 has a useful discussion.

451–3 αἰc|θητά τε καὶ νοητὰ | [φ]ύc[ε]ων: an extremely important division for the Epicurean view, because gods belong exclusively to the latter category, namely existents that can be perceived by thought (cf. 191–2). These include not only gods (they are *λόγῳ θεωρητοί*, *Σ KD* 1), but ideas of humans and horses, imaginables such as satyrs, mathematicals, and certain aspects of volition, whose purely noetic existence is facilitated by images in the soul formed from (extremely fine) atoms, and can thus still be said to belong to the class of bodies. (Void/location, since it lacks the power, characteristic of body, to act upon the senses, must also be discoverable by thought.) In contrast to the basic division (432), this division is introduced by Philodemus with a certain subtlety as part of the *reductio*. The inference may be drawn that this is the third category for which the critic is searching, and that it is already subsumed under the category of bodies (432).

453–4 cυν|[πε]φ[υ]κότων: the apograph represents the letter *ν* several letters after the beginning of the line, but I can see no way to accommodate this. Since the general sense is secure, *cυν|[πε]φ[υ]κότων* (suggested by Anon. A, cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 132) will suffice *exempli gratia*. (Philippson's *cυν|[ε]ς[η]κότων* looks attractive, but Epicurus never uses *cυνιστάναι* in the perfect, and Philodemus never in this sense.)

455–6 ὧν οὕτως εὖ|δ[ηλ]ος: the reference is to Epicurus' making of the basic division, as though: 'since he was so clear'. For parallels, see Plat. *Polit.* 308 D, Alexis fr. 140 K.–A. (Athen. 4. 164 B–D) *φιλόcοφός τις εἶ . . . εὔδηλον*. In Philodemus: *Rhet.* i. 25,19; cf. ii. 232,21; and cf. D.L. 10.13 (Epicurus) *caφὴc δ' ἦν οὕτωc* that in his *On Rhetoric* he made *caφήνεια* the sole goal of writing. Philippson proposed the correction *εὖ|λ[ογ]ος*, which has some palaeographical plausibility, but no good personal parallels.

457–8 ἐμνημόνευ|c[εν: the verb alludes back to 443 *μνημονεύ[cειν*, where the reference is to a hypothetical rational classifier, here to Epicurus himself.

459–60 τάτ|τειν: this verb, together with its compounds, occurs commonly in reference to the process of *διαίρεσις*. For the simple form, see *De Sign.* 34,27, 35,25.

460 ὑφειλήφεσαν: for the false aspiration (i.e. = *ὑπειλήφεσαν*) in the Herculaneum papyri see M. Capasso, *CErc* 17 (1987), 177 n. 26. The identity of the plural subject is not entirely clear; possibly these are those critics whose argument is described at 35–50. They seem to think that if they can show that for Epicurus gods cannot exist as bodies (all compounds being perishable), they will have shown that they must be classed by him among non-existents. Thus they will have 'supposed that he classed all (existing) things as bodies'. Philodemus goes on to say (460–4) that since they understood that Epicurus classed everything as bodies they can to this extent be considered reliable reporters of his views. They made the mistake of supposing that, since gods were not specifically mentioned in the basic division, Epicurus did not include them as existing. It does seem from this passage as though Epicurus' formulation of his position on the gods left some room for dialectical openings on the part of opponents. Philodemus thinks this objection can be dismissed easily enough, because Epicurus' views were sufficiently clear. But he seems at a loss to produce a text in which Epicurus specified that because gods on the Epicurean view come about as a result of bodies and compounds, they must necessarily themselves be bodies and compounds *in this same sense*. Epicurus probably had good reasons for not making such a claim.

460–1 *Order of columns.* This column has been placed here in its proper order in the descending sequence of the 1077 series. The next column in the descending sequence of the 1098 series (col. 17) happened to join perfectly with the present column, carrying on the syntax virtually unbroken. The link between the two columns thus commends to the editor the method of keeping as closely as possible to the descending order of (alternating) columns.

Col. 17

For their polemical purposes, Epicurus' opponents gladly represented him as classing all things as bodies (458–60). They might even be regarded as reliable reporters in this respect; for they supposed (464–5) that he explicitly set forth all things as existing as either bodies or the locations they occupy (rather than specifically mentioning gods as a separate class among these: 454–8). But in fact Epicurus called into question neither people nor horses nor any other perceptible or thinkable entity (448–54), including gods; so that, if he had speciously held

that the gods exist simply for the sake of social peace, he and his followers would scarcely have:

(i) offered demonstrations for their existence;
(ii) attacked those who denied the gods;
(iii) developed proofs for their arguments;
(iv) included other matters about the gods in their books.

This list is of particular interest because it recapitulates the contents of this section of the treatise. Thus it constitutes a partial διαίρεcιc, 'division' or 'outline', such as is explicitly mentioned at the close of the treatise (vol. ii; *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,14–19 Henrichs 1974*a*, 25–6); see Introd. § 3(*d*).

461 ἑκο]ύcιοι: such opponents of their own accord concede that Epicurus classed all things as bodies (compare the objection reported at 34–50). For the personal use of ἑκούcιοc see e.g. Thuc. 1. 138.

461–2 ἄ[νlδρ]ec: the founders of the Kepos (also called καθηγεμόνεc) are regularly styled in the Epicurean literature from Herculaneum by the title ἄνδρεc, 'the men': e.g. *Rhet.* 2.215,11 Longo (= Hermarchus fr. 38) κατὰ τοὺc ἄνδρ[ac; *De vit.* col. 25,1–2 (p. 68 Jensen, = Hermarchus fr. 45) ἐπιμέ-λει|αι τ[ο]ιούτων ἀνδρῶν. For this title see Longo 1978, 22–3; Angeli 1988 on Πρὸc τοὺc [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) fr. 82. The fuller form is perhaps το]ῖc ἀν[δρ]άcιν κ[αθ'] οὓc [φι]λοcοφοῦμεν (T 24 Longo 1978; 'the Great Men' Sedley 1989*b*, 106; cf. below, 1068–9, and Dem. Lac. T2 Gigante). The term derives from the use of ἀνήρ to designate a person of authority, as e.g. master of a household (while ἄνθρωποc denotes a free man in contrast to a slave or beast). Cf. Seneca, *Epist. ad Luc.* 6. 6 *Metrodorum et Hermarchus et Polyaenum magnos viros non schola Epicuri, sed contubernium fecit.* Dr Holford-Strevens compares Lucr. 3. 371 = 5. 622 *Democriti quod sancta viri sententia sumit.* (So too at Lucr. 1. 731 Empedocles is *vir*, but there the expression remains within the bounds of normal idiom.) If this is the meaning of ἄνδρεc here, as what follows suggests (especially the plural in 476), then we need the article here, either to be supplied or, more likely, in cυναλιφή with ἄνδρεc.

462 ἀξιόπ[ιcτον: 'believable', 'trustworthy': Philod. *De mus.* 77. 12,37; *De lib. dicendi* col. 6a,14. Another possible restoration is ἀξιοπ[ρεπεῖc 'praiseworthy' (*Rhet.* ii. 30,21).

463–4 μετεωρ[ίζωνlται: the verb appears at *De vit.* col. 15,6 (cf. Livy 22. 12); col. 10,31 (passive).

464–5 The subject of this inconceivably short sentence ought to be the same opponents as are the subject of 460 ὑφειλήφεcαν. I propose to restore ὑπ[ε|λίποντ]ο (though this is not the only supplement possible). The hiatus with ἐκείνει would be tolerated after a strong pause at end of sentence, which is guaranteed here by δέ at line-end. Philippson proposed to restore

a third person singular aorist in -(c)]ε, but this is impossible because the author regularly adds nu-movable at sentence end (e.g. 1383, 1468). D. Delattre proposes (*privatim*)]cέχειν· εἰ δὲ + imperfect verb. That they 'supposed that (Epicurus) set forth (his views)', or perhaps passively 'he was supposed (by them) to have set forth (his views)', is in direct contrast with 455–8: Epicurus was clear enough in his basic classification that he did not need to mention the gods as a separate category. ἐκτίθημι standardly refers to the publicly setting forth of philosophical views (see on 313–14). Philodemus means that his opponents assumed that whatever Epicurus believed about the gods he explicitly set out as part of his basic classification of things, and that in assuming this they were wrong. For the loss of the iota in ἐκ]θεῖνα⟨ι⟩ see *MGrHerc* 104–7.

465 ἐκείνει: the subject must be Epicurus, the similarly unstated subject of τάτ|τειν in 460. For this use of κινέω see LSJ II.1:'stir up questions about' (Plat. *Theat.* 163 A), 'call into question' esp. assumptions (Aristot. *De caelo* 271^{b}11)—a sense not recognized by *Lex. Philod.*, but see Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. ('labefactare, convellere argumentando') with numerous instances: Philod. *De sign.* col. 9,38, 27,29.

466 τούτω]ν μηδέν: these are presumably the items named in 448–54: people, horses, all perceptible and thinkable things. Epicurus obviously never challenged their existence, though they were not mentioned in the basic division, and the same follows for the gods, likewise not mentioned in the basic division, though he held elsewhere (e.g. *Ad Menoec.* 123) that they existed. In a similar form of this argument at 489–500 the author argues that if Epicurus had been insincere about believing in gods, he might as well have been insincere about any of his professed views—another *reductio ad absurdum*. Instead of μηδέν here we should have expected οὐδέν.

468 συμ]περιφοράν: social convention or utility and the security (freedom from fear of harm) provided by them. For Epicurean use of this term, especially in the context of debates over matters of religion, see on 312–13. The argument that Epicurus was insincere about what he did say about the gods is further developed at 489–500. Here it is merely stated that his views on the gods were not *simply* intended to forestall social opprobrium. (In 467 γε is minimalizing:'if Epicurus said gods exist *just* for the sake of social peace . . .'.) It should be remembered, however, that the Epicureans in fact placed a high premium on συμπεριφορά and the securing of social harmony in religious matters. Part of the argument for observing traditional forms of cult is the necessity for upholding the ordinary customs and society of people (συμπεριφέρεσθαι): see 751 (an argument that also appears at *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,1–8). Philodemus will demonstrate in that section that Epicurus and his followers in fact did so.

469 ἔλεγε]ν: I have restored the singular (*contra* Philippson, who supplies ἔλεγο]ν) since it was *Epicurus'* view that set the precedent for the work of his

followers described below (where the plurals probably also include Epicurus himself). The singular also coheres with the verb (of which Epicurus is the subject) in 465, which must be singular. Philodemus' argument here depends in part on an assumed conservatism in the development of Epicurus' doctrine in the early history of the school; i.e. he takes it for granted that the view that gods exist was not an addition or in contradiction to Epicurus' teaching. Once again Philodemus seems hard pressed to quote an actual passage where Epicurus explicitly said *θεοὺς εἶναι* (as opposed to arguing that Epicurus implied or assumed it in argument). See 454–8 with commentary on 460.

470 ἀποδείξεις: cf. 652 with commentary. It is not exactly clear to what 'demonstrations' the author refers. They are probably not those of a rigorous logical sort (see e.g. Sext. Emp. *Pyr. Hyp.* 2. 135–43 = *HPh* 36B), since rather heretically the Epicureans eschewed formal logic, definition, and dialectic (so D.L. 10. 31; Cic. *De fin.* 1. 7. 22 *tollit definitiones*; *Acad.* 1. 3 *nihil definiunt*; Epic. frr. 242–3 Us.). Perhaps they denote the type of argument from *ἀντιμαρτύρησις* encountered e.g. at Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123–4, on which see Furley 1972. By contrast, another class of arguments named below is that of *πίστεις* (rhetorical proofs, Aristot. *Rhet.* 1. 2, $1355^{b}35$–$1356^{a}20$). By *πίστις* Philodemus seems to mean an argument presupposing *x* (in this case the existence of gods) that, if it turns out to be valid, lends support (*πίστις*) to the prior assumption. *πίστις* is a frequent designation in Philodemus for Epicurean argumentation. On Epicurean logic see De Lacy and De Lacy 1978; Sedley 1982; Barnes 1988; Long 1988.

471–3 ο]ὐδ' ὑπεξαιρέ|των ἀντιπιπτόν|[των: a genitive absolute in *variatio*, possibly 'not even with exceptions made for opposing arguments', (literally: 'not even with there being opposing arguments to be refuted or excepted'), i.e. Epicurus and his immediate followers did not even bother to refute objections to their theology (Henrichs). *ὑπεξαιρεῖν* = *excipere* at *Rhet.* ii. 230,31. In this case *οὐδέ* (473) would have to be pleonastic with *οὐκ*] *ἀποδείξεις ἔ*[*φε*|*ρον* in 470–1, *οὐ*]*δ' ἂν ἐπολέ*|*μουν* in 473–4. But normally we should expect the participle *ἀντιπιπτόντων* to be predicate, not the verbal adjective *ὑπεξαιρέτων*, as if *ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ὑπεξαίρετα ἀντέπιπτεν*, 'since there were not even any objections (literally: things to be refuted or excepted) to tell against them', or equivalent to the protasis of a past *irrealis*: 'not even if there had been any serious objections to tell against them' (but in fact there were none). The implication of this reading would be a claim that the early Epicureans sustained no criticism for their views on the gods, and so whatever argumentation they provided for their existence was not in the manner of polemical rejoinder, but of a positive, constructive sort.

472, 476, 478 Since the surrounding line-beginnings are lost, it is possible that these genitive plural endings at the beginnings of their lines (which appear on the apograph as though filled in, outside the preserved portion of

the column) were conjecturally supplied by the copyists or one of the Neapolitan *accademici* advising them. For another instance see 1165. (I am grateful to Simon Laursen for advice on this point.)

473–5 ἐπολέ|[μουν τ]οῖc ἀναιροῦ|[cιν: this is an easily recognized reference to the passage 519–48 where Epicurus and Hermarchus are praised for engaging with notorious atheists. For the verbal parallel see 522–3 with commentary there.

475–81 Note the interwoven syntax. Here *τοcού|των . . . [καὶ τοι]ούτων* is emphatic. *διὰ . . . λό|γων [πίcτε]ιc* may refer to the discussion of the origin of the belief in gods in cultural history (225–318). *πίcτιc* is Philodemus' usual term for the type of argument used by Epicureans (so also below, 2358). (Philodemus' present argument is in the form of a *πίcτιc*.) For its logical value see on 470. *λόγοc*, on the other hand, can be used simply of philosophical discourse or treatment. Philodemus refers to the entire work as a *λόγοc* on behalf of Epicurus on the matter of *εὐcέβεια* at the close of the treatise, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,21 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 26). Cf. Introd. § 3(*c*).

479–80 περὶ αὐ|[τῶν: sc. *θεῶν*, carried over from 469.

480 cυν]βαινόν[των: the word may here have its technical sense from logic and dialectic, i.e. things 'following from' other arguments, i.e. entailed to be true 'about them' (*περὶ αὐ[τῶν*, viz. the gods).

481 ἐν βυ]βλίοιc: for the orthography see on 207. The books are undoubtedly those of Epicurus and his early followers, cited throughout. Cicero himself very probably reflects Philodemus' text here, when he makes Cotta's imaginary interlocutor at *De nat. deor.* 1. 115 object that Epicurus wrote *de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos libros* (see also below on 1281–92). Philodemus draws attention here to the sheer number of cases in which the subject of the gods was discussed in Epicurean books (475–7 *διὰ τοcού|των . . . [καὶ τοι]ούτων*). Against this impressive catalogue he opposes the plethora of works and titles of poets and non-Epicurean philosophers cited in the second part of *De pietate*. He similarly calls attention to their number at 1705–9 (and to that of the latter category at 2491, 2501–3). The result in both parts is a paratactic catalogue style of writing typical of one branch of Hellenistic writing on the history of ideas. On such lists see further Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 25 *qualia*; Obbink 1989, 217–18 with nn. 85–6.

483 οἱ] coφοί: or *φιλό]coφοι*. The broken context does not allow for identification of these persons. In the light of what precedes, we should have expected them to be Epicureans. Philippson surmises that *coφοί* refer to poets, but this would be rather late for that kind of idiom. More likely the reference or comparison involved the Epicurean *καθηγεμόνεc*.

488 ἀναcκε]υήν: a term from logical argumentation (e.g. Philod. *De sign.* col. 11,38) usually referring to proof by denial or an argument from the non-existence of something.

488–9 *Order of Columns.* This column (from **1098**) could have linked with the following col. 18 (from **1077**), which proceeds to another πίστις refuting the allegation that Epicurus was insincere about believing in the existence of gods. It is thus closely related to the present column on grounds of content; but there is not enough preserved at the bottom of the present column to restore the exact syntax or even to be sure about the join. No more than one column can have intervened.

Col. 18

A counter-argument to the allegation that Epicurus only pretended to acknowledge the existence of the gods, with the intention of deceiving the masses.

489–500 The preserved half of this sentence consists of an enumeration of principal Epicurean views: infinity of the universe, indivisibility of primary bodies, pleasure as an ethical good, pain as an object of avoidance, 'and each of the doctrines (δόγματα)'. All are grammatically the object of the infinitive ἐκτι|[θέ]ναι (498–9), the accusative subject of which is Epicurus (497). Because it is highly unlikely that any of the Epicureans' opponents accused Epicurus of putting forth these views 'falsely but intentionally' (496), and since any view regarding the nature or existence of gods is rather obviously missing from the list, it seems very likely that the lost first part of the sentence set up a *reductio ad absurdum* in the following form: 'if it were true (as our opponents claim) that Epicurus insincerely held that gods exist, it would also be necessary that he falsely but intentionally advanced each of the rest of his principal views.' In other words, it would be absurd to suppose that Epicurus set forth views on any of the subjects listed without meaning what he said. Philodemus probably also means to imply that Epicurus' view on the existence and nature of gods was as integral and basic to his philosophy as any of the views listed. What we are missing up to this point in the treatise is the actual passage in which Philodemus presented this allegation itself (though it is mentioned and perhaps presupposed as already introduced at 467–9). In this case we are lucky enough to have preserved by Cicero the criticism of Posidonius on precisely this point (Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 123 = Posidonius fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd, 346 Theiler), to the effect that Epicurus said what he did about the gods only to mitigate popular disfavour. The possibility that Philodemus is responding to Posidonius on this point seems very likely. In that case the present passage would be an identifiably Philodemean contribution to the debate, since Posidonius' work must be later that of Zeno of Sidon, who himself wrote a treatise *On Piety* and on whom Philodemus is known to be drawing in the present work (see 1465–8 with commentary). See also Introd. § 1 above, pp. 15–17.

489–94 All the doctrines in this catalogue are adduced elsewhere in the

opening section of the treatise, and in Lucretius' poem, in conjunction with Epicurean views on the gods.

489–90 Boundlessness of the universe: see 674–5.

490–1 Indivisibility of first bodies: see 42.

492 Pleasure as an ethical good: said to be connected with how we envisage the lifestyles of the gods (see 139).

493 Pain: see 196, 307 *πάθ[εσι*; cf. 64 *πράγματων*; 238 *ταράγματος*; 233 *βλά]βη[ν*; 268–9 *δι]|άλυσι[ν*.

494–5 Other basic views (*δόγματα*) related to the existence of gods: see 37–41, 432–60 on bodies; 185–9 on indestructible compounds; 239–41 fear of death.

δοl[γμάτ]ων: the standard term in Epicurean usage for approved, incontrovertible Epicurean views (NB not *δόξαι*). On the syllabification see Introd. §2(*g*).

496 πε]πλασμένως: so also Philod. *Rhet.* i. 220,17.

497–8 ἀλλ' οὐl[κ ἀ]πὸ τύχης: for *ἀπὸ τύχης* see Philod. *De ira* col. 21,30 Indelli ('per caso'). Diels 1916*a*, 893 (= 295) n. 5, who adopts Usener's correction *ἀ]πὸ ψυχῆς*, compares Sirach 19. 16 (cf. also Philod. *De lib. dicendi* col. 16b,2–3 *λέ|γ[ο]υσιν ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς*). But *τύχης* has the support of the primary apograph, and makes better sense, being virtually equivalent to *οὐκ ἄκων*, i.e. with the intention of deceiving (whereas *ἀπὸ ψυχῆς* in the desired sense would be redundant after *πε]πλασμένως*, and *ἀλλά* in 497 leads us to expect a contrast). On the claim that Epicurus put forth his views on the gods insincerely and with the intention of deceiving the masses see Cic. *De nat. deor.* i. 123 (= Posidonius fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd, 346 Theiler); Introd. §3(*c*).

498–9 ἐκτιl[θέ]νται: specifically denotes the public setting forth of views (see on 313–14). The argument entails that Epicurus had no 'secret teachings'.

502 ἐγώ: the passage probably contained a statement of promise or intention to establish that Epicurus' statements regarding gods were sincere, as fulfilled in the following column (19) and culminating in the conclusion at 696–708, before the catalogue of instances of Epicurean participation in cult.

514 π]αρασ[τήσασ: the subject apparently Epicurus, who appears in the nominative at 520 (cf. 502 *ἐγώ*, viz. Philodemus).

515–18 τοῖς . . . [ὑπὸ τ]ῶν | [ἀν]δρῶν αὐ[τῶν γε]|γραμμέν[οις: i.e. the books written by the Epicureans themselves, singled out for mention above at 481 *ἐν βυ]βλίοις*. For the sense of *ἀν]δρῶν* see above on 461–2; this instance identified by Longo 1978, 27 (see T III. 18).

518 προσέχε[ιν: without *νοῦν* in this sense: LSJ s.v. 4a, cf. b.

518–19 *Order of Columns.* This column has been moved up slightly (it will have been misnumbered by three columns) in the descending order of columns in the

1077 sequence because of the similarity of its argument to that of the preceding col. 17 and because of its syntactical link with the following col. 19. That column presumes that the allegation of insincerity against Epicurus has already been introduced. The opponent's failure to take into account actual statements in Epicurean writings is then contrasted with the citation of Epicurean works in the following columns.

Col. 19

The argument is as follows. 519–32: So far from denying the existence of gods, Epicurus himself attacked notorious fifth-century atheists by name, portraying them as madmen for their socially aberrant views about the gods, and (533–41) for advancing explanations of the names of the gods, which would, if true, make it impossible for gods to exist. 542–6: Hermarchus also made this argument, and (546–54) discussed Empedocles' use of metaphor in connection with the names of gods and the Epicurean doctrine of natural affinity in language. 554–9 Epicurus exhibited this doctrine through his enthusiasm for participation in the mysteries at Athens.

520–1 *μέμφομαι* with acc. *rei*, dat. of person: LSJ s.v. 2; *Lex. Philod.* s.v. A cognate acc. (i.e. *μ[έμψιν*, cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 10) is possible but less likely than *μ[ανίαν* in the context of what follows, especially in the light of 528 below. Cf. Emped. *ap.* Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7. 124: *ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίαν ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης* (= *VS* 31 B 3 = fr. 2 Wright); Plat. *Symp.* 218 B: *τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίαν τε καὶ βακχείας*; Philod. *De piet.* above, 473–5; *Π[ε]ρ[ὶ] μα[νίας* (*P. Herc.* 57 + 353) in Crönert 1906, 108 n. 507; D. Bassi, *RFIC* 45 (1917), 457–66; E. Bignone, 'Philodemea', *RFIC* 47 (1919), 421–3; Dorandi 1990*a*, 2350 (though Philippson 1938, 2472–3 thought the title should be restored as *Περὶ προ]μη[θίας*).

Philippson (following Usener) reconstructed the opening as a reported Academic objection against Epicurus himself; the necessary restorations (in 520–1) do not stand up against scrutiny of the apograph. Scholars relying uncritically upon Usener's *[ἀλλ' ἐ]|ροῦσιν* (522–3) argued that Philodemus was thus dependent directly or indirectly on an Academic report for his citation of atheists from *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 (followed by Winiarczyk 1976, 37, 44–5). It now emerges that the present citation stems from an independent Epicurean tradition regarding Epicurus' published views on atheism.

522–30 For the locution, cf. 130–5 *τοῦ]|τό φασι μέγις[τον] | εἶναι τεκμήριον | τοῦ περιαιρ[εῖν τὸ] | θεῖο[ν] ἐκ τῶν [ὄν]|των*; 473–5 *ἐπολέ|[μουν* (sc. Epicurei) *τ]οῖς ἀναιροῦ|[σιν* (sc. *θεούς*); later in *De pietate* (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,11–12 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 22): *τῶν ἁπλῶς τὸ | θ[εῖο]ν ἀ[ν]αιρούντων*, of one Philippus (*RE* 44), an otherwise unknown atheist, if

not Philip of Opus or a Macedonian potentate or the Cyrenaic named at D.L. 1. 16; with the dative participle: Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 123. This use of *αἱρεῖν* (Lat. *tollere*) and its compounds is common philosophical parlance, and especially favoured in theological debate: Philod. *De piet.* above, 133 (passive), 474–5, 2146–7; D.L. 2. 97 *ἦν δὲ ὁ Θεόδωρος παντάπασιν ἀναιρῶν τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας*; and see Reiche 1971, 296–329; Henrichs 1974*a*, 31. The antonym is to 'preserve' or 'conserve' the god's proper characteristics in one's thought (266 *τηρεῖν*, *φυλάττειν*). In general the charge is that the opponents' views, if true, would make it impossible for gods as commonly (and, for Epicurus, self-evidently) conceived to exist; hence they are said to 'do away' with them in effect. Though apparently not legally actionable, this charge and the one which follows constitute a kind of rhetoric of atheism popular in philosophical debate after the fourth century; for its philosophical force, see below on 527–9.

521–2 ἐ]|κ τῶν ὄντων (Gomperz): 'from existing entities' (see above on 231 for this sense of *φύσις*). The division is regular: see *MGrHerc* 11 n. 1. Philippson was wrong to print | ⟨ἐ⟩κ *τῶν*. Short prepositions and negatives with their following words are regarded virtually as phonetic units (e.g. below, 2036–7 *ἐ|ξ αὐτῶν*); in the present case the rule is that labials or gutturals (but not nasals) before dentals cohere with the dental in division: thus 1280–1 *ἐ|[κ]τείνω*, below, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 7,31–2 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 18) *πέμ|πτωι*, 12,13–14 (p. 22) *ἐπιδει|κτέον*, 13,2–3 (p. 23) *βλά|πτειν*. The two considerations combine to produce the present division; likewise *De piet.* 1518–19 *κἀ{ι}|κ τῆς*, Philod. *Rhet.* i. 109,5 Sudhaus *ἐ|γδιστα[ζ]ομέ[νου*, *P. Grenf.* 1,12 *ἐ|κ τῆς*. On syllabification in *De pietate* see Introd. §2(*g*); in papyri more generally, *MGrHerc* 10; Turner and Parsons 1987, 17 with n. 96 with further references; in school exercises: Cribiore 1993, especially 99–104.

523–4 κἀ[ν τῶι] | δωδεκάτω[ι: the title *Περὶ φύσεως* must be supplied, as in all citations from Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* in *De pietate* (except for the inaugural one at 225–7). Philippson 1921, 376 argued from the omission of the full title *Περὶ φύσεως* here that the citation immediately preceding this one ought to have come from a different book of that same work, a citation which would have named the title. Now that we know that col. 8 (1077 fr. 19) *precedes* the present citation in the original order of columns (as it did not in the editions of Gomperz and Philippson), it is clear that Philodemus named the full title only in that instance (225–7, apparently the first citation from *Περὶ φύσεως* in *De pietate*), and by book number alone thereafter (cf. 1050, 1055, 1078, 1088, 1888–90, cf. 1787–8 with comm.). For the content of *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 as a whole see on 225–7. In the present citation atheism, together with the theories of Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias, which ascribed the development of belief in the gods to linguistic change, fear of natural phenomena, or fictions invented for political control (and that thus

implicitly 'removed the divine from the sum of things') were explained as a later, deviant stage in cultural history. Knowing the precise order of citations from *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 in *De pietate* of course tells us nothing certain about the original order in which Epicurus treated these subjects in that book (a point I owe to D. Sedley). For example, Epicurus may have begun the section on early religion by attacking the theories of Prodicus *et al.* But Epicurus' language in the present passage suggests a distinct attempt to associate their views with the secondary, deviant stage of thinking about the gods. So on the whole it seems likely that Epicurus treated these topics in the order in which Philodemus presents the citations: the account of the earliest humans first, followed by the criticism of Prodicus *et al.* The next extant citation from *Περὶ φύσεως* in *De pietate* (below, 1050–4) comes from book 13.

One of the more interesting pieces of information to be derived from the present text is that book 12 of Epicurus *Περὶ φύσεως* contained the earliest known *index atheorum*. Philodemus' *De pietate* transmitted one version of it. On the derivation of the later catalogues, see Henrichs 1976, 20–1; Winiarczyk 1976, 32–46, esp. 37; 1984; Obbink 1989. The precise dating of the composition of *Περὶ φύσεως* 12 (and thus of the earliest *index atheorum*) is open to dispute. Longo (on Hermarchus fr. 29) rightly notes that 301/0, the archon-date recorded in the *subscriptio* of *Περὶ φύσεως* 14 (G. Leone, 'Epicuro, *Della natura*, libro XIV', *CErc* 14 (1984), 17–107), can be taken as a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of *Περὶ φύσεως* 12. Nonetheless, I am sceptical that the archon-dates in the *subscriptiones* of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* preserve dates of *composition* (*contra* D. Sedley, *CErc* 3 (1973), 13, cf. 79 'the year in which the book was written'; so also Clay 1982, 17–26). A comparison with all the preserved *subscriptiones* for ancient literary works suggests that the subscriptions in *Περὶ φύσεως* likewise record information regarding copying, redaction, and correction, and thus date the work of a scribe or *διορθωτής* (possibly the publication of a particular version). Epicurus may well have already completed much of *Περὶ φύσεως* (at least books 1–12) before or shortly after coming to Athens in 306/5, and in the following years successively revised and published the work book by book in the multiple redactions known from among the Herculaneum copies with their archon-date-bearing *subscriptiones*. This is supported by the phrase *τῶν ἀρχαίων (ἐκ] τ̣ῶν ἀρχαίων̣ [* (Vogliano, followed by Sedley 1973), which occurs in the *subscriptiones* and which almost certainly means 'from the old exemplars' (implying a text had already existed for some time) and from the designation *ἐγράφη* in the *subscriptio* to *Περὶ φύσεως* 28 (Epic. fr. 31. 22 Arr.^{2}), which means not 'was composed' (for which we would expect *συνεγράφη*) but 'was copied, was inscribed'. Sedley 1989*b*, 107 suggests instead that the words *] τ̣ῶν ἀρχαίων̣ [* below the title in the papyrus of Epicurus' *De nat.* 28 are 'the remnants of a phrase meaning roughly

"concerning the early works"', i.e. Epicurean juvenilia (*τὰ ἀρχαῖα* or *τὰ ἀρχαϊκά*, cf. Philod. *De Stoic.* col. 9,4–22 Dorandi) containing views retracted or revised in the discussions related in that book. For an approximate dating (third century BC) of the papyri of *Περὶ φύσεως* which contain the subscriptions see Cavallo 1983, 47–58 esp. 58; id., *Scrittura e civiltà*, 8 (1984), 5–12.

For the sources that constitute our knowledge of *Περὶ φύσεως* 12, see above on 225–7. It is likely that the criticisms of Prodicus, Critias, and possibly Diagoras and the rest came in the context of a critique of their anthropological views (i.e. how men first came to believe in and worship the gods), emphasizing attitudes towards the external world and common notions, rather than in an explicit denial by Epicurus of allegations of his own atheism, as Philodemus' isolated citation might suggest. At Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 118 (a passage related polemically to the present one), Cotta represents the triad Diagoras, Critias, Theodorus as atheists who nevertheless ironically provided a basis for civic religion by locating the origin of religious beliefs in *fear* of the gods. This may constitute a post-Antiochean Academic response to, and parody of Epicurus' criticism as put forth in the present passage. In *Περὶ φύσεως* 13 (cited below, 1050–4) Epicurus turned to treat the correct attitude to be adopted towards the gods.

524–5 Προ]ιδίκωι: Prodicus' 'Euhemerism' and his portrayal by later sources as an atheist has been treated in detail by Henrichs 1975*b*; 1976; 1984*b*. On the basis of the present passage it can be said that Epicurus grouped Prodicus among those who remove 'divine nature' from the sum of things—a charge which, from an Epicurean point of view, was as fittingly applied to his theory (often confused with Euhemerism) about the divinization by early man of essential goods (or their discoverers), as to the claim *οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι* attributed to him by the later tradition. See also below on 535.

525 Δια[γόραι: Epicurus could have read of his atheism in Eudemus of Rhodes' *Τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορία*. Diagoras also appears in this connection in Diog. Oen. fr. 16 Smith (the name appears intact at fr. 16 II,4). From fr. 16 of Diogenes it is known, however, that Epicurus grouped the (sceptical) views of Protagoras on the gods with the (avowedly atheistic) view of Diagoras. According to Diogenes, Epicurus had said that Protagoras, in saying that he knew not whether there were gods or not, meant *exactly the same thing* (*τὸ αὐτό*) as Diagoras who said there were none. (See too C. W. Chilton, 'An Epicurean View of Protagoras', *Phronesis*, 7 (1962), 105–9; P. M. Huby, 'Epicurus' Attitude to Democritus', *Phronesis*, 23 (1978), 80–6.) There was a tradition going back to Aristoxenus that Diagoras in his genuine poetry spoke piously, that only works spuriously attributed to him contained atheistic views. If Aristoxenus was wrong, says Philodemus later in the treatise (see vol. ii) after quoting several of these poems in evidence (*P. Herc.* 1428 col. 11), then Diagoras *ἔπαιζεν*, 'trieb Scherz' as Henrichs

1974*a*, 21 (cf. 28 with n. 51) has it, but with the added implication that his engagement with such symposiastic poetry was a frivolous one; cf. Philod. *Epigr.* 29. 7 Sider (= *AP* 9. 412, 20 Gow–Page, 23 Gigante) *Ἀντιγένης καὶ Βάκχιος ἐχθὲς ἔπαιζον*, with the list of epigram incipits in *P. Oxy.* LIV 3724 col. 2,8 *Μουσῶν Ἀντιγένους*, on which Gigante, *SIFC* 52 (1984), 136 observes that the mention of the Muses strongly suggests that *ἔπαιζον* in Philodemus' epigram means 'wrote poetry'; cf. Hedylus *HE* 6. 4; Lucilius *AP* 11. 134. 1; Catullus 50. 4–5 *scribens versiculos uterque nostrum ludebat*. Any views thus expressed, like those of madmen, children, poets, and drunken symposiasts, were not to be taken seriously—a form of philosophical slander only slightly less severe than the charge of lunacy in the present text. It suggests that if his alleged atheism could not be altogether ignored in the consensus of theological debate, it could at least be declared out of court on psychological grounds by a manœuvre analogous to the 'madman argument' (cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 34 *puerilibus fabulis* with Pease's note ad loc.). In this case, Philodemus continues, the Stoics err even *worse* than Diagoras (col. 11,7–14; Henrichs 1974*a*, 21 *τούτους Διαγόρου | [μ]ᾶλλον πληνμε-λεῖν*), in so far as they (unlike Diagoras) deceptively appeared to admit the existence of the divine while subtly and deliberately doing away with it in effect in their interpretations (see col. 12,3–12; Henrichs 1974a, 22). On Diagoras generally see F. Jacoby, *Diagoras ὁ Ἄθεος* (Abhandlungen d. Deutschen Akademie d. Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur u. Kunst, 1959/3); M. Winiarczyk, 'Diagoras von Melos: Wahrheit und Legende', *Eos*, 67 (1979), 191–213, 68 (1980), 51–75 on *De piet.* 527–9, who argues that Diagoras' atheism is an invention of the Hellenistic philosophical and biographical tradition (so also Dover 1976, 27 = 1988, 137 regards Diagoras as a notorious sceptic (Aristoph. *Nub.* 830), who spoke slightingly of the Eleusinian mysteries, not an atheist). But as Burkert 1985*a*, 316 n. 35 notes, this overlooks the testimony of the present text, according to which the view of Diagoras as an atheist (who might have said something like *οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι*, or clearly implied he thought so) must be at least as early as Epicurus, i.e. the late fourth century BC. The present text thus demonstrates that the attribution of atheism to Diagoras antedates the Hellenistic period. Jacoby wanted to date Diagoras' trial to about 430 BC; L. Woodbury, *Phoenix*, 19 (1965), 178–211 (= *Collected Writings*, ed. C. G. Brown, R. L. Fowler, *et al.* (Atlanta, 1991), 118–50) defends the traditional date of *c.*415 BC.

526 Κριτίαι: strikingly the earliest and only allegation of atheistic beliefs against Critias before Satyrus, whose habit of inferring biography from drama is sometimes regarded as responsible for the inclusion of such figures from the fifth century in the later catalogues of atheists (see Dover 1976, 29, 45 = 1988, 138–9, 150 on Satyrus' role, with 45–6 = 1988, 150–1 on Critias). There is no evidence that Critias (or for that matter Diagoras), unlike

Prodicus, was an *avowed* atheist, or that he personally held the views expressed by characters in any dramatic work he may have written, nor are we told that Epicurus called him ἄθεος. (The testimony for Critias' alleged atheism is collected by Winiarczyk 1984, 162–3; see below for further bibliography.) Epicurus may have regarded him as disrespectful of the gods on the basis of popular tradition (e.g. acts of violence as one of the Thirty, his association with Socrates, Alcibiades, Plato, and other unsavoury characters in the overthrow of the democracy, mutilation of the herms, etc., as Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 9. 54 seems to have in mind, noting he was εἷς τῶν ἐν Ἀθήναις τυραννησάντων), though the remarks which follow in the present text (lines 540–1) suggest that an anthropological account like that found in the famous passage of the satyr-play *Sisyphus* (*VS* 88 B 25 = Critias, *TrGF* 1².43 F 19, from Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 9. 54, 'Aëtius' 1. 72 in *Dox. Gr.* 298) was the point of attack. This is not of course to say that Epicurus in levelling his philosophical charge of atheism (519–30) against the thinkers named did not count heavily upon their association with incidents of civic impiety in the popular tradition: this certainly influenced, for example, the popular view of Euripides, who in both ancient and modern times has vied for authorship of the *Sisyphus* (A. Dihle, 'Das Satyrspiel "Sisyphus"', *Hermes*, 105 (1977), 28–42), as an atheist. Dihle advocates the authorship of Euripides, but as Burkert 1985*a*, 314 with n. 22 noted, he overlooked the evidence of the present text as testimony both explicitly associating Critias with atheism, and antedating Satyrus and the Hellenistic biographers. The authorship of Euripides is reasserted and defended and the relevance of the present passage dismissed by Yunis 1988, who argues that it is unlikely that Epicurus, in referring to Critias, was thinking of *TrGF* 1².43 F 19, since Epicurus fr. 87 Us. (= *De piet.* 519–30) does not deal (as it is argued Sisyphus' speech does) primarily with undetected crime. On the question of authorship, cf. *contra* Pančenko 1980; Lefkowitz 1987; 1989; Davies 1989, who cites (p. 25) the present fragment of Epicurus and accords it the same weight as does Burkert; Winiarczyk 1989 (who exploits part of the present text, but is unaware of Burkert's observation op. cit., which does not appear in the original German edition). As Dihle had shown, the only other author (other than Sextus himself, in attributing the *Sisyphus* fragment to Critias) who supplies evidence for Critias as an atheist is Plutarch, *De superstitione* 13 (which D. F. Sutton, *CQ*² 31 (1981), 33–8 had already argued was an extrapolation from the fragment). Both Plutarch and the present text pair the names of Critias and Diagoras, a familiar juxtaposition in the secondary, anecdotal tradition. But as Davies 1989, 25 rightly points out, the addition of Prodicus' name in the fragment of Epicurus rules out secondary association and points to a more reliable identification with philosophers who were reputed (at least from the late fourth century) to have actually denied the gods' existence.

The continuation of fr. 87 Us. in the present text (530–41) and its context in the Epicurean debate sets the matter in a different light, because the naming of the gods there described clearly involves intentional deceit (cf. 540–1 *ἀπά*]||*της*; see also below 1184–1217, 1853–62, 2202–41, 2430–48, where the Epicurean position on undetected crime is ultimately differentiated from that expressed by the speaker of the *Sisyphus* fragment, to which it is in certain respects precariously close). From the text of the present fragment we can be sure that what Epicurus said was not that Critias explicitly said *οὐ θεοὺς εἶναι*, but merely that he said something that could be construed as tantamount to it, and so (by implication) 'eliminated the divine from the sum of existing things' (*τὸ θεῖον ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἀναιρεῖ*, see 521 with commentary). Epicurus will have meant that what he said about the gods made it impossible for them as generally conceived to exist. The remainder of this column went unknown to all the above participants in this debate, because it was not included as part of Epic. fr. 87 Us., which ends at l. 530; and Gomperz 1866, 376 is not much help after that point. All indications emerging from the remainder of this column suggest that Epicurus thought Critias had advanced a theory (as does the protagonist in the *Sisyphus* fragment) of how popular religious belief and practice (e.g. naming of the gods, or explanations of their names, 534–41) had been deceptively manipulated in the development of human civilization. See especially below, 539–40 and 1185–1217 (with commentary) which exhibit vestigial echoes of the *Sisyphus* account. Lines 527–30 (where see commentary) appear to allude to Prodicus' alleged atheism in precisely the same way as Critias' here, on the basis of a famous portrayal in a dramatic work (namely Teiresias in Eurip. *Bacch.* 170–369, esp. 286–97, long suspected to be a thin veil for the sophist Prodicus). For echoes of the *Sisyphus* fragment already in Lucretius (perhaps via Epicurus' description in the present fragment from *De nat.* 12) see Gigante 1957; on its text see further W. Luppe, *Hermes*, 120 (1992), 118–19.

κἄ[λλοις: Protagoras, at least is added by Diog. Oen. (fr. 16 Smith, which, like the present passage, probably derives from Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* book 12: above on 225–7); perhaps also here fall some those of thinkers listed as atheists at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 62–4, 117–18, with the exception of Euhemerus (also in the lists of Sextus and 'Aëtius') who is ruled out on chronological grounds (the list may have been expanded; see Winiarczyk 1976, 37; Obbink 1989, 215–23). Regarding Theodorus, cf. D.L. 2. 97 with Nietzsche's emendation *Εὐήμερον* for *Ἐπίκουρον* (*RhM*² 25 (1870), 231, cf. Epic. fr. 391 Us.), and see Winiarczyk, *Philologus*, 125 (1981), 64–94, and his Teubner edition (with Diagoras, Leipzig, 1981). Diog. Oen. (ad. loc.; cf. commentary on 525) contrasts the views of Protagoras with those of *Diagoras* (if only for the purpose of arguing that the positions of both were in Epicurean terms identical), a contrast which suggests a division made at later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,1–8 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 25)

between 'those who say it is unknown whether there are any gods or what they are like' and those who 'say openly that there are none or clearly do away with them (*φα|νερὸνc ὄντας ὡc ἀν|ήιρουν*)' (cf. Introd. § 1). Those philosophers named in the present passage fall into the latter category; Protagoras, Academic sceptics, etc. in the former.

527 If *μέμφεται* (Usener) is to be read, it is unlikely that the scribe wrote *μεν-*, as the Herculanensia regularly exhibit the homorganic nasal in this verb; see *MGrHerc* 65 ff., 269. *Nu* is thus more likely the work of the copyist. The present tense is usual in *De pietate* for citations from books (see e.g. 228, 1048–9, but the aorist or imperfect sometimes in testimonia). After the gap, the apograph represents ΘẠCKA, which cannot be right, and Usener's correction *φὰc κα[* is acceptable assuming some shifting of traces before the papyrus was copied by the *disegnatore*, together with Usener's correction *π̣α[ρὰ* | or the correlation *κα[ὶ παρὰ]* | . . . *καὶ* (for which the apograph allows adequate space). On the other hand, a finite verb is not in fact required here: we have already had *ἐμ̣[έμψα]|το* with the dative *τοῖc ἀναι-ροῦcιν* in 521–2, with which the proper names in 524–6 may stand in apposition after *ὡc* in 523. So the possibility remains that the lost end of l. 526 contained not *κἄ[λλοιc*, but the name of another 'atheist' carrying over into 527: e.g. *κἀ[ριcτο]|μένε̣[ι καὶ] φὰc* (sc. Epicurus) etc.

527–9 π̣α[ρα]|κόπτε̣ιν καὶ μ̣[αίνεc]|θαι: cf. esp. 654–6 *πάν|τε[c εἰ μὴ παρ]άκοποί τι|νε[c*; *P. Herc.* 1577/1579 fr. 4,34–40 (= *SVF* ii.640, p. 193); Philod. *De poem.* 2 col. 9,28 above on 299; Lucr. 5. 164–5 *desipere*; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 94 *summos viros desipere, delirare, dementes esse dicebas*, very likely Cicero's rendering of the present passage, and 1.37 (with Pease's note ad loc.); Diog. Oen. fr. 149 Smith col. 3,2–3 with M. F. Smith, *Prometheus*, 8 (1982), 209–10. If the argument (e.g. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.43–4) from the agreement of all mankind (*consensus omnium*) for the existence of gods were valid, one might ask, how then could the Epicureans have accounted for well-known historical instances of atheism? Epicurus, after all, had himself attacked notorious atheists in *Περὶ φύcεωc* 12. The answer is that Epicurus and his followers sought to portray atheists (and agnostic sceptics, whom they classed together) as madmen whose abnormal views did not figure in the determination of *κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*. See further on 654–6, Obbink 1992*b*. For the rhetorical topos (especially in theological polemic) to which the Epicureans were particularly but by no means exclusively addicted, see Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.37 *quasi delirans*, and for a listing of corresponding expressions in *De pietate* and elsewhere in Philodemus, Philippson 1939, 28–9. In a similar light Cicero's Epicurean also portrays those thinkers who, though not avowed atheists, nevertheless 'eliminate the divine from the sum of things' by positing 'inconceivable' deities; these include Plato (1. 18), Parmenides (1. 28), Heraclides of Pontus (1. 34), Cleanthes (1. 37), the poets (1. 42), Oriental prophets (1. 43). Cicero makes Cotta counter the argument

at 1.92,94. It is clear (e.g. from Colotes' attack, as preserved by Plutarch) that the charge of madness originally had considerably more than mere rhetorical import, particularly in the sphere of epistemology. An Academic or sceptical opponent, for instance, could be thus forced to concede his irrationality (and thus the credibility of his views), or advance a positive defence of his scepticism in violation of *ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων* or at least upon grounds which would play well into the hands of materialists appealing to sense impression and common notions. The Stoics likewise appealed to the argument from common notions (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*) on the issue of the existence of gods; they differed with the Epicureans on the exact content of the naturally acquired generic conception (*πρόληψις*) of the divine: see Kleve 1963, 96–108; Schian 1973; Schofield 1980; Obbink 1992*b*. W. H. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, ii (Cambridge, 1965), 482 n. 1, unfamiliar with the polemics involved, was wrong to dismiss out of hand the Epicurean argument.

529–32 βακχεύουlcιν: i.e. those engaging in Dionysiac *ὄργια* or raving, as though under the influence of a deity, like the *θεόληπτοι* at Aristot. *Eth. Eud.* 1214^{a}5. Compare (together with the preceding *μαίνες*]|*θαι*) Heraclitus *VS* 22 B 15 *ὡυτὸς δὲ Ἀίδης καὶ Διόνυσος, ὅτεῳ μαίνονται καὶ ληναΐζουσιν* (an observation I owe to Jan Bremmer) and Eurip. *Hipp.* 954 *Βάκχευς* with Barrett's note ad loc. The present wording may reflect Epicurus' original rather closely (with a joke perhaps on Socrates' philosophic inspiration at Plat. *Symp.* 218 B). Part of the point is that to whatever limited extent such extreme views were shared, they could hardly be representative of the common conception of the divine. For the topos, cf. Philod. *De mus.* 25. 12,22 Kemke; *De ira* col. 30,25; Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1091 B (of the Epicureans): *καὶ ὀλολυγμοὺς ἐκβακχεύοντες ὑφ' ἡδονῆς*. In any case, the metaphor of *ritual* madness (cf. Eurip. *Hipp.* 952–4) adduced by Philodemus appears to involve a touch of irony, especially since the raving bacchant Teiresias (long suspected to be a thin disguise for the sophist Prodicus: see above on 526 *Κριτίαι*) at Eurip. *Bacch.* 286–97 instructs Pentheus in the proper etymological interpretation of Dionysus' name and related words (*τὸ μέρος* 'part' of the aether = *ὁ μηρός* 'thigh' = *ὅμηρος* = baby Dionysus as 'hostage' in Teiresias' explanation) as revealing the true origin of the myth about his birth from Zeus's thigh and the original form of words used in his myth, or even his name itself (accepting Dalmeyda's correction *διάλυσιν* [sc. *Ἥρας νεικέων*] for *Διόνυσον* in 294 with no lacuna, as defended by C. W. Willink, *CQ*^{2} 16 (1966), 27–50 at 40–1, cf. Cornut. *De nat. deor.* 30, though rejected by Dodds and Henrichs). Epicurus is unlikely to have approved of Teiresias' view. An allusion by Epicurus to the Euripidean play seems likely, for Philodemus goes on (534–41, where see commentary) to specify that Epicurus' attack was directed in part against the etymological explanations of divine names propounded by these thinkers.

529–33 The wording here seems to reflect *KD* 1 (*τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε* etc.) which delimits the 'common conception' of god, perhaps alluded to in 537 below, and which, as we know from Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.45, constitutes for Epicurus the naturally acquired *πρόληψις* of divine nature. For an impressive list of recollections of the wording of this *sententia* (by far and away the most well-known and frequently cited of all Epicurus' ideas), see Usener 1887, 394. The implication is that Epicurus argued in *De nat.* 12 that it was inappropriate (to the universal *πρόληψις* of the divine) for anything 'which causes us trouble or disturbs us' to have *originally given rise* to religious beliefs—e.g. deceit or fear of retribution (Critias), want of essential goods or reverence of human benefactors (Prodicus, cf. Persaeus), fear of natural phenomena (Critias' Sisyphus, and Democritus, whom the biographical tradition makes the mentor of Diagoras).

531–2 πρᾶγμ[α ἡ]|μεῖν: *πράγμ[αθ' ἡ]|μεῖν* edd., and cf. the wording of *KD* 1 (previous note), but it is too long for the space at line-end. For the absence of *συναλιφή* in *De pietate* before a word beginning with an aspirated vowel see below on 727–8.

535 παραγραμμίζ[ουσι: I take the subjects to be Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias (*et al.* in 526, *αὐτούς* in 530). Philodemus is still paraphrasing Epicurus; so the remainder of the column (from 531 to 541) should be added to Epicurus fr. 87 Usener. *παραγραμμίζειν* = *παραγραμματίζειν*, as it does at *Σ* Aristoph. *Pax* 867 (cf. *Eq.* 79). Its principal use (e.g. D.L. 3.26, *Σ* Thuc. 1.24, *Σ* Aristoph. *Nub.* 31, *Ran.* 432) denotes a punning interpretation of a name or word by means of alliterative transposition, addition, or substitution of consonants. An example of what Philodemus has in mind emerges later (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 9,27–9 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 21), directed against the Stoics: *Ἀθηνᾶν μὲν | οἷον Ἀθ[ρ]ηνᾶν εἰρῆς|θαι* (cf. Plat. *Crat.* 399 A, 414 C, 418 A). Use of a technical term from the grammarians (as shown by its appearance in scholarly commentaries) may have been intended to imply that such explanation of the gods' names was a grammatical triviality as well, and LSJ, who cite the present passage (s.v.), were not far off in translating 'makes the gods nugatory'. Such interpretations belittle the gods, literally reducing them to assemblages of letters. Similarly apposite is the use of *παραγραμματίζειν* with regard to place-names at Strabo 1.2.34, where it means to emend or interpret etymologically by means of a change of letters (cf. 10.3.3–8 with Henrichs 1975*a*, 16–17). For an extended critique of the Stoics with regard to such interpretation of *nomina sacra* see below, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 7 (esp. 9–11 *καὶ τὰ | τῶν θεῶν [ὀ]νόματα ἐφαρμότ-τει*), col. 9 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 18–20), and in Cicero: *De nat. deor.* 3.62 *quamquam, quoniam Neptunum a nando appellatum putas, nullum erit nomen quod non possis una littera explicare unde ductum sit*; (then the charge of lunacy:) *in quo quidem magis tu mihi natare visus es quam ipse Neptunus*, followed

by a critique from common notions, as at 1. 36; cf. 2. 66 *Neptunus a nando, paulum primis litteris immutatis*, and the collection of similar instances at *Thes. Ling. Lat.* vii (1937), 513, 37–53. The earliest known theologian who interpreted divine names by rewriting them seems to have been Stesimbrotos of Thasos, *FGrHist* 107 F 13 *Διόνυcoc = Διόνυξoc, ὅτι cὺν κέραcι γεννώμενoc ἔνυξε τὸν Διὸc μηρόν*. Stesimbrotos is quoted several times in the criticism of the poets in the second part of *De pietate* (Schober 1988, 84, 88, 91 bis; Luppe 1987*a*; 1987*b*), and criticized for engaging in this type of criticism of poetry and myth. Manipulation of divine names (= *παραγραμματίζειν*) is to be distinguished from etymological allegory by metonymy (e.g. Dionysus = wine, as at Eurip. *Bacch.* 276 ff.), though the two sometimes occur in combination and both antedate Stoicism by a considerable stretch: the latter form (metonymy) was at least known to Prodicus (see Theagenes *VS* 8 A 2) and was employed by the author (Stesimbrotos, according to W. Burkert, *ZPE* 62 (1986), 1–5) of *P. Derveni* (Pack² 2465a), as well as having an influence of sorts upon Euripides (see *Bacch.* 276 ff.). On Prodicus' alleged use of *metonymy* see Eurip. *Bacch.* 274–85 with E. R. Dodds's commentary ad loc. and the corrections of Henrichs 1975*b*, 110 n. 64. If the present reconstruction of ll. 533–5 is basically correct, the present passage is now testimony (as early as Epicurus) for Prodicus' interpretation of divine names by means of rewriting (*παραγραμματίζειν*; see also above on 529–31). Epicurus has good reason to be alarmed at the kind of explanations given to divine names. For on Epicurus' theory such names had originally been formed *κατὰ φύcιν*, like the original conception of the gods by the *πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι* (above, 225–31). On the proper use of *nomina sacra* see *Ad Herod.* 77 (a passage that corresponds to Epicurus *Περὶ φύcεωc* 12–13), which lays down very specific restrictions on the kind of *ὀνόματα* that can be attributed to the gods, against the penalty of mental anxiety: 'In all the terms with which we set forth our conceptions of such blessedness (i.e. the gods, *πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα . . . κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα*), we must preserve (*τηρεῖν*) them in all their holiness lest from our expressions there grow opinions that deny this majesty. Otherwise these contraditions will cause the greatest confusion in our souls.'

535–6 [ὀνόμα]|τα: Philippson proposed [*πράγμα*]|*τα*, but it is hard to see how this could be an appropriate object for *παραγραμμίζειν*. For *ὀνόματα* in this context, see the parallels quoted in the previous note and especially Democritus *VS* 68 B 26 *μετάθεcιc τῶν ὀνομάτων* (below on 538).

536–7 Ἀν[τιc]|θέ[νηc]: another of Epicurus' *Paradebeispiele* of atheists (524–6). Like Prodicus and Diagoras (above), he too is treated later in *De pietate* (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 21 (Gomperz 1866, 72) = Antisthenes fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi = *SSR* V A 79 Giannantoni: *π]αρ' Ἀντιc|θένει δ' ἐν μὲν [τ]ῷ | Φυcικῷ λέγεται τὸ | κατὰ νόμον εἶναι | πολλοὺc θεοὺc κα|τὰ δὲ φύcιν ἕν[α*, 'According to Antisthenes in his *Physics* it is said that many gods exist

by convention, but only one in reality' (carried over into Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 32). See below on 538; A. Brancacci, 'La théologie d'Antisthène', *Φιλοσοφία*, 15–16 (1985/6), 218–30; cf. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, 'Le premiers cyniques et la religion', in ead. (ed.), *Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements* (Paris, 1993), 143–4; M. Gigante, 'Cinismo e epicureismo', ibid., 189–90. On the title of Antisthenes' work and Epicurus' acquaintance with it see Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) fr. 110 Angeli, with her note, pp. 232–3; cf. also fr. 111; Philodemus knew it (or of it): *De Stoicis* col. 13,1–5 Dorandi.

537 τὸ κοινό[τατον (sc. *ὄνομα*, from 535–6?): for the distinction see Didymus, *in Demosth.*, col. 14,22–31; cf. Philod. *De Ira* col. 44,3. The reference may be to the most natural conception of the divine in Antisthenes' explanation of names of gods. *τὸ κοινὸ*[*ν* (Gomperz) is in any case too short; *τὸ κοινῷ*[*c ὄν* (Philod. *De Sign.* 19,4) is a possibility. In Philod. *De signis τὸ κοινόν* often means 'the common view', e.g. *τὸ κοινὸν ὅτι* . . . 'the common view that . . .'.

538 ὑποτίνων: an early exegetical term from criticism of poetry and myth (cf. *ὑπόνοια*). For the sense: LSJ s.v. 2 citing Paus. 7. 9. 4; Eurip. *Or.* 915 *ὑπὸ δ' ἔτεινε . . . λόγους . . . τοιούτους*; Plut. *Tim.* 10 *ὑπέτεινεν αὐτοῖς ἀπάτην* 'suggested a deceit.' Philippson's rendering of the *disegno*'s *υποτινων* as *ὑπ' ἐκε*⟨*ί*⟩*νων* has little to recommend it (cf. *MGrHerc* 26). *ὑπό τινων* (Gomperz) is, of course, possible; but it is difficult to accommodate a passive verb to the surrounding context. I take it that Epicurus means that Antisthenes, in his *Physics*, ascribes the multiplicity of gods to name-giving (*thesis*), putting in their place the most common, general view of the gods. In this way he reduced the many gods of cult to one natural principle. This accords well with what Philodemus says later about Antisthenes (*P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 21 = Antisthenes fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi, quoted above on 536–7): he said that by convention (*νόμος*) there exist many gods, but in reality (*κατὰ φύσιν*) only one (*ἕνα*). According to Epicurus, the formation of language took place both naturally and by the accretion of convention: *νόμος* confirmed that speech-forms are in fact *κατὰ φύσιν*. Thus we have the direct testimony of Philodemus that the Epicureans defended the proposition (here said to be controverted by Antisthenes) that the gods exist in their commonly conceived individuality (539 *τὰ κατὰ μέρος*). Later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 10,16–11,5 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 21), Philodemus turns the same charge against this with the Epicurean view:

πλα|νῶσιν δ' ὡς πολλοὺς | ἀπολείπον[*τε*]*ς. ὥσθ' [ὃ]||ταν ς̣ημνόν* [*τι φῶσι*]*ν | εἶνα*[*ι τὴ*]*ν αἵρεσιν, ἐπι|δεικνύσθωσαν τοῖς | πολλοῖς ἕνα μόνον | ἅπαντα λέγοντες οὐ | πολλοὺς, οὐδὲ πάντας | ὅσους ἡ κοινὴ φήμη | παραδέδωκεν, ἡμῶν | οὐ μόνον ὅσους φασὶν | οἱ Πανέλληνες ἀλλὰ | καὶ πλείονας εἶ*[*ν*]*αι λε|γόντων· εἶθ' ὅτι τοι|ού*[*τ*]*ους οὐδὲ με*⟨*με*⟩*λλή|κασιν ἀπολείπειν | οἵους ς̣*[*ἐ*]*βοντα*[*ι*] *πάν|τες, καὶ ἡμεῖ*[*ς ὁ*]*μολο-||γοῦμεν· ἀνθρωπ*[*ο*]*ε*[*ι*]||*δεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοί γε* ⟨*οὐ*⟩ *νο|μίζουσιν ἀλλὰ ἀέρας | καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρας.*

But they (the Stoics) deceive others into thinking that they allow many, so that when they claim that their philosophy is properly religious, let them be revealed to the many to be saying that there is one universal god, not many, nor all that the common report has handed down, while *we* say that there are not only all those gods whom all Greeks affirm, but even more besides; then that they are not even prepared to admit that they are such as all men worship (i.e. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς), and we agree (i.e. with the common conception); for they (the Stoics) do not consider them to be human-like, but airs and breezes and aethers.

539 τὰ κατὰ μέροc: for the technical expression (= individual, countable things taken one by one, ἰδίως, as opposed to κοινότερον as above, 537) see 451. The criticism is that such philosophers, by giving etymologies for the names of gods (as instances of metaphor, metonymy, and phonetic metathesis, or as political fictions invented for social control), destroy the gods in their individuality (τὰ κατὰ μέροc), just as Antisthenes did when he declared that in reality there was only one god.

539–40 θέ]|cει: μετάθεcιc τῶν ὀνομάτων (cf. 534 παραγραμμίζ[ουcι) was one of Democritus' four proofs that the origin of language was by imposition and conventional usage (θέcει): *VS* 68 B 26, from Proclus, *In Crat.* 16. 5. 25. Someone imposes a name and we all use it. Another possible restoration here is cυνέ]|cει 'by craft or cleverness', especially in the context of Critias' *Sisyphus*. But see Diog. Oen. fr. 12 Smith col. 3,4–4,3 (from the section on cultural history corresponding to Epicurus, *De nat.* 12): μήτε τὸν Ἑρμῆν παρα|λαμβάνωμεν εἰc δι|δαcκαλίαν, ὥc φαcίν | τινεc (περιφανὴc γὰρ | αὕτη γε ἀδολεcχία), μήτε τῶν φιλοcόφων | πιcτεύωμεν τοῖc λέ|γουcι κατὰ θέcιν καὶ | διδαχὴν ἐπιτεθῆναι | τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖc πράγ[μα]|cιν ἵν' αὐτῶν ἔχωc[ι τὰ ἴδι]|α τῆc πρὸc [ἀ]λλήλουc ἕνε|κα ῥᾳδίαc ἀποδηλώcεωc οἱ ἄνθρωποι. 'And let us not introduce Hermes as teacher, as some claim he was [i.e. the first to introduce speech] (for this is palpable drivel), nor let us credit those philosophers who say that it was by deliberate invention and teaching that names were assigned to things in order that human beings might have distinctive designations for them to facilitate their communication with one another' (transl. M. F. Smith).

540–1 διά τι[νοc ἀπά]|τηc: cf. especially Critias (see on l. 526), whose satyric character Sisyphus postulated a πρῶτοc εὑρετήc who by a clever deceit had invented the idea of gods in order to constrain men to obey the laws out of fear of them; like Democritus, he also grounded popular belief in these gods in fear of physical phenomena. Philodemus gives an extended account of this theory, below, 1852–67, 2145–82. W. Burkert suggests to me (*per litteras*) that perhaps the ἀπάτη 'denounced in 540 is just the trick of παραγραμμίζειν' in 534.

541 ἔτι πρότ[ερον: the temporal adverb to be taken with 540–1 τι[νοc ἀπά]|τηc. The point is that these philosophers either (1) posit a εὑρετήc who arbitrarily assigned names to gods by invention, θέcιc (thus controverting the

Epicurean claim for naturalness of early language, and 'destroying the gods in their individuality' (τὰ κατὰ μέρος); or (2) they posit an even earlier stage (supposedly before belief in the gods existed) when a Sisyphus-like character fooled humans into believing in the gods 'by some deceit' (διά τι[νος ἀπά]|της).

Longo, following Gomperz and Philippson, *BPhW* 43 (1923), 2 n. 1, punctuates before ἔτι, making this phrase *introduce* the following citation from Hermarchus. She argues that therefore 301/0, the supposed date of the composition of Περὶ φύσεως 12 (but see above on 523–4), should be taken as a *terminus ante quem* for Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles*. Apart from the unique and improbable circumstance of making one of Epicurus' future successors arrive at one of his own views before he himself did so, ἔτι alone with the adverb makes for a difficult sentence beginning, and there is no conceivable reason for Philodemus to have mentioned such a thing as the chronological precedence of Hermarchus' work, if he could have known it for a fact. Under her proposed syntax, the Hermarchus fragment would begin: 'Even earlier, Hermarchus cited this too . . .'. But earlier than what? There is no reason to presume that a reader, unaware of the fact, would have recognized a reference to both the (otherwise unknown) date of composition of Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles*, and that of the book of Epicurus' *On Nature* cited back at 524. Of course, the latter could have been inferred in part from the *subscriptiones* of Περὶ φύσεως. But I have shown above (see on 225–7) that the Herculaneum library does not exhibit much familiarity with these rolls. On the other hand, the division of relative stages in cultural history is highly relevant to the theory of development of atheism, and therefore the adverb should be taken (following Krohn) with what precedes. (In 545–6 παρασ̣η[μαίνε]|ṭαι and προστιθεί[c imply that Hermarchus' views added to and built upon those of Epicurus, rather than breaking new ground, as Gomperz's punctuation would suggest.)

542 καὶ τοῦθ': as Longo notes, must refer to what comes before (καί is additive). It can therefore be known that in *Against Empedocles* Hermarchus discussed stages in the origin of atheism. What follows (547–54) suggests that Hermarchus' remarks there were connected to the criticism in 533 ff. of Prodicus, Critias, Diagoras, *et al.* for distorting the natural and conventional form of divine names and offered arguments for maintaining the traditional forms, without recourse to sophistic explanations of their origins in human history.

542–3 = Hermarchus fr. 29 Longo (34 Krohn, discussed in his introd., pp. 10–11); cf. *Dox. Gr.* 127 n. 1. The final book of Hermarchus' extensive treatise (book 22, as we know from D.L. 10. 25) is likewise cited at 993–1002, and its first book at 1099–1108. For the possible influence of these passages on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93, see Diels loc. cit., Hirzel 1877–83, i. 19. Under discussion in Hermarchus' work were matters of cultural history, including

the formation among early mankind of the concepts of the divine, justice, and law, together with theories of natural relations between gods and men and between men and beasts, and philosophical daemonology (hence Empedocles: see Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1123 B = fr. 51 Longo). Hermarchus' ultimate objective, however, was a defence of Epicurean doctrine on these points. On Hermarchus' criticism of contemporary philosophical opponents through attacks on a wide range of older philosophical authorities, see Obbink 1988*a*, 432–3; Vander Waerdt 1988; Alberti 1995. The present fragment corroborates the hypothesis that the issue of natural relations, here between gods and men, was central to Hermarchus' work.

545–6 παρασημ̣[αίνε]ι̣ται προστιθεί[c: the middle is required for *παρασημαίνειν* in this sense ('note or mark in passing or by the side', i.e. either by the side of the text or outside the argument). Philodemus means that Hermarchus, in making his own argument about natural theology in criticism of Empedocles, noted that Epicurus himself had criticized notorious atheists, as Philodemus describes above (519–36). This argues against taking *ἔτι πρότ[ερον* in 541 with what follows, since it would make Hermarchus do this before Epicurus actually said what he said in *On Nature* 12 about atheists. So also *προστιθεί[c* 'adding', as W. Burkert points out to me, indicates that the following is more or less a verbatim quotation from Hermarchus.

546–7 πε]|ρ[ὶ] δὲ μεταφορᾶ[c: strikingly early for a reference to metaphor as the figure of speech in Aristotle's formulation. Philodemus was of course familiar with the term in its Aristotelian sense, as passages in the *Rhetoric* show (on which see M. McCall, *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Metaphor and Comparison* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969)). But Epicurus himself is known to have used the term in his discussion of language in book 28 of *Περὶ φύcεωc* (fr. 13 col. 5,3–7 at line 4, p. 49 Sedley, whose text supersedes that of Arr.[2] for this book) in its Aristotelian sense of 'metaphor', and not in the (earlier) sense of 'analogical inferences': *ἄλ|λο[υc .....] μεταφορὰc | ποι[εῖν φωνῶ]ν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγνω|cτα ὑ[πὸ τῶγ γν]ωcτῶν, ἀλ|λὰ διὰ τὰc αὐ-[τ]ῶμ πλάνac*, '[not because] others transfer words from the class of that which is knowable to denote that which is unknowable, but because of their own errors' (text and translation of Sedley 1973, 49, cf. 64), a point which Epicurus says he had discussed further in a work *Περὶ ἀμφιβολίαc*. Apparently Hermarchus in *Against Empedocles* criticized those (as in 533–6) who advanced hypothetical etymologies as the original forms of divine names, noting that Empedocles' use of metaphor (cf. Empedocles' poetic etymologies) in his naming of divine elements demonstrated a natural connection (549–52 *τ[ῆι cυν]|αφῆι τῆc φύcεωc*) between divinity and worship (549–54). Here we can point to at least one instance in which Hermarchus in his twenty-two-book *Against Empedocles* actually criticized Empedocles himself, and to what he said there. Aristotle, who regarded Empedocles as something of a genius in the use of metaphor, in his pointed discussions of

the subject (*Poet.* 1457^{b}13, ^{b}24, 1458^{a}5, *On Poets* fr. 10 Janko, *An. Post.* 97^{b}37, *Met.* 357^{a}24—the last of which criticizes Empedocles, not his use of metaphor) had made him notorious for his use of the trope. Hermarchus may have gone on to criticize Empedocles' poetic and etymological metaphors (he called evening the 'old age of day' etc.), on the grounds that they use words in an unnatural way. In the case of names of the gods, his poetic etymologies would result in naming that would be inappropriate from the point of view of common usage (giving the names of the gods to inanimate physical things, for example), though Empedocles may have suggested or argued for a 'natural connection' between elements and their worship as divinities. At any rate the Epicurean view on the naturalness of the original formation of names of the gods was properly demonstrated, according to Philodemus, by Epicurus' own practice and usage (554–9, also discussed further below, 768–70, 822, 840, 894–5, 970–1).

548–9 *Order of Columns.* See on 578–9.

Col. 20

In a discussion of his use of metaphor, Hermarchus said Empedocles relied upon our natural affinity to the divine in worship and in the use of language in cult. This was further demonstrated in Epicurus' works in concern over celebration of the mysteries at Athens.

548–9 κατὰ [τοὺc ‖ θνη]τούc: cf. 2047 *ὡc θνητοί*, 'as far as a mortal can', here: 'in human fashion', as W. Burkert suggests to me ('acknowledged or not by divine Empedocles'), noting that *προcτιθεί*[c in 546 introduces a 'more or less verbal quotation' from Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles*. The subject of 547–8 *ἐ*]‖*χρήcατο* is thus Empedocles (as reported by Hermarchus), not Hermarchus as it has been understood by previous editors (the subject cannot, of course, be Epicurus, for the reason that he must be introduced by name at 554–5). As Burkert notes, it is difficult to say what kind of *μεταφορά* Hermarchus imputed to Empedocles. In 548 the apograph reads *τοιc* for *τουc*, but the confusion of Y for I is well exampled in this text: see 1150, 1304, 1543, 1744.

549–52 τ̣[ῆι cυν]αφῆι τῆc φύcεωc: according to Epicurean linguistic theory the names for most things, including names of the gods (cf. 302–3) and language used in worship, are the result not of arbitrary convention or an individual's coining (cf. 533–41 on Antisthenes), or due to changes introduced haphazardly over time, but are the products of a natural process of evocation and therefore naturally appropriate to human activity and thought (Epic. *Ad Herod.* 75–6, *Περὶ φύcεωc* 28; Sedley 1973; poets often confuse the process). Epicurus used the term *cυναφή* in *Ad Pyth.* 85, *De nat.*

11 (26. 45,3 Arr.²) and 28 (31. 18,6 Arr.²) in reference to natural connection or relation; at Plut. *De invidia et odio* 536 E it appears in an Epicurean context in connection with the *περιπλοκή* of atoms. Epicurus himself used the related term *ἁφή* 'contact' or 'touch' in the discussion of meteorological phenomena in *De nat.* 11 (26. 16,5 Arr.²) and in the *liber incertus* 34. 10,9 in a discussion of psychology (presumably of atoms in the soul). According to D.L. 10. 28 Epicurus wrote a book *περὶ ἁφῆς*. Cf. also Plut. *Amat.* 769 F. According to the present text, Hermarchus attributed Empedocles' use of divine epithets for elements in his cosmology to a concept of *cυναφή*, 'connection' (cf. 1084–5 *διαδόδε|[cι)*, justifying the naturalness (550 *τῆς φύcεως*) of worship (or of the original formation of divine names used in worship) and, judged from 552–3 *λο[γοθ]ε|ραπείας*, of the use of language in cult, in particular the use of divine epithets (769), oaths by the names of the gods (strictly observed by Epicurus: treated below, 820), and similar expressions (924–5, 929, 968, 971). Although the main points are clear in outline, Philodemus does not elaborate the details. It is enough for him to show in refutation of his opponents that the argumentation of the earliest Epicureans presupposed a sincere belief in the *existence* of the divine. If Hermarchus for a moment had doubted the existence of the divine he could not have discussed the appropriateness of Empedocles' use of metaphor in applying divine names to his elements. A. Henrichs suggests to me that for this reason the *φύcιc* in question must be *divine* nature, with the additional possibility that *φύcιc* here may have its Epicurean sense of 'entity' (see above on 230 and 322–3), i.e. a 'connection with divine existence'.

552–3 λο[γοθ]ε|ραπείας: apparently only here, thus very likely reflecting Hermarchus' original wording. *θεραπεία* ought primarily to be a matter *de adorandis deis*, as Usener recognized (*Gloss. Epic.* s.v. *λογοθεραπεία*; *Lex. Philod.* s.v. 'curandi ratio verbis') rather than referring to therapeutic effects of such language on the worshipper *per se*. Though it is not impossible that such a connection was implied, Hermarchus' remarks were probably concerned rather with the 'connection', apparently exhibited in Empedocles' poetic metaphors, between mankind and the gods which engendered the (original) appropriateness of the names of gods and language used in *θεραπεία*, 'worship'. (Compare also the term *θεολογία* in the sense 'speech about the gods' below, 840, 968.) For the significance of terms like *θεραπευτής*, *θεραπεύω*, and *θεράπων*, especially (though not exclusively) in cults of Asclepius, see Pleket 1980, 159–61, whose explanation (p. 160): 'in moments of great personal distress the worshipper feels himself to be a servant of his deity', might have elicited objections from Epicureans (so also the association of these terms with *ταπεινότης* 'humiliation' in Hellenistic cult). Cf. Castner 1982, who raises the issue. One of the sections of the criticism of the poets in the second part of *De pietate* is devoted to the representations by the poets of such *θεραπεία* among the gods themselves (e.g. Schober 1988, 86–

8; Obbink 1995*b*, 203–5). On positive psychological *θεραπεία* (not necessarily exclusive of the religious sort) more generally see Gigante 1975; cf. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,1 *θεραπε]υτικόν*; col. 2,16–18 *πῶς οὖ[ν] | οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμ[ό]|νιον δοξάζε[ι]ς, εἴπερ ἐ[λατ]|το[ῦ]ται πρὸς σέ*; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117E (Epic. fr. 130 Us.) *πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰς ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ σώματος θεραπείαν*.

554–5 παρ' Ἐπικούρωι: very likely 'in Epicurus' own works' (cf. 189), as Daniel Delattre suggests to me, rather than 'in Epicurus' case'. (For *παρά* with the dative in this sense see commentary on 1465–6.) If so, it probably indicates that the quotation from Hermarchus ends with *γείνεται* in 554, though this is not certain (Hermarchus outlived Epicurus, and may well have mentioned him or his works in *Against Empedocles*).

557 κοινωνί[ας: an Epicurean catchword: below, 1938–9; *Sent. Vat.* 36, 37 (bis), 38; Hermarchus fr. 34 Longo ap. Porphyr. *De abst.* 1. 7 *τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινωνίαν τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, ibid. 1. 10. 2, 1. 10. 4; restored by Diels at *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,33. Here it seems to have the sense of 'community' or 'participation', specifically in the mysteries at Athens. Philodemus presumably went on to specify how this was occasioned by means of a natural *συναφή* as mentioned in 549; the point may have been that a community or unity of discourse was of central importance in such religious observance.

558–9 Ἀθήνηςιν . . . μυςτηρίων: Epicurus' actual participation in the mysteries could be documented from the records of the school, and Philodemus does so, below, 807–10. Exactly what mysteries are meant here is unclear; perhaps those at Eleusis, but this is not certain. Philodemus' only other mention of mysteries (besides that below at 807–10) is at *De dis* 1 col. 16,23, as an example of problems about which some people are reluctant to speak. Epicurus' own concern for initiation into mysteries seemed implausible to modern scholars as long as the mystery religions were viewed as holding a secret creed or doctrine with secret philosophical content and passed on to initiates. Epicurus would find much to agree with in the view of W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), according to whom the mystery cults had sets of signs, symbols, and allusions around which initiates bonded socially, but no systematic doctrine, creed, or beliefs. A potential difficulty in the present passage is Epicurus' concern for *universal* participation (if that is what *κοινωνία* entails), since mysteries are by definition selective in membership and entail a sharp distinction between the initiated and the unititiated, between 'us and them'. But probably Epicurus saw the *κοινωνία* of the initiated as essential for (or paradigmatic of) social security and harmony, hence his *σπουδή* in this matter. The preceding discussion about natural connection in linguistic matters suggests that Epicurus may have also been concerned with verbal unanimity exemplified in the traditional language of the mysteries and their liturgies of initiation.

577 Πολύαινος: what Polyaenus said here is not preserved, since the

following column does not survive. But we may suppose that it also concerned the naturalness of divine names used in worship (or P.'s observance of them), since if Philodemus had moved on to a new point he would have followed his usual practice of citing Epicurus' views first, and then moving on to the those of the *kathegemones*: see Introd. §§ 3(*a*)–(*c*). Polyaenus is likewise at 1090–8 said to have shown in his *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* that divine nature is a cause of goods for humans, and Philodemus claims (slightly earlier: 1087–90) that the same subject was covered by others among the early Epicureans (a book 6 and a book 8 are cited). Polyaenus has already been cited at 10–11 as responding to Ariston's criticism of Epicurean views on the gods. On Polyaenus' biography see Tepedino 1991 and below on 865 and 932. I have made *καὶ Πολύαινος* the final line of this column, as depicted on the Neapolitan apograph (for some reason *HV*² II depicts a wider bottom margin, giving the impression that there were 2 or 3 lines following this one before the foot of the column). It is not impossible that 578 was originally in the position of 575, and that 576–7 or 576–8 were unreadable by the *disegnatore*, in which case a syntactical link between this line and another column is further ruled out.

578–9 *Order of Columns.* Col. 20 has been linked with col. 19 in the present edition on grounds of context, because it follows syntactically on it. It is also roughly in proximity in the descending order of (alternating) columns, though it has had to be slightly moved forward (by two columns) in the exact descending order, presumably due to misnumbering of the *disegni*.

It cannot, on the other hand, link with the following col. 21 because both come from the 1098 half of the roll: col. 20 is missing its right margin, while col. 21 is missing its left margin, thus indicating that it is not contiguous with any preserved column in the 1098 sequence (see Introd. § 2(*c*)). Probably only one column is missing between cols. 20 and 21.

Col. 21

Too little remains of this column to reconstruct its argument with certainty. However, (*τῶν*) *ἀρχαίων* (twice: 580, 587–8) suggests that it is possibly development of thinking about the gods that is under discussion. The views may be those of Polyaenus, introduced at 578, though a column has been lost in between and this section may now be devoted to another of Epicurus' followers. This column is included in Polyaenus fr. 55 Tepedino.

579 πεφα]ύλιςται: for *φαυλίζω* 'regard as worthless' see Plat. *Leg.* 667 A, Xen. *Mem.* 1. 6. 5c; Epic. *De nat.* inc. lib. 34. 25,21 *αἰτίαν ἔ[χ]ει [ἀν]|όμοιον τῆι ἐ[ξ ἀ]ρχῆς cυc[τά]|cει φαύλ[η]ι οὔc[ηι]*.

584 τῶν βα]ρβάρων: Ax 1933, 167 compares Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.43 *quae*

est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum?

585–6 ἐπιτείμη|[σις: 'censure, criticism': Thuc. 7. 48; Aristot. *Rhet.* 1355^{a} 24; *Pol.* 1340^{b}40; Philod. *De ira* col. 35,21; *De lib. dic.* 75,2 and often.

588 δι]ατιθέσθω{ι}: cf. 722.

590–1 ἀντιμε|[ταλαμβ]άνειν: 'exchange for': Philod. *Rhet.* i. 159,8; *De oec.* col. 23,26.

600 περιγραφ[: cf. 434–5 *περιγράφειν*, where the meaning is something like 'exclude', 'set apart'.

606–7 *Order of Columns.* This column may well have joined with the following col. 22, though too little is preserved to reconstruct the syntax. The two columns fall in ascending order in the 1098 sequence, but since the first preserves the right margin of its column, and the later the left margin, they may have originally been on the same layer of papyrus on this half of the broken roll, but were transcribed as usual by the *disegnatori* as separate columns.

Col. 22

The first half of this column is poorly preserved, while reconstruction in its second half is impeded by a textual corruption (in 630). 608–10 seem to deal with characteristics of the gods. 614–15 reports a rival (not necessarily non-Epicurean) view. 625–9 concern proofs for the existence of gods. 634–6 make reference to an Epicurean authority, probably Zeno of Sidon.

607 -ωνα: I have not followed Philippson (who likewise linked this column with the preceding one) in restoring *μήτ[ε Κρο]νί||ωνα*, since the traces at the end of 606 do not conform (I suspect in any case some misrepresentation in copying). Nothing else in the context calls for the sudden appearance of a particular god's name or epithet, which would be something of a surprise in the context: names of gods are generally avoided in the first part of *De pietate*, in contrast to the highly critical section on poets and philosophers in the second part); the only occurrences are 302–3 (Ares and Athena, restored in a negative context), 834 (Zeus, from Epicurus in an oath), 894–5 (Zeus, on types of life), cf. 1846. It looks as though Epicurean theology could do for the most part without divinities highly individuated by name: it was simply recommended by Epicurus and his followers that one should 'speak auspiciously' (*εὐφημεῖν*) and that certain traditional usages should be maintained. See 758–996. At 765–73 Epicurus is reported to have said that the wise man will have the divinity's name 'continually on his lips at festivals' and that this could be an aid to obtaining a more certain conception of the divine. But compare the censure of

Prodicus *et al.* at 533–41 for altering the understanding of traditional appellations of the gods.

For the sake of clarity in the editorial tradition I present here Philippson's text of this column (which cannot be right in its entirety but which contains some insights) as follows:

	μήτ[ε Κρο]νί‖ωνα καὶ ἡ[μερώ-	1098 17
	τατον λειτ[ουργίαν	
	δ' ἔξοντ[α κἀεί·	
610	τίς οὖ[ν ἂν ἐνόμιζε	
	θεὸν ἀ[ΐδιον, εἰ	(5)
	μηδὲ [ἄφθαρτον αὐ-	
	τὸν ὤι[ετο καθάπερ	
	ἔνιοι τῶ[ν Στωικῶν	
615	καὶ τὴν [..... ...	
	μ[..]ςας[..... ..	(10)
	τ[....]ς[..... ...	
	π[.....	
	πο[.]c [νομίζομεν	
620	[δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς μα-	
	καρί[ους, ὃν τρό-	(15)
	πον [καὶ τὰς ἀπορ-	
	ροί[ας νοητὰς ἐν	
	ὑπ[νοις προσλαμβάνο-	
625	μεν [κ]ἀν[αγινώσκομεν	
	πᾶν τὸ δυ[νάμενον	(20)
	τρ]έπεσθαι πρ[ὸς	
	ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θ[εοῦ· τά-	
	χα δ' ἂν προσέλ[θηι τις ἄ-	
630	θεος, μνημονεῦ-	
	σαι νομισθησόμε-	(25)
	νον ἀξιώσομεν	
	καθάρσεως, [τὰς δὲ	
	νῦν φάσεις [Ζήνων ἐξ-	
635	έθηκεν ὁ [ἐξηγη-	
	τὴς ἡμῶν, [..... ..] ‖	(30)

607–8 -τατον λειτ[: Philippson's ἡ[μερώ]‖τατον λει[τουργίαν seemed attractive, but cannot be right because there are no superlatives of two terminations in the Herculaneum papyri (see *MGrHerc* 180–8; perhaps λειτ[ουργόν should be considered: *De mus.* col. 36,12–13 λειτουρ|γοὶ παρὰ τὰς εὐωχ[ίας). The stem λειτουργ- at any rate suggests features that cannot be attributed to the Epicurean gods: Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 113: astrologers who give futile explanation of causes fail to free divine nature from the burden of responsibilities (τὴν θείαν φύσιν μηθαμῇ λειτουργιῶν ἀπολύωσι); in a similar context *Ad Herod.* 76 τὴν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις φορὰν καὶ τροπὴν . . . μήτε

λειτουργοῦντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γενέσθαι καὶ διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξοντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας.

614 ἔνιοι τῶ̣[ν: ἔνιοι τῶ̣[ν Στωικῶν (Philippson) is possible, but the partitive genitive could also have designated a dissenting group among the Epicureans themselves.

620–1 μα]|καρι[: a quality appropriate to attribute to gods on the Epicurean view; cf. 607–8, and Epic. *Ad Herod.* 76 (quoted there).

622–3 Philippson's restoration τὰς ἀπορ]|ροί[ας νοητάς, suggested by 624 ὑπ[(perhaps ἐν] | ὕπ[νοις) may be right. But his restoration of 624 and 625 produce lines that are embarassingly too long (see his text above on 607).

626–8 πᾶν τὸ δυ[νάμενοlν] ἕπεσθαι πρ[ὸς τὴν] | ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θ[εοῦ: since this must end a sentence, it was probably controlled by a verb indicating approval, while ἕπεσθαι (cf. ἑπόμενος) here seems to have its technical sense from logic and dialectic of 'follow logically from', i.e. 'be entailed'; see LSJ II.3 cf. 4, usually with the dative: Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 71,11; *De dis* 1 col. 14,28. Hence '(Epicurus preaches the honouring) of all that may follow from the god's existence.' Presumably this would include the entailments μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, but rule out anything approaching teleology or benevolence.

628 ὕπαρξιν: for the word (with the genitive) cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 10,35 τ̣[ὴν] | ὕπαρξιν (sc. τῶν θεῶν) ἀνα[ι]ρο̣ῦ̣[σι (cf. *De dis* 1 col. 15,31); cf. in a different sense *De oec.* col. 25,30. The term (later = *existentia*) is almost certainly of Stoic origin (*SVF* i.113; ii.153, 223, 337, 356, 404, 536, 1016; iii.466), as argued by Kristeller 1991, 25–6 with n. 8.

628–9 τά]|χα δ' ἂν προσέλ[θοι: that this clause begins a new sentence is clear. Its subject, recorded in 630 in the form ολοσμνημωνη[ ] is entirely perplexing. Philippson's wholesale rewriting of the *disegno* as τά]|χα δ' ἂν προσέλ[θῃ τις ἄ]|θ̣ε̣ος, μνημο̣ν̣ε̣ῦ̣|σαι has nothing to recommend it on palaeographical grounds. It leaves 629 far too long and 630 too short. This is obviously unsatisfactory. But nothing else suggests itself, and 630 may be unrecoverably corrupt.

631–3 νομισθησόμεlνον ἀξιώσομεν [ ] | καθάρσεως: 'that which will be customary (i.e. τὸ κατὰ συμπερφοράν?) we shall think worthy of purification', i.e. something in the nature of logical inference, of the sort suggested by ἕπεσθαι πρ̣[ὸς τὴν] | ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θ[εοῦ (627–8). But it is difficult to reconstruct the syntax here. And there is reason to expect the article with καθάρσεως.

633–5 [τὰς δὲ] | νῦν φάσεις [... ἐξ]|έθηκεν: perhaps a clause in contrast to the one that precedes. The third-person verb, together with the intervention of the unnamed interlocutor in 628–30, leads one to conclude that the subject of ἐξ]|έθηκεν must have been named here. A name (not longer than five letters in the nominative) could fill the gap here. Hence Philipp-

son's [*Ζήνων*] (also cited at 1466). But certainty is impossible, since this name could also have come in 635 (7 letters plus the article) or in 636 (8 letters).

636 -της ἡμῶν: sc. *Ἐπικουρείων*. A reference to Philodemus' teacher Zeno here is very likely (though it is not impossible that the subject of 634–5 *ἐξ*]|*έθηκεν* is simply Epicurus himself): cf. the description of his devotion to him at *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 11,6ff. Angeli (Zeno Sidonius fr. 11 Angeli–Colaizzo) *Ζήνωνος ἐγεν*[*ό*]||*μην περιόν*[*το*]*ς* [*οὐκ*] *ἄπιστ*[*ος*] *ἐραστὴς καὶ τ*[*εθνηκό*]||*τος ἀκοπίατος ὑμνητής*. Below at 1465–8 (where see commentary) Philodemus names Zeno as an authority for some of his information about Epicurus.

636–7 *Order of Columns* This column may link with the following col. 23 since they come from different halves of the papyrus roll. There is not enough preserved to reconstruct the syntax of the join. But the context at the beginning of col. 23 is suitable for the grammatical construction (indirect discourse at 639 might be dependent upon 634–5 *ἐξ*]|*έθηκεν*) and the views expressed by the unknown (but probably originally named) Epicurean cited in 634–6.

Col. 23

After a lacunose beginning this column presents in reported speech praise for the Epicureans who wrote about gods in their books: they deserve, says the author, credit for their efforts. It would be pointless, he sardonically suggests, to accuse of impiety everyone who failed to produce rigorous proofs for the existence of gods. For all humans in fact worship them, as did Epicurus and his followers—a subject to which the author turns next (723). Further on this column see Obbink 1989, 210–12.

637–9 The opening lines may preserve a report about perception or knowledge of the gods (*γνῶσις* of them is *ἐναργής*: Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123). I suspect something like the following:

περὶ τοῦ ἐπιμαρτυ||*ρου*]*μένη*[*ν*] *ἐνάργει-* 1077 15
αν ἀ]*ναμενοῦντος*
640 *κατ' αἰῶ*]*να, καὶ πάν-*
τας κτλ.

What follows must be in *oratio obliqua*, perhaps dependent on 634–5 *ἐξ*]|*έθηκεν*. For *κατ' αἰῶ*]*να* in this context cf. Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 141,32; 164,16; *De dis* 3 col. 11,3; 10,7; 12,19; fr. 42,6.

639–40 πάν|τας: there is no compelling reason to alter (with Gomperz and Philippson) the reading of the *disegno* (to *πάν*|*τες*). The copyist is unlikely to have mistaken the shape of an epsilon for an alpha (haplography

from 646 *πάντας* is but a distant possibility); 645, read by edd. as *ἀνόσιοι*, is a letter short at the end of the line, and the preserved trace is compatible with *ἀνοσίου̣[ς* (sc. *πάντας*); for the corruption Y for I see above on 548–9. The accusative would presume a preceding construction in *oratio obliqua* (perhaps dependent on 634–5 *ἐξ*]|*έθηκεν* if the two columns are truly contiguous).

645 ⟨ἀ⟩δυναμίαν: the addition of the alpha privative seems demanded by the sense, but there is not room for it to have been lost at the end of 644, and I have accordingly supplied it at the beginning of 645. For the term (= 'inability due to defect of intelligence') see Tarán 1975, 292 on [Plat.] *Epin.* 985 E; cf. *Leg.* 821 AB, *Hip. Ma.* 295 E; Arist. *Poet.* 1460^{b}17. Cf. Marcus Aurelius 2. 2. 3 (with Farquharson's note, ii. 520) where the sense seems to be 'lack of power or influence.' In spite of 649–53, I do not think the statement amounts to a concession that the Epicureans failed to produce sufficient proofs for the existence of gods; Philodemus clearly means that Epicurus and his followers 'deserve to be admired because of their intention and not regarded as impious on account of *ἀδυναμία*' (to which they are not in any case subject). Their opponents, however, thought otherwise and the argument here may in part be a response to allegations of impiety (and the intellectual insanity this would entail). See e.g. Obbink 1989, 202–23.

ἀνοσίου̣[ς: see on 639–40 *πάν*|*τας*. *ἀνόσιος* is Philodemus' usual term (176, 648) for the much rarer *ἀσεβής* (1144).

646–7 πάντας δὲ ἀνθρώπους: cf. 653–7. On the argument from *consensus omnium* see esp. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 43, *De div.* 1. 1, with Pease's notes on both; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1172^{b}36–1173^{a}1, *Cael.* 270^{b}5–6; Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 9. 61–5; Schian 1973; Schofield 1980, 283–308; Obbink 1989, 210–23 and 1992*b*. The Epicureans combine the argument from consensus with their doctrine (for which see Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 44) that it is part of human nature to form *προλήψεις* of the gods.

647–8 ὥ|ρα{ι}: literally 'it is a fitting time to call all men impious' (i.e., if on the opponents' view one were to regard the Epicureans described in the previous lines as impious, it would be necessary to call all men impious). for *ὥρα* sc. *ἐστί* = *tempus est*, see Philod. *De mus.* p. 105,15 Kemke: (if one is to follow the common man's value judgements, many unworthy practices have been honoured), *καὶ φιλοσοφίαν δὲ* | *διὰ τὰ μὴ τετευχέν̣α[ι τ]οῖς* | *ὅλοις ἐπάθλων ἀτει[μ]ά|ζειν ὥρα*.

648–9 ἐ|πειδήπερ: 'especially since', 'in view of the fact' (on the opponents' reasoning).

649 οὐδείς: Philodemus does not mean to suggest that the Epicureans did not successfully produce adequate demonstrations for the existence of gods: they produced not only *πίστεις* 'rhetorical arguments' (478) but also *ἀποδείξεις* 'proofs'. He means rather, by a kind of reverse application of the consensus argument, that if Epicurean demonstrations are to be thought

inadequate, then all men (many of whom do not produce demonstrations but nevertheless acknowledge and worship the gods) must be regarded as impious (a *reductio ad absurdum*). See further below on 654–6.

650 εἰκνουμένας (sc. *ἀποδείξεις*): in a strict logical sense = 'logically compelling', 'valid'; cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 1.205, LSJ s.v. *ἱκνέομαι* who cite the present passage. Compare also 627–8 *ἕπεσθαι* in its logical sense.

650–2 πε|ρὶ τ[οῦ θ]ε̣οὺς ὑπάρ|χε[ιν: with this formulation cf. 627–8 *πρ̣[ὸς τὴν] | ὕπαρξιν τοῦ θ[εοῦ.*

652 ἀπο]δ̣είξεις: cf. 470. The 'proofs' mentioned there are not explicitly said (as these are here) to be either (*a*) about the existence of gods, or (*b*) logically compelling; but I think Philodemus must have intended to imply that they were so. On Epicurean opposition to Aristotelian *ἀπόδειξις* see Furley 1972, especially 613. Philodemus later refers to his own arguments in the present work as *πίστεις* (below, 2041–2, 2358).

654 σέβ]ονται: the supplement [*νομίζ*]*ονται* appears to be slightly too long for the available space. Additional support for [*σέβ*]*ονται* is provided by comparison with Philodemus' statement later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10,33 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 21) of the Stoics: *τοι|ούτ̣[ου]ς* (sc. *θεοὺς*) *οὐδὲ με⟨με⟩λλήκασιν ἀπολείπειν | οἵους ς̣[ἑ]βοντα[ι] πάν|τες*, they 'they are not even prepared to admit that they (sc. the gods) are such as all men worship'; *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,1–10 *δ]έδο[ι]κα τοὺς θεοὺς πάν|[τας οὓ]ς σέ[βο]μαι* (an *ἄφρων* speaks) 'I fear all the gods whom I worship'; col. 1,23–4 *θ]αύμαζε ταύτην | [τὴ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου* (voice of the Epicurean author) 'marvel at this conception and worship'; col. 1,27–8 *ὅταν σέ|[βε-ς]θα[ι νο]ῶσιν* 'when they intend to worship'; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117B *ὡς σεβομένῳ σοι τὰ τότε ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα . . . ἐποίεις οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι.*

655–6 παρ]άκοποί τινε[ς: cf. 519–30 where Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias are depicted as madmen for implicitly or explicitly denying the gods. Both by minimizing their occurrence (*τινές* = 'some few') and portraying them as socially and intellectually aberrant, Philodemus seeks to counter the sceptical, Academic argument that belief in the gods was by no means universal. (In this way the sceptics argued that the dogmatists' appeal to universally accepted opinion about the gods had no claim to validity.) For the introduction of atheists (usually philosophers) by Academic sceptics as a counter-argument see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.62–4; 3.8, 11, 17 with Pease on 1.43; by Pyrrhonists: Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9.50–9 (cf. 191–2). At *De nat. deor.* 1.63 Cotta adduces a list of historical figures who committed acts of notorious sacrilege; but instances of whole peoples who failed to believe in gods were much harder to find. At 1.63 Cotta suspects there must be some, but cannot name any; so also Plut. *De comm. not.* 1075A; Diod. 3.9.2 and Sext. Emp. *Pyr. Hyp.* 3.234 name only *ὀλίγοι τῶν Αἰθιόπων*. One dogmatic alternative was (as here) to portray such figures as socially and intellectually

marginalized; another alternative was to posit a stage in cultural history when atheism had developed (the 'first men' having universally believed in gods): so Theophr. *De piet.* F 584 A Fortenbaugh, ap. Porph. *De abst.* 2. 8, and Simpl. *In Epict. Ench.* 222 C–223 A. Epicurus already in *De nat.* 12 had employed both alternatives: see 519–30 for the former (atheists as madmen), and for the latter 225–31 (universal belief among the earliest humans). On gods and madmen in Hellenistic philosophy see Obbink 1989, 215–23.

656 [αὐτούc]: sc. *θεούc* (carried over from 651).

666–7 *Order of Columns.* That this column is roughly in its proper position is evident from the fact that 654–7 *cέβ]ονται πάν|τε[c . . . αὐτούc, κα]θάπερ | ἡμ[εῖc* looks forward to (or leads into) the following section on the practice of cult by Epicurus and his followers at 723. Judged from the scant traces preserved at the end of the present column, it does not join with the following col. 24 (which, however, does come from the other half of the broken roll, so that it could have physically linked). Perhaps one column is lost between cols. 23–4.

Col. 24

In spite of the fact that the better part of this column is preserved by the apograph, many gaps and problems remain unsolved. Two groups of thinkers are apparently contrasted: Epicureans and potential opponents. We get positive references to approved Epicurean views (669 *ἀπεφα[ιν-*, 673–5: true images and infinity). In view of the past tenses (669, 681, 684, 690), it is not entirely clear whether the first group of views are held by early or later Epicureans (or early humans?). Nor is it exactly clear who are the accusers (688 *κατήγοροι*) and who are the accused. At issue may be the departure of certain thinkers (like the *ἔνιοι* at 1853–61 who have a *ἕτερον λόγον* about piety that gives the wrong impression and causes hostility against Epicureans?) from approved philosophical views and traditional beliefs and speech about the gods (676 *ἀπ' εὐφημιc[μοῦ*). The discussion has affinities with 308–18, 465–9, 489–500, 1853–67, and 2429–31. Much, however, remains uncertain.

666 οιcθ': Rules for syllabification followed by the scribe lead us to expect either the relative pronoun (*οἷc*), or a preceding vowel, e.g. *θε]|οῖc θ' ὑπά[ρχειν* (Philippson) i.e. 'and for the gods to exist'.

671 ὅλης: cf. 389 *ὅλοις;* 335, 630.

673–5 The statement that 'the images are true and the universe infinite' must have been introduced by a verb of indirect discourse, perhaps 669 *ἀπεφα[ίνοντο*, constructed with an articular infinitive *τό]* . . . *εἶναι* 672–4. This is a standard statement of Epicurean doctrine (see 490–1): that 'all

impressions are true' enabled even the earliest humans, according to the Epicureans, to have correct views of the gods (see on 225–31). ἀλήθεια (668) is often mentioned as a *kriterion* in this context. The position that the universe is infinite may be significant in the present context, since it is said to be required for the doctrine of *isonomia*, cryptically described at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1, and below, 1735–41. The infinity of the universe also appears in the list of basic Epicurean views retailed at 489–95. Since such views were not held by the earliest humans, Philodemus must be speaking here of later developments in intellectual history.

676 ἀπ' εὐφημιc[μοῦ: 'out of pious speech'. Cf. 924–5 εὐ]|φημεῖν.

677 παρῆλθον: I have corrected conforming as closely as possible to the reading of the apograph, which yields nonsense.

679–80 ⟨τ⟩οὺ[c εἰ]|ρημένουc [ἄ]νδ̣ρα[c: *οἱ ἄνδρες* (see on 461) is the standard way of referring to the *kathegemones*, Epicurus' earliest followers and successors in the school (this testimonium missing in Longo 1978). The reference of ταῦτα πεποηκέναι must be to their thinking that 'the images were true and the universe infinite' (673–5) in contrast to alleged posturing (as at 489–500) or later departures from the school's view.

681–3 Philippson supplements these lines as follows: ἐπ̣[ήρκε]cε παρὰ τὸ | ἀν[αcτ]ῆc[αι] πρὸc ἀ̣|πε[ιλί]αc, which he takes with 677–80 as follows: 'For, besides the fact that the aforesaid men (Epicureans) did not do these things (i.e. express these views in order to disguise their atheism), it was not sufficient for inciting (people) to threats (against them).'

683–9 Philippson translates his reconstruction as follows: 'But if they (the Epicureans) have in a changed way withdrawn themselves (i.e. from their atheistic views), so as to raise the suspicion of fear (of being harassed for such views), then the opponents, as the accusers of those who have withdrawn themselves, should formally charge them.' But there are problems: see in particular below on 688–9.

683–4 με[μπ]|τῶc (Delattre *privatim*) fits the space better than Philippson's με[ταθε]|τῶc 'inconsistently', a *hapax legomenon* which he takes to be equivalent to μεταθέμενοc. Philodemus uses the adjective μεμπτόc at *De oec.* col. 25,28; the adverb appears at Plut. *Cleom.* 38.

684 ἀνεcτράφη̣c[αν: used frequently with an adverb (e.g. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 204,15) in the sense of 'to conduct oneself in a certain way', here 'if they have conducted themselves in a blameworthy fashion'.

686 ὑποψίαν: 'suspicion', 'fear', perhaps with a genitive (lost in the second half of the line) defining what was feared or who was suspicious. Philippson's proposal to change the Ε of the *disegno* to Φ seems implausible; and in other respects his conjecture φ[όβ]ο[υ does not fit the space on the *disegno*, although he was certainly right to suspect an expression defining ὑποψία more closely. I propose instead either ε[ἰ]c̣ [ἡμᾶc (in which case the subject of the verb in 684 may not be Epicureans) or, less preferably,

ὃ̣[χλ]ο[υ, for which see 1677 (cf. 1405) and the whole discussion of Socrates from 1665–99, which has certain affinities with this section. On *ὑποψία* in this sense see also below, 1213–14, 1370 (a virtually certain supplement); more conjecturally 1747–8. Alternatively, there is an outside possibility is that *ὑποψίαν* here occurs in its philological sense, namely expressing doubts over the authenticity of views and texts, for which see Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 11,5 with Angeli's note ad loc.; Dem. Lac. *P. Herc.* 1012 col. 37,2 with Puglia ad loc. and p. 22 n. 3.

686–7 ἀ]|πο[γ]ραψάτωσα[ν: the Hellenistic third person plural imperative (= classical *ἀπογραψάντων*), the norm in Athens from the third century BC. For the standard sense 'enter a charge', 'indict', 'denounce' see LSJ s.v. III.1. The alternative restoration ὑ]|πο[γ]ραψάτωσα[ν (relatively frequent in Philodemus) means straightforwardly 'set forth', 'explain'. A very similar challenge to potential opponents appears at Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 17,10–12 Angeli.

688–9 The two lines are precariously long, judged at least by the (certain) lengths of 678 or 690. 689 in particular contains 17 characters as restored, whereas the scribe regularly maintains 12–15 per line in this text. But there seems to be no alternative to the genitive or accusative in the restoration of 688–9.

688 κατήγοροι: it would make sense for these accusers to be the same as those opponents who accused the Epicureans of saying that the gods exist only for the sake of social peace (467–9) and that Epicurus set forth his views insincerely (489–99). But 'those who have conducted themselves in a blameworthy manner' may not be Epicureans, or at least orthodox Epicureans. In this case Philodemus would be saying that his opponents should accuse those thinkers, not Epicureans.

689–90 ὑ]|πελάμβαν[ον: cf. 460.

691–2 ἀν[αγκας]|τῶς: 'necessarily', 'under compulsion', e.g. at [Plat.] *Ax.* 366A (where it is contrasted with *ἑκούσιος*). Philippson's supplement could be altered and the text corrected to accommodate *ἀναγκαστικῶς* (viz. *ἀν[αγκαστι]|κ̣ῶς*), a frequent adverb in Epicurus and Philodemus, usually of conviction compelled by evidence; Delattre's *ἀν[αποδείκ]|τως* yields a wrong word-division. But both would exceed the allowable line-length.

692–3 ζῶια μ[ακάρια] | καὶ διαιώνια: see e.g. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123 *τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων*, and cf. above, 236 *τἄλλα ζῶια*. For *διαιώνιον* see above, 46 and 352 with commentary.

693–4 κατα]|λείπειν: 'allow the existence of'; see on 36, 1047–8.

694–5 οὐ γ[ὰρ] . . . γε μήν: cf. *De oec.* col. 13,3 *οὐ μήν*; *De dis* 1 col. 14,8 *καὶ μήν*.

695–6 *Order of Columns.* This column could physically have joined with the following col. 25, since they both come from different halves of the broken papyrus roll. But since a new sentence must begin at 694, and another at 696, thus leaving an

inconceivably short sentence introduced by *οὐ γάρ* (though see 464–5), it is more likely that one column is lost between cols. 24 and 25.

Col. 25

Concluding the section (1–723) on argumentation adduced by the early Epicureans for the gods, the author observes that Epicurus' pupil Metrodorus criticized even Socrates himself for his attitudes and behaviour toward the gods, in particular for his insistent search for a definition of piety in Plato's *Euthyphro*, and his failure to reach a conclusion. Turning from theology to matters of cult, the author begins with an attack on those transgressing or mocking traditional forms of religious observance. Observance of traditional cult has been alluded to several times in the treatise already (above, 256–65 in connection with early humans, and 646–57: virtually all—madmen excluded—worship the gods, whether they have proofs for them or not). At the end of this column the author turns to treat the official Epicurean position on cultic observance, as documented from the early history of the school, with a condemnation of those who (like Socrates?) would transgress or mock religious practices.

696–8 οὕτω | δὲ μακρὰν ἀφεστή|κασι: for the expression see Philod. *Rhet.* i. 12,26–8; ii. 146,36; *De bono rege* 31,4; *De mus.* 137,37 Delattre, and cf. below, 1468–74 (of Epicurus): *τοσοῦ[το] | τοίνυ[ν ἀ]πέσχε [τοῦ] | βλα-π[τικ]ὸς ἀνθ[ρώ]||πων γ[εγον]ένα[ι τι]||νὸς ὧ[στε ο]ὐ μό[νον] | τοὺς γενέ-[τα]ς ἴσα [θε]||οῖς ἐτίμησεν* etc.

697–701 ἀφεστή|κασι τοῦ μὴ . . . λέγειν: the negative force of *ἀφεστήκασι* requires that it be treated as a verb of hindering or avoiding. *μή* therefore must be the pleonastic negative, to be omitted in translation (Smyth § 2739: 'a redundant *μή* to confirm the negative idea of the leading verb'; cf. Schwyzer ii. 598; Kühner–Blass i. 391–3), e.g. Thuc. 5.25; Xen. *Cyr.* 1.6.32, cf. *Mem.* 4.2.3 (*μή* not obligatory, but redundant when it appears). The sense is: 'so far off do they stand from giving the pure account' (as the opponents had alleged of the Epicureans themselves: 176–7 *ὥστ'] ἀνόσιοι, δια|[βαλεῖν] ἡμᾶς*; 645–6 *ἀνοσίου[ς] | νομίζεσθαι*). Unless Philodemus is being ironic (i.e. by purporting to relate an opponent's charge about the Epicureans in their books—a possibility that cannot be ruled out, but see below), the subject of *ἀφεστή|κασι* (697–8) must therefore be non-Epicurean philosophers, such as Prodicus, Diagoras, Critias, Antisthenes, and Empedocles named above at 520–45. Philodemus notes here that Metrodorus' criticism of Socrates adds another figure (i.e. Plato) to this roster of unbelievers. The *ὥστε* clause at 701–5 gives an example of the kind of criticism of other philosophers by the

Epicureans that is necessitated by 'how far they come from giving the pure account' ἐν τοῖc περὶ θεῶν. This conclusion could be avoided, and the Epicureans made the subject of ἀφεcτή|κακι, by supplementing a pejorative adjective in place of Gomperz's ἀ|[γνεύ]οντα in 698–9, but in fact there are no suitable candidates: at the beginning of 699 (where N^1 shows]ευ in a later hand before οντα, perhaps simply derivative from Gomperz's supplement and so ignorable: it does not appear in the copy N^2 or in the engraving HV^2 II) there is not room to read e.g. ἄ|[δικον] ὄντα, or ἀ|[νόcιον] or ἄ|[νομον] with which it is frequently paired; the hiatus ἀ|[cεβῆ] ὄντα vel sim. will not have been tolerated, and ὄντα in any case would be otiose.

700 ἐν τοῖc περὶ θεῶν: sc. βιβλίοιc: 'in their (sc. other philosophers') writings about the gods' (so already Duening 1870, 28). τὰ περὶ θεῶν is Philodemus' standard designation for theological works/arguments (above, 479–81). This explains in part the mention of Plato in 704–5 ('Plato's character Euthyphro'): because Socrates himself wrote nothing, Philodemus has to explain that, according to Metrodorus, it was in Plato's portrayal of Socrates' dialogue with Euthyphro that Socrates strayed so far from the true λόγοc about the gods. We might have expected τοῖc περὶ θεῶν here to be Epicurean writings: it is so taken by Acosta and Angeli following Körte, taking the Epicureans to be subject of 697–8 ἀφεcτή|κακι and understanding τοῦ μὴ τὸν . . . λόγον . . . λέγειν to mean 'from *not* giving an acceptable account'. (Tepedino 1991, 176 prints ἐν τοῖc Περὶ θεῶν as though a reference to books by the title *On Gods* by Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Phaedrus.) The following mention of Metrodorus' attack on Socrates is then taken as an example of the Epicureans' giving an acceptable λόγοc. It is true that Philodemus is constantly at pains in the treatise to make explicit things done, said, or thought περὶ θεῶν by the Epicureans: see, with special emphasis on their writings above, 479–81 τ]ῶν περὶ αὐ|[τοὺc (sc. θεοὺc) cυν]βαινόν[των | ἐν βυ]βλίοιc; 641 οἳ . . . ἔγραψαν. Their writings are filled with oaths and vows (825–8); Epicurus' letters are drawn upon extensively (esp. 797–957). But Philodemus has also shown that the Epicureans discussed the theological writings of non-Epicurean philosophers (see 520–45), so there is no reason why ἐν τοῖc περὶ θεῶν should not here designate the works of other philosophers criticized by the Epicureans. These works will be further criticized in detail in the final section of the treatise (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 1975*b*), to which the present mention of them is only a prelude. What follows here (701–8) is easily construed as another example of a case in which the Epicureans countered their opponents by criticizing their predecessors for having strayed so far from the true λόγοc on the gods. By contrast the Epicureans give the true account in all their writings, a point that has already been made above at 479–81. It is difficult to understand τοῖc περὶ θεῶν as designating Epicurean books given that Metrodorus' book is not explicitly cited by title as an example at 703–5 (as Körte *et al.* believed it

was), and is in any case impossible if Epicureans are not the subject of ἀφεστή|κασι (697–8).

701–3 καὶ | Cωκράτην . . . αὐτόν: 'even Socrates himself'. Having been formally condemned on such charges, Socrates might otherwise be thought to have been sufficiently chastised in the cause of piety. Kleve 1983, 243 understands καὶ Cωκράτην to mean '*already* Socrates', presumably reflecting Philodemus' historical perspective: i.e. 'already (viz. even before Zeno) Metrodorus criticizes Socrates'. Zeno's attacks on Socrates were legendary (Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 *scurram Atticum*). But in this case we should expect καί immediately to precede Μητρόδωροc in the syntax, not Cωκράτην as the text has it. καί is more easily correlated with the intensive pronoun αὐτόν if taken with intensive force in the sense of 'even', 'as well'. Such emphasis is not necessarily at odds with the fact that Socrates was generally reviled in Epicurean circles (on which see esp. Kleve 1983; Vander Waerdt 1989), in rejection of the view of Socrates as a model of piety and a martyr who died for his pious convictions. (Plato, for example, represents Socrates as fastidiously pious, and as having a similar view of himself: see e.g. *Apology* 36 C–E, where Socrates proposes for himself, instead of a penalty, the honour of meals in the prytaneum.)

There appears to have been a change in the once hostile attitude of the Epicureans towards Socrates, especially Plato's Socrates, between the mid-third and the first century BC. After Plato's dialogues had become part of the standard canon and the focus of the epistemological debate had shifted to from Arcesilaus to Carneades (and later Antiochus), the figure of Plato's Socrates (in contrast to Xenophon's Socrates, as the vituperative attack on S. in Philodemus' *De oeconomia* shows) was rehabilitated and made among Epicureans to seem more philosophically acceptable, or at least beyond dispute in argument. (See the further treatment of Socrates below, 1330–62, resumed at 1674–1701: Philodemus there exhibits some sympathy for Socrates' plight, but sees his death at the hands of the Athenians as his own fault for not disguising his views from some people, and thereby harming them.) Philodemus in general exhibits an increased tolerance toward Plato's works, as Indelli 1986 shows in an examination of all citations of Plato by name in Philodemus' writings; he concludes (p. 112): 'non sembra di poter cogliere una particolare ostilità nei confronti di Platone: come si è visto, il tono delle citazioni platoniche è, per cosí dire, neutro, e . . . pare non assumere atteggiamenti esasperatamente critici'; id. 1988, 161–3, and cf. Obbink 1991, 88. It must at least have seemed embarrassing to some contemporaries (as it did to Cicero, judged from *De nat. deor.* 1. 93) that Epicurus' early followers, as well as Philodemus' teacher Zeno, had actually attacked Plato's Socrates, who, if anyone, was thought of as the paragon of piety. In this case the intensive καὶ Cωκράτην would at once 'apologize' for the criticism of Plato's Socrates as it emphasizes the thoroughgoing piety of Metrodorus'

criticism of Socrates. The Socrates of Xenophon's writing is also criticized later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 20,20–30 (Schober 1988, 115 = Test. Socr. 35 Acosta–Angeli) for having said 'in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*' (4. 3. 13) that god shows not his *μορφή* but his *ἔργα*. Below at 1678–82 Philodemus seems acquainted with (but sceptical about) a school of opinion that the real Socrates refrained from discussing his theological views in public.

703 αὐτόν: the intensive pronoun, 'Socrates himself'. The subject *Μητρόδωρος* is interposed between *Σωκράτην* (object of *καταμέμφεται*) and the intensive pronoun *αὐτόν*, thus laying new emphasis on the pronoun. The transmitted syntax is defended by Duening 1870, 28 n. p as equivalent to *ὥστε Μητρόδωρος καὶ αὐτὸν Σωκράτην καταμέμφεται εἴπερ τοῦτο ἐπόει πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τοῦ* [*sic*] *Πλάτωνος*, though this is condemned on grounds of word-order by Körte 1890, 547 ('quae ab omni arte grammatica aliena sunt'), who is followed by Philippson. The syntactical difficulty is alleviated if the phrase *πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα* is controlled not by *μέμφεται* (706), but by a verb (i.e. 707–8 *λ*[*έ*]|*γον*[*τα*) dependent on it in *oratio obliqua*.

It is impossible that the *disegnatore* should have mistaken *ἐν τῶι* for *αὐτόν*. It is so emended by Körte 1890, 547, followed by Philippson, but the two words could scarcely be graphically more dissimilar, a type of confusion unparallelled in this treatise. If the title of Metrodorus' book *Against Plato's Euthyphro* is to be read here, *ἐν τῶι* must be supplied thus: *αὐτὸν* ⟨*ἐν τῶι*⟩ *Πρὸς κτλ*. It is true that *ἐν τῶι* sometimes drops from MSS in citations: Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1108 E *ὁ δὲ Μητρόδωρος ἄντικρυς* (⟨*ἐν τῶι*⟩ inseruit Menagius) *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας εἴρηκεν* (fr. 33 Körte). But there are further difficulties with reading the title here: see next note.

703–5 πρὸς | Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλάτωνος: cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 *istisne fidentes somniis . . . Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt*. A book by the title *Πρὸς τὸν Εὐθύφρονα* is also cited below, 958–60 *περὶ*] *τῶν θεῶν* | [*ἐν τῶι*] *Πρὸς τὸν Εὐ*|[*θύφρο*]*να λέγων* (missing in Körte 1890), and explicitly attested for Metrodorus in the list of works in *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44 *καὶ ἐκ*] | *τῶν Μητ*[*ροδώρου οἵ*]|*ον ἐν* [*τῶι Πρὸς τὸν*] | *Εὐθύφρο*[*να*, where the presence of the article before *Εὐθύφρο*[*να* is guaranteed by line-length (text quoted in full above on 205–6; cf. Crönert 1906, 24; F. H. Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics* (Cambridge Philological Society Suppl. 10; Cambridge 1985), 6). It is uncertain whether Cicero knew the book itself: his reference at *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 (quoted above) appears to be summarizing this section of *De pietate* (as 1. 25–41 clearly summarizes the last section of the treatise, *P. Herc.* 1428: see vol. ii). It scarcely can be coincidence that Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles*, which also appears in Cicero's list, is also cited apologetically in this ambit (just above, 542–54; below, 999–1002, 1099–1108). For the form of the title *Against Plato's Euthyphro*, compare Colotes' *Against Plato's Lysis* (*Κωλώτου* | *Πρὸς*

τὸν Πλάτω|νος Λύσιν) and *Against Plato's Euthydemus* (Κω[λ]ώτο[υ] | Πρὸς [τὸ]ν Π[λάτωνος] | Εὐθ[ύ]δ[η]μον, both titles being preserved in full in the subscriptions to the Herculaneum rolls that contain the books themselves: see Crönert 1906, 5–7, 163–70; A. Concolino Mancini, 'Sulle opere polemiche di Colote', *CErc* 6 (1976), 61–7; Westman 1955, 31–9) and Metrodorus' *Against Plato's Gorgias* (*P. Herc.* 1005 col. 11: ὑποψί[α]ν . . . τοῦ Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος | Γοργίαν δευτέρου, text quoted in full below on 705–6). In all these cases the title is given as Πρὸς τὸν --- to show that the work is a treatise, e.g. 'Against Plato's Euthyphro' and not a speech 'Against Euthyphro' (though in theory the former could also be personal). But in the present passage at 703–5 πρὸς | Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλά|τωνος the article is absent. Compare the use of the article with titles of Platonic dialogues named after persons in D.L. 3. 50–1 vs. the same persons named without the article at 3. 52 (note, however, that the article does not appear with the titles in the more abbreviated catalogue of the Thrasyllan tetralogies at 3. 57–62). Thus in order to read the title here one must not only supply ἐν τῶι (see above on 703) but also the article after πρός, as follows: αὐτὸν ⟨ἐν τῶι⟩ Πρὸς ⟨τὸν⟩ Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλάτωνος. (Given the other occurrences of these titles, we might have expected ἐν τῶι Πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνος Εὐθύφρονα.) Given the need for two different supplements, and nothing to account for either omission, we may safely conclude that this is not a citation by title (though there is no question what work is intended), and πρὸς κτλ. must be a prepositional phrase going with what follows. The accusative article with the genitive Πλάτωνος in the phrase πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλάτωνος may be understood as equivalent to πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τὸν ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος, i.e. the person in Plato's dialogues. (Otherwise the expression Εὐθύφρονα τὸν Πλάτωνος might be taken to mean 'Plato's son Euthyphro'. Cf. the similarly problematic genitive at D.L. 9. 61 ἤκουσε Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στίλπωνος.) Accordingly there will have been no need for an exact citation of the title: from this it will have been obvious that it was in his book *Against Plato's Euthyphro* that Metrodorus faulted Plato's protagonist Socrates. Ancient citations of titles of books are notoriously imprecise (see e.g. Obbink 1988*a*, 433 with n. 27 for other examples). In this respect 703–5 is as much a citation (not by its exact title) of Plato's dialogue, the *Euthyphro*, as it is of Metrodorus' treatise which engaged it.

Diels suggested (*Dox. Gr.* 127 n. 1) that Metrodorus' book was a theological work, believing it to be named here as an example of Epicurean writings περὶ θεῶν (700), though this is less than certain (see on 700, below on 707–8). The present testimony and the other mentions of Metrodorus' *Against Plato's Euthyphro* are nevertheless significant, for together they record our earliest notices of Plato's dialogue of this name, making the Epicureans the earliest attested readers of it. The authorship of Metrodorus (see on 705–6) dates this to the first quarter of the third century BC. The author of [Plat.]

Ep. 3 may have known the text of the *Euthyphro*: he seems to have understood Socrates' reference to Meletus as *ἀγνώς* at *Euthyphro* 2B8 to refer to Socrates' scarce acquaintance with Euthyphro (*Ep.* 3. 316C7–D1 *σοῦ δὲ ὄντος μὲν σφόδρα νέου . . . καὶ σφόδρα ἀγνῶτος ἐμοί*), rather than his relative lack of political prominence (though the latter is almost certainly right: see Tulin 1990, 41 with n. 2). Early acquaintance with Plato's *Euthyphro* may also be demonstrated by the fact that definitions of piety identical with several of those canvassed in the *Euthyphro* also appear in the pseudo-Platonic *Horoi* ([*Def.*] 41 E14–15, 415A9 with Plat. *Euthyphr.* 12E5ff.; [*Def.*] 413A1–2 ~ *Euthyphro* 14D1 (cf. [*Epin.*] 988A1–5 and see Tulin 1990, 24 n. 3). The examples at [Plat.] *Περὶ δικαίου* 372 are drawn with little change from *Euthyphro* 7BC (Heidel 1896, 8 n. 10, 20 n. 3). So also [Plat.] *Minos* 314B–D probably draw upon *Euthypro* 9E and 14B (Heidel 1896, 42 n. 25). Some of these pseudo-Platonic works may thus exhibit some acquaintance with the *Euthyphro*, and some may antedate the third century BC. But the citation of Plato's *Euthyphro* in Metrodorus' title here at 458–60 is apparently the earliest recorded formal notice of this dialogue, in particular citation of it by its *title*. The present passage, correlated with the other references to Metrodorus' book in Herculaneum papyri, is the earliest recorded notice of the contents of Plato's dialogue (the evidence is discussed in full by Tulin 1990). Aristotle never mentions the *Euthyphro* (as he also never mentions the *Ion* or the *Critias*), although the language of *Gen. An.* 778^{a}16ff. may recall *Euthyphro* 10A–11B (see Tulin 1990, 197 n. 1). Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.*, s.v. *Πλάτων*) did not think Aristotle ever alluded to the *Euthyphro* (the alleged allusions to the *Laches*, *Lysis*, and *Charmides* are far from certain). It is noteworthy that the early Epicureans knew the dialogue by the title '(Plato's) *Euthyphro*', rather than by its alternative title *Περὶ ὁσίου* (= *ὁσιότητος*, cf. Epicurus' *Περὶ ὁσιότητος*, for which see above on 205–6), under which we know it also circulated in antiquity (D.L. 3. 58), since titles for Plato's dialogues in any form (except the *Apology*) are not generally attested until much later: before the Thrasyllan division a periphrastic form of reference (as indeed in the present passage) seems to have sufficed. (On the alternative titles of Plato's dialogues see Tarán 1975, n. 19; Tulin 1990, 4 with n. 6: they are not pre-Hellenistic, though Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1415^{b}30 once attests the secondary title of the *Menexenus*, which is usually taken to be the exception proving the rule that neither form of title existed before the Thrasyllan division).

Emergence of interest in the *Euthyphro* in the early third century also raises eyebrows, because it was no doubt the epistemological *ἀπορία* of its conclusion (we cannot know what piety is) that drew censure from Epicurean quarters, and this presumes that the debate with Arcesilaus and the Academy of the late fourth and early third centuries, which championed universal suspension of belief in certain knowledge (*ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων*),

was current (see below on 707–8). On certain points (or on certain definitions of piety in the dialogue) Metrodorus may have taken the part of Euthyphro, in the same way in which Philodemus in *De oeconomia* takes the part of Critobulus against Socrates in Xenophon's dialogue (Kleve 1983, 228; Tepedino 1991, 176). A companion piece *Against Plato's Gorgias*, in at least two books, must have existed by the second half of the second century, since Zeno knew reasons for suspecting the attribution of its second book to Metrodorus (*P. Herc.* 1005 col. 11, quoted below on 705–6). On acquaintance with Plato's works, and the attitude exhibited towards them in the Herculanensia, see above on 702; Indelli 1986, 109–12; 1988, 161–3. Plato is also cited later in *De pietate* (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 9,1–2 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 19), referring to an etymology at *Crat.* 404 C, though the citation actually comes in a passage Philodemus is paraphrasing from Diogenes of Babylon's famous book *Περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς* (cf. Indelli 1986, 111 n. 19). For the Epicurean treatment of Socrates, see the discussion of him below at 1468–1670, esp. 1491–1537. Cf. M. T. Riley, 'The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates', *Phoenix*, 34 (1980), 55–68; Kleve 1983; A. A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', *CQ*² 38 (1988), 150–71; Vander Waerdt 1989, 253–67, who argues that Xenophon's rather than Plato's Socrates was the more important model for the formation of the Epicurean view of Socrates, and that it was Colotes who first took an interest in Socrates and attacked him, a view which receives slender support from the fact that there were doubts expressed over the authenticity of one of the two books of Metrodorus' *Against Plato's Gorgias* (see next note).

705–6 εἴπερ ἐπόει | τοῦτο: 'if he did this', i.e. 'if Socrates really did what he was represented by Plato in the dialogue as doing'. In other words, Metrodorus said that Socrates was at fault if Plato's report (that Socrates did this *πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα*: namely, asked Euthyphro 'what is holy?') were true. I would paraphrase as follows: *ὥστε Μητρόδωρος καὶ Σωκράτην αὐτὸν καταμέμφεται εἴπερ "τί ὅσιόν ἐστιν" ἔλεγε πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τὸν ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος*. For the resumptive use of *ποιέω* in the second clause, to avoid repeating the verb of the first, see LSJ *ποιέω* B.4. In addition, *εἰ ἐπόει* in coordination with *μέμφεται* ought to be present contrafactual, implying that there were serious doubts to contend with on this point. Because this reading potentially introduces as many questions as it answers, it would be well, before defending it, to consider the competing construals of Philodemus' Greek here.

1. Körte took *ἐπόει* to mean 'compose' and the subject of *ἐπόει* to be Metrodorus: Philodemus thereby expresses doubts over Metrodorus' authorship of *Against Plato's Euthyphro*: *εἴπερ ἐπόει τοῦτο κτλ.* means 'if Metrodorus (really) wrote this (work, *Against Plato's Euthyphro*), then he reproaches Socrates'. For *ποιεῖν* used of the process of composition, see Philod. *Rhet.* 1. 240,16 *τοὺ[c] | ῥή[τορ]ας ἐ[ν τοῖ]c λόγοις | τ[ὸ περ]ὶ*

μ[εγ]άλων πρα|γ[μάτ]ων ποιεῖcθαι τοὺc | λόγουc; 2. 230.24 (middle). Of written works: LSJ s.v. A.4. This reading gets some support from the fact that doubts over the authenticity of certain Epicurean works (including the second book of Metrodorus' *Against Plato's Gorgias*) are attested in a notice by Philodemus about his teacher Zeno of Sidon and his contemporaries (probably Epicureans): see Philod. *Πρὸc τοὺc* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 11 Angeli (Zeno Sidonius fr. 25 Angeli–Colaizzo, where it is still called col. 8); cf. Körte 1890, 542, 546–7; Crönert 1906, 24 n. 136, 69 n. 338; F. Sbordone, *Philodemi Adversus [sophistas]. E papyro Herculanensi 1005* (Naples, 1947) 146; Angeli on *P. Herc.* 1005 col. 11. (Kleve 1983, 229, followed by Vander Waerdt 1989, 255, is simply wrong mistaken in saying that Zeno was the author of *Against Plato's Gorgias*.) The passage reads as follows (Zeno is certainly the subject, though the introduction of the report is lost):

ἐρχόμενον ἀκριβεί]|αι πρὸ[c τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, | πε]ρὶ πολλῶν ἠγ[εῖc]θαι [τὰ]|κε[ί]-νοιc ἀρέ[c]κοντ', [ἐκ] τ̣ῆc ἀ̣[ρ]|χῆc ὑποψί[α]ν τινὰ̣ [λ]α̣μβά|ν[ει]ν ὡc περί τινων ἐπι|cτολῶν̣ καὶ [Πρὸc Πυ]|θοκλέα περὶ μ̣[ε]τεώρων | ἐπιτομῆc καὶ τοῦ Περὶ ἀ|ρ̣[ε-τ]ῶ̣[ν], καὶ τῶν εἰc Μητρόδωρον ἀναφερομένων | Ὑποθηκῶν καὶ τῶν Μαρ|τυριῶν καὶ μᾶλλον [δ]ὲ̣ | τοῦ Πρὸc τὸν Πλάτωνο̣c | Γοργίαν δευτέρου, καὶ τῶν | εἰc Πολύαινον τοῦ Πρὸc | τοὺc ῥήτορac καὶ τοῦ̣ Περὶ | cελήνηc καὶ τῶν εἰc Ἑρ|μαρχον· ἐξέλεξεν δὲ καὶ | [..... ..] γεγραμμένω̣[ν (text after Angeli 1988, 176–7)

... as regards the writings of the Epicurean masters, on many counts (e.g. trying) to consider their doctrines, he (sc. Zeno) conceived from the beginning a certain suspicion, about certain letters, and about the epitome *To Pythocles* on celestial phenomena, and about the treatise *On Virtues* and about the *Precepts* (or *Will?*) attributed to Metrodorus and about the *Testimonies* and especially about the second book of *Against Plato's Gorgias* and among the (treatises attributed) to Polyaenus *Against the Rhetoricians* and the book *About the Moon* and about the works (attributed) to Hermarchus. Moreover, he picked out (i.e. for censure?) ... of the things written ... (column breaks off)

We know for certain only that Zeno looked into the matter of the authenticity of the works listed in that passage, not that he definitively condemned them; nor do we know whether he thought them inconsistent with the views of the early Epicureans, recent or early forgeries, or the productions of hostile dissidents. But Angeli (ad loc.) notes that the passage makes a distinction between two groups of works by early Epicureans whose authenticity was questioned: the letter *Ad Pythoclem* and a treatise *On Virtues*, on the one hand, as opposed to *works attributed to* Metrodorus (*τῶν εἰc Μητρόδωρον ἀναφερομένων*); the latter include a *Ὑποθῆκαι* (*Precepts*) and *Μαρτυρίαι* (*Testimonies*), and the second book of an *Against Plato's Gorgias* (presumably its first book was not objectionable), together with an *Against the Rhetoricians* and *On the Moon* similarly attributed to Polyaenus. Angeli 1988, 289–94 ingeniously argues that this division seems to privilege the letter *Ad Pythoclem* on the question of authenticity (it is not said to be

'attributed' to Epicurus), as against the other named works merely 'credited' to Metrodorus and Polyaenus. (For this use of *ἀναφέρομαι* in *De pietate* see below (vol. ii; Henrichs 1972*a*, 77), *P. Herc.* 1610 fr. 3,15–19 *ἐν δὲ τοῖς* | *[ἀνα]φερομένοις εἰς* | *[Μο]υσαῖον γέγραπται* | *[Τάρ]ταρον πρῶτον* | *[καὶ Ν]ύκτα*; cf. Clem. *Alex. Strom.* 1. 21. 131 Stählin *Ἴων δὲ ὁ Χῖος ἐν τοῖς Τριαγμοῖς καὶ Πυθαγόραν εἰς Ὀρφέα ἀνενεγκεῖν τινα ἱστορεῖ*, with D.L. 8. 8.) At least one of these works said to have been questioned by Zeno is noted elsewhere in Philodemus' works to have been suspected for its authenticity: *Against the Rhetoricians*, as here, is said at Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 23,7–11 to have been attributed to Polyaenus (*τὸ δὲ Πο|λυαίνο[υ] λεγόμενο[ν]*, = *ἀναφερομένων εἰς* in *P. Herc.* 1005 col. 11 Angeli) but in reality it had been demonstrated to have been non-Epicurean.

Later in the treatise (see vol. ii) Philodemus similarly records doubts over the authenticity of certain works ascribed to Pythagoras (*P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 10: Schober 1988, 113) and Diagoras (*P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 11–12: Henrichs 1974*a*, 21–2). Below at 2496–2501 he includes a general caveat to readers not to expect too much accuracy from him about titles and ascriptions of the non-Epicurean works of poets and philosophers criticized in the second part of the treatise. Demetrius the Laconian was very active in the philology and textual criticism of Epicurean works (see Puglia 1982, 1988; Sedley 1989*b*).

2. Acosta and Angeli 1991, 382 take *ἐπόει* to mean 'do' and take Socrates as the unexpressed subject of *εἴπερ ἐπόει* | *τοῦτο*, 'ammesso che il filosofo mirasse ad una esatta definizione del concetto di religiosità, in realtà fu ben lungi dal realizzare il suo progetto' (cf. Tepedino 1991, 176 who emends *N*'s *ἐπόει* to *ποιεῖ*, 'se pure fa questa considerazione'). To Körte's reading of *ἐπόει τοῦτο* as 'compose this (book)' it is objected that Metrodorus' *Against Plato's Euthyphro* does not appear in Zeno's list, nor is its authenticity elsewhere questioned: it is cited without further notice below, 959–60, and explicitly as Metrodorus' in *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44 (text above on 205–6). Its genuineness is apparently presumed by Cicero's unsympathetic speaker at *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 (quoted above on 703–5). This argument from silence does not prove that Philodemus is not here registering doubts about its authenticity. Angeli 1988, 297 (so also Acosta and Angeli 1992, 382; Tepedino 1991, 176) further objects that Philodemus would undermine his own argument here by questioning the authenticity of the very work he cites to prove his point. I should not care to speculate about the author's capacity for pedantry. Körte's explanation that Metrodorus is the subject of *ἐποίει* is seriously weakened, however, if the title of the work *Against Plato's Euthyphro* is not explicitly present in the text at 703–4, as I have argued above (*εἴπερ ἐπόει τοῦτο* cannot simply mean *εἴπερ αὐτὸν ἐμέμφετο*, for this would be to say: 'he reproaches him, if he indeed reproached him', which is senseless). The undesignated change of subject (cf. 702–3 *Μητρό|δωρος* sc. *καταμέμφεται*) is unexceptionable, but exactly what exactly *τοῦτο* is supposed to be is left unstated.

3. According to Tepedino 1991, 176, the subject of *ἐπόει* is likewise Socrates, and the expression 'sembra riferirsi ... alla "impura discussione"', i.e. the *λόγος περὶ θεῶν* of 699–701: 'if Socrates was indeed far from speaking a pure *λόγος*, Metrodorus reproached him' (referring back to 697–701, as though *εἰ ἐπόει τοῦτο = εἰ ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μὴ τὸν ἀγνεύοντα λόγον λέγειν*). But this cannot be right, for the reason that Socrates (or rather Plato's Socrates) is being adduced here as an example of just such a failure to give a pure account, so that questioning whether or not he really gave it would be not just pedantic but an outright contradiction. The Epicureans harboured no doubts whatsoever that Socrates was in fact impious, nor is this called into question in Philodemus' treatment of him later in the treatise (1468–1670; Kleve 1983, 228).

4. Already Duening (see above on 703) took the subject to be Socrates, connecting *ἐπόει* closely with the preceding phrase (not a title) *πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα*, i.e. if Socrates really did this in response to Euthyphro. Assuming that *μέμφεται* introduced a dependent clause (e.g. with *ὅτι* or, more likely, a participle, as I have restored *λ̣[ε̣]|γον[τα* in 707–8) specifying exactly for what Socrates was reproached by Metrodorus, it is pretty clear that *εἴπερ ἐπόει τοῦτο* means 'if Socrates really did what he was represented by Plato as doing', and reflects something Metrodorus said, rather than being Philodemus' qualification of his own report, as in (1) above. *τοῦτο* (cf. *τόδε*) may legitimately point forward if it is in direct apposition with a following clause or phrase. In other words, Metrodorus said that Socrates was at fault if Plato's report (that Socrates did this) were true. I would paraphrase as follows: *ὥστε Μητρόδωρος καὶ Σωκράτην αὐτὸν καταμέμφεται εἴπερ "τί ὅσιόν ἐστι" πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα τὸν ἐν τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἔλεγεν*. Thus Metrodorus made the kind of distinction that we find only rarely exampled in antiquity between the 'real', historical Socrates and his dramatic portrayal by Plato or someone else. For this distinction see e.g. Aristotle, *Met. A*6, 987^{a}29–^{b}14, *M*4 1078^{b}12–30 *ἀλλὰ ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς*, cf. *EE* 1. 5, 1216^{b}3–10, 7. 2, 1145^{b}23–7. Since *εἴπερ ἐπόει τοῦτο* seems to be part of the report *Μητρόδωρος Σωκράτην μέμφεται*, it appears to reflect Metrodorus' original opinion or statement, rather being simply Philodemus' annotation, though this is not conclusive. In either case the point of questioning whether Socrates really did what Plato represented him as doing (asking Euthyphro in 'what is holy?') could have been to declare that his criticism of Socrates was aimed, in this case, at Academic scepticism and its portrayal of Socrates, not necessarily at Socrates himself, in case Plato's depiction should perhaps be thought, at least by some, at odds with the facts or with the portrayal of Socrates by one or another of the other Socratics, like Xenophon or Aeschines. That Philodemus was familiar with attempts to distinguish between Socrates and his various representations (or between different portraits of him) is demonstrated beyond any doubt by 1675–84

below, where Philodemus addresses briefly the contention of some, unnamed persons that Socrates in fact attempted to refrain from discussing theology in public. Philodemus' response there may reflect the same running dialogue (perhaps with unknown persons) as εἴπερ ἐπόει τοῦτο in the present passage. In the present passage he (if not already Metrodorus) allows in passing that perhaps the real Socrates may not have persistently asked Euthyphro 'what is holy?' ('if he indeed did this'), but maintains that Plato's Socrates at any rate did so, (and Metrodorus attacked him for it), whereas at 1675–684 he concedes that (someone's?) Socrates may have said οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ cκεδάceιc ὄχλον, but points out that if he did, it just shows how many enemies he made by teaching in public. Cf. Vander Waerdt 1989, esp. 229 n. 12, who argues that the Epicurean attack was initiated by Colotes and actually focused on Xenophon's Socrates, to the relative neglect of Plato's. The present text, the only extant report of the content of *Against Plato's Euthyphro*, fits the philosophical profile of Metrodorus and the early milieu of the school, in so far as it reveals an attack that conforms well to what we know about early Epicurean criticism of Arcesilaus' New Academy (see below on 707–8).

706–7 καταμέμ[φε]|ται: 'censure', 'find fault with'. With accusative of person: Thuc. 7. 77, 8. 106; at Philod. *De oec.* col. 27,20 καταμέμφεcθαι takes the genitive of person, but cf. *De morte* col. 32,18 (where the restoration of an accusative object seems inevitable). Cf. above, 520 ἐμ[έμψα]|το (+ dative of person, *acc. rei*) of Epicurus chastising famous philosophers of Socrates' generation and circle (and see commentary ad loc.).

707–8 "τί ὅ[cιόν ἐ]cτι" λ[έ]|γον[τα: sc. Cωκράτην (702). Cf. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1118 C διαγελᾷ (sc. Colotes) καὶ φλαυρίζει τὸν Cωκράτην ζητοῦντα "τί ἄνθρωπόc ἐcτι;". Philodemus does not explicitly say that Metrodorus defended Euthyphro against Socrates (so Angeli 1988, 297: 'Metrodoro, infatti, compose un libro *Contro l'Eutifrone di Platone* dove difese Eutifrone cosí come Filodemo il Critobulo dell'*Economico* di Senofonte', following Kleve 1983, 243, repeated by Tepedino 1991, 176), but that Metrodorus criticized Socrates himself, and here specifies the charge: namely, for asking for a definition of holiness (cf. Plat. *Euthyphro* 5 C 8–D 7 λέγε δή, τί φὴc εἶναι τὸ ὅcιον, 6 DE, and *passim*). The potential significance of this criticism is intriguing: 'He probably criticized Socrates' disrespect for popular religion' (Kleve 1983, 228, without knowledge of the new reading). The idea of Metrodorus' taking the part of Euthyphro against Socrates (as Philodemus sides with Critobulus in *De oeconomia*) may seem implausible, because Euthyphro appears in the dialogue as a comically superstitious and superficial mystic, a self-styled μάντιc and free-lance ἐξηγητής, who not only fails to answer adequately any one of Socrates' mocking questions ὅ τι ὅcιόν ἐcτι ὃ χρὴ ποιεῖν (cf. 4 D); but also remains woefully mistaken about the outcome of Socrates impending trial (see 3 B–D, 4 B, 6 BC). On the other hand, the

Platonic dialogue emphasizes the important Academic role of definition in any inquiry, while the Epicureans eschewed definition, dialectic, and inquiry based on asking questions about the meaning of terms, especially in the Socratic formulation familiar from the Platonic dialogues: *τί ἐστιν;* (For the rejection of definition and dialectic see also above on 470.) It is hard to think that an adherent of Epicurus (who rejected all *μαντική*) could have condoned Euthyphro's engagement with Socrates on this topic, much less agreed with some of the definitions of piety offered by Euthyphro in the dialogue, e.g. the one at 14 D *ἐπιστήμη αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως*, styled *ἐμπορικὴ τέχνη* by Socrates. But Metrodorus' objection may have been levelled against the fact that Socrates in the dialogue persistently and in public (cf. below, 1675–84) asks for a definition of holiness, but is satisfied by none of the traditional definitions offered, concluding that neither he nor Euthyphro knows what holiness is. (Cf. Epic. *Ep. Ad Menoec.* 133, where the good person is said typically to be *τοῦ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος*.) For this reason the criticism can only have been aimed at someone who read the *Euthyphro* sceptically (like contemporary members of Arcesilaus' New Academy), extolling the failure to discover *τὸ ὅσιον* and the aporetic conclusion as recommendations for *ἐποχὴ περὶ πάντων*. (Despite attempts by modern commentators to discover a positive outcome to the dialogue, Socrates explicitly states at 15 C–E that no conclusion has been reached.) The Epicureans were certainly not interested in the kind of inquiry that proceeds by definition of terms (Cic. *De fin.* 1.22 *tollit definitiones*; *Acad.* 1.5 *nihil definiunt*; Epic. frr. 242–3 Us.), and Socrates' rejection of *any* definition of piety will have seemed obtuse from the Epicurean point of view, according to which we should use words in their most basic senses. For Epicurus *τὸ ὅσιον* can be known through its *πρόληψις* or *κοινὴ νόησις* (which is not the same as *consensus omnium, pace* Kleve 1983, 243: see Obbink 1992*b*, 199–202). For Epicurean definitions of piety and holiness (such as they are) see below, 1138–55, *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1, 16–24 (with commentary in Obbink 1992*a*), echoed at Lucr. 5.1189–1203 (cf. Dionigi 1976, 35–6). It is tempting to suggest that Metrodorus' *Against Plato's Euthyphro* was as much a refutation of dialectic and definition as a theological work.

The supplement "*τί ὅ̣[σιόν ἐ]στι̣*" *λ̣[έ]γον[τα*, a verbal reminiscence of Socrates' repeated request from Euthyphro for a definition of impiety, practically leaps forth from the apograph's TIC[.....]CH/[.]ΓON[, the TI of *ἐστι* having been mistaken by the *disegnatore* for H (an easy confusion). In a very similar construction at Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1118 C (quoted above), Colotes 'denounced Socrates for seeking to discover what man is and flaunting the boast that he did not even know himself'. Restoration of the present passage can be further expanded, *exempli gratia*: *καταμέμ̣[φε]ται "τί ὅ̣[σιόν ἐ]στι̣" λ̣[έ]γον[τα προσθέμ]ενο̣[ς] | περὶ [θεῶν κ]α̣τὰ φ̣[ύ]σιν | [αἰτίας διδ]όναι* (sc. *Σωκράτην*) *[δι᾽] | ἃς τ[ὴν ἀσφ]ά̣λεια[ν] | ἐξ ἀν[θρώπω]ν εὐο̣[δοῖ* '(Metrodorus) blames (Socrates) for asking 'what is holy', adding that concerning the

gods he (viz. Socrates) defines natural causes by which the human race might speed safety away (i.e. subject them to harm from other people)' etc. But it is not impossible that further quotation from the text of the *Euthyphro* is lurking here (*διδόναι*, for example, is used often in the dialogue of giving to, or by the gods, or for offering a definition). L. Judson suggests to me *λ[έ]γον[τ' οὐδέποτε*: 'for never saying what holiness is'.

711 τ[ὴν ἀcφ]ά̣λεια[ν: 'protection from harm', especially from being harmed by other people in society, one of the benefits for which the gods (or rather, believing in them) are responsible in the Epicurean view. The perpetual need for such *ἀcφάλεια* guarantees the gods a kind of eternal existence: see below, 1176–1217 and 2145–55 (*ἀcφάλεια* at 2152) where this is set out. This argues very strongly for Philippson's restoration *ἐξ ἀν[θρώ-πω]ν* in 712 (see previous note).

720–2 τὰ] μέγιcḷτα . . . εἰ | μὴ διοικεῖται καὶ | παντελῶc: very likely a reminiscence of Epic. *KD* 16 *τὰ δὲ μέγιcτα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογιcμὸc* (opp. *τύχη*) *διώκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν cυνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοική-cει* '(In but few things chance hinders a wise man), but the greatest and most important matters reason has administered and, throughout the whole period of life, does and will administer.' Cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 7,4–5 *δύναται | cυμφερόντωc ἑαυτῶι* (sc. *τῷ cοφῷ* ut vid.) *διοικεῖν*.

724 As Gomperz noted (in his app. crit.): '*γίνομαι* nothwendig verderbt oder unrichtig gelesen'. Philippson emends to simply *ο⟨ἶ⟩μαι*, but this fails to account for the sequence ΓΙΝ before ΟΜΑΙ on the apograph. Cf. *MGrHerc* 91.

725–6 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 25 and the following col. 26, coming from opposite halves of the broken papyrus roll, join neatly at this point in the descending sequence of columns from their respective halves. It is entirely fortuitous that the column-break comes at a division between sections (*μέρη*) in the organization of the work. For this reason the link between the two columns would have been very difficult to discern independently of a reconstruction of the physical characteristic of the papyrus roll relative to the order of the numbered fragments.

Section 2: Observance of Cult and Ritual (723–1022)

Philodemus begins the section on participation in cult and ritual by Epicurus and his early followers with a promise (730–4) to show that Epicurus observed all forms of worship and gave reasons for doing so. These reasons are canvassed first, followed by a catalogue of instances of actual participation in cult or ritual culled from early Epicurean writings.

The first section dealing with the rationale justifying cult is further divided into two aspects: a social one, involving maintenance of custom, obedience to law, and engagement in society (735, 750–1, cf. 755–6); and another concerned with physical or philosophical reasons (736–7), on the basis of natural behaviour (739–40) for the wise (758–65) and conducive to formation or preservation of accurate concepts of divinity (743–50, 766–73, cf. 873–7). Of course the gods cannot be annoyed if they do not receive cult (740–2), since they need nothing (754–8).

The second part of this section, attestations of actual instances of cult by early Epicureans (especially Epicurus), is further divided into instances involving public cult on the one hand (Athenian festivals, mysteries, etc.: 790–1, 865–6, 1017), and on the other hand private cultic celebrations within the Epicurean school itself, on the model of the societies of the Attic *orgeones*, including the cult of the dead founders, traditions that were still in their own way observed in Philodemus' own day and within his circle of associates. Also documented are Epicurus' swearing of oaths (820–54), his recommendation of them to his followers, common meals (840–5), civic sacrifice (879–96), προσκύνηcιc (897–8), statues and dedications (910–11), prayers, and invocations (929–45). The next section in the treatise (1023–1689) deals with a related topic: the kind of assistance (or harm) to be expected from the gods as a result of proper cultic observance.

This section is one of the scattered pieces of evidence for Epicurus' psychology of a religious life which had both its public and its private character. It registers Epicurean sympathy with the great public festivals and rituals of the many, and a commitment to maintaining the private festivals that defined their own community as socially distinct. As a whole the section on religious participation contributes to an ancient debate devoted to attacking and defending Epicureans for engaging in acts of religious cult. If Epicurus and his early followers could be shown to have participated in acts of public and private cult, they could be said to have fulfilled traditional requirements for piety. If they could be shown to have given philosophical justification for such participation by the wise (without at the same time contradicting their physical theology or compromising their ethics), they could be theoretically exonerated from the charge that they publicly worshipped simply to cultivate the favour of the masses (or the related charge that they worshipped without any real belief in the efficacy of such acts). Similar recommendations of cult on philosophical grounds appear throughout the Epicurean tradition:

P. Oxy. II 215 col. 1,4–24: *οἴ]κεῖον, μηδ' ὅταν γε | [ν]ὴ Δία οὕτω λέγηται πά|[λι]ν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων· | ["δ]έδο[ι]κα τοὺς θεοὺς πάν|[τας οὓ]ς σέ[βο]μαι [κ]αὶ τού|[τοι]ς βο[ύ]λ[ο]μαι πάντα κα|[τ]αθύειν καὶ τούτοις | [ἀν]ατιθέναι." χαριέστε|[ρο]ς μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ποτὲ | [ὁ τ]οιοῦτος ἄλλων ἰδιω|[τῶ]ν ἐστιν, ὅμως δὲ οὐ|[δὲ] ταύτῃ πω τὸ βέβαιον | [εὐ]σεβείας ὑπάρχει. σὺ | [δ', ὦ] ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώ|[τα]τον μέν τι νόμιζε τὸ | [διε]ιληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ (ὅ τι* Holford-Strevens) *| [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι | [δια]γνοηθῆναι δυνάμε|[θα], κα[ὶ θ]αύμαζε ταύτην | [τὴ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου | [ἀδ]ε[ί]ᾳ τοῦτο.*

. . . is it fitting, and not, by Zeus, when it is said instead by just anyone happening along: 'I fear all the gods whom I worship, and I wish to make all the burnt offerings and dedications to them.' Such a person is perhaps more sophisticated than other individuals, nevertheless in this there is still no firm basis for piety. But you, sir, consider it a thing of the greatest blessedness to discern properly that which we can conceive as the one best thing among existing things. Marvel at this notion and revere it in freedom from fear.

Philod. *De mus.* col. 4,6 (fr. 386 Us.) *τὰ δὲ τοσαῦτα λεγέσθω καὶ νῦν, ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον μὲν οὐ προσδεῖ[τ]αί τινος τιμῆς, ἡμῖν δὲ φυσικόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τιμᾶν μάλιστα μὲ[ν] ὁσίαις [ὑ]πολή[ψ]εσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις [ἕ]κάστωι τῶν κατὰ μέρος.*

Let it suffice to say now that the divine needs no mark of honour, but that it is natural for us to honour it, in particular by forming pious notions of it, and secondly by offering with each individual usage (i.e. as appropriate; or possibly: to each of the gods in turn) the traditional sacrifices.

Col. 26

726 θεωρίαν: cf. 918; 1388–9; *P. Oxy.* II 215; Obbink 1984.

727–8 τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα | [ἱερ]ά: the more standard form of this expression in Greek employs the verb *παραδιδόναι*, as at Philod. *De mus.* col. 4,6 *φυσικόν ἐστιν αὐτὸ τιμᾶν . . . τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις* (Epic. fr. 386 Us., quoted above, which continues, however, by specifying that *μουσική* is not among *τὰ παραδεδομένα*). Cf. below, 1574, 2282–3, 2492. Lack of *συναλιφή* before a word beginning with rough breathing is tolerated at 1290 *καὶ ἅγιον* (cf. 531, 739–40 *εἶναι | [ἡμεῖ]ν*). But the first word in these cases ends in a long vowel or diphthong, so we should perhaps be prepared to restore *τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα | [κοιν]ά* (cf. 1133–4) or *[νόμιμ]α* here (no room for any supplement at the end of 727, *-μενα* being already crowded out into the *intercolumnium* on the apograph).

728–9 παραβαίνον|[τας: restoration of the accusative plural is guaranteed by *διαγελῶντας* in what follows. *παραβαίνειν* is a traditional locution for the transgression of any law, especially of a religious nature or with religious implications: Hdt. 1.65 *τὰ νόμιμα*; Aesch. *Agam.* 789 *δίκην*; *IG* i^3.

37. 53–4 *εἰ μὲν ταῦτ*]|*α παραβ*⟨*α*⟩*ίνοιμι*; Eurip. *Ion* 230 *θεοῦ νόμον*; Aristoph. *Av.* 331–2 *θεσμούς, ὅρκους*, 461 *τὰς σπονδάς*; Thuc. 1.78; Lys. 9.15; Aeschin. 3.204; Aristot. *Pol.* 1325^{b}5 *ὁ παραβαίνων;* Philod. *Rhet.* i. 165,6; *De mus.* 93,6 (of the violation of musical modes). In the light of the criticism of Socrates by Metrodorus cited in the preceding column, it is tempting to suggest that Philodemus has in mind here Socrates, Alcibiades, and the *hermocopidae*. Critias is mentioned at 525 and probably alluded to later in the treatise (1184–1217), while Socrates gets his own separate discussion (see 1359, 1164–1701).

729 διαγελῶντας: a rare expression and, like *παραβαίνειν*, somewhat poetic: already Eurip. *Bacch.* 272, 322; Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.26; *Adv. Col.* 1118 CD *ἐν οἷς δὲ κομιδῇ διαγελᾷ* (sc. Colotes) *καὶ φλαυρίζει τὸν Σωκράτην ζητοῦντα τί ἄνθρωπός ἐστι . . . Κωλώτῃ δὲ γελοῖον* (sc. the Delphic maxim *γνῶθι σαυτόν* that set Socrates inquiring) *δοκεῖ. τί οὖν οὐ καταγελᾷ καὶ τοῦ καθηγεμόνος;* (sc. Epicurus). It recurs at Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 45,7 (where its object is a mode of philosophical argumentation). The scribe's initial omission of ΓΕ was due to haplography occasioned by the near-identical shapes of the letters Α and Λ which preceded and followed respectively.

732 ἅπαν]τα: sc. *τὰ ἱερά* (727–8). The claim that the wise man will in theory observe *all* of them may seem exaggerated. But in principle this should be no different from the expectation that the just man will fulfil every moral obligation, or that the good citizen obey every law. At 793–7 the author extends this statement, claiming no less than that Epicurus himself did so in practice: *πάσαις ταῖς* | *πατρίοις ἑορταῖς* | *καὶ θυσίαις κε*[*χ*]*ρ*[*η*]|*μένος*. So there is no reason to doubt the supplement *ἅπαν*]*τα*. Compare the claim later (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10,26–30 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 21) that Epicureans acknowledge the existence not only of *all* the gods of the Greeks, but many more besides—i.e. all conceivable divinities; for the tendency towards generalization cf. 758–60 *πάντα γὰρ co*|[*φόν*; 882–4 *πάν*|*τα πράττωμεν* [*κα*]|*τὰ τοὺς νόμους*; 1379–81 *χρ*]*ὴ πάντα πείθες*|[*θαι*] *τοῖς νόμ*[*οι*]*ς καὶ* | [*τοῖ*]*ς ἐθισμοῖς*). But will the Epicurean at Athens keep the Spartan Karneia or the Persian Mithrakana or the Roman Feralia? (Cf. Lucretius' ambivalence towards the Magna Mater at Rome.) Is there justification in Epicurus' tenets for participation in the religious rites of every deity, including Isis, Cybele, Attis (i.e. cults of dying or suffering gods), Mithra, Zeus Hypsistos, cults of rulers? Lucian's Alexander of Abonuteichos groups later Epicureans with Christians as opponents of his cult (unless this is simply a convenient satirical fiction). What about rituals of purification, or traditional rites of mourning (since, according to Epicurus, death is 'nothing to us')? Yet mourning in private funeral cult is expressly attested for the Epicureans in a passage cited by Plutarch (*Contra Epic. beat.* 1101 AB, quoted below on 797–9) and we know as a matter of historical and archaeological record that the Epicureans in fact observed on a regular basis the

funeral rites of the members of their own school (see 811–19 below with commentary on 818–19). Their claim to have done so without perceiving any contradiction between doctrine and practice should probably be taken at face value, not judged by the viewpoints of later periods or modes of rationalism which looked to Epicurus' philosophy for an ally. The Epicurean will keep every rite that ordinary humans do, particularly those of one's own city, but not exclusively so, and not only as a civic obligation. It emerges from Philodemus' defence in *De pietate* that the Epicureans in fact shaped their belief around practice. For in denying that ritual practices always entail certain beliefs (e.g. sacrifice and the principle *do ut des*), Epicurus seems to have acknowledged that under the appropriate circumstances the rites of almost any cult could have place in the repertory of the approved acts of the wise man. A primary prerequisite for approval by Epicurus for acts of cult seems to be their status as traditional, widespread rites of long-standing acceptance, conditioned by regularity and habituation within a given community (cf. 727–8 τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα | [ἱερ]ά; 735 διὰ τ]οὺc νόμουc; 795 πατρίοιc ἑορταῖc | καὶ θυcίαιc), perhaps as a guarantee that such behaviour and specific modes of observance are sufficiently primitive and natural. On an equal footing is the stipulation that one worship without fear or attribution to the divinity of characteristics incompatible with its perfection (fear, anger, retribution, perishability, or perturbability).

733 τ]ηρεῖν: cf. 731 τετηρηκώc. Here the verb is used in the sense (unusual for Epicurean texts) of *observare*; for the more common usage in the sense of *servare* (= φυλάττω, οὐκ ἀναιρεῖν) see Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77 ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα τηρεῖν (δεῖ) κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενον ἐπὶ τὰc τοιαύτας ἐννοίαc; above, 265–8 οὐδὲ | γὰρ ἔτι τ[η]ρεῖται τὸ | παντα[χ]ό̣θε[ν] εὖ-δ[αι]|μον.

735 διὰ τ]οὺc νόμουc: 'à cause des lois' (Festugière 1968, 90; yet on p. 89, 883–4 below κα]|τὰ τοὺc νόμουc is rendered 'conformément aux usages'). The force of νόμοc in both passages must however be 'law' (including of course *leges sacrae*, cult regulations, and 'unwritten' law). Cf. below, 1379–81 χρ]ὴ πάντα πείθεc|[θαι] τοῖc νόμ[οι]c καὶ | [τοῖ]c ἐθιcμοῖc.

736–7 διὰ φυcεικὰc | [αἰτίαc: the restoration of [αἰτίαc] by Gomperz was called into question by Schmid 1951, 153 n. 149, on the grounds that the resulting contrast with 735 διὰ τ]οὺc νόμουc is potentially problematic: according to Schmid, the supplement would make Philodemus attribute to Epicurus the view that in human behaviour worship takes place *both* according to law or custom, *and* as a direct outcome of physical causes. The problem is that if worship is the result of such patterns of causation, human choice in this matter is called into question (which has just been contravened at 726–9: it is up to us to choose to engage in worship or not). As Schmid put it, 'Natürlich ist mir die Verwendung von αἰτία im Sinne von *vis effectrix* geläufig, aber die Junktur φυcικὴ αἰτία würde zu sehr in eine Sphäre

führen, die in unserem mit der Antithese Nomos–Physis arbeitenden Kontext nicht ganz angemessen ist' (comparing further the discussion *de libertate agendi* at Epic. *De nat.* 34 fr. 34. 32,13,32 Arr.²). Schmid's objection raises an interesting question, namely: how can the choice to engage in worship or not be 'up to us', yet at the same time be determined or explained by a chain of physical causation?

Schmid, without enthusiasm, suggested as alternatives the supplements *διὰ φυcικὰc | [ὁρμάc]* or *διὰ φυcικὰc | [ἕξειc]*, neither of which are suitable (*ὁρμή* is not a term favoured by Epicureans, while the plural *ἕξειc* is unsuitable: there could be only one *ἕξιc*, 'disposition' in which worship was appropriate). *ἐπιθυμίαc* and *ἐπινοίαc* are ruled out by lack of space: the *disegno* allows 3–5 letters, since the the word occupies the same space as ΛΑΔ in the preceding line and ΘΑΙΓΑ in the following one, both preserved. (Arr.² prints 735–6 as *φυcικὰc [αἰ|τίαc]*, but while there is space for a letter at the end of 736, there is no sign that anything was missing at the end of line, and the *disegnatore*, who could read the end of every other line in this column, could also make out the faint traces of the tiny suprascript correction *φυcι̣κα̣c* at the end of this line.)

It is tempting to supplement *διὰ φυcικὰc | [ἀρχάc]*. The use of *ἀρχαί* in the sense of general principles covering the way things work is well established: e.g. Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 116 *μάλιcτα δὲ cεαυτὸν ἀπόδοc εἰc τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν . . . θεωρίαν*. Of course the Epicureans do think we have a natural *basis* for engaging in worship and acts of cult (not necessarily causally predetermined). *διὰ φυcικὰc | [ἀρχάc]* at any rate conforms to the sense expected: 'per osservanza di *principî* naturali' (my italics, Arr.²'s mistranslation of *φυcικὰc | [αἰτίαc]* in the present text). Unfortunately, to replace *αἰτίαι* with *ἀρχαί* here does not help much, since the two terms occur frequently in conjunction (Epic. *De nat.* 34 fr. 34. 20,9–10 Arr.² *τὴν | [ἀρχ]ὴν ἔχουcα καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν*) or interchangeably, while generally any set of *αἰτίαι* can be subsumed under the larger category of an *ἀρχή*: Epic. *De nat.* 34 fr. 34. 31,8–12 Arr.² *ὅθεν | [καὶ τὸ τοῦ τέλουc] αὐτοῦ ἐπιλόγιc|[μα εἶχε μὲν] καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τὴν αἰ|τίαν, εἴχο|μεν δὲ [κ]αὶ ἡμεῖc.*

At Epic. *De nat.* 34 fr. 34. 32,21–5 Arr.², *τὰ μ[ὲν] | διὰ τὴν φυ[cι]κὴν αἰτ[ί]αν* is contrasted with *τὰ δὲ διὰ τὴ[ν] ἐξ ἡ|μῶν γεινομένη[ν*, a contrast which (though the following lines allow that these are two ways of looking at the same thing) poses the curious dilemma that if worship is occasioned by 'physical causes' it can hardly be 'up to us', so that it would have been superfluous at best for Epicurus to have been exhorting his friends to choose it. Cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 10,20–1 *λόγωι θεωρουμ[ένων] | αἰτιῶν*, which stylizes the gods themselves as 'causes' or 'sources' (of their own existence?). Are they also to be thought of as the sources/causes of their own worship? Perhaps Epicurus held this to be so, and explained it as part of the seeming paradox of his theory that volitional states are themselves the products of

physical causation. In a related discussion (*De nat.* 34 fr. 34. 21–2 Arr.², a much discussed passage: esp. Sedley 1983*a*, 36–8; 1988, 319–21), Epicurus seems to have held that supervenient developments (*ἀπογεγεννημένα*) in human psychology can acquire the status of autonomous mental states, capable of exerting causation upon atoms, i.e. they can 'acquire a causation that proceeds from the self' *ἰcχάνε[ι] τὴν ἐξ ἑαυ[τοῦ] αἰτίαν* (fr. 34. 22,21–3 Arr.², in the text of Sedley 1988). If this is so, Epicurus would involve himself in no necessary contradiction in saying that humans should engage in worship, both in keeping with traditional customs or laws, *and* because of the nexus of physical causation now leading people to worship, and originally to the establishment of such practices in the first place. Cf. also *P. Herc.* 346 col. 2,2–15 where the author denies that *χάριc* (= 'delight') is in itself an effective cause of *cεβαcμός*, but stipulates that the latter does have an *αἴτιον* in *τὰ οἰκεῖα: οὐ | γὰρ ὁ cεβαcμὸc [εὖ]ρητ[αι καθ]ὸ χάριc περὶ | τοὺc' εὐεργέτας καὶ [αἰτίουc] τινὸc ἀγα|θοῦ τοῖc φρονοῦcιν· ἐ[κ πάντω]ν* (for which I think we must read *ἐ[κ δὲ πάντω]ν*) *τῶν π[α|ρ]όντων γίνεται ὅλωc, τοῦ δ' αἰτ[ίο]υ | τῶν ο[ἰ]κείων ἐφικ[έcθαι* (with the corrections in what follows in Angeli 1988, 36).

Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. gives three distinct senses of *αἰτία*: (1) *causa* (i.e. 'reason'), (2) *res effectrix*, and (3) *vis effectrix*. The last is certainly the sense in the passages above from the *liber incertus* of Epic. *De nat.* on volition (cited above from Arr.² as book '34'), and must be the sense in the present passage if *διὰ φυcικὰc | [αἰτίαc]* is to be read (and it would be implied by the reading *διὰ φυcικὰc | [ἀρχάc]*). Below at 1044–9 Epicurus explained how the divine could be just such a 'source' of retribution and preservation for humans (*αἰτία ν[εμέcεωc] | καὶ cωτηρία[c ἀνθρώ]|ποιc*). In this case too it is not clear whether or not humans have a choice in being harmed or benefited by the divine (i.e. by their own conceptions of the divine). Bad men are automatically harmed by the gods, i.e. by their own defective conceptions of gods: worrying that they might after death suffer for their misdeeds, they suffer an equivalent harm (2233–41). Good men are benefited by their proleptically verifiable conceptions of the gods, in so far as such conceptions provide them with paradigms for moral emulation. The choice between types of gods, and hence of harm or benefit, is to some extent beyond an individual's control: it is determined by the kind of person one is: since we have affinity for our own virtues, we all individually of necessity choose gods like ourselves (Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124). But obviously Epicurus thinks that it is possible through reasoning to sort out our ideas about divinity, conceptually improve if not exchange one's gods, and so maximize benefit. This causal chain of physically determining states might be termed an *αἰτία*, or be said to take place *δι' αἰτίαc*, in a way that would not be inconsistent with Epicurus' recommendation that in general people should choose to worship the gods. Such a recommendation is consistent with experience as well (a repeated

theme in the *liber incertus* of Epic. *De nat.* on volition), in which we at least act under the belief that we have a choice to worship, sacrifice, celebrate a holiday, or not. Reasoning and philosophical debate about the nature of god is often experienced as just such a choice.

737–8 προσεύχεισθαι: on prayer among Epicureans see Pascal 1906, 241–57; Hadzits 1908, 73–88; C. Bailey, *Proc. Class. Assoc.* 19 (1922), 19–25; N. W. DeWitt, *Trans. Royal Soc. of Canada*, 1944/2, 79–88; Capone Braga 1951, 92–106; Festugière 1968, 71–100; below, 1419–25 μετὰ τὰς | καλλιερήσεις καὶ || τὰς σπου[δαίας κεὐ]φώνους λ[ιτὰς ἀναι]|ροῦμεν [τὴν παρα]μυθίαν [τῶν εὐω]|χιῶν; 768–70 διὰ τὸ | τοὔνομα τάντα | ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχειν; Colotes to Epicurus ap. Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1102 B (fr. 30 Us.) καὶ πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς σεβάσεις θεῶν (Wyttenbach, τιμῶν codd., τιμίων Post, τινῶν Hirzel) καὶ λιτάς; Epicurus' response ibid. 1117 C ἐποίεις οὖν, φησι, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι (on the incident see below on 897–8); ibid. 1117 B (Metrodorus fr. 38 Körte) ποιήσομέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς (cf. the Spartan prayer τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ap. [Plat.] *Alcib. II* 148 C); Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 45 *ut deos pie coleremus . . . habet enim venerationem iustam quicquid excellit*, and (by implication) 1. 36 (of Aether as a Stoic divinity) *si intellegi potest nihil sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus neque in optatis neque in votis*; so also Philodemus below at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 4,5–9 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 14) castigates the Stoic Persaeus for recommending sacrifice to others but refusing to pray himself: κελεύσειν | τ̣ε̣[ι]μᾶν α[ὐ]τ[ο]ὺς̣ (sc. τοὺς θεοὺς) θυ̣σ̣ί̣αις [τ]οιαύταις, αὐτὸς | δ' οὐκ εὔξεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. The proper content and occasion of prayer were to be strictly observed, as can be seen from the dim view taken towards the popular or casual use of prayer ap. *Gnom. cod. Parisini.* 1168 fo. 115^{r} (Epic. fr. 388 Us.): εἰ ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐχαῖς ὁ θεὸς κατηκολούθει, θᾶττον ἂν ἀπώλλυντο πάντες ἄνθρωποι, συνεχῶς πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατ' ἀλλήλων εὐχόμενοι, 'If God heeded the prayers of men, all men would have long since perished, for they are continually praying many grievous things against one another' (not included by Arr.^{2}, but certainly authentic: συνεχῶς was a favourite word with Epicurus). Cf. Ennius, *Telamon* fr. 318 Vahlen^{2} = 134 Jocelyn ap. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 3. 79 *nam si curent, bene bonis sit, male malis; quod nunc abest*; Metrodorus ap. Luc. *Iupp. trag.* 22 (not in Körte); Hermarchus ap. Procl. *Comment. in Plat. Tim.* 66 DE Diehl (fr. 37 Krohn = 48 Longo); D.L. 10. 25; Lactant. *Div. inst.* 7. 5. 3 (Epicurus fr. 371 Us.). At 928–45 below we get a list of things for which Epicurus himself prayed, to which may be added his prayer for Pythocles 'not yet eighteen': εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσητα πάντα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανίσκου (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124 C = fr. 161 Us., 118 Arr.^{2}). As Sedley 1976*b*, 43–4 points out, it would be very odd (ironic to say the least) if, as scholars have assumed, Pythocles was dead when Epicurus so prayed.

For a less generous view of Epicureans engaging in prayer see Plut. *Contra*

Epic. beat. 1102B (fr. 30 Us.) *ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις οὐθὲν δεόμενος διὰ φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ*; and Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124C (cited above). Understandably, the two Epicurean positions—philosophical commitment to the observance of religious forms on the one hand, and social criticism of popular or casual observance on the other—appeared contradictory to some observers: so Origen, *Contr. Cels.* 7. 66 (Epic. fr. 390 Us.) specifically attests that the Epicureans prayed to statues of the gods, but concludes that this was only to curry favour with the masses; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1112C (not in Usener or Arr.[2]) *ὥστε τοῖς τούτων* (sc. *τῶν Ἐπικουρείων*) *δόγμασι τὸ ζῆν ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι, κενὰς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀθέους καὶ ἀψύχους, ἔτι δὲ ἀμίκτους καὶ ἀσυγκράτους ἀρχὰς ὑποτιθεμένοις. πῶς οὖν ἀπολείπουσι φύσιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ ζῷον; ὡς ὅρκον ὡς εὐχὴν ὡς θυσίαν ὡς προσκύνησιν, ῥήματι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ φάναι καὶ προσποιεῖσθαι καὶ ὀνομάζειν, ἃ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς δόγμασι ἀναιροῦσιν*, 'Thus by the (Epicureans') doctrines life and living things are abolished, since the primal elements on their hypothesis are void, impassive, godless, and inanimate, and moreover incapable of mixture or fusion—how then can they claim to leave room for a thing's nature, for mind, for a living being? As they do for an oath, for prayer, for sacrifice, for worship: in their manner of speaking, in word, by affirmation, by pretending, by naming things that by their ultimate principles and tenets they abolish.' The confusion of Plutarch and others on this matter is hardly surprising, not only because there is nothing remotely like divine teleology in Epicurean theory (and the restriction from the divine of anything that might compromise its happiness), but also because Epicurus (and also Lucretius) had voiced harsher views regarding the casual use of prayer, curses, and the like; see e.g. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,5–16 (mimicry of an unnamed *ἄφρων*). For a similarly dim view of the popular neglect of oaths taken by the gods, see Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 256 (Epic. fr. 53 Us., 20.4 Arr.[2]). For philosophical views on prayer in general, see H. Schmidt, *Veteres philosophi quomodo iudicaverint de precibus* (RGVV 4/1; Giessen, 1907); Norden 1923, esp. 101–4; E. des Places, 'La prière des philosophes grecs', *Gregorianum*, 41 (1960), 253–70; Kindstrand on Bion F 29; Henrichs 1975*b*, 122 and nn. 96, 97. An extensive critique of Stoic theology (on the grounds that it would render prayer ineffectual) is to be found at Cic. *De nat. deor.* 3. 79–93, behind which may lie Carneades using Epicurean arguments against the Stoa. The Stoics also argued from the universally accepted efficacy of prayer to the existence of god (Cic. *De div.* 2. 101–6; Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 133).

The adaptation of such religious forms as prayer and hymn in literature and other cultural contexts has of course a long history in the Greek tradition. Some of the background is sketched by H. Kleinknecht, *Die Gebetsparodie in der Antike* (Tübinger Beitr. zur Altertumswiss. 28; Stuttgart, 1939); W. Horn, *Gebet und Gebetsparodie in den Komödien des Aristophanes*

(Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft; Nuremberg, 1970); Hildebrecht Hommel, *Ciceros Gebethymnus an die Philosophie, Tusculanen V 5* (Sitz. der Heidelberger Akad. der Wiss., Philosoph.-historische Klasse, 3, 1968); on the prayer to Pan in Plato's *Phaedo*, D. Clay, 'Socrates' Prayer to Pan', in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to B. M. W. Knox* (New York, 1979), 345–53 (on *Phaedo* 279 BC) with bibliography; K. Gaiser, *RM*² 132 (1991), 105–40. In the case of the Stoics, Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (*CA* 227–31) may be compared in this respect, though the Stoics condemned over-ostentatious and utilitarian prayer (D.L. 7. 124 = Posidonius fr. 40 Edelstein–Kidd; Schmidt, op. cit., 27 ff.; Henrichs 1975*b*, 122 n. 17). A prayer by Cleanthes to Zeus appears at Epict. *Man.* 52 (see *SVF* i. 327 for further Stoic instances). Even the 'Euhemerist' Polybius closes his *Histories* (39. 19. 2) with a prayer to the gods.

738–9 ἐν τῶι Περὶ | [βίων: the title *Περὶ βίων* was first restored here by Usener, who acknowledged the merits of Bücheler's supplement *Περὶ [θεῶν*. Against *Περὶ [βίων* it may be said that in six of the seven extant citations of this work (originally in four books) by Epicurus by title, it is always either cited by specific book-number (D.L. 10. 119 *bis*; 136; Philod. *Rhet.* i. 54, 8; *De morte* fr. 1,16), or in the plural form *ἐν τοῖς Περὶ βίων (βιβλίοις)* (D.L. 10. 27; Philod. *Rhet.* i. 97,18 = fr. 11 Us.). The only other instance is uncertain: namely, the citation below at ll. 896–7, since we can as easily restore *κἀν [τοῖς Πε]||ρὶ βίων* at line-end there as Bücheler's *κἀν [τῶι Πε]||ρὶ βίων*. (Bücheler and Usener actually read *κἀν [τῶι Πε]||ρὶ βίων δεν̣[τέρωι* there, ΔΕΤ[*N*, but see the app. crit *ad loc.*; the postponement of the book-number would be odd, but not anomalous.) The topic of whether or not the wise man should pray, for example, sounds like the sort of subject discussed in *βίοι* 'types of lives', including the entire life-span: should one (or the wise) engage in political affairs, marry, write poetry, serve kings, and so on? On the other hand, there is no good reason why it could not have been discussed in a work *On Gods* (cf. e.g. Philod. *De dis* 3 ap. fr. 386 Us.), and we should probably be wary of assigning such fragments on assumptions about the contents of these books, of which we know very little. In the text I have printed *Περὶ | [βίων*, in spite of its anomalous citation here as a unitary book, for the sole reason that it conforms better to the available space represented by the *disegno* (2–3 letters) than does *θεῶν*. Perhaps 738 *ἐν τῶι* should be emended to *ἐν τοῖς*.

739–40 οἰκεῖον εἶναι | [ἡμεῖ]ν̣ φησιν: this is virtually equivalent to *ἡμῖν δὲ φυσικόν ἐστιν (τιμᾶν)* in Philod. *De mus.* col. 4,6 (= fr. 386 Us., quoted more fully above, introd. to Section 2). The restoration *[σοφί]αι* (instead of *ἡμεῖ]ν̣*) was printed first by Bücheler and universally followed, but cannot be right: the article is wanting, and in any case the expression of anything being *οἰκεῖον* to an *ἀρετή*, virtue, as opposed to *φύσις* (or one's *φύσις* or *διάθεσις*, or to an entity itself) is unparalleled. N is sometimes mistaken for

AI by the *disegnatore* in this text (cf. 499, 740, 753–4, 758; for an example beyond dispute, see 2495). For the force of *οἰκεῖον* see *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,2–3 *γίν̣[ε]c[θ]αι ὅταν καθ[ή]κ̣[ῃ | τ]ὸ τῆς φύcεως, ὡς ἔλεγον,* [*οἰ*]*κεῖον* 'when what is appropriate to nature becomes fitting'; Epic. *KD* 7 *εἰ μὲν ἀcφαλὴc ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίοc, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύcεως ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀcφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουcιν, οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύcεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθηcαν*; *De Epic. P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1,15–16 (in Clay 1986, 13; Tepedino 1988) *ἐν | τοῖc τῆς φύcεω*[*c οἰ*]*κείοιc*. For the locution in the dative with a person or entity cf. D.L. 7. 85 (*SVF* 3. 43,4–5) *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον . . . εἶναι παντὶ ζῴῳ*. For Epicurus a series of contrasts, *οἰκεῖον–ἀνοίκειον, ὁμόφυλον–ἀλλόφυλον, ὅμοιον–ἀλλότριον*, correlates and opposes elements of the physical and ethical world, on which see C. Diano, 1935, 78 = 1974, 15; id., 'La psicologia d'Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni. III', *GCFI* 22 (1941), 7–9 = 1974, 183–5; Barigazzi 1953, 155; Capasso 1982, 91–3. On its origin in Plato, Aristotle, and the Cynic tradition, see Decleva Caizzi 1977, 104; Capasso 1982, 90–1 with n. 9. See the section on harms and benefits from the gods below (1023–1701, esp. 1043–54) where Epicurus' view that the divine has *οἰκειότηc* for some persons and *ἀλλοτριότηc* for others is discussed in further detail.

740–2 οὐχ ὡc | [δυc]μενῶν τῶν | [θεῶν] εἰ μὴ ποιή|[coμεν]: *ὡc* = 'as if', with the apodosis of the condition expressed in the form of a genitive absolute, giving the reason Epicurus did *not* say on account of which to pray was *οἰκεῖον*; we should expect the (lost?) clause introduced by *ἀλλά* which follows to give the reason why he did say it was *οἰκεῖον*. For the clause of exception in this context see Lucr. 6. 68–78:

> quae nisi respuis ex animo longeque remittis
> dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum,
> delibata deum per te tibi numina sancta
> saepe oberunt; *non quo violari summa deum vis*
> *possit*, ut ex ira poenas petere imbibat acris,
> sed quia tute tibi placida cum pace quietos
> constitues magnos irarum volvere fluctus,
> nec delubra deum placido cum pectore adibis,
> nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur
> in mentis hominum divinae nuntia formae,
> suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis.

(One must rid oneself of superstitions about the gods, for otherwise) the holy powers of the gods, degraded by your thought, will often do you harm; *not that the high majesty of the gods can be polluted by you*, so that in wrath they should yearn to seek sharp retribution, but because you yourself will imagine that those tranquil beings in their placid peace set tossing the great billows of wrath, nor with quiet breast will you approach the shrines of the gods, nor have strength to drink in with tranquil peace of mind the images which are borne from their holy body to herald their divine form to the minds of men.

(tr. Bailey 1928, 480, who compares this passage as 'echoed' in the present text; more likely Lucretius echoes the original text of Epicurus cited here by Philodemus). A similar caveat appears below at 1036–41 in connection with the proper sense in which we should expect harms and benefits from the gods: 'not out of weakness or because we have fear of anything from the deity'. So also *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,28–32 *ἀλλὰ μόνον | [μὴ] ὀλ[ιγ]ωρῶν τηλικού|[του] cεμνώματος κατὰ | [τὴ]ν θ[ε]ωρίαν πρὸς τὴν [cε|αυ]τοῦ εὐ-[δαιμ]ονίαν*, 'but not belittling in religious observance an entity of such sanctity in relation to your happiness'.

743–4 ἀλλὰ κατὰ | τὴν ἐπίνοιαν: the *ἐπίνοια* in question must be that towards which the wise man 'progresses' (*βαδίζοντα*) as he goes about at festivals with the divinities' names constantly on his lips (below, 765–73). The force of *κατά* here must be 'in keeping with': it is in keeping with one's conception of divinity (and essential for its conservation or refinement) that prayer is natural, fitting, appropriate. For *ἐπίνοια* used of an apparently correct understanding of the divine see above, 316.

744–7 (*ἐπίνοιαν*) **τῶν | [ὑπερβ]αλλουcῶν | [δυνά]μει καὶ cπουl[δαιό-τ]ητι φύcεων:** note that these *φύcειc* (which are the true Epicurean objects of cult) stand in direct contrast to the mythical *θεοί* of 742 (an almost certain restoration) who according to Epicurus cannot really be annoyed if they are not worshipped. *ὑπερβάλλω* only here in Epicurus. But the surpassing excellence of divine nature in the Epicurean conception is often stressed: below, 754–7 *τὸ μέγιc|[τον] . . . καὶ οἱονεὶ | [τὸ κ]αθ' ἡγεμονίαν | [ὑπερ]έχον*; 886–8 *ἐν τοῖc περὶ τῶν ἀρίcτων κ[αὶ] | cεμνοτάτων*; an impressive catalogue of such appellations retailed below at 1277–1305; Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77 *πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα* (a neologism); *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,16–21 *cὺ | [δ', ὦ] ἄνθρωπε, μακαριώ|[τα]τον μέν τι νόμιζε τὸ | [διε]ιληφέναι καλῶc ὃ τὸ (ὅ τι* Holford-Strevens) *| [παν]άριcτον ἐν τοῖc οὖcι | [δια]νοηθῆναι δυνάμε|[θα* ('But you, sir, consider it a thing of the greatest blessedness to discern properly that which we can conceive as the one best thing among existing things'); ibid. col. 1,28–32 *ἀλλὰ μόνον | [μὴ] ὀλ[ιγ]ωρῶν τηλικού|[του] cεμνώματος κατὰ | [τὴ]ν θ[ε]ωρίαν* ('but instead not belittling in religious observance an entity of such sanctity'); Lucr. 6. 71 *summa deum vis*; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 45 *habet enim venerationem iustam quicquid excellit*; ibid. 1. 56 *pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque praestantem*; ibid. 1. 116 (in apostrophe of Epicurus himself—for the use of which convention by Cotta in *De nat. deor.* 1 see Pease's note on 1. 61) *at est eorum eximia quaedam praestansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam allicere sapientem* ('But divinity possesses an excellence and pre-eminence which must of its own nature attract the worship of the wise')—a passage which must be textually very close, in its derivation from Epicurus' original formulation, to the present one. Cf. Sen. *De benef.* 4. 19 *propter maiestatem, inquis, eius eximiam singularem naturam*; Cic. *De fin.* 1. 68, 2. 88. The tendency towards what may seem like

gross exaggeration in these formulations is not merely rhetorical but signals rather a conceptual limit or boundary in Epicurean epistemology beyond which nothing else (or nothing greater) can be conceived, and which can in turn be invoked as a criterion in proof. For the avoidance of naming any particular divinity in these descriptions, see above on 607. Avoidance of even the expression *ὁ θεός* is notable in these passages and in Epicurean practice (though not exclusively so: for examples see 1141 and further on 1277 on the genders in the catalogue of divine epithets). The best-known Epicurean example of this phenomenon in the use of *nomina sacra* (especially favouring the neuter) is Epicurus' *KD* 1 *τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον*; cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.86, where Cotta complains that as a result one cannot tell from Epicurus' language what kind of entity Epicurus is describing or whether or not such an entity even exists (though the following sentence makes clear that he did think Epicurus believed it to exist).

748–51 From the series of letters transmitted by *N*, an acceptable sense can be extracted. Gomperz relegates these lines to the apparatus; Philippson punctuates after *φύcεων*, leaving an unlikely short sentence to be concluded before a new one begins in 752, and had to postulate the scribal omission of a verb in 751. The supplements and corrections of Diels 1916a, 908 (= 310) deserve to be considered in full:

	ὧν τ]άc τε τελει̣ό-		... of which (natures) I
	τητας] γει̣νώcκω		know the fulfilments and
750	*καὶ τὰc] τοῖc νόμοιc*	(25)	social intercourse in keeping
	cυμπερι]φοράc·		with the laws.

This reconstruction assumes that the sentence thus ends not with *φύcεων*, but 748–51 contained the verb completing the *ἀλλά* clause beginning in 743. (Other editors punctuate with a full stop after *φύcεων*, so that the main clause *οἰκεῖον εἶναί φηcιν* must be understood over again with the adverbial phrase *ἀλλὰ κατὰ κτλ.* alone, which seems less grammatically natural.) However, the sense produced by Diels's corrections (quite possible in 751, speculative in 748) leaves something to be desired. In particular the change to a declaration in the author's own person seems abrupt, since Philodemus is speaking, quoting Epicurus in indirect form. With a few modifications we can retain Diels's corrections and allow what is likely: namely, that the citation (in indirect quotation) from Epicurus continued through 748–51, as follows:

	ἵνα τ]άc τε τελει̣ό-		... in order that we may
	τητας] γει̣νώcκω-		realize our/their fulfilments
750	*μεν καὶ] τοῖc νόμοιc*	(25)	and social intercourse in
	cυμπερι]φοράc· πρὸc		conformity with the laws.
	τῶι γράφ]ειν δὲ καὶ		and in addition to writing
	τοῦτο, ἐ]ν̣ τῶι πε[ρὶ ‖ θεῶ]ν̣ κτλ.		this, in *On Gods* he also says ...

The entire sentence would thus run as follows: 'For in *On Lifecourses* he says that to pray is natural for us, not because the gods would be annoyed if we did not pray, but in order that, according to the understanding of natures surpassing in power and excellence, we may realize our fulfilments (or the fulfilments of such natures) and associations in keeping with the laws.' *cυμπεριφοράc* thus shares the definite article with *τελειότητας*. For *τελειό-|[τητας]* see Philod. *De lib. dicend.* 56(2),6 *κατὰ λογιcμοῦ τε|λειότητα*; 9ª8 *πρὸc ἐπ[ί]γνωcιν τῆc | ἀλλήλων τελ[ει]ότητοc*; cf. above, 352–4 *διαιώνιον | ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν | εὐδαιμονίαν* with commentary there, and below, 1264.

750–1 (*τὰc . . .*) **τοῖc νόμοιc | [cυμπερι]φοράc:** for Epicurean commitment to *cυμπεριφορά* 'social intercourse' see commentary on 312–13 (also at 468 and 907–8; cf. 2166–7 *cυμπεριφέρεcθαι*). For the plural, see Philod. *Ind. Stoic.* col. 3,7–12 *γέγραφεν . . . διότι cπανίωc ἑαυτὸν διδοὺc | [ὁ Z]ήνων εἰc τὰc cυμπε|[ριφορὰc] διὰ τὴν τοῦ cώ|[ματοc ἀcθ]ένειαν*, 'he (probably the Stoic Persaeus) wrote . . . that Zeno rarely gave himself to social intercourse on account of infirmity of the body' (see Capasso 1982, 148, who rightly corrects Traversa's translation of *cυμπεριφοράc* as 'perambulatum'). See also *De ira* col. 28,3; *De lib. dicendi* 12a,9, 12b,3 (which treats the *cυμπεριφορά* that exists between master and slave as based on benevolence and forgiveness of wrongs, on which see M. Gigante, 'Testimonianze di Filodemo su Maison', *CErc* 1 (1971), 67–8); *Rhet.* ii. 49,6 *τοῖc πολιτικοῖc πράγμαcιν* ('versor in' Vooijs); D.L. 7. 144 (*SVF* ii. 195,29–30); *P. Herc.* 346 cols. 1,30, 13,3–7 *εἰc τ[ὴ]ν ἀληθι|[ν]ὴ[ν] cωτη[ρ]ίαν αἰτίαν ἣ cυνέργει{η}|ά[ν τι]να παραcχομένων καὶ καλῶc | μ[ὲν] cυμπεριοιcθηcόμεθα τοῖc | τ[ῆc] φύcεωc* [....] *ἀλλοτρίοιc πρόc* (after which the text breaks off: see Capasso 1982, 147–9; I think we must supply *οὐκ* or *μήτ'* before *ἀλλοτρίοιc*). As in 734–7, conformity with the law and social custom is placed on an equal footing here with recognition of physically surpassing divine nature (cf. 735–6 *φυcει|κα'c | [αἰτίαc*). In what follows it is suggested that Epicurus thought traditional religious events to be optimal occasions for perfecting one's ideas of divine nature (cf. 748–9 *τελ{λ}ε[ι|ότητας*, and see on 748–51). The implication here may be that association with humans is not unrelated to the manner in which we form ideas of divine nature (see on 557). In the Epicurean conception the gods are after all human in form and exhibit certain human characteristics (see Philod. *De dis* 3). The Epicurean sage, who is one object of Epicurean cult, is (or was) human. Without human association, and the knowledge, experience and observation of humans it brings, one might not properly form conceptions (i.e. in their full *τελειότης*) of such divinities.

753–4 *Order of Columns.* The descending order of alternating columns (**1077// 1098**) in this section conforms to the logical sequence that might have been expected on grounds of context alone. The present column obviously introduces the section on religious participation (see 730–1 where the future tense *φανή|[cεται* sets out what can be expected to follow, while 790–2 shows that we have not yet

had the description of Epicurus' own participation). Following an order attested elsewhere in the treatise (e.g. cols. 20–1) Epicurus is treated first, followed by the *kathegemones* in turn. Philodemus first sets out Epicurus' own theory justifying religious observance (cols. 26, focusing on prayer, and 27, including prayer at festivals), before turning to acts of worship actually attested for the founder (cols. 28–33). These are further subdivided into civic festivals and mysteries (col. 28), Epicurean *orgeones* or private cult (col. 29), oaths (cols. 29–30), sacrifice (col. 31), initiation (col. 32, which also mentions cult statues), and prayers (col. 33). In col. 31 Philodemus is already starting to sum up the section on Epicurus' own participation in cult (see 877–8). Cols. 34–5 go on to deal with the involvement of Hermarchus and perhaps other Epicureans. The present col. 26 links with the following col. 27 by means of a physical join and by its contextual position in this structure.

Col. 27

Theoretical justification for participation in cult (continued). A quotation from Epicurus is adduced to the effect that the wise man will engage in worship, even though the gods have everything they need. Festivals in particular are singled out as optimal occasions on which the wise shape their conception of divine nature with further conviction.

753–4 ἐ]ν̣ τῶι Πε[ρὶ || θεῶ]ν̣: N is sometimes mistaken for Al by the *disegnatore* in this text (e.g. see above on 739–40). Epicurus' *De dis* has already been cited by the author at least twice (above, 190, 382) and it is also cited below at 1248–62 in connection with the divine as τὸ | κ[ατι]cχῦον, which bears some similarity to the present citation. (*Περὶ* [*θεῶν* has also been restored by some editors as the source of 737–51, but I have argued ad loc. that *Περὶ* [*βίων* is to be preferred there.) Judged from the report at 190–202 Epicurus' *Περὶ θεῶν* was very much concerned with specifying the πρόληψιc of divine nature and defining its constitution. Philodemus also draws on that work in book 3 of his own *De dis* (at fr. 8,5–8 = Epic. fr. 17 Arr.²). In addition to specifying what divine nature could *not* be (perishable, untroubled, etc., cf. *KD* 1), Epicurus also attempted in this work to ascribe positive attributes to divinity: hence its description here as 'most great' and 'excelling' in something very much like 'sovereignty'. The lengthy catalogue of such attributes of the divine at 1277–1305 (ascribed there to Epicurus and the *kathegemones*) may be considered an extension of the present description.

754–5 τὸ μέγιc|[τον: compare the preponderance of superlatives in the list of epithets for divine nature at 1282–96, esp. 1281–2 πάντων | [τ]ῶν ὄντων ἄριcτον, 'the best of all existing things'; it is also ὑψηλόν 'exalted' (1288). For the generalized neuter and the avoidance of the term θεόc or the name of a specific divinity, see on 744–8.

755 φησι: sc. Epicurus. The placement of the verb here indicates that a new citation from Epicurus has just been introduced, so not many words can have preceded it. This lends support to the link between the two columns (a new sentence must begin in 751 or 752), and to the restoration at 753–4 of the title of the work from which the statement is cited.

755–6 καὶ οἱονεὶ | [τὸ] κ̣αθ' ἡγεμονίαν | [ὑπερ]έχον: it is unclear whether we should articulate *κ̣αθ' ἡγεμονίαν* or *κ̣αθηγεμονίαν* (so Gomperz). The latter is defended by Longo 1978, 23, but the apograph does not represent enough space to allow for the restoration of the article *τὴν* before the noun. For the idea cf. D.L. 7. 88 (*SVF* i. 162 Zeno) *ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι*, criticized later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 4,15–30 (Henrichs 1971*a*, 15); cf. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1125C (Epic. fr. 556 Us.) *οὐχ οἱ τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίας λέγοντες;* In the extended description below at 1285–6 the divinity is called 'that which rules over all good things', (*τὸ*) *πάντων* [*τ*]*ῶν ἀγα*|[*θῶν*] *κυριεύοντα* (cf. also below, 2367). The particle *οἱονεί* here 'apologizes' for the expression or admits that this is a simile or a metaphor assimilating a traditional or rival way of speaking about divinity to Epicurean usage: though the divine does not rule over anything in our world (as it is said, for example, by the Stoics to do), it can none the less in its own way be thought of as analogous to entities in our experience that do so because they are important and powerful. For the qualification of speech see below, 895–6 it is possible to live like Zeus *ὡς φαί*]*νεται*; *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,12–13 (of an oath by Zeus) *τὸ δὴ λε*|*γόμενον* (although in that text the oath *νὴ Δία* occurs twice in col. 1 without any qualification).

757 ὑπερ]έχον: cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. g 5,25–8 *οὐδ' οἱ μὲν ἐλ*[*λεί*]|*που*-[*σιν οἱ δ' ὑ*]*περέχου*[*σιν,*] *ἀλλὰ πάντε*[*c τ*]*ε* | *κ*(*αὶ*) *πᾶ*[*c*]*αι τὴν ἀνυπέρε*[*κ*]*τον ἀκρότητ' ἔ*|*χουσιν.*

757–8 ἔχειν | [πᾶ]ν̣: i.e. needs nothing, a fundamental principle in Epicurean theology (e.g. *KD* 1), but especially relevant in the context since Philodemus is explaining, using Epicurus' own words, why cult is an appropriate activity for the wise man, even though divinity cannot actually be bothered if humans do not worship (as has just been stated at 740–2).

πᾶ]ν̣: N is sometimes mistaken for Al by the *disegnatore* in this text (and vice versa): cf. 499, 740, 753–4, 2495. Usener's supplement and correction here *ἐκεῖν*[*ο* | *εἶν*]*αι* (accepted by Philippson and often repeated) cannot be right. Besides exceeding space at line-end and producing an objectionable hiatus, the resulting syntax would thus mean: '(Epicurus) says the greatest thing and a thing as it were excelling in sovereignty is *that*'. The antecedent of *ἐκεῖνο*, identified with the synonyms for divine nature *τὸ μέγιστον* and *τὸ* (*τι* Usener) *καθ' ἡγεμονίαν ὑπερέχον*, is left vague and unclear. *ἐκεῖνο* cannot

refer forward to what follows, as is obvious in any case from those lines, nor is it likely to have had an antecedent in what preceded on any reconstruction of the columns, since 754–5 (NB *φησί*) must initiate a new citation from Epicurus. At the end of 757 we should perhaps supplement [*τὸ* | *πᾶ*]ν̣ (though the apograph, which represents the surface of the papyrus as intact here, does not indicate anything written in the space).

758 πάντα γὰρ cο̣ι[φόν: with *πάντα cοφόν* we must understand *Ἐπικούρειον*; it would be very odd to find Epicurus acknowledging the existence of any other kind of wise man. Philodemus in his ethical and psychological works (e.g. *De ira*) often couches his argument in terms of what the *cοφός* will or will not do. Thus the (Epicurean) wise man always has pure and holy ideas about the divine, considering its nature to be of a certain sort, and especially at religious festivals acquires an even more precise conception of the divine (without thinking that he can bribe the gods through such worship). The particle *γάρ* will thus be explanatory of 734–40 (i.e. why worship and prayer are justified on philosophical grounds), especially in relation to Epicurus' statement related at 754–8 that the divine has everything it needs (and therefore cannot possibly benefit in any literal sense from cult). We may be sure that the sentence beginning with *γάρ* continues the quotation (in indirect form) from Epicurus, for it is couched in an infinitive construction with subject accusative, and so must still be dependent on *φησί* in 755.

759–60 καθαρὰc καὶ ἁ̣[γίο]υc δόξαc: for *ἅγιος* used in descriptions of divine nature, see 1290–2 (*τὸ*) *ἅγιον καὶ* | *ἁγιώτατον κ*[*αὶ*] *ἵλε*|*ων. ἅγιος* is usually treated as an adjective of three terminations by Greek authors. We could with Usener correct to ἁ|[*γνὰ*]ς̣; but the apograph very clearly reads]YC, and there seems to be no plausible motivation for such a mistake (e.g. letter shapes). As a feature of traditional religion, allusions to ritual purity have their origin in the earliest philosophical poetry: see e.g. Xenophanes *VS* 21 B 1. 13–14 *χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὔφρονας ἄνδρας / εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖcι λόγοις*; Heraclitus *VS* 22 B 69 *τὰ ἀποκεκαθαρμένων παντάπαcιν ἀνθρώπων* (of ritual katharsis transposed to the intellectual plane: so Dodds 1951, 181 n. 13); Empedocles *Καθαρμοί VS* 31 B 112–54; *VS* 31 B 3. 2 *ἐκ δ' ὁcίων cτομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύcατε πηγήν*; 31 B 110. 2 *καθαρῇcιν . . . μελέτηcιν*. Cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 83 *καὶ γὰρ καὶ καθαρὰ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποήcει πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ μέροc ἐξακριβουμένων κατὰ τὴν ὅλην πραγματείαν ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐν μνήμῃ τιθέμενα cυνεχῶc βοηθήcει*; Philod. *De piet.* below, 933–4 (Epicurus in direct quotation) *καθαρὰν τ*[*ὴν ζωὴν*] | *διηχέναι*; above, 633 *καθάρcεωc*; Plat. *Leg.* 716 E; Demosth. 22. 78; Theophr. *De piet.* F 584 A Fortenbaugh (ap. Porph. *De abst.* 2. 19), citing the inscription over the entrance to the Asclepius sanctuary at Epidaurus: *ἁγνὸν χρὴ ναοῖο θυώδεοc ἐντὸc ἰόντα / ἔμμεναι· ἁγνεία δ' ἐcτὶ φρονεῖν ὅcια*. The appearance of this restriction both in philosophical contexts and variously in actual cult

regulations led W. Burkert to conclude: 'From the practice of ritual, in the figure of impurity, a concept of guilt develops; purification becomes atonement. . . . In practice, such statements were regarded not as devaluing the outer forms of piety, which were still rigorously upheld, but as adding a deeper dimension. In the sphere of purification, ritual and ethical reflection could therefore merge without a break' (1985*a*, 77; cf. Dodds 1951, 37 with n. 47; Festugière 1942, 19–20). In Epicurus' case, Burkert's observations can clearly be extended to other cult practices.

761 περὶ] τοῦ θείου: note the specification *τοῦ θείου* ('the divine') rather than *τοῦ θεοῦ* ('the god'), generally avoided by the author (and Epicurus), though not exclusively so. See above on 744–7 for the Epicurean avoidance of certain designations for divine nature and the preference, as here, for the neuter.

762–5 μεγ]άλην τε καὶ ceβ[μν]ὴν . . . ταύτην τὴν | φύcιν: cf. 886–8 (*αἱ δόξαι*) *περὶ | τῶν ἀρίστων κ̣[αὶ] | cεμνοτάτων* (sc. *θείων ὄντων*); 1282–3 (*τὸ*) *τ]ῶν ὄντων ἄριστον | [κ]αὶ cεμνό[[ν]]τατον* (sc. *τὸ θεῖον*), and see the note on 902–3 *cέμνωμα*. For the expression *τὸ cεμνόν* see Henrichs 1974*a*, 27 n. 47.

763–4 ὑπειληφέ[ναι: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 134 *τὴν δὲ τύχην οὔτε θεόν, ὡc οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουcιν, ὑπολαμβάνοντοc*; *P. Oxy.* II 215 cols. 2,20, 3,17. The verb need not entail that such *δόξαι* are necessarily true beliefs, though that is probably the claim here.

765–6 ἐν δ[ὲ] ταῖc | ἑορταῖc μ[ά]λιcτ(α): this must be taken to refer primarily to the public, calendrical festivals of Greek cities. However, such events were also occasions for the cultic celebrations of many private, family and royal cults, so we should perhaps not rule out the possibility that the author has also in mind here the *orgeones* of the Epicurean *thiasoi* (for which see below on 811–19) as forming part of such festival occasions. That Epicurus said that festivals were an especially good time for thinking about the divine (more so than any other time) is consistent with a Mediterranean pattern, though a modern Protestant may wonder how such festivals, with their emphasis on unusual sights and sounds and on eating, drinking, and general merriment, could be especially conducive to philosophic conversation or serious contemplation (though they doubtless were optimal occasions for the acquiring of students). But festivals were given over primarily to the commemoration of the divinities in whose honour they were held. Epicurus doubtless saw this as the usual and primary occasion when most peoples' idea of the divine was formed, and thus as an optimal opportunity for release from one's everyday concerns and mortal fears and thus for sorting out one's concept of divinity. Just as important for Epicurus is the fact that festivals were also the occasions for celebrating the private cult around which the Epicurean community cohered. Thus the element of social intercourse (said to be integral to this process at 751 in the previous column) seems to have played a role in the explanation that followed, as well

as the occasion offered (and pleasure conferred) at festivals for the viewing of works of sacred art and other spectacles, and for remembrance of family and teachers and the school's founders, which figure in an important way for the Epicureans in the formation of the wise man's conception of god.

766–8 ϵ[ἰ]c | ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆc | βαδίζοντα: for this expression, see above on 230. This must be taken to refer to the progress (*προκοπή*, below, 949) of the wise toward the *ἐπίνοια* of divine nature: i.e. it is especially on such occasions as festival celebrations that the *ἐπίνοια* actually takes shape.

768–70 διὰ τὸ | τοῦνομα πάντα | ἀνὰ cτόμ' ἔχειν: for the expression, see Eurip. *El.* 80 *ἀνὰ cτόμα ἔχειν*; *Andr.* 95 *ἀνὰ cτόμα καὶ διὰ γλώccης ἔχειν*; Aristoph. *Lys.* 55. A good example of what Epicurus undoubtedly had in mind is Ariphron's *Paian to Hygeia* (*PMG* 813 Page) which Lucian, *De lapsu inter salut.* 6 (iii. 361 MacLeod) says even in his own day was *τὸ γνωριμώτατον ἐκεῖνο καὶ πᾶcι διὰ cτόματος*, 'extremely well known and on everyone's lips'. Cult hymn was the only type of religious poetry and song approved by the Epicureans: so later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 11,15–33 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 22), in connection with the lyric poetry of Diagoras (*PMG* 738 is quoted). See also the justification by Epicurus of prayer above at 737–51, and the examples from his own lips given at 929–57. For the notion that by Epicureans an accurate and effective conception of divine nature is achieved in the process of ritually repeated linguistic acts see below, 1278–9 with the commentary there.

Note the inconsistency in the text here in the presence of *cυναλιφή*: 769–70 *πάντα | ἀνὰ* (not hiatus but *scriptio plena*: S. L. Radt, *ZPE* 38 (1980), 56–8), but 770 *cτόμ' ἔχειν*, which points to inconsistency in scribal practice, not to variation in authorial style; i.e. this should be unconnected to the fact that this is a quotation or close paraphrase from Epicurus, who less strictly and consistently avoids hiatus (especially in the more technical prose of the books of *Περὶ φύcεωc*) than does Philodemus in this work (on which see Diels 1916*a*, 892 (= 294); on avoidance of hiatus in Philodemus: Strathmann 1892). According to his usual practice the scribe should have written *πάντ' ἀ|νά* here (cf. 644–5 for confusion in syllabification at line-end).

769 πάντα: to be taken as an adverbial accusative (= *διὰ παντός*, sc. *χρόνου*), i.e. 'forever', 'continually' as at Soph. *Aj.* 705, Thuc. 1. 38; cf. Plat. *Soph.* 254B *διὰ πάντων*. Without the article the expression is somewhat poetic: but the alternative, 'because everyone had a name on his lips', does not fit the sense, and perhaps not the word-order (we should expect *διὰ τὸ πάντα τοῦνομ' ἀνὰ cτόμ' ἔχειν*).

770–1 πί[c]|τει cφοδ[ρο]τέρωc: for *πίcτιc*, whether of formal proof in logic or in the sense of 'belief', see on 478, cf. on 460. At 2357–62 below, Philodemus says that the Epicureans advance a *πίcτιc* to the effect that the gods are not terrifying in their nature, while at 2039–43 he says that those who think the gods to be tyrants and expect misfortunes from them do not

have a πίστις and therefore accomplish nothing. Epicurean πίστις was not a matter of logical ἀπόδειξις (see above on 470, 478, 652), but for that matter no less convincing, a preliminary stage conducive to certainty. Epicurus clearly thought that festivals were the optimal occasions for the acquisition of conviction about the divine. For the possession of πίστις in degrees of comparison see Epic. *Ad Herod.* 63 οὕτω γὰρ ἡ βεβαιοτάτη πίστις ἔσται; for the idiom adjective/adverb + τῇ πίστει see *De oec.* col. 10,21–8, where Philodemus, commenting on the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomicus* whose author he understood to be Theophrastus, concedes that καὶ | τὸ τὰς εὐθυ-|σίας δὲ καὶ τὰς | ἀπολαύσεις ποιεῖσθαι τῶν | δο[ύ]λων ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἢ | τῶ[ν] ἐλευθέρων βιαιότε|ρον ἅμα τῇι πίστει, διότι πλέ|ον [ἔχ]ουσιν, οὗ χάριν τὰ το[ι]|α[ῦτ' ἐ]νομίσθη, '("Theophrastus'" recommendation) "to make good sacrifices and entertainments more for the benefit of the slaves than on account of one's free dependants" ([Aristot.] *Oec.* 1344^{b}19), is also strongly persuasive, "because they have more (needs) on account of which such things are instituted".'

An easy change of the apograph at the end of 770 yields Usener's reading πά̣|θει here. But there are problems. The *disegno* indicates the presence of multiple layers (probably a *sottoposto*) at the beginning of 771, so that θ there is by no means probative. In addition πάθος very often carries connotations of 'suffering', a κακόν which one would have expected Epicurus to have separated from the activity of contemplation on religious occasions (cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 13,2).

772–3 κατα[cχεῖ]ν̣ τὴ[ν | ....]ν̣θ[ ]αι: for Philippson's κατασχεῖν see Epic. *Ad Herod.* 52 καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν κατέχειν. (κατά[ληψι]ν̣ is possible here, but not well attested in Epicurean writings.) We are missing the noun specifying what exactly the wise man acquires from 'progressing to an understanding of divine nature' at festivals. Usener's ἀ]φθαρ̣|σίαν is not encouraged by the apograph, which gives converging diagonals (possibly]N) then θ followed by a small space (i.e. room for ι or ρ) before αι̣ at line end. Usener assumed that what the wise man acquires is a clear conception of one aspect of divine nature (namely immortality); but why immortality should be so singled out rather than some other aspect is unclear as it stands. Perhaps what the wise man achieves while forming an ἐπίνοια of divine nature at festivals is not purely conceptual but social (cf. above, 735, 750–1) or even something metaphorically approaching society with the gods: we might thus read here κατα[cχεῖ]ν̣ τὴ[ν | αὐτῆι (sc. φύσει) cυνο]υ̣ς̣[ί]αν̣ (assuming c mistaken by similarity of shape for θ). For the idea see Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 1,13–18 Diels (Epic. fr. 386 Us.) ὁ cοφὸc προcεύχεται (suppl. e.g. Festugière 1968, 98 n. 2)] τοῖc θεοῖc καὶ θαυμάζει τὴ[ν] φύcιν [αὐτῶν κ(αὶ)] τὴν διάθεcιν καὶ περᾶται cυνεγγί[ζειν] αὐτῆι καὶ καθαπερεὶ γλίχεται θιγε[ῖν καὶ cυ]νεῖναι, καλεῖ τ[ε] καὶ τοὺc cοφοὺc τῶν [θεῶ]ν φίλουc καὶ τοὺc θεοὺc τῶν cοφῶν '[The sage addresses prayers] to the gods, he

admires their nature and condition, he strives to come near it, he aspires, so to speak, to touch and live with it, and he calls wise men friends of the gods, and the gods friends of wise men.'

782–3 *Order of Columns.* Although the present col. 27 and the following col. 28 come from opposite halves of the papyrus roll, these columns do not link (see 783, which must begin with a word ending in -κ). Therefore probably one column is lost after 782 (i.e. was not copied by the *disegnatore* because of extent of damage). The lost column will have continued the discussion of reasons given by Epicurus in justifying on philosophical grounds participation in various forms of worship.

Col. 28

Conclusion of the philosophical justification for participation in cult. Testimonia for Epicurus' own engagement in acts of cult: (*a*) civic festivals, Choes; (*b*) mystery initiation.

783 Rules of syllabification make it virtually certain that the line began with *οὐκ* (the only monosyllabic word that can end in κ and fit the context, which e.g. rules out *ἐ|κ*). Since *οὐκ* probably does not at this distance negate the infinitive in 786–7, it possibly stands here for *οὐκ (ἐστιν)* or *οὐκ (ἔνεστι)*. Considering its position here before 790, together with the space left by the scribe as punctuation, this is clearly the end of the sentence concluding the section on reasons justifying participation in cult, the beginning of which has been lost.

783–4 Perhaps *δυσκα[τ]ᾳν[οή]|⟨τ⟩ων* should be read here. The word is not attested, but conforms to the apograph's ΔΥCΚΑ[ ]Λ|[...]|ΩN better than Philippson's *δυσκαλλ[ιερήσε]|ων* (also unattested, and too long: Philippson was thinking of 1420 below, *καλλιερήσεις*), while *κατανοεῖν* is familiar in this context (cf. 451–3 *αἰσ|θητά τε καὶ νοητά*). In 784 Philippson's *ε[ἰ]δέ[ναι* seems reasonable.

784–6 I suggest here the supplement *ε[ἰ]δέ[ναι τὰς αἰτί]|ας*. Philippson's *ε[ἰ]δέ[ναι ἐπινοί]|ας* produces hiatus (there is not room for the article), the cognate accusative is awkward, and *ἐπίνοιας* would be an unlikely repetition in 788. In 786 it is difficult to tell whether *ἤ* is the disjunctive connective or the particle of comparison; if the latter, then *ἀμε[ίνο]|νας* could take *τινων* in 785 as its object of comparison (so Arr.²: 'superiori ad alcuni oppure anche conservare di fatto le nozioni degli dèi in determinati tempi'). To hazard a reconstruction, I should prefer to read:

	καί φησιν οὐ]-‖		(Epicurus says) that he does
28	*κ ἐκ δυσκα[τ]ᾳν[οητέ-*	1098 12	not know the causes of some
	ων ε[ἰ]δέ[ναι τὰς αἰτί-		(things? gods? rites?) to be better
785	*ας τινῶν ἀμε[ίνο-*		(i.e. *φυσικαί*: see 736–7) from

νας ἢ [τῶι φυλάτ-
• τειν ἐνε[ρ]γε[ίαι
τὰς ἐπινο[ίας τῶν
θεῶν διά τ[ινων
χρόνων· οὐ [μόνον
δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδο[γμάτι-
σεν ἀλλὰ καὶ δι[ὰ τῶν
ἔργων κτλ.

things (or: gods?) badly conceived, as (he does) by preserving effectively one's conceptions of the gods during certain times. And not only did he teach these things, but also in his actions . . . .

In 785–6 ἀμε[ίνο]|νας must be a predicative adjective, before ἢ [τῶι φυλάτ]-|τειν, 'than by preserving'. The reference of τ[ινων] | χρόνων would in this case be festivals or religious celebrations as described above, 760–73, and demonstrated below in the case of Epicurus. The force of 787 ἐνε[ρ]γε[ίαι should be 'effectively', 'actively', 'in actuality', i.e. in contrast to δυνάμει: one should have ἐπίνοιαι of the gods actually present in mind, not merely δυμάμει, available when needed.

789–90 διά τ[ινων] | χρόνων: Gomperz's restoration preserves the reading of the apograph ('at certain times', i.e. select times, holidays and religious festivals?). But attention should be drawn to the possibility of correcting here to π̣[ολλῶν (Quaranta) or even π̣[άντων, which would expand the time-period over which the envisaged process takes place. In favour of either of these corrections it may be said that Epicurus certainly thought that one should always φυλάτ]τειν . . . τὰς ἐπινο[ίας τῶν] | θεῶν (786–9).

790–2 οὐ [μόνον] | δὲ ταῦτ' ἐδο[γμάτι]|σεν: this concludes the section on reasons by which Epicurus justified cult on philosophical grounds. δογματίζω (see on 308) indicates that such views were approved Epicurean positions, with the added implication that he actively taught them.

792–3 ἀλλὰ καὶ δι[ὰ τῶν] | ἔργων αὐτῶν: Philodemus claims that Epicurus' own actions confirm the sincerity of his articulated views on the gods cited earlier. If this seems a weak point in the argument (anyone who questions Epicurus' sincerity in speaking about the gods is not very likely to be convinced of the sincerity of his actions), it should be remembered that the charge of impiety had historically been directed against the neglect of the gods as recipients of cult in the first instance. Traditionally, evading a charge of impiety entailed showing that one had in fact performed such acts and performed them κατὰ νόμους (compare the arguments advanced along these lines by Socrates in Plato's *Apology*; see too Andocides, *On the Mysteries*).

This begins the section on attested acts of worship by Epicurus. With remarkably little difficulty Philodemus can adduce cases in which Epicurus engaged in festivals and sacrifices both public and private, in funeral cult, swore oaths by the gods, prayed, and was intitiated into the Mysteries at Athens. That he did not do so alone (but in the company of others: 800–1,

including Epicureans: 865–6, 936, 954–5) seems to suffice as a defence on this point for other Epicureans as well. With the exception of private cult (including funeral cult) within the school, we do not otherwise hear of Hermarchus, Metrodorus, and the rest engaging themselves in specific rites of public sacrifice, prayer, oaths, and initiation as we do for Epicurus, though similar behaviour involving dedications, statuary, and the like are independently attested for them in the historical record (see below on 794–6). But we are never told by our Epicurean sources, for instance, that Polyaenus celebrated the Anthesteria (as Epicurus advised him to do: 865–9). It is, of course, made explicit in this section that Epicurus exhorted his followers to act with regard to religious cult as he himself did (829–30, 865–9). Nor can it be the case that Epicurus' followers confined their religious activities to the private cult of the school, for this is contradicted by the historical and archaeological record (dedications at Eleusis and Epidaurus, *theoria* at Delphi: see on 794–6).

794–6 πάcαιc ταῖc | πατρίοιc ἑορταῖc | καὶ θυcίαιc κε[χ]ρ[η]|μένοc: for the gross generalization that the early Epicureans observed all rites of worship see above, 732 with commentary, and below, 1453. Attestations of actual participation in festival activities (including, but not restricted to *ἑορταί* and *θυcίαι*) by Epicurus or Epicureans include the following (noted above, p. 10): (1) offerings of blood sacrifice, (*a*) *θυcίαι*, in public cult: below, 880 (cf. 1453), Athen. 5. 179 D (Epic. fr. 56 Us.), Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102 B (Epic. fr. 30 Us.), 1102 C (not in Us., Arr.^{2}, quoted more fully below on 880) *φθέγγεται φωνὰc ἐναντίαc οἷc φιλοcοφεῖ· καὶ θύων μὲν ὡc μαγείρῳ παρέcτηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ cφάττοντι, θύcαc δὲ ἄπειcι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον "ἔθυον οὐ προcέχουcιν οὐδέν μοι θεοῖc"*, *Adv. Col.* 1112 C (not in Us., Arr.^{2}, quoted above on 737–38) *ὡc θυcίαν*, Porph. *De abst.* 1. 7–12 (a cultural-historical account and defence of blood-sacrifice by Hermarchus); and (*b*) *ἐναγίcματα* in private cult: see below on 818–19; (2) attendance upon local calendrical festivals: the Attic festival of the Pitchers (*τῶν Χοῶν*) on the second day of the Anthesteria, below, 806–8; and at the Anthesteria in general, below, 865–9, Obbink 1984, 617; 1989, 200–2 (cf. also below, 1398); at Panhellenic festivals: the second-century BC Epicurean Philonides was a *θεωροδόκοc* from his native Laodicea ad mare, and appears at Delphi in several contemporary lists of *θεωροδόκοι*: see Plassart, *BCH* 45 (1921), 1–85, Daux, *REG* 62 (1949), 20–2, Robert, *REG* 63 (1950), 163 no. 127, Daux, *Delphes au IIe et au Ier siècle*, Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, Fasc. 140 (Paris, 1936), 511–14, Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, i (Oxford, 1972), 416 n. 320; (3) for religious feasting (*εὐωχία*) especially in the context of private or ancestral feasts, see in particular below, 818–19 (cf. 1307–8) and the five separate calendrical rites stipulated by Epicurus in his will (D.L. 10. 18 ff.), which provide for the continuing funeral cult (*τὰ ἐναγίcματα*) of the founders and their families; (4) dedication of *ἀναθήματα*: D.L. 10. 126,

Raubitschek 1949, 96–103 (= 1991, 337–44): Phaedrus and dedicatory herms to the gods of Eleusis, in conjunction with the Eleusinian mysteries; Castner 1982, 51–7 (to Asclepius at Epidaurus); (5) initiation in the Attic (i.e. Eleusinian) mysteries: above, 557–9, below, 808–10, 1397–8); (6) adoration of cult statues (*ἀγάλματα*): below, 910–12, Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 85, Origen *Contr. Cels.* 7. 66 (Epic. fr. 390 Us.); so also use of statuary and amulets as talismans: Cic. *De fin.* 5. 3; Frischer 1982, 87–128.

797–9 ἐπ' Ἀρ[ιστ]ωνύμου μὲγ γὰ[ρ] Φύρ|σωνι: there were two different letters by Epicurus *To Phyrson*: the present one, written in 289/8 concerning Theodotus and the cult activities of Epicurus (Dorandi 1990*b*, T 19); and a later one, cited below, 841–2 as *ἐπὶ Διοτίμου* (i.e. written in 285/4, T23 Dorandi, fr. 94 Arr.[2]) in which Epicurus mentioned the book *Πρὸς τοὺς ἀσχόλους* (see Dorandi 1990*b*, 126). A third letter to Phyrson (not by Epicurus, but by his brother Neokles) is cited below, 945–57. The dossier of Epicurean letters used by Philodemus also contained letters by other persons *to* Epicurus (see on 945–6). For the dating of the letters *To Phyrson* see also below, 841–2; Clay 1982, 20, 25–6. For the dating of Epicurus' letters by Athenian archons see Clay 1982 and below on 938–9. For the archons: W. K. Pritchett and B. D. Meritt, *The Chronology of Hellenistic Athens* (Cambridge, Mass. 1940, esp. the table, pp. xv–xix, with the revisions by A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology: Calendar and Years in Classical Antiquity* (Munich, 1972), 212–13. Clay (op. cit.) argues that Epicurus' letters and other writings were deposited along with his will at his death in the Metroon at Athens, and for that reason bear Athenian archon-dates, as though official documents. At 938–9 below it is argued that Epicurus did not date his own letters. For the archon dates in the *subscriptiones* to the books of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* preserved at Herculaneum, see above on 523–4.

Phyrson is almost certainly the same person as *Πύρσων* (so the MSS) mentioned at Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1101 A (Epic. fr. 120 Us.); the emendation is not followed by M. Pohlenz and R. Westman in their edition (Leipzig, 1959), but see the note of Einarson and De Lacy ad loc. and further below. Since a substantial portion of Plutarch's paraphrase of the letter *To Phyrson* was omitted in Usener and Arr.[2], and since the present citation comes also from this work, I give the passage (*Contra Epic. beat.* 1101 AB) in full, in order to give an idea of the contents of Epicurus' letter:

τοῖς ἀναιροῦσι λύπας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ στεναγμοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων τελευταῖς μάχονται καὶ λέγουσι (sc. οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι) τὴν εἰς τὸ ἀπαθὲς καθεστῶσαν ἀλυπίαν ἀφ' ἑτέρου κακοῦ μείζονος ὑπάρχειν, ὠμότητος ἢ δοξοκοπίας ἀκράτου καὶ λύσσης· διὸ πάσχειν τι βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ νὴ Δία (NB the oath) *λιπαίνειν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τήκεσθαι, καὶ ὅσα δὴ παθαινόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες ὑγροί τινες εἶναι καὶ φιλικοὶ δοκοῦσι. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς Ἐπίκουρος εἴρηκε καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς πρὸς Ὠσίθεον γράφων τὸν πατέρα καὶ Πύρσωνα τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος. ἔναγχος γὰρ κατὰ τύχην τὰς ἐπιστολὰς διῆλθον αὐτοῦ*

(Epic. fr. 120 Us. fin.)· καὶ λέγω μιμούμενος ὡς οὐχ ἧττόν ἐστι κακὸν ἀθεότης ὠμότητος καὶ δοξοκοπίας, εἰς ἣν ἄγουσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ τὴν χάριν ἐκ τοῦ θείου μετὰ τῆς ὀργῆς ἀναιροῦντες. βέλτιον γὰρ ἐνυπάρχειν τι καὶ συγκεκρᾶσθαι τῇ περὶ θεῶν δόξῃ κοινὸν αἰδοῦς καὶ φόβου πάθος, ἤ που τοῦτο φεύγοντας μήτ' ἐλπίδα μήτε χάριν ἑαυτοῖς μήτε θάρσος ἀγαθῶν παρόντων μήτε τινὰ δυστυχοῦσιν ἀποστροφὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀπολείπεσθαι.

(The Epicureans) disagree with those who would do away with grief and tears and lamentation at the death of friends, and say that an absence of grief that renders us totally insensible stems from another greater evil: hardness or a passion for notoriety so inordinate as to be insane. Hence they say that it is better to be moved somewhat and to grieve and even, by Zeus, to melt into tears and so with all the maudlin sentiment they feel and put into their writings, getting themselves the name of being soft-hearted and affectionate characters. For this is what Epicurus has said not only in many other passages, but in his letter on the death of Hegesianax to Sositheus the father and Pyrson the brother of the deceased. You see I recently happened to run through his letters [end of Epic. fr. 120 Us.]. I say then, taking his remarks as my model, that irreligion is no less an evil than hardness and the passion for notoriety; and it is to irreligion that they lead us who with the wrath of divinity would do away with delight from it. For it is better that our belief about the gods should include an intermixture of a certain emotion that is part reverence and part fear, than that, by trying to escape this, we should leave ourselves no hope, no delight, no confidence in prosperity, and in adversity no refuge in the divine.

Phyrson was a native of Colophon (below, 954–6); his father was Dositheus (whose name has also suffered minor corruption in Plutarch's text) and his brother Hegesianax, whose premature death was the occasion for Epicurus' letter. Plutarch says that the work he read was *περὶ τῆς Ἡγησιάνακτος τελευτῆς* and that it was addressed *πρὸς Δωσίθεον τὸν πατέρα καὶ Φύρσωνα* (*Πύρσωνα* codd., an obvious phonetic confusion; the identification was made first by Gomperz, in the index to his edition of *De pietate*, p. 157) *τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ τεθνηκότος*, and implies that this work was among *τὰς ἐπιστολὰς αὐτοῦ* (sc. *Ἐπικούρου*), though it was obviously a single work in epistolary form. Probably the 'letter to Dositheus' posited by Usener and the work addressed to Phyrson cited in the present passage (797) both refer to one and the same work (a possibility suggested originally by Usener, adn. to p. 151,4), dealing primarily with the matter of consolation on the occasion of Hegesianax' death. Also identical with this work may be the treatise entitled *Hegesianax* (D.L. 10. 27: on the form of the title see above on 165), since, as D. Clay has shown, the works titled after the names of individuals (but not as addressees) were primarily commemorative and memorial pamphlets affording a model of the philosophical life that were intended to be recited aloud on the occasions of their birthdays as celebrated after their deaths in the private cult of the school: so Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1097E; *De lat. vivend.* 1129A; Clay 1986, 18, 24 with n. 17, 26. The work may have originally been a letter, or in the form of one, with dual addressees, that

later passed under the alternative title *Hegesianax*. Normally from such a title one would expect a dialogue in which Hegesianax played a major part. Perhaps conversations between the speaker (Epicurus) or others and Hegesianax while still alive were related (cf. the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus*).

In the passage cited here by Philodemus (797–810, possibly also 811–19), Epicurus may have been describing how he and Theodotus (also known to the family in Colophon) were commemorating Hegesianax' death by mourning (for the reasons stated in Plutarch's excerpt) as well as by celebrations in civic festivals (807–10) and private funeral cult (813–19). The private cultic celebration described below at 811–19 may thus have been connected with Hegesianax' death or birthday. The passage from Plutarch quoted above, together with the present text (797–819) thus provide a valuable scenario of Epicurus' reaction in terms of traditional religion to the death of a friend. Plutarch tells us that in this work Epicurus holds that public rituals of mourning (grief, tears, lamentation) are appropriate and natural at the death of friends. Indeed it is crucial that our idea of the gods (ἡ περὶ θεῶν δόξα) contain an admixture of the natural emotions expressed in such rituals; it is in this sense that the divine can be said to be for us an 'escape' or 'refuge' (ἀποστροφή) in adversity. Even the brief random passage from *To Phyrson* excerpted by Plutarch contains one of Epicurus' characteristic oaths (in a highly emotional and ritual context), as it shows how Epicurus provided an ethical approach to matters of traditional religion in a work which ostensibly eulogized a member of the school but in fact treated the serious philosophical subject of death. It was a *De morte*.

Below at 953–7 Philodemus asserts that Phyrson was no ἰδιώτης and had achieved some prominence κατὰ] τὰ πολ[ιτικά, which may be connected with the concern expressed here (800) over one of his Colophonian συμπολῖται. For Philodemus the fact that Epicurus could write openly to Phyrson about his and Theodotus' participation in civic and family cult illustrates and emphasizes the public, cosmopolitan nature of Epicurean religious observance.

799–801 αὐ]τοῦ πολείτου Θεο]δότου: this sentence from Epicurus (possibly continued at 811–19) must have gone on to say something about Theodotus, for it seems otherwise pointless for Philodemus to mention here that Epicurus was writing to Phyrson about *him*. Phyrson and his father Dositheus (perhaps also Hegesianax) were apparently Epicureans (as the addressees of works by Epicurus). It seems likely that Theodotus was an Epicurean as well, especially if 811–19 are concerned with him (as I suggest below). Perhaps all three were sympathetic and potential adepts. Theodotus himself, however, must have been resident in Athens, at least in 289/8, since (as related in the present passage) in that year Epicurus wrote to Phyrson about Theodotus in connection with Epicurus' own engagement in Athe-

nian festivals (806–10), possibly also their celebration of the Epicurean *eikades* (see on 811–19). Theodotus was thus like Phyrson a native of Colophon who may have been a member of the Epicurean community at Athens contemporary with the *kathegemones* (as was perhaps also Hegesianax, if he died at Athens).

802–3 τῶν ἑορτῶν . . . | πασῶν: with the generalization, reported in Epicurus' own words, may be compared those at 732, 794–6 (cf. 1453). Here, however, Epicurus clearly meant 'all the festivals and sacrifices' held at a specific period of time in Athens (see on 732).

803–6 Of these lines the letters preserved are so exiguous as to make any restoration uncertain without a parallel passage on which to rely as a guide. Of the three sequences με[in 803–5, one is almost certainly an infinitive form of μετέχειν 'to share in' all the festivals; one in all probability should be restored as με[τὰ φίλων (cf. *De Epicuro P. Herc.* 1232 col. 28,12 Tepedino, cf. Clay 1986, 13). 804, 805, or 806 must have contained a connective. A possible reconstruction is as follows:

γράφων "καὶ
τῶν ἑορτῶν" [φησι (20)
"πασῶν με[τεσχηκέ-
ν̣[αι]" κ[αὶ] "με[τὰ φίλων
805 με[τέχω]ν π̣α[σῶν
το[ύτων,] τὴν τῷ̣[ν
• Χο̣ῶν ἑορτὴν [συν- (25)
εο̣ρτάζων

Writing to Phyrson about his countryman Theodotus, Epicurus says that he (sc. Epicurus) 'has also shared in all the festivals' and that 'sharing in all of them with friends, celebrating with the people the festival of the Choes . . . .

Philippson's restoration of an oath νὴ Δία in 805 is highly suspect, since Epicurus is later quoted directly as swearing in this fashion, and Philodemus himself does not otherwise employ such asseverations in this treatise.

806–8 τῷ̣[ν] | Χο̣ῶν ἑορτὴν [συν]|εο̣ρτάζων: Castner 1982, 53 says we cannot be sure whether the person said here to be celebrating the Choes and Anthesteria is Epicurus (as assumed by Festugière 1968, 75) or rather Theodotus. But the nominative συν]|εορτάζων leaves no doubt that reference is to the subject of the verb of speaking (so also 801 γράφων, which must be Epicurus), so that there is no doubt whatsoever that the subject of συν]-|εορτάζων, as well as the main point of the testimony, is Epicurus. συνεορτάζειν suggests the notion of public and civic festival observance. Cf. *IG* ii/2, p. 516 n. 384b = Dittenberger, *SIG*² 587 l. 204; Athen. 10. 437E τοῖς οἰκέταις συνεορτάζοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν Χοῶν ἑορτῇ καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον διὰ γῆρας χρῆσθαι ᾗ παρειλήφεσαν ἑταίρᾳ κτλ.

The Choes or 'day of the Pitchers' (so called after the earthenware jugs from which the new wine was drunk) was held on the second of the three

days of the Anthesteria at Athens, celebrated on the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, and preceded by the Pithoigia (the day of 'opening of the casks') on the eleventh and followed by the day of the 'pots', the Chytroi, on the thirteenth. The Choes were a notoriously egalitarian affair, with slaves, labourers, and even children sharing in the celebration. Contrary to everyday custom, everyone, including children, got his own personal *chous* or wine jar for the drinking of the new wine. On the Choes see M. P. Nilsson, 'Die Anthesterien und die Airoa', *Eranos*, 15 (1915), 181–200 at 184–5; Burkert 1983, 213–38; 1985*a*, 237–41, 259; cf. below, 865–8 on the Anthesteria, and see Hamilton 1992 for further discussion and a catalogue of testimonia for both festivals. The attestation of Epicurean participation in the Choes would be striking if it were in fact a 'day of pollution' (*μιαρὰ ἡμέρα*) and a festival of the dead, a kind of All Souls' festival: 'ghosts or spirits of the dead emerged from the underworld on these days and entered the city, only to be chased away at the end of the festival' (Burkert 1983, 216, an interpretation originally advanced mainly by Harrison 1922, 32–49; cf. Nilsson 1955, 594–7; Bremmer 1983, 110–20). Hamilton 1992 shows that the evidence for 'pollution' at the Choes (as opposed to the Pithoigia and Chytroi) is weak. In Epicurus' case it is enough to note that on the Choes drinking by the entire community of the new wine in honour of Dionysus was combined with the usual measures for the avoidance of pollution. So also Theophrastus' *δεισιδαίμων* (16. 2) celebrates the Choes (according to one emendation: see Rusten 1993, 106), scrupulously avoiding any pollution. The Choes were celebrated in private homes as well as at the temple of Dionysus *ἐν Λίμναις*, since all other temples were closed on this day. Thus another reason for Epicurus' interest in this festival can be seen from the fact that it was an important time for ceremonies of private cult that marked the initiation, especially of young people, into the family clan, the *phratry* (on this aspect see Burkert 1983, 221, who also notes: 'Sharing in the wine signified the first step toward sharing in the life of the society, in adult life'). Teachers customarily received presents on the day of the Choes: Eubulides fr. 1 (*PCG* v. 186); Athen. 10. 437 D.

808–10 τὰ] | μυστήρια τά[στι]|κά: Epicurus' *σπουδή* with regard to *λογοθεραπεία* and *κοινωνία* in the Mysteries at Athens has already been mentioned above, 550–9. It is difficult to know for sure whether in the present passage he called them *Ἀττι*]|*κά* (i.e. of Eleusis in Attica) or *ἀστι*]|*κά* (the latter could conceivably refer to the events of the City Dionysia; cf. 557–8 *τῶν*] | *Ἀθήνησιν . . .* | *μυστηρίων* where a similar ambiguity exists). But Epicurus' involvement in the mysteries is also mentioned below at 1397–8 in a reported criticism of his cultic activities, which, together with the present passage, makes it very likely that it is initiation in the mysteries that is meant, and that Epicurus himself had been initiated (perhaps more than once, as was common); attendance on the Dionysia alone

would scarcely have involved Epicurus in a potential contradiction with his theology.

For dedications by later Epicureans at Eleusis see Raubitschek 1949 = 1991, 337–44 (Phaedrus, in the context of *theoria* there and hence also very likely initiation). Theophrastus' δειcιδαίμων (16. 11) similarly takes himself with his children and wife (or, in her place, the nurse) once a month to renew his initiation. But for the philosophical schools initiation in the mysteries took on added significance with a difference of emphasis. Language familiar from the mysteries, for example, was commonly adopted by the schools (including Epicurus') as a way of describing philosophic enlightenment by comparison with religious experience. The term τέλειοc and its derivatives (standard designations for the religious initiate and the process of initiation) were invoked, for example, to describe the philosophically indoctrinated: see H. Diels on Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 24,12–13 (p. 93 and n. 1): 'τέλειοc ist der aus der Mysteriensprache entlehnte Kunstausdruck der Epikureer für den vollendeten Menschen im Gegensatz zu dem Pöbel.' See also Epic. *Ad Herod.* 36 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ τετελεcιουργημένου τοῦτο κυριώτατον κτλ.; 83 ὅcοι δὲ μὴ παντελῶc αὐτῶν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων (ἀποτετελειωμένων Diels) εἰcίν, ἐκ τούτων κτλ.; Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 14,8–9 (p. 24 Diels) καὶ μὴν ὅ γε τέλει[ο]c (= cοφὸc) ἄν|θρωποc, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοὺc θεοὺc ἀνεπίβλητοc | ᾖ διειλημμένωc, ἀδιαλήπτωc ἐπι[βάλ]λει πολλάκι[c]; col. 24,12–13 οὐδὲ τὸν τε|[λείωc] τέλει̣ο[ν οἱ θεοὶ π]άντεc ἅμα | [φοβεῖν] γε [ν]ομίζονται; *De morte* 34,10; *De libert. dic.* fr. 46,7 (p. 22 Olivieri); col. 8a,3 (p. 48 Olivieri); Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1102B (Epic. fr. 30 Us.) θυcίαιc καὶ τελεταῖc ὁμιλεῖν; Dionysius Episc. ap. Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 14. 27. 8–9 (ii. 336,15 Mras = Epic. fr. 364 Us.) which parodies Epicurus' physical discoveries as a religious vision (see O. Regenbogen, *Lukrez* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1932), 42–3, who compares Parmenides, the *Somnium Scipionis*, and the Mithras liturgy in *PGM* IV (fr. 10,13 ff. Dieterich–Weinreich[3]) in this respect); hence Lucr. 1. 62–78 (the *moenia mundi*), and 3. 17 *totum video per inane geri res, apparet divum numen sedesque quietae.*

In Epicurean texts the use of this sort of language can be traced to the earliest generations of the school: see Metrodorus fr. 37 Körte (= Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 10, Clem Alex. *Strom.* 5. 138), and fr. 38 Körte (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117B): μόνον οὐ καταδύντεc ταῖc ὁμοιοπαθείαιc καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντεc ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰc τὰ 'Επικούρου ὡc ἀληθῶc θεόφαντα ὄργια; cf. R. M. Jones, *CPh* 21 (1926), 113; on such images for *arcana philosophiae*, see Lobeck 1829, i. 123–6; for θεόφαντα of mystery spectacles and visions, ibid. i. 61; and for the expression φαίνειν τὰ ἱερά, cf. Lucr. 3. 14–17. So already in Plato the terms μύηcιc, ἐπόπτεια, ὀργιάζειν are used to describe the coincidence of philosophical enlightenment and religious experience: É. des Places, 'Platon et la langue des mystères', *Études platoniciennes* (1981), 83–98; Burkert 1985*a*, 324 with n. 15; Chr. Riedweg, *Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philon,*

und Klemens von Alexandrien (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte, 26; Berlin and New York, 1987). On the topos in general, see G. Lejeune Dirichlet, *De veterum macarismis* (RGVV 14/4; Giessen, 1914), 62–3; Bignone 1936, i. 369; R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen* (Leipzig, 1922), 133–4; K. Kerényi, *ARW* 28 (1930), 392–5; W. A. Heidel, *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, 3 (1910), 377 ff.; J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle: Der Mythos vom Descensuskampfe* (Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, 20; Leipzig, 1932), 506–11; on the merger of literary and cultural mysteries: Festugière 1968, 57–8 and n. 3; id., *L'Idéal religieux des grecs et l'Évangile* (Paris, 1932), 116 ff.; id., 'Hermetica', *HThR* 31 (1938), 1 ff. On the very different use of τέλειος, τελετή, and related terms by the Stoics, see Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 1035 B (*SVF* ii. 42); *Et. Magnum* s.v. τελετή (*SVF* ii. 1008; cf. i. 538); Plut. *Quaest. conviv.* 718 D; *De Iside* 382 DE; Boyancé 1937, 42–3, 49 n. 2; Lobeck 1929, i. 123–5. In short, by such allusions the Stoics argued from their etymology of these terms that theology should come last (after physics, logic, and ethics) in philosophical inquiry—against the Epicureans, who, following their doctrine of πρόληψις with regard to divine nature, placed it first. Here Epicurus speaks of the actual mysteries of cult and his own involvement in them, which gives a different but not inconsistent dimension to the use of *Mysterienterminologie*.

810 καὶ τὰς ἄλ[λας: Festugière 1968, 75 n. 2, 88 n. 6 supplies || [τελετὰς μυούμενος here; but it seems far more natural simply to understand ἑορτὰς over again from 807 (cf. 795, 802) as the cognate accusative of συν]||εορτάζων. If this is correct, the column that follows may continue on without a break: ἐπὶ τὸν τε]θ̣λιμμένον (sc. δεῖπνον) becomes the extension of the statement in indirect discourse, the verb of which is ἄγειν in 813.

810–11 *Order of Columns.* Note the preserved stichometric points (787, 807) at an interval of exactly 20 lines. It is clear from the statement at 790–7 that this column cannot have preceded the list of philosophical reasons given by Epicurus for participation in cult (cols. 26–7). Taken together, the columns which fall next in the new reconstruction (alternating columns of **1077/1098** in descending order) present a documented list, in the catalogue style characteristic of the author in this work, of examples of acts of worship and related religious activities on Epicurus' part. The present col. 28 may continue directly with the following col. 29 without a break (see the commentary on 811–19 for reconstruction of the syntax).

Col. 29

Epicurean engagement in cult, continued. (*c*) An invitation to dinner in celebration of the Twentieth; decoration of the house, with feasting open to all. (*d*) How the Epicureans used oaths; their writings filled with them; how Epicurus swore by Zeus himself, not substituting euphemisms, and advised his followers to do the same.

811–12 ἐπὶ τὸν τε]θλιμμένον (*δεῖπνον*): Epicurus also used the word in connection with minimal parts: if they did not exist, 'we should be compelled to squander things that exist by squeezing them into the non-existent' (*Ad Herod.* 56 *εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναγκαζώμεθα τὰ ὄντα θλίβοντες καταναλίσκειν*, cf. *Ad Pyth.* 99, 107, where *θλῖψις* figures in cloud-formation). The sense required here is 'straitened', 'reduced', 'slender', 'meagre': Theocr. 21. 18 of a close hut *θλιβομένα καλύβα*; cf. Matt. 7. 14 *ὁδὸς τεθλιμμένη*; D.H. 8.73 *βίος τεθλιμμένος*, 'a slender existence'; *AP* 7. 472. 5 (Leonidas); cf. metaphorically at Philod. *De lib. dicend.* fr. 22a,4 *ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδοξίας θλίβονται*. For the proverbially meagre repast of the Epicureans, see Philod. *Epigr.* 27 Sider (= *AP* 11. 44, 23 Gow–Page, 20 Gigante) with the comments of Sider ad loc., in Obbink 1995*a*, 46–50, and see below on 812. The exiguousness of the Epicurean *δεῖπνον* was no doubt intended to contrast ironically with the care taken by Epicurus and his friends in their lavish preparations for cultic celebration (cf. 817–18 *ἐπιλαμπρυ|[νάντω]ι*), thus highlighting that they took cult seriously, not mockingly and insincerely or in the gluttonous pursuit of pleasure as their opponents charged. For this reason it became a kind of topos and inside joke in the school's literature, as the epigram intimates, promising invaluable philosophical simplicities while looking forward to a more lavish celebration at the expense of the wealthy patron. Historically the 'meager repast' may reflect actual economic and social conditions, straitened circumstances faced by the school in its early years as by the rest of contemporary Athens (see below on 929–32).

Diels (followed by Philippson) wanted to emend *N*'s]Є to]Η so as to read *ἀλ]ηλιμμένον*, i.e. 'having anointed himself' (i.e. with oil during bathing in preparation for the dinner). But the *disegnatore* is not likely under any conditions to have mistaken the shape of Є for an Η. A further difficulty is that in the usage recognized by Philodemus, *ἀλείφω* means 'prepare', 'incite', or 'encourage' (i.e. someone to do something): *Rhet.* i. 322, 17 *ἐπὶ τὴν | [π]ολιτικὴν ἀ[γω]νίαν | ἀλειφόντων ἐλπίδι*; ii. 59,17; reflexive in middle: *Rhet.* i. 18,19 *πρ]ὸς συκ[ο]φάν[τας ἀ]λει|φομένων*; ii. 158,13. Diels and Philippson understood *τὸν ἀλ]ηλιμμένον . . . αὐτόν* to be Epicurus, and Vogliano even restored *Ἐπίκουρ]ον* in 812, but see below on 812 *αὐτόν*.

812 δεῖπν]ον: so Diels, thinking in particular of *καλεῖν* and *εὐωχεῖν* in 818–19. *Θεόδοτ]ον* could also be considered here, being slightly more suitable for the space (*Ἐπίκουρ]ον* Vogliano). Cf., however, Philod. *Epigr.* 27. 3 Sider, the invitation poem to Piso (= *AP* 11. 44, 23 Gow–Page, 20 Gigante) *εἰκάδα δειπνίζων*; Epic. ap. Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1089 C (fr. 436 Us.) *ποίας εἰκάδας ἐδείπνηςα πολυτελέστατα* (discussed further below on 812 *αὐτόν*); *P. Herc.* 176 fr. 5 col. 18,3–4 (p. 44 Vogliano, text of Angeli, *CErc* 18 (1988), 40), from a letter from Idomeneus to Epicurus on the funeral of Apollodorus (quoted more fully below on 817–18): *τ]ὰ περὶ τ[ὴν πα]|ρασκευὴν*

τῶν εἰ[ω]θότων | ἐπὶ τοῖς τηλικούτοις γί[νεσθαι δείπνω[ν]; Athen. 7. 298 D Ἐπικούρειος δέ τις εἰκαδιστὴς τῶν συνδειπνούντων ἡμῖν ἐγχέλυος παρατεθείσης "πάρεστιν", ἔφη, "ἡ τῶν δείπνων Ἑλένη· ἐγὼ οὖν Πάρις ἔσομαι." The ἐναγίσματα of the Epicurean cult of heroes were certainly eaten (see on 843–4 τρα]|πέζης, 880 θύωμεν).

αὐτόν: I take the antecedent of αὐτόν in 811 to be the Colophonian Theodotus mentioned above at 800–1, the accusative subject in indirect discourse controlled by [φησι in 802 (cf. 801 γράφων, sc. Ἐπίκουρος), on the hypothesis that this column joins directly with the preceding one. The sentence from Epicurus related at 797–810 must have gone on to say *something* about Theodotus, for it seems otherwise pointless for Philodemus to have declared at 800–1 that in the passage cited Epicurus was writing to Phyrson about *him*.

Diels (and Philippson) took his restoration ἀλ]ηλιμμένον and αὐτόν to be Epicurus (they read ἀλ]ηλιμμένον, αὐτόν τε . . . ἄγειν). But the accusative as here ought to refer to someone other than the verb of speaking. Accusative subjects referring to the speaker are sometimes admissible if emphatic, but this does not help here. We should not expect αὐτὸν . . . ἄγειν to have been introduced by λέγει or φησι or any construction involving Epicurus speaking about himself.

Philippson tried to overcome this difficulty by supposing that the sentence was introduced by φασὶν Ἐπίκουρον παραγίνεσθαι] at the beginning of the column. But this is unsatisfactory because Philodemus in this treatise only uses this indefinite φασίν to introduce testimony when he is reporting the criticism of his opponents (or of the equally misguided poets in the section on poetry and myth). φασίν lacks the textual precision characteristic of the author when speaking of Epicurus and the *kathegemones*, while the degree of detail in this fragment presumes citation from a single named work. Furthermore, all the testimonies in this section derive from *Epicurus'* own works; not even any of the *kathegemones* are cited to substantiate Epicurus' attitude and behaviour towards cult (either because their works contained no such defence, or because their evidence was regarded by the opponents as later or secondary and thus insufficient: cf. the letter from Neocles at 945–57—the exception that proves the rule). The accusative αὐτόν could have been introduced by a construction like ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ or by νομιστέον, etc., and could in this way introduced Epicurus in the accusative with infinitive; but 811–19 contains the sort of details regarding specific festival celebrations that could only have been presented as evidence in a reported account. So the conclusion is virtually inevitable that 811–19 must be a reported account from a work of Epicurus, and that αὐτόν refer to someone other than Epicurus.

As a report by Epicurus himself the present passage 811–19 (possibly 797–819) nevertheless gives a good idea of the kind of thing that Epicurus said

that gave rise to characterizations like that by Carneades (ap. Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1089 C, fr. 436 Us.) that Epicurus was in the habit of recording such activities in his writings as though in 'official records' (*ἐφημερίδες*) under such headings as: "*ποσάκις Ἡδείᾳ καὶ Λεοντίῳ συνῆλθον;*" ἢ "*ποῦ Θάσιον ἔπιον;*" ἢ "*ποίας εἰκάδας ἐδείπνηςα πολυτελέςτατα;*" 'How often I got together with Hedia or Leontion', or 'Where I drank Thasian wine', or 'At which of our school's festival celebrations I had the most sumptuous dinner' (on the passage see further Obbink 1989, 219; Einarson and De Lacy's emendation of *εἰκάδας* to *εἰκάδος*, followed there, should not be maintained). The present passage (797–819) reads very much like one of these descriptions, right down to the mention of specific festivals, other named Epicureans who shared in the festivities, and their celebration at known locations. The language and character of the present passage is very close to *De Epic. P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1, quoted below on 818–19 (everyone, for example, is invited to the feast, from both within and outside the school, cf. 819), although there it is apparently Epicurus who does the inviting personally (as was presumed in the present passage under Diels's reconstruction). Compare, however, Philodemus' invitation poem to Piso, *Epigr.* 27 Sider (= *AP* 11. 44, 22 K., 23 Gow–Page, 20 Gigante), which clearly asks (ll. 7–8) for an invitation in return.

813–14 τ]αὐ̓τ̓ην (sc. *ἑορτὴν*) **ἄγειν | [τὴν ταῖς] εἰκά⟨c⟩ι:** for *ἄγειν* used of the school's private festival celebrations, especially those honouring the memory of the dead *kathegemones*, see *P. Herc.* 176 fr. 5 col. 27,14–17 (= Polyaen. fr. 12 Tepedino) on the cult of the dead Polyaenus *καὶ | ἄλλους ἧc ποτε διά τ[ι]νας | φιλοcόφους ἀ[c]χολίας ἐ[πέ]|πλη[ξ]εν ἐa[υ]τῶι καὶ τελ[ε-|τὴ]ν ἄγειν αὐ[τ]ὴν ἐπεκ[ά]λ[η|cεν* (*: *ἐπεκ[έ]λ[ευ|cε* Vogliano); D.L. 10. 18 (testamentum Epicuri) *cυντελείτωcαν*.

In Diels's supplement *εἰκά⟨c⟩ι* in 814 the lapsed sigma does not seem to me to be an implausible omission (if we assume it was already in the original papyrus). *εἰ καί* does not seem syntactically likely here under any reconstruction. For some equally egregious omissions in this papyrus see e.g. 263 *ἀφθα⟨ρ⟩cία[c*; 729 *δια̣γε̣λ̣ῶντας*. The scribe often corrects such omissions in a minute supralinear hand (see e.g. 813), and we can rarely be sure in cases like the present one that the correction has not been overlooked by the *disegnatore* or otherwise obliterated. The plural is usual in such expressions: Theophr. *Char.* 16. 10 *ταῖς τετράcι*, 'on the fourth of every month'.

The *εἰκάδες* were celebrations held by the Epicureans on the twentieth of each month on the model of Athenian ancestral and private cult, first in honour of Metrodorus, and after Epicurus' death, in his honour. (*ἄγειν* is standard terminology, but cf. Philod. *Epigr.* 27. 8 Sider *ἄξομεν . . . εἰκάδα πιοτέρην*.) They included a cultic dinner, libations of wine, symposiastic activities, and other elements of private, ancestral, and hero cult. See D.L. 10. 18; Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1097 E (Epic. fr. 190 Us.); Angeli–Colaizzo 93

n. 301; Festugière 1968, 30–5, esp. 31 n. 2; Clay 1986, 11–28; id. 1983, 255–79 esp. 272 ff.; Sider on Philod. *Epigr.* 27 in Obbink 1995*a*, 46–50.

814–15 διαφό|[ροις εἰλ]α̣πινα[c]ταῖc: for the punctuation after εἰλ]α̣πινα[c]ταῖc see Festugière 1968, 90 n. 2, taking διαφό|[ροις εἰλ]α̣πινα[c]ταῖc with ἄγειν as a dative of accompaniment or interest ('to celebrate this feast for' or 'offer a festal banquet to'). For εἰλαπιναστής see Athen. 174 A (cult title of Zeus on Cyprus, overseeing rights of guests and hosts); *Il.* 17. 577 'guest', 'boon companion' ('Das Homerische Wort hat sich vielleicht im Kult erhalten': so Diels 1916*a*, 894 (= 296)). Compare εἰλαπίνη, a lavish feast or banquet: *Il.* 18. 491 γάμοι τ' ἔcαν εἰλαπίναι τε; *Od.* 1. 226 εἰλαπίνη ἠὲ γάμοc (both contrasted with ἔρανοc, a more modest holiday banquet, 'picnic').

816–18 It would be possible to restore: ο̣[ἳ | ....-c]αν ἐπιλαμπρύ|[νεcθα]ι, i.e. 'who (e.g. wished) to decorate his house'.

816 τῶν κατὰ] τὴν οἰκίαν: cf. *P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1,7–8 (quoted below on 818–19) τούc τε | [κ]ατὰ τὴν οἰκ[ίαν] ἅπαντας. It is not known exactly where the εἰκάδεc were celebrated: according to Sider on Philod. *Epigr.* 27, they were held 'presumably at some suitable outdoors site'. There is certainly no evidence that they were celebrated in the Kepos. D. Clay (1986, 22, 26) notes that Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 1. 16. 5 preserves evidence for a monument (μνῆμα) of the Epicureans outside Athens, which Clay identifies as the 'place of the Epicurean cults'. This may have been so for the later period since Aelian (fr. 39, Epic. fr. 436 Us.) seems to have known marble 'serving-tables' (τράπεζαι), such as were only used in cult (see below on 843–4), erected at Epicurus' tomb. Whereas the evidence for the early period of the school (816 κατὰ] τὴν οἰκίαν, *P. Herc.* fr. 8 col. 1,7–8 κ]ατὰ τὴν οἰκ[ίαν, Philod. *Epigr.* 27. 1 Sider εἰc λιτήν cε καλιάδα) all attest to the εἰκάδεc being celebrated in private homes (presumably of Epicureans). If the reading of the present passage advanced above is correct, they were not always celebrated at Epicurus' own home, even during his lifetime. Philod. *Epigr.* 27 Sider seems to envisage (with how much seriousness is not clear) the εἰκάδεc being celebrated at the home of Piso (whose status as an Epicurean is questionable at best).

817–18 ἐπιλαμπρυ|[νάντω]ν̣: the aorist apparently attested at *P. Herc.* 176 fr. 5 col. 18,3–4 (p. 44 Vogliano, text of Angeli, *CErc* 18 (1988), 40), from a letter from Idomeneus to Epicurus on the funeral of Apollodorus: τ̣ο̣[ιο]ύ-του καὶ || ἐ[τ]άξαμεν ἀ[ξ]ί]ως, Πυθοκ[λέ]|ουc τοῦ ἀρίc[του] καὶ τὰ περ[ὶ] | τ[ὴ]ν ἐκφορὰ[ν μάλ' ἐπιλα]μ̣π̣ρ̣[ύ]|ν]α[ν]τοc καὶ [τ]ὰ περὶ τ[ὴν πα]|ρα-cκευὴν τῶν εἰ[ω]θότων | ἐπὶ τοῖc τηλικούτοις γί|νεcθαι δεῖπνω[ν], 'we made the appropriate arrangements, with worthy Pythocles attending with much splendour to the funeral ceremonies and to the preparations for such banquets as it is customary to hold for persons of his age'. Strabo 16. 20 (quoted more fully below on 818–19) τὰc ἐνταῦθα (sc. at Ephesus) εὐωχίαc λαμ-πρυνόμενοι. So also Theophrastus' δειcιδαίμων (16. 10) on the fourth and

seventh (so Pasquali and Rusten 1993, 108: 'twenty-fourth' Immisch, supplying ⟨*φθίνοντος*⟩) of the month gives himself a holiday, has warm wine prepared, and spends his time garlanding the statues in his house. For the (relatively rare) *ἐπιλαμπρύνω* (the compound omitted by LSJ in oversight, but see LS[8] s.v.) see Plut. *Lysand.* 30 *τὸν οἶκον*; D.H. 6. 41 *γένος τιμαῖc*.

818–19 καλέcαν|[τα πάντ]ac εὐωχῆcαι: *καλέω* and *παρακαλέω* are standard terms for 'invite' in the formal sense; it is used of Epicurus' invitation of persons both inside and outside the school to celebrate the *εἰκάδεc* in *P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1 (for the text see Clay 1986, 13, cf. Tepedino 1988) *τοῖ]c μη[θὲν] | δ[ι]ὰ ταράχουc μ[οχ]θοῦci τὰc π[ε]||ρὶ τῶν ἀρίcτων καὶ μακαριc[το|τά]των φύcεω[ν] ἐνν[οίας. λέγει δὲ | κα]λεῖν εὐωχ[εῖc]θαι αὐ-τούc τε | κ[θ]ὼc καὶ τ[ουὲ] ἄλλουc, τούc τε | [κ]ατὰ τὴν οἰκ[ίαν] ἅπαντας καὶ | [τ]ῶν ἔξωθεν [μηδέν]α παραλεί|ποντας, ὅcοι τ[ὰ]c [εὐ]νοίας [καὶ | τὰc] ἑαυ[τ]οῦ [κα]ὶ τὰ[c τ]ῶν ἑαυ|[τ]οῦ φίλων ἔχουcιν. [ο]ὐ γὰρ δη|μαγωγήcειν τοῦ[τ]ο πράττον|τας τὴν κενὴν καὶ ἀφυcιολό|γη[τ]ον δημαγ[ωγ]ίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν | τοῖc τῆc φύcεω[c οἷ]κείοις ἐνερ|γοῦντας μ[ν]η[cθ]ήcecθαι πάντων | τῶν τὰc εὐν[οίαc] ἡμῖν ἐχόν|των, ὅπωc cυ[γκαθ]αγίζωcιν τὰ | ἐπὶ τῇι ἑαυτ[ῶν μα]-καρίαι . . . [καθ]ήκοντα*, 'as concerns those who do not experience turmoil and difficulty in their conceptions of natures that are best and most blessed. And he (sc. Epicurus) says that he invites them to join in a feast, just as he invites others—all those in the house and who leave out none (masc.) of those outside, as many as are well disposed both to him and to his friends. In doing this (he says) they will not be engaged in gathering the masses, something which is a form of meaningless "demagogy" and unworthy of the natural philosopher; rather, in practising what is congenial to their nature, they will remember all those who are well disposed to us so that on their blessed day they can join in making the sacrificial offerings that are fitting to . . .'. In the present passage *εὐωχῆcαι* is similarly transitive: 'he invited and feasted them all'.

For other examples of *εὐωχέω, εὐωχία* in the context of private or ancestral cult, see the five separate calendrical rites stipulated by Epicurus in his will (D.L. 10. 18), which provide for the continuing funeral cult (*τὰ ἐναγίcματα*, on which see esp. Festugière 1968, 31 n. 2, 34 n. 3) of his parents and brothers (see below, 1475–6), the celebration of his own birthday on 10 Gamelion (together with similar rites for his brothers and for Polyaenus), and most importantly, the gatherings on the twentieth of each month (*ταῖc εἰκάcι*) to commemorate himself and his favourite pupil Metrodorus. For the traditionally religious character of these rites of private cult, see esp. below, 1419–25: *μετὰ τὰc | καλλιερήcειc καὶ || τὰc cπου[δαίαc κεὐ]φώνουc λ[ιτὰc ἀναι]||ροῦμεν [τὴν παρα]μυθίαν [τῶν εὐω]||χιῶν*; above, 768–70 *διὰ τὸ | τοὔνομα πάντα | ἀνὰ cτόμ' ἔχειν*; *P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1 in Clay 1986, 13; Festugière 1968, 30–5; Clay 1986, 11–28; id. 1983*a*, esp. 272–4. On *εὐωχίαι* as ritual feasts, both of funeral banquets and feasts in the colleges (*thiasoi*), or

in the mysteries see Plat. *Leg.* 2.666B τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ξυccιτίοις εὐωχηθέντα, καλεῖν τούς τε ἄλλους θεοὺς καὶ δὴ καὶ Διόνυcον παρακαλεῖν εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεcβυτῶν τελετὴν ἅμα καὶ παιδιάν; *LSAM* 53,15–17 ἐπιτελεῖν τὰς εὐωχίας τῶν | τε κόcμων καὶ τῶν μολπῶν κατὰ τὰ π[ά]|τρια ἔθη; ibid. 35; *LSAM* 78 B,20; Ditt. *Syll.*[3] 783 (*c.*27 BC) l. 43 τοὺc μὲν θεοὺc ἐθρήcκευcεν εὐcεβῶc, τοὺc δ' ἀνθρώπουc εὐώχηcε πανδήμωc; *OGI* 168 (115 BC) l. 11 εὐωχηθεὶc ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἡραίου (of funeral banquets), cf. Ditt. *Syll.*[3] 1232 (AD 58–9) l. 10 ὥcτε τὰc] γενηcομ[ένας ἀεὶ] ἐξ αὐτῆc προcόδουc εἴc τε ἀνα[cκευὴ]ν τοῦ μ[νημείου καὶ] εὐωχίαν εἶναι; *IEph* 3216 = R. Meriç *et al.*, *Die Inschriften von Ephesus*, vii/1 (Inschriften griechischer Städte von Kleinasien, 17/1; Bonn, 1981), 159 τούτου κήδονται οἱ ἐν Ἐφέcῳ ἐργάται προπυλεῖται πρὸc τῷ Ποcειδῶνι . . . ποιήcουcιν δὲ τὴν εὐωχίαν μη(νὸc) Ποc(ειδεῶνοc) η' ἀπι(όντοc); of the feasts of the colleges, *thiasoi*, and *eranoi*: *OGI* 737 (2nd c. BC) ll. 18–19 ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοῦ πολιτεύματοc εὐωχιῶν cτεφανοῦcθαι (an order made by Idumaean mercenaries stationed at Memphis); or of feasts in the mysteries: Strabo 16.20 πανήγυριc δ' ἐνταῦθα (sc. at Ephesus) cυντελεῖται κατ' ἔτοc, ἔθει δέ τινι οἱ νέοι φιλοκαλοῦcι μάλιcτα περὶ τὰc ἐνταῦθα εὐωχίαc λαμπρυνόμενοι. τότε δὲ καὶ τῶν Κουρήτων ἀρχεῖον cυνάγει cυμπόcια καί τινας μυcτικὰc θυcίαc ἐπιτελεῖ; *Brit. Mus. Inscr.* 483. 9 (under Commodus, 180–92) μὴ ἔλαττον ἀναλίcκειν εἰc τὴν εὐωχίαν; l. 15 ἐπὶ ταῖc ὁμοίαιc εὐωχίαιc; l. 10 ἀνάλωμα τοῦ δείπνου (cf. l. 2 of the mysteries: πάντα περί τε μυcτηρίων καὶ θυcιῶν); see also the inscription of Antiochus I of Commagene, *Inscr. gr. lat. Syrie* l. 91 = Norden 1958, i. 143 sect. 12. For εὐφροcύνη in an almost identical sense see the example in Panamara in Caria, *BCH* 51 (1927), 73 καλῶ πρὸc τὸν θεὸν ὑμᾶc καὶ παρακαλῶ καὶ τοὺc ἐν τῇ πόλι τῆc παρ' αὐτῷ μετέχιν εὐφροcύνηc (= an invitation to the table of the god), πάντας ἀνθρώπουc ὁ θεὸc ἐπὶ τὴν ἑcτίαcιν καλεῖ καὶ κοινὴν καὶ ἰcότιμον παρέχι τράπεζαν τοῖc ὁποθενοῦν ἀφικνουμένοιc; Mark the Deacon, *Vit. Porph.* 92 ἐποίηcεν εὐφροcύνην, and cf. of the Epicureans: Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1097E (Epic. fr. 190 Us.) τὸ δὲ ἐκ περιττοῦ πρὸc εὐπαθείαc ἐπαίρεcθαι ναυτῶν δίκην Ἀφροδίcια ἀγόντων καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν, ὅτι (Metrod. fr. 46 Körte) "νοcῶν νόcον ἀcκίτην τινὰc ἑcτιάceιc φίλων cυνῆγε καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνει τῆc προcαγωγῆc τοῦ ὑγροῦ τῷ ὕδρωπι καὶ τῶν ἐcχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ δακρύων ἰδιοτρόπῳ ἡδονῇ·" ταῦτ' οὐδεὶc ἂν ὑγιαίνων εὐφροcύναc ἀληθεῖc ἢ χαρὰc ὀνομάceιεν, 'But for a man to go out of his way to work up an excitement about small comforts, like sailors celebrating a feast of Aphrodite, and to be proud because (Metrod. fr. 46 Körte) "when suffering from the dropsy he invited friends to a number of common meals and in spite of the disease did not refuse to take liquid, and was softened, recalling Neocles' last words, by the curious pleasure that is mingled with tears"—no one would call this the "mental joy" or "delight" of men in their sound mind' (text and translation Einarson and De Lacy 1967).

821–2 ὅρκοις καὶ | θεῶν ἐπιρρήσειν: on oaths in general, see especially Hirzel, *Der Eid* (Leipzig, 1902); Burkert 1985*a*, 250–4; on Epicureans: Hirzel (op. cit.) 102 with n. 3, 207 n. 1. Epicurean use of oaths is criticized by Dionysius Episc. ap. Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 14. 27, 10, p. 783 B (Epic. fr. 389, quoted below on 825–8), quoting specific instances of *μὰ Δία, νὴ Δία*, and *πρὸς τῶν θεῶν* (so his testimony is very likely to be independent of Cicero and the rhetorical tradition). Cf. Cicero to the Epicurean Trebatius (*Ad fam.* 7. 12. 2) *quomodo autem tibi placebit Iovem Lapidem iurare, cum scias Iovem iratum esse nemini posse?* Hirzel, comparing *νὴ τὸν Ἡρακλέα* in Diog. Oen. fr. 138 Smith col. 1,2 argues (op. cit.) 102 n. 3 that for the Epicureans the use of oaths is not likely to have had much more religious significance than *mehercle* und *hercle* to the Romans, a claim that is challenged at least by Philodemus' testimony in the present passage.

In answer to Cicero's question ('what can it possibly mean for an Epicurean to swear by the gods?'), it may be said that for an Epicurean the swearing of an oath exhibits or even creates a disposition, *διάθεσις*, in one's soul to fulfil it—a disposition which according to Epicurean theology is closely connected, if not coextensive, with the gods by which one swears. Epicurus fr. 388 Us. (quoted above on 737–8) calls for a scrupulous and careful use of oaths and imprecations. The Epicurean position on oaths will have been not unlike that of the early Stoa, e.g. Cleanthes, according to which the appropriateness (or validity) of an oath depends upon the sincerity of the swearer's intention to fulfil it (*SVF* i. 581). Later Stoics, in particular Chrysippus, modified this position, emphasizing the logical and epistemological difficulties connected with oaths, curses, prayers, and the like (especially with regard to propositions about future time): see *SVF* ii. 197, and J. D. G. Evans, 'The Old Stoa on the Truth-Value of Oaths', *Proc. of the Cambr. Philol. Soc.*[2] 20 (1974), 44–7. But for Epicurus, whose rejection of *μαντική* was necessitated in part by his denial of bivalence in future contingency, an oath (or command or prayer) has a special status in so far as it deals with future time (a precursor of Austin's theory of illocutionary acts). In order to avoid universal necessitation in unbroken chains of physical and logical causation, according to Epicurus, certain future-tense locutions are exempt from the principle of bivalence (according to which every proposition must be true or false): otherwise 'it will be necessary for Hermarchus to be alive tomorrow, or for him not to be alive. But there is no such necessity in the nature of things' (Cic. *Acad.* 2. 97 = Epic. fr. 376 Us., *HPh* 20 I). For Epicurus an oath e.g. in the form 'may the gods be (for some future period) propitious' may, depending on the disposition of the swearer, 'be felicitous' regardless of its literal fulfilment and without its contrary necessarily being a false statement (a view which in some respects anticipates modern theories of the pragmatics of speech). Already Hermarchus (ap. Procl. *Comment. in Plat. Tim.* 66 DE Diehl = fr. 37 Krohn,

48 Longo) intimates difficulties, if such statements are to be held to normal canons of logic. There Hermarchus is supposed to have said: if we have need of a prayer, we shall have need of another prayer to ensure the fulfilment of the first prayer, and so on. Similarly Hermarchus (Philod. *Rhet.* 2 pp. 135–45 Longo, especially col. 47,1–3 = Hermarchus fr. 36 Longo) denies the validity of oaths in courtroom rhetoric. For they do not in fact provide a guarantee, *πίστις* of their fulfilment. The oath exhibits an (undetermined, non-necessary) volitional state in the process ('downward causation') of becoming a determining physical reality. On the problem see the relevant texts at *HPh* 1.20 E 1, H–I for Epicurus (with pp. 111–12: 'Epicurus . . . saw physical and logical determinism as two aspects of a single thesis'); ibid. 38 E (with p. 23) on Stoics, where the example is prophecy.

823 ἐδοκίμαζον: according to Diels 1916*a*, 894 (= 296) 'man erwartet *ἐδοκίμαζεν*'. But Philodemus has generalized the point to include the later Epicureans as well, possibly in the light of his own practice in this respect, and apologizes (824–5 *γελοῖον ὑπομι|μνήσκειν*) for belaboring the point. In deference to Diels, however, it is true that he seems to have adduced examples of oaths and imprecations from Epicurus alone.

825–8 ἀναμέσ|του τῆς πραγματείας τῶν τοιούτων | οὔσης: this claim can be objectively verified from the ancient testimony and surviving fragments: in Epicurus' works see e.g. the oath *νὴ τοὺς θεούς* at *De nat.* lib. inc. fr. 37.5,2 Arr.²; fr. 196 Us. (cf. Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1101 A, fr. 120 Us., 46 Arr.²). Epicurus otherwise swears only by Zeus (see below, 834–7, 895), though cf. Diog. Oen. fr. 138 Smith col. 1,2 *νὴ τὸν Ἡρακλέα*. Such invocations were especially frequent in his work (Dionysius Episc. ap. Eus. *Praep. ev.* 14. 27,10 = Epic. fr. 389 Us. *κατ' ἐκείνων τῶν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς* [sc. *θεῶν*] *ὅρκους τε καὶ ὁρκισμοὺς μυρίους τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ βιβλίοις ἐγγράφει ὀμνύς τε συνεχῶς μὰ Δία καὶ νὴ Δία, ἐξορκῶν τε τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας καὶ πρὸς οὓς διαλέγοιτο πρὸς τῶν θεῶν κτλ.*). M. Capasso and T. Dorandi, *CEπ* 9 (1979), 40–1 analyse Epicurus' oaths in their rhetorical and argumentative contexts and conclude that such exclamations are indicative of extreme agitation in argument, usually occasioned by polemic against adversaries (*De nat.* 14 fr. 29. 18,13 Arr.²; *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 11,5 *ἀλλ[ὰ] μὰ Δία τῶμ μὲν . . . οὐκ ἂν φήσαι|μ[εν*; fr. 120,20 Us. = 46,5 Arr.²), or by the importance of the argument being treated (*De nat.* lib. inc. fr. 37.5,2; fr. 114,25 Arr.²), or by a particular emotion which is supposed to provide proof (fr. 72,12 Arr.², 196,3 Us. = 81,5–6 Arr.²), or by the fact that Epicurus is speaking directly of himself (fr. 60,5 Arr.²). On the variation in tone and function see further Arr.² pp. 680–1; *MGrHerc* 201; Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.vv. *Ζεύς, μά, νή*; Diels 1916*a*, 893 (= 295) with nn. 3–4; Festugière 1968, 91 n. 6. In the writings of the *kathegemones* and Epicurean works other than those which remained at Herculaneum, the occurrence of oaths is harder to trace, since most have

perished. See, however, *P. Oxy.* II 215 (by an Epicurean author) col. 1,5, 33: *νὴ Δία*. For Philodemus see *MGrHerc* 220–1 and Capasso–Dorandi 1979, 41, who suggest that in Philodemus the expression *πρὸς θεῶν* is always indicative of particular tension in polemic against adversaries (*Rhet.* i. 107,5; ii. 86,20); exceptions may be made for instances like the present one in which Philodemus is quoting Epicurus himself: e.g. Philod. *Pragm.* 26,5 Spina (*CErc* 7 (1977), 60 = Epic. fr. 60 Arr.²); ibid. col. 32,5–6 (p. 63 Spina = Epic. fr. 196 Us., 81 Arr.²); see also Crönert, *Hermes*, 38 (1903), 368 = 1975, 166 n. 20. A related linguistic phenomenon is the strange acclamation in Epicurus' letter to his girlfriend Leontion (fr. 143 Us.) *Παιὰν ἄναξ, φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἷου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντας σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον*, which Ian Rutherford informs me is unparalleled, apart from the identical one from him addressed to the Syrian Mithres, fr. 148 Us. (both at D.L. 10. 5—from the opening of the letters, as though the invocation of a hymn invoking Apollo?).

831–2 πε̣[ίc]ιτειc φυλάττειν: see on 478 and cf. 770–1.

836–7 οὐ γράφων | "ναὶ τ[ὼ] ὄζω{ι}" καὶ "τί γὰρ;": apposite is the comment of Festugière 1968, 92 n. 1: 'Comme les langues modernes le nom de Dieu (*Parbleu, morbleu, Great Scott!*), le grec évitait le nom de Zeus dans les jurons: d'où le *μὰ τὸν κύνα* socratique (Burnet ad Plat. *Apol.* 22 A 1). Epicure blâme ici cette retenue (*οὐ γράφων*), mais exige qu'on prenne avec sérieux l'appel au témoignage de la divinité.' Cf. also Plat. *Gorg.* 489 E 2 *μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον*, 'a playful distortion of *μὰ τὸν Ζῆνα*' (Dodds ad loc.); ibid. 481 B 5 *μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν*, with Dodds's note ad loc.; in general *contra*: S. Pulleyn, *CQ*² 44 (1994), 17–25. One explanation of this phenomenon is that the *nomina* of divinities are *sacra*, and to speak them even in an oath is to profane them. Hence the tendency in most languages to distort them euphemistically, as was evident not only in Socrates' speech but in popular speech in general. Allegedly related is the explanation is that the common name of the divinity is avoided out of fear of danger from contact with the divinity, as a potential source of *miasma*, or because it is believed that certain divinities respond only when invoked with a special or secret name, known only to a select few, and of which such expressions as *μὰ τὸν κύνα* are probably perversions or parodies or believed to be such (compare Socrates' association of *μὰ τὸν κύνα* with Egyptian *esoterica* at Plat. *Gorg.* 481 B 5).

At *Aves* 521 Aristophanes offers a different motive (or rationalization) for the avoidance (I owe the reference to Dr Holford-Strevens): *Λάμπων δ' ὄμνυς' ἔτι καὶ νυνὶ τὸν χῆν', ὅταν ἐξαπατᾷ τι* (instead of *μὰ τὸν Ζῆνα*). 'Lampon' avoids punishment from the gods for forswearing his oath when he cheats you by substituting *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* for the god's name the name of an animal (according to the scholia, an animal used in *μαντεία*). The line pokes fun not only at 'Lampon' (who appears in conjunction with Diopeithes at 998), and the *χρησμολόγος* later in the play (cf. Hierocles in *Pax*), but

also at Socrates (who swore *μὰ τὸν κύνα*: Plat. *Phaed.* 98 E; Charm. 172 E; cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 83).

So also *μὰ τὴν ἀμυγδαλῆν* (Eupol. fr. 79 K.–A.), *μὰ τὰc κράμβαc* (Eupol. fr. 84 K.–A.; Teleclid. 27 Kock), and even *μὰ τὸν* (*Ran.* 1374) or just *νή* without the name of a god (Gomme and Sandbach on *Dysk.* 510) in aposiopesis to add to the ludicrousness. Contemporary fashion and fastidiousness in asseveration are mocked in the plot of Cratinus' *Cheirones*: there was an ancient time when the 'greatest oath among men' was to swear 'by the dog'. But later men abandoned this practice, introducing first oaths by the goose, then by gods (Cratinus fr. 249 K.–A. *οἵc ἦν μέγιcτοc ὅρκοc / †ἅπαντι λόγῳ† κύων, ἔπειτα χήν· θεοὺc δ' ἐcίγων*). In the play, Rhadamanthus sets things straight. (As Leeuwen notes on Aristoph. *Av.* 521: 'Lampo vero homo divinus in antiquo more permansisse dicitur—ut iocandi materies inde possit duci.')

To this the Epicureans stridently object, not because they want the person who forswears an oath to be punished by the gods he swears by, but because it conflicts with their theory of natural origin of language, and implies a belief in gods who in any case could in fact swayed or manipulated by humans (see e.g. above, 740–3, 756–8). At the same time they did not condemn oaths in general, viewing them instead as natural linguistic acts with a sound psychological basis and hence on their theory with some connection with the divine (for the significance of oaths sworn by Epicureans, see above on 821–2).

While the general sense and import of Philodemus' point here is clear, attempts to discern the exact form of the euphemistic oath that Epicurus did not swear (836 *οὐ γράφων*) preserved in this line have met with less than complete success. All previous supplements have been based solely on HV^2 II's reading NAIT[..]OΞΩI. They include *ναὶ τ[ὴν Λ]οξώ{ι}* (*spatio longius*, apart from being obscure to any of Epicurus' readers); *ναὶ τ[ὼ φ]οξώ{ι}* (Gomperz 1866, 104: 'by the two smashed pots' adding: 'kann die burleske, nach der Analogie von *ναὶ τὼ cιώ* gebildete, Schwurformel eine Gegners gewesen sein'); *ναὶ—τ[ί λ]ἐξω{ι}* Diels 1916*a*, 894 (= 296), adding: 'Man könnte in Erinnerung an Epicharmus *ναὶ μὰ τὰν κράμβαν* (fr. 25 K[aibel]), an Zenons *κάππαριν* (Athen. IX 370 C), an den Eid des Rhadamanthys bei der Platane (*Σ* Plat. Bekk. 331) versuchen *ναὶ τ[ὸν] ἰξὸν'*, and correctly noting: 'aber es handelt sich hier nicht um den Ersatz, sondern um das Verschweigen des Zeusnamens'.

One of the Neapolitan apographs (N^2, elsewhere mostly a copy of N^1), however, preserves here a different reading from N^1, HV^2 II, namely: NAIT[$_{.(.)}$]OZΩI, apparently a correction of N^1's reading NAIT[..]OΞΩI; on such alterations in the apographs, see Introd. §2(*h*). On this basis of NAIT[$_{.(.)}$]OZΩI, the reading of N^2 (not previously known), A. Henrichs suggests to me *ναὶ τ[ὼ{ι}] ὄζω{ι}*, i.e. *νὴ τὼ ὄζω*, 'by the twin shoots'. Cf.

Eurip. *Hec.* 123–5 *τὼ Θησείδα δ', / ὄζω Ἀθηνῶν, δισσῶν μύθων / ῥήτορες ἦσαν*, where the 'twin scions' are not the Dioscuri but Theseus' sons Acamas and Demophon, who also led the Athenians at *Iliu persis*, *EGF* F4 = *PEG* 6, thus giving the impression of a specifically Athenian allusion (cf. C. Collard, *Euripides, Hecuba* (Warminster, 1991), 137: on the Brygos-painter's cup Louvre G.152 they are shown leading Polyxena away to sacrifice: Beazley *ARV*² 369. 1), whereas the Tyndarid Dioscuri were Laconian. But by a similar motif the Dioscuri also frequently appear in epiphany, especially on the battlefield, in response to appeals for divine aid (see T. Lorenz, 'Die Epiphanie der Dioskuren', in *Kotinos: Festschrift für Erika Simon*, ed. H. Froning *et al.* (Mainz am Rhein, 1992), 114–22). In fact the oath *νὴ τὼ θεώ* is similarly ambiguous. When a Spartan swears *ναὶ τὼ σιώ*, the reference is to the Dioscuri; when a Boeotian swears *νεὶ τὼ θιώ* as at Aristoph. *Ach.* 405, it is to Amphion and Zethus; but Attic *νὴ τὼ θεώ* is a woman's oath (Men. *Epitr.* 543, *Georg.* 24) referring to Demeter and Persephone (i.e. *Φερρέφαττα*): see Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1396; cf. *Eccl.* 155–9, where the point is that a woman pretending to be a man ought not to have sworn *νὴ τὼ θεώ*. Hence Philodemus' contention here is that an oath sworn by the 'twin shoots' is ambiguous, a circumlocution to avoid naming any specific divinity. This form of oath was accordingly avoided by Epicurus, in favour of the straightforward *νὴ Δία* 'by Zeus' (I am grateful to Dr Holford-Strevens for numerous clarifications).

ὄζος in this sense is already Homeric (*Il.* 2. 540; for the metaphor: *Od.* 14. 175 *τὸν ἐπεὶ θρέψαν θεοὶ ἔρνεϊ ἶσον*). With *ναὶ τὼ ὄζω* here may be compared Achilles' famous oath at *Il.* 1. 235 *ναὶ μὰ τόδε σκῆπτρον, τὸ μὲν οὔποτε φύλλα καὶ ὄζους φύσει*, where part of the oath is sworn by (i.e. on) *οἱ ὄζοι*. (The Attic ephebes similarly swore their oath by the shoots of the olive, also called to witness by Demeter at *Hymn. Cer.* 23.) The Iliadic heroes commonly swear by this *σκῆπτρον* (7. 412, 10. 328, cf. 9. 568, 10. 461), the origin of which Achilles invokes in his oath at 1. 235. Implicit in the present passage could be an Epicurean criticism of the practice of euphemism, as a distortion of natural linguistic usage, or, in this case, of Euripides or the Homeric poet (he should have made Achilles swear his oath by an acknowledged god; cf. *Rhet. Gr.* iii. 315,2; vii. 883,8 Walz), rather than an attack upon a philosophic predecessor (like Socrates) as commentators have assumed (so Gomperz 1866, 104 quoted above; Diels 1916*a*, 894 (= 296): 'Welchen vorsichtigen Philosophen Epikur hier tadelt, ist unbekannt').

837 καὶ "τί γαρ;": similarly in affirmation, 'of course', no doubt', 'it must be so': LSJ s.v. *γάρ* I.4; cf. Lat. *quid enim?*

838–40 Κωλώτηι | [πάντω]ν τε ὅρκων καὶ | [πάσης] θε[[ν]]ολογίας: the mechanics of the correction are discussed above, Introd. §2(*h*). Cf. *θεολογίας* in this sense below, 968. For *θεολογία* as 'speaking about the gods' in the form of *hieroi logoi* and myths, rather than the later sense of systematic

theology see W. Burkert, *Ancient Mystery Cults* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987), 70 with n. 17, 78, 87–8, citing V. Goldschmidt, 'Theologia', *REG* 63 (1950), 20–42; Jaeger 1947; also A. J. Festugière, *Études de religion grecque et hellénistique* (Paris, 1972), 13–63, esp. 28–30. The word *θεολογία* itself first occurs in Plato, *Republic* 379 A. According to Chrysippus *SVF* ii. 42 (p. 17) the essence of *τελεταί* was the 'transmission of a *logos* about the gods', that is '*theologia*'.

840–1 *Order of Columns.* This is an unusual instance of a column in one of the two main sequences (here from **1077**) following directly on from the preceding column in that sequence (rather than alternating with a column from the other sequence). This is easily explained on the assumption that the *disegnatore* faced a layer of papyrus which contained the right-hand side of one column followed by the left-hand side of the following column on the same surface of papyrus. These two columns he copied successively as separate fragments and assigned separate (ascending) fragment numbers to each, as was the rule throughout the **1077//1098** sequences: cf. col. 46, the fragmentary column on the left of the Oxonian *disegno* that was not reproduced by the *disegnatore* of *N*, though both columns appear on the same apograph in *O*. So also col. 57 was not reproduced by the *disegnatore* of *N* when he copied the preceding col. 56, though both columns appeared on the same papyrus layer, as can be seen from the extant *scorza*. For another example of this phenomenon see the link between cols. 38 and 39. The apographs of *O* 1077 frr. 1–3 are not the only ones on which two successive columns in *De pietate* appear on the same *disegno*: see e.g. **242** (below, cols. 69–70, 73–4) N^1 1077 frr. 4–5, 6–7, 10–11; for those of **433**, **1088**, and **1428** see vol. ii.

Col. 30

Epicurean engagement in cult (*d*), continued: oaths. Citation of two letters of Epicurus: one enjoining to his followers observance of sacred institutions, especially oaths and agreements in connection with communal dining in the Epicurean community. Second: citation of Epicurus' letter *To Polyaenus*, with injunctions to observe the Anthesteria and honour its gods.

840–1 ἐπὶ || δὲ Χαρί[νου: the letter written *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου* is also mentioned at Philod. *De div.* col. 34–5, pp. 66–7 Tepedino (Dorandi 1990b, T 13–14) and *De Epic. P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 5, 1–2 p. 65 Vogliano—a passage in which *ἀφροδίσια* are mentioned (see the reconstruction by Tepedino, *CErc* 8 (1978), 80–1). It emerges from the texts in Tepedino, op. cit. 80–1 (see also the list of all Epicurean documents dated by Athenian archons compiled by Clay 1982, 25–6) that in all these passages it is Polyaenus who is addressed; this confirms the testimony of Seneca, who tells us that the famous letter was addressed to Polyaenus (*Ep.* 18. 9 = Epic. fr. 158 Us. *hoc certe in iis* (Reynolds following Rossbach, *his* MSS) *epistulis ait, quas scripsit Charino*

magistratu ad Polyaenum, so also Theon, *Progymn.* 169 (ii. 71,15 Spengel) = Epic. fr. 105 Us., 17 Arr.², which addresses Polyaenus but does not mention the archon-year; cf. below, 865–6, 932 with 938–9), and that it concerned expenditure on various aspects of life. According to Seneca, Epicurus in it told Polyaenus that less than an obol a day was necessary to live, though Metrodorus, who had not progressed so far in philosophy, might require a whole obol. The letter is also cited below, 937–45. Citations of letters *To Polyaenus* also occur above, 578 and below at 865–70, possibly the same as the letter written *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου*, since no other identifiably different letter *To Polyaenus* is known (though see on 837–9). For the alternative forms of the title see below on 938–9. For the archon-year (291/0) see Dorandi 1990*b*, T 15; cf. Clay 1982, 20, 25. For the dating of Epicurus' letters by Athenian archons see above on 797–9 and below on 938–9.

Usener 1887, 132–4 and A. Momigliano, 'Nuovi testi storici', *RivFC*² 13 (1935), 302–16 at 303 identified this Charinus as the earlier Athenian archon Kairimos of 308/7, thus placing this letter before Epicurus' move to Athens in 306. But another archon of this name appeared in an inscription from the Athenian Agora (I 6703) that Meritt dates to 291/0: see 'Greek Inscriptions', *Hesperia*, 26 (1957), 53–4 no. 10; see also A. Wilhelm, *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts*, 5 (1902), 136 n. 7; A. C. Johnson, *CPh* 9 (1914), 256. We otherwise have no dated letters from Epicurus before 292/1 (Dorandi 1990*b*, T 10–12; cf. his T 8–9, from 296/5 and 294/3 but too fragmentary to be certain they refer to letters by Epicurus); cf. the similarly dated *subscriptiones* at the conclusions of Epic. *De nat.* books 15 and 28. The archon-dates were almost certainly not original with the letters or the books of *De nat.* themselves—a phenomenon that would be unparalleled (see below)—but rather reconstructed by a later second-century BC scholar in compiling a *syntaxis* documenting the history of the school. Who exactly was responsible for the dates is unknown. But of such activity we have remains on papyri from Herculaneum, namely the work of one Philonides (see Introd. § 2(*h*)), a second-century BC Epicurean philosopher resident at the Seleucid court at Antioch, who is known to have edited and produced epitomes of the letters of Epicurus and the *kathegemones* for circulation there among the 'idle youth'.

Judged from the extant private letters from antiquity, especially the extensive personal correspondence preserved on papyri from Egypt, it is extremely rare for private, personal letters to bear dates of any kind, and when they do it is only day and month. As a result, it is virtually impossible for us to date them precisely, except from internal and palaeographical indications, in contrast to official or registered private documents which regularly bear dates by consular formulae, regnal years, imperial titulature, and the like. (In Cicero's correspondence notice in the body or close of the letter of the day and month when it was despatched is frequent enough,

though for some one has to infer the date from the letter's content, as Cicero says he did for the letter of Atticus' to which he responds in *Ad Att.* 3. 23(1), noting that for Atticus the omission of the date was *contra consuetudinem*, which implies at least that it might not be a universal practice. See further Paolo Cugusi, *Evoluzione e forme dell'epistolografia latina* (Rome, 1983), 57 and n. 64, a reference I owe to Dr Holford-Strevens.) Clay 1982 argues that Epicurus' writings were assigned Athenian archon-dates when they were, as he argues, deposited in the Metroon at Athens along with Epicurus' will (D.L. 10. 16 *ἀναγεγραμμένην*, which as he points out (p. 23), is also used in the description of Epicurus' earlier writings as *ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν* at *Ad Herod.* 35. 1–2 and of the book *Περὶ ἀμφιβολίας* at *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 14,27 Arr.²; see ibid. n. 27 for more on the terminology for official registration and recording of documents).

841–2 καὶ ἐπὶ] | Διοτίμ[ου: for the archon-date (284/5) see Dorandi 1990*b* on T 22–3; cf. Usener, *RhM*² 34 (1879), 414–15; G. F. Unger, *Philologus*, 38 (1895), 446–7; Clay 1982, 20, 26 (where the present text should be added to the entry for Diotimos). The letter written *ἐπὶ Διοτίμου* is also cited at Philod. *Pragm.* col. 24,3–6 Spina (Epic. fr. 168 Us.) *τὸ Πρὸς τοὺς ἀσχ[όλο]υς αὐ|τῶι καὶ μνημονεύ[ει] κατὰ Δι[ό]τιμο[ν] Ἐπίκουρος ἄρχ[ο]ντα τοῦ | βιβλ[ίου] Φυρσῶνι γο[ῦν] γράφων* 'his work *To Those who are Occupied* and in the archonship of Diotimus Epicurus makes mention of the book (i.e. the one entitled *To Those who are Occupied*), writing to Phyrson . . .'. (For the dating formula in *κατὰ* + acc., instead of *ἐπὶ* + gen., see Dorandi 1980, 172 n. 62; 1991*a*, 241) This valuable testimony thus establishes that the present letter, written in 285/4, was addressed to Phyrson, and was thus a different, later letter to him from Epicurus than the one cited above, 797, written in 289/8.

Philodemus introduces the two letters together: first the letter written in Charinus' archonship (= *To Polyaenus*), then notes that the same subject was discussed in the letter written in Diotimus' archonship (= *To Phyrson* 2). In the lines that follow, Philodemus probably treats the two in chiastic order: thus 843–65 probably derive from the letter written *ἐπὶ Διοτίμου* (= *To Phyrson* 2); then at 865–70 Philodemus turns back to the material addressed to Polyaenus (865 *ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ πρὸς Πο]|λύαινον* = the letter written *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου*). Presumably he introduces them together rather than separately for purposes of variation or, more likely, because they dealt with similar subject matter.

843–4 τὴν κα[θ' ἱερᾶς τρα]|πέζης [συνθήκην: for the *τράπεζα ἱερά*, a table dedicated to the gods at feasts, on which meats and offerings were set out see *IG* I³ 255.6; *LSCG* 1 A,19–23, 11 A,4, etc.; *LSAM* 36,26–7 (Priene, ii BC) *παρατιθε]|μένων καὶ τραπεζῶν τῶν κοσμουμένων*; 1933,2; Dinarch. 3. 2; *P. Cair. Zen.* 4. 59707,15–16 *καθαρῶν ἐπὶ τράπεζαν τοῖς κεκλημένοις εἰς τὰ Βασίλεια*; ibid. 4. 59708,2 (*Zenon Papyri*, ed. C. C. Edgar, iii BC) *ἐπὶ τράπε-*

ζαν ἱερά[ν; ibid. 4. 59569,24 ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν τῶν Διοσκόρων; 1 Cor. 10: 21 τράπεζα Κυρίου, τράπεζα δαιμονίων; S. Dow and D. H. Hill, 'The Greek Cult Table', *AJA* 69 (1965), 103–14 with illustrations. Normally κατά + genitive yields 'against'. Because oaths derived originally from imprecations 'against' offending individuals or divinities, κατά with the genitive commonly denotes the object by which the pledge is sworn: see Smyth § 1690c citing Thuc. 5. 47 ὀμνύντων τὸν ὅρκον κατὰ ἱερῶν τελείων, and cf. Kühner–Blass i. 476; Mayser ii/2. 930, cf. 255. 45. (It remains possible, of course, to restore e.g. an adjective in 843 with Tepedino: τὴν κα[θαρᾶς τρα]|πέζης.)

Plut. *De lat. vivendo* 1129 A attests that the Epicureans were known for the use of τράπεζαι and associated them with their sacred celebrations in honour of dead members of the school, especially Epicurus' family: τί γὰρ αἱ κοιναὶ τράπεζαι; τί δὲ αἱ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ καλῶν σύνοδοι; τί δὲ αἱ μυριάδες στίχων ἐπὶ Μητρόδωρον, ἐπὶ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἐπὶ Χαιρέδημον γραφόμεναι καὶ συνταττόμεναι φιλοπόνως ἵνα μηδὲ ἀποθανόντες λάθωσιν; In the light of Plutarch's reference to κοιναὶ τράπεζαι, we might restore κα[τὰ κοινῆς τρα]|πέζης here at 843–4. Aelian (fr. 39 = Epic. fr. 436 Us.) also mentions 'serving tables' (τράπεζαι) of marble erected at Epicurus' tomb (on which see Clay 1986, 22, 26).

Such τράπεζαι were important accessories of the cults of heroes in Greece: see W. S. Ferguson, 'The Attic Orgeones', *HThR* 37 (1944), 80–1 with n. 27; Clay 1986, 26–7. They were especially associated with the consumed inner parts of animal sacrifices (ἐναγίσματα) and with communal dining. Thus it can be established that the Epicureans had no aversion to animal sacrifice and consumption of the sacrificial victim (cf. the Peripatetic Theophrastus on this point, for which see F 584 A at Porph. *De abst.* 2. 1–34; Bernays 1866; Obbink 1988*b*), a fact which is at least consistent with the documented portrayal of stereotyped Epicureans as μάγειροι, 'cooks', 'sacrificers' in Attic comedy (for which see below on 1530–2). For the Epicureans the image will have had social significance as well. For the common meals defined their civic status as a philosophical *thiasos*. Cf. Isnardi 1974, 138 n. 5: 'La "sacra mensa" è la scuola filosofica intesa come tiaso filosofico-religioso.'

[συνθήκην] is of course only a guess here. Such covenants or agreements are said to figure in the commemoration of the social compact that creates justice in the civilized community: see *KD* 32 συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι; ibid. 33 οὐκ ἦν τι καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς μετ' ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς . . . συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι. Alternatively we could restore here τὴν κα[θ' ἱερᾶς τρα]|πέζης [κοινωνίαν μὴ] | παραβαί[νειν; for Epicurean κοινωνία see 557 with commentary. Both συνθήκη and κοινωνία (along with τράπεζαι, oaths, contracts, and libations) recur in the list of practices and institutions that arose with the introduction of justice in cultural history, as related below, 1936–41, cf. 2273–86.

845 παραβαί[νειν: cf. above, 726–9 *θεωρίαν ὡ[c] | [τὰ] διαδεδ[ο]μένα | [ἱερ]ὰ παραβαίνον|[τας* with the parallels listed in the commentary ad loc. For its use of the transgression of oaths see e.g. Aristoph. *Av.* 331, 332, cf. Thuc. 1.78, Lys. 9.15, Demosth. 17.12; cf. Aristoph. *Av.* 461, Thuc. 1.123 *τὰc cπονδὰc παραβαίνειν.*

845–64 The remains are too exiguous to allow reconstruction with anything like certainty. Philippson's reconstruction of this column (1921, 372), uncharacteristically close to the apograph and the required line-lengths, may be examined in full for comparison:

30	δὲ Χαρί[νου καὶ ἐπὶ	1077 11	
	Διοτίμ[ου παραινεῖ		
	τὴν κα[θ' ἱερᾶc τρα-		
	πέζης [cυνθήκην μὴ		
845	παραβαί[νειν· καὶ	(5)	
	μὴν τί [θύcει θεοῖc		
	πολλὰ [ὁ cοφὸc εὐω-		
	χήcει δὲ [καλῶν οἴ-		
	νων κα[ὶ ἡδειῶν		
850	ὀcμῶν [ὡc cυνβι-	(10)	
	ώτας; ἀλ[λὰ μὴν τῆι		ωταοαν[*N*
	μεγαλοφ[ροcύνηι καὶ		
	φιλοco[φίαι τούτοιc		
	ταὐτὸν [ἂν εὐφραῖ-		
855	νον τη[ρήcαι καὶ	(15)	
	τῶι θέλ[ειν τὴν θεῶν		
	μορφὴ[ν ζηλοῦν τῶι		ηρφη[*N*
	τ' ἔcecθα[ι αὐτῆι		
	τῆι κατ[αλήξει τῶν		
860	θεῶν ἐπ[ιθυμητὴc τού-	(20)	
	των καὶ δ[ιὰ τοῦ πεφη-		
	νέναι τ[ούτοιc καὶ		
	κατὰ τρ[όπουc εἶναι		
	ναι cύντ[ροφοc·		
865	ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ πρὸc Πο-	(25)	
	λύαινον [cυνεορταc-		
	τέα κἀν[θεcτήρι-		
	α· καὶ γ'ὰρ τῷ[ν θεῶν		
	ἐπιμνηcτέ[ον ὡc αἰ-		κε[*N*
870	τίων πολλῶν [ἀγαθῶν] ||	(30)	τονπολλων[*N*

Note, however, that the restorations at the beginnings of ll. 857 and 870 are impossible.

852 μεγαλοφ[ρ: cf. below, 1288–90: (*τὸ θεῖον*) *μεγαλό|φρονα καὶ μεγαλό|ψυχον*, with commentary there.

865–6 πρὸc Πο]λύαινον: for the letter to Polyaenus, written *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου*, see above on 840–1, also cited below, 937–45 where see commentary.

866–8 [cυνεορτας]|τέα κάν[θεστήρι]|α: cf. 807 *Χοῶν ἑορτὴν* [*cυν*]|*εορτάζων* (sc. Epicurus), where Epicurus attests his own celebration of the Choes, the second day of the Anthesteria (12 Anthesterion). For the Anthesteria in Hellenistic Athens see M. P. Nilsson, 'Die Anthesterien und die Aiora', *Eranos*, 15 (1915), 181–200; Burkert 1983, 237–42, 282; Hamilton 1992.

870–1 *Order of Columns.* We should expect a column from the 1098 sequence to come next, since cols. 28 and 29 both come from **1077**. Col. 31 may follow col. 30 directly, continuing the citation from Epic. *Ad Polyaenum*. But there is too little preserved at the bottom of 30 and the top of 31 to be certain about the link.

Col. 31

Epicurean participation in cult, continued. Citation of a work by Epicurus regarding formation of the idea of divine nature; (*e*) exhortations from the same work of Epicurus regarding sacrifice; maintenance of all religious customs in keeping with an accurate conception of the divine. (*f*) Approximation of one's lifestyle to that of Zeus. (*g*) Epicurus' *On Lifecourses* is cited concerning ritual obeisance (*προcκύνηcιc*).

878 ἐκτείνῳ: Philodemus employs this same idiom parenthetically below at 1280–1 (where see commentary) *ἵνα μὴ cυνγράμ*|[*μ*]*ατα παρατιθεὶc ἐ*|[*κ*]*τείνω*, apparently for foreshortening the argument, or proceeding directly to the point. For the sentence-initial *ἵνα μή* clause in an apology for digression see Plat. *Gorg.* 465 B 6 *ἵνα οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ*. Here it moves the exposition on Epicurus' participation in cult from indirect to direct quotation of Epicurus' own words. For its use with *λόγοc* (= discussion) see Philod. *Rhet.* i. 273,7 *ἀλλὰ τὸ μ*[*α*|*κρὸ*]*ν λόγον*; id. *liber inc. P. Herc. 1015* fr. 11,4–5 (new reading of F. Longo Auricchio, *privatim*) *ἀλλὰ πολ*[*ὺ* | *τὸ*]*ν λόγον ἐκτείνα*[*ντα*.

879 πάλιν: the adverb *πάλιν* alone is commonly employed by Philodemus as a transitional formula in the catalogue style of the *πραγματεῖαι*. Sometimes followed by *δέ*, it marks the end of one citation and the beginning of a new one, without introducing a new main verb or grammatical construction, especially in strings of direct quotations from the writings of the early school backing up the same point: see e.g. *Pragm.* col. 32,5 = Epic. fr. 102 Us.; Gomperz, *Hermes*, 5 (1871), 395.

880 θύωμεν: for Epicureans and sacrifice see above on 794–6, where sacrifice as an approved ritual measure is directly connected with festivals and feasting, in both public and private cult. Sacrifice by Epicureans is also grouped with oaths and prayer for critical mention by Plutarch, because he

considered them incompatible with atomism and an inanimate cosmos, or a divinity incapable of being placated (*Adv. Col.* 1112C, not in Us., Arr.², quoted above on 737–8), but acknowledging that the Epicureans did in fact employ them, according to Plutarch speciously and in name only, since he thought they conflicted with the Epicureans' own tenets. Similarly at *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102B (Epic. fr. 30 Us.) Plutarch reflects and mocks the Epicureans' own claims to have engaged in 'all forms of worship', sacrifice included, as though 'putting on a show out of fear of public opinion' at a major festival (the passage is worth quoting in full):

ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις οὐθὲν δεόμενος διὰ φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ· καὶ θύων μὲν ὡς μαγείρῳ παρέστηκε τῷ ἱερεῖ σφάττοντι, θύσας δὲ ἄπεισι λέγων τὸ Μενάνδρειον "ἔθυον οὐ προσέχουσιν οὐδέν μοι θεοῖς" (fr. 750 Körte)· *οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ φθονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἷς χαίρουσιν ἕτεροι πράττοντες, αὐτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας. . . . ἢ καὶ τοὺς δεισιδαίμονας οὐ χαίροντας ἀλλὰ φοβουμένους οἴονται θυσίαις καὶ τελεταῖς ὁμιλεῖν, μηθὲν ἐκείνων αὐτοὶ διαφέροντες, εἴ γε διὰ φόβον τὰ αὐτὰ δρῶσιν, οὐδ' ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μεταλαγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ μόνον δεδιότες καὶ ταραττόμενοι μὴ φανεροὶ γένωνται τοῖς πολλοῖς παραλογιζόμενοι καὶ φενακίζοντες· ἐφ' οὓς καὶ τὰ περὶ θεῶν καὶ ὁσιότητος αὐτοῖς βιβλία συντέτακται "ἑλικτὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πᾶν πέριξ"* (Eurip. *Andr.* 448, suggesting a Spartan *skutale*) *ἐξαμπεχομένοις καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένοις διὰ φόβον ἃς ἔχουσι δόξας.*

For out of fear of public opinion he (sc. the Epicurean) goes through a mummery of prayers and obeisances that he has no use for and pronounces words that run counter to his philosophy; when he sacrifices the priest at his side who immolates the victim is to him a butcher; and when it is over he goes away with Menander's words on his lips: 'I sacrificed to gods who heed me not' (fr. 750 Körte). For this is the comedy that Epicurus thinks we should play, and not spoil the pleasure of the multitude or make ourselves unpopular with them by showing dislike ourselves for what others delight in doing. . . . This is indeed why they imagine that the superstitious attend sacrifices and initiations, not because they like to but because they are afraid, here the Epicureans are themselves no better than they, since they do the same from fear and do not even get the measure of happy anticipation (i.e. of recompense from the gods) that the others have, but are merely scared and worried that this deception and fooling the public might be found out, with an eye to whom their books on the gods and on piety have been composed 'in twisted spirals, slanted and askew' (Eurip. *Andr.* 448), as in fear they cover up and conceal their real beliefs. (Text and translation Einarson and De Lacy 1967.)

The *ἐλπὶς χρηστή* forgone, according to Plutarch, by the Epicureans is verbally echoed in Philodemus' defence below, 2343–7 *τῆς ἀγαθῆς | τοίνυν ἐλπίδ[ος] | τοὺς εὐσεβεῖς ⟨τοῦτον⟩ τὸν | τρόπον ἀποστεροῦ|μεν;* 'Do we in this way deprive the pious of their fine hope?', which answers 1413–18 *καλὰς ἐλπίδας* (cf. 988–9 *τῶν ἀγα|[θῶν τὰς] ἐλπίδας*). On the Epicureans' *ἐπίληψις* (more than kissing) see below on 897–8. It may be noted in this connection that Epicureans occasionally appear satirized in Hellenistic comedy as

'cooks' or 'sacrificers' (*μάγειροι*), usually as pandering to the delicacies of the palate, sometimes in parody of philophical terms or concepts as well: for example in Damoxenus' *Σύντροφοι* ap. Athen. 3. 101 F–103 B = fr. 2 K.–A. the cook uses the word *καθήγιcα*, i.e. of sacrifice in private and family cult of the dead (as pointed out by Clay 1986, 18–19); cf. Athenion's *Cαμόθρᾳκεc* ap. Athen. 14. 659E–661 D = fr. 1 K.–A.; Menander fr. 750 Körte. The name of Epicurus appears in fr. 2 of Damoxenus' *Σύντροφοι*, fr. 3 K.–A. of his *Ἀνδροφόνος*, fr. 5 K.–A. of the *Cυνεξαπατῶν* of Bato, and in fr. 2 K.–A. of the *Φιλέταιροι* of Hegesippus; see below on 1528–31, with Acosta–Angeli 1988, 375–6. It is unclear whether the Epicurean *μάγειροι* are being satirized for their attitude towards sacrifice and religious feasting or towards pleasure in general (the two are not mutually exclusive). Pythagoreans are similarly singled out for sport in comedy, which as W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 198–201 notes, focuses both on their habits in dress, eating, etc., as well as on their views on the afterlife. But whereas Pythagoreans are portrayed in comedy in comedy as starvelings and beggars, the Epicureans appear as gluttons and gastronomical specialists.

881 *καί* may mark the abridgement here of the text of Epicurus' letter. The similarity of the two exhortations in the subjunctive, combined with the repetition of *καλῶc*, and the fact that *οὗ καθήκει* virtually = *κατὰ τοὺc νόμουc*, suggests that Philodemus may be omitting something (perhaps not much) before a restatement of the same point later in the letter.

οὗ [καθ]|ήκει: Castner 1982, 53 translates: '*where* it is customary', but the reference to time, marking the observance of important religious holidays or the calendrical celebrations of secular groups (as the Epicureans observed the *εἰκάδεc* and the birthdays of Epicurus and Metrodorus), rather than place (e.g. Epidaurus, Eleusis), seems more appropriate. *καθ*]|*ήκει* also refers to ethical appropriateness (cf. *καθῆκον*) especially to what is *οἰκεῖον* to an individual. See *De Epic. P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1, 21 in Clay 1986, 14 *καθή*]*κοντα*; *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,2–4 *ὅταν καθ*[*ή*]*κ*[*η* | *τ*]*ὸ τῆc φύcεωc, ὡc ἔλεγον,* | [*οἰ*]*κεῖον.*

884–9 μ[η]|θὲ[ν] ταῖc δόξαιc α[ὐ]|τοὺc . . . διαταράττοντὲ[c: 'in no way whatever disturbing ourselves with our views'. Cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 78 (quoted more fully below on 885–6) *τάραχον μηθέν*. In the present passage *μηθέν* (in place of *οὐθέν*) probably carries over the idea of prohibition, as though originally *μὴ διαταράττωμεν* (cf. 880 *θύωμεν*, 883 *πράττωμεν*); *μη*(*θέν*) here could also have conditional or contingent force: 'Let us sacrifice and do all things according to the laws, *as long as we in no way whatever* disturb ourselves with our views' about the gods. *ταῖc δόξαιc* must be either an instrumental or locative dative, controlling *ἐν τοῖc περὶ τῶν* in 886. In the usage of this author *δόξαι* does not necessarily denote *false* beliefs (i.e. does not = *κεναὶ δόξαι*, as it sometimes does), for we have

already been told at 758–61 that every wise man has δόξαι about the divine and 'believes that its nature is great and august', which implies that such δόξαι can also be true.

885–6 α[ὐ]|τούc: the reflexive pronoun, here = ἡμᾶc αὐτούc, so rightly Usener, followed by Diels, Festugière 1968, 89 ('sans nous laisser aucunement troubler'), Castner 1982, 53. The demonstrative pronoun α[ὐ]|τούc (sc. θεούc?) is printed by Bücheler, Gomperz, Philippson, and Clay 1986, 15 (Arr.²'s αὐτούc is a misprint for αὐτούc, as the translation 'turbarci' shows). If they were right, the logical antecedent of α[ὐ]|τούc would have to be either (1) the gods themselves (879 [θεοῖc], i.e. by holding faulty views of the gods, by believing that they will be annoyed if we do not worship, we should make the gods 'disturbed' in our conceptions of them), or (2) the laws (884 τοὺc νόμουc; cf. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2, 7–8). But either of these is less satisfactory as an object for διαταράττοντεc than 'ourselves' (we might have expected the middle here, but see *De nat.* 34 fr. 34.30,21–2 Arr.² cυνεχῶc ἂν ἑαυτὸν | ταράττοντα), since διαταράττω implies the notion of fear and expectation of harm, such as are experienced by persons, whether from mental anxiety or from the gods (for Epicurus the two amount to the same thing). 'Not disturbing the *gods*' (reading α[ὐ]|τούc) or '*laws*' might echo the language of traditional piety for the uninitiated, but it would make Epicurus say precisely what Philodemus does not want him to say: namely, 'not professing opinions that would get us in trouble with the gods' (who for Epicurus cannot be disturbed), or 'with the law' (which would seem not to need saying). Cf. Philod. *De Epic. P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1,2–5 = col. 28 Tepedino (text modified from Clay 1986, 14; cf. Tepedino 1988, 226–7; 1994, 27) τοῖ]c μη[θὲν] | δ[ι]ὰ ταράχουc μ[οχ]θοῦci τὰc π[ε]|ρὶ τῶν ἀρίcτων καὶ μακαρι-ς[το|τά]των φύcεω[ν] ἐνη[οίας, 'as concerns those who do not experience difficulty over their conceptions of natures that are best and most blessed', where by implication turmoils are experienced by persons who labour under false ideas about the gods, while the gods themselves remain all along undisturbed. This is certainly the force of Epic. *Ad Herod.* 78 ἀλλ' ἁπλῶc μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύcει τῶν διάκριcιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μηθέν. Similarly the conclusion of Epic. *Ad Menoec.* (135): ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοιc cυγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸc cεαυτὸν ἡμέραc καὶ νυκτὸc πρόc ⟨τε⟩ τὸν ὅμοιον cεαυτῷ καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ' ὕπαρ οὔτ' ὄναρ διαταραχθήcῃ, ζήcειc δὲ ὡc θεὸc ἐν ἀνθρώποιc. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωποc ἐν ἀθανάτοιc ἀγαθοῖc ('Practice these things [viz. Epicurus' ethical teachings] and all that goes with them day and night in relation to yourself and with someone like yourself, and you will never be disturbed in waking or dreaming, but live like a god among men. For in no way like a mortal animal is a human who lives among immortal goods'). Here too the emphasis is on avoiding being disturbed ourselves through our views. Cf. Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1092B (Epic. fr. 384 Us.) τὸ μὴ φοβεῖcθαι θεὸν ἀλλὰ παύcαcθαι ταραττομέμουc, the

aim of their theology is 'to have no fear of god, but instead to be rid of our anxieties'. Cf. below, 1315–16 *ἡμᾶc cυν|[ταρ]άττειν*.

886–8 ἐν τοῖc περὶ | τῶν ἀρίcτων κ̣[αὶ] | cεμνοτάτων: a very similar description of the gods at *De Epic. P. Herc.* 1232 fr. 8 col. 1,3–5 *τὰc π[ε]|ρὶ τῶν ἀρίcτων καὶ μακαριc̣[το|τά]των φύcεω[ν] ἐνν[οίας*, on which see Clay 1986, esp. 15–16. Cf. also above, 743–7 *κατὰ | τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν | [ὑπερβ]αλλουcῶν | [δυνά]μει καὶ cπου|[δαιότ]ητι φύcεων*. In the present passage (*ἐν*) *τοῖc* must be a generic neuter, dependent on 885 *ταῖc δόξαιc*: '(by our beliefs) in matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings', cf. Festugière 1968, 89 'dans nos jugements sur les êtres les meilleurs et les plus augustes'.

888–9 διαl|ταράττοντέ̣[c: a term traceable to Epicurus himself: in Epicurus the compound only here and *Ad Menoec.* 135 *διαταραχθήcῃ* (with other affinities to this passage: see below on 892–6). Cf. below, 1315–16 *ἡμᾶc cυν|[ταρ]άττειν*. Philodemus otherwise uses only the simple form, *ταράττω*: *De morte* col. 22,5; *Rhet.* i. 352,8; 266,35; 268,12. So also Epicurus in the book on psychology, *De nat.* 34 fr. 34.30,21–2 Arr.^{2} *cυνεχῶc ἂν ἑαυτὸν | ταράττοντα* (if someone became forgetful in his acts of his belief in volition 'he would be continually disturbing himself'); fr. 38. 3,3–4 *ἀπὸ τῶνδέ τινας ὡc [β]λαβη|cομένο[υc] ἢ ταραχθηcομέν[ο]υc ε[ἴρ]η|ται*; Porph. *Ad Marc.* 29. 32. 21 (Epic. fr. 207 Us., 126 Arr.^{2}) *κρεῖccον δέ coι θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ cτιβάδοc κατακειμένῳ ἢ ταράττεcθαι χρυcῆν ἔχοντι κλίνην καὶ πολυτελῆ τράπεζαν*. Note at line end the haplography of epsilon (subsequently corrected *supra lineam*) because its shape was nearly identical with the preceding sigma; cf. on 729. (Usener conjectured that the scribe had corrected an original *διαπραττοντεcτι* to *-ττοντεcεται*, i.e. *διαπράττοντεc ἔτι*. The apograph represents the suprascript epsilon too far to the left for this, i.e. directly after the tau, but perhaps it should not be pressed for accuracy in such a context.)

890–1 δίκαιο[ι θύω]|μεν: another exhortation to sacrifice (cf. 880), as justified here by the condition stated in 884–9. Usener's supplement *ὦ]|μεν* is too short, produces hiatus (not necessarily objectionable in Epicurus), and would mean 'let us be entitled' (to sacrifice, presumably). Other possibilities here include: *δίκαιο[ι ζῶ]μεν* 'let us live righteously', and *δικαίο[υ φα]|μέν* 'we say that it is characteristic of a righteous person' (i.e. to sacrifice, do all things according to the laws, etc., but without disturbing oneself with one's ideas of the gods). The introduction of the notion of righteousness (*δίκαιον* in its earlier sense, rather than 'justice' with its later, legal implications) is probably connected with the fact that in the philosophical tradition piety is often defined as a species of 'righteousness', *δικαιοcύνη*: Plat. *Euthyph.* 12E (cf. *Prot.* 331); Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 116. Piety as justice towards the gods became the standard Stoic definition: Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9.124 (Zeno); Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6. 15. 125. 5; 7. 12. 80. 17; Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 68. 8 Wachsmuth (*SVF* iii. 660). In the Stoic camp on this point may also be placed [Plat.] *Def.* 412E (cf. 415A). See also Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 115, 116 and on Verg.

Aen. 4. 393 (*pius*); M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, i (Göttingen, 1948), 126; ii. 72. But it also appears in the definition given at Arist. *VV* 1250^{b}22. For the Epicurean definition see below, 1130–55; further: Schofield 1983; Obbink 1984 and 1992*a*.

891–2 ἀφ' ἧc ἔλε[γον δό]|ξηc: Diels takes this as a self-citation by Epicurus of something he said earlier in the letter here being quoted; see his impressive list of examples of such self-citation in Epicurus: 1916, 898 (= 300). But it would be odd for Philodemus to carry over the reference in quotation into his own text where it refers to nothing; it could have been easily omitted. I should prefer to take the imperfect ἔλε[γον as referring to an event in the past of which Epicurus was reminding the addressee of the letter, i.e. as part of the narrative, just as he reminded Colotes and Neocles in letters of their acts of obeisance, describing the events in the imperfect (see Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117B = Epic. fr. 141 Us., 65 Arr.^{2}; *Contra Epic. beat.* 1100C = Epic. fr. 178 Us. and below on 897–8); Epic. *De nat.* 28 was similarly narrated as the recollection of a conversation between Epicurus and his pupils: see Sedley 1984.

Furthermore, δό]|ξηc in 891–2 is too long for the available space, in a column where the scribe seems to have strictly observed the right margin: the apograph allows three letters after ελε[. I should thus prefer to read ἀφ' ἧc ἔλε[γον ἐ]|ξῆc 'on which (view, understanding δόξηc over from 885 ταῖc δόξαιc) I was saying next', i.e. in the conversation narrated by Epicurus in the letter, as conjectured above.

ἐ]|ξῆc was restored already by Bücheler, who actually articulated and restored the text as follows: περὶ] | μὲν ἀφῆc ἔλε[γεν (sc. Epicurus, taking the remark to be an aside by Philodemus) ἐ]|ξῆc, i.e. as a reference to another book by Epicurus, the *Περὶ ἀφῆc* (D.L. 10. 28; cf. above, 549–50). This sounds like an attractive approach. But a new sentence must begin in 896 with κἄν, and μέν *solitarium*, though a recognized idiom, seems difficult following so closely upon 890 δέ. It is difficult to see how in this case μέν could emphasize περὶ ἀφῆc, or what antithetical clause might be supplied in thought. Also against Bücheler's περὶ] | μὲν ἀφῆc ἔλε[γε (sc. Epicurus) is the imperfect tense here: Philodemus regularly uses the present when telling us what Epicurus said (see on 527).

894 ὁμοίω[c τῶι Διΐ: it was a conceit of traditional wisdom that the sage might rival even Zeus in happiness. This was probably the conclusion of the letter: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 135 (quoted in full on 885–6), a passage which curiously parallels the present one: in both instances the reader is exhorted to ethical strategies and theological views that will ensure he is not disturbed because of his beliefs, which is further said to result in a state of happiness equal to that of a god. See also *Gnom. Vat.* 33 and the passages collected as Epic. fr. 602 Us. For the comparison to Zeus: Aelian. *VH* 4. 13 τῷ Διὶ ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίαc διαγωνίζεcθαι; Cic. *De fin.* 2. 88 *nihilo beatior Iuppiter quam*

Epicurus; Sen. *Ep.* 25.4 *ipso Iove de felicitate contendat*; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 2.21 *κἂν Διὶ πατρὶ μάχεσθαι*, repeated by Theodoret. *Curat. Graec. aff.* 11.16 who adds: *μὴ γὰρ δή τις μόνον ἴδῃ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ κωμῳδούμενον ὄνομα, τὸν Δία λέγω· τὸν γὰρ δὴ τῶν ὅλων θεὸν οὕτω νοῶν ἐκεῖνος τὴν βλασφημίαν ἐτόλμησεν*. All these passages, however, also include, along with the expectation that the Epicurean may rival Zeus in happiness, the claim that he will do so without lavish material goods or the hope of them (e.g. with only bread and water, etc.) or under adverse physical conditions (in prison, shipwreck, under torture, etc.). In the light of this, and the close parallel with Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 135 (quoted above) *οὕτω γὰρ* [*ἐν*]||*δέχεται* must be taken to refer in the first instance to the stipulation at 884–9 that one should not disturb oneself in one's beliefs: i.e. it is possible for the Epicurean to rival Zeus in happiness, because he will not be disturbed in his beliefs, even when sacrificing. Thus there is no special claim that sacrifice in itself lends any requisite material or hedonistic good to happiness, apart from a proper occasion for considering the nature of the gods: a good meal.

895–6 ὡς φαί]|νεται: for the qualification, minimizing the claim that the Epicurean will actually live like Zeus (or indicating its figurative, metaphorical sense), see above, 755–7 *οἱονεὶ* | [*τὸ*] *κ̣αθ' ἡγεμονίαν* | [*ὑπερ*]*έχον* (sc. *τὸ θεῖον*) 'excelling in leadership, as it were'; *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,12–13 *ὥ πρὸς Διός, τὸ δὴ λε*|*γόμενον* 'as they say', which begs pardon for the traditional form of the oath.

896–7 κἀν [τοῖς Πε]|ρὶ βίων: for this work and its contents see above on 738–9, where I think it is also cited. Since in all extant citations of this work, it is cited either by specific book-number or in the plural form *ἐν τοῖς* (sc. *βιβλίοις*) *περὶ βίων*, we should probably restore the latter here. (*κἀν* [*τῶι πε*]||*ρί* fits the space on the apograph slightly better, but it is difficult to be certain of where the line ended within a letter or two, especially in the final lines of the column.) Bücheler, followed by Usener, corrected to *κἀν* [*τῶι Πε*]*ρὶ βίων δευ*[*τέρωι* (sc. *βιβλίῳ*), where the apograph reads ΔЄΤ[(sc. ΔЄϒ[). But with the unusual postposition of the book-number, a continuation in the form *δευ*[*τέρωι περὶ*] | *προσκυνή*[*σεως γρά*||*φων* would produce a line too long for the available space in 897.

897–8 π̣[ερὶ τῆς] | προσκυνή[σεως: on *προσκύνησις* (the custom of kneeling, prostration, or osculation before statues of the gods or as marks of honour to important humans) see Kindstrand on Bion F25; H. Bolkestein 1929, 21–4 on Theophr. *Char.* 16.5, where the superstitious man is found *ἐπὶ γόνατα πεσὼν καὶ προσκυνήσας* (with Kindstrand op. cit. for further examples); G. Geraci, 'Ricerche sul *προσκύνημα*', *Aegyptus*, 51 (1971), 3–211. The nature of Epicurean interest in the practice is illustrated at Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1112C (not in Us., Arr.², quoted above on 737–8) *ὡς προσκύνησιν*; *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102B (fr. 30 Us.) *ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις*. Also apposite here is the anecdote told of how once when Epicurus was speaking

about nature (*φυσιολογοῦντος*) Colotes, one of his oldest and dearest disciples, suddenly fell at his knees. In a letter Epicurus reminded him of the incident: 'In your reverence for what I was saying at the time you were seized by a desire, not at all in keeping with our philosophy of nature (*ἀφυσιολόγητον*), to embrace me and clasp my knees, and to give me all that kissing which certain people use in their devotions and prayers (*πάσης τῆς εἰθισμένης ἐπιλήψεως γίνεσθαι κατὰ σεβάσεις τινῶν* [coni. Hirzel, *τιμίων* Post, *τιμῶν* MSS] *καὶ λιτάς*). So I was compelled to pay you the same sacred honours and the same marks of reverence (*ἐποίεις οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνθιεροῦν σὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ἀντισέβεσθαι*).' To Colotes' obeisance Epicurus had responded further: 'Go on your way then as an immortal god and think of us too as immortal' (*ἄφθαρτός μοι περιπάτει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτους διανοοῦ*: Epic. fr. 141 Us., 65 Arr.[2] ap. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117B). On the passage see Westman 1955, 27–31; W. Schmid 1961, 754; Festugière 1968, 41 who notes, for example, that *ἐπίληψις* signifies the act whereby the worshipper takes hold of a limb of the adored one to kiss it ('geste concret, visible encore dans les pays du Midi'). Elsewhere Plutarch describes the same incident as an act of *προσκύνησις* (*Contra Epic. beat.* 1100A): *γράφειν ὡς Κωλώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προκυνήσειεν γονάτων ἁψάμενος*); nor this was an isolated incident, as Plutarch relates, ibid. 1100C (Epic. fr. 178 Us.): *ὁ τὴν Νεοκλέους μαρτυρίαν καὶ τὴν Κωλώτου προσκύνησιν ἐν τοσούτῳ λόγῳ τιθέμενος καὶ ἀγαπῶν*. (Note that Epicurus was given to reminding his adherents of these incidents in his letters to them, and that they seem to have occurred in the context of teaching.)

Epicurus treated *προσκύνησις* in his *Περὶ βίων*. He probably said that on occasion the wise man would engage in such acts of obeisance, and when he did so it would not be falsely but as a natural reflection of a physical state of affairs and be closely connected with the formation of the concept of divinity. In the incident with Colotes, at least, it seems to have been connected with the wise man's being in some sense a divine sage. Expressions of such admiration for humans certainly occurred in this context within the Epicurean school. Cf. Epicurus to Pythocles, D.L. 10. 5 (fr. 165 Us.) *καθεδοῦμαι προσδοκῶν τὴν ἱμερτὴν καὶ ἰσόθεόν σου εἴσοδον* (which does not say that Pythocles *is* a god). At *Ad Menoec.* 135 (quoted above) he likened the Epicurean to a god among men (*ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις*). According to *Gnom. Vat.* 36 'The life of Epicurus, when compared with that of other men for graciousness of manner and independence of external needs, could be taken for a divine legend (*μῦθος*).' Lucretius compared Epicurus to the Sun (3. 1042–4: *ipse Epicurus obit decurso lumine vitae, / qui genus humanum ingenio superavit et omnis / restinxit, stellas exortus ut aetherius sol*), which is not in itself divinizing (cf. Sappho 34. 1 L.-P.); but at 5. 8–10 he is unequivocal on the matter: Epicurus had been a god. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 48; Plin. *NH* 30. 5; Cic. *De fin.* 5. 3.

It is more difficult to evaluate the seriousness of such language and acts of expression, or to know whether to take them simply as part of a style of language and gesture, or rather as forming an integral aspect of philosophical doctrine. Festugière 1968, 67–70, for example, regards Epicurus' attitude toward Colotes' act of *προσκύνησις* as ultimately ironic and playful, but facetious; whereas W. Schmid 1961, 754–5 takes it as a serious expression consistent with, if not required by Epicurean doctrine, and regards Epicurus' *ἀντισέβεσθαι* as an indication by Epicurus that Colotes had reached the state of a perfect sage. According to Festugière: 'On s'y tenait pour supérieurs aux autres hommes, l'esprit d'adulation régnait' (1968, 70 comparing Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1091 B *ἀφθάρτους καὶ ἰσοθέους ἀποκαλοῦντες αὐτούς*). It is certainly true that a spirit of adulation reigned, but this does not tell us exactly why it did so. There was some room for jests and verbal humour (*Gnom. Vat.* 41, cf. Epic. fr. 394 Us). But when Epicurus described Colotes' desire for *προσκύνησις* as *ἀφυσιολόγητον*, he probably did not mean that it was not due to physical causes (cf. above on 736–7); perhaps a gesture of false modesty? The examples about *προσκύνησις* may have been intended at least to illustrate the theory of how the sage forms and negotiates his conceptions of divine nature. There is nothing *prima facie* illogical or incoherent or insincere in Epicurus' telling a student, whom he has instructed that if he controls his desires and avoids disturbance in his beliefs that he will live like a god (since even a god could not be happier), that he is now like a god, or for the student to respond in kind.

898–9 *Order of Columns.* It is not obvious that the following column is talking about *προσκύνησις*; perhaps it argued that it was a justified reaction to the recognition of *τὸ σέμνωμα* (902–3). But the link cannot be recovered with certainty, and a column may have been lost in between.

Col. 32

Epicurean participation in cult (continued): (*h*) statues and dedications. The state or preservation of this column makes restoration hazardous. What can be reliably salvaged from Philippson's text appears in the apparatus criticus. The following reconstruction of this column by Diels, as collated from Diels 1916*a*, 908 (= 310) and unpublished notes ascribed to him recorded in Anon. A, is provided by way of comparison:

32	*καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς [αὐτῆς*	1077 9
900	*δόξης οὗ[τος γε-*	
	νόμενο[ς ἁπάντων	
	τεθεώρηται [τῶι σε-	

μνώματ[ι προέχων (5)
τῶι τῆς [ζωῆς καὶ τῆι οἰ-
κείᾳ περι[εργίαι τοῦ
τελεῖν [τὰ ἱερὰ τῆι
τοῖς νό[μοις cυμπε-
ριφορᾷ c[υμφωνῶν· (10)
περιγέλ[α]c[τον δ' ὁ-
μοῦ καὶ [τὰ τῶν θε-
ῶν ἀγαλμάτ[ων εὐλα-
βε[ῖc]θαι φη[λώματα
μ[...]γε[..... .. (15)
.....]ιμ[..... ...
.....]φυc[.... ερ-
γαζομ[..... ....-
μένην ἅ[μα τῆι
θεωρίαι [χρῆcθαί φη- (20)
cιν εἰc πᾶcαν [αὐτοῦ
τὴν cυνη[γυρίαν τῆι
τοῦ δαίμονος [ἐπι-
νοίαι κα[ταλαμβά-
νων· ἐπὶ [μὲν τῶι δαι- (25)
μονίῳ Cω[κράτης εὐ-
φημεῖν ο[..... ...-
ειν προcφερ[.....
ὅcην δημ[..... ..] || (29)

902–3 cε]ιμνωματ[: also below, 975, and restored at 1022, a distinctively Epicurean neologism synonymous with *τὸ θεῖον*. Its earliest occurrence is at *Ad Herod.* 77, where Epicurus says it is necessary to preserve (*τηρεῖν*) all the 'majesty' (*πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα*) of the gods in the expressions (*ὀνόματα*) we apply to conceptions (*ἔννοιαι*) of the gods, in order that opinions opposite (*ὑπεναντίαι δόξαι*) to this *cέμνωμα* may not arise as a result of such expressions. Otherwise the resulting contradiction (*ὑπεναντιότης*) will produce the greatest disturbance (*τὸν μέγιcτον τάραχον*) in people's souls. (Cf. Lucretius' rendering of this passage at 6. 68–78, where at 71 *summa deum vis* = *cέμνωμα*.) Echoes can be discerned in *P. Oxy.* II 215 (see Obbink 1992*a*) col. 1,30 *τηλικού|[του] cεμνώματος*, *SIG* 834,15 (the *Epistula Plotinae*). For its relation to the expression *τὸ cεμνόν* see Henrichs 1974*a*, 27 n. 47.

927–8 *Order of Columns.* A column from the 1077 sequence is here interposed between two columns of the 1098 sequence (cols. 31 and 33). Mention of statues or dedications in 911 (*ἀγάλματα*) may cohere with the discussion of *προcκύνηcις* in col. 31. But in col. 33 the discussion reverts to prayer and related expressions.

Col. 33

Epicurean engagement in cult, continued. (*i*) Use of prayer and related expressions are quoted from letters by written by Epicurus and his brother Neocles.

929 κἂν πόλ[ε]μ[ος ἦι: whether this refers to any specific war is unknown, since the the recipient (and date) of the letter from which this citation comes are equally uncertain. In principle, the proposition could be perfectly general, the outbreak of war being always in the offing. Since we know that Athens was under siege several times during Epicurus' residence there after 306, he may have had the concrete possibility in mind. Earlier, when Epicurus was living in Lampsacus, a town dependent on Lysimachus, who controlled Thrace and the Hellespont, hostilities between Lysimachus and Antigonus were almost continuous for possession of the straits, and perhaps the letter was written at a time when Lampsacus was threatened (so Festugière 1968, 73 n. 2, taking this date from the reference to Charinus below in 939, and understanding Charinus with Usener to be the homonymous Athenian archon of 308/7, rather than the later one of 291/0: but see above on 841). In the spring of 307, Antigonus, who already controlled much of Asia Minor, together with his son Demetrius amassed a navy of 250 ships for the purpose of liberating the Greek cities, especially Athens, which he took on 10 June 307: see W. S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London, 1911), 63, 95–6. But in fact *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου* at 938–9 refers to a later, entirely different letter than the one cited here in 928–32, and we have no other letter of Epicurus' from the period before his move to Athens in 306 (see above on 840–1), so a later date is preferable for the war mentioned in 929—if the reference is in fact specific. In 294, for example, Demetrius besieged Athens, in connection with which struggle there is mention of Epicurus' activities: according to Plut. *Demetr.* 34 (see also below on 950–7) things became so straitened for the Athenians under siege that Epicurus had to count out individual beans to his associates to sustain them.

931–2 θεῶν εἱλε̣[ων ὄν]|των: Norden (1958, i. 125) hovers between designating this expression as 'sakral' and identifying it as an idiosyncrasy of Epicurus' style ('rhythmische *λέξις*'). For the genitive absolute with conditional force substituting for an optative of wish or imperative in prayers and acclamations (= 'if only . . .' or 'as long as') see Smyth, §§2071, 2074: *μὴ ἐμοῦ ἄκοντος* (Lat. *non me invito*), a common idiomatic use of the absolute construction (cf. Soph. *Ai.* 455); Mayser ii/3. 76–7. Festugière 1968, 73 notes how often traditional expressions stress that success is impossible except 'with the gods' (*σὺν θεῷ*), and that nothing could be got without them (*οὐ θεῶν ἄτερ*); id., *L'Idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Évangile* (Paris, 1932), 24–5 for further examples. As Norden observes (1958, i. 125), it may be regarded as

certain that the prayer *θεῶν ἱλεων ὄντων* expressed here in the form of the genitive absolute is in Epicurus' own words quoted directly (rather than substituting for a prayer expressed in the optative or imperative in the original letter), even though the surrounding words are quoted indirectly, 'um so mehr als Philodem unmittelbar eine andere Stelle [viz. below, 936–7] mit demselben Schluß anführt'. While it is not Philodemus' normal practice to quote Epicurus in direct speech (cf. e.g. above on 519–41), he does so above, 879–96 (probably from a letter of Epicurus'). The form of the prayer in the genitive absolute, much like 'God willing' in English, is exampled at Eurip. fr. 397 N² (from *Thyestes*) *θεοῦ θέλοντος*, Menand. *Monost.* 349 Jaekel, and see Nauck's note for further examples (cf. Alexis fr. 283. 4 K.–A. *ἄν θεὸς θέλῃ*; 249. 1 K.–A. *ἄν θεοὶ θέλωσι*). On Epicurean prayer see above 737–51 and 768–72 with commentary; Philod. *Epigr.* 34 Sider (= *AP* 6. 349, 19 Gow–Page, 16 Gigante) which invokes Melicertes, Leukothea, Nereids, waves, Poseidon, and Zephyrus in a prayer for a safe sea-voyage to Peiraeus; Lucr. 2. 434, 5. 1156, and especially 5. 104–9 at 107 *quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans*, an apotropaic *praeteritio* urging his addressee to consider that *ratio* causes us to understand that all things eventually *succidere*, yet at the same time wishing away the potential destruction evoked by the the mere description of such an event: see Reiche 1971; G. Harrison and D. Obbink, *ZPE* 63 (1986), 75–81 at 81 n. 32.

932 καὶ Π̣[ολυαίνωι: Tepedino's correction and restoration are recommended by the fact that this must begin a new citation (the space after *τῶν* in 932 designates punctuation), and the next citation begins in 938 with the formula *πρὸς τὸν αὐτόν* 'to the same'. We know from the archon date *ἐ*]|*πὶ Χαρίνου* in the second citation at 938–9 that the addressee of that letter was Polyaenus: see Sen. *Ep.* 18. 9 (Epic. fr. 158 Us.) *hoc certe in iis* (Reynolds, following Rossbach, since no deictic force is intended: *his* MSS) *epistulis ait, quas scripsit Charino magistratu ad Polyaenum*. Furthermore, the only known letter of Epicurus written in Charinus' archonship was the one *To Polyaenus* (see above on 840–1). We can thus conclude that either (1) the addressee was named here in 932 (i.e. *Π̣[ολυαίνωι*), or (2) the quotation in 928–32 comes from the same letter as that of 932–7 (reading e.g. *π̣[άλιν φησίν·*). If (2), then the addressee of 928–32 as well that of 932–7 will be Polyaenus. On the other hand, *ὃ Μ̣η̣[τροδώρωι* may be recoverable in 928, so that there is a slight preference for *Π̣[ολυαίνωι* in 932. The papyrus' original Π will have been easily mistaken by the *disegnatore* for an H. Already Philippson suspected the name of an addressee here and restored *Ἡ[ροδότωι*. Gomperz, *Hermes*, 5 (1871), 394 corrected the apograph's H[and printed the supplement *π̣[άλιν*, which leaves the line woefully too short, though we could have *π̣[άλιν δέ·* (cf. 1849). This supplement has been universally followed by editors unaware of the identification of the letter, since it is a fairly common formula of addition in Philodemus' style of composition by compilation

(e.g. above, 879; frequently in *Pragm.*). For the author's use of the dative in this work in citing a letter by its addressee (rather than *πρός* + accusative) see 798–9 *Φύρ|cωνι* (though 865–6 *πρὸc Πο]λύαινον*).

933 καθαρὰν τ̣[ὴν ζωήν: 'Pure, je pense, de tout vain souci', so Festugière 1968, 73 n. 3, though it may be added that Epicurus probably held that this is what all people actually (or originally) intended to express when they used such language or engaged in rituals of purification. On expressions of ritual purity adapted to philosophical contexts see above on 758–9.

934–5 διά]|ξειν: cf. 895.

935–6 cὺν αὐτ[ῶι] | Μάτρωνι: literally: 'with Matro himself', i.e. 'Matro and all', since the use of *cύν* rather than *μετά* should have the sense 'plus': 'Epicurus said that, if the gods were propitious, he would continue to live a pure life, Matro and all'. Festugière 1968, 73 translates (on what grounds I do not know) 'dans la compagnie du seul Matrôn'. Matro accompanied the young child (apparently in the capacity of a guardian or slave-chaperon, *παιδαγωγός*) to whom was written from Lampsacus the letter sometimes attributed to Epicurus, *P. Herc.* 176 fr. 5 col. 23 (Epic. fr. 176 Us., 261 Arr.²):

ἀ]||φείγμεθα εἰc Λάμψακον ὑ-
γιαίνοντεc ἐγὼ καὶ Πυθο-
κλῆc κα[ὶ Ἑρ]μαρχοc καὶ Κτή-
cιππoc καὶ ἐκεῖ κατειλήφα-
μεν ὑγ[ι]αίνοντας Θεμίc-
ταν καὶ τοὺc λοιποὺc φίλο[υ]c·
εὖ δὲ ποιεῖc καὶ εἰ cὺ ὑγι-
αίνειc καὶ ἡ μ[ά]μμη [c]ου
καὶ πάπαι καὶ Μάτρω[ν]ι πάν-
τα πείθῃ [ὥcπ]ερ καὶ ἔμ-
προcθεν· εὖ γὰρ ἴcθι, ὦ Ἀπία,
ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ο[ἱ] λοιποὶ
πάντεc cε μέγα φιλοῦμεν
ὅτι τούτοιc πείθῃ πάντα
[ ]α με· [ἢ]ξω
γὰρ ο[..]ντα[ ]

We have reached Lampsacus safe and sound—I, Pythocles, Hermarchus, and Ctesippus—and there we have found Themista and the other friends in good health. I hope you and your mummy are well, and that you are always obedient to your daddy and to Matro, as you used to be. For you may be sure, Apia(s), that both I and all the others love you very much for always being obedient to them.

On the addressee and authorship of the letter see below. Gomperz 1871, 388 thought the letter was addressed to a little girl, the daughter of Metrodorus. The reading of the addressee's name in the papyrus, long disputed, was finally confirmed with a binocular microscope by D. Sedley in 1976. On Matro see also Gomperz 1871, 394. We hear no more about him; this and the

present passage in *De pietate* are the only mentions in all our sources. He may have been an οἰκέτης of Epicurus' (like Nikias and Lykon) or of one of the *kathegemones*; or he may have been a freedman. But as a παιδαγωγός he does not seem to have been a distinguished *sectator* of the master like Epicurus' learned slave Mys (see above on 60). Knowing that the present fragment in *De pietate* comes from a letter to Polyaenus takes on added significance in connection with Matro, since we know that Polyaenus was himself the παιδαγωγός of the young prodigy Pythocles: so Philod. Πρὸς τοὺς [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 6,19–20 = Polyaenus fr. 2 Tepedino, where an adversary scurrilously claims to tattle: τοῖος ἦν Πυθο|[κλ]έους π[αιδ]αγωγὸς Πολύ-|[αινος, 'That is the kind of chaperon Polyaenus was to Pythocles', which in spite of the abusive polemic presupposes that Polyaenus was in fact Pythocles' παιδαγωγός. On Pythocles' reputed homosexuality (Alciphr. *Epist.* 4. 17. 3 makes Epicurus call him his Alcibiades) see Tepedino 1991, 133–4. In these cases παιδαγωγός has the sense of Latin *tutor*, 'guardian', not a private instructor. Private documents certainly do not indicate any teaching as opposed to supervisory duties (see Cribiore 1993, 129–32). On παιδαγωγοί generally, see M. Golden, *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens* (Baltimore, 1990), 145–9. Most were probably slaves, though their use was no doubt restricted to the wealthier classes. Relative usefulness and productivity could be a consideration in their selection. Zopyrus, the παιδαγωγός of Alcibiades, was 'chosen because he was old and unfit for other work' (Plat. *Alcib. I* 122B; and compare the story that Pericles, watching a slave break a leg, observed, 'There's a new παιδαγωγός': Hieronymus of Rhodes fr. 19 Wehrli). Hence in Epicurus' phrase here 'Matro and all' (935–6 σὺν αὐτ[οῖς] | Μάτρωνι), Matro may be being singled out as close to redundant. Mention of him as such in both letters advertises the fact that the Epicureans were at least of sufficiently high social standing to have slaves as attendants. Philod. *De morte* 4 *P. Herc.* 1050 cols. 12,30–13,3 refers to Pythocles, 'not yet 18 years old', as under the care of Metrodorus (οἵ]α κελεύει Μητρόδω[ρος), but this obviously refers to instruction, since he is there praised for his philosophical accomplishments. Vogliano, *SIFC*² 13 (1936), 267–81 suggested that on Polyaenus' death (not before 290/89) Metrodorus took over Pythocles' tuition. This appears to be too late a date for Pythocles to have needed a παιδαγωγός (so Sedley 1976*b*, 43–8, who revises the chronology and puts the date of his birth around 324 BC), but Pythocles still may have passed at some point from his chaperon Polyaenus to studies with Metrodorus. It seems to have been an early Epicurean procedure to place children under another's sponsorship or tutelage, in cases where the parents themselves were newcomers to the school (see Sedley 1976*b*, 31), since we hear that Pythocles himself was later παιδαγωγός to the sons of one Cronius: Philod. *Pragm.* (*P. Herc.* 1418) col. 20, 14–16.

Since Philodemus quotes the present citation only for the prayer θεῶν

ἵλεων ὄντων, and may begin the indirect quotation somewhat arbitrarily, we are not obligated to assume that Epicurus himself is the subject of the infinitives διηχέναι and διά]|ξειν (as editors have assumed on grammatical grounds); i.e. the subject of these verbs (of whom Epicurus was speaking) may as well have been someone in Matro's care or company, like the child in the letter (the slave Nikias, I think), or, perhaps more likely, Polyaenus himself: i.e. '(Epicurus says) to Polyaenus that he (sc. Polyaenus) had lived and would continue to live a pure life, Matro and all, "if the gods are propitious".' (There is not, however, quite enough space to supplement καὶ π[άλιν αὐτόν, sc. Polyaenus, in 932.) If this is correct, it is possible that Matro was the old παιδαγωγός of Polyaenus (who himself became παιδαγωγός to young Pythocles): both will have been παιδαγωγοί in Epicurus' οἰκία. Polyaenus' father Athenodorus (D.L. 10. 24) may have likewise been a παιδαγωγός, since sons often inherited their father's occupation (the same said of Epicurus and his father, also a schoolmaster, at D.L. 10. 3). Since Epicurus' statement that he (Polyaenus) 'has lived and will continue to live a pure life, Matro and all' is predicated upon 'the gods being propitious', there may be a further suggestion that at the time of writing separation is somehow threatened, e.g. by war, death, illness, travel, shipwreck.

The letter to the child (fr. 176 Us., Arr.² pp. 678–9, cited above) directs its addressee to 'always obey daddy and Matro, as in the past'. According to this document, Polyaenus' young charge Pythocles was with its author, along with Hermarchus and one Ktesippos, when the letter was written from Lampsacus, where the four had just arrived safe and sound (ὑγιαίνοντες) to find Themista and the rest of the friends in good health (ὑγιαίνοντας . . . τοὺς λοιποὺς φίλους). But there is no mention of Pythocles' tutor Polyaenus. Yet this would make sense if Polyaenus is the author of the letter, as Vogliano argued on the basis of the content of the preceding columns, 'Autour du jardin d'Épicure', *Mélanges Bidez* (Brussels, 1934), 979–92; id., 'Nuove lettere di Epicuro e dei suoi scolari', *Annali dell'Università di Cagliari* 1927–8, 385–95; Liebich 1960, 36–8, against Gomperz 1871, Usener, Philippson, *Gnomon*, 4 (1928), 392, Bignone, and Festugière. On the letter to the child see further Vogliano 1928, 49 and 116; Diano 1946, 68 no. 163; Arr.² pp. 678–9. Angeli 1988*a*, 45–7, 50–1 (with further references), who makes a strong case that the letter was written by Batis, sister of Metrodorus and wife of Idomeneus, on the grounds that it comes from the section of *P. Herc.* 176 that deals with her life (cols. 19–23, where at least four other letters by her hand are also quoted).

The result for the present text is that the παιδαγωγοί Matro and Polyaenus will have been separated when the latter returned to Lampsacus (some time before 292/1, since in that year Epicurus wrote a letter to Leonteus and him there: Philod. *De Epic. P. Herc.* 176 fr. 5 col. 24,4–6; Sedley 1976*b*, 47), and it is probably to this period of separation that the present fragment in *De*

pietate refers, thus giving an approximate date of 292/1 for Epicurus' letter *To Polyaenus* cited at 932–7 (a year earlier than the one to him written *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου*). On Polyaenus and Pythocles see further Sedley 1976*b*, 43–8.

Festugière 1968, 65 with n. 4 thought that the letter must have been written to a little boy, because of the presence of the *παιδαγωγός* (it was assumed a girl would not have one) and because the addressee is a member of the Epicurean community. But Sedley 1976*b*, 47 with n. 84 argues on the basis of onomastic evidence that the child's name, whether (nominative) Apia or Apias, is likely to be feminine, suggesting implications for the Epicurean attitude toward women: Apia(s) is instructed to be obedient to her father and male guardian, not her mother. It may be worthy of note that she has her own *παιδαγωγός* (which Sedley attributes to the Epicurean revolutionary practice of allowing women to become philosophers, e.g. Leontion, Themista, and Phrontis), though the *παιδαγωγός* probably had no teaching duties as such (see above). Angeli 1988*a*, 50–1 reiterates the view of Sedley, identifying the child as the daughter of Metrodorus.

938–9 πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν [ἐ]|πὶ Χαρίνου: the 'same person' to whom the letter was addressed must have been Polyaenus, for there is no evidence for any other letter written by Epicurus *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου* than the one addressed to Polyaenus cited by Seneca, *Ep.* 18. 9. The other extant citations likewise indicate that the letter written *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου* was addressed to him (see on 932 *καὶ Π*[*ολυαίνωι* and above on 840–1). For the date (291/0) see Dorandi 1990*b*, T 15; cf. Clay 1982, 20, 25; cf. above on 797–9.

There were clearly two alternative schemes for citing Epicurus' letters: one by addressee (when this was known, in the dative or *πρός* + accusative), another by archon-date (when the letter bore one). The two different types of citation apparently served to individuate letters written in the same year or to the same person. Philodemus uses either form alternatively as a kind of 'tag' or 'title' of a letter with no particular expectation of consistency, or they could be used together (as above, 797–9: *ἐπ' Ἀρ*[*ιστ*]*ω*|*νύμου μὲγ γὰ*[*ρ*] *Φύρ*|*σωνι*). Since the dates for Epicurus' letters were probably not original with the actual letters (above on 840–1), they may have been introduced some time in the second century in order to individuate letters written to the same addressee. From the present passage, we know that Epicurus wrote more than one letter *To Polyaenus*, since 937–44 are said to come from the letter written *πρὸς τὸν αὐτόν* (sc. *Πολύαινον*) but *ἐπὶ Χαρίνου* (so also 578, 865 ff.). Therefore 932–7 must come from a different letter *To Polyaenus*. The citations in 840, 865 ff., however, certainly come from the letter written *Πρὸς Πολύαινον ἐπὶ Χαρίνου* and attested by Sen. *Ep.* 18. 9. (The status of 578, also *πρὸς Πολύαινον*, is not entirely certain.) On the dating of Epicurus' letters by Athenian archons see above on 797–9 and 840–1 with the bibliography cited there.

It is very improbable that Epicurus' actual, original letters recorded notice

of their dates, whether by Athenian archon or any other formula. Private letters on papyrus from Egypt are very infrequently dated by magistrates, though many types of public and private documents do bear them, and epistolary practice may have been different at Athens. The archon-dates in the citations of the letters, like the practice of dating books of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύcεωc* by archon-year (see above on 523–4), will have been reconstructions by later Epicurean scholarchs documenting the history of the school. Our earliest archon-dates on Epicurean documents come not from letters but from books 15 (300/299) and 28 (296/5) of *Περὶ φύcεωc* (see T 5–6 Dorandi 1980). Further on letters in general: J. L. White, *Light from Ancient Letters* (Philadelphia, 1986) with bibliography; P. J. Parsons, 'Background: The Papyrus Letter', in E. Suárez de la Torre (ed.), *Epistolografía* = *Didactica Classica Gandensia*, 20 (1980), 3–19.

939–45 Concealed here is probably another acclamation wishing well for 'the same friends in friendship'. But the sense of 941 is almost entirely lost, and what appears to be a paragraphos in the margin after this line ought to indicate a syntactical break in or at the end of 940. There is not room for *μεν*[*όντων*] before the intractable *θεcτω*[ ]. In 943 I suspect *ἅπαν* or *ἅπαντα*, then *κε*[*κυ*]|*ρίωτ*[*αι θεοῦ τινο*]*c ἐ*|*ξωθ*[*εν ἐ*]*πιφέρον*|[*τ*]*oc* 'with some god imposing/applying (it) from without', i.e. from the gods (perhaps Epicurus' own words quoted in direct speech), another prayer in the form of a genitive absolute, for which see above on 931–2.

945–6 ὁ δ' ἀ]δελφὸc | α[ὐτ]οῦ: it is incredible that Philodemus had access to documents (otherwise unheard of) by the hand of Epicurus' brother, presumably Neocles (the identification first Bücheler p. 610, followed by Diels 1916*a*, 896 (= 298)), who studied with him (see above on 165); Usener relegated the present citation to a footnote (on fr. 168, adn. p. 151,3). Although we know that the dossier of Epicurean documents used by Philodemus contained dated letters *to* Epicurus from others (e.g. the letter *From Mithres*), as well as those from Epicurus' own pen, it seems more likely the quotation from Neocles in the present passage was drawn from a work of Epicurus' in which Neocles' words were related (perhaps a dialogue in which he played a major role). D.L. 10. 28 lists a work by Epicurus entitled *Νεοκλῆc πρὸc Θεμίcταν*, presumably a book titled after the name of his brother (though not addressed to him: compare the book entitled *Καρνεΐcκου Φιλίcτα*, a partly encomiastic memoir written by Carneiscus but titled after Philista, whom it commemorated, and preserved on a Herculaneum papyrus, for which see on 165, 797–9 with references there; Capasso 1988, 37–53, 104 n. 123). D.L. 10. 27, 28 credits Epicurus with works similarly titled after the names of his two other brothers: a *Χαιρέδημοc* and an *Ἀριcτόβουλοc*. But Neocles seems to have been the most philosophically advanced of the brothers (Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1100B, Epic. fr. 178 Us.) which accords well with what Philodemus says about him here.

946–9 ζηλωτὴc | καὶ δαιμόνιον ἐcχη|κὼc ἐν τοῖc λόγ[οιc | π]ροκοπήν: literally: 'an admirer (of Epicurus') and one who had attained extraordinary advancement in his studies', probably added by Philodemus to put Neocles' statement on an evidential par with the foregoing testimony of Epicurus' own words. It was not unthinkable (at least to non-Epicureans) that the *kathegemones* might have departed from Epicurus' own views on this matter. Philodemus quotes Neocles' testimony as especially close to the master himself. The family in any case had connections with Colophon (hence the letters to Phyrson, and concern for another native, Theodotus above at 800–1), since their father (also named Neocles) an Athenian cleruch on Samos, took refuge in Colophon after his expulsion from the island by Perdiccas in 322/1.

950–2 For lack of a better solution, I have adopted *exempli gratia* the restorations of Diels 1916*a*, 896 (= 298), but without enthusiasm or complete conviction. Diels (loc. cit.) compares Plut. *Demetr.* 34 where it is said that when Demetrius was besieging Athens in 294, Epicurus distributed beans to his followers from the stores of the Kepos, a gesture which Diels associates with 952 *ν*]*έμ*[*ειν* in his reconstruction. According to Diels, the passage 'zeigt, daß dieser [sc. Neocles] sogar von dem Grundsatze Epikurs, daß die Götter sich nicht um die Menschen kümmern, einmal abwich'. This seems highly unlikely. The notion of *βοήθεια* being provided by us *to* the gods is unaccountable under any interpretation of Epicurus' theology. And there are other problems: *εἶναι* in 950 is awkwardly separated from *δέον* (as Diels admitted: '*εἶναι δέον* ist übel getrennt'); *δέον* may be an accusative absolute construction. At the end of 951 [*θεοῖc* is uncomfortably long (3–4 letters maximum). No solution to these difficult lines is forthcoming, though in 950 *τὰ*[*c*] *ἀπαρ*[*χὰc* should be considered, perhaps as metaphorical allusion to the *cυντάξειc* collected by the Epicureans from their satellite communities (see Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117D = Epic. fr. 130 Us., 54 Arr.^{2}, allegedly from *Tὸ Idomeneus*: *πέμπε οὖν ἀπαρχὰc ἡμῖν εἰc τὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ cώματοc θεραπείαν ὑπέρ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκνων*, and see Usener, *Glossarium* s.vv. *ἀπαρχή* and *cύνταξιc*; Philod. *De mus.* 68,32). Gomperz suggests correcting to *θείου* in 951 (which is of little help without the article).

953 οὐ πρὸc ἰδιώτη[ν: for this term ('layman' as opposed to *φιλόcοφοc*, or simply an outsider as opposed to an adherent of the school) see *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,11–14 (of an unnamed *ἄφρων*) *χαριέcτε*|[*ρο*]*c μὲν γὰρ ἴcωc ποτέ* | [*ὁ τ*]*οιοῦτοc ἄλλων ἰδιω*|[*τῶ*]*ν ἐcτιν* 'such a person is perhaps more sophisticated than other outsiders'; Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 12,2 with Diels p. 65 with n. 2. But based on the apparent contrast drawn in 953–6 *ἰδιώτηc* is opposed here to *πολιτικόc*. It is supposed to carry extra weight in defending the Epicureans against impiety that Neocles used such language in addressing someone involved in civic government, i.e. in a public context where these

words, if they had been in any way impious, would have damaged the public reputation of the school.

954–6 πρὸς Φ[ύρ]ιcω[να] τὸν Κολοφ[ώνιον: Hegesianax' brother Phyrson is also mentioned in Philod. *Pragm.* col. 24,6 and addressed in the letter from Epicurus named above, 798–9, where see commentary. Epicurus and his brothers had family connections at Colophon (see on 946–9). They probably depended on Phyrson and Theodotus (800–1) for payment of the annual 120-drachma *cύνταξιc* or 'school fees' which outside members of the school paid for the support of Epicurus and his friends. The payment of the fee is often mentioned in the school's correspondence (see Arr.² p. 672 for a list), and the present fragment may derive from a similar reminder or 'notice of payment due'. See above on 950–2 and Epic. fr. 130 Us., 54 Arr.². *τὸν Κολοφ[ώ|νιον* of course refers to Phyrson's citizenship.

ἄν]δρα: there may be an implication that Phyrson is an Epicurean 'master' at Colophon—whether a title conferred by the founders, perhaps in return for payment of the annual 120-drachma *cύνταξιc*, or whether these titles were assigned to the early Epicureans by later adherents documenting the history of the school I cannot tell; but the latter seems more likely in view of the fact that there are no certain examples of the founders referring to themselves as *ἄνδρεc*, *καθηγεμόνεc*, etc. For the evidence and on *ἀνήρ* in this sense see Longo 1978; above on 461–2.

957–8 *Order of Columns.* One column has probably been lost after the present col. 33, for it is difficult to see how the following column can have continued on from *τὰ πολ[ιτι||κά*. The following two columns in the descending sequence both treat views of Metrodorus and Hermarchus regarding the honouring of gods (994–5) and *cεβαcμόc* (976–7), so the lost column must have dealt with the views of the *kathegemones* concerning cult and worship. This coheres well with the fact that the last citation in the present col. 33 comes not from Epicurus himself, but from his brother Neocles. The views of the *kathegemones* follow (cols. 34–5), concluding the section on religious observance and cult. Festivals (*ἑορταί*) are still the subject of 1015–22, but 1023 ff. clearly introduce a new topic, beginning again with Epicurus' testimony.

Col. 34

Citation of Metrodorus from *Against Plato's Euthyphro* regarding pious actions and speech.

959–60 ἐν τῶι] πρὸς τὸν Εὐ|[θύφρο]να: for this work by Metrodorus attacking Socrates in Plato's dialogue see above on 702. Presumably Metrodorus' name appeared in the introduction to this citation in the lost

preceding column, in something like the following construction: 'Metrodorus adds additional evidence, saying (960 *λέγων*) concerning the gods in his *Against Plato's Euthyphro* that it is necessary for us to become' etc. The occurrence of the article here suggests that *πρὸς τὸν Εὐ[θύφρο]να* is here the title of Metrodorus' book, though in principle even with the article it could simply mean 'saying to Euthyphro' and the subject of *λέγων* in 960 could be Socrates, as above at 702–8 (where the article, however, is omitted). Note that the specification *Πλάτωνος* 'of Plato' cannot have appeared here, as it does above at 703–5 (where it is apparently not part of the title), nor does it occur in the only other attestation of the title, *P. Herc.* 1111 fr. 44 (for the text see above on 205–6). Of course it may have appeared in full citations now lost to us, including its *subscriptio*. That it was part of the original title of Metrodorus' book is suggested by analogy with the titles of the other books by Colotes and Metrodorus attacking named dialogues of Plato (see above on 703–5) and supported by Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 *Metrodorus . . . contra . . . Platonem*. On consistency (or rather the lack of it) in citations of titles generally see Obbink 1988*a*, 428–35 esp. 433.

967–9 κατὰ τὸ διὰ | [τῆς] θεολογία[c] ο̣ὐ̣lcιῶδεc ἔργον: on the sense of *θεολογία* see above, 840.

970–1 μνήμην τῆc ἀρίcτης | [φύ]ceωc: this expression strikes one as redundant when followed by *κατὰ φύcιν*, but that phrase may cohere with what follows.

974–5 πρὸc | [τὸ cέ]μνωμα: for this term, probably a neologism coined by Epicurus and favoured by later Epicureans, see above on 902–3.

976–7 τ̣ὸν cεβαcl[μόν: this term usually designates the way the Epicureans exhibited admiration and honour for members of the school in gestures, speech, and practices reminiscent of private cult and the cult of rulers (see, for example, the critique of it in Philod. *Πρὸc τοὺc* [¬--] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 13 esp. ll. 10–15, probably by a hostile Epicurean). For its use in a positive sense of the approved private cult of the school, see Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 32; Philod. *Tratt.* (*P. Herc.* 346) col. 2,3 (the passage quoted above on 736–7); *De dis* 3 col. 10,5; *De oec.* col. 23,28; *De bono rege* col. 24,18; *De libert. dic.* col. 4,5–6; Capasso 1982, 93–4; Clay 1986; and Angeli 1988, 29–36.

986 ὑμν[: very likely *παραπλ]ηcίωc* in 984 begins a new sentence (it thus needs a connective, *καί* or *δέ*). In 986 could be restored *τὸ]ν̣ θ[εὸν] ὑμν[εῖ* or *ὑμν[εῖν*. Cf. below, 1851 *ὑμνήcει* (suspiciously also in the final line of its column). Praise and *cεβαcμός* of the school's founders and teachers are sometimes described in terms of encomiastic hymn—the only kind of religious poetry approved by the author: above on 768–70 with commentary; later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 11,15–33 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 22) in connection with the lyric poetry of Diagoras. Since the author quoted here is probably still Metrodorus (Hermarchus is introduced at 993), Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1097 B, Metrod. fr. 15 App. especially should be noted:

οἵας φωνὰς ἀφῆκεν Ἐπίκουρος, οἷα δὲ γράμματα τοῖς φίλοις ἔπεμψεν ὑμνῶν καὶ μεγαλύνων Μητρόδωρον, 'ove è forse lecito cogliere un'eco delle forme di esaltazione reciproca tipiche nella vita del kepos' (Capasso 1982, 116). So also Philod. Πρὸς τοὺς [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 14,6–9 = Zeno of Sidon fr. 11 Angeli–Colaizzo καὶ Ζήνωνος ἐγεν[ό]|μην περιόν[το]ς [οὐκ] ἄπιστ[ος] | ἐραστὴς καὶ τ[εθνηκό]|τος ἀκοπίατος ὑμνητής, 'Of Zeno (of Sidon) I was a faithful admirer while he lived and now that he is dead an indefatigable *laudator*' (see below on 1465–8); *De morte* col. 17,4; *De libert. dic.* 74,1 (= *laudes*); *Tratt.* (*P. Herc.* 346) col. 4,26–8 ὑμνεῖν | καὶ τὸν σωτ[ῆ]ρα τὸν ἡμέτερον | καὶ κτίσαι; col. 11,5–7 τ]ῆ[ι] ἀκροτά[τ]ηι καταζῆν τ[ο]ῦ αὐ|τοῦ (sc. Zenonis) τούτου ὕμνον ('*laudes magistri*') συνεχὲς | ἐνκαταρδεύοντας αὐτοῖς. Closely related locutions include: D.L. 10. 5, Epic. fr. 143 Us. (from the incipit of *To Leontion*) Παιὰν ἄναξ, φίλον Λεοντάριον, οἵου κροτοθορύβου ἡμᾶς ἐνέπλησας ἀναγνόντος σου τὸ ἐπιστόλιον; so Epicurus was supposed to have basely flattered (κολακεύειν) Mithres, a Syrian and a διοικητὴς of Lysimachus: ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Παιᾶνα καὶ ἄνακτα καλοῦντα (D.L. 10. 4).

986–7 *Order of Columns.* See on 957–8. The present col. 34 cannot link with the following col. 35, because both come from the same **1077** half of the roll, and because col. 35 links with its following col. 36, also from **1077**. (No more than two columns of near-complete line-lengths can have appeared on the same *scorza* layer; in cases where three appeared, one of the three columns was necessarily extremely exiguous—see e.g. the *O disegno* of cols. 52–4 in Pl. 3—and was always disregarded by the *disegnatore* of *N.*) One column must therefore be lost between cols. 34 and 35.

Cols. 35

Conclusion of the section on participation in cult with quotations from Hermarchus. Beginning of section on what kind of harms and benefits may be expected from the gods; that the early Epicureans allowed that such harms and benefits proceeded from the gods. Epicurus' views on the subject in his book *On Gods*.

988–9 τῶν ἀγα|[θῶν τὰς] ἐλπίδας: 'hopes' or 'expectations of goods' i.e. from the gods. Perhaps Metrodorus (who is probably quoted in the present passage: there seems to have been no change of speaker since 959–60, though we cannot be sure about 977–83) said they were fulfilled in cult in some extended sense, perhaps intellectually or conceptually. Cf. below, 1412–18 προσεπιφέρου|σιν δὲ καὶ διότ[ι] | τ[ῶ]ν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν | καὶ δικαίων παραι|ρούμεθα τὰ[ς] καλὰς | ἐλπίδας ἃς ἐν τοῖς | [θ]εοῖς ἔχουσι, 'they charge in addition that we deprive good and just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods'; 2343–53 τῆς ἀγαθῆς | τοίνυν ἐλπίδ[ος] | τοὺς εὐσεβεῖς ⟨τοῦτον⟩ τὸν | τρόπον ἀποστεροῦ|μεν οἱ καὶ μεγίστη[ν] | αὐτοῖς ὠφέλειαν [ἐκ] | τῶν θεῶν ὑ[πογρά]|φοντες καὶ τὴν πο|νηροτάτην

ἀνα|κόπτοντες α[ὐτοῖς] | προσδοκίαν; 'Do we then in this way deprive the pious of their fine hope—we who set forth the greatest benefit for them from the gods and remove the worst expectation?' The same phrase is echoed by Plutarch at *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102 B (Epic. fr. 30 Us., quoted in full above on 880) οὐδ' ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μεταλαγχάνοντες, and 1101 B (quoted above on 797–9). It would be interesting to know if the Epicureans included material 'goods' as derivable from the gods, or even, for example, pleasures stemming from material goods. According to contemporary Stoics, for instance, the wise man will pray for τὰ ἀγαθά which, on the Stoic account, are necessarily non-material (D.L. 7. 124 = Posidonius fr. 40 Edelstein–Kidd).

990–1 **ἐ]ν τῶι πε[ρί:** a title lost here, possibly Metrodorus' *On Gods*, followed by a brief citation from the work.

994–5 Philippson restored πε]ρὶ τιμῆς θε|[ῶν here, but as a book-title this is unattested.

996 **ὑπὲρ ἐ]κε[ί]νης:** perhaps sc. ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας (ὑπέρ is a common Hellenistic variation for περί'). Unfortunately what Hermarchus said here is beyond recovery.

997–1001 **πε]ρὶ γὰρ Ἐπι[κούρ]ου [πο]λλὰ λέ⟨γ⟩ων | [ἐν] τῶι τελευταίωι | [τ]ῶι πρὸ[ς Ἐ]μπεδο̣ι[κλ]έα̣:** the final book (22) of Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles* has already been cited above at 542–3, where see commentary. The admission here that in that book Hermarchus extensively discussed Epicurus confirms the new addition (achieved by means of a new join) to the citation from Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles* above at 542–4, where the passage goes on (554–9) to discuss Epicurus. The other topic that we know for certain was treated in this book was the development of culture in human history from the earliest times, and the present passage may have gone on to relate part of Hermarchus' or Epicurus' views on the formation of the idea of divinity or the recognition of the appropriateness of cult in connection with early humans. (This is perhaps the explanation for the imperfect προς|εδοξάζετο in 1009–10.) Thus Longo 1988*a*, 127 aptly compares the passage below, 2273–7, from Philodemus' account (perhaps dependent in part on Hermarchus' as well as Epicurus') of how early humans naturally learned to observe traditional religious practices: 'because to break one's oath is to be unjust and also lying, and both are disturbing. And they (sc. early humans) thought and passed on the same kind of attitudes about sacrifices and festivals and other similar practices.' On Hermarchus in *Against Empedocles* see further above, 542–54; Longo 1988*a*, frr. 27–34 with commentary, pp. 125–50; Obbink 1988*a*; Vander Waerdt 1988; Alberti 1995.

1009–22 I have printed a diplomatic text of this passage, in order to focus attention on the important and more textually secure passage which follows at 1023–42. However, a partial reconstruction of ll. 1009–22 may be assayed as follows:

	ὅτι]		
	ἔ]ν [τῶι τι]μᾶν προς-		
1010	εδοξάζετο τὴν {κ}		
	τοῦ θ[εο]ῦ cεμνότη-	(25)	
	τα μ[ᾶλλο]ν †οὐδεν[..		TIT[*N*
	τινος [οὐ μόνο]ν νομί-		
	ζειν ἄ[ξιον] τοιού- ||	(28)	
1015	των, ἀλλ[ὰ καί φηcιν	1077 6	
	οἰκεῖον ε[ἶναι ταῖc		
	ἑορταῖc τ[ὸ θεῖον ἀγα-		
	πᾶcθαι κ[αὶ ταῖc ἐ-		
	πινοία[ι]c [τὴν φύcιν	(5)	
1020	cυμπερι[λαμβά-		
	νουca⟨ν⟩ μά[λιcτα		
	κατὰ τὸ c[έβεcθαι·		

In honouring (i.e. the god) it used to be taught in addition that it is worthy of such people (i.e. the wise) not only to think God greater than anything, but also he (sc. Epicurus) says that it is appropriate to festivals that the divine should be loved, and (appropriate) to (our) notions that its nature (i.e. should be loved), embracing (it, sc. the divine) in respect to worship.

I do not think that the κ at the end of 1010 was a letter in fact, but rather one of the wedge-shaped space-fillers often written by the scribe lest he leave space at line-end (mistaken by the *disegnatore* here for a κ). Judged by the preserved line-ends of 1009, 1013, and 1014, this must be the right margin of the column. Thus at the end of 1011 there is not room for *cεμνότη[τα* (*pace* Philippson); *ουδεν* at the end of 1012 is short by a letter or two.

1009–10 προcεδοξάζετο: the imperfect (here middle or passive) is somewhat out of place, since Philodemus usually uses the present when citing the writings of the early Epicureans (for an exception: below, 1097–8). On the other hand we know that Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles* (which has just been cited at 999–1001) dealt extensively with the affairs of prehistory, especially the development of human civilization, so perhaps the present lines related something said by Hermarchus in that discussion, where the tense would be at home (on the use of the imperfect in narrative accounts of cultural history, see above on 233–4, 300–13).

1014–15 *Order of Columns.* Col. 35 is joined to col. 36 by two parts of the same word, *τοιού||των* (1014–15). The two fragments were on the same *scorza* layer, and so copied in N^1 as a single apograph, though as separate fragments, bearing respectively the numbers fr. 6 (col. 35) and 7 (col. 36). For some reason (perhaps a misguided attempt to restore the original order of columns in the treatise) these numbers were shortly afterwards crossed out on N^1, and renumbered in reverse sequence: accordingly they are numbered 7 and 6 in N^2 and HV^2 11, in both of which they appear as two separate apographs (i.e. on separate sheets). Col. 36 indubitably joins with the following col. 37 (from the 1098 sequence), and col. 36

begins a new section (1023 ff.: harms and benefits from the gods), whereas col. 35 is still concerned with the cult of the gods (989 *ἐλπίδας*, 994–5 *τιμῆς θε*|[*ῶν*, cf. 1017 *ἑορταῖς*).

Section 3: Harms and Benefits from the Gods (1023–1701)

Philodemus begins the section on harms and benefits (*βλάβη καὶ ὠφέλεια*) from the gods with a summary (1023–42), then treats Epicurus' views first (1043–87). In the summary the subject of the third-person verbs (1026–7 *κατα*]|*λείουσι*[*ν*, 1042 *φασί*) is probably not Epicureans in general, but rather, as Longo 1985,239–40 has shrewdly observed, Epicurus and his earliest followers the *καθηγεμόνες* (specifically Metrodorus, Polyaenus, and Hermarchus, who are the only other Epicureans subsequently quoted later in this section). This places the focus of Philodemus' defence not on Epicureanism in general (or contemporary Epicureans) but on the earliest generation of the school. This is an important point, in so far as it makes clear that the treatise is not so much an attempt to defend contemporary Epicureanism as to reconstruct Epicurus' original teachings on the proper attitude to be adopted towards the gods, perhaps as much for the benefit of contemporary Epicureans as for their opponents.

The introductory passage summarizing the early Epicurean position thus takes on added value as a source. It is especially important in so far as it provides exegesis of a troubled sentence in Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123–4, where Epicurus explains that 'the gods are not such as the many believe them to be. For the many do not preserve them, such is their conception of them (cf. LSJ s.v. *οἷος* II. 2). The impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to gods the beliefs of the many about them' (*οἵους δ' αὐτοὺς πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτούς, οἵους νοοῦσιν. ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων*). For this the following explanation is immediately given:

οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ' ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις· ἔνθεν †αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι αἴτιαι τοῖς κακοῖς† ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι (⟨*τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*⟩ addidit Gassendi). *ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες.*

For they are not *προλήψεις* ('preconceptions') but false suppositions, the

assertions of the many about gods. It is through these that ... stem from gods, and benefits. For having a total affinity for their own virtues, they are receptive to those who are like them, and consider alien all that is not of that kind.

For various attempts to explain this text see Usener 1886, pp. xx–xxii; Diels 1916*a*; Bailey 1926, 330–1; Philippson, *BPhW* 51 (1931), 61–4; Diano 1935, 71; W. Schmid 1951, 97–156 esp. 103–4; 1962, 368–70; Barigazzi 1953, 145–58; R. Stark, *Hermes*, 93 (1965), 420–2; Festugière 1968, 48–50; Arrighetti 1973, 537–40; Henrichs 1974*a*, 30; Sedley 1974, 90–2; Long–Sedley 1987, ii. 145; Vander Waerdt 1988, 101–2.

A crucial factor in any interpretation is the way one takes ἔνθεν, whether as referring to ὑπολήψεις/ἀπόφασεις περὶ θεῶν ('according to which', so Bailey, Barigazzi, Long–Sedley, or 'as a result of which state of affairs', referring to the entire preceding sentence), or rather to the gods themselves: 'whence', sc. from the gods. But since the subject under discussion is ideas about the gods in the preceding sentence, it seems quite impossible to take ἔνθεν as anything but 'from these false notions'. It is true that on the view of Long–Sedley the ὑπολήψεις/ἀπόφασεις περὶ θεῶν are in fact the gods (of ἄφρονες), so that the distinction between the two different referents of ἔνθεν disappears under their explanation, although their view ought grammatically and technically to exclude the wise, or the gods of the wise from consideration (except by unstated extension) in this and the following sentence (i.e. αἱ μέγιστα . . . ὠφέλειαι and οἰκειόμενοι . . . ἀποδέχονται . . . νομίζοντες). On the other hand, taking ἔνθεν in reference to the gods themselves (so Bignone, Vander Waerdt 1988, 101) makes the following ἐκ θεῶν redundant, for the sentence would then mean: 'Whence (i.e. from the gods) the greatest . . . for bad men from stem *from the gods* (ἐκ θεῶν).' Lexically ἔνθεν is defined locally and temporally (= Lat. *inde*), but can be extended to denote the concept of origin from which (hence almost = ὅθεν), though I have not been able to find an example of its use leading to a conclusion (i.e. 'therefore'); cf. ἐπάγω, which is sometimes used of implication in logic. It ought to allude specifically to a place, time, or particular state of affairs recently mentioned, in relation to (originally direction from) which the following statement makes a beginning, rather than introducing entirely new and unrelated matter. This is the only identified instance of its use by Epicurus. Dr Holford-Strevens notes that the word (except in the

phrase ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν) belongs to poetry, and to Xenophon (who affects poeticisms). Epicurus may not even have used it; the reader should be warned the corruption in the passage may begin as early as ἔνθεν if not earlier.

The subject of the final sentence οἰκειούμενοι . . . ἀποδέχονται . . . νομίζοντες could be: (1) the gods, assuming an undesignated change of subject (Philippson, Schmid, Arr.², Sedley 1974, Vander Waerdt), (2) the good and the wise (Usener, Bignone, Diano, Festugière, who must supply ⟨τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς⟩ after ὠφέλειαι, since they have otherwise not been mentioned); (3) the many, πολλοί (Bailey, Diano, Barigazzi); (4) people in general (Long–Sedley), whom I take to be not the many plus the few wise (= all humans), but the many minus the foolish, i.e. the epistemologically significant consensus. (I do not think the subject can have been left deliberately ambiguous.)

The most common strategy for solving the corruption that appears in the text above between daggers (marked by the ellipsis in translation), is to find a means of removing the word αἴτιαι—among which may be mentioned the emendation by A. A. Long (*HPh* ii. 145, no. 23 B) of αἴτιαι to αἱ ἐπὶ: 'It is through these that the greatest harms, the ones affecting bad men, stem from the gods' (translation *HPh* i. 140). Usener, who thought the entire sentence beginning with ἔνθεν had been inserted from a marginal scholium (in part because the sentence which follows it begins with γάρ but seems to explain the sentence that precedes this one), deleted αἴτιαι and added τε (to be correlated with καί), and followed Gassendi in supplying ⟨τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς⟩ after ὠφέλειαι. Thus: ἔνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι τε τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι ⟨τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς⟩. Diano deleted αἴτιαι together with τοῖς κακοῖς, and is followed in this by Arr.²: ἔνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι. (Note also the emendation of αἴτιαι to αἰκῖαι 'pains' by C. Jensen, *Ein neuer Brief Epikurs*, AGG³ 1933/5, 79: βλάβαι ⟨καὶ⟩ αἰκῖαι τοῖς κακοῖς.) In support of removing αἴτιαι it may be noted that in some texts βλάβαι and ὠφέλειαι are said to proceed more or less directly from the gods (see 1024–5, 1031–2). αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι stands first in the text; αἴτιαι is omitted in one MS (the Constantinopolitanus).

On the other hand at 1042–6 below Philodemus says that Epicurus himself sketched out the kind of αἰτία . . . σωτηρίας that could be be accepted as coming διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ. If this (together with the other texts cited below) reflects Epicurus' original wording in *Ad Menoec.* 124, the word AITIAI (sc. substantival αἰτίαι and not adjectival αἴτιαι) may be

original and sound, and we should expect *βλάβαι* and *ὠφέλειαι* to stand in the genitive: i.e. *αἱ μέγιστα βλάβης* (vel *βλαβῶν*) *αἰτίαι*. The closest proposal to this thus far is Bignone's suggestion (*Riv. di. fil.* 43 (1915), 540, often credited to Von der Mühll, who did not print it in his main text): *αἱ μέγιστα* (vel *μεγίστων*) *βλαβῶν αἰτίαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* (assuming that *κακοῖς* is a gloss that displaced an original *ἀνθρώποις*, as does I. H. Leopold, *Mnemosyne*², 43 (1915), 282), combined with Von der Mühll's suggestion (1929, adn. to p. 45,6) *ἐκ θ. ἐπ. καὶ ὠφελειῶν*. This is accepted by Philippson, *BPhW* 43 (1923), 1099 and by Vander Waerdt 1988, 101 n. 50, except that the latter reads *τοῖς κακοῖς* of the MSS for Leopold's emendation *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, and the MSS' *ὠφέλειαι* instead of Von der Mühll's emendation *ὠφελειῶν*, noting that the lack of parallelism (in case between *βλαβῶν* and *ὠφέλειαι*) is characteristic of Epicurus' Greek (no examples are given): *ἔνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλαβῶν αἴτιαι τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι*, 'whence the greatest causes of harm come to evil men from the gods, and the greatest benefits'. Other proposals for saving *αἴτιαι* include ⟨*ὧν ἐκεῖναι ὑπολήψεις μόνον εἰσὶν*⟩ *αἴτιαι τοῖς κακοῖς* (Diano 1935,63; 1946,7,104: 'i danni di cui solo quelle false supposizioni sono causa ai malvagi'); and W. Schmid 1951, 118–19: *βλάβαι* ⟨*συν*⟩*αίτιαι τοῖς κακοῖς* ⟨*κακῶν*⟩, 'harms which are contributory causes of evils for bad men'.

Language involving *αἰτία* or *αἴτιος* (i.e. of harms or benefits from the gods) is reflected in a source with a neglected but impeccable pedigree: Atticus ap. Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* 15. 5, p. 800a = Epic. fr. 385 Us. = Atticus fr. 3. 8–9 des Places: *ἤδη δὲ ταύτῃ γε καὶ κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ὄνησις* [NB = *ὠφέλεια*] *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ θεῶν γίνεται· τὰς γοῦν βελτίονας ἀπορροίας αὐτῶν φασι τοῖς μετασχοῦσι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν παραιτίας γίνεσθαι*, 'Moreover in this way according to Epicurus profit comes about for humans from the gods; indeed, they say that their (sc. the gods') finer effluences are contributory causes of great goods for those sharing in them (sc. the effluences)' (cf. below, 1083–7). The occurence of *παραιτίας* (rendered 'sont causes partielles' by des Places) in this passage even caused Usener to recant his earlier judgement, as reflected in his text (p. 60), on the the crux in *Ad Menoec.* 124: 'hoc testimonio [sc. Attici] inlustrantur verba Ep. ep. III 124 p. 60,10 sq. non recte a me in suspicionem vocata' (adn. to p. 258,1). In other words, in hindsight Usener understood the text as transmitted: i.e. *ἔνθεν αἱ μέγιστα βλάβαι αἴτιαι* (vel ⟨*παρ*⟩*αίτιαι*) *τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται* = 'whence the greatest harms proceed causally from the

gods for bad men', (impossibly so, since in the passage above from Atticus *παραιτίας* is meant in an active sense, whereas in *Ad Menoec.* 124 the adjective *αἴτιαι* would in this case have to be construed passively: 'harms proceed as *caused* from the gods'). Similarly below, 1094–9, Polyaenus is quoted as having showed that 'divine nature is a cause for us of these goods' (*τ*]*ῶν ἀ*[*γαθῶν*] | *αἰτίαν ἡμε*[*ῖν*). The passages from *De pietate*, together with the testimony of Atticus, at least show that the concept of causation (cf. above, 736–7 *διὰ φυσικὰς* | [*αἰτίας*) and language involving the terms *αἰτία* and *αἴτιον* were employed in these discussions and had a well-founded place in the formulation of Epicurus' argument in *Ad Menoec.* 124 (or its exegesis). This is shown most conclusively in a passage later (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,13–32 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 22–3):

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐπιδει|*κτέον αὐτοὺς ὅτι βλά*|*βης καὶ κακῶν οὔ φα*|*ς*[*ι*]*ν αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς* | *ἀνθρώποις τοὺς θε*|*οὺ*⟨*ς, ὅ*⟩ *δοξάζοντας ἀπέ*|*χεσθαι τῶν ἀ*[*δι*]*κο*-|[*πρ*]*αγημάτω*[*ν*] *ἔνι*|*οί* (*ἐνίους* coniecit Diano) *φασιν,* [*ἡ*]*μεῖς δὲ καὶ* | *ταῦτ' ἐν*[*ί*]*οις ἐξ αὐτῶν* | *λέγομεν παρακολου*|*θεῖν κα*[*ὶ*] *τῶν ἀγαθῶν* | *τὰ μέγιστα. καὶ διό*|*τ*[*ι*] *τὰ θεῖα τοιαῦτα κα*|[*τ*]*αλείπουσιν καὶ γε*|[*ν*]*ητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ φαί*|*ν*[*ε*]*ται, το*[*ῖς*] *δὲ πᾶσιν* | *ἡμεῖς ἀκολούθως ἀϊ*|*δίους κἀ*{*ι*}*φθάρτους* | *ε*[*ἶ*]*ναι δογματίζομεν.*

Next it must be demonstrated that they (sc. the Stoics) deny that the gods are responsible for harm and misfortune to humans; some say that people holding this opinion abstain from unjust actions, but we (sc. Epicureans) say that these things follow for some of them from the gods—and also the greatest of goods! And that they make divinities out to be such as are capable of being begotten and passing away, whereas we—consistently with all men—consider them to be eternal and indestructible.

Philodemus here implies (in what is virtually an autoschediasma of Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124) that in contrast to Stoics, Epicureans do not deny that the gods are *αἴτιοι* 'responsible' for harm and misfortune to humans. In this text the superlative adjective *μέγιστα* has clearly been understood to apply to *τὰ ἀγαθά* (here = *ὠφέλειαι*) as well as to *βλάβη καὶ κακά*. Note that just as in Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124 we are not specifically told for whom the *ὠφέλειαι* are beneficial (presumably *ἐνίοις* is to be understood over again from l. 22), which makes it virtually certain that Philodemus knew a version of that passage in which the specification ⟨*τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*⟩ did not follow *ὠφέλειαι* in its text. This does not mean that it was not implied (so Vander Waerdt 1988, 101 n. 50 'Gassendi's supplement *ὠφέλειαι* ⟨*τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*⟩ is to be understood if not printed'). As Long and Sedley, 1987, ii. 145, note,

'a correct or relatively correct conception of the divine nature is beneficial not only to those already good, but to anyone at all'. But did the Epicureans take the further step of claiming that in this case at least human error was beneficial, i.e. that good and bad men benefit from the latter's defective conceptions of the divine? This seems unlikely in view of the fact that it would be philosophically almost without parallel, while it would bring Epicurus' position dangerously close to that of Sisyphus in Critias' satyr play *TrGF* i². 43 F 19, criticized above 519–30 and below, 1176–1217 (cf. Perelli 1955). In other words, the *ὠφέλειαι* in *Ad Menoec.* 124 cannot be *simply* the same *βλάβαι* that for bad men arise as a result of their false *ὑπολήψεις* about the gods, only viewed from a different perspective (on the grounds that such false beliefs cause them to abstain from unjust acts in a way that is beneficial not only to them but to everyone). But this view is not unknown to Philodemus. Note that in the passage quoted above from *P. Herc.* 1428 (col. 12,13–32, Henrichs 1974*a*, 22–3) Philodemus says that some (*ἔνιοι*) hold that people who believe that the gods are a source of harm and misfortune to men abstain from unjust actions. The reasons why they think this are set forth below, 1176–1217 and 1701–2480, and they may not be entirely mistaken. But he goes on to say that the Epicureans also hold that the greatest of goods stem from the gods (*ἐξ αὐτῶν | λέγομεν παρακολου|θεῖν κα[ὶ] τῶν ἀγαθῶν | τὰ μέγιστα*), thus rehabilitating the traditional view that it is the good, the pious, and the just who may expect to benefit from the gods, which is ultimately beneficial not only to them but to everyone. Cf. also below, 1412–18, 2343–53 (cited on 988–9).

The conclusion is inescapable that *αἴτιαι* at *Ad Menoec.* 124, whether a vestigial remnant of an earlier version in the form *ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβης αἰτίαι τοῖς κακοῖς*, or whether it intruded from a marginal scholium (perhaps glossing *ἔνθεν* by explaining that the aforementioned false *ὑπολήψεις/ἀποφάσεις* about the gods were *αἴτιαι* 'responsible' for, or *αἰτίαι* 'causes' of, the 'greatest harms to bad men'), represents an authentically Epicurean variant of the text that was almost certainly known to the author of *De pietate*.

The further point is that the doctrine seems to have been formulated in both ways: either it is said that harms and benefits proceed directly from the gods, or the gods are styled the causes of them. The alternative formulations may reflect a dual need for explanation faced by the Epicureans. (1) The formulation with *αἰτίαι/αἴτιον* explains that the gods can be responsible for harm and benefit to humans, in

something like the traditional sense (Philodemus can claim that in this way the Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, conform to most people's ideas on the subject). In this explanation harms and benefits are not held to stem as directly from the gods: it is not through any fault of the gods *per se* that they are a kind of cause of harm (to bad men). Since they are fundamentally concepts in the first place they are merely part of the larger physical spectrum with its attendant processes of causation. (2) The version in which the harms and benefits are said to stem directly from the gods explains how it can be that the gods can harm humans (since this is directly contravened e.g. by *KD* 1), i.e. provides the explanation that it is people's *ideas* of the gods that actually produce the harm (for the bad) or benefit.

It might of course be objected against the Epicurean position that it is not then really the *gods* who cause harm, but mistaken ideas of them. But this objection is ultimately not decisive against the Epicurean view. For the 'gods' who bring benefits to wise men have exactly the same ontological status, though a different content, as the mistaken ideas of gods that bring harm to bad men.

There is at any rate in these accounts a common effort to sustain the view that the harms and benefits stem directly from the gods: the gods are not only implicated in causal process, and the harms and benefits are said to be by-products of such processes (thus the gods are παραίτιοι of goods, fr. 385 Us.), but the Stoics mistakenly deny the gods to be αἴτιοι for misfortunes, whereas Epicureans cautiously say that from them goods and harms 'result' (παρακολου|θεῖν, *P. Herc.* 1428, col. 12, 13–32, quoted above); at 1023 in the present passage there is admitted to be a 'production' (τὸ περ[αίνεσθαι) of harms and benefits from the gods; at *Ad Menoec.* 124 the greatest harms ἐπάγονται for the bad—all of which may somewhat qualify the Epicurean claim (saying: 'in a way', 'so to speak', or 'in a sense'). But the argument in question was not intended to tell us in the first instance what the gods are like, where they live, etc.: rather, its purpose is to account for how the majority of humans now think and talk about the gods, i.e. an explanation of 'false popular belief rather than doctrine', (*pace* Vander Waerdt 1988, 101 n. 50) in a way that is consistent with the Epicurean theory.

Col. 36

1017–18 *ἀγα]πᾶcθαι* could be supplemented here (as opposed to correcting with Philippson to *τι]μᾶcθαι*) on comparison with Philod. *De bono rege* col. 20,19, where good kings are said to *ἀ|γαπᾶcθ[αι] cεβαcμοῦ*, since it is necessary that the Phaeacians be scorned for their dancing at parties rather than be 'admired with respect'. See the reconstruction above on 1009–22.

1020–1 cυμπερι[λαμβά]|νουcα: this was a word used by Epicurus in technical contexts, especially involving definition of a term or concept: *De nat.* 15 fr. 30. 29,3; *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 18,24 (= p. 53 Sedley); also below, 1338–9 *ἐπειδὴ cυνπερι[λαμ]|βάνειν ἔοικεν ἡ [εὐ]|cέβεια καὶ τὸ πρὸ[c] | ἀνθρώπουc ἀβλα|βέc*, 'since piety seems to include also not harming people'; *De dis* 1 col. 19,14. The general sense is 'include', 'embrace' ('comprehendo' *Lex. Philod.*). At the end perhaps *ν* has dropped out before *μα* (cf. app. to 325–6).

1023–42 Here the *kathegemones* are said to have held a doctrine whereby there are produced benefits and harms for good and bad persons respectively (1025–6 *ἀγαθοῖc, κακ[οῖc* are datives of interest). Philodemus paraphrases, saying that for wise and just men (i.e. *οἱ ἀγαθοί*) there is a completion or production (by humans in general) of benefits and harms (from the gods) which are no less or even greater than those harms and benefits which people in general usually assume (in 1028–9 *φρον[ίμοιc καὶ] | δικαίοιc* are likewise datives of interest, though the grammar would also allow them to be subjects of the jussive construction with the verbal adjective *νοη[τέον* in 1030). The present passage thus adds another dimension to that expressed in *Ad Menoec.* 124. For in addition to assuming the account there of why people in general think and talk as though the gods were a source of great harms and benefits (and, in a sense, are right about this), the present passage purports to give a rationale whereby the Epicurean sage will do so as well.

Longo 1985, besides materially improving the text, notes that the subject of 1026–7 *κατα]|λείπουcι[ν* must be the *kathegemones* rather than Epicureans in general. To her text I add only two basic modifications: different punctuation in 1031 and a new reading and supplement that requires no alteration of the original apograph in 1034–5.

1023 τὸ δὲ περ[αίνεcθαι: a very common word in Philodemus' usage, usually in the sense of *proficio*, but above, 489–90 in the sense of *finio*, 'delimit'. Here it is passive, with the accusatives *ὠφελίαc, βλάβαc* as the subjects of the articular infinitive. As the passages above illustrate, the singular of the abstract nouns *βλάβη* and *ὠφέλεια* and these same terms in the plural occur almost interchangeably in these contexts, so that it is very difficult to tell which stood here, though the sense is not in doubt. (See the construction with the plurals below at 1031–2, but the singular at 1045–6.)

1026–7 κατα]|λείπουcι[ν: 'leave undisputed', 'allow the truth of', 'posit',

'admit'. On the use of the verb see above on 36; Henrichs 1974*a*, 30–1. Cf. below, 1047–8 *κα*]|*ταλεπτέον*.

1028–9 φρον[ίμοις καὶ] | δικαίοις: this phrase is clearly echoed in a passage below (1412–18) where Philodemus characterizes his adversaries' charges: *προσεπιφέρου*|*σιν δὲ καὶ διότ*[*ι*] | *τ*[*ῶ*]*ν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν* | *καὶ δι*-*καίων παραι*|*ρούμεθα τὰ*[*ς*] *καλὰς* | *ἐλπίδας ἃς ἐν τοῖς* | [*θ*]*εοῖς ἔχουσι*, 'they charge in addition that we deprive good and just men of the fine expectations which they have of the gods' (cf. 2343–53). Philodemus' claim to have evaded this charge, as expressed here and further in the section on the development of human society below, is that those who are wise and just will understand that there is a sense in which traditional expectations of harm and benefit are fulfilled through the gods, so that there is an identifiable sense in which humans gain harm and benefit from them: namely, from the projection, as concepts of divinity, of their own ethical ideals (*HPh* i. 144–9, no. 23). The previous sentence (1023–7) has explained that bad men share in harms and good men in benefits, whereas the present sentence (1027–35) specifies that for the wise and just the harms and benefits are as great or greater than people think. This is an important specification: according to Epicurus the wise and just stand as much as anyone else (i.e. people in general, for instance, or the foolish) to be benefited or harmed by their own conceptions of the gods.

Diano 1946, 106 with n. 1 curiously held that the *φρον*[*ίμοις καὶ*] | *δικαίοις* in 1028–9 are not 'the wise':

> non de sapientibus Epicureis loquitur Philodemus . . . sed de iis tantum qui vulgo prudentes et iusti habentur; qui licet sint iusti, at cum non vera de dis opinentur, ne damna quidem, quae ex falso religione sequi docet Epicurus, effugere possunt. Neque his restitutis intellegi potest quid sit quod improbi minora vel etiam maiora (quae quidem inter se pugnant) quam boni (? at absurdum est: an altero alter? sed *ἢ καὶ*?) ex falsis suis de dis opinionibus, superaddita conscientia scelerum, percipiant. Omnia plana si haec sententia Philodemi fuit, ut prudentibus et iustis paria damna et beneficia esse (i.e. beneficiis damna compensari) diceret, improbos autem cum beneficia minor tum maiora damna percipere.

Philodemus is speaking here not about Epicurean sages, but about those who are commonly called prudent and just, who, although they are just, nevertheless do not hold true views about the gods and are therefore unable to escape the harms which Epicurus teaches stem from false religion. Nor, if we took it in this way, would it be possible to understand why it is that the bad have smaller or indeed greater harms (which indeed is a contradiction) than good men (but this is absurd: one more than the other? but what of *ἢ καὶ*?) from their false opinions of the gods, with the addition of consciousness of their crimes. Everything is clear if Philodemus' view is that for the prudent and just there are equal harms and benefits (i.e. harms compensate benefits), while bad men receive less benefits and greater harms.

Cf. *contra* W. Schmid 1951, 104–5, Longo 1985, 239.

1028 The anacoluthic *μέν* has the effect of emphasizing the phrase *τοῖc*] | *μὲν φρον*[*ίμοιc καὶ*] *δικαίοιc*, 'for the wise and just' (as opposed to all humans). The antithetical clause to be supplied in thought is 'but by humans in general there is understood to be harms and benefits of a different sort from the gods' (cf. 1033–5).

1029–30 τ̣[ὸ τελει]|οῦcθαι: the apograph represents a single straight ascender leaning to the right before the break, ruling out *ὁ*[*μοι*]|*οῦcθαι*, but only appoximating *τ̣*[. Cf. the *ἀκροτάτη* (*τελειοτάτη*) and *ἀτελὴc εὐδαιμονία* mentioned by Philod. *De dis* 3 col. g5,25 compared by W. Schmid 1951, 105 n. 32 (cf. Diels p. 14 n. 1). I take the subject of the verbal adjective to be impersonal, with the entities affected or agents *φρον*[*ίμοιc καὶ*] | *δικαίοιc* 1028–9 expressed in the dative, and the articular infinitive expressing indirect discourse as often, e.g. above, 489; later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 21 (Gomperz 1866, 72) = Antisthenes fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi, quoted above on 536–7: *λέγεται τὸ* | *κατὰ νόμον εἶναι* | *πολλοὺc θεούc*. Thus what one is or becomes goes in the dative, not the accusative (cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124), so that the harms and benefits must be the accusative subject of the passive *τελει*]|*οῦcθαι*. This does not, therefore, necessarily constitute proof that the subject of the final sentence in *Ad Menoec.* is similarly the wise and just, or even people in general, although Philodemus, who probably found the final sentence as perplexing as some modern scholars, may have intended the present sentence to be an explanation, exegesis, or even expansion of the content of the sentence in *Ad Menoec.* 124. Compare below, 1050–4, where we learn that Epicurus in *De nat.* 13 discussed this concept in terms of *οἰκειότηc* which the *god* (1053 *ὁ θεόc*) has *for some people* (who are not specified, but can only have been the wise) and the *ἀλλοτριότηc* he has for others.

1030 νοη[τέον: for the construction here, cf. *κα*]|*τ̣αλειπτέον* below, 1047–8.

1031–2 καὶ τὰc ὠφ[ελίαc καὶ] | τὰc βλάβ̣α[c: that the collocation *καὶ . . . καί* is expected here seems obvious from the preserved elements; elsewhere in *De pietate*, e.g. below, 1340–2, 2348–53, above at 527–30. The meaning of *κατα*]|*δεεcτέρ̣α*[*c* in 1032–3 (where see commentary) has caused difficulties over the articulation of the text here to editors led astray by Philippson's imaginary reading *τ̣ο̣*[*ῖc κα*]|*κ̣οῖc* at 1034–5. Diano 1935 and W. Schmid following Philippson wanted to separate *ὠφ*[*ελίαc* and *βλάβ̣α*[*c* adversatively, printing *καὶ τὰc ὠφ*[*ελίαc, ἀλλὰ*] | *τὰc βλάβ̣α*[*c κατα*]|*δεεcτέ-ρ̣α*[*c ἢ καὶ*] | *μείζουc*. So also Longo's variant: *καὶ τὰc ὠφ*[*ελίαc,*] | *τὰc βλάβ̣α*[*c δὲ κατα*]|*δεεcτέρ̣α*[*c ἢ καὶ*] | *μείζουc*. However, these reconstructions leave the initial *καί* before *ὠφ*[*ελίαc* impossibly difficult to explain, and they must resort to contortions to account for it (apparently left untranslated by Longo). In view of this Diano 1946, 106 later relented and printed the collocation originally seen by Bücheler and Gomperz that is followed in the

present text, but punctuates the following cause differently so as to create two different groups of harms and benefits: *καὶ τὰc ὠφ[ελίαc καὶ] τὰc βλάβ̣α[c, κατα]|δεεcτέρ̣α[c δὲ καὶ] | μείζουc*, etc. He takes *καὶ τὰc ὠφ[ελίαc καὶ] τὰc βλάβ̣α[c* (in equal amounts) to pertain only to the 'prudent and just' of 1027–9 and takes *κατα]|δεεcτέρ̣α[c δὲ καὶ] | μείζουc* (sc. *τὰc ὠφ[ελίαc καὶ] τὰc βλάβ̣α[c*) to apply only to bad men, who get 'lesser' benefits but greater harms because of their false views of the gods (see his explanation quoted above on 1028–9). Unfortunately for this complicated scheme, 'the bad' are never actually mentioned here as he thought (following Philippson's supplement in 1034–5; the 'bad' do appear at 1026 *τοῖc κα[κοῖc*, but they cannot simply be understood again separately here).

1032–4 οὐ κατα]|δεεcτέρ̣α[c ἢ καὶ] | μείζουc: the fact that *κατα]|δεεcτέρ̣α[c* here means 'more deficient', 'weaker', i.e. 'less severe', caused endless difficulties among commentators obliged to explain why Philodemus contrasted 'lesser' harms or benefits with 'greater' ones. L. A. Holford-Strevens's supplement [*οὐ*] solves all difficulties: 'no weaker', viz. 'just as dire'. Diano 1935 and 1946, for example, postulated a complex classification of *ἄδικοι–κακοί–ἄφρονεc* and *δίκαιοι–ἀγαθοί–φρόνιμοι* who supposedly received harms and benefits in correspondingly greater and lesser amounts. Longo 1985, 239, following W. Schmid 1951, 103–5, restricts benefits to the wise (1028–9 *φρον[ίμοιc καὶ] | δικαίοιc*) as ungraduated, and restricts the graduated harms to the non-wise alone: 'la beatitudine-conoscenza della teologia epicurea può essere conseguita soltanto ad un unico livello che è il grado sommo, mentre l'errore e l'oscurità possono essere presenti in gradazioni varie: chi accede allo *status perfectionis* soni i sapienti (da identificare con i *φρόνιμοι–δίκαιοι* del nostro passo), mentre i *κακοί* (che sono i *πολλοί*, i piú) sono vittime dei vari gradi di *ἄγνοια*.' This scheme depends on Philippson's improbable *τ̣ο̣[ῖc κα]|κ̣οῖc* in 1034–5. W. Schmid 1951, 105 postulates polemic here with the Stoic doctrine *ἴcα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα εἶναι*. He argues that, unlike the Stoics (who held *ἀcέβεια* to be a *τῇ εὐcεβείᾳ ἐναντία ἕξιc*), the Epicureans allowed for gradations of piety rewarded by a graduated scale of harms and benefits. *κατα]|δεεcτέρ̣α[c* means 'weaker', 'less severe', (the opposite of *μείζουc*). *περι]δεεcτέρ̣α[c* or *ἀ]δεεcτέρ̣α[c* might also be considered here. But Philodemus uses the term below in criticism of the doctrine of intermediate terrestrial *daimones* later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. E d (*HV*² II 7b), Speusippus fr. 57 Tarán (cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 31–3, *Dox. Gr.* 529–30; new text in Tarán 1981, 375 with commentary) *οὐδὲ [τὰc] | ψυχὰc τῶν καλῶν κ̣[ἀ]|γαθῶν θείαc λέγων | δυνάμειc, πολὺ δὲ [κα]|ταδεεcτέραc καὶ ἐλ|λειπούcαc*, 'and not (like Speusippus) calling the souls of the noble and good divine powers, but much inferior and deficient' (i.e. compared with other gods).

1034–5 ὦ[ν ἄνθρω]|ποι cυνάπ[τουcιν: the new restoration conforms perfectly to the traces and spacing of the apograph (compare Philippson's

τ̣ο̣[ῖc κα]|κ̣οῖc) and produces good sense. There may be an echo here of Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123 *μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίαν ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε*, 123–4 *ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων*. The entire sentence will thus constitute a claim (in defence against detractors, see on 1028–9) that the wise and just necessarily understand that people receive no lesser harms, and even greater benefits than people in general normally believe to stem from the gods. The passage thus recalls Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124, where the very greatest of all of harms (or their causes) are said to proceed from the gods for the bad, but benefits may also be derived from them. The claim for even greater benefits is also characteristic of the author's general representation of Epicurus' position on religion: the Epicurean sage will observe all religious rites and events (certainly more than most people, 732 ff.); Epicurus himself participated in all festivals and sacrifices (795 ff.); the Epicureans believe not only in the existence of all the gods of the Greeks, but in even more (below, at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10,26–30; Henrichs 1974*a*, 21); Epicureans even criticized Socrates, a paragon of piety (above, 701–5). In short, Epicureans are more pious than even most people, to whose way of talking about and acting towards the gods the Epicureans conform as well, only more consistently.

1036 ἀcθέ[νειαν: an echo of Epicurus, *Ad Herod.* 77 *ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται*. Cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 88b,5; col. 7,31 *εἰ καὶ ταῦ[τ'] ἐ[δύ]|νατο, τὴν δύνα[μιν ἂν εἶχέ π]ως καὶ τοῦ πάντ[ας] | ποιῆσαι σοφοὺς κ(αὶ) μακαρίους κ(αὶ) μηδὲν κακόν. τὸ | δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀσθέ-νειαν κ(αί) τιν' ἔλλειψιν συνάπτει | τῶι κρατίστωι*; col. 12,17. For the clause of exception, conversely defining what we should not expect from the gods or why not, see above on 740–3.

1039–40 ἐπα[ναχω]|ρήσει τῆς [ὀνήσεως: for *ἐπαναχώρησις* in the sense of 'return' see Thuc. 3.89. *ἀπόρησις* does not occur in Epicurus (compare his use of *ἀπορέω* at *Ad Herod.* 37 *τὰ ἀπορούμενα*; 38; fr. 562 Us., in reference to intellectual deficiency; Theophr. *De odoribus* 12), and *ἐπαπόρησις* is attested only by Hesychius. For *ὄνησις* (*ὠφέλεια*) see Atticus fr. 3. 8–9 des Places (quoted in full above on 1023–1701) *ὄνησις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ θεῶν γίνε-ται*. This is not the only possible restoration in 1040, but it seems clear enough that we need here something positive that can be expected to issue from the gods to humans.

1041–2 τ[αῦτά | φ]αcι cεμνό̣[τατα: since Philodemus goes immediately on to quote specific works of Epicurus, Metrodorus, Hermarchus, and Polyaenus in support of his claim here, it seems virtually certain that the subject of *φαcι* is Epicurus and the *kathegemones* rather than Epicureans in general (see above on 1023–42). This supports the thesis of Longo 1985, 239–40 that they are likewise the subject of 1026–7 *κατ]|λείπουcι[ν*.

1043–4 ἔν τε γὰρ τ[ῶι Περὶ] | θεῶν: for this work by Epicurus, see

above, 189–90 (possibly 382–3). Philodemus' claim here that Epicurus discussed the 'cause' in many places in his *De dis* may be relevant above, 753–4 (where, however, the title is restored) introducing the quotation from Epicurus at 754–73; cf. 739. Epicurus' *De dis* is also attested by Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102BC (cf. above on 205–6). It otherwise seems to have been concerned with some of the technicalities of how we are to think of the gods as existing, judged at least from the only other attestation: Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 8,5 ff. (Epic. fr. 31 Us., 17. 1 Arr.^{2}), where the assertion that the gods have *ποιὸς ὕπνος*, 'a kind of sleep', can be seen to be parallel to Cicero's report at *De nat. deor.* 1. 49 (cf. 1. 68) *nec tamen ea species* (sc. *deorum*) *corpus est, sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem, sed quasi sanguinem*. On the link (with which the present passage *ποία . . . αἰτία* may be usefully compared) see especially Arrighetti 1961; Longo 1985.

1044–5 *Order of Columns.* Col. 37 falls neatly here after the present col. 36 in the descending order of alternating columns. This link provides added confirmation of the relationship between *P. Herc.* 1077 (col. 36) and *P. Herc.* 1098 (col. 37).

Col. 37

1044–5 ποία [τίς ἐc]||τιν αἰτία: often in questions (Hdt. 3. 34. 2 *κοῖον μέ τινα νομίζουcιν εἶναι;*), here in indirect speech for *ὁποία*: Hdt. 1. 158, 3. 34. 4, Thuc. 7. 38, Xen. Anab. 2,2,2, Aristot. *Pol.* 3.15 1286^{b}24 *γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινεc ἔτυχον*. Philodemus does not tell us what kind of an *αἰτία* Epicurus said this was in his *De dis*. Presumably he said it was a *φυcικὴ αἰτία* (cf. on 736–7). Perhaps he also said that such a cause (or its resulting effect) was *οἰκεῖα* to us: cf. 739–40 *οἰκεῖον εἶναι | [ἡμεῖ]ν φηcιν*.

1045–6 αἰτία ν[εμέcεωc] | καὶ cωτηρία[c: cf. 1023–5, 1031–2 where *ὠφέλεια* from the gods is contrasted with their potential for *βλάβη*. It is not certain that *ν[εμέcεωc* should be restored here (*ἡ[γεμονίαc?*). Usener restored *αἰτίαν [βλάβηc] | καὶ cωτηρία[c*, but Bücheler thought the pair *ὠφελίαc] | καὶ cωτηρία[c* more appropriate (hendiadys for 'saving benefit'?). *ν[εμέcεωc* is commended by the reference to Nemesis later in the treatise (see vol. ii; Luppe 1974*a*–*b*; 1975). Normally *νέμεcιc* is righteous anger aroused by injustice, not always of the gods. But cf. Hdt. 1. 34 *ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεcιc μεγάλη Κροῖcον*; Soph. *Ph.* 518 *τὰν θεῶν νέμεcιν ἐκφυγών*, 602 *θεῶν βία / καὶ νέμεcιc*. It is of course unknown what kind of *cωτηρία* ('preservation', 'keeping safe', 'safety') Epicurus in this work said came to humans *διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*. But it seems doubtful on the whole that he connected it (in the sense of 'deliverance') with the role of the sage as *cωτήρ* sometimes mentioned in Epicurean texts, e.g. Philod. *Tratt.* (*P. Herc.*) 346 col. 4,19 *ὁ cωτὴρ ὁ ἡμέτεροc*, or that he suggested that the sage could be a kind of *θεόc* who provided *cωτηρία* (in the form of ethical 'security') to his followers. Epi-

curus may instead have connected this *cωτηρία* with the role of the divine in Epicurean theology to provide a conceptual analogy for great *ἡγεμονία* (see above, 755–8, i.e. a political analogy), and to provide civic security through social observance of public religious rites (see 750–1) and the Epicurean conception of justice as a pact which leads to the mutual *cωτηρία*, 'preservation', of humans. Cf. *ἄδεια* in 1189, *ἀcφάλεια* in 2152, *cωτηρία* in 2164, 2335–6. *cωτηρία* is mentioned in connection with how we should think of the gods as existing at *De dis* 3 col. 11,40: if they need couches, furniture, and other such things as we do they will be eternally in need of them *ἐπὶ cωτηρίᾳ* 'for their preservation'.

1046–7 ἀνθρώ]|ποιc: cf. 1034–5 *ὦ[ν ἄνθρω]ποι cυνάπ[τουcιν.*

1047 διὰ τοῦ θε[οῦ: since this is a quotation from Epicurus, it may be significant he employs the noun *θεόc* rather than the neuter substantive *τὸ θεῖον* or some equivalent like *τὸ δαιμόνιον* (cf. 1141 and see above on 744–7). The restoration of the masculine noun is guaranteed by its occurrence just below in 1053, and we have just had it in 1038.

1047–8 κα]|ταλειπτέον: misrepresented by Sedley 1974, 91: 'men must abandon any expectation of divine intervention in their affairs'. *καταλείπω* means 'leave undisputed', i.e. 'allow' in Philodemus' usage: *Rhet.* i. 50,13; *De ira* fr. 12,15, col. 40,2. Cf. above, 1026–7 and see on 36; Henrichs 1974*a*, 23.

1048–9 ὑπ[ογρά]|φει: cf. *Ad Menoec.* 123, where Epicurus enjoins Menoeceus to 'think of God as an imperishable and blessed creature, as the common idea of God is is outline' (*ὡc ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόηcιc ὑπεγράφη*). Rist 1972, 26 takes this to mean presenting certain general features of a thing. In Stoic logic a *ὑπογραφή* is an 'outline account', a formula for the marking-off of a definiendum prior to the construction of a definition. It clarifies what is under discussion but may not yet reveal its true nature. See *HPh* i. 23 C 3 with p. 194. Cf. below, 2343–53 (cited on 998–9), and (in vol. ii) *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,33–13,1 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 22–3) *τὸ δὲ cυνέχον—ἐν γὰρ | ἄ̣λ̣λ̣οιc ὑπογραφήc̣ε||τ̣αι τ̣ὰ ἄλλα.*

A hint about what Epicurus may have said on this point can be gleaned from *Ad Menoec.* 134: *ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυcικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν· ὁ μέν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήcεωc ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆc, ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην*, 'For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope (cf. below, 2343–53) of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation' (Bailey). This implies that what is *ὑπογραφόμενον* about the gods need not be the literal and specific truth, but must be consistent with it.

1050–1 ἔν τε τῶι τρε[ιcκαι]|δεκάτωι: this book of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύcεωc* is also cited at *P. Herc.* 1111 frr. 45,4 and 44,4–5 (quoted above on 205–6), in notable conjunction with book 11 of the same work and his *Περὶ*

ὁσιότητος. This supports the argument of Sedley 1974 that book 13 dealt largely with theological matters, especially the gods' non-involvement in human affairs. It probably corresponded closely to the discussion of that subject prominent in the closing paragraphs of *Ad Herod.* (especially 76–82). Sedley (1974, cf. 1984) argues further that the letter *To Herodotus* summarizes doctrines of books 1–13 of *Περὶ φύσεως*.

Philippson, unaware of the original order of columns, postulated the haplography of the full title *Περὶ φύσεως* here: i.e. *ἔν τε τῶι τρε[ισκαι]|δε-κάτωι περ[ὶ ⟨φύσεως λέγει περὶ⟩ τῆς] | οἰκειότητος* etc.—unnecessarily, since we know now that Philodemus mentioned the title only in the first citation (at 225–7, where it appears in the full form) and simply by book-number thereafter (e.g. here, 523–34, 1078, 1888–90). For this form of citation see above on 225–7. But we have too few citations of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* from the Herculanensia to know if this was normal. Nor is it clear why Philodemus cites frequently from *Περὶ φύσεως* in *De pietate* but virtually nowhere else. He knows that Epicurus discussed there the doctrine of *οἰκειότης καὶ ἀλλοτριότης*, and knows that he did so in book 13, while the topic of divine *ὠφέλειαι* appeared in 12. But he does not appear particularly anxious to engage in exegesis of these doctrines, as he does for example in the section above on religious participation (for which the *Περὶ φύσεως* is not apparently cited), or below in the section on human development (which probably does depend on *Περὶ φύσεως* 12).

1051–4 περ[ὶ τῆς] | οἰκειότητος . . . [καὶ] | τῆς ἀλλοτρι[ότητος]: this doctrine is recognizable from the final sentence in *Ad Menoec.* 124 *ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες* (and see above on 1023–42). Philodemus' wording here suggests that the much-disputed subject ought to be the gods in the first instance (though by implication they stand as a model or analogy for the natural behaviour of humans), or at least that Philodemus understood it this way. (Philodemus is not quoting Epicurus directly here, but the noun *ὁ θεός*, cf. 1047, at least is somewhat uncharacteristic of his usage.) Cf. in this connection Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 41,20, 18,8 where *τὰ οἰκεῖα δέχεσθαι* by the gods seems to be opposed to *τὰ ἀλλόφυλα ἀπωθεῖσθαι*. The problem, as Diano 1946, 108 following Usener points out, is that the final sentence does not seem adequately to explain, as its introductory *γάρ* declares, either the preceding sentence *ἔνθεν—ὠφέλειαι*, or (assuming that sentence to be an intrusive gloss) the sentence before about the *ὑπολήψεις* of the *πολλοί*. On the other hand, the subject of *οἰκειούμενοι . . . ἀποδέχονται* cannot, as Diano and Usener thought, be the good and wise, for the reason that we must then supply *⟨ταῖς ἀγαθοῖς⟩* after *ὠφέλειαι*, since they have not been otherwise mentioned, and a reader could not be expected to supply in the nominative a noun merely implied or vaguely suggested but suppressed in the dative. And *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,13–32 (quoted above on 1023–42, where

see commentary) shows with some persuasiveness that *ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς* did not appear in the text known and echoed by Philodemus. So on the whole we are best served by the reading of Long–Sedley 1987, who take the plurals *οἰκειούμενοι . . . ἀποδέχονται* to refer to human behaviour in general, as though proverbial or gnomic (which avoids the problem of an undesignated change of subject).

For *οἰκειότης* and *ἀλλοτριότης* see on 1103, 1106; cf. *οἰκεῖον* and *ἀλλότριον* (synon. *ἀνοίκειον*), and see on 739–40 *οἰκεῖον εἶναι | [ἡμεῖ]ν φησιν*. That *ἀλλοτριότης* 'heterogeneity' occurs elsewhere in Epicurus only in a technical context and in *Περὶ φύσεως* (the treatment of *τὰ μετέωρα* in book 11 fr. 26. 44,16 Arr.^{2}) confirms that Philodemus reflects Epicurus' wording in the present citation. According to Epicurus' will (D.L. 10. 20), those who studied with him 'showed him every mark of friendship' (*τὴν πᾶσαν οἰκειότητα ἐνδεδειγμένοι*); cf. *KD* 40, Philod. *Pragm.* col. 12,4–6 (fr. 197 Us., 97 Arr.^{2}) *οὐ μό|νον διὰ τὴν οἰκειότητά [σου, ἀλλὰ] | καὶ διὰ τὸ ἦθος αὐτῶν*. In Theophrastus: Obbink 1988*b*, 283.

1052–3 ἢ[ν πρός] | τινας ὁ θεὸς ἔχ[ει: although this does not tell us much about the philosophical intricacies of Epicurus' '*βλάβη-ὠφέλεια*-Lehre', it does well show what Philodemus thought was compatible in the doctrine with popularly accepted views about the divine (which is his concern here). According to Diano 1946, 106 *ἔχει* here = *praebet*. It would be more accurate to say that the fact that harms and benefits result, through a process of physical causation, from whatever it is that different types of people conceive to be god, is styled by Epicurus as the god 'having' a sense of affinity or opposition for corresponding types of humans; one might render *de familiaritate quam deus cum quibusdam hominibus habeat* (cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124). The key term in this formulation thus becomes *πρός τινας*, as is also reflected in the passage below from *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,13–32 (quoted in full above on 1023–42) *[ἡ]μεῖς δὲ καὶ | ταῦτ' ἐν[ί]οις ἐξ αὐτῶν | λέγομεν παρακολου|θεῖν κα[ὶ] τῶν ἀγαθῶν | τὰ μέγιστα*. See also Henrichs 1974*a*, 30 n. 61, who notes that in that text the *ἔνιοι* are the *κακοί*, as in *Ad Menoec.* 124—whereas in the present passage Philodemus has specified that also *πρός τινας* 'for some' the god has an affinity and (presumably for others) an opposition. Presumably this is not merely Philodemus' interpretation, but actually appeared in the text of *Περὶ φύσεως* 13 as he says here. Perhaps he thought it needed pointing out (since it is not explicitly said at *Ad Menoec.* 124) that this doctrine was appropriately consistent with general belief about piety and the gods, especially in the light of the charge he is answering, below, 1412–18, cf. 2343–53. Thus notable here is the unusual occurrence of *ὁ θεός* rather than one of the more colourless philosophical designations for godhead (see on 744–7, 761; for *θεός*: 1141 and see on 1277 ff.). Thus any god will 'have affinity' for the person who so conceives of him, and 'be opposed' to those who do not. But only for the good and the

wise will this also be God indeed, and not just someone's conception of a god or projection of values.

1055–6 ἐν δὲ τῶι πέ[μπτωι καὶ] | τ̣ριακ[ος]τῶ̣[ι: the book-number was recovered by Usener, who printed *πε[ντεκαι]|τριακ[ος]τῶ̣[ι*, though it requires some violent changes to the apograph. This was upheld by Sedley 1974, 92 (at least as far as *-τ̣ριακ[ος]τῶ̣[ι*: 'Book Thirty-something'). L. A. Holford-Strevens notices that after the teens, one expects such a formation as *πεντεκαι-* only in derivations from the cardinal, and I have modified Usener's supplement accordingly. Cf. the regular form of the ordinal reconstructed at 1888–90. Because the books of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως* extended to a uniquely high number (see below on 1078) and because of the peculiar manner by which *Περὶ φύσεως* is cited in *De pietate* (by book-number alone: see above on 225–7), the present citation can only be to that work, a book in the thirties. Since the ordinal must begin immediately after *ἐν δὲ τῶι* in 1055, and since *N*'s ME[cannot accommodate any numeral, correction of the apograph is demanded: *πέ[μπτωι καὶ* seems the only likely possibility for recovering one (though as far as I know there is no other instance where the copyists mistook M in this hand for Π). If this is book 35, then all we know of it we know from this fragment, namely from 1057–9, that in it Epicurus clarified something about *ὠφέλεια*, apparently from the gods. Sedley 1974 was concerned to demonstrate the possibility of a group of books concerning ethical topics at the close of Epicurus' *Περὶ φύσεως*, particularly a series concerned with human psychology, and sought to claim book 35 from the present citation for the well-known *liber incertus* (34 Arr.^{2}) on psychological topics: 'the book in question may have had more to do with human psychology than with the gods themselves' (Sedley 1974, 92). That book has since been shown to have been book 25 by Laursen 1987, from a reading of the book number itself in the *subscriptio*. Nevertheless it remains possible that book 35 did deal with human psychology, especially in connection with the strong denial of *ἀνάγκη* (not found, e.g. in the letter *Ad Herod.* and consequently not in *De nat.* 1–13) in human motivation found in the *liber incertus* (apparently book 25), and that it compared or clarified the doctrine about harms and benefits resulting from human views of the gods. (Epicurus may, for example, discussed in it whether or not the acquisition of such *βλάβαι* and *ὠφέλειαι*, primarily psychological on any interpretation of Epicurean theology, are 'up to us' or not.) This is at least consistent with the fact that the immediately following citation comes from Epicurus' *On Fate* and concerned *συνεργία* from the gods.

1057–9 σὺν τῶι τι [ταύ]τ̣ης | τῆς ὠφελ[ίας] διαlc[α]φεῖν: for the verb *διαφέω* see above on 208–9.

1059–62 According to Arr.^{2} book 35 had the theme 'del rapporto uomini–dèi e dell'opera benefica che gli dèi esplicano *σὺν τῶι τινας δ' ἡδονῆς ὠφελεῖν* in quanto *σώιζοντες αὐτοὺς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωτῆρες γίνονται* [Phi-

lippson's lavish reconstruction of the present passage]', on which Sedley 1974, 90 comments: 'students of Epicurean theology may share my relief at discovering that this curious sentiment, with its Christian overtones, is not Epi-"curus' own but was invented for him in 1921 by R. Philippson.' Arrighetti rose to the defence of Philippson's ingenious reconstruction 'in saving themselves they become saviours of others' in a reply in *CErc* 5 (1975), 50–1, citing the occurrence of *cωτηρία*[*c* in 1046. Yet this is specifically said to be something they have for humans (1046–7 *ἀνθρώ*]|*ποιc*), not for themselves. More appositely he cites [Plut.] *Plac.* 1.7.7, *Dox. Gr.* p. 300, fr. 361 Us., together with Atticus fr. 3,66–9 des Places ap. Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* 15. 5. 9, p. 800a (fr. cit. Us.) *κατ' Ἐπίκουρον τὸ τῆc προνοίας οἴχεται, καίτοι τῶν θεῶν κατ' αὐτὸν πᾶcαν κηδεμονίαν ὑπὲρ τῆc cωτηρίας τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν εἰcφερομένων* (cf. also Arrighetti 1955, 322 and 342–7). But it would be out of keeping with the present section of Philodemus' treatise for him to cite examples of Epicurus' having held that the gods conserve their *own* goods, or that we should think of them as so doing. Much more likely than Philippson's *cώι*]|*ζον*[*τεc* here is probably a form of *νομίζω* or *δοξάζω* (cf. on 1295) on analogy with *Ad Menoec.* 124. Beyond that not much can be said about what is lost here: 'agitur de utilitate quam ex cognitione divinae naturae homines capiant' (Usener adn. to p. 128,32), except that something is wrong with the transmitted letters in 1060–1 because *καὶ* | *τῶν ἀλλα*[is not a conceivable syntax, and 1061–2 could be *εὐερ*]|*γ*[*εcία* or *cυνερ*]|*γ*[*ία* (cf. 1394, 1065 respectively).

1064–5 ὑπὲρ τ[ῆc] | ἐκ[είν]ων cυνεργία̣[c: Usener took *ἐκ*[*είν*]*ων* to be the gods, i.e. concerning the gods' assistance (to humans). But Arr.² takes it to refer to assistance provided by the Epicurean sage, comparing *Gnom. Vat.* 34 and 44. Perhaps the (understood) antecedent was *ἀνθρώπων*, people in general: 'concerning humans' assistance' (i.e. from the gods, or from the divinized philosopher), sc. 1059–60 *οἱ νομί*]|*ζον*[*τεc*? This is the only preserved citation of this work by Epicurus, though we knew that it existed from the list at D.L. 10. 28. Presumably it dealt with *ἀνάγκη* and, perhaps, human psychology. Below at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 8,5 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 18) Philodemus attacks Chrysippus' work on a closely related topic, *Περὶ προνοίαc*. For the term *cυνεργία* see Philod. *De mus.* 69,28; *Rhet.* i. 270,34 (and often); again in a political context (cf. *cωτηρία*) Polyb. 8. 33. 10.

1066 ἀποφαίνεται: for the term see on 224–5 and cf. 1097–8.

1066–9 κάν | ταῖc ἐ[πι]cτολα[ῖ]c | [μ]έντοι ταῖc Πρὸ[c] | τοὺc μεγάλουc: this was a collection known to Philodemus of Epicurus' letters to 'famous' or 'noble' addressees, perhaps the *ἄνδρεc* (above on 461–2). Usener (ad fr. 104) conjectured that it also included letters from famous individuals, comparing the letters cited in Philod. *Pragm.* Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 21. 4 (Epic. fr. 132 Us.) *omnes illos megistanas et satrapas et regem ipsum, ex quo Idomenei titulus petebatur, obliuio alta subpressit.* But it is unknown whether these were letters to famous contemporary figures of political importance (as perhaps Mithres,

minister to Antigonus, to whom Epicurus wrote frr. 74–82 Arr.²), or to important contemporary philosophers. (They were certainly not letters to famous philosophers of the past, like Empedocles or Democritus: Obbink 1988*a*, 433–5.) It seems likely, however, that they were letters to famous Epicureans, such as Philodemus cites extensively in the previous section on cult and in his treatises *Pragmateiai* and *De Epicuro*. There is reason for thinking that Philodemus here passes over (see next note) further citation of these letters (*μέντοι*) on the point of harms and benefits from the gods and proceeds directly in the following columns to cite actual treatises by Polyaenus (1092 ff.) and Hermarchus (1099 ff., there may have been more); Epicurus' works are cited again at 1255 ff.

1069–70 ὁμ̣[ο]|λογεῖν: i.e. Epicurus did not say anything in the 'letters to important individuals' contradicting what he said in *On Nature* 13 and in *On Destiny*, cited above on the point about God having affinity with some and providing them with assistance—lest it be thought that Epicurus expounded one doctrine about the gods in his technical treatises, and another in these letters. The treatises were probably for and addressed to adepts, while Epicurus' letters (if the three transmitted by Diogenes Laertius are any indication) were summaries for the use of insiders and a wider public alike. If, however, the addressees of the *ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς τοὺς μεγάλους* were (1) great men in the eighteenth-century sense (as we say VIPs), then the contrast intended by Philodemus will have been that Epicurus did not say one thing in his technical treatises for adepts, and another in his letters to outsiders; but if these letters were to (2) other important Epicurean *ἄνδρες*, then that he did not say one thing in his published treatises and another in letters addressed to insiders. In the case of (1) there are really no good candidates for such addressees, apart from the letter(s) *To Mithres* (frr. 74–82 Arr.², while (2) would apparently be a separate collection of letters *πρὸς τοὺς μεγάλους* (*ἄνδρας*) or perhaps *μεγάλους* (*φίλους*), cf. frr. 96–9 Arr.²

1071–2 ἵνα μή τ[ις] | εἴπῃ πρὸς τοὺς [: Usener thought this should continue: [*μεγάλους αὐτὸν πεπλασμένως λέγειν*, but its continuation is unclear. For instance, Anon. A suggests the supplement *ἵνα μή τ[ις] | εἴπῃ πρὸς τοὺς [φίλους* (sc. *Epicureos*), which suits the context well since in the following columns Philodemus proceeds to cite from actual works by Polyaenus, Hermarchus, *et al.* before drawing his conclusions about harms and benefits from the gods as exemplified by the lifestyle of Epicurus and the *kathegemones*.

1072–3 *Order of Columns.* The following col. 38 may join directly (it comes from the other half of the broken papyrus roll), but too little is preserved at the beginning of col. 38 to be certain or to reconstruct the link. In 1073 perhaps *α]ἴτ[ιος* or *α]ἰτ[ία* (cf. 1097 *αἰτίαν*) and 1074 probably *βλ[αβ-* (cf. 1089–90 *ὠφε|λίαν*) at least confirms the sequence, showing that the causation of harms and benefits through the gods is still under discussion.

Col. 38

1078 ἐν τῶι] ἕκτω[ι: it is uncertain from what work Philodemus is citing books 6 and 8 in ll. 1077–89 by book-number alone: Epicurus' *On Nature* is most likely. Elsewhere this work is cited by book-number alone, except in the first citation (a convention which is sufficiently unusual: see on 224–5; it would have been confusing to say the least if this practice were followed for other multi-book works). 1088–9, dealing as it does with ethics and psychology as well as theology, does not sound especially like material likely to have been covered in *De nat.* 6 and 8. In the present column Philodemus turns from Epicurus to treat the works of the *kathegemones*: Polyaenus is cited at 1092–9 and Hermarchus at 1099–1108. (Cf. 1089–90 *τὴν ὠφε|λίαν τ[ί]θεν-ται*, where the plural verb must thus refer to the *kathegemones* in addition to Epicurus, whose views on this topic have already been treated at 1043–65.) We might therefore expect here a citation from Metrodorus. The only known work of Metrodorus' which extended to eight books was his *Against the Sophists* in nine books, known from D.L. 10. 24, Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1091 A (Epic. fr. 423 Us., cf. 1091 E), Galen, *De libris suis* 17 (xix. 48 K.); see Metrod. fr. 28 Körte. (In fact, aside from the thirty-seven books of Epicurus' *On Nature*, and Philodemus' own *De rhetorica* and *De vitiis* in ten books, the *only* other early Epicurean work known to have extended to this length was Hermarchus' mammoth twenty-two-book *Against Empedocles*, which is not a possibility for the present citation because it is introduced by title just below, 1099–1105.) If 1078–89 come from Metrodorus' *Against the Sophists*, then both the title and Metrodorus' name must have preceded. In 1073–4 we could restore *M]ητ[ρόδωρος | περὶ τῆς] βλ[άβης*. But I can see no way to accommodate *ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς σοφιστάς φησι* in any of these lines before the book-numbers in 1078 and 1088–9, though of course the title may have come in the previous column, if we are missing one between cols. 38 and 39 (which is impossible to tell, since we have no stichometric indications preserved from this section of the treatise). On the whole, a continuation of the citations from Epicurus' *On Nature* from 1043–62 seems more likely here, with the section on the *kathegemones* beginning in 1089.

1082–3 κ]αὶ εὐόρκους | [καὶ δι]καίους: cf. 1027–9 *καὶ τοῖς] | μὲν φρον[ίμοις καὶ] | δικαίοις*; 1414–16 *τ[ῶ]ν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν | καὶ δικαίων*. The present passage must be introduced by a similar construction: '(In book 6 he establishes that) those who keep their oaths and are just are moved by the most virtuous influences' etc.

1083–5 ταῖς ἀ|[ρ]ίσταις διαδόσε|[σι] κινεῖσθαι: an obscure doctrine and terminology. Could it have plausibly been treated in the physical books of *On Nature* 1–13? *διαδόσεις* are 'transferences' or 'communications', e.g. of motion at Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 105–6: earthquakes may be caused by the *διάδοσις* of motion (*κινήσεως*) caused by the falling of masses of earth and the

repercussion (*πάλιν ἀνταπόδοσιν*), hence 'tremors' at Lucr. 6. 546–7: *quippe cadunt toti montes magnoque repente / concussu late disserpunt inde tremores*. The entire passage 6. 535–56 in Lucretius (together with the corresponding passage from *Ad Pyth.*) bears scrutiny, in so far as Lucretius intended it to illustrate the causal interconnectedness of all physical components of the world including air. The way in which effluences 'from the gods' affect us like tremors in the form of images and the conceptions they constitute will have made for an interesting analogy. Cf. Epict. 1. 12. 6 *διαδόσεις ἐκ θεῶν εἰς ἀνθρώπους;* Marc. Ant. 1. 17. 6 (pl.); Heliod. ap. Orib. 44. 23. 59 *ἐκ διαδόσεως τῆς ἀφῆς γινώσκειν τι* (cf. above, 549–50 *τ̣[ῆι συν]|αφῆι τῆς φύσεως*, and Epicurus' book *Περὶ ἀφῆς* ap. D.L. 10. 28). Of celestial influence in astrology Ptol. *Tetr.* 3. 2. 2 Boll–Boer *ἐκ τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος διαδόσεως*. Cf. *διαδίδωμι*: Philod. *De ira* col. 8,31–2 *ἐπὶ τὰς διαδι|δομένας τῶι σώματι κει|νήσεις ἀσταθεῖς*.

1085–7 καὶ παlρ' αὐτοὺς καὶ παρ' ἐlκείνους: the antecedent of the latter may be the gods, as suggested by Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. *διάδοσις* (cf. s.v. *διαδόναι*). The notion that the good are 'moved by the finest effluences' both from the gods and from *themselves* implies that we are to think of the two as more or less equivalent in this process of causation. This is highly suggestive of the view that according to Epicurus the gods exist even for the good and wise as their own conceptions of divinity, as 'projections of their moral ideals' (see *HPh* 1, no. 23). Yet the formulation here shows that the Epicureans were capable of distinguishing in their theory between psychological agents and 'gods' that have a separate ontological identity. For *παρὰ* with the accusative in this sense see Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. *παρά* + accusative, and LSJ end of *παρά* + accusative. I have translated 'from themselves' and 'from the gods' (cf. Kühner–Blass i. 511–12). More precisely, *παρὰ* here *delimits* the range of these *διαδόσεις*, 'influences' (Henrichs).

1087–9 κ]αὶ παραl[π]ληςίως ἐν τῶι ὀγ|δόωι: nothing else of course is known about the content of this book (whether from Metrodorus' *Against the Sophists* or from Epicurus' *On Nature*). But the citation by book-number alone suggests that we are right in restoring the citation by book-number in 1078. We should punctuate after *ἐν τῶι ὀγ|δόωι*, understanding *φησιν*, since 1089–90 *καὶ τὴν ὠφε|λίαν* begins a new syntactical unit.

1092–4 ἐ[ν τῶι] | πρώ[τωι] Πρ[ὸς τὸ Πε]|ρὶ φιλοσοφί[ας Ἀρις]|τοτ[έ-λ]ους: only here. On the form of the title and parallels for early Epicurean works attacking the specific works by Plato, Aristotle, and contemporaries see above on 703–5. We know only that it consisted of more than one book, addressed the arguments of Aristotle's *On Philosophy*, and recommended to the reader the existence of divine nature (*θεία φύσις*: see commentary on 1098–9) as a cause of benefits (cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123–4). Tepedino 1991 (Polyaenus fr. 29) restores here *Πολύ[αι]νος ἐ[ν τῆι] | πρώ[τηι] χρ[αφῆι πε]|ρὶ φιλοσοφί[ας* (cf. Longo 1985, 238; Tepedino 1991, 178). However, no

work by the title *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* is attested for Polyaenus (as for Aristotle), though we know Polystratus wrote one (see Capasso 1976; Ph. De Lacy, *CErc* 7 (1977), 126), as did Metrodorus (frr. 31–3 Körte from Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1127B–D, 1108E). Bignone 1936, ii. 59 thought that polemic with Aristotle could be detected from the mere title of these works, as though echoing the title of Aristotle's dialogue of that name. But see Tepedino on Polyaenus fr. 29, who is justifiably sceptical. Capasso 1976, especially 81 n. 10, shows that Polystratus' treatise by that name was protreptic in nature, and not specifically anti-Aristotelian in character. Metrodorus' *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* was concerned with that philosopher's involvement in politics. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the early Epicureans knew and responded to Aristotle's popular writings. On Polyaenus' career see Sedley 1976*b*, 43–8, esp. 47; Angeli 1988*b*; Tepedino 1991, 25–67. Philodemus had a curious attachment to Polyaenus: *ἐπιεικὴς καὶ φιλικός, ὡς οἱ περὶ Φιλόδημόν φασι*, 'a good and kindly man, as Philodemus affirms' (D.L. 10. 24; for the expression *οἱ περὶ τὸν δεῖνα* = *ὁ δεῖνα* see below on 1367–8). Adulation of this sort is typical of the syntaxis of Epicurean philosophers in D.L. 10 (cf. 10. 25: Hermarchus *γενόμενος ἱκανὸς ἀνήρ*, 'was a good man'; cf. above on 896–7; Festugière 1968, 70). But Philodemus' reported attachment to Polyaenus has never been adequately explained (D.L. cites no work by him: cf. id. 2. 105). *P. Herc.* 176, which treats him in fr. 5 col. 14,4–16, col. 27,5–12, cannot be by Philodemus because it was written in the second century BC. The numerous mentions of him in the present work (*Against Aristotle's On Philosophy* here and *Against Ariston* above, 10; cf. 578, letters from Epicurus to him: 840–1, 865–6, 932, 938) may therefore be relevant for the question of authorship of the present work. Philodemus' teacher Zeno of Sidon knew of suspicions that Polyaenus' treatises *Against the Rhetoricians* and *On the Moon* might not be authentic (Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 11 Angeli). He died before Epicurus, and there was a cult of him even in Epicurus' lifetime (D.L. 10. 18).

1094–7 Philippson restored *αὐ*]|*τοτ*[*ελ*]*οῦς*[*αν ἡδο*]|*νῶν* [*τ*]*ῶν μ*[*εγίστων*] | *αἰτίαν ἡμε*[*ῖν* here, but the sense in which this cause may be said to be *αὐτοτελοῦσαν*, 'self-completing' is baffling (cf. 1910). Why should it be any more 'self-completing' than any other cause? Moreover *αἰτίαν* on Philippson's reconstruction is left without an article (cf. 1044–5). For the divine as an *αἰτία* of goods see above on 737 and 1045; cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124 (see on 1023–1701). Note here the specification *ἡμεῖν* 'for us' as above, 740.

1098–9 τ[ὴν] | θείαν φύσιν: the collocation, quoted here from Polyaenus, is strikingly favoured by the author of Epic. *Ad Pyth.*: 97 *ἡ θεία φύσις . . . ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι*; 113 *ὅταν τὴν θείαν φύσιν μηθαμῇ λειτουργιῶν ἀπολύωσι*; 115 *οὐδὲ κάθηταί τις θεία φύσις . . . κἄπειτα τὰς ἐπισημασίας ταύτας ἐπιτελεῖ*. It also appears at *Gnom. Vat.* 24 *ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ*

ἔμπτωcιν εἰδώλων, and is restored above, 199, cf. 63 with commentary, 104, 321. In other Epicurean writings it seems to have been replaced by synonymous expressions for God, though we know from 230–1 above that Epicurus in *Περὶ φύcεωc* 12 referred to the gods as *ἄφθαρτοι φύcειc*. On Epicurus' practice of referring to a thing as its nature see above on 230–1.

1099–1101 **Ἔ[ρμαρ]|χοc θ' ὁμ[οί]ωc ϛ[...]|ετη[.]αν ψυχήν**: Diels (*Dox. Gr.* 127 n. 1) ingeniously recovered the name of Hermarchus here, and connected it with the mention of his *Against Empedocles* (already restored by Bücheler) in the succeeding fragment in the Neapolitan numbering. Autopsy of the original Neapolitan *disegno* confirmed the link, showing (since they were originally copied side by side on the same apograph) that both fragments were on the same layer of *scorza*. What Hermarchus' exact concern was with the soul (cf. above, l. 4) in this passage remains murky owing to an apparent corruption in 1101. A restoration in Anon. A suggests ϵ[ὐϵρ]-|⟨γ⟩έτη[c]αν ψυχὴν; for a letter dropped from the beginning of the line see **242** fr. 3 (vol. ii; above, p. 22).

1101–2 *Order of Columns*. Cols. 38 and 39 are both fragments of the **1077** sequence numbered in ascending order (frr. 4 and 5, respectively). The two columns were drawn side by side on the original *disegno* N^1 (see on 1099–1101). In the copy (N^2) the two fragments were copied separately as successive apographs, as though they were separate fragments: they are numbered in ascending order (so also cols. 28–30), reflecting their original sequence. Sometimes the original order is unintentionally reversed (see cols. 9–10, 35–6) when the *disegni* were assigned fragment-numbers after copying.

Col. 39

1103–8 On this fragment of Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles* see Longo 1988*a*, 125; Obbink 1988*a*. Philodemus has already cited the work for its criticism of sophistic interpretations of gods' names above at 542–59 and at 993–1002 on Epicurus and worship of the gods, both times citing from the final book; on its possible dating see on 521. The present citation is the only piece we have from book 1. It is notable, if the restorations in 1106–7 are correct, not because book 1 seems to have discussed how benefit derives for humans from the gods (which is unremarkable), but because in it provides valuable confirmation that in the work Hermarchus discussed the concept of *οἰκειότηc* 'affinity' as suggested by the fragment from Hermarchus in Porph. *De abst.* 1 (especially its role in justice and natural relations, cf. 1107–8), from which work we also know that the term figured large in Theophrastus' *Περὶ ϵὐcϵβϵίαc* (see on 1106). The final book was book 22, if this was the same work as that cited as *Περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέουc* at D.L. 10. 25 in 22 books. Philodemus' form of the title (*Πρὸc* = *adversus Ἐμπεδοκλέα*), apparently the form known to Cicero (*De nat. deor.* 1. 93), was recently confirmed

when it turned up on a *sillybos* (since its writing is against the fibres and the verso is inscribed with a document, or possibly the colophon of a work written on a reused roll) from an Egyptian papyrus (*P. Oxy.* XLVII 3318) containing book 9, probably occupying the entire roll (though see R. Coles in *P. Oxy.* XLVII (1980), 10; cf. T. Dorandi, 'Sillyboi', *Scrittura e civiltà*, 8 (1984), 185–99 at 195). The designation *Ἐπιστολικά* that follows in Diogenes means not that *Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα* was in the form of letters to the fifth-century philosopher, but represents a separate entry in Diogenes' list of Hermarchus' writings designating a collection of letters, as shown by Longo 1988*a*, 124 (so already Bernays 1866, 139–40); cf. Obbink 1988*a*, where a reference to an earlier suggestion along these lines by Laks 1976, 24–5, 95–6 was omitted in oversight.

1105 πρ[ώτηι γραφῆι: I have followed Krohn's *πρ[ώτηι* with *γραφῆι* adopted from Longo 1988*a*. For *γραφή* as a synonym for *βιβλίον* see Epic. *De nat.* lib. inc. fr. 36.24,5 Arr.², Philod. *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 18,7–9, Dem. Lac. *Poem.* 2 col. 66,10; above, 225–7, and for the equivalence see also Capasso 1981, 397; Longo 1985, 238 n. 16; Capasso 1987, 54 with n. 89; Longo 1988*a*, 125. In addition I note that, in contrast to *βυβλίον* or *πραγματεία*, *γραφή* is normally used in the Herculanensia to designate a numbered book out of a larger, multi-book work. But the book-number *following* the title is slightly suspicious (cf. 999–1001, 1092–4), and A. Henrichs reminds me that the feminine is common in book-numbers with *βύβλος* understood. F. Bücheler suggested the restoration *πρ[αγματείαι* in reference to the treatise as a whole; but elsewhere Philodemus cites this work by a specific book: 543, 999, both by the final book.

1106 οἰ[κειότητ(α): cf. above, 1050–4, where it is recorded that Epicurus in *De nat.* 13 discussed the *οἰκειότης* and *ἀλλοτριότης* which the god has (1053 *ἔχ[ει*) for different types of humans (cf. on 739–40). The subject of natural 'affinity', between beasts and men, and men and gods, especially as a basis for justice, was a subject we know Hermarchus discussed in *Against Empedocles* 1: see fr. 34 Longo (Porph. *De Abst.* 1.7–12; cf. Longo 1988*a*, 94–9, Vander Waerdt 1988. Cf. Theophrastus F 531 Fortenbaugh: Obbink 1988*b*, 283. With 1107 *ἐν[ίοις* cf. 1052–53 *πρός] τινας*. For 1107–8 *τὸ] | ἐναντί[ον ἄλλοις* see 1054 *ἀλλοτρι[ότητος*. Here *ἔ]|χειν* adds that the gods (or godlike persons like the sage) 'feel' such an affinity for some things/persons and so by implication 'furnish' the goods described in 1095–1103.

1117–18 εὐχὰς καὶ προς[κυ]|νήσεις: cf. 896–8 with commentary.

1119 τιμάς: cf. above, 994 (also from Hermarchus' *Against Empedocles*).

1123–4 ἐφαρ]|μόσεις ἑο[ρτῶν: 'adaptations', 'interpretations', of festivals; Hermarchus probably disapproved of such 'adaptations' since he is found in concert with Epicurus above at 535–46 criticizing sophistic philosophers for their similar interpretations of gods' names. *ἐφαρμόττω* = *συνοικειόω*, Lat. *accommodare*, hence similar language and criticism below (see vol.

ii), *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 8,9–13 (of Chrysippus) τὰ | τῶν θεῶν [ὀ]νόμα|τα ἐφαρμόττει τῆς | δρειμύτητος ἀπο|λ[α]ύων ἀκοπιάτως, 'he adapts the names of the gods (i.e to suit his interpretations), indulging in subtlety without ceasing'; *De poem.* 5 col. 10,27; *Rhet.* i. 206; 281,12. But this terminology originates in the Epicurean tradition with Epicurus himself: *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 16,10; 31. 18,26. As an abstract noun the expression is rare: ἐφάρμοσις = ἐφαρμογή, e.g. ap. Epict. 1. 22. 2 ἐ. τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς οὐσίαις.

1129 ἡγοῦμαι: for the interjection of the authorial first person see above, 320, 502, 723–5; below, 1384–7.

1129–30 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 39 and the following col. 40 aptly come from opposite halves of the broken papyrus roll. A link between the two columns seems likely. Nevertheless the restorations in 1127–9 are intended primarily *exempli gratia* to suggest a plausible syntax, consistent with such a link, for the opening of the following col. 40.

Col. 40

In spite of the fragmentary state of the preceding column, the logical sequence of argument can be recovered with reasonable security: Philodemus argues that the Epicurean position in no way entails that the concept of piety is to be entirely done away with. He then outlines the requirements for a person's being pious or impious: the Epicureans maintain that the pious person upholds the imperishability and blessedness of God (here styled as ὁ θεός) who, if conceived without unhealthy anger or benevolence, can also be seen as the source of good and ill.

The philosophical options on this point are nicely elaborated below, 1176–1217, which also acknowledges some interesting affinities (as well as differences) between the Epicurean position and earlier philosophical views. According to Philodemus there: (1) some earlier philosophers represented the gods as capable of harming and benefiting humans, but like the Epicureans almost no one made them act in conformity with unsuitable conceptions that debased the gods (1181–2 οὐ . . . ὁμο[ί]ας | τοῖς χυδαίοις). (2) Still other philosophers held that the gods did no harm whatsoever (the Epicureans agreed only that they did not do so in a traditional, literal sense), but dishonestly disguised their views from the public. Both positions (1) and (2) contravene popular belief. According to the Epicurean position there is *some* basic validity, and not merely utility as in position (2), in popular beliefs and traditions about the gods, even if people in general are ultimately mistaken about the *way* in which gods harm and benefit (cf. 1133–4

τῶι [τὰ κοι]|νὰ φυλάττειν: the Epicureans hold that this is necessary). In addition, view (2) exhibits considerable hostility to ordinary people in general and would do away with the concept of piety altogether, a move which is denounced in the Epicurean view (cf. 1130–4, 1338–44, 1367–83, 1460–3, 2343–53). The definitions of the pious and impious man are thus carefully constructed to embody Epicurean restrictions on divinity (perfect happiness and imperishability), but contingently to allow some basis for such traditional beliefs about harms and benefits in the thinking of the pious person. The descriptions of the pious and impious persons in cols. 40–1 should be closely compared with Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123, in exegesis of which they were doubtless composed.

1131–3 ἐ]ξελέc|θαι τὴν πᾶcαν ὁcιό|τητα: for Epicurus' use of the verb see *De nat.* fr. 34.25,5, 12, 15 Arr.^{2}. For the force of the expression cf. ἀναιρέω and see above on 522.

1134–8 ὡ[c] | δ' οἱ λεγόμε[νοι δει]|cιδαίμονεc εἰ[c ἀνυ]|πέρβλητον ἀ[cέβει]|αν ἐκβάλλειν: construing ὡ[c with the infinitives and nominative is difficult. I have taken ὡ[c to mean 'as', treating δέ as a weak conjunction and the infinitive ἐκβάλλειν as correlative with those that precede. Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. δειcιδαίμων suggests that we should understand a verb like δοκοῦcιν as controlling the infinitive ἐκβάλλειν here. I have followed suit in taking ἐκβάλλειν as dependent on ἡγοῦμαι in 1129 in a change of subject (δειcιδαίμονεc) leaving the same verb unexpressed in the new person and number. Thus the γάρ clause that follows explains how or why the δειcιδαίμονεc are wrong in their thinking, as it sets forth the grounds for not thinking (as they do) that the Epicurean view involves them in any impiety. For this reason the γάρ clause denies that the person conceiving of God according to the Epicurean conception is impious, and explains that such a person will also allow that everyone derives harm and benefit from God (as do traditionally pious persons and, *a fortiori*, δειcιδαίμονεc). Epicurus at *Ad. Menoec.* 123 does not rail heatedly against the superstitious, but he suggests there that in the minds of some the definitions of the pious and impious man have been reversed: ἀcεβὴc δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺc τῶν πολλῶν θεὸc ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰc τῶν πολλῶν δόξαc θεὸc προcάπτων, 'the impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to gods the beliefs of the many about them'.

Philodemus elsewhere uses ἐκβάλλω actively and transitively in the phrase ἐκβάλλειν εἰc ἄπειρον 'produce (something) to infinity', e.g. *De dis* 1 col. 12,2–13:

δε[...]τ[....]ωι καὶ μίζουc.[...]κ[.....]|ται ψευδεῖc [ὑ]πολήψειc ἔχουcιν το[.]ι[. .]c|τιτο[..μηδε]μίαν ἐν τοῖc οὖcιν εἶνα[ι] φύ[cιν] μή|τ' ἔμψυχον μήτ' ἀναίcθητον

δ[υναμένην] | ἐπιφέρειν ἀνεκκαρτέρητον [ἢ] δυσεκ|καρτέρητ[ο]ν κακόν, οὐδὲ τἀγα-θὸ[ν] τοῖς [ο]ὖσιν | ὅσον ἐκ τ[ῶν ὑπο]κει[μέν]ων ἀνεκ[π]λήρω|τον ἢ δυσεκπλήρω-[τ]ον. τοῦτο γ[ὰρ] ἀγνο|ούμ̣ε̣ν[ον] πο[ιεῖ] τὰ μὲν ὑπολήψ[εω]ν̣ δ[ε]||κτικὰ ζῴ̣[ι]α καὶ εἰς ἄ[πε]ιρον ἐκβά[λλ]ε̣ι[ν] | τὰ δεινὰ καὶ συνάπτειν τισὶν φύ[σε]σιν | τὰς τούτων̣ ἀ̣περγαστικὰς δυνά[μεις.

. . . (the many) have false conceptions . . . (? they do not know that) among existing things there is no entity [e.g. a god] either living or insensible that is able to inflict unbearable evil or evil difficult to endure, and (that) the good among existing things, inasmuch as it derives from realities, is neither unachievable nor difficult to achieve [cf. the Epicurean τετραφάρμακος, quoted below on 1538–9]. For this, when it is unknown, causes animals that are capable of forming false conceptions (i.e. humans) to produce for themselves terrors to an infinite extent and to attribute to certain natures (i.e. to the gods) the capacities of causing them.

So also *De dis* 1 cols. 13,7–15, 15,9–34 (new text in Angeli 1988, 214). Epicurus at *KD* 15 uses ἐκπίπτειν (which elsewhere appears regularly as the passive of ἐκβάλλω) in this sense, as does Philodemus at *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) fr. 77,5 (see Angeli's note ad loc. who compares among others the Aristotelian expression εἰς ἄπειρον βαδίζειν). There is a close parallel to the reflexive use of ἐκβάλλω as in the present passage in Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 97: αἰτιλογία is ματαία for certain persons who have not clung to the δυνατὸς τρόπος (method of possible explanation), and so 'have fallen back on the useless course of thinking that things could only happen in one way' (εἰς δὲ τὸ μάταιον ἐκπεσοῦσι τὸ καθ' ἕνα τρόπον μόνον οἴεσθαι γίνεσθαι). Compounds in -βάλλω and -πίπτω often carry connotations of complete and utter catastrophe, especially in matters intellectual: cf. Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 87 ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει φυσιολογήματος; Philod. *De sign.* col. 30,30–1 δια|πίπτει[ν ἐρ]οῦμεν, 'we say that such a person fails' in his inferences.

1135–6 δειλδαίμονες: compare Theophrastus' famous sketch (16) styled after the character trait δεισιδαιμονία (lit. 'fear of the gods') with the comments of Rusten 1993, and see further H. Bolkestein 1929; M. Stein, *Definition und Schilderung in Theophrasts Charakteren* (Stuttgart, 1992) 199–201. Theophrastus' δεισιδαίμων attempts to influence the gods in his own behalf, and substitutes personal rituals for public ones. Though 'superstitious' is the usual translation of δεισιδαίμων, Xen. *Agesil.* 11.18 and Arist. *Pol.* 5.11, 1315^{a}1 use the word δεισιδαίμων in a positive sense. Given the fact that Philodemus refers here to 'those who are called' (λεγόμενοι) δειλδαίμονες, he must have taken the word to have potentially positive connotations, at least to some (i.e. 'those who are said to be very religious' in the older, original sense of the term). The personal noun δεισιδαίμων is not otherwise used by Philodemus or Epicurus, though the abstract noun δεισιδαιμονία occurs once in the Herculanensia (in a decidedly negative sense): *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 10,12–15 δεισιδαιμονίας δὲ (sc. ἐμπίπλανται) τῶι | τὸν θεὸν αἴτιον ὑ[π]ολαμ|βάνειν καὶ θανάτου καὶ [ζ]ω|ῆς.

1138–44 Definition of the pious man (ὁ ἀcεβήc). For definitions of the pious man in Hellenistic philosophy, often phrased negatively by denying that he fulfils the conditions for being impious, see below on 1147–55. Here the person who is ὅcιοc is contrasted with ὁ ἀcεβήc, then aligned with the person who correctly conceives the nature of god (1147–55). The ἀθανακία and μακαριότηc (1139–41) of the gods are often stressed in the Epicurean accounts, not only in *KD* 1 and other prescriptive definitions, but also in Epicurus' description in *De nat.* 12 of the degeneration of the conception of god in the early history of humankind, above, 224–89, esp. 261–5, where is said that from the gods 'things unworthy of their completely conceived immortality and complete blessedness are sought in prayer' (προcτρέ[π]ε-τα[ι | καὶ τ]ἀνάξια τῆc ν[ο|ο]υμένηc ἀφθα⟨ρ⟩cία[c] | αὐτῶν καὶ παντελοῦc | μακαρι[ό]τητοc). With 1143–4 cυ]νaπτομ[έ]νο[ιc ἡμῖν compare (also in close paraphrase of Epicurus) above, 1031–5 τὰc ὠφ[ελίαc καὶ] | τὰc βλάβ[c κατα]|δεεcτέρ[c ἢ καὶ] | μείζουc ὦ[ν ἄνθρω]|ποι cυνάπ[τουcιν.

1146–7 The meaning of ἐξορίζω is clearly 'expel', elsewhere: 'rule out': see Epic. *KD* 39, below, 1519–20 ἐκ τῆc cυμμαχίαc ἐ|ξοριcθέντων (of philosophers driven out of Athens for their views). Thus the subject of 1146 ἐξορ]ίζει must be the impious man, since ἑκά[τε]|ρον can only be taken to refer to ἀθαν[acίαν and μα|κα[ριότητ]α in 1139–41. We must therefore restore ἀ]cεβήc in 1144. Usener contrived to restore here εὐ]cεβήc as subject of ἐξορ]ίζει, but this would not produce acceptable sense. It should further be noted that neither Philodemus nor Epicurus elsewhere uses the expression ὁ εὐcεβήc substantively to designate the character type of the pious person, as they do ὁ ἀcεβήc for the impious one; cf. below, 1337, where the adjective is used of δόξαι, not persons; at 2345 it designates the 'so-called pious'.

The impious man is thus said here to be the person who, in his conceptions and definitions of God, excludes either imperishability or blessedness (together with certain other characteristics attributed to him by Epicureans). (Cf. *Ad Menoec.* 123 ἀcεβὴc δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺc τῶν πολλῶν θεὸc ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰc τῶν πολλῶν δόξαc θεοῖc προcάπτων.) It is of course implied that the Epicurean does not do this (see 1160–5). But it is certainly never made explicit or emphasized that 'those who are called' δειcιδαίμονεc do so.

1147–55 Definition of the pious man (ὁ ἐπινοῶν κτλ.), continued. That the pious man (here simply said to be not impious) will attribute (here simply preserve) imperishability and blessedness to God (1140–2) is entailed by Epic. *KD* 1. The Epicureans further draw a close connection between divine existence on the one hand, and μακαριότηc as an ethical τέλοc, and it is this relationship which the definition of piety or the pious man is made to reflect: i.e. piety is held to have a moral as well as a theological content, much along the lines of ὁμοίωcιc θεῷ κατὰ δυνατόν 'emulation of God's nature' (cf. below, 2046–50 πρῶτον μὲν | ὡc θνητοὶ μειμε[ῖc]|θαι τὴν

ἐκείνων | εὐδαιμονίαν | θελήσουσιν). This view necessitated a distinction between types of piety and a revision of its traditional definitions (for a survey of which see Plato's *Euthyphro*). On the Epicurean redefinition of piety along ethical lines see further Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123; *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,16–24, 2,8 ff.; Lucr. 5. 1198–1203; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 116 (with Pease's note ad loc.); Schmid 1951, 97–156; Dionigi 1976, 35–6; Obbink 1992*a*; for its Stoic counterpart see Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 115; *SVF* iii. 604–10; Epict. 1. 26; 2. 20, 22–4, *Encheiridion* 31, [Plat.] *Def.* 412E; Aristot. *VV* 1250^{b}22; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen, 1948) i. 126, ii. 72. The Epicurean description represents a considerable divergence from both the Cynic view of piety, which rejected adherence to traditional religious laws and customs, and the sceptical Pyrrhonist one, which advocated such adherence, without any claim to knowledge of the nature of the divine or the intrinsic appropriateness of such acts (see Pyrrho, Test. 55 and 62 Decleva Caizzi, frr. 68 and 81 Diels, Sext. Emp. *PH* 1. 23–4, 226, 246; 3. 2; *Adv. Math.* 9. 49). The Epicureans make a strong dogmatic claim for the certainty of such knowledge, centring the very concept of piety and the basis for right religion upon 'thinking rightly' about the gods: so also Plat. *Leg.* 10. 888B περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὀρθῶς διανοηθέντα; Theophr. *De piet.* fr. 8. 18–19 Pötscher = fr. 584 D,20–2 Fortenbaugh μεγίστην θυσίαν τὴν ὀρθὴν περὶ αὐτῶν [sc. θεῶν] . . . διάληψιν; Diogenes ap. Julian, *Contra Cyn.* 17. 199B (Rochefort) = *SSR* V H 84 Giannantoni εἰ δὲ ἐνόει περὶ θεῶν ὀρθῶς, Sen. *Ep.* 31. 8; Epict. *Man.* 31. 1 τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ὀρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν—all which texts, however, attribute some form of care in human affairs or placability to the gods, which the Epicureans deny (cf. Plut. *De Stoic. rep.* 1051D = *SVF* ii. 1115; *De comm. not.* 1075E = *SVF* ii. 1126).

1147 For ἐπινοῶ in connection with formation of (correct) ideas about the gods (perhaps by the process κατ' ἀναλογίαν rather than by direct perception), see above, 316–17 and commentary on 416–17 with bibl. there for the terminological force. The wise, for instance, form their ἐπίνοια of the divine especially at festivals (above, 765–73). The stipulation that this be done 'apart from anger and fear' (which would be 'unhealthy' or 'debilitating', ἀσθενούσης, i.e. to the concept of divinity) similarly refers to the formation of concepts of the gods, i.e. to qualities attributed to the gods in our ideas. The truly pious individual will not attribute these characteristics to the divinity because they would weaken it; by implication they would, if attributed to divinity, also be debilitating to us. So by imitation of the deity properly conceived these characteristics will also be avoided in oneself. For 1150 παρασκε[υάς see below, 1348–53: we view our δόγματα as 'the cause of our own tranquillity', παρ[α]||σκευασ[τικ]ὰ τῆς ἡ|μῶν αὐτῶν ἀτα[ρα]||ξίας. To say that there are παρασκευαί, 'provisions', 'productions', 'furnishings' of goods and evils from the gods is for Epicurus neither a way of tacitly admitting their interference in the world, nor a metaphorical formulation

designed to allegorize popular belief. Rather the term indicates that the way in which God 'causes' harms and benefits is part of a complex, articulated process of causation, with the possible added implication that the causation is an indirect one (certainly less simple and direct than most people believe about the gods). A good example of the way in which harm and benefit can result from the gods as *παρασκευαί*, 'by-products' is given by Epicurus at *Ad Herod.* 77, where it is said that 'we must observe all the majesty associated with all the names which we apply to such conceptions [sc. of blessedness and imperishability], if they give rise to no belief conflicting with their majesty (*cέμνωμα*). Otherwise the conflict itself will give rise to the greatest mental disquiet', *ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα τηρεῖν κατὰ πάντα ὀνόματα φερόμενα ἐπὶ τὰc τοιαύτας ἐννοίας, ἐὰν μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἐξ αὐτῶν τῷ cεμνώματι δόξῃ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ταῖc ψυχαῖc αὐτὴ ἡ ὑπεναντιότηc παρασκευάcει.* (The noun *παρασκευή* is oddly omitted from Usener, *Gloss. Ep.*, though Usener was the first to extricate it from the present text; cf. Philod. *De lib. dicendi* col. 39,6 *ἐπὶ τῆc παραc̣κευ|ῆc τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τοῦ | τελέωc αἰcχρόν εἶναι*; *Rhet.* i. 67,32–4 *πρὸc πολιτικ[ῆ]c | δυνά[μ]εω[c] παρασκευ|ήν.*) Epicurus' use of *παρασκευάζω* to describe complex causal states provides many informative comparisons to the use of *παρασκευαί* in the present passage. The aetiology, for instance, at *Ad Herod.* 64 that makes the soul 'responsible' for 'furnishing' sensation is formulated in terms of *τὰ παρασκευαζόμενα*. With 1155 *προc]δεῖcθαι* cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 1 fr. 87,17.

1159–60 *Order of Columns.* Col. 41 falls next in the descending order of the **1077** sequence. Its physical connection with the present col. 40 is suggested by the fact that the pious man (as defined in the present column) is still being praised at 1160–5 *τ]οιοῦτον | [οὖν ἄ]νθρωπον*, where he is contrasted again with the impious man.

Col. 41

The pious and impious individuals contrasted, continued; a response to opponents who attacked the *λόγοι* of Epicurus; classification of rival philosophical positions allowing the existence of gods according to their views of harms and benefits provided by them.

1160–1 τ]οιοῦτον | [οὖν ἄ]νθρωπον: sc. *ὁ ἐπινοῶν κτλ.* as described at 1147–59. Knowing that this column follows upon the definitions of the pious and impious persons in col. 40 aids much in reconstruction and interpretation of this sentence (in the editions of Gomperz and Philippson, for example, these two columns are separated by twenty-six pages). We also now have the immediately following column to aid in interpretation.

1164 ταπεινοῦ: this term sometimes figures in Epicurean descriptions of how divinity is *not* properly conceptualized (e.g. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 2,15–19 *πῶc οὖ[ν] | οὐ ταπεινόν τι τὸ δαιμ[ό]|νιον δοξάζε[ι]c, εἴπερ ἐ[λατ]|το[ῦ]ται*

πρὸc ⸌ε⸍, 'how could you not regard the deity as something base if you denigrate it in relation to yourself?' Epic. fr. 488, *Gnom. Paris.* ἡ ταπεινὴ ψυχὴ τοῖc μὲν εὐημερήμαcιν ἐχαυνώθη, ταῖc δὲ cυμφοραῖc καθηρέθη): to attribute fear and expectation to divinity is to debase it, to hold a view of God as fundamentally debased by undesirable ethical characteristics. In the present text the attribute has been transferred to the impious man himself, who, as it were, takes on the characteristics of his own 'God'.

1165 καταφρονοῦμεν: sc. οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι. Cf Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 16,26–7 τινὲc [δ'] οὔ|τε τ[οῖc γ' ἄφ]ρocιν, οὐc κατακεφρόνη[c]αν; *De dis* 3 col. 14,25.

1165–6 οὐ|δαμ]ῶc δὲ καὶ marks a transition in the argument of this section. On the basis of the Epicureans' arguments for harms and benefits from the gods and from the Epicurean definitions of the pious and impious man related above, Philodemus concludes that his accusers had no basis for attacking only Epicurus' λόγοι as ἀνόcιοι (and not other philosophers' as well). From the explanation that follows it can be inferred that the opponents' objection was that the harms and benefits allowed by the Epicureans to stem from the gods were not similar in every respect to those of popular belief. Philodemus responds by arguing that virtually no philosopher who allowed that the gods harmed and benefited represented such harms and benefits as similar to those entertained in base beliefs (the only exception he dismisses below as dishonest: see on 1202–5). Part of the point is that it would have been philosophically irresponsible (if not absurd) for them to have done so. He argues at length that there are negative social and philosophical consequences of allowing such a view for the many while disguising one's true philosophical view (see 1190–1217 and cols. 63–86). His objective is to claim credit for the Epicurean position's conformity with some aspects of popular belief (harm and benefit from gods), while dismissing other aspects as inappropriate.

1171–2 τοῖc κατηγο|ροῦcιν: for mention of the opponents in *De pietate* see the full listing given above on 297–8. Philodemus says here that they censure only the λόγοι of Epicurus as impious, i.e. as opposed to those of other philosophers as well. (The only other possible contrast here would be the λόγοι of Epicurus, on the one hand, versus his acts on the other; but this seems to be ruled out below at 1394–1425, where the opponents are represented as having also criticized Epicurus' participation in certain acts of cult, e.g. prayer, and mockery of others forms of cult, e.g. mysteries and festivals.) The accusers are here said to exhibit ἀπεχθημοcύνη and a good deal of δυcαιcθηcία; for the latter cf. 436 ἀναλγήτων with the commentary ad loc. He implies that they should have realized that no philosophers ever believe the gods conform in reality to the basest of people's conceptions of them, yet, at the same time, the Epicureans go a good deal further towards the vindication of popular belief than most philosophers.

1174 εὐθύν[ου]cιν: the verb involves a legal metaphor ('to examine

formally the conduct of an official') and thus could have political implications, though Philodemus later explicitly states (1508–16) that Epicurus, unlike some other philosophers, was never actually prosecuted on a charge of impiety: because his views caused no one any harm, he and his followers were immune from this kind of prosecution (1523–59, cf. 2465–80). So it is more likely that εὐθύνω here has epistemological connotations ('to expose error'); for this usage see Philod. *De sign.* cols. 25,26, 30,17, and 32; *Rhet.* i. 6,67; i. 203,8 (this use does not have antecedents in Epicurus' terminology, though compare the literal designation of measurement in the terms κανών and κριτήριον). For the literal, legal sense ('mount a case against', 'charge') see Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 207,16, 17, and 20.

1175 ὡς ἕνεκα [τοιού]των: 'for these reasons' (as impious) ought to have a concrete, identifiable reference in what precedes. The reasons in question will thus be the fact that the foregoing definitions of the pious and impious man do not allow harms and benefits from the gods in *every* respect (specifically not those which are χυδαῖα to attribute to gods). Philodemus goes on to argue that no other philosophers did so either, so that it is unforgivable (1167) for the opponents to have condemned Epicurus' arguments alone as impious.

1176 ἀνοςίους ὄντας: cf. 176, 648; cf. 1144 ἀ]cεβής.

1177 εἰπε[ῖ]ν: or εἰπε⟨ῖ⟩ν; for the orthography see on 330 καλε⟨ῖ⟩ν.

1176–88 There are three distinct groups of philosophers under consideration. (1) Those who held that the gods were a source of harms and benefits, but not in ways similar to popular beliefs (Prodicus *et al.*, as criticized in *P. Herc.* 1428); (2) those who hold that such harms and benefits are in some basic way similar to those imagined by most people (the Epicureans exclusively occupy this category); (3) those who said that the gods do no harm at all because the gods have need of nothing (the Epicureans agreed with the latter point but not the former). It is not certain who Philodemus has in mind by the final category. He could mean early Stoics (Zeno, Chrysippus, Cleanthes) who held Zeus to be a self-sufficient force in the cosmos. (Philodemus knows that the later Stoics Chrysippus and Persaeus had revived the views of Prodicus and other sophists on this point: below (vol. ii), *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 2–3 Henrichs 1974*a*, 13–14.) Or he may be thinking of one of the relatively unknown 'atheists' like Theodorus or the Philippos mentioned at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,10–12 Henrichs 1974*a*, 22 (*Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν | ἄλλων τῶν ἁπλῶc τὸ | θ[εῖο]ν ἀ[ν]αιρούντων*). But in the passage that follows he says that they also let the many believe in the existence of gods who punished people in the traditional sense in order to secure social control, which suggests he was thinking of Critias. (Democritus is said to have believed that the images of the gods conveyed great ills and benefits.)

In any case this doxographical classification (probably of Philodemus'

own devising) of those philosophical positions allowing the existence of gods but differing significantly on the issue of harms and benefits is of considerable interest and deserves comparison with the classification of atheists that appears below (vol. ii) in *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 14,32–15,8, for which see Introd. § 3(*d*). In the present passage Philodemus acknowledges that the Epicureans did not believe the harms and benefits they thought stemmed from gods to be *entirely* in conformity with popular belief, at least not with such views as would debase one's conceptions of divinity, characterized here by the word χυδαίοις, a strong term with overtones of social class. This is consistent with Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123 and other passages, where the expressions of the many about gods come under criticism (though Epicurus certainly believed that at the beginning of human history such agreement had existed: see above, 224–31). But Philodemus is also at pains to argue in the present section that the Epicurean view of divinity allowed at least some affinity with present common belief (see above, 1133–4 *cὺν τῶι* [*τὰ κοι*]|*νὰ φυλάττειν*; *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 10,24–11,1; 12,29–32 in vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 21, 23), as some philosophers did not, with disastrous consequences.

1182 χυδαίοις: 'vulgar', 'pertaining to the swinish multitude', i.e. unworthy of divinity, as in the case of the views of the gods portrayed in myth. At Philod. *De poem.* 5 col. 26,7 χυδαῖοι are similarly 'laymen', opp. to *cοφοί*. Philodemus is pointing out that none of his philosophical predecessors went so far as to try to preserve the integrity of such gods: every one of them defended some selective and refined view of the divine. To summarize, then, what might otherwise be a difficult passage to comprehend: Philodemus is explaining rather laboriously that his opponents did not attack the religious actions of Epicurus (since Epicurus could be easily exonerated on this point: Philodemus has just finished retailing a long list of acts of public and private cult by Epicureans). Rather the opponents fastened upon what Epicurus *said* about the gods. But they cannot be excused for attacking his 'words alone' either, as Philodemus goes on to show, comparing Epicurus' representation of the gods with that of his philosophical precedessors. Some of these had held (as did Epicurus) that the gods do harm and benefit to humans, but did not allow that this harm and benefit were like traditional, common, less respectable beliefs (*οὐ . . . ὁμο*[*ία*]*c* | *τοῖc χυδαίοις*). For this reason, Epicurus cannot be faulted for saying that (*a*) the gods do good and harm to humans, but that (*b*) they do not do so in the way commonly believed by people or as they are portrayed in myths. 1184–5 [*ἔνι*]|*οι* leads us to expect another group ('the rest', 'others'). And in fact this is what we find in the following column: still other philosophers said that the gods harmed no one (because they did not need to); thus they (the philosophers) turned to injustice, since they no longer believed in an omniscent divinity. Philosophers and *theologoi*, perceiving the truth, consequently deployed false stories (*mythoi*) about the gods in order to effect control over the foolish.

1188 προσδεῖσθαι: cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. a fr. 87,17.

1188–9 *Order of Columns.* Col. 41 (**1098** fr. 4) seems to link directly with the present col. 42, though we should have expected **1098** fr. 7, not fr. 4, to come next in the descending order in the 1098 sequence. Thus there must have been some disordering in the numbering of the *disegni* such as is exhibited elsewhere in the treatise (see e.g. 518–19 on cols. 19–20). Such reordering seems to be required not just to facilitate the present join between cols. 41 and 42, but because **1098** fr. 4 must have come before **1098** fr. 5 in the original treatise (where we should have otherwise expected fr. 4 to follow fr. 5). The reason for this is that fr. 5 gives the Epicurean response (col. 48: people must be told straightforwardly to obey the laws and customs) to the position expressed in fr. 4 (col. 42: philosophers who knowingly allowed false tales about the gods to ensure social control). Thus the reconstructed sequence of the numbered *disegni* of **1098** is as follows: fr. 4, frr. 6–7, fr. 5. Interleaved with these are the columns of the **1077** sequence in their anticipated descending order.

Col. 42

Philosophers who said that the gods did no harm (continued), and their consequences: rise of injustice, concealment of their true beliefs about the gods; '*theologoi* and philosophers' who deployed myths about the gods in order to effect control over the foolish. Philodemus might be partly summarizing the position of his opponents. He does not dispute that the developments described actually occurred (at some hypothetical point in the past); but questions the desirability of their consequences, together with the appropriateness and political and ethical effectiveness of social control over the foolish by letting them believe false stories about the gods' punishment of wrongdoers. He holds that this misguided view is largely responsible for suspicions that the Epicureans were 'impious', for the reason that they openly called into question the myths about the gods, thereby potentially harming the state, at least under the view of justice described in the present column (see esp. 1330–58). The view is later taken up and criticized at greater length (below, cols. 63–82), a demonstration which leads directly into the critique of the poets in the second part of the treatise and provides the pretext for the Epicurean criticism of them. Cf. also Cic. *De nat. deor.* 3. 77. The view advocated here by Philodemus' opponents prefigures the doctrine of *theologia tripertita* (that there are separate classes of deities, and separate sets of views about the gods held by poets, philosophers, and statesmen) as developed by Panaetius and Varro and best known from Aug. *CD* 4. 27, 6. 5 (see Lieberg 1979). The view considered here is also critically noticed as early as Cic. *In*

Cat. 4.7–8, cf. Sallust, *Cat.* 51.20, 52.13 (where it is implied that Caesar might have used it).

1188–9 τούΙΙ[των: sc. 1183–4 *τὰc ὠφελ[ί]ac | καὶ τ̣ὰc βλάβac.* The gods have no need of harming and benefiting humans because they enjoy complete freedom from fear. With this point the Epicureans agreed (see next note).

1189 παρ' ἄδει̣α[ν: for *παρά* with the accusative with causal sense see Demosth. 4.11 *παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν* 'in consequence of our negligence', Smyth §1692.3; Kühner–Blass i. 513; Mayser ii/2. 491. *ἄδεια* also occurs in Epicurean contexts in a positive sense: *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,24; Atticus fr. 3.6 des Places (Epic. fr. 532 Us.) *τὴν ἐκ θεῶν ἄδειαν παρασχόμενος*; cf. Cic. *De fin.* 1.62. But whether it is to be taken here with 1188 *προσδεῖcθαι* or with 1186 *ἔφαcαν* seems uncertain at best.

1190–2 ἀπά]τ̣ην δὲ με[γά|λην: cf. above, 540–1, with commentary ad loc., and the *Sisyphus* fragment (see above on 526), where it is entertained that false views about harms from the gods were invented by a powerful political individual as a means of securing power and social control.

1193–4 ἐ̣[πο]|μένωc: this linking temporal adverb (also at 1202) is very characteristic of accounts of cultural history: cf. above on 234–5. For discussion and examples: Henrichs 1975*a*, App.; Davies 1989; below on 1205–7, 2145–82.

1194 ἄιττου[cι: = *ἄ̣ττουcι.* The usage may be somewhat poetic (see below on 1211–13); cf. Euripὶ. *Suppl.* 962; Plat. *Alcib. I* 118 B; Philod. *De mus.* col. 3,16 Kemke, where it appears in the papyri without the iota; ibid. p. 12,7 K.

1195 τὰc κρυφαίουc: i.e. they kept their activities and true views hidden or secret from the rest, who, since the philosophers kept silent about no longer fearing '(any)one supposed to know everything', continued to believe the traditional stories about the gods and the nature of their harms and benefits (e.g. that they punish wrongdoers).

1196–8 ὑπονοούμε|νον ἅπαντα γινώc|κειν: i.e. *τὸν θεόν* (cf. 1181) or perhaps *Δία.* The point is that at this stage these philosophers combined their denial that the gods do any harm (1185–6) with the recognition that they lack omniscience (while keeping back both insights from the rest). Philodemus later notices Prodicus' denial of divine omniscience to the gods below (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 19, on which see Henrichs 1976, 16–17. There is an echo here in Critias' *ἅπαντα γινώc|κειν* (*VS* 88 B 25 = *TrGF* 12. 43 F 19, ll. 17–19).

1198–1201 οὐκέτι φο|βούμενοι. δι' ὃ {ν} (= 'therefore') **| cιωπᾶν ἀcφα|λέc|τερον ἐ̣[τύγ]χαν[εν:** the point here seems to be that after first realizing and saying that the gods do no harm (1184–8) these philosophers consequently (1193–4 *ἐ̣[πο]|μένωc*) kept silent about their real opinion that there

was no all-knowing god, who therefore did not punish humans for their misdeeds). Instead, they presumably let the many continue to hold false conceptions about the gods, for the stated reason that this happened to be 'safer', 'more conducive to security' (*ἀcφαλέc|τερον*). Cf. below, 2150–55: 'securing mere *ἀcφάλεια* either for themselves from the multitude or for the latter from each other'.

Unfortunately Philodemus' account is so abbreviated (we are also missing the following column) as to not make it explicit exactly why it was 'safer' to be silent. Was it in order that the old view of gods who punished wrongdoers would provide social control (as is said to have motivated the *theologoi* and philosophers in the subsequent stage: 1207–17)? Or was it 'safer' because they feared reprisal from the many for holding unconventional views about the gods? The most likely reason it was 'safer to be silent', is that only in this way could they conceal and escape prosecution by the many for their own misdeeds: if the truth about the gods became known, their *δειναὶ ἀδικίαι* would be exposed and no longer be *κρυφαῖοι*. See especially in this connection the argument attributed to the Epicurean Hermarchus (below, 2313–32 = fr. 31 Longo) in what is obviously a criticism of the view that the scenario described in this column is actually a desirable political option as a means of social control: 'because the gods are not seen to harm wrongdoers, the worst of mankind would escape notice according to this argument'.

1200–1 ἀcφαλέc|τερον: see the corresponding passage below, 2150–5 (some were just attempting to secure their own *ἀcφάλεια* from the many). Terms for security and indemnity like *ἀcφάλεια* (cf. 1046, 2164, 2335–6 *cωτηρία*; 1189 *ἄδεια[ν]*) and *ἀcφαλές* were catchwords in Epicurean discourse, especially in accounts of cultural history; see on 2152. According to Epicurus, nothing can increase the pleasure derived from security and freedom from fear: see e.g. *KD* 7, 13, 14, 28, Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124D.

1202–5 ἑπομ]ένωc | ἐποίο[υν οἱ δί]καιοι τῶν [θεολ]όγων | καὶ φιλοcόφων: the explanation introduced by *γάρ* at 1206 suggests that *ἑπομ]ένωc* in 1202 is not the temporal adverb meaning 'subsequently' (as in 1193–4), but rather the modal adverb meaning 'consequently'. There are thus effectively two stages covered in cols. 41–2: (1) at a time when people believed that gods harm and benefit humans (not the beginning of cultural history, when humans held true views about gods, but some intermediate stage) some philosophers said that gods did no harm whatsoever. (2) No longer fearing an all-knowing divinity, they were incited to injustice, but remained silent about (their real view of) divinity, in order to avoid detection and punishment at the hands of the many. Consequently (1202 *ἑπομ]ένωc*), some *theologoi* and philosophers persisted in dishonestly maintaining false tales about the gods, namely because they saw that, if the many believed that the gods punished mortals in the traditional sense, misdeeds were held in check, and in this way all life would not be rendered beastly by people's

injustice against one another (cf. especially the *Sisyphus* fragment, ll. 24–7, and see below on 1205–8).

The phrase 'philosophers and *theologoi*' recurs below at 1570–4, where it is emphatically denied that Epicurus came into any contact with their teachings. Epicurus is also by contrast repeatedly said in the following columns to have made public his views on the gods (1230–4, 1375–89, 1575), while at 1853–67 'some' are said to 'conceal' what seems true to Epicureans, and thus give the impression of trickery and impiety. As a result, the option described the present column of maintaining false beliefs about the gods in order to maintain political control over ἄφρονες may be safely dissociated from the Epicureans, though they believed this occurred in the distant past. And while neither the '*theologoi* and philosophers' nor the authors of the 'myths' are here named, we do in fact know who Philodemus means. For at the start of the section on poets' representations of the gods (below, 2480–2), Philodemus says he 'will begin with the self-important theologues and poets' (κατάρξομαι δ' ἀπὸ τ[ῶν || cεμ]νῶν θεολόγων | [καὶ π]οητῶν) and indicates that these figures are 'praised by those who attack us on the grounds that we are setting forth views impious and disadvantageous to mankind'. It thus becomes clear that the '*theologoi* and philosophers' described here are in fact the poets and pre-Socratic philosophers whose pronouncements about the gods are attacked in the famous section of *De pietate* that precedes the critique of Stoic theology contained in the concluding section of the treatise (*P. Herc.* 1428; see vol. ii). Here he treats figures as early as Homer and Hesiod and as late as the Attic tragedians, Timocles, Menander and Callimachus, but also including *theologoi* (a common scholiastic term for 'poet interpreted allegorically': Aristotle, *Met.* *A*3, 983^{b}29 speaks of poets as the first theologians; cf. the critical term φυcικός and see G. Most, *CQ*^{2} 37 (1987), 1–19 at 7), from Heraclitus to Empedocles, together with the mythographers and writers of prose (e.g. Prodicus, Democritus, Xenophon, Heraclides Ponticus, Aristotle, and Theophrastus); for the 'poets' see the index in Gomperz 1866, 152–8 (not complete), with Schober 1988; for the pre-Socratic philosophers in *P. Herc.* 1428, see the list in Henrichs 1975*a*, 94–5. (Socrates, in part because he wrote nothing, presented a special case and had to be treated separately in the present part of the treatise: see below, 1353, 1589–1701, cf. 1512.) Further, it seems almost certain that Philodemus' opponents had accused the Epicureans of divulging to ordinary people that the tales promulgated by the philosophers, *theologoi*, and poets about the gods were false, and that their opponents further alleged that Epicureans were thus responsible for endangering the scheme of social control sketched in the present column (cf. 2482–9).

These considerations lend some support to Bücheler's restoration εἶ]καῖ-||[οι 'mindless' in the present passage, as opposed to Gomperz's more neutral ὡc] καὶ [ἔνι]|οι. (The apograph leaves unclear whether this line ended with or continued past]και; almost all the other lines in the column end at about

this point, but 1202 does extend this far beyond the margin of the other lines.) The supplement δί]καιοι was suggested to me by D. Delattre. That the initial motives of the '*theologoi* and philosophers' were just seems clear from 1205–17. But everything else from this point on in the treatise suggests that the '*theologoi* and philosophers' were ultimately misguided in their calculations on this point, while Philodemus thinks that it is most of all due to them that the suspicion of impiety has fallen upon the Epicureans. In fact, it is fair to say that the remainder of this first part of the treatise (up to the criticism of the poets) is devoted to showing that such a move was woefully misguided and impracticable as a political option, while the second part of the treatise (the criticism of the poets and philosophers) is devoted to proving this point by means of (1) showing how imperfectly the philosophers, poets, and *theologoi* preserved true conceptions of the gods in their *mythoi*, and (2) turning the opponents' allegations back against the Stoics.

1205–8 οὐ | γὰρ ἐλά[νθα]νεν τἀ|ληθὲς αὐτούς: A. Henrichs compares Critias *VS* 88 B 25 = *TrGF* 12. 43 F 19, l. 26 ψευδεῖ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ. The 'truth' that did not escape them was that the gods do not harm humans for their misdeeds in the traditional, literal sense (i.e. 1182 χυδαίοις) depicted in the *mythoi* (and not that the gods do not harm at all, which the '*theologoi* and philosophers', unlike the Epicureans, probably also believed, in addition to those philosophers described at 1184–9). The Epicureans did not, I think, in principle deny that some false myths about the gods usefully kept the misdeeds of the very foolish in check. But Philodemus (and Lucretius too) clearly argue that even such myths were misleading and had pernicious effects on the thinking of most people, or worse: *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*. They were therefore ultimately useless to a community of sages. Cf. *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12, 13–32 (vol. ii; quoted fully above, p. 462), where Philodemus accuses the Stoics of denying that the gods are responsible for harm and misfortune to men, and allows that 'some say that people holding this opinion abstain from unjust actions, but we (sc. Epicureans) say that these things (i.e. harm and benefit) actually result for some of them from the gods—and also the greatest of goods!' (echoing Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124). Here 'those who say that people holding this opinion abstain from unjust actions' alludes to the view held by the '*theologoi* and philosophers' in the present passage. (See also below, 1852–65, where the 'some' who are said to 'conceal' what seems true to Epicureans are probably the same persons.)

1209 τῶν μύθων: the connotations of this term are unmistakably negative in the Epicurean view: see the corresponding passage below, 2158–65, with commentary on 2159.

1211–13 τῶι ἐ|πικρέμασ[θ]αι: Philodemus does not otherwise use the verb, perhaps here reminiscent of the medium of mythographic poetry whereby the '*theologoi* and philosophers' work their spell over the foolish and achieve their ends: Simon. *PMG* 520. 4 Page (from a *threnos*) ὁ δ' ἄφυκτος

ὁμῶς ἐπικρέμαται θάνατος; *Hymn. Apoll.* 284; Theogn. 206, 1184. The compound form also appears in prose history: Thuc. 2. 53; 7. 75 cf. 3. 40; Polyb. 2. 31. 7 κίνδυνον; D.S. 16. 50 φόβον. The uncompounded form occurs seven times in Pindar in mostly proverbial contexts: e.g. *O.* 1. 57b (of the 'overpowering stone' hung by Zeus as a curse over Tantalus); *O.* 6. 74 (of envy over the victor); *O.* 7. 25 (ἀμφὶ δ' ἀνθρώπων φρασὶν ἀμπλακίαι / ἀναρίθμητοι κρέμανται, 'countless are the snares that hang over the minds of men'); *I.* 8. 14; Theogn. 1371; Archil. 91 West *IEG*² μηδ' ὁ Ταντάλου λίθος / τῆςδ' ὑπὲρ νήσου κρεμάσθω. With the dative: A.R. 3. 483 ἐπικρέμαθ' ἡμιν ὄλεθρος.

1212–13 τοῖς | ἀνοη⟨το⟩τέροις: the 'rather foolish' would be in this case everyone except the theologues and philosophers (1204–5). The ἀνόητοι are often opposed to φρόνιμοι (e.g. Gorgias, *VS* 82 B 11a). Cf. Democr. *VS* 68 B 75 κρέσσον ἄρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνοήτοις ἢ ἄρχειν.

1213–14 τὴν ὑ|ποψίαν: probably Philodemus means that they were thought to be held in check from misdeeds by the fact that 'expectation' (of being harmed by the gods for their misdeeds as depicted in the myths) weighed down upon them. Cf. in a slightly different sense 1370.

1214–16 ἵ]να μὴ τὸν | [ὅλον βί]ον [θ]ηριώδη | [παρ]έχωμεν: the theme of the transition of human existence from or to a brutal animal state of existence is familiar from ancient accounts of *Kulturentstehungslehre*. See e.g. Democr. *VS* 68 B 5,1; the *Sisyphus* fragment, ll. 1–2 ἦν χρόνος, ὁτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος / καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρέτης; Kleingünther 1933, 68. When rival ethical systems are contrasted and their developments discussed in such terms, it is often implied or argued that a given position is true or preferable because it maintains human existence in a civilized, non-bestial state. So Philodemus' opponents argued in the present case against the Epicureans, who, they held, threatened this state of existence by revealing that the stories about the gods' harming wrongdoers in the traditional, literal sense were not true. So also the Epicurean Colotes had argued that sense perception must be reliable, for otherwise human existence would long ago have reverted to that of beasts (Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124D θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα). Philodemus himself turns the argument against the Stoics at the conclusion of the treatise at *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 13–15, esp. col. 14,17 (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 25) ὅτι τὸν τῶν [θ]η|[ρίω]ν βίον εἰς το[ὺς] | ἀνθρώπ[ο]υς με[τ]α|φέρουσιν, 'one might justly reproach them with turning human life into that of beasts'), arguing that 'no one would refrain from injustice out of fear of gods' who are as insensible as the Stoics' aethers and breezes. So also below at *P. Herc.* 1648 fr. 5,2–4 (vol. ii; Schober 1988, 96) Homer is criticized for portraying Circe as turning men into beasts (πάντας] δὲ τοὺς πρὸς | [αὐτὴ]ν ἀφικνουμέ|[νους ἡ Κί]ρκη θηριοῖ).

1216–17 κἄλ|[λως τ]ὸ δυσμενές: the sentence could have continued: 'And that otherwise their enmity (towards the rest of mankind might be discovered, they further . . .)'.

1217–18 *Order of Columns.* See on 1188–9, where it is explained that the following two columns (43–4, **1098** frr. 6–7) are slightly out of expected order in the descending sequence (i.e. we should have expected them to fall *before* **1098** fr. 4, the present col. 42. Some slight confusion in the numbering of the *disegni* has probably occurred. The present col. 42 cannot link with the following col. 43 because both come from the same **1098** sequence. We are thus missing at least one column (not more than two) from the **1077** sequence here. The lost column will have continued the discussion of the political effects of allowing the many to believe the myths about the gods (or perhaps, rather, abbreviated it, since it is later taken up in greater detail, below in cols. 63–86).

Col. 43

This column contrasts Epicurus' explicit pronouncements about the divine with the 'hidden' views of the early 'philosophers and *theologoi*' discussed in the previous two columns. προγόνους (1225) may be related to the earlier 'philosophers' described at 1184 and 1203–5. Then there is a strong contrast with Epicurus' views (1230–1 ὁ δ̣] οὖν Ἐπίκου|[ρος, 1242–3), in opposition to the misguided views of earlier thinkers, combined with his public expression (1242 ἀ]ṇ̣ποφαίνε|[ται?) that the gods are blessed and imperishable (1243–4). In addition, 1227–9 clearly pick up the point left off before the digression at 1172–3 (namely, that the detractors censure only Epicureans and not other philosophers as well for not representing the gods in every way in accord with popular belief). In the text I present a rather ambitious reconstruction of 1223–30. For the text of the rest of the column (1230–47) I present a tentative reconstruction as follows, drawing on Philippson 1921, 382 with changes to accommodate sense and spacing and some substitutions from Philippson's earlier text (Philippson 1916, 390).

43		**1098** 6	
1230	cιν· ὁ δ̣] οὖν Ἐπίκου-		
	ρος δοξῶν] κενῶν ε-		
	....]ει, τῶι θε-	(15)	ἐ|[λευθερ]ọι Philippson
	cμῶι τῶν γρ]αμμάτων		
	ἢ τῶν ἀπ]αγορευμά-		
1235	των οὐκ] αἰḍούμε-		]ΑΓΛΟΥΜΕ *N*
	νος· οὐδὲ φο]βοῦμαι		
	μή τιcιν] ἄθεος Ἐ-	(20)	
	πίκουρος] δόξῃ τῶν		
	cωφρόν]ωṇ ὄντων		]Ο *N*

1240 οὕτ]ως ἅπαντα κατα-
ξίως λέγω]ν τὰ περὶ
τῶν θεῶν κἀ]ποφαίνε- (25)]T N
ται τὸ μα]κάριον]X N
ἀΐδιον] καὶ ἄφθαρ-
1245 τον ὂν καὶ μ]ηδὲν
πρᾶγμα ἔχ]ον τῷ- ||]ONTA N

However, Epicurus (e.g. challenges) their empty opinions not being ashamed before the law of his writings and pronouncements. Nor do I fear that any of the wise will think Epicurus an atheist, so excellently does he speak regarding divine matters and declares his opinion that what is blessed and imperishable exists and has no trouble, while all interference from the gods (is impossible). For of the gods . . .

1246–7 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 43 continues on with the following col. 44, though both come from the **1098** sequence and are in ascending order because they were presumably on the same layer of papyrus, but copied (as usual in such cases) by the *disegnatore* as separate fragments. As in other such cases (see above, cols. 38–9), only the right-hand and left-hand sides of the two successive columns respectively are preserved.

Col. 44

What Epicurus said in addition about the pre-eminence of the divine. This column and the next appear to have been tacked on as a kind of appendix or summation to the section on harms and benefits from the gods as part of the apology that Epicurus and his early followers spoke openly and piously about the gods (especially in contrast to the philosophers described just above at 1184–1217 who denied harms and benefits from the gods). A number of benefits (principally psychological) to be derived from the gods are cited as having been discussed by Epicurus in his books *On Gods* and *On Holiness*.

1246–7 τῷ||χλημα: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 127 ἀοχλησίαν. Perhaps also we could restore ὃ]||χλημα, a rare term. Cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 11. 158 (*Adv. Eth.*) συμβαῖνον ὄχλημα, of the distress (ὄχλημα) caused by pain (πόνος) owing to the false belief that pain is an evil (on the Pyrrhonist view). Cf. *MGrHerc* 297 n. 3. A very similar and slightly more common Epicurean term is ὄχλησις: cf. Epic. *KD* 8; *De nat.* 34 fr. 34. 32,4; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1127D (Epic. fr. 134 Us., 61 Arr.²) ὄχλησιν παρασκευάζωσιν; Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 28a,5; fr. 32a,1–4 κ(αὶ) κατασκευὴν μετὰ τοῦ λο|γισμοῦ κ(αὶ) τῆς τῶν περιεχόντων ἐυλαβεί|ας ἰσχύει διερείδεσθα⟨ι π(ρὸς)⟩ τὸ ἀλλόφυλον ἀπὸ | πάσης ὀχλήσεως κ(αὶ) πᾶν τὸ ποιητ[ικ]ὸν τῆς ἀ|[ϊδιότητος ἀποδέχεσθαι] (Diels): 'and in

construction (sc. of the concept of divinity) with rationality and caution (or: protection) with respect to its surroundings it is able to stand up against what is foreign (to it?) from all burden and to receive what is able to effect its everlastingness.'

1247–57 could be restored as follows, *exempli gratia* (following Philippson, with modification):

44	χ̣λ̣ημα πᾶν τ[ῶν	1098 7
	θεῶ̣[ν ἀπογν]οὺ̣[c· τὸ	
	γὰρ τῶν [θεῶ̣]ν κ[ατ' εἶ-	
1250	δο[c πᾶν ἀ]νυπό̣[πτευ-	
	τον μᾶλλ[ον ἡμῖν	(5)
	πρὸc [ταραχὴν εἶναι	
	καὶ ἅπαν [καθαρὸν	
	τοῦ παντὸc [δεινοῦ	
1255	παρασκευ[αζόμε-	
	νον καὶ τὸ [ἀλλότρι-	(10)
	ον δ[ια]λῦ̣[σαί τε	

Philippson's text is paraphrased with some comments in Festugière 1968², 61. However, in 1248 ἀπογν]οὺ̣[c is highly suspect on grounds of usage. In 1249–50 κ[ἀλγη]|δό̣[να is possible; in 1250–1 perhaps ἀ]νπό̣[μνη]|στον (cf. 1566–7).

1255–9 have some affinity with Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 32a,1–4 (quoted above on 1189). Further, κ[ατι]cχῦ̣ον [πᾶν together with the reference that follows to Epicurus' *De dis* picks up nicely the citation of that work above at 756–8 τὸ] κ̣αθ' ἡγεμονίαν | [ὑπερ]έχον ἔχειν | [πᾶ]ν̣.

1261–4 Lit.: 'Nor does he (viz. Epicurus) say in *On Gods* that it (sc. divine nature) is prohibited (κ]ωλυόμε[νον) from doing these things' (i.e. 'dispelling what is foreign to it and marshalling its overpowering strength', 1256–9). For the form of summation (here expressed negatively) see above, 1066–71: 'and in his . . . he seems to speak consistently (ὁμολογεῖν) on this point.'

1261–2 ἐν] | τῶι Περὶ θεῶν [φησιν (Us.): φησιν at end of sentence also at Philod. *De poem.* 5 col. 37,13. For Epicurus' book by this name (also cited above, 189–202, 382 ff., [753 ff.], 1043–9 [not in Us., Arr.²], and at Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 8,5–8 [= Epic. fr. 17.1 Arr.²]). Philodemus probably cites it (and the *On Holiness*) here in order to point out against detractors that Epicurus actually published works dealing with the gods and piety, and to show through quotations in this and the following column that the Epicureans, if they did not sound like poets or mythographers or sophistic philosophers in their writings about the gods (and they certainly did not in most respects, as the following quotations make clear), none the less spoke piously about the gods as existing, providing harms and benefits, capable of philosophical treatment, and deserving of veneration—all in a way they thought consistent

with their own doctrines. It is this or similar passages to which our sources allude as presenting this argument with the explicit collocation of Epicurus' works *On Gods* and *On Holiness*: see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 115, 123, Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102 C (see also above on 205–6).

1263–4 κα[λεῖ] δὲ καὶ τὸν | τ[ελειότ]ητος [βίον: *καλέω* is often used in citations of Epicurus with special reference to his exact wording or terminology; see above, 330 with commentary. The 'life of completion' utilizes the language of mystery initiation: see above on 808–10. The apograph very clearly reads T[; Usener's change to Θ[to accommodate his restoration *θ[ειό]τητος* implies a graphically unlikely mistake, and the supplement is too short for the available space. *θειότης* never occurs in Epicurean literature, and *τελειότης* has been partially restored above at 748–9 and below at 1305–6; but words formed from *τελέω* and *τέλειος* are frequent in Epicurean theological parlance: see above on 353.

The *τελειότης*, 'completion', referred to will be the consummate happiness enjoyed by the Epicurean divinities in their freedom from fear and invulnerability from destruction. Individual humans can, through instruction, practice, and training, approximate this state of happiness by conceiving the gods properly and imitating their lifestyle (1266–7 *βίον ἥ]|διστον καὶ μ[ακαρι]|ώτατον*; cf. below, 2046–58). The gods themselves take on this state of existence as they are properly conceived by the Epicurean; the process of conceptualizing the gods is described in terms of completion: the gods exist *κα]τὰ συντέλε[ιαν* (211), as they are produced (370 *ἀποτελεῖσθαι*, cf. 217–18) in thought from unities (*ἑνότητες*, 347–75). As the concept is perfected in its clarity and suitability for ethical emulation, the sage, like the initiate who has reached a high rank of initiation (similarly said to be *τέλειος*), takes on a kind of divinity analogous to his idea of god.

1266–7 ἐν [τῶι] Πε|ρὶ ὁσιότητ[ος: for Epicurus' work by this name see above on 206–7. For its collocation with Epicurus' *On Gods* in the present instance and in ancient sources see above on 1261–2.

1268–9 πᾶ[ν τὸ μι]|αρὸν φυλάτ[τεσθαι: Usener's restoration *καθ]|αρόν* requires a false syllabic division never adopted by the scribe. For philosophical concern over ritual purity see above on 758–9. Fears about ritual pollution, guilt, and the like produce anxiety, which is painful and to be avoided at all costs by the Epicurean.

1273 οἰκε[ιοῦν: for its force and usage see above 1052 *οἰκειότητος*; cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124 *ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς*, discussed above in the introd. to Sect. 3.

1275–6 μακ[αριότη|τα: see above, 1140–1 with commentary; cf. 1243–4, Epic. *KD* 1.

1275–6 *Order of Columns.* Col. 44 (**1098** fr. 7) coheres contextually with col. 45 (**1077** fr. 2), though the restorations at 1275–7 are extensive. A physical join between

the two columns is in any case possible because they are each columns from separate halves of the papyrus roll.

Col. 45 (Pl. 2)

A catalogue of divine epithets, culled from the writings of Epicurus and his followers (hence the plural λέγον|[τε]c in 1278–9; cf. 1026–7 κατα]|λείπουcι[ν with commentary). Perhaps we are to think of this litany of epithets as being 'on the lips' of the Epicurean sage as he goes about at festivals perfecting his conception of divinity (above, 765–73). It is noteworthy that none of these epithets has identifiable associations with specifically named, localized divinities, but most would be at home in a wide variety of cult and mystery contexts, public and private, and could be transferred as well to the meet the psychological and ethical underpinnings of Epicurean theology. This is followed by a claim by the author that the Epicureans also have a higher standard of piety than most people. Thus they charge other philosophers with holding a view of the divine that is incompatible with its true nature, which can be ascertained from its πρόληψιc, 'preconception'.

1276 ἀπηρτιcμένα: cf. Epic. *De nat.* 11 fr. 26.38,17–19 δι]ὰ τῶν ὀρ|γάνων ο[ὐ]θὲν ἀπαρ|τίζοντεc, 'non riuscendo con gli strumenti a far nulla di preciso' (Arrighetti). Philod. *De mus.* col. 23,6–9 (p. 31 Kemke) cκοπεῖν | [τ]ὰ κατὰ μουcικήν, ἀλ|λ' ἀπηρτιcμένην cφοδρῶc | [πρ]ὸc τὸ τέλο[c] αὐτῆc.

1277 γ' ἔ]χε[ιν: the restoration of the particle may seem adventurous. But there is no alternative here, since the sentence must end with ἔ]χε[ιν (because of δ]ὲ in 1278), and ἀπηρτιcμένα | [ἔ]χε[ιν would produce hiatus. (There is not room for παρέ]χε[ιν.)

1277–81 διατελοῦcιν implies that they continue to do so, or do so continually, but is also semantically connected with the phrase that follows, indicating that Philodemus is beginning to sum up the section and proceed to another point, so that διατελοῦcιν has the force of a transition, 'finally'. Philodemus means: 'they say so continually, so that extending my treatise by adding on more examples of such treatises (cυγγράμματα) by the founders would be going on too long'. For the summing-up and abridgement of the narrative with the phrase ἵνα μὴ cυγράμ|[μ]ατα παρατιθεὶc ἐ|[κ]τείνω see above, 877–99 (abbreviation of attestations of Epicurean cult practice); cf. below, 2338–43: '(which I shall demonstrate), as I promised, not a long way off (εἰc μακράν) but in the present discussion (cυναγωγή)', though the disquisition that follows (which includes the criticism of the poets) goes on for more than 150 columns. So also the present expression promises to abbreviate by summarizing ('in order that I not extend my treatise elaborating'), yet

in fact what (almost absurdly) follows is a catalogue of Rabelaisian proportions. (As in the catalogue of poets, the objective is clearly to persuade by inundating the reader with as many examples as possible, while elaborating only a select few.) Cf. also 2496–2509, where the possibility of error in the citation of names of poets is acknowledged and pardon begged, 'because of the multitude of editions (ἐκ[δό]|cεω̣[ν]) and, more likely, because of my haste (διὰ τὸ cπεύδε̣[ιν | μ']), lest I seem to be dwelling for a long time on such matters'. Such interjections are a good key to sectioning and thematic division within the treatise, and in addition are indicators of methods of structuring and διαίρεcιc of topics in the composition of contemporary *Fachprosa*: thus with the present clause may be compared Sallust, *Jugurtha* 17. 2 (introduction of the digression on African geography and ethnography) *cetera quam paucissumis absolvam*; ibid. 19.2 *silere melius puto quam parum dicere, quoniam alio properare tempus monet.*

1281–92 Note that the list is structured into cola: (1) of all existing things, the divine is: (*a*) best, (*b*) most holy, (*c*) most worthy of emulation; then follows a series of (2) miscellaneous epithets (but mostly concerned with psychology?), he: (*a*) rules over all good things, (*b*) is unburdened, (*c*) exalted, (*d*) great-minded, (*e*) great-spirited; finally (3) ritually speaking, he is: (*a*) pure, (*b*) purest, (*c*) propitious. The list is not, I think, an idle collocation nor a random heaping-up of terms for rhetorical effect alone, but in some sense meant to recapture a pattern of thought in Epicurean μελετή and θεραπεία about the divine. Thus, for instance, the epithet ἵλεων (1291–2), which has in Greek cult connotations of the merciful and beneficent qualities of the divine, is reserved until last in the list, for the Epicurean would be adjured to hold this quality in mental suspension until he had fully comprehended the others in the divine. Only then could the way in which the Epicureans thought the gods truly benefited humans (basically: in a psychological sense) be fully understood. Similarly the collocation ἅγιον καὶ | ἁγιώτατον 'holy and holiest', a kind of ἀναδίπλωcιc which preserves genuine features of poetic repetition in religious liturgy: see e.g. Norden 1923, 169 n. 1; for the succession of superlatives: id., *Aus altrömischen Priesterbüchern* (Lund, 1930) 36–7. The repetition of πάντων (1282, 1285) in a description of divine nature recalls Diogenes of Apollonia *VS* 64 B 5 = fr. 9 Laks καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν· αὐτὸ γάρ μοι τοῦτο θεὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀφῖχθαι καὶ πάντα διατιθέναι καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι, the hieratic quality of which was emphasized by Jaeger 1947, 165–71, esp. n. 59. The series may also be seen as rehearsing the pattern of thought by which the Epicurean is to form a concept of the divine, namely by taking any characteristic attributable to the divine, and then thinking of in the superlative, a mental *transitio*, μετάβαcιc, that is linguistically underscored in the text. (Cf. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,16–22 and, for a related anticipation of the ontological argument for the

existence of God, see Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 133; Schofield 1980, 300; Obbink 1992*b*, 213–15; Brunschwig 1994, 170–89.) In general the list has its own idiosyncratic liturgical quality, though associated with no particular, known divinity. Cicero, reflecting on the present list (or its sources), says that reading Epicurus' books *de sanctitate, de pietate adversus deos* you would think you were listening to *pontifices maximi* (*De nat. deor.* 1. 115). The gender of 1286 κυριεύοντα must be masculine, which suggests that the others may be so as well (ἵλεων in 1291–2 perhaps accusative masculine singular, as at Plat. *Leg.* 749 A), though taken individually the rest could also be grammatically neuter. I have translated 'it' (i.e. τὸ θεῖον) not 'he'; but it should be noted that the understood antecedent may well be masc. θεός (cf. 1053 ὁ θεός and commentary there). See further below on individual epithets.

1281–2 πάντων | [τ]ῶν ὄντων ἄριστον: cf. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,17–23 (= *HPh* 231) μακαριώ|[τα]τον μέν τι νόμιζε τὸ | [διε]ι̣ληφέναι καλῶς ὃ τὸ | [παν]άριστον ἐν τοῖς οὖσι | [δια]νοηθῆναι δυνάμε|[θα], κα[ὶ θ]αύμαζε ταύτην | [τὴ]ν δ[ι]άληψιν καὶ σέβου; above, 886–7 ἐν τοῖς περὶ | τῶν ἀρίστων κ[αὶ] | σεμνοτάτων, 'in matters concerning the most excellent and august of beings'.

1283 σεμνό[ν]τατον: cf. above, 758–65 πάντα γὰρ σο̣|[φὸν] καθαρὰς καὶ ἁ|[γίο]υς δόξας ἔχει | [περὶ] τοῦ θείου καὶ | [μεγ]άλην τε καὶ σε|[μν]ὴν ὑπειληφέ|[ναι] ταύτην τὴν | φύσιν, 'for every wise man holds pure and holy beliefs about the divine and believes that its nature is great and august'; 886–7 ἐν τοῖς περὶ̣ | τῶν ἀρίστων κ̣[αὶ] | σεμνοτάτων. Compare the Epicurean neologism τὸ σέμνωμα above on 756–7. The epithet was in common use in cult, especially of gods: Demeter, *Hymn. Cer.* 486; Hecate, Pind. *P.* 3. 79; Thetis, id. *N.* 5. 25; Apollo, Aesch. *Th.* 800; Poseidon, Soph. *OC* 55; Athena, ibid. 1090; at Athens the Erinyes were the σεμναὶ θεαί; often of rites and mysteries: *Hymn. Cer.* 478; and often of the sites, places, or temples of the gods. Cf. Demosth. 21. 126 τὸ σέμνον (= ὁσιότης). For the superlative, see Polyb. 15. 31. 7 σεμνότατα. The apograph's reading CEMNONTATON preserves an original scribal error from the papyrus (in N^1 and the facsimile printed in HV^2 II a point of expunction appears over the medial N, though it does not appear on N^2).

1284 ἀξιοζηλωτότατον: a rare epithet: Plut. *Flam.* 20 ἀξιοζήλωτον ἀποίσεται νίκην; Dioscorides, *De mat. med.* praef. 4. Cf. below, 1294, where the Epicureans claim to ἐζηλωκέναι after the greatest form of εὐσέβεια. The corruption (corrected suprascript on the papyrus) may have been facilitated by similarity to the term ἀξιόλογος: see e.g. Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 81; *De nat.* 34. 32,27.

1285–6 πάντων [τ]ῶν ἀγα|[θῶν] κυριεύοντα: cf. above, 756–7 τὸ] κ̣αθ' ἡγεμονίαν | [ὑπερ]έχον; 942–3; Philod. *De morte* col. 24,32 ὅτι κυ|ριεύς[ους]ι τῶν σαν[ίδων] οὓς οὐ θέλου|σιν; Diagoras, *PMG* 738 πρὸ π̣αντὸς ἔργου

βροτείου; *PGM* i. 214 κυριεύων ἀγγέλων; iv. 3168 ἐλπίδος; xii. 115 κόσμου; iii. 475 πά[ντων; iv. 1669 χρόνου; vii. 838 κατὰ τοῦ κυριεύοντος τὴν οἰκουμένην; viii. 47 ἀριθμὸν ζ' τῶν κυριευόντων; iv. 192 ἄχρις οὗ κυριεύσῃς τῆσδε τῆς σκηπτουχίας; iv. 220 κυριεύσας . . . λεκανομαντείας ἅμα καὶ νεκυοαγωγῆς. The relatedness of this locution to the status term κύριος, especially used allusively as an epithet in a religious context as becomes increasingly frequent in this period and later into the Christian period, is apparent here (for purely pagan examples see LSJ s.v. κύριος B.3). The locution may also have the sense 'obtaining', 'procuring', 'providing all good things', thus prefiguring the epithet ἵλε|ων 'beneficent' which closes the list (1291–2). The specification that the divinity provides *all* good things (πάντων) is familiar from traditional aretalogies of cult and reflected in poetry. Cf. Pythag. *VS* 58 D 2 (i. 468,34) θεὸς καὶ οὗτος πάντων κύριος.

1286–7 ἀ|[πραγ]μάτευτον: cf. below, 1593 with commentary. According to Epic. *KD* 1 τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει. Here a term from Epicurean ethics and physics adapted as though for use as a cult epithet (cf. epithets in invocations formed with the alpha privative, e.g. ἀκάματος in *Suppl. Mag.* ii no. 87,2). Cf. Plut. *Pyrr.* 20 (Epic. fr. 363 Us.) εἰς ἀπράγμονα βίον καὶ μεστὸν εὐπαθειῶν; Julian, *Ad Themistium* p. 330,15 Hertl. (Epic. fr. 551 Us.) σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν ἀπράγμονα; Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 172,3; Muson. fr. 18B p. 105 Hense ('not costing much trouble').

1288 ὑψηλόν: sometimes of persons, in sense and contexts very similar to σεμνός: Eurip. *Suppl.* 555 δαίμονα . . . ὑψηλὸν αἴρει; *Hel.* 418; *Hipp.* 730; Plat. *Rep.* 494 D; Andoc. 3. 7; Aeschin. 2. 174. But the word does not seem to have been used much in theological contexts.

1288–90 μεγαλόφρονα καὶ μεγαλόψυχον: as a term of ethics the latter appears at Philod. *Rhet.* i. 209,21; ii. 248,12; *De vit.* 27,27; μεγαλοψυχία as a virtue is treated at *De vit.* 24,36. μεγαλόφρων appears as a epithet of Ἡσυχία at Aristoph. *Lys.* 1289 (cf. Isocr. 2. 25).

1290–1 ἅγιον καὶ | ἁγιώτατον: above, 759–60 καθαρὰς καὶ ἁ|[γίο]υς δόξας; cf. ἁγνεία at Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 4,14; above, 698–701 τὸν ἁ|[γν]εύοντα λόγον | ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν | λέγειν; *De Stoic.* 9,9, 22,7. The primary designation of ἅγιος is 'sacred', 'holy' (of persons: 'devoted to the gods'), especially of gods' things: temples, sacrifices (e.g. Isocr. 10.63, Plat. *Leg.* 729 E) and oaths ([Aristot.] *Mir.* 834^{b}11); of initiates: Aristoph. *Av.* 522 (in hymnic anapaests); Isocr. 11.25 ἁγίως καὶ σεμνῶς ἔχειν. For the cult background see Burkert 1985*a*, 269–71; E. Williger, *Hagios: Untersuchungen zur Terminologie des Heiligen in den hellenisch-hellenistischen Religionen* (RGUV 19/1; Giessen, 1922). The word does not occur in Homer, Hesiod, or tragedy (where ἁγνός is substituted) and is generally avoided in Attic, but occurs with extreme frequency of divinities in the magical papyri. For the assonance ἅ. ἅ. cf. the invocations ἅγιος ἅγιος ἅγιος κύριος in *Suppl. Mag.* i no. 29,15–16 (Σαβαωθ);

ibid. 25,5–6, 32,1, which are quoting Isa. 6: 3; *PGM* P 13,8 *ἅγιος, ἅγιος ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῦ αἰῶνος*; and for a purely pagan example *PGM* iv. 522 *ἁγίοις ἁγιασθεὶς ἁγιάσμασι, ἁγίας ὑφεστώσης μοι*. For the anaphoric repetition cf. *θεός θεός* in the hymnic proem of Diagoras (*PMG* 738) quoted later (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 11,26 in Henrichs 1974*a*, 22. For the superlative see Plat. *Leg.* 729 E.

1291–2 ἵλεων: so also in the prayer formula known from Epicurus' letters *θεῶν εἵλεων ὄντων*, of which Philodemus could quote several instances (above, 929–37); Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 17,10 *ἱλ[αστούς. ἵλεων* ought to be the neuter adjective (of which the masc./fem. is *ἵλεως*), the Attic form of *ἵλαος/ἵλεος*. As a term of cult ('propitious', 'gracious') it is attested as early as Homer, and is used most often to describe gods themselves (rather than their things or places). For cult instances see *SIG* 985.47 (Philadelphia); *SIG* 527.92 (Dreros on Crete); *GDI* 5089.26 (Hierapytna); *IG* v(1). 1562 (Olympia, dedicatory epigram); *Hymn. Cer.* 204; *Paean. Erythr.* 19; Hom. *Il.* 1. 583; Hes. *Op.* 340; Plat. *Leg.* 712 B. In prayers: *PGM* i. 303 *ἵλαος ἔλθοις*; iii. 206 *ἐμοὶ ἵλαος ἔ[ccο*, iii. 213 *θεὸς ἵλαος ἔccο*; also *ἵλαθί μοι*: ii. 116 (*δέσποτα Μουσῶν*), ii. 165 (*Πρόνοια καὶ Τύχη*), iv. 2828 (*Σελήνη*); *Suppl. Mag.* ii no. 87,6 *εἵλεώς μοι γεν[οῦ] | Ζ[ε]ῦ Ἰαω Ζὴν Ἥλιε*. To say/ask that a god or things be *ἵλεως* often seems to involve expectations, as a result of carrying out ritual procedures or taking precautions, which tend to have restraint from blame or harm from gods as their objective.

1293–4 μεγίστην εὐσέβειαν: the notion that there are differing conceptions of piety emerges clearly already from Plato's *Euthyphro*. That Epicurus claimed to offer his followers grounds for distinguishing simply between them is implicit e.g. in Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123. What distiguishes Epicurean piety from most other definitions has been discussed in the definitions of the pious and impious man above, 1130–65. That the Epicurean will be more scrupulous in such matters, both intellectually and ritually, constitutes a good part of Philodemus' main thesis in *De pietate*. Philodemus' assertion here that the Epicureans alone seek the greatest type of piety is probably intended as a contrast to the methods of the earlier 'philosophers and *theologoi*' described above, 1184–1217, who dispensed with the concept of piety for themselves, while letting the many hold a false view of it. Such thinkers did not, like the Epicureans, claim to be more pious than other individuals. Philodemus takes this as a point in favour of the Epicureans, who publicly teach (*δοξάζειν*) what they believe about the gods.

1295–6 δοξάζειν ὁ|σι[ώ]τατα περὶ θεῶν: *ὁσιώτατα* could alternatively be the superlative adverb (as *σεμνό[τατα* above at 1042).

1298–1301 κατ]αγεινώσκουl[c]ιν ὡς ἂν ὑπεναντίl[α] τῆι προλήψει δογμαlτιζόντων: the reference to the others as 'teaching', *δογμα|τιζόντων*, probably indicates that he means other philosophers in particular, though

Epic. *Ad Menoec.* states that the assertions of the many about the gods are not derived from *προλήψεις*. The term *ὑπεναντίος* has definite echoes of Epicurus' terminology (see 1054 with commentary), and together with *πρόληψις*, a technical term for which Epicurus was notorious, reflects a process of reasoning that forms a major part of Epicurus' epistemological programme. The source tradition is unambiguous that he thought it was at least possible to have a *πρόληψις* of god or divine nature, but otherwise we do not hear much about it in this treatise, nor does it seem to have played a major role in Philod. *De dis* (cf. col. 2,17; it does, however, come under discussion later, at 1887). When Philodemus says here that the others teach about the gods in a way that is contrary to the *πρόληψις* of them, the concept is probably deemed to be unproblematic and to be fully sketched out (*ὑπογραφόμενον*, cf. 1048–9) by such passages as *KD* 1, *Ad Menoec.* 123, and the definitions of the pious and impious man above, 1130–65.

1301–2 κα|θα[ρώτα]τα: again this may be the superlative adverb, understanding *δοξάζειν* over again from 1295.

1302–4 τὴν ἄ|φραστον ὑπεροχὴν | τῆς ἰσχύος τοῦ θε[ί]ου: the appearance of the epithet *ἄφραστον* here is curious. Perhaps it has been simply assimilated from other cult or theological contexts, for there is no other reason why for the Epicureans divinity (or positive aspects of it) should be ineffable, nor do they exhibit any unwillingness to describe it (it is certainly not held to be incomprehensible, which is sometimes implied by the term *ἄφραστον*). For *ὑπεροχήν* see Epic. *De nat.* fr. 34. 31,20 Arr.^{2}. The 'strength' of divinity may have been explained by Epicurus in terms of the atomic formation of ideas of divinity that accounted for its persistence over time in individuals and cultures and its enduring psychological/emotional impact. See above on 224 ff. and cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 1. 41 (*σώματα*) *ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων*. It is unclear whether *τοῦ θε|οῦ* should be read here, or *τοῦ θε[ί]|ου*. The former is in keeping with the lengths of 1301–2, but the length of the immediately preceding line (1303) allows for the restoration of an extra letter. Several of the epithets in the catalogue above must be masculine (see above on 1281–92; cf. above, 1053, 1141, where Epicurus clearly used the term *ὁ θεός*); but the last is neuter.

1305–6 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 45 could physically join with following col. 46 (each comes from a separate half of the papyrus roll), and restorations could be devised to facilitate this. But the stichometric notation (see Introd. §2(*f*)) requires that between lines 1146 and 1430, four hundred lines have intervened (i.e. two stichometric letters, Λ and Ν, at 200 lines each = 400 lines). This is equivalent to *c.* 13 ⅓ columns, of which only 10 ⅓ are preserved. At least one must be missing between cols. 42 and 43 (see on 1217–18). I suspect that one column is missing here between cols. 45 and 46. The missing column will have contained a reversion to the citation of Epicurus in the singular (to accommodate the singular verbs at the beginning of col. 46) and additional material setting up the explanation of why

Epicurus' teachings, in spite of the pious pronouncements exhibited in the present col. 45, nevertheless seemed (to some) to be harmful to government of the city, as elaborated in cols. 46–7.

Col. 46

Digression explaining why Epicurus' views seemed harmful to the government of the many. This column and the next pick up the discussion left off at 1217–18. The thrust of the argument seems to be that Epicurus, because he spoke publicly regarding the false views about the gods held by the many and propagated by the poets, seemed to hold views that jeopardized civic relations among people. (Philodemus is perhaps relating an opponent's charge rather than expressing his own view.) This possibility is countered in the succeeding columns with the record of evidence that Epicurus was not in fact perceived by the Athenians as harmful.

1308 π]αραινεῖ: this verb used is of Epicurus' pronouncements on the divine above, 829–30, where see commentary. Enough is preserved to be sure that the views that follow are Epicurean and not, say, those of Socrates (1359) or some other figure who seemed harmful to government.

1309 δύσκ[ολον: not a philosophical term ('susceptible of anger'), but 'bad-tempered', an epithet of everyday life and comedy. Cf. *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 10,19 δύς]κολοι κ[αὶ] δύσθ[υ]μοι; Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 23,7 ἡ γὰρ ἀλγηδό|νος ὑπ[ο]μονὴ μάχεται καθάπ[αξ πρ(ὸς) τὴν θεῶν] | φύσιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ δύσκολ[ο]ν οὐ γ[ίνεται; cf. fr. 82.

1310–11 π]αρὰ τῶν πολ[ητῶν: this reading was already suggested by Gomperz (O^2, the copy of O^1, reads παραιτων here, in error). If correct, it would relate back to 1203–17 where the '*theologoi* and philosophers' are said to have exploited the existence of *mythoi* (1209) about the gods' punishing humans for their misdeeds in order to keep the foolish in check. The present passage would acknowledge that Epicurus had publicly denounced the poets' stories about the gods' being δύσκολοι as false.

1311–12 τῶι καθαλ[ρῶς φι]λοσοφεῖ[ν: the Epicurean wise man will have pure ideas (καθαρὰς δόξας) about the divine (759); an Epicurean is quoted as praying to lead a pure (καθαράν) life (933). Comparison with Epic. *Ad Herod.* 83 καὶ καθαρὰ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιήσει (ὁ λόγος) πολλὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος and fr. 117 Us. (to Apelles) καθαρὸς πάσης παιδείας ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὥρμησας, shows that the present expression could relate to the proscription of the ideas of the poets, above, 1310–11.

1314–16 μηδὲν αὐτῶν | [ὠφέ]λιμον ἡμᾶς συν|[ταρ]άττειν: this sounds much like the quotation from Epicurus above, 884–9 (and, if an echo of it, confirms α[ὐ]|τούς over αὐ]|τούς at 885–6). I suspect, however, that the

occurrence here of the adjective *ὠφέλιμον* relates to the question of whether or not the false myths about the poets are really 'beneficial' in securing social control and government (Philodemus argues at length below, cols. 63–86, that they are not). *ὠφέλειαι* from the gods are allowed above at 1031 and 1058 (= 1046 *cωτηρία[c*, 1084–5 *ἀ|[ρ]ίcταιc διαδόcε|[cι*, 1095–6 *[τ]ῶν ἀ[γαθῶν*, 1150–1 *παρακε̣[νὰc] | τῶν ἀ[γα]θῶν*, cf. 1181–4), and at 1394 Epicurus is said to have allowed aspects of religion 'by which our life is preserved' (*οἷc βίοc ἡ[μ]ῶν | διακώζεται*). Here in 1314 *αὐτῶν* requires a definite antecedent, which could be either the gods or the poets (if the restoration of 1310–11 is correct). *αὐτῶν* here might be thought to refer to the gods, not the poets; but the god has just been mentioned in the singular in 1312–13.

1317–18 (*μὴ*) **ἐπιβ]ολαῖc ἀνοήτοιc | [ἀκολ]ουθοῦντεc:** in neutral contexts, *ἐπιβολή* for the Epicureans refers to the mind's capability to focus information received through sensory processes into an impression (*φαντασία*), an important factor in concept formation: see *HPh* 15 (esp. Lucr. 4. 722–822 = *HPh* 15D 7–8, on how we can form images in the mind at will), 17A–B with commentary, i. 77–8, 90. Such 'focusing' is a deliberate mental act, involving a sense-like mental impression, capable of determining what is in principle imaginable. Epicurus held that such impressions technically come out 'true' (see *HPh* 16), and *KD* 24 (*HPh* 24) implies that *ἐπιβολή* constitutes something like a criterion of truth (according to D.L. 10. 31 = *HPh* 17A this was an Epicurean innovation). The present expression *ἐπιβ]ολαῖc ἀνοήτοιc* would be an oxymoron, unless one assumes that it is possible for such 'focusings of thought' to go awry before the *φαντασία* 'impression' is fully formed (so apparently Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 14,12; cf. *De dis* 3 col. d2,26). If so, *ἐπιβολαὶ ἀνόητοι* would mean something like 'idle imaginings'. The term *ἀνοήτοιc* recalls the *ἀνοητότεροι* (1213) who are thought by some to be held in check by the *mythoi* about the gods (1190–1217).

1321–9 Compare Philippson's reconstruction:

	τ]ῶν γὰρ λυπη-		]ωνγαραγπα ο
	ρῶν, ὅ]τι̣ καὶ τὸ πρὸc		]π ο
	ἡμᾶc ἀ]ποβαίνο[ν]		
	κακὸν ἔ]φρόντιcαν,		
1325	*αὐτοὺc ἀπο]λύ̣ωμεν* >	(20)	η ο
	καὶ οὕτω]c ἐχόντων		
	ἔcχε ζ]η[μί]ac οὐ-		
	δενὸc πάντ]ων [τ' εὔ-		
	νοιαν ἐφύλ]αξεν·		

If *ἐφύλ]αξεν* in 1329 is correct, the passage probably at least said that a false view of the gods no longer provided protection (e.g. against the misdeeds of the foolish). It is more difficult to ascertain what persons must have been the subject of 1324 *ἔ]φρόντιcαν*, for it can scarcely have been unexpressed (as in

Philippson's reconstruction above). The same people must be the subject of 1347–8 τι|μῶcιν (at 1353 οἱ πολλο[ί are introduced).

1330–2 φαίν]εται τοί[ν]υν | [παρας]κευάcθαι [ἐ]ναργῆ γν]ώcιν: here φαίν]εται is impersonal; the subject of παρες]κευάcθαι is philosophers generally who reveal that the tales about the gods are not true (cf. 1353–63, where Socrates is adduced as one example), and is thus left unspecified. For the phrase ἐναργὴς γνῶcις see Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123.

1333 λυ]μαντικαί: cf. Muson. fr. 8 p. 34 Hense; Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 35 (λυμαίνεcθαι); ibid. 53 (the more the bad prosper, the more they λυμαίνονται); Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 24a3 τὴ[ν τῶν] περιεχόντων [λυμαν]||τηρίων ἀπειρίαν; Epict. 3. 7. 20.

1334–5 *Order of Columns.* We know that the present col. 46 links with the following column 47, because both appear on the same Oxonian *disegno*. Like the *N* disegni of **1077**, *O* **1077** is preserved in two copies (except in the case of fr. 1 which has only one). O^1 is a copy of O^2, as is shown by inferior readings at several points. There is no Neapolitan *disegno* of this column, though the following column (on the same layer of papyrus, as can be seen from the Oxonian *disegno*) was copied by the *disegnatore* of *N* (see col. 47). Perhaps the left-hand edge of the *scorze* had been further obscured by damage between the drawing of *O* in the year 1790 and that of *N* in 1807.

Col. 47

An explanation of hostility against philosophers who reveal true things about gods. Piety defined as justice. Socrates and the Athenians adduced as an example. Epicurean theology contrasted with the views of other philosophers suspected of impiety.

1334–5 τῆc τῶν πρ]ὸc ἀλλ[ή]||λουc ἀνθρώπω[ν] | πολιτείαc: an objective genitive, dependent upon 1333 λυ]μαντικαί 'harmful to civic relations among people with one another'. (Cf. below, 2150–5, especially 2155 παρ' ἀλλήλων.) πρὸc ἀλλ[ή]||λουc, however, modifies the dependent genitive τῶν ἀνθρώπων ('humans *vis-à-vis* one another'), which is nested in between the article τῆc and its noun πολιτείαc.

1337 εὐ[cεβεῖc: sc. δό|[ξαι? (1332–3), dependent upon 1330 φαίν]εται (with εἶναι understood). For the adjective see below, 2345, where εὐcεβεῖc means the 'so-called pious'. Similarly here Philodemus means that philosophical views that reveal the myths to be false are not *regarded* as pious by people in general (not that they are in fact impious: see the definitions above at 1130–65).

1338–44 'Since piety appears to include not harming both other people and especially one's benefactors and homeland.' This seems to be drawn from a definition or discussion of piety, specifying one component of it. It

must be a definition accepted by Philodemus, since he never denies it, and at times seems to assume it in arguing in what follows that Epicurus was not in fact harmful in this way. Cf. below, 2263–5, where it is claimed that piety and justice are 'virtually the same thing' (*cχεδὸν ταὐτ*[ὸ | *φαίν*]*εται τὸ ὅσι*ο[*ν καὶ* | *δί*]*και*[*ον*).

1340–2 τὸ πρὸ[c] | ἀνθρώπους ἀβλα|βές: for the notion that the Epicurean should make himself as harmless as possible to everyone in pious emulation of the Epicurean gods themselves, see below, 2043–58; for Epicurus as an example, below, 1468–1512, 1523–60, 1566–69; cf. 2332–7, 2473–7; other philosophers as counter-examples, above, 1184–1217 (philosophers and *theologoi*), below, 1353–63 (Socrates), 1512–23 (other philosophers exiled, executed, or lampooned), 1570–2 (despised *theologoi* and philosophers), 1664–1701 (Socrates), 1853–67 (those who 'keep hidden' what seems true to Epicureans), 2171–4 (atheists and charlatans). Philodemus singles out of humans in general 'one's benefactors and homeland', for it is specifically on these (rather than on mankind in general, for whom acccording to Epicurus we have no natural affinity) that the Epicurean concept of justice (treated in the final section of the treatise) is based. Thus the definition can be seen to be an authentic Epicurean one and may go back to Epicurus or possibly Hermarchus. As Philodemus says below (2263–5) justice and piety are (for Epicureans) virtually the same thing. Philodemus says here that such views (as e.g. reveal that the myths about the gods are false) *seem* to harm others by threatening governance, and therefore to be impious (= unjust). But he later argues that while this was true of Socrates and certain others it was not so for Epicurus and his followers.

1344–53 'Of course they honour (i.e. respect, acknowledge) a thing (i.e. divinity) rather kindly and propitious, whereas we all regard our views as the true cause of our own tranquillity.' This rendering assumes that people in general are the subject of 1347–8 *τι|μῶcιν* (or, perhaps more likely, philosophers like Socrates below who reveal that the myths are false, but nevertheless believe in a literally beneficent divinity, unlike the Epicureans). But this is not entirely certain: the subject could be, for example, those with political authority, or those who propagate false views about the gods to keep the foolish in check. Note that the philosophers described above at 1184–1201 only denied that the gods cause *harm* to mortals (1185–6), and that they were all-knowing (1196–9), not that the gods exist or could be beneficial.

1347–8 τι|μῶcιν could also be taken in a judicial sense, in which case we should render: 'of course they punish (i.e. the impious) somewhat (*τι*) more gently and carefully, while we think that our own views will truly bring us tranquillity' (i.e. we Epicureans do not rely on political punishment for such crimes). But outside the lawcourts, one would expect rather *τιμωρῶcιν*, and below at 1357–8 we have *κολάζουcιν* of what the Athenians did to Socrates, apparently adduced as a contrast to the present case (1353 *ἀλλ'*).

1348–53 The term *παρασκευαστικά* recalls the terminology with which Epicureans describe benefits as 'deriving' from the gods (see above, 1150, 1255, discussed on 1147–8). For this reason I think Philodemus must be speaking exclusively of Epicureans here, and not generalizing about 'all of us humans' (not all of whom could in any case be expected to have *δόγματα* in the first place). Philodemus as much as admits here that the goods of which the gods are *παρασκευαστικοί* are ethical and psychological in nature (i.e. what they provide is *ἀταραξία*, a state of the soul), and that the gods exist in the first instance as our ideas (here *δόγματα*, 1350) about them.

1345–7 ἠπιώ[τε]|ρον: Philod. *De ira* col. 19,19; *De lib. dicendi* col. 8b,12. Of gods: Soph. *Philoct.* 738; Eurip. *Bacch.* 861; Aristoph. *Vesp.* 879; Eurip. *Alc.* 310; *Med.* 133; 1 Thess. 2. 7; 2 Tim. 2. 24.

1346–7 κηδεμον̣[ι]|κώτερον: Philod. *De lib. dicendi* fr. 26,6 *κηδεμονι|κὴ νουθέτησις*; 13b,12; Polyb. 31. 27. 12; Cic. *Att.* 2. 17. 3; Muson. fr. 14 p. 73 Hense; Joseph. *Bell. Iud.* 1. 28. 2 (comparative).

1353–8 In 1355 *οὕτω{ι}* must refer backward, and so provides a key for the reconstruction of the preceding section. Thus 1355–7 *πε|ρὶ θεῶν ἀποφαινο|μένους* must refer to the divulging to the foolish true things about the gods (cf. 1206–7 with commentary), such as that they do not cause harm to mortals as portrayed in the myths. *ἀποφαίνομαι* is used often of the Epicureans teaching their views (see on 224–5, cf. 1097–8 of Polyaenus). Since the many are introduced as subject here, they are probably not the subject of 1347–8 *τι|μῶσιν* or 1324 *ἐφρόντισαν*.

1358–63 For Socrates in Epicurean circles generally see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 93 (who makes Cotta express something approaching horror at the fact that they reviled him as the *scurra Atticus*), and see Kleve 1983; Vander Waerdt 1989; above on 697–708. By using Socrates as an example here Philodemus does not mean to imply that his punishment was unjust or undeserved. He later returns to the topic below, 1665–1701, arguing that Socrates certainly brought his punishment on himself by meddling among the crowds (*ὄχλοι*), offending people, and incurring political enmities. Even if not deserving of punishment, he certainly gave the Athenians the excuse (*πρόφασις*) to punish him. He also notes (1691–1701) that Socrates' anxiety over offending by introducing 'strange divinities' (*καινὰ δαιμόνια*, probably referring to Socrates' reticence about his personal *δαίμων*) justified such a pretext. The fact that Philodemus turns the discussion back to Socrates several times (see also 696–708, where he is named and quoted, and 1512–23, where the reference to comedy leaves no doubt that he has Socrates in mind) shows that he constituted for Philodemus a special case in the history of Greek theological speculation that demanded special treatment. He does not, for instance, appear among those philosophers attacked after the poets below in *P. Herc.* 1428 (though Xenophon and Plato do, as do other Socratic successors; cf. Speusippus and Heraclides of Pontus). For Socrates himself

had called into question the traditional myths about the gods and demanded a higher moral standard for the divinities to which he prayed. Yet he himself taught in the form of myths and believed that certain false tales about the gods were necessary to the city to hold the *ἀνοητότεροι* in check. He thus occupies an identical (or slightly later) stage in Philodemus' cultural history as the 'philosophers and *theologoi*' (above, 1202–17) who utilized false tales about the gods in order to keep the foolish in check. Socrates thus occupies the category of those who 'seem to procure clear knowledge with views harmful to the governance of men and therefore not pious' (1330–7). Philodemus argues that such people are at the very least responsible for giving the false impression that the Epicureans are similarly impious, and are therefore to be blamed. Yet it should be noticed that the approach towards Socrates exhibited here and later in the treatise is neither that of complete revulsion nor of sarcastic parody, but rather an attempt toward understanding and analysis of Socrates as a unique and problematic figure in intellectual and social history (cf. above on 702 for similar indication of a change in the Epicurean attitude towards Socrates).

1359–60 καί τινας ἑτέρους: we do not know whom Philodemus means. 'Some philosophers' are similarly described below, 1512–23. At *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,9–12 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 22) Philodemus knows of an otherwise obscure atheist who 'denied the gods outright'. Perhaps he is simply assuming there were others (on the basis of the biographical tradition about Diagoras and Anaxagoras, the decree of Diopeithes, etc.) and wants to complete the category, implying that Socrates was not entirely alone in this respect. Perelli 1955, 54 n. 1, apropos of the present passage, compares Diog. Oen. fr. 11 Chilton col. 1,2–4 *τοὺς χρηστο]τάτους ὡς Ἀ|[ναξαγόρα]ν κατα-τρέ|[χουσι*, but Smith 1993 (on his equivalent fr. 16, which now reads *τοὺς ὁσιω]τάτους ὡς ἀ|[θέους λεία]ν κατατρέ|[χουσιν* here) argues against introducing the names of additional atheists here, although Protagoras and Diagoras are certainly discussed in the lines that follow. However, below at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 11,12–12,2 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 21–2) Philodemus pauses to contemplate the possibility of exempting Diagoras from his criticism of philosophers for saying false things about the gods, by appealing to a tradition stemming from Aristoxenus that Diagoras in his genuine lyric poetry spoke piously about the gods ('as befits a poet'), while the other works attributed to him were spurious.

1361–3 εὐ|παιδευτότατοι | λεχθέντες: sc. *οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι*. They are also mentioned below, 1595–6 (probably again in connection with Socrates, but the passage is very fragmentary). Socrates (ap. Plato *Apol.* 29D), looking backwards in time, purports to address the average Athenian as *Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν*. For the longstanding tradition that the Athenians were more educated than others (or most of all) see e.g. Pericles ap. Thuc. 2. 34ff.; Theseus in Euripides'

Hippolytus, Aegeus in the *Medea*, and Paul in the *Epistle to the Romans* express similar sentiments. Philodemus' statement here could of course reflect his personal opinion—his teacher Zeno had been there, and Philod. *Epigr.* 34 Sider (= *AP* 6. 349, 19 Gow–Page, 16 Gigante) *cῷον ἐπὶ γλυκερὴν ἠόνα Πειραέωc* suggests a personal visit—or even contemporary (Roman) intellectual values. But to avoid historical anachronism in reference to Socrates it must at least have been believed to have been true about Athens of the fifth century. By Philodemus' day few will have doubted it. As Dr Holford-Strevens notes: 'The claim, however inappropriate for the fifth century, when in many respects Ionia and the West were far ahead, was more plausible when urged by Isocrates in the fourth, but triumphed because it was to Athens that Macedon looked for culture' (citing *AP* 7. 45. 3 *Ἑλλάδοc Ἑλλὰc Ἀθῆναι*).

1363–4 *Order of columns.* Of this column we have the witnesses of both the Oxonian and Neapolitan *disegno* and thus are in a better position than elsewhere to constitute the text accurately. (In general the Naples *disegno* transmits more accurate readings, but the Oxonian exhibits greater features of detail, e.g. the stichometric point and suprascript corrections missing on *N*; the papyrus may of course have deteriorated in the twenty-year interval after *O* was copied.) The present column may well join with the following one, since that column comes from the other half of the papyrus roll. But note that the following col. 48 is slightly out of sequence in the descending order of fragments in the **1098** sequence. We should have expected col. 48 (fr. 5) to have preceded col. 42 (fr. 4). I have departed from the descending sequence on grounds of context and content, since col. 48 relates the result of the matters described in the preceding columns (namely, that the Epicureans have been suspected of impiety). Col. 42 (fr. 4) also seems to treat events that come early in cultural history, whereas if it follows the present col. 47, those events must be later than Socrates. Once the two fragments are interchanged (assuming misnumbering by the *disegnatore*), the subject of suspicion of impiety against Epicureans follows naturally in the chronology. See also above on 1183–4.

Col. 48

How the Athenians' punishment of philosophers like Socrates did not lead to suspicions of impiety and neglecting the gods being directed against Epicurus.

1364–8 Assuming a link with the following column, I offer the following reconstruction of the fragmentary beginning of this column, *exempli gratia*:

	λεχθέντεc ἀν-‖	
48	*θρώπων, ὅτι ἔκ]αμον*	1098 5
1365	....·] *διὰ τοῦ-*	
	το δὲ τὴν ἐπ]ιτειμή-	
	cιν οὐδαμ]ῶc τοῖc	

περὶ τὸ]ν Ἐπίκουρον (5)
οὐδὲ τ]οιαύτας ἐνε-
κε]ίνηcαν ὑπο[ψίας

... (as the Athenians punished Socrates and certain others, even though they were) reported to be the most educated of other people, because they became tired of *(one word missing)*. But in no way on account of this have they stirred up blame against Epicurus, nor even such suspicions of impiety ... etc.

With ἔκ]αμον in 1364 (Philippson—an adjective ending in]αμον is unlikely) we expect a participle in 1365, perhaps διώκοντεc ('because they wearied of prosecuting them', with Athenians as subject) or φυγόντεc (Philippson, 'because they wearied of being prosecuted', with either Athenians or sophists as subject).

1366–7 ἐπ]ιτειμη|[: some form of ἐπιτίμηcιc, connected with hostility against Socrates and philosophers like him. For the term see Thuc. 7. 48; Aristot. *Rhet.* 1355ª24; *Pol.* 1340ᵇ40; in the plural D.S. 5. 1. Philodemus several times uses it in the plural: *De lib. dicendi* 75,1–2 γίν[ε]|cθαι τὰc [ἐ]πιτιμ[ή]cειc; 82,1. So perhaps here we should restore the plural accusative (as in the reconstruction above) or even nominative as subject of 1369–70 ἐνε|[κε]ίνηcαν, or in a result or causal cause with ὥcτε or ἐπειδή.

1367–8 τοῖc | [περὶ τὸ]ν Ἐπίκουρον: the same expression below, 1856–7. Not Epicurus and his school, but as abundant parallels suggest, simply 'Epicurus' himself. On the idiom see S. L. Radt, *ZPE* 38 (1980), 47–56, later augmented in *ZPE* 71 (1988), 35–40 and 74 (1988), 108. For a striking example: Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22. 1, where οἱ περὶ Καρνεάδην τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν καὶ Διογένη τὸν Cτωϊκὸν come to Rome to plead Athens' case on the famous philosophic embassy in 155 BC (it is unlikely that Carneades and Diogenes brought students).

1369–70 ἐνε|κε]ίνηcαν ὑπο[ψίαc: the plural here guaranteed by 1369 and 1372. ἐγκινέω is not recorded in this sense by LSJ; for the sense 'give rise to', 'call forth a response' see LSJ s.v. κινέω II.2. For ὑποψία in the negative sense of 'paranoid suspicion', 'apprehension', see above on 686 and cf. 1213–14; Epic. *KD* 11, 34; Polystr. *De contemp.* cols. 9,25, 15,23, 23,1, 31,24. It is unclear whether the subject of ἐνε|[κε]ίνηcαν is the Athenians (perhaps in reference to direct legal proceedings as at 1505–32) or philosophers like Socrates (indirectly, by giving philosophy a bad name).

1371 τὰcεβ]εῖν καὶ τὰμελεῖ[ν: cf. Plat. *Leg.* 900B; Demosth. 18. 227; Xen. *Cyr.* 1. 2. 7.

1373–5 οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὰ | [κοι]νὰ τῶν ἀνθρώ|πων ἔθη: echoed below, 1380–1, as though in repetition of a formula.

1375–83 δέον introduces an accusative absolute construction (as above at 444), probably with the force of a causal clause: the Epicureans never incurred punishment for or even suspicions of impiety, because the Epicureans are obliged (δέον) to say to them (people in general? the Athenians?

philosophers like Socrates?) explicitly that everyone must piously observe the laws and the customs.

1376 τούτοις: these ought to be the Athenians, or at least those who might otherwise suspect the Epicureans of neglecting the gods and being impious. Such a declaration by the Epicureans would make clear their viewpoint about piety to the many as matter of public record. But it might be possible to understand *τούτοις* here to be the 'philosophers and *theologoi*' (perhaps including Socrates) who would privately challenge traditional thinking about the gods. In this case these people are also the subject of 1383 *προ]cτάτ[τ]ωcιν*, with the added implication that they threaten to 'introduce' or 'instigate' elements of impiety.

1377–8 αὐθεκαc|[τό]τερον λόγον: for *αὐθέκαστος* see *De vit.* col. 30,17, 31,5; the adverb at *De sign.* col. 32,32. Cf. Cleanthes in *SVF* i. 127; Philemon fr. 93 K.–A.; Posidippus fr. 41 K.–A.

1380–1 τοῖc νόμ[οι]c καὶ | [τοῖ]c ἐθιcμοῖc: the same collocation at *IG* ii². 1043. 30 (i BC).

1381–2 ἕωc | [ἂν μ]ή: 'as long as they do not', i.e. 'until such time as . . .' etc. 'Sometimes in post-Homeric Greek *ἕως* and the subjunctive (with or without *ἄν*) has a touch of purpose' (Smyth §2418; cf. Schwyzer ii. 650; Kühner–Gerth ii. 449; Mayser ii/1.268–74), as here. If we take the subject of this clause to be *νόμοι καὶ οἱ ἐθιcμοί*, there is an added implication that if laws and customs stipulated *τὰ ἀcεβῆ*, the Epicurean would not observe them. Though this is potentially in contradiction with 732 above (where see commentary) no contradiction between a law or custom and the notion of piety is likely to develop according to the Epicurean view, for the reason that the laws and customs are seen as having originated as a mechanism for assuring people's mutual safety (see below, 2158–65), and so are *a fortiori* pious. In this way Philodemus can claim that the Epicureans fulfil the traditional definition of piety (set forth above, 1338–44) as 'not harming both other people and especially one's benefactors and homeland'. Were a situation suddenly and irrationally to arise in which a religious practice was in contradiction with *εὐcέβεια* so defined (e.g. the sacrifice of Iphigenia, Lucr. 1. 80–101), the Epicurean would not observe it.

1383–4 ὑ|[περ]άνω: adverbial: 'above all else', also in a first-person asseveration at Philod. *De morte* col. 34,28.

1388–9 ἐν τῆι θε|[ωρί]α[ι: see above on 726.

1389–90 ὡc] Ἐπίκουλ[ροc] προ[φέρει: the main point is of course that in contrast to the '*theologoi* and philosophers' (perhaps including Socrates) Epicurus and the Epicureans voice their true views about the divine and religious observance publicly (cf. 1375–6 *ἐμ|[φαί]νειν*).

1393–4 *Order of Columns.* We are missing a column before the corresponding fragment of the **1077** sequence, since that fragment (col. 49) begins *in medias res.* There must have been a return in the narrative to recounting detractors' charges

against the Epicureans, since another such charge (cf. above, 1165ff., 1227–30) is under discussion at the opening of col. 49.

Col. 49

Further charges by opponents: (1) that Epicurus accepts certain aspects of religion as beneficial to life, but mocks the mysteries and festivals; (2) that Epicurus went unharmed by the Athenians because his teachings were unknown to them; (3) that the Epicureans deprive the virtuous and just of the expectation of goods they have in the divine. Philodemus has anticipated most of these charges by adducing evidence above that they produced arguments for the gods, participated in cult, and allowed for harms and benefits from the gods; he now turns in this and the following columns to treat each charge individually, beginning with the last first. For the introduction of his opponents' charges (in part a conventional device for articulating divisions in the narrative) see the list above on 297–8. We are missing the preceding column, but it is unlikely that it afforded any more explicit indication of specifically who the accusers were. The last mention of the opponents is above at 1165–76 (they attack the doctrines of Epicurus alone for not representing the gods' harm and benefit as similar to base conceptions), and to their complaints he now returns. On the present passage see also Vicol 1945, 264–5; Perelli 1955, 54; Obbink 1989, 212–15.

1394–1402 I suspect that something like the following preceded 1394 in the intervening column (now lost): *κατατρέχουσι μὲν ἡμᾶς εἰπόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου τὰ μὲν τῶν θεῶν ὠφέλιμα καταλείπεσθαι καὶ τὴν εὐργε*]||*σίαν, οἷς ὁ βίος ἡ*[*μ*]*ῶν | διασώζεται, φ*[*λ*]*υ*|*αρίαν δέ* etc., '(Our opponents) attack us saying that benefits from the gods are allowed by Epicurus and also benefaction, by which things our life is preserved, but (he thinks) the mysteries and festivals to be foolishness.' (For the opponents and *κατατρέχουσι* see 2485 below.) That the detractors allow that Epicurus accepts *some* harms and benefits from the gods is indeed implied above, 1165–76, where their objection is reported that Epicurus does not accept *all* traditional features of divine harms and benefits (i.e. not those which are *ὅμοιαι χυδαίοις*, see 1181–2). Here the mysteries and festivals are singled out as aspects allegedly disregarded by Epicurus. This the opponents infer or conclude from the fact that 'those for whose sake they (sc. mysteries and sacrifices) take place (i.e. the gods) are said (i.e. by Epicurus) to bother themselves about nothing (*μ*[*η*]||*δενὸς ἐπιστρέφε*[*σ*]||*θαι*)'. (The syntax of this sentence was disentangled by A. Henrichs, who also suggested the supplement *εὐερ-*

γε]||cίαν in 1394.) Philodemus has anticipated the charge by having already adduced Epicurus' involvement in both: 558–9, 808–10 (mysteries); 766, 794–808, 866–8, cf. 1017 (festivals). In this charge there appears to be preserved a genuine criticism of the Epicureans. As his opponents saw it, the gods as described by Epicurus seemed to take no notice of the cult offered them. And so they deduce further (see 1412–25) that the forms of ritual actually observed by the Epicureans are insincere or parodies, designed to cultivate popular favour, but ultimately disruptive of social harmony.

For further reflections of the charge that Epicurus was an atheist whose true views on the gods were screened from the public by the allegedly contradictory practice of religious observance, see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 123 (Posid. fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd = 346 Theiler) *verius est igitur nimirum illud quod familiaris omnium nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum, nullos esse deos Epicuro videri, quaeque is de deis inmortalibus dixerit invidiae detestandae gratia dixisse*, 'it is doubtless therefore truer to say, as our good friend Posidonius argued in the fifth book of his *On the Nature of the Gods*, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular odium', which at least allows that the Epicureans did in fact say positive things about the god (the lack of specificity in *quaeque is . . . dixerit* points to inference rather than evidence). Cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 9. 58 καὶ Ἐπίκουρος δὲ κατ' ἐνίους ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει θεόν, ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς, 'and, according to some, Epicurus in his popular exposition allows the existence of god, but in expounding the physical nature of things he does not allow it.' Cf. Lactant. *De ira Dei* 4. 7 (Posid. fr. 22b Edelstein–Kidd = 346 Theiler) *itaque verbis illum deos relinquere, re autem ipsa tollere quibus nullum motum nullum tribuit officium*; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117B (Epic. fr. 141 Us., 65 Arr.²) ὑποκρίνεται γὰρ εὐχὰς καὶ προσκυνήσεις οὐθὲν δεόμενος διὰ φόβον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φθέγγεται φωνὰς ἐναντίας οἷς φιλοσοφεῖ . . . οὕτω γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν σχηματίζεσθαι καὶ μὴ φθονεῖν μηδ' ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς; id. *Contr. Epic. beat.* 1102B (Epic. fr. 30 Us.), 1102C; *Adv. Col.* 1119D–E, 1123A, 1124E.

1394 εὐεργε]||cίαν: cf. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 327 fr. 10, and later in this treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 7,6–12 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 17–18, of Chrysippus) κ̣[αὶ] τὸν | Δία νόμον φησὶ⟨ν⟩ εἶ]ναι καὶ τὰς Χάριτας | τ̣ὰς ἡμετέ̣[ρ]ας κα|ταρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀν|ταποδόσεις τῶν | εὐε[ρ]γεσιῶν; ibid. col. 4,2–9 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 14, of Persaeus drawing on Prodicus).

1394–5 οἷς ὁ βίος ἡ[μ]ῶν | διασώ̣ζεται: for the the theory that religious customs and social institutions have their historical origin or philosophical justification in preserving human existence (*βίος*), see above, 1214–16 (of the function of myths about the gods) ἵ]ν̣α μὴ τὸ̣ν̣ | [ὅλον βί]ον [θ]ηριώδη | [παρ]έχωμεν, 'in order that we might not turn our whole life into that of

beasts'; below, 1954, 2271; *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 14,17 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 25, against the Stoics) ὅτι τὸν τῶν [θ]η|[ρίω]ν βίον εἰς το[ὺς] | ἀνθρώπ[ο]υς με[τ]α|φέρουσιν; Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124 D τὸν βίον οὐ νόμους διατάξαντες καὶ νόμιμα . . . εἰς πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἔθεντο; ibid. θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα; Henrichs 1975*b*, 93–124 on Prodicus' theory of the origin of the gods as divinized ὠφέλιμα or their inventors.

1395–6 φ[λ]υλαρίαν: for Philodemus' use of this term in reference to philosophical polemics (especially with reference to language and style) cf. φλυαρέω and see Indelli 1988, 204–5 on Philod. *De ira* col. 31,17–20.

1398–9 ἅ|τε, as opposed to ὡς, states a reason true in fact. In this case the truth is the opponents' view, here paraphrased by Philodemus, that it is really for the gods' sake that the festivals (allegedly neglected by Epicurus) are held. On the Epicurean view the festivals and mysteries, and indeed all other forms of worship are naturally elicited; thus ἅτε asseverates the Epicurean position as well. See above, 735–7, 794–7.

1401–2 ἐπιστρέφε[c]|θαι: cf. below, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 14,20–4 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 25) καὶ μά[λ]ιστ' ἐὰν μηδ' ἐπιστρέ|φωνται καθάπερ φα|σὶν τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν | διὰ ταῦτα ψόγου, 'especially if, as they (sc. the Stoics) say, they are not bothered about being blamed by the many for this' (i.e. turning our life into that of beasts).

1402–12 The statement reported here (that Epicurus was not exiled by the Athenians because his philosophy was largely ignored by them) sounds like a polemical rejoinder by opponents of the Epicureans countering an Epicurean defence (against charges of atheism) that Epicurus was in fact never politically harassed by the Athenians. For it is difficult to imagine such a charge being levelled except as a response on this point (unless perhaps criticism of the Epicurean doctrine of λάθε βιώσας?) One might suspect Philodemus of making all this up, as a way of anticipating a possible response by his opponents. But he later brings this up again, and bases his argument on it, claiming it as objective proof that Epicurus (unlike some philosophers) never offended his fellow citizens (see 1545–56, which refers back to this passage). If genuine, this reported statement presupposes an anterior stage of argument on the question of Epicurus' piety, one that antedates Philodemus and perhaps derives from the generation of his teacher Zeno of Sidon (see below, 1465–8, where Zeno's contribution to the debate is cited), possibly even to the time of the *kathegemones*. (There is no evidence that it dates from Epicurus' own lifetime.)

1405 ὄ[χλ]ον: the role of the ὄχλος is brought up again in connection with Socrates' fate at the hands of the Athenians, below, 1675–82; cf. 1575.

1405–8 οὐχ ὅτι . . . ἧττον ἀσεβεῖς εἶχ[εν] (sc. Ἐπίκουρος) **| ὑπολήψεις:** this preserves the (original) Epicurean explanation or defence: Epicurus was not exiled by the Athenians because he had 'less impious beliefs' (than other philosophers, for whose treatment see below, 1512–23).

1408–10 The construction here with the articular infinitive is paraphrased below (1547–9) in the form *ὅτι | τ[οῖc] ἀνθρώποιc οὐ|κ [ἐγ]εινώcκε[τ]ο*, 'that he was unknown to people'.

1412–18 The third charge: Epicurean theology deprives the virtuous and just of the 'noble expectations' (*καλὰc | ἐλπίδαc*) which they have in the gods (i.e. expectations of rewards for good behaviour and punishment for bad). Thus they believe that the myths about the gods punishing wrongdoers are true and that their sacrifices will be rewarded by favours from the gods. This charge by the opponents is also verbally echoed below, 2343–53: 'Do we then in this way deprive the pious of their fine expectation (*τῆc ἀγαθῆc . . . ἐλπίδ[oc]*)—we who set forth the greatest benefit (*μεγίcτη[ν] . . . ὠφέλειαν*) for them from the gods and remove the worst expectation (*πο|νηροτάτην . . . προcδοκίαν*)?' For the charge see Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102 B (fr. 30 Us., quoted above on 880) *οὐδ' ἐλπίδοc χρηcτῆc* (cf. 988–9). Cf. also below, 2147–8. *ἐλπίc* refers to expectation (potentially but not necessarily mistaken) of benefits from the gods: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 134 *ἐλπίδα παραιτήcεωc*, Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1117 A (Epic. fr. 116 Us.), 1125 B (Metrod. fr. 6 Körte, cf. fr. 5); whereas *ὑποψία* denotes paranoid expectation of harms: Epic. *KD* 11, 34. above, 1213–14, 1370, above on 686. Philodemus takes up mention of the just (*δίκαιοι*) here as the next section treats in large part the relation of piety to justice in cultural history.

It is clear from the charge related above at 1394–1402 that the opponents know that Epicurus accepts some features of traditional religion as valid, for the mysteries and festivals alone are singled out for mention. Further, the opponents claimed only that he regarded them as culturally worthless (which Philodemus implies was itself an inference and false), not that he abjured them altogether. Here the opponents similarly know that the Epicureans engaged in prayer; they are accused of doing away with its theoretical basis (together with that of religious feasting, 1423–5), but not refusing to pray themselves: cf. above, 737–51, and Persaeus on Stoic prayer later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 4 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 14–15). Worth comparing in this respect is a similar criticism preserved in the source tradition at Athen. 5. 179 D with reference to Epicurus' work entitled *Cυμπόcιον*, which Athenaeus is drawing on throughout this section dealing in particular with *ἀπαρχαί* and libations before banquets. According to Athenaeus, Epicurus cared nothing for libations or first-fruit offerings (*ἀπαρχαῖ*), but resembled Semonides' uncouth woman: *ἄθυcτα δ' ἱρὰ πολλάκιc κατεcθίει* (Semon. 1. 56 West; Catull. 59. 2–3; Terence, *Eun.* 491 prob. from Menander). The standard interpretation is that the woman commonly feasts on sacrificial offerings, left near tombs and other places, which have gone unburned: see H. Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species* (London, 1975), 78; cf. *ἄθυτα* (for which the Semonidean hapax *ἄθυcτα* is in all probability an iambic-shaped variant) in *LSAM* no. 84. 11, Aeschin. 3. 131, cf. 152; *JHS* 8

(1887), 388 no. 17. 4–7, a dedication to Apollo by a devotee who became ill after eating the *ἱερὸν ἄθυτον αἰγοτόμιον* and rectified his offence *καθαρ-[μ]οῖc κὲ (θ)υcίαιc* which the dedication commemorates; the *lex cathartica Cyrenaica*, *LSS* no. 115. 33–73 (p. 187 §6). The sacrificial meat, after it had been offered to the god, often in fact became the perquisite of the temple officials. (The MSS of Athenaeus in fact transmit the reading *ἄθυτα*.) Embedded in Athenaeus' discussion is the reason why there were no *ἀπαρχαί* or libations at Epicurus' symposium: namely because these were the proper occasions for the taking of omens and Epicurus had denied divination (see 186E). Also contained in Athenaeus' source for this testimony was a charge similar to the one in the present passage: for it certainly seemed contradictory to some philosophical opponents that Epicurus abjured certain ritual measures (*ἀπαρχαί* and libations, cf. mysteries and festivals above at 1397–8) but took part whole-heartedly in others. This criticism Athenaeus found in his source polemically styled with a quotation of iambos that makes Epicurus out not only to be wilfully negligent of certain aspects of cult, but also in violation of ritual restrictions in others, and thus impious on both counts. Cf. above on 812 for Carneades' mocking of Epicurus for his indulgence in feasting during celebration of the Epicurean *εἰκάδεc*.

1420 καλλ̣ι̣ερήcειc: see *IG* i³. 92. 23; Onosander 10. 26 of an auspicious sacrifice before battle.

1420–1 *Order of columns.* This and the following column are represented sequentially on the Oxonian *disegno*, from the **1077** half of the broken roll (1404–11 can be seen showing through from the layer below on Pl. 5). Since it is numbered fr. 2 it must have been copied *before* fr. 3 (cols. 46–7), but have been later than that column in the original sequence of columns in the treatise.

Col. 50

Continuation of detractors' charges that the Epicureans reject in theory the basis for cult.

1420–1 (μετὰ τὰc καλλιερήcειc καὶ) τὰc cπου[δαίαc κεὐ]|φώνουc λ̣[ιτάc: the 'mellifluous and sonorous prayers', as represented by the opponents, must be taken to be those of the Epicureans. (Philippson takes them to be prayers of the virtuous and just, named in 1414–15; there does not appear to be sufficient space to restore *ἢ cυμ]|φώνουc* in 1421.) For this is then criticized as hypocritical (1419 *μετά*, implying contrast or contradiction), on the inference that the Epicureans 'destroy the *παραμυθία* for religious feasting', i.e. by not allowing in their teaching about the gods for divinities who fulfil in a literal sense the 'fine expectations' of worshippers. (After this we lose continuous sense of the text, and the syntax of what follows seems unrecoverable; Philippson's supplements fail to convince.)

For Epicureans' well-attested practice of engaging in prayer see above on 737–8. The inflated language of the charge here mimicked by Philodemus (cf. 1395–6 φ[λ]υ|αρίαν, 1416–17 καλὰς | ἐλπίδας) may derive from poetry, perhaps comedy, or philosophical invective.

1422–3 ἀναι]|ρο[ῦ]μεν: i.e. they 'do away' in their doctrines with the pretext for feasting. For the inferential use of this term see above on 133, cf. 522–3.

1423–5 τὴν παρα]|μυθίαν [τῶν εὐω]|χιῶν: for *παραμυθία* see Philod. *De ira* col. 31,17–19 *τῶν δὲ φιλοσό|φων οἱ μὲν φλυαροῦντες | ἐν ταῖς παραμυθίαις;* ibid. col. 44,37; *De morte* col. 37,11; *De mus.* p. 98,40 (cf. *παραμυθητικός De poem.* 1,29); [Plat.] *Ax.* 365 A; Epict. 1. 1. 18, where the term has the sense of 'consolation', hence 'reassurance', in the present case, namely, that their 'fine hope which they have in the gods' will be answered in return for their sacrifices and prayers. The term recurs in a lacunose passage below, 2419. In the cases cited above *παραμυθία* also has connotations of providing relief, abatement, or assuagement, i.e. from toil, grief, etc., which is also possible here (as provided by feasting, or expected to be provided by gods in response to prayers and sacrifice). But I think Philodemus uses the term here in a slightly different sense, namely that of 'explanation' or 'excuse' (see e.g. Longin. 4. 7, and see LSJ s.v. 4–5). For the feasting of the Epicureans (*εὐωχία*: Philod. *De morte* col. 5,3; *De mus.* p. 107,13) and their well-known mock references to the lavishness of their feasts, parodied in the secondary tradition, see above on 811–19. Here they are said hypocritically to do away with the real basis for feasting, etc.

1426 παῖδες: for a possible connotation here see 1449 *ἡβα[σκόντων* with commentary and above on 525.

1448–9 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 50 probably joined with the following col. 51 in the original treatise. But there is too little preserved of the syntax at the end of col. 50 to be certain that a single column is not missing in between.

Col. 51

Philodemus responds to the opponents' charges against Epicurus above, beginning with the allegation that it is necessary for people to have false hopes from the gods, then adduces evidence that (1) Epicurus did not, as his opponents had claimed, ignore mysteries, sacrifices, oaths, and the like, as attested in the writings of the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon; (2) Epicurus was harmless to other people, as shown first of all from the fact that he was piously disposed towards his own family. On this passage see Angeli–Colaizzo 1979, 79, 110–13.

1449–51 ὡς ἡβα[σκόντων ἢ] | ὀνειρωτ[τόντων] | καταφρονῶ[ν: the

subject of the nominative participle must have been Epicurus himself. For his name is not introduced in what follows, though he is certainly the the subject of 1455–6 ἔπρα]|ξεν (cf. 1443). These people (supply τῶνδε, cf. 1448) whom Epicurus 'despises as puerile or dreaming' will have been those who say that the gods do not really harm mortals, or that false views about the gods are necessary for maintaining social control and justice. (Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 34 reads καταφρονῶ and supposes that the subject is Philodemus.) For the slur of puerility (ἡβα[cκόντων) see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 34 *Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros*, and cf. above, 1426 παῖδες; below, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 5,28–9 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 1b) and Philod. *Rhet.* i. 356,7 παιδα⟨ρ⟩ιωδῶς. But as Pease notes (ad loc.) such expressions were standard parlance in Hellenistic philosophical invective: Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 97 *an quicquam tam puerile dici potest*; *Acad.* 2. 33 *faciunt pueriliter*; 2. 54 *similitudines . . . pueriliter consectantur*; *De fin.* 1. 19 *cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter*; 1. 17 *puerilis est delectatio*; 3. 19 *dicere ornate velle puerile est*; *De Leg.* 1. 7 *in historia puerile quiddam consectatur*; cf. *De nat. deor.* 1. 55 (of Stoic theology) *tamquam aniculis*. For 'dreaming' (ὀνειρωτ[τόντων) used of the mentally unbalanced see Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 42 *exposui fere non philosophorum iudicia sed delirantium somnia*, and cf. 1. 37 (of Zeno of Citium) *quasi delirans* with Pease's note ad loc. Though a topos, it could scarcely be convention alone that induced Cicero, while drawing on *De pietate* as a source, to utilize this sort of language in composing *De nat. deor.* 1. An almost certain instance of this verbal transference is between 527–9 above π̣[αρα]|κόπτειν καὶ μ̣[αί-νεc]|θαι and *De nat. deor.* 1. 94 *summos viros desipere, delirare, dementes esse dicebas* (Cotta referring to Velleius' critique); cf. above on 527–9, and for further instances see Philippson 1939, 15–40 esp. 29; cf. id. 1940, 21–44.

1452–60 This section is mainly summary in response to the opponents' charges. It 'must be accepted' (1459–60) that Epicurus 'acted in accordance to what he taught' (1455–7), since Philodemus has already adduced specific evidence to the effect that Epicurus recommended and engaged in festivals, sacrifices, and oaths and other pledges (cf. 791–2 'not only did he teach these things, but by his very deeds . . .'). For the sense of 1459 πίcτεωc see above, 831–2 and 844 where these are discussed.

1458–9 τοῖc [cημί]|οιc πίcτεωc: see LSJ s.v. πίcτιc II. 1 for the differentiation of ὅρκοι from πίcτειc. As the entry there shows, πίcτιc often occurs in the singular (and without the article) for the collective plurality, and is often paired with ὅρκοι.

1460–2 ἐ̣[φύ]|λατ[τε: cf. above, 1133–4 τὰ κοι]|νὰ φυλάττειν.

1462–5 τ]α̣[ύτην] κ̣[υριω]|τάτη[ν ἐν] τοῖc c̣[υμ]|βολαίο̣[ιc τῆ]ν̣ [cυ]ν-θεlcίαν: for cυμβολαῖα (normally of contracts, money lent on bond, etc.) in the sense of 'engagements' or 'transactions' see LSJ s.v. II. 2 citing Demosth. 18. 210; Aristot. *Pol.* 1200^{b}12 τὰ περὶ ἀγορὰν cυμβολαῖα; Eurip. *Ion* 411; Plat. *Leg.* 913 A. Here it may refer to contributions made to the celebrations of

private cult within the Epicurean community (cf. *cύνταξιc* of 'contribution' in this sense), for which see above on 954–6.

1465–8 α⟨ἱ⟩ π̣ε[ρὶ βί]ου π̣[αρὰ] | Ζήνωνι γενόμε|ναι cυναγωγαὶ διαlcαφοῦcιν: *cυναγωγαί* appears in the sense of a *collectio argumentorum* at Philod. *Rhet.* 2 p. 155,7 Longo, but in the sense of 'demonstrations' below at 2341–2 and at *Rhet.* 2 p. 153,25 Longo (the last example cited by Angeli–Colaizzo 1979, 113 with n. 550). Here π̣[αρὰ] | *Ζήνωνι* with *γενόμε|ναι* is locative: cf. *Poem.* 5 col. 12,10–12 Mangoni *τῶν το[ί]νυν παρὰ τῶι Φι|λομή[λω]ι [γ]εγραμμένων*; cols. 24,25–25,1 *τὰ [παρὰ] τῶι Κράτη|τι*, 29,19–20 *τὰc παρὰ Ζήνωνι | δόξαc*. For *παρά* + the dative in citing authors, a Hellenistic usage (Polyb. 9. 2. 4; D.H. *De comp.* 9,18) see LSJ II.4; it is exampled frequently in *De pietate*: *N* 1088 fr. 6,19–21 (Schober 1988, 87) *παρ' Ὁμήρω⟨ι⟩ δ' ὁ̣ [Πρω|τ]εύc ἐc[τι Πoc[ειδά|ω]νoc ὑπ̣[οδμώς*; *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 3,8 (Henrichs 1975*a*, 18) *π]αρὰ Φιλοχόρωι*; fr. 21 *π]αρ' Ἀντιc|θένει* (fr. 39A Decleva Caizzi) *δ' ἐν μὲν [τ]ῷ̣ | Φυcικῷ̣ λέγεται τὸ | κατὰ νόμον εἶναι | πολλοὺc θεοὺc κα|τὰ δὲ φύcιν ἓν[α*; fr. 22 *παρ' Ἀριc|τοτέλει* (fr. 26 Rose) *δ' ἐν τῶι τρί|τωι Περὶ φιλοcοφίαc*. Philodemus here cites his teacher Zeno of Sidon as a source for the evidence that Epicurus participated in forms of cult as summarized above. How much of the rest of the treatise derives from Zeno's work is unclear. Zeno himself wrote a treatise entitled *Περὶ εὐcεβείαc* certainly known to Philodemus: see *Πρὸc τοὺc* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 10,20 = Zeno fr. 12 Angeli–Colaizzo (but see Angeli 1988 for text and transl.) where it appears in a list of Zeno's works in which he countered *τὰ κατηγορούμε̣ν̣α̣ | τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ βίου τῶν | περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον*, 'accusations against the doctrine and life of Epicurus'. The present citation shows that the Herculaneum *De pietate* cannot in fact be Zeno's original *Περὶ εὐcεβείαc*, but also hints that it is probably closely dependent upon it (at least for the section about cult, since it is here specifically credited to him). For a similar case where Philodemus proceeds by relating a series of arguments by opponents as they had been discussed by Zeno, see *De sign.* col. 19,4–8 *ἡμῖν | μὲν οὖν δ[ι]αλεγόμενοc ὁ Ζήνων | καὶ λόγουc τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόν|των τοὺc ἐκκειμένουc προεφέ|ρετο*. There, however, Philodemus summarizes the arguments of Zeno's opponents point for point, then gives Zeno's refutation for each in the same order. But here in the first part of *De pietate*, there is less summary, and the opponents' positions seem to be mere invectives against and allegations about Epicurean attitudes towards the gods rather than real arguments, let alone positive doctrines of their own, as in *De signis*, *Rhet.*, or *Mus.* Later in the second part of *De pietate* (see vol. ii) we get something more like summary (of Stoic views: Zeno, Persaeus, Cleanthes, Diogenes, in sequence) but no point-by-point refutation, as in *De signis*. There is no indication that the refutation of opponents set forth in *De pietate* is anyone's other than Philodemus' own, apart from the fact that the refutation of the Stoics in *P. Herc.* 1428 stops

with Diogenes of Babylon, Zeno's favourite opponent. On the method of composition by summary and refutation (*recapitulatio*) see Henrichs 1974*a*, 10 n. 31; Delattre 1989.

Zeno's name is also a very probable restoration at 634 above, only a possible one at 60–1. Philodemus indicates his assiduous devotion to Zeno at *Πρὸς τοὺς* [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 14,4–13 (Zeno of Sidon fr. 11, but see the text of Angeli 1988), where he speaks of 'Epicureans with whom [a verb is missing here] and (with whom) I was a faithful admirer while he was alive and now that he is dead I am a indefatigable *laudator*, especially of all his virtues (as found?) in the "vaunts and religious possessions" (issuing?) from Epicurus' *Ἐ*[*πι*]||*κο*[*ύ*]*ρ*[*ει*]*οι μεθ' ὧν απο* .[...]||*ρου*[.] *καὶ Ζ*ή*νωνος ἐγε*-*ν*[*ό*]||*μην περιόν*[*το*]*ς* [*οὐκ*] *ἄπιστ*[*ος*] | *ἐραστὴς καὶ τ*[*εθνηκό*]||*τος ἀκοπίατος ὑμνητής,* | *μάλιστα πασῶν αὐτοῦ τῶ*[*ν*] | *ἀρετῷν ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐξ Ἐπικ*[*ού*]||*ρου καύχαις τε καὶ θεοφ*[*ο*]||*ρίαις*. For *ὑμνητής* see 986 and cf. 635–6, 1851; Capasso 1982, 115 n. 107. *καύχη* is attested only at Pindar, *Nem.* 9. 7; *καύχαις τε καὶ θεοφορίαις* could come from a dactylo-epitrite poem -|-⏑⏑-|-⏑⏑⏑- (-ed). Philodemus cites Pindar later in *De pietate* (see vol. ii): Schober 1988, 77 (Henrichs 1972*a*, 84 = fr. 80 S.–M.), Schober 1988, 80 (fr. 266 S.–M.); cf. Pind. *Isthm.* 5. 51 *καύχαμα*; *Ol.* 9. 38 *καυχᾶσθαι*. According to Nausiphanes ap. D.L. 10. 7 (fr. 93 Us. 101 Arr.^{2}) Epicurus in *Περὶ φύσεως* called *σοφιστικὴ καύχησις*. For *θεοφορία* see Philod. *Mus.* p. 25 and 49 Kemke in a discussion of Korybantic ecstasy; Diosc. *AP* 6. 220, 4. For the metaphor of philosophic wisdom as prophetic inspiration see below 2044–5 *ἐχρησμῳ*[*ι*]||*δήσαμεν* with commentary there.

1468–72 τοσοῦ[**το . . . ἀ**]**πέσχε** [**τοῦ**] | **βλαπ**[**τικ**]**ὸς . . . γ**[**εγον**]**έν**α[**ι**] **. . . ὥ**[**στε . . .**: for another instance of this idiom and construction see above, 696–701: 'So far are they from rendering a impious account that . . .'.

1470–1 βλαπ[**τικ**]**ὸς ἀνθ**[**ρώ**]||**πων**: the charge by the opponents that Epicurus was as a matter of fact harmful to people has not been explicitly stated in what precedes. (Philodemus later points out that even the opponents had to argue that Epicurus was largely unknown at Athens to explain why he was not exiled: 1545–56, cf. above, 1402–12.) Probably the opponents only claimed that his views were potentially harmful to people, because by revealing certain views about the gods to be false he threatened to destroy the social protection provided by them: this theme has been brought up several times (1184–1217, 1330–44), and it is this point that Philodemus is largely exercised to treat in the remainder of the treatise, so its introduction here is seminal. Philodemus begins by relating Epicurus' harmlessness to his other pious acts like participation in sacrifice, festivals, oaths, and the conducting of private and ancestral cult. This last item provides the connection with what follows, since the private cult of the Epicureans was connected in the first instance with (and had its origin in) the cult founded by Epicurus in honour of his brothers (to whom he is here said to have been

particularly well disposed) and to his parents, whom he honoured 'on a par with the gods'.

1473–4 τοὺc γενέ[τα]c ἴcα [θε]|οῖc ἐτίμηcεν: D.L. 10. 18 (*Epicuri testamentum*) attests the financing of the cult of Epicurus' parents and brothers, together with the celebration of Epicurus' birthday and the *cύνοδοc* of his followers on the *εἰκάδεc* from the proceeds of Epicurus' estate. Epicurus also asked in his will that the memorial celebrations in honour of his brothers be maintained after his death, as they had been by himself. See further Clay 1986 for the nature of the celebrations in honour of Epicurus' brothers. The honouring of one's family members, beginning with one's parents, was a central aspect of traditional definitions of piety: see e.g. Aristot. *VV* 1250 ^{b}22, and so is adduced here as a central point against the detractors. Philippson compares the encomium at D.L. 10. 10 *ἥ τε πρὸc τοὺc γονέαc εὐχαριcτία καὶ ἡ πρὸc τοὺc ἀδελφοὺc εὐποιία πρός τε τοὺc οἰκέταc ἡμερότηc* etc.

1475–6 πρὸc [τοὺc] | ἀδελ[φο]ὺc ἐρῳ[τι|κῶc: for *ἐρωτικός* not 'amorous' but in the weaker sense of 'fondly disposed' to things or persons see e.g. Plut. *Demosth.* 25; Plat. *Symp.* 207 B; for the adverb: Thuc. 6. 54, Xen. *Hier.* 1. 21. So Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 18 *τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθοc*, cited by Festugière 1968, 48 n. 52 in connection with Epicurus' brothers. Philippson thought the following column might have continued: [*διέκειτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖc οἰκέταc φιλανθρώπωc ἐχρῆτο.*

1476–7 *Order of Columns.* Although the following column is poorly preserved, the present column is locked into sequence here because it introduces the defence that Epicurus was harmless to people, which is clearly in full swing when col. 52 (physically attached to the following column) begins. That column links physically with **1098** fr. 2. So (following the pattern of descending order of alternating columns) we should expect the present col. 51 to fall here, since it is **1098** fr. 3.

Col. 52

1478 Perhaps *τοῖc φί*|[*λοιc* should be restored here, which is at least consistent with the hypothesis that this column continued the defence that Epicurus was harmless to people, beginning with his family members and moving out to include his *cυμφιλοcοφοῦντεc* and eventually the Athenians at large (cols. 53–4).

1486–94 can be seen to be a *sovrapposto* on the original Oxonian apograph (Pl. 5) since these letters correspond to those at ll. 1402–11 from col. 47 (*O* 1077 fr. 2). In other words, when the present fragment was copied by the *disegnatore*, these lines were showing through from the column on the layer of papyrus underneath the present one. Thus the present col. 52 (*O* 1077 fr. 1) can be seen to have been copied before that column. It was therefore closer to the centre of the papyrus roll and thus later in the original order of columns in the treatise than col. 47.

1503–4 Philippson thought the final word of the column might be a verbal adjective:

1503 ..... δίκαι]ος οὖ-
τω τ' ἦν νομιc]τέος, (28)

The following word (at the beginning of col. 53) could be the participle *οὖcι*, the dative plural participle of a verb ending in a vowel (so that it is syllabically divisible before *ουcι*), or the third plural present indicative of such a verb (e.g. *ποι]|οῦcι*). But only the first of these is compatible with the traces preserved here at the foot of this column, assuming these were accurately read.

1504–5 *Order of Columns.* Col. 53 follows the exiguous col. 52 on *O* 1077 fr. 1 with an intercolumnium of 1.0 cm. Note that this fragment is not attested in duplicate *disegni*, unlike those of *O* 1077 frr. 2 and 3.

Col. 53 (Pl. 5)

If the charges of impiety against Epicurus were true, argues Philodemus, Epicurus could not have lived out his life in the secure and tranquil repose for which his doctrines were famous. Unlike many philosophers, he was reproached neither for his manner of life nor for his doctrines; he was never (1) prosecuted in court, (2) exiled, (3) put to death, nor was he (4) satirized in comedy. Rather Epicurus was ἄλυπος, a term which carries connotations of both 'freedom from pain' (in accordance with Epicurus' theory of pleasure) and of 'causing no disturbance' to others (i.e. through his theological views). Thus Epicurus' own teachings enabled him and his followers to live in freedom from fear of harm.

1505–6 κατὰ τὰc αἱρέcειc τῶν βίων: *hairesis* is a technical term in Hellenistic ethics referring to a set of choices, manners, dispositions, or positions in moral conduct. They are discussed in detail below, 2198–9; cf. above, 1226–7. Epicurus himself wrote a *Περὶ βίων*, probably cited above, 737 ff. as having affirmed that prayer is *οἰκεῖον* to the philosopher's style of life.

1507–8 ἄλυ|πος (sc. Epicurus): for the term see Plut. *De virt.* 101 B (Epic. fr. 520 Us.) *τὸ ἀμέριμνον καὶ τὸ ἄλυπον*, and cf. *ἀλυπία*: Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1101 A (Epic. fr. 120 Us., cf. frr. 526, 548) *τὴν εἰc τὸ ἀπαθὲc καθεcτῶcαν*, also *ἀτάραχος*: Epic. *Ad Herod.* 1. 53 (*ὄγκοι*) *ἀταράχωc καὶ οἰκείωc ἔχοντεc*. For the personal use as here see Crates Cyn. *Epist.* 35, 2 *οὗτόc ἐcτιν ἄλυποc ἀτάραχοc, ὁ μακάριοc ἀνήρ*. For the sense 'free from pain or sorrow': Plat.

Protag. 358 B; Eurip. *Bacch.* 1004 (cf. 423); for 'causing no pain or grief': Plat. *Polit.* 272 A. Cf. Isocr. 12. 5 τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῆν ἀλύπως.

At 2043–60 below Philodemus explains that this is achieved through imitating the Epicurean gods, who are similarly ἀβλαβεῖς and ἄλυποι: 'those who believe what I have prophesied about the gods first will wish to imitate their blessedness (μακαριότης) as far as mortals can, so that, since blessedness has been seen to come from doing no harm to anyone, they will be most anxious to make themselves harmless (2056–7 ἀ|λύπους) to everyone as far as is within their power.' Philodemus probably intends the present demonstration to illustrate the ὠφέλειαι derived by Epicurus from the gods. In this way the sage, having become similarly godlike, himself becomes a model for emulation.

1509–12 μηδεμίαν οὐχ ὅτι δίκην ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἀντιλογίαν: possibly implying that he did not bring a δίκη against anyone, nor did he ever have to defend himself against one.

1512–23 The author refers here to unnamed individuals believed to have been harassed for their lifestyles or teaching. Socrates has already been mentioned in this connection (1353–63) and his case is treated at further length below, 1664–1701. In view of the reference to comedy below, there can be little doubt that it is he whom Philodemus has primarily in mind.

1513–16 ἐνίων μὲν | ἐνκληθέντων . . . φιλοσόφων: Philodemus certainly believed that some earlier philosophers had been regarded by their contemporaries as atheists, and that their beliefs had elicited a hostile reaction both privately and publicly. Epicurus himself may have held a similar view, for at 519–31 above he is quoted as having criticized the notorious trio Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias for removing the divine ἐκ τῶν ὄντων, and he seems also to have thought that they had been criticized in Athenian drama for doing so (see above on 529–32). Critias himself had close associations with Socrates (cf. Aeschin. 1. 173). Epicurus also included Protagoras, and perhaps Antisthenes, in his list of atheists (536–7; Diog. Oen. fr. 16 Smith col. 2,1–12; cf. fr. 6 Smith col. 3,1–2 τοῖς] εἰρημένοις ἀνδράς[ιν ἐν]|καλέσομεν: named are Heraclitus, Thales, Melissus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaximenes, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus).

1515–16 τῶι βίωι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις: for the term βίος see above on 1505–6. λόγος here probably means 'teachings', including those in written form.

1519–21 ἐ|ξορισθέντων καὶ θ[α]|νατωθέντων: these are probably presented as alternatives: Socrates could have gone into exile (the practice was especially familiar in a Roman context). On the other hand, the Athenians are said to have sentenced Diagoras to death *in absentia*. Philodemus distinguishes between execution/exile from a city and that from a 'league' (συμμαχία), probably for rhetorical amplification. In the Hellenistic world it was as common for confederacies (of cities and their allies or protectorate states)

as for cities to bestow rights of citizenship, safe conduct (ἀcφάλεια), tax exemptions, and the like, as well as to conduct such civil proceedings as those under discussion here. But in this case ἐκ τῆc πόλεωc . . . ἐκ τῆc cυμμαχίαc is a polar expression intended to encompass a variety of options for social living situations, but is not intended to have specific reference in every detail: i.e. we are not to think that Epicurus might have been banished from any league or city in particular.

1524–5 τοῖc γνη|[cί]ωc cυνβιώcαcι[ν: the adverb excepts from Philodemus' claims on the present point the occasional dissident, renegade Epicurean like Metrodorus' brother Timocrates who abandoned the school. They were traitors and unfaithful and are therefore presumably discountable as untrustworthy and unreliable witnesses. For Timocrates' slanders against Epicurus (he said, for instance, that Epicurus used to vomit twice a day owning to his gluttony) see D.L. 10. 4–9, a list of οἱ δυcμενῶc ἔχοντεc πρὸc Ἐπίκουρον. There is no evidence that they included the charge of impiety or atheism (D.L. 10. 10 τῆc μὲν γὰρ πρὸc θεοὺc ὁcιότητοc καὶ πρὸc πατρίδα φιλίαc ἄλεκτοc ἡ διάθεcιc, the language of conventional encomium rather than defence against an actual charge). On Timocrates generally: A. Angeli, *CErc* 23 (1993), 13–17; on his distortion of Epicurus' views see Sedley 1976*a*, 121–59. In view of the documented controversy, it seems like special pleading on Philodemus' part to argue that Epicurus never offended *anyone*. Of course Philodemus is unlikely to have viewed the controversy as Epicurus' fault.

1526–28 μεγα̣λο̣με|[ρῶ]c διεφύλαξεν αὐ|[τ]όν: in spite of the corruption in the apograph the correction is secure (on the basis of similarity of letter-shapes). μεγαλομερῶc here probably has connotations of generosity and munificence, as well as of lavishness on a large scale, probably with reference to the hosting of the school's festival celebrations; cf. above, 811–19 with commentary: 'everyone' was invited, as is often insisted upon in the papyrus sources. Cf. *IG* vii. 2712. 61 (of δεῖπνα); cf. LXX 3 Macc. 5. 8; *OGI* 339. 68 (Sestos, ii BC); cf. Polyb. 16. 25. 3; 31. 28. 6; LXX 3 Macc. 6. 33; Ant. Lib. 18. 1. Cf. μεγαλομέρεια 'lavishness': *OGI* 168. 58 (Syene, ii BC); *Sammelb.* 4321. 4 (ii BC).

1528–32 τὸ | μιcόχρηc̣τον cτόλμα καὶ πάν̣τ̣α̣ [cι]νό|μενον . . . τ[ῆc] | κωμῳδίαc: the tone momentarily rises in vehemence (Philodemus feigning anger? cf. *De ira*, cols. 34,31–35,5: even the wise person will give the appearance, φαντακία, of an angry person, but not for long, and if he gives it for long 'is not deeply angry, though virtually seems so'). For μιcόχρηcτον 'hating the better sort' see Xen. *HG* 2. 3. 47; cf. D.H. 8. 6. For cίνομαι (in Homer of Scylla devouring Odysseus' crew) see Hes. *Op.* 318 (never in tragedy, once in Plato, frequent in Xen.).

Old and Middle Greek comedy did of course have their fun with intellectuals of the Greek enlightenment, who could be stereotyped as socially

disreputable or generally disrespectful of the gods. If Philodemus is citing comedy as a source from which he infers what he says about 'some philosophers' above, then comic derision of individuals is placed on an equal footing with supposedly historical political persecution. On precisely these grounds Dover 1976, 29 (= *Collected Papers* ii. 138–9) questions the historicity of much of the ancient tradition regarding the persecution of fifth-century intellectuals for impiety (e.g. on Satyrus: 'It is hard to take very seriously a writer who can take the plot of a comedy as a real event').

In addition it is probably not true that Epicurus and his followers went entirely free from comic derision. 'Epicureans' do appear occasionally in Hellenistic comedy, usually stylized as *μάγειροι* (cooks in charge of the preparation of private sacrifices), and satirized for pandering to delicacies of taste. See the references in the comedies cited above on 880; E. Bignone, 'Sopra un frammento del comico Damosseno', *RIL*² 50 (1917), 286–301; id. 'Epicuro e comici greci: Teocrito e Ateneo', *A&R*³ 6 (1938), 75–92 (= *L'Aristotele perduto*, ii (Florence, 1973²), 223–47, cf. i. 508, 561–2, 573–5); K. Büchner, 'Epikur bei Menander', *SIFC* 14 (1937), 155–66; M. Pohlenz, 'Menander und Epikur', *Hermes*, 78 (1943), 27–75; Barigazzi 1955, 52–4; F. Wehrli, 'Menander und die Philosophie', in *Ménandre* (= Entr. Hardt 16 (Geneva, 1969), 147–69, with further literature cited there; I. Gallo, 'Commedia e filosofia in età ellenistica: Batone', *Vichiana*², 5 (1977), 206–42 = id., *Teatro ellenistico minore* (Rome, 1981), 15–67; id. 'Damosseno e la parodia epicurea nella scena', *Teatro ellenistico minore*, 69–140. Cf. Epicurus compared to Semonides' uncouth woman who 'gobbles up the unburnt sacrifices' (fr. 1. 56 West) at Athen. 5. 179 D (Epic. *Symp.* fr. 56 Us.) for which see above on 1412–18 (perhaps from a comedy or sillographic poem). There is no clear instance of these 'Epicureans' ' being satirized for their theological views, but their attitude towards sacrifice and religious feasting (in the context of Epicurus' stereotyped doctrine of pleasure) is certainly at issue. It may have seemed humorously incongruous to portray Epicureans, who seemed to regard the gods as implacable, as professional adepts at sacrifice, because of their exaggerated expertise in gastronomic pleasures. But Philodemus claims here that Epicurus *never* fell prey to comic derision, and it will scarcely have helped his case to retreat to the claim that Epicurus was never personally portrayed. Yet he could have safely argued that comic portrayal never led in Epicurus' case to exile/execution, as he, like many others, believed about Socrates. For the precise sense of *ἔπεσε* in 1531 cf. *διαπίπτω*, *ἐκπίπτω*, *ἐκβάλλω*, and the like see above on 1134–8 and below on 2436–8.

1532–3 *Order of Columns.* The original apograph *O* 1077 fr. 1 depicts a thin vertical strip of letters following this column, the first letter or so of the lines of the following column. These letters proved to match the letters (lacking but independently restored by Gomperz and Philippson) at the beginning of the lines of a column preserved from the other half of the broken roll: *N* 1098 fr. 2 (now col.

54). Col. 54 thus follows on continuously from the present col. 53. There is a tracing of the Oxonian apograph of this fragment, the earliest in *De pietate* to be transcribed, in Wattenbach 1876, Taf. 4; it had been reproduced, along with the other two Oxonian apographs, in Gomperz's edition.

Col. 54 (Pl. 6)

Epicurus did not have to respond to detractors: his own teachings provided him and his followers with an effective remedy against things which might cause people harm. The opponents' own allegation (1402–12) that Epicurus was not exiled by the Athenians because he was unknown to people proves that Epicurus and his followers were regarded as harmless. The 'effective remedy' refers to Epicurean doctrine. Philodemus thinks that Epicurus' teaching about the role of justice in society was primarily responsible for protecting the Epicureans from social criticism; he sees this as substantiated by the historical record and acknowledged even by his opponents' allegations. The historical evidence for Socrates, who is discussed next, offers a contrast to Epicurus, leading to a demonstration that the opponents' conception of a system of social justice maintained by false beliefs about the gods (as exemplified in the myths of the poets) cannot be right.

1532–3 οὐδὲ || [φωνὴν ἔρ]ρηξέν | [τινα: 'and he did not even utter a sound'. Philippson compares Demosth. 9. 61 *ῥῆξαι φωνήν*; Herod. 1. 85 (*ῥῆξαι* = *κρᾶξαι* Hesych.). Of the many supplements that could be made in this and the following three lines to produce acceptable sense, I have reconstructed a generic conditional sentence. It is true that Philodemus is willing to accept for the purposes of argument his opponents' premiss below that Epicurus went unmentioned at Athens (1545–53, cf. 1408–12), whereas the restoration adopted makes Epicurus as the actual target of assault by sophistic rhetoricians. The problem could be resolved, and 1533 brought up to length by the addition of *ἄν*: *οὐδὲ || [φωνὴν ἂν ἔρ]ρηξέν | [τινα κατὰ τ]ῶν co|[φιστῶν οἱ* vel *εἰ ἐ]μνημό|[νευσα]ν*, 'nor would Epicurus even have uttered a single word against the sophists, had any of them made mention of him'. But I think Philodemus will not have admitted that Epicurus was a nobody in Athens, but only that the fact the opponents thought so demonstrated the effectiveness of his ethics.

1534–5 κατὰ τ]ῶν col|φιστῶν: the *σοφισταί* could be rivals of the school like Timocrates (see above on 1524–5) of potential political opponents, or competing philosophers. Philodemus does not use the term of his own opponents in *De pietate*, but the present instance must refer to the era of

Epicurus and the *kathegemones*. In this case the reference will probably be to sophistic orators, with whom Epicurus polemicized in his *On Rhetoric*, fr. 53 Us., 20.4 Arr.^{2}, preserved by Philod. in *Rhet.* 3 (see Hammerstaedt 1992, 26–30); cf. Epic. *Rhet.* fr. 20. 4. col. 3a,27, col. 5a,4, 20 (display orators); *De nat.* 14 fr. 29. 29,19 (poets, sophists, and rhetors); *De nat.* 28 fr. 31. 19,3, 7 (ὥcπερ τι[νὲc τῶ]ν coφι|cτῶν), 12 (a philosophical opponent).

1538–9 ἡ π]ά[ν]των ἐπ[ιτ]ει[λ]ὴc φυλακή: Dr Holford-Strevens notes that in this position Philippson's [ἡ] α[υ]των would have to be either the direct reflexive αὐτῶν or (in a subordinate clause) the indirect reflexive αὐτῶν, neither of which has any place here. τοι]α[ύ]των, 'things of that sort' (referring back, but to what?) could be read, but for the movable ν at the end of 1537, which is complete. Thus in the proposed restoration there is said to have been (apparently for Epicurus) an 'effective remedy' against anything which could harm people or give the impression of wishing to do so. The supplement ἐπ[ιτ]ει[λ]ήc at 1538–9 is palaeographically attractive, not absolutely certain (P. Parsons suggests ἐπ[ιμ]ει[λ]ήc). But there are other reasons for its likely occurrence here. In its broadest sense φυλακή denotes a preventive or precautionary measure, an attested usage in the medical writers where it appears as a synonym for εὐλάβεια; see, e.g., the formula φυλακὴ ἔcτω (+ genitive) at [Hippocr.] *Acut. sp.* p. 31,19 Kühlewein, *Affect.* p. 12,9 Littré. The present context would hardly immediately suggest a medical usage. As such the phrase may simply bear the neutral sense of 'effective prevention' or 'avoidance.' The use of φυλακή here may also be related to a common philosophical use of φυλάττειν in the sense of observing (or 'preserving') basic or preferred concepts as a methodological safeguard against the introduction of false opinion. See e.g. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7. 23 νοῦν εἰc δυcέκκρουcτον τῶν παραδιδομένων φυλακήν; ibid. 11. 151, and cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123 πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ θεοῦ) . . . μακαριότητα; Philod. *De lib. dicendi* 56,12 Olivieri; *De poem.* 35,30. τηρεῖν functions as a virtual equivalent in this sense: Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77 πᾶν τὸ cέμνωμα τηρεῖν. (The standard contrasting term is ἀναιρεῖν [Lat. *tollere*], for which see e.g. above, 522–3, below, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 12,12 and often.) The argument would thus be that the Epicurean methodology of conceptually preserving the integrity of the Greek gods κατὰ τὸ πρέπον offered its followers a form of protection from the social *invidia* traditionally incurred by radical theologians. Cf. D.H. *De comp. verb.* 24 (= fr. 230 Us.) where Epicurus' statement that clarity is the only goal of writing is said to have been an ἀλεξιφάρμακον agains the charge of laziness.

What is more, φυλακή is also used of religious or magical precautionary measures taken to secure safety (through divine protection) for a person, city, or community. For example, in *leges sacrae*: Sokolowski, *LSAM* no. 32 (Magnesia 197/6 BC) line 68 and p. 92; *SIG*^{3} 985, 52 (Philadelphia ii–i BC); for further parallels: Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen*, ii (Berlin, 1893),

253–5; A. Wilhelm, *Jahresheft des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts in Wien*, 8 (1905), 282; id., *Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde* (Vienna, 1909), 180; P. Roussel, *BCH* 35 (1911), 453–4; I. Vanseveren, *RPh* 11 (1937), 333; L. Robert, *BCH* 59 (1935), 493 and n. 2 (= *Opera minora selecta*, i (Amsterdam, 1969), 306). For φυλακή in second- or third-century BC civic decrees dealing with sacral affairs (such as Delphic θεωρίαι), see *SIG*³ 402, 38 (Chios); 412, 13–14 (Erythrae); 589, 67–8. In none of these instances—all non-Attic—is the φυλακή concerned with physical or military defences; rather, the ψήφισμα or its erection on stone is itself ominously said εἶναι εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως. For the clause (by no means confined to religious measures) φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας in Attic decrees, see the discussion of P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford, 1985²), 231–5, who concludes (p. 234) that it must originally 'have been employed in times of crisis', i.e. referring not to a standing defence, but to specifically enacted measures. For φυλακή as a generic prophylactic term in the magical papyri, see *PGM* iv. 1298 and 2746, vii. 698 (hymnic invocations in which φυλακή is used of the gods' powers). Related terms like φυλακτήριον, φύλαγμα, and φυλάττειν abound in magical contexts. The use of φυλακή to denote magical properties is also represented in the literary sources: e.g. Paus. 4. 20. 4 (of a tin scroll [see 4. 26. 8] inscribed with the τελεταί of the Μέγαλοι Θεοί and buried on Mt. Ithome, which provided 'secret protection' to the Messenians); Frazer on Paus. 8. 47. 5 (iv. 433–4); Zenob., *Cent.* 5. 85. A fragmentary *Lesbiaca* (Commentary on Alcaeus?) in *P. Oxy.* LIII. 3711 refers (col. 1,28–30) to an inscribed and buried statue of a lion as εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς | [νήσου. The ritual and linguistic parallelism with those instances cited in the previous note suggest that there was no significant difference in kind between magical φυλακαί and those from religious (or civic) settings (the difference being simply between private and public contexts of performance). Similarly, the use of the term in so-called magical contexts may have been closely allied, at least originally, with the the medical usage of the term discussed above. A case for the use by Epicureans of statuary, amulets, and related iconography with talismanic properties has been made by Frischer 1982, 87–128.

So it is worth noting that ἐπιτελής is a technical term in Greek religion meaning 'complete', 'effective', 'perfect', 'complete(d)', or 'specific', often in the the context of sacrifice or prayer, and referring to a religious obligation discharged or a ritual measure successfully performed or fulfilled, which has been largely overlooked in modern literature on Greek religion because there is no real equivalent in Western sacral language. For the term ἐπιτελής see e.g. Plat. *Leg.* 931 E πᾶς δὴ νοῦν ἔχων φοβεῖται καὶ τιμᾷ γονέων εὐχάς, εἰδὼς πολλοῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἐπιτελεῖς γενομένας; [id.] *Epist.* 8. 353 A: ἔστω δὴ παντάπασι μὲν εὐχή τις—ἀπὸ γὰρ θεῶν χρὴ πάντα ἀρχόμενον ἀεὶ λέγειν τε καὶ νοεῖν—ἐπιτελὴς δ' εἴη σημαίνουσα ἡμῖν τοιόνδε τινὰ λόγον;

Hdt. 3. 124: ἡ δὲ ἠρήσατο ἐπιτελέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι; *SIG*³ 581, 5–8 (Hierapytna in Crete, ii BC) from the prescript prayer: ἐπιτελέων δὲ | τᾶν εὐχᾶν γενομενᾶν θυσίαν καὶ πόθοδον ποιήσασθαι, καθά | κα δόξηι τῶι δάμωι. Thus the phrase ἐπιτελὴς εὐχή and the use of ἐπιτελής of the propitious fulfilment of prayers was standard parlance in ritual contexts. Cf., of the observance of oaths, Hippocr. *Jusjurandum* (*CMG* i. 1) ὄμνυμι . . . θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάσας, ἵστορας ποιεύμενος, ἐπιτελέα ποιήσειν κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κρίσιν ἐμὴν ὅρκον τόνδε καὶ συγγραφὴν τήνδε . . . ὅρκον μὲν οὖν μοι τόνδε ἐπιτελέα ποιέοντι, καὶ μὴ συγχέοντι. In some instances the adjective is susceptible to a neutral (i.e. non-religious) interpretation: of the completion or effectiveness of events with the neuter plural (e.g. Hdt. 1. 124, 117, 3. 141, Thuc. 1. 141), or even with a specified predicate (D.H. 10. 46, Ant. Lib. 19. 3). But (except in the religious instances cited above) it occurs not at all in the Aristotelian or the Hippocratic corpora, where its occurence in the sense of natural or biological fulfilment might have been expected. If the intended meaning in the present phrase were simply 'the protection which the Epicureans *perfected, put into effect, completed*, etc.', we should expect not ἐπιτελής but ἐπιτετελεσμένη (cf. Polyb. 15. 22. 1). The ritual signification of the term ἐπιτελής was probably derived from the technical sense of the active form of the verb ἐπιτελεῖν (= ποιεῖν τι ἐπιτελές) in similar contexts (cf. συντελεῖν), e.g. of the performance of blood sacrifices: Aristot. *Athen. Pol.* 54. 6, Theopompus (probably *not* Theophrastus) ap. Porph. *De abst.* 2. 16 (*FGrHist* ii. 1B, fr. 344 p. 607); Sokolowski, *LSCG* nos. 65. 9 (p. 121, Andania i BC), 83. 31–2 (p. 167, Korope i BC), 160. 8 (p. 280, Cos iii BC), 161A. 14–15 (p. 282, Cos iii BC); of the consecration of marriages: Aristot. fr. 549 Rose³ = fr. 560 Gigon; of the transfer of a priesthood: Sokolowski, *LSS* no. 47. 11 (p. 100, Andros i BC); of δημοθοινία: ibid., nos. 61. 39 and 59 (p. 60–1, Agliate ii BC); of θυσίαι and πομπαί: ibid. no. 14. 26 (p. 37, Delphi 129/8 BC); of the holding of a feast (εὐωχία, etc. cf. δημοθοινία above): F. Hiller von Gaertringen, *Die Inschriften von Priene* (Berlin, 1906), 113. 61 (i BC); of the observance of vows: Hdt. 2. 63 ἄλλοι δὲ εὐχωλὰς ἐπιτελέοντες πλεῦνες χιλίων ἀνδρῶν; Hiller von Gaertringen, *Inscr. Prien.* 108. 27 (ii BC). (This list is not complete. I should not have extended it even to this length if the technical sense of ἐπιτελής and ἐπιτελεῖν were not relatively undocumented.)

I take the force of the present phrase ἐπιτελὴς φυλακή to be that the 'protection' possessed by the Epicureans was not merely effective, it was *ritually* effective, i.e. an act of piety productive of the same kind of exemption from prosecution for impiety as participation in religious ritual. If the phrase ἐπιτελὴς φυλακή (like ἐπιτελὴς εὐχή) derives from the religious sphere and means here 'a performed protective rite or measure', then we have to deal with an instance of religious language used allusively in a philosophical context, a characteristic device, for example, in philosophical poetry, and

a practice well attested for Epicurean writers, who often refer to philosophical doctrines in language traditionally associated with religious measures. On the phenomenon, see esp. Norden 1923, 93, 101–4; Festugière 1968, 57–8, 71–100; id., 'Hermetica', *HThR* 31 (1938), 3–4; W. Schmid 1961, 746–55 ('Epikur als Stifter einer quasireligiösen Gemeinde'); Obbink 1984; id. 1992*a*. Epicurean appropriation of religious language and traditional forms of piety is explicitly criticized e.g. by Carneades ap. Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1089C, Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 115, Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1111B, 1112C, 1117C, 1119C–E. In the present instance, the allusive reference of *ἐπιτελὴς φυλακή* may thus have been to the ritually therapeutic, almost apotropaic function of popular philosophical teaching, achieved in part through the use of gnomic statements (such as *λάθε βιώσας*) as verbal *pharmaka* or philosophical preventives against the threat of social, moral or intellectual harm. See esp. Cic. *Tusc.* 4; Gigante 1975, 53–61; P. Laín Entralgo, *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity*, transl. L. J. Rather and J. M. Sharp (New Haven and London, 1970). For this there are well-attested parallels: first, Horace, *Ep.* 1. 1. 34–7:

> sunt verba et voces quibus hunc lenire dolorem
> possis et magnam morbi deponere partem.
> laudis amore tumes: sunt certa piacula, quae te
> ter pure lecto poterunt recreare libello.

Here the remedies or preventatives provided by philosophy are spoken of as 'propitiatory offerings', by which Horace means the sayings of philosophers contained in their books; like a charm or incantation, they are to be ritually recited for proper effect. That is to say, committed to memory and 'practised' (*μελετᾶν*). Epicurus continually enjoined his followers to memorize his writings (D.L. 10. 16; Epic. *De nat.* 28 fr. 13 col. 13,3–4 Sedley) and trained them in this art (D.L. 10. 12). The letters of Epicurus transmitted by Diogenes are of course epitomes explicitly intended for memorization: *Ad Herod.* 33–6, 82–3; *Ad Pyth.* 84–5, 116. For the role of memory and recitation in Epicureanism, see Rabbow 1954, esp. 112–14, 130–8; Sedley 1973, 5–83 at 79. It is even possible that Horace's phrase *certa piacula* reflects a Greek phrase like *ἐπιτελεῖς φυλακαί*. *Certa* may of course mean no more than *quaedam*, *τινά* (cf. Eurip. *Hipp.* 478–9: *εἰσὶν δ' ἐπῳδαὶ καὶ λόγοι θελκτήριοι· φανήσεταί τι τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου*; Xen. *Mem.* 2. 6. 10 *εἶναι μέν τινάς φασιν ἐπῳδάς*). But it makes better sense in the context to take it as meaning 'fixed, specific, certain', i.e. of effect or result: for examples, see the hexameter epyllion on Alcestis in Barcelona, *P. Barc.* inv. no. 158–61 (ed. Parsons–Nisbet–Hutchinson, *ZPE* 52 (1983), 32) ll. 1–2 *praescie lauripotens Latonie Delie Paean, / invoco te laurusque tuo de numine certas*; M. Marcovich, *Mnemosyne* suppl. 103 (Leiden, 1988) prints *lectas* instead of *certas*, but the the latter is clearly the language of prophecy: Lucr. 5. 110–12 *fundere fata / sanctius et*

multo certa ratione magis quam / Pythia quae tripode a Phoebi lauroque profatur; Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 17 *nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo certa ut sint et fixa qua dixero*; Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 21; Ovid, *Fasti* 3. 333 (at Macrob. Sat. 3. 9. 2 *certo carmine evocarent tutelares deos*, the sentence as a whole suggests that *certo* = *quodam*). In these instances *certa* conveys the solemn religious overtones of the numinous and indubitable. Compare the instances of ἐπιτελὴς εὐχή cited above. Horace's phrase is certainly not standard Roman sacral language, according to which the proper rendering would be *res* (or *sacra*) *absoluta* or simply *sacra/rem fieri/facere* (see esp. Liv. 29. 19. 8). Horace may be alluding to quasi-religious affairs (i.e. Epicurean or popular philosophical terms and teachings) using the quasi-sacral language of conventional poetry, as at *C.* 1. 28. 34 *teque piacula nulla resolvent*, a text parallel in many ways to *Ep.* 1. 1. 36; cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 3. 333 *da certa piamina* (v.l. *piacula*), and the occurences of *certa* cited in this note. On the literary use of the terms *piacula*, *carmina*, etc., see further W. Gemoll, *Die Realien bei Horaz*, iv (Berlin, 1895), 44–51; S. P. C. Tromp, *De Romanorum piaculis* (Amsterdam, 1921); E. Fraenkel, *Gnomon*, 1 (1925), 194–6; F. Marx, *RM* 78 (1929), 410–11; H. Fugier, *Recherches sur l'expression du sacré dans la langue latine* (Publ. de la Fac. des Lettres de la Univ. de Strasbourg, 146; Paris, 1963), 331–3. So also the Epicurean author of *P. Herc.* 465 refers to a verse of Epicharmus as a potential ἀποφυλακή against excessive spending and greed in fr. 12, 14. The text was known already to Usener (*Gloss. Epic.* 240, 522, 583, 692) and quoted in part by Schmid 1939, 80; ll. 8–15 are edited by T. Dorandi and E. Spinelli, *CErc* 20 (1990), 56–7; and see Capasso 1993 for further treatment. The παροιμία of Epicharmus was of course well known in antiquity (see the app. crit.). I give a composite edition, based on a collation of the Neapolitan apograph against the original papyrus, extant at Naples and 'poco leggibile' (*Catalogo dei papiri ercolanesi* (Naples, 1979), 154):

8 βεβουλήμεθα δὲ τὰς κακ[ί-
ας ἐξελαύνειν. καί τινες [φι-
λαργυρί[α]ι προσκόψαντε[ς
εἰς ἔκχυσιν μεταπίπτου-
12 σιν. ὑπογραπτέον τινα κε-
φαλαιωδῶς καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ταύτης ἀποφυλακὴν π[α-
ριστάν[τα]ς ὅτι καὶ κ[τ]ῆς[ις
16 χ]ρημά[των] καὶ τήρης[ι]ς ἡ-
δ]ονῶν [ἐν] τῶι βίωι προ-
νοί]ας χ[ρήιζ]ει, μὴ κατ' Ἐπί-
χαρμον] εὖ π[οιεῖ]ν τὸ παρὸν μ[ό-
20 νον] ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μέλλον-
τος ἔχ]ειν πρόνο[ιαν . . .

P. Herc. 465 fr. 12 = *N* 465 fr. 12 (*HV*² IX 198; Φιλοδήμου, fort. Περὶ φιλαργυρίας) 8–15 Usener 13 α corr. Usener: Λ *N* 16–18 cf. W. Schmid, *Eth. Ep.*, 80 18 χ corr.

Usener: K *N* 19 Kaibel, et de proverbio Epicharmi (sed dictum Pittaci ap. D.L. 1. 77) cf. *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 21,4–5 (Schmid, *Eth. Ep.* 49), Plat. *Gorg.* 499 c, *Leg.* 954 c, Philod. *De oec.* col. 25,5 ff (p. 69 Jensen cum app. crit.) 19–20 Epicharmus fr. 201 Kaibel, *Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, i (Berlin, 1899) 127 μ[ό]νον Schmid: μ[έ]λλει Kaibel 20 τοῦ corr. Kaibel: ΤΟΤ *N* 20–21 μέλλον|[τος Kaibel ἔχ]ειν Schmid 21 πρόνο[ιαν Schmid: προνο[εῖν Kaibel

Finally, there is the semi-metrical Epicurean τετραφάρμακος or fourfold protection charm to be recited as protection against fear of god, death, and evil:

ἄφοβον ὁ θεός,
ἀν[ύ]|ποπτον ὁ θάνατος,
καὶ | τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητ̣ο̣ν, |
τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκα[ρ]|τέρητον.

Nothing to fear in God,
Nothing expected in death,
Easily got is the good,
Easily borne the bad.

Quoted by Philod. Πρὸς τοὺς [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) col. 5,10–14 (Angeli = Epic. fr. 196 Arr.[3]). See Gigante 1975, 60–1; F. Sbordone, 'Il quadrifarmaco epicureo', *CErc* 13 (1983), 117–19; Angeli 1988, 265–70. Restatements of the τετραφάρμακος are given by Philod. *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 4, Demetrius Laco (*P. Herc.* 1006), pp. 59–61 De Falco, and by Cicero at *De fin.* 1. 62, where the first colon appears as *de dis immortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit.* Likewise Norden 1923, 93–4 notes that Epicurus' emphatic affirmation of the gods (*Ad Menoec.* 123) has a clear rhythmic structure consisting of two bacchiac dimeters and a final colon (cretic + trochee):

θεοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν,
ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν
ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις.

On the rhythmic structure of Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123 see further the bibliography listed in Angeli 1981, 83 n. 439. In all three instances, reading, recitation, or memorization of philosophical maxims is supposed to provide protection from potential harm, perhaps on the model (suggested by Hor. *Ep.* 1. 1. 34–7) of recited verbal charms or incantations. And with regard to the subject of the present text (protection from the threat of social harm) there is preserved in gnomic form a well-known Epicurean formula for securing social justice: μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι (repeated with slight variation at Epic. *KD* 31–5 and rendered by Lucr. 5. 1020: *nec laedere nec violari*). This is precisely the doctrine referred to in the present text, for the Epicureans' φυλακή of things which might cause anyone harm is said to have ensured that they were not themselves harmed in return. It seems therefore best to take in this context the ἐπιτελὴς φυλακή which the Epicureans are said here to have employed against the threat of social harm, and thus to add

verbal *pharmaka* (characteristically as a philosophical expedient, to be sure) to the list of popular or traditional religious practices condoned and appropriated by Epicurus and his followers. Such an allusion would be appropriate in vindication from the charge that Epicurus' philosophy rejected the whole of traditional religion (which it clearly did not), especially in support of the peculiarly Epicurean claim (expounded at some length in this section of *De pietate*) that 'true philosophy' could be consonant with, and (in a sense) account for, basic religious practices and beliefs. In this way the text represents the teachings of Epicurus as preserving basic and self-evident concepts (including that of divine nature) and thereby securing peaceful coexistence in society.

1539–45 (ἡ φυλακὴ) τῶν . . . λυ|[πης]όντων ἢ . . . π̣[α]ρεξόντων: both genitive participles are dependent upon *φυλακή*. In 1428 α[ὐ]τῶν (designating the possessors of the *φυλακή*) refers to Epicurus and his followers inclusively, as is clear from 1523–6: *Ἐπί*|[κ]*ουρος ἅμα τοῖς γνη*|[*σί*]*ως συνβιώσασι*[*ν* | *α*]*ὐτῶι̣*. For *φυλακή* with the genitive (in the sense of 'means of guarding against, warding off', as opposed to 'conservation of'), see LSJ III 2; [Plat.] *Def.* 413 D *εὐλάβεια φυλακὴ κακοῦ*; Antiphon 2. 1. 2: *ὑποψίας φυλακὴ ποιήσασθαι*; Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 73 *καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὰς ἀλγηδόνας περὶ σῶμα λυσιτελεῖ πρὸς φυλακὴν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν*; 80 *φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς οἰστρώδεις*. The last two passages suggest that the participles in the present text (1539–45 *λυ*|[*πης*]*όντων ἢ . . . π̣*[*α*]*ρεξόντων*) are *neuter* (of this point I have been persuaded by A. Henrichs and P. Parsons). The *φυλακή* would thus be primarily against unspecified *things* which cause anyone (*τινάς*) harm, or provide the *φαντασία* of just wishing to harm (*μόνον τοῦ* | *θ*[*έ*]*λειν βλάπτειν*); although for *φυλακή* (with genitive) of persons, see LSJ s.v. I 2. Also in this respect see Isocr. 12. 5 *ἀλύπως τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῆν*, and compare the remark of Plato (*Leg.* 821 A) that one should not be meddlesome or too inquisitive (*πολυπραγμονεῖν*) in matters of religion.

1545–65 The opponent's charge mentioned above, 1402–12 (that Epicurus was not exiled by the Athenians because his teachings went unknown to them), is adduced as proof of the effectiveness of the Epicurean 'remedy' against anything which could harm people (or give the impression of wanting to do so). The structure of this sentence is as follows: the relative clause *ὃ γὰρ ἐτόλμησαν εἰπεῖν* (further specified by the *ὅτι* clause in indirect discourse) is the subject of 1555 *δηλοῖ*, which introduces indirect discourse with the accusative articular infinitive *τὸ μὴ γεγονέναι βλαπτικόν* as its verb (as though a direct object of *δηλοῖ*). The binary accusative subject of the articular infinitive is *αὐτόν* (sc. *Ἐπίκουρον*) and *τοὺς συσχολάζοντας αὐτῶι* (sc. *Ἐπικούρῳ*), which is therefore emphatic.

1545–7 ὃ . . . τινὲς ἐ[τ]όλ|μ̣[ης]αν εἰπεῖν: these are the same opponents mentioned above (1394–1425) who also claimed that Epicurus had ignored

the mysteries and sacrifices, cheated the just of their fine hopes from the gods, etc., so they are unlikely to have been rival Epicureans, as though Philodemus were shocked by something approaching heresy or schism within the school and emphasizing the opponents' audacity and ignorance (cf. above, 1168–72). τολμάω is normal in contexts of effrontery; cf. *ausus es hoc ex ore tuo?*, and our own 'How dare you suggest such a thing?'. For he surely does not believe their claim here, but rather only what he takes to be the historical reality behind it (namely, that Epicurus never caused anyone any trouble). The opponents' charge may also have been a criticism of the Epicurean doctrine of λάθε βιώcac and the failure/refusal of prominent Epicureans to take an active role in political affairs, as not only Diogenes of Babylon and Persaeus had done, but also Carneades.

This is not to say that we are to think of Athenian democrats at the time of Stratocles reviving (against the Epicureans) the fifth-century notion that the ἀπράγμων is ἀχρεῖοc (and a potential oligarch as well), or of Cicero railing in the first against noble *piscinarii*. But for a hint that already in Epicurus' lifetime the school had to face criticism on the doctrine of detachment from political life see Plut. *Non posse suav.* 1097B–D (cf. *Adv. Col.* 1126E–1127A) where Epicurus is contrasted on this point with Aristotle, Theophrastus, Phanias, Philip, Themistocles, and Miltiades for their political assistance to their cities, and it is implied that Epicurus felt obliged to brag in his letters about his public assistance with the case of Lysimachus' minister Mithres (frr. 74–82 Arr.²), 'so that you would have thought that it was written in congratulations for the freedom or deliverance of the whole Greek nation or the Athenian State' (1097D), and that 'the supply of papyrus would have run out through over-harvesting of the Nile before they would have tired of writing about it' (*Adv. Col.* 1126F).

1545–6 δ | γ[ὰρ] αὖ: I take αὖ to refer back to repetition of this claim already related above at 1402–12: 'again', 'once more' (cf. αὖτε, αὖθιc, ἔμπαλιν, πάλιν). αὖ can also have adversative sense: 'on the other hand' (usually with δέ); we could have here ὅ|τ̣[ι δ'] αὖ, 'to the contrary, the fact that . . .'. But γάρ, if it is right here, makes this explain what precedes (in which case the restored lines 1533–6 cannot have said that Epicurus achieved notoriety through the strength of his 'effective remedy').

1547–9 ὅτι | τ[οῖc] ἀνθρώποιc οὐκ [ἐγ]κωμιάcκε[τ]ο: a paraphrase of 1408–12 τῶι] | διαλελῃθέναι πολ]|λοὺc ἀνθ[ρ]ώπου[c | τ]ὴν φιλοcοφί[α]ν α[ὐ|τ]ο̣ῦ, 'because his philosophy had escaped the notice of many people'.

1551–3 τῶν cυνπολε[ι]|τ̣[ευ]ομένων βλα|π̣[τι]κόν: for βλαπτικόc with the genitive cf. φυλακή above in 1539 and 1470–1 βλαπ[τικ]ὸc ἀνθ[ρώ]|πων. The use of cυνπολε[ι]|τ̣[ευ]ομένων ('those taking part in public life together with them', *in re publica versantium*) makes a minimal claim for political involvement. Philodemus uses the passive later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 7,21–7 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 18) from Chrysippus: ἐν δὲ | τῶι

τρίτωι (sc. *Περὶ φύσεως*) *τὸν' κ[όσ]|μον ἕνα τῶν φρο|νίμ[ω]ν, συνπολει|τευ-[ό]μενον θεοῖς | καὶ ἀνθρώποις*, 'in the third book (of his *On Nature* Chrysippus) says that there is one universe of the wise, citizenship of it (he says) being held by the gods and men together' (on the passage see Schofield 1991, 74 with n. 19; A. Laks, *Ancient Philosophy*, 14 (1994), 459–60).

1556–8 δια]|βο[λὴ]ν πικρ[ὰν ἢ δί]|κη[ν: cf. above, 1509–12: Epicurus had neither a *δίκη* nor even an *ἀντιλογία* with anyone.

1558–9 δι[ὰ] κυρίου δό[γ]|μ[ατος: cf. Epic. *KD* 9 *τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως*; ibid. 16 *τὰ κυριώτατα* 'most important matters'. But a *κύριον δόγμα* could be a valid or final legal judgment, as at Plat. *Leg.* 926 D.

1560–1 *Order of Columns.* The opening letters of this column (1098 fr. 2), missing on the apograph, are preserved on the right-hand edge of O 1077 fr. 1 (col. 53). Since that fragment was the innermost column of the 1077 sequence in the treatise, there are no more columns of **1077** to alternate with those of the 1098 sequence. We know, however, that **1098** fr. 1 must come later in the treatise than the present col. 54 (**1098** fr. 2), where it coheres in context, since living unostentatiously is under discussion. After the discovery of the new stichometric letter in col. 57, we can be virtually certain that all the cols. 50–7 originally linked with each other, since there are exactly 7 columns preserved between the letters N in col. 50 and Ξ in col. 57. The new stichometric discovery confirms an order that was already established on grounds of content and other physical links. Of the seven columns between N and Ξ, five are physically linked with each other.

Col. 55

Nor were Epicurus' views about the gods offensive to the many.

1562 δινῶν: 'clever orators'; cf. 1534–5 *co|[φιστῶν*, the reference below to *π[άνδ]εινοι λόγοι*, and the fate of Socrates at the hands of the *ὄχλος* in col. 59, also mentioned in the present column at 1575–6. The rise of rhetoric in early history is discussed later in col. 61. Here at issue is the contribution of rhetoric and sophistic oratory to the reputation of those like Socrates.

1566–7 ἀν[υπο]|μνήστους: the sense is 'unmentioned' in the sense of not causing one to be spoken ill of, as Pericles bade Athenian women to be (rather than 'unostentatious'). *P. Flor.* 323,13; *P. Masp.* 98,14 (both vi AD) 'not subject to any petition or challenge.' Cf. above, 1508–12, 1557–9. *ἀνάμνηστος* is attested, so that we could have here *ὅλως τε ἂν [ἀνα]|μνηστοὺς εἶνα[ι.*

1570–2 τῶ[ν δια]|βληθέντων [θεολό]|{ο}γῳ[ν ἢ] φιλο[σόφων: the philosophers and *theologoi* against whom the mass mind had been poisoned, mentioned above at 1184–1217; cf. also below, 2158–65, 2481–2, and the the poets and philosophers quoted in the section which follows. For the sense of *θεολόγοι* see above on 1204 and below, on 2481–2. The present passage, though fragmentary, is very important to the reconstruction of Philodemus'

argument, since here he can unambiguously be seen to dissociate the Epicurean tradition from the view that the myths and tales about the gods, though false, usefully hold the foolish in check. It is in opposition to this thesis that the next section of the treatise is composed. See below, intro. to Section 4. In the present passage it is asserted that Epicurus 'did not even encounter (i.e. come in contact with) their teachings'.

1573–4 ἐνεκύρηϲε το[ῖϲ] | παραδεδομέν[οιϲ]: i.e. Epicurus, who claimed to have had no teacher (see Furley 1977; Obbink 1995*a*, 192 with n. 12), did not encounter or absorb in his philosophical training the heretical views of Critias, Diagoras, Prodicus, or even Socrates or Aristotle. Unlike such philosophers and their pupils, Epicurus' theological views remained, according to Philodemus here, beyond reproach. *παραδεδομένα* are 'teachings', 'things passed down'. Cf. above, 727–8 *τὰ*] *διαδεδ*[*ο*]*μένα* | [*ἱερ*]*ά*; below, 2281–3: 'they believed and passed down (*π*[*α*]||*ρέδοϲαν*) similar things about sacrifices and festivals and other similar rituals'.

1575–6 ἀλλὰ τοῖϲ ὄχλοιϲ | ἐ[πι]δει[κ]νύ[μ]ενο[ϲ: the 'crowd' (*ὄχλοϲ*) has been mentioned above at 1405 in connection with Epicurus' potential for offending it. It plays a prominent role in the discussion of Socrates which follows the present passage. Cf. 1409–10, 1561 *το*]*ῖϲ πολλοῖϲ*.

1584 π[άνδ]ειναι λόγοι: for *πάνδειναϲ* cf. Philod. *De ira* col. 43,20; Plat. *Rep.* 610D *πάνδειναν ἡ ἀδικία;* cf. 605C. Thus it almost certainly describes here the *παραδεδομένα* of the 'despised philosophers and theologians', for which see above, 1184–1217.

1588–9 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 55 (1098 fr. 1) must have been the innermost column of the 1098 sequence in the treatise, and the first column of **1098** transcribed by the *disegnatore*. For its position here see above on 1560–1.

Cols. 56–7 (Pls. 3–4)

The surviving papyrus fragment is a *scorza*, split up the centre of the column, making restoration unusually difficult. Examination by autopsy has brought new readings to light and clarified many of the problems in the first half of the column. Most of the text remains tentative in the second half (see the app. crit.). The lifestyle of the Athenians, and perhaps Socrates', are under discussion.

1592–3 οὐ[κ ἀ]πραγμόν[ω]ϲ = *πολυπραγμόνωϲ*. The first line of Timon's *Silloi* (fr. 1 Diels, *SH* 347) is an invocation to *πολυπράγμονεϲ* ('all busybody sophists'), the subjects of his satire. So Epictetus (3. 1. 21) calls Socrates *πολυπράγμων*, and Diogenes Laertius reports (9. 64) that many people envied Pyrrho his 'freedom from occupation' (*ἀπραγμοσύνη*). In the present context, compare the remark of Plato (*Leg.* 821A) that in gen-

eral one should not be meddlesome or inquisitive (*πολυπραγμονεῖν*) in matters of religion (cf. Burkert 1985*a*, 273 with n. 56). But *πολυπράγμονες* was also commonly applied to the Athenians at large (as e.g. in the plays so entitled by Timocles, Diphilus, and Heniochus), and it is just possible that this word belongs to the characterization of the Athenians which follows in ll. 1593–6. For *ἀπραγμοσύνη* and *πολυπραγμοσύνη* as political catchwords in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War, see K. Kleve, *SO* 39 (1964), 83–8.

1593–8 Very similar phraseology is used to describe the lifestyle of the Athenians at Thuc. 1.6 (*ἀνειμένῃ τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν*), and that of the Spartan ephors at Arist. *Pol.* 1270^{b}32: *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαιτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν ἐστίν* etc. In the present passage discussion of the Athenians' history may have led into the discussion of Socrates in the columns that follow, or Socrates may already be under discussion.

1596–7 Perhaps *ἀ*|*[ναι]δῆ*, as another reflection of the Pyrrhonian view of Socrates; *ἀναίδεια* had been an early Cynic ideal, in contrast to the Pyrrhonist recommendation to observe the ordinary conventions of society (cf. Long 1978, 76).

1597–8 Possibly *διαλα*|*[βεῖ]ν* (Gomperz); cf. below, *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 4,9–11 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 14–15, on Persaeus' attitude towards prayer) *δωρεὰν γὰρ* | *αἰ[τεῖ]ν μηθὲν διει*|*λη[φό]τα περὶ αὐτῶν* (i.e. he would not himself offer prayers, as he was unwilling to ask for a gift 'without understanding' about the gods).

1604–5 Probably *σωτ]ηρίας* (Philippson); cf. below, 2164–5, where it is argued that the myths about the gods were ultimately not a source of security to states (*οὔτε σωτηρίας αἴ̣τ̣[ια]* | *πολειτείας*).

1616–17 *Order of Columns.* We should expect the present col. 56, being the surviving fragment of **229**, to have been the last layer of the *scorza* (since it is the one not destroyed after copying to reveal the layer underneath) and hence outermost in the roll, nearer the beginning. The exiguous traces of the openings of lines of the following col. 57 are preserved on the same papyrus fragment (*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 8) though they were never depicted by the Neapolitan *disegnatore*. Contrast *O* 1077 fr. 1, where the traces of the following column are so depicted; the Neapolitan *disegnatore* must have ignored many such negligibly preserved columns. These traces do not seem to correspond with the line beginnings of any other preserved column of the treatise. In any case they probably do not join with col. 58 (**229** fr. 7), since (like **1098** and **1077**) the **229** *scorza* probably contained half or less of the circumference of the roll. The other half (or more) of that circumference must now be contained in the other sequences of miscellaneous columns containing this portion of the treatise, namely **247/242**, **437** and **1610**, before the section on the poets (which similarly consists of multiple sequences from several *scorze*) begins (see vol. ii). Since the layers of these *scorze* were copied selectively by the *disegnatore* (usually only when a substantial portion of the width of a legible column appeared on the

surface), as a result in many cases we are missing transcriptions of the adjoining columns.

Col. 57 (Pls. 3–4)

See above on 1616–17. Though the remains of the column are exiguous, the discovery of an unnoticed stichometric letter (Ξ) in the margin of this column confirms the reconstruction of the treatise, and shows that portions of all the columns between the letters N and Ξ are preserved. See above on 1560 and Introd. §2(*f*).

Col. 58

A return to the discussion of Socrates, picking back up the point left off at 1363 (after which a column may be missing). The Epicureans as a school were virtually unique in reviling Socrates, who appears elsewhere in our sources (with the exception of certain Cynics—see below) as a paradigm of philosophical excellence. For the background to the Epicurean hostility see Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* 1.91; Min. Fel. *Oct.* 38. 5; Kleve 1983; Vander Waerdt 1989. Elsewhere Philodemus adopts a hostile posture almost as a matter of school loyalty, for example in *De oec.*, an 'anti-commentary' on the Socratic *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon. In the present passage, Philodemus contrasts Epicurus with Socrates, charging that the latter, unlike Epicurus, harmed people in general through his views about the gods. This position may have seemed badly in need of argument, in view of the long tradition of Socratic *ἀπολογίαι*; thus Philodemus cites an epic hexameter line, thought to have been spoken by Socrates, in order to prove that Socrates imposed his views on people at large (see Kleve 1983, 236–7, 242–4; Bücheler 1865, 536 [= 606]).

Perelli 1955, 29–56 connects these and several of the following columns (esp. col. 75) with Epic. fr. 368 Us. (Epict. 2. 20. 3) and argues that a hasty reading of Philodemus' *De pietate* was responsible for the misrepresentation of Epicurus' views there (see further below on 2171–4).

The author has already cited above Metrodorus' attack on Socrates for his 'impure discussion' of religious matters in Plato's *Euthyphro* (697–708). The other mention of Socrates in *De pietate* comes in a detached fragment below at *P. Herc.* 1428 (fr. 6 d, p. 71 G.), criticizing Xenoph. *Mem.* 4. 3. 13 (= Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 31; Philodemus'

representation there is considerably closer to Xenophon than Cicero's rendering).

1645–6 μυκτῆ|[ρες ὅτι γ]ὰρ ἠξιώ|[θησαν: sc. Socrates and the certain others punished by the Athenians (above, 1333–63). Socrates is called *μυκτὴρ ῥητορόμυκτος* in Timon Phliasius fr. 25 Diels (*SH* 799), alluding to his sarcasm. This suggests a close connection between the present passage and the Pyrrhonian representation of Socrates. For *μυκτήρ* (not an everyday word in this sense) here see Longin. *De subl.* 34. 2 with Russell ad loc., Hor. *Sat.* 1. 4. 8 *emunctae naris*, Lucian. *Prom. es in verbis* 1, Sen. *Suas.* 1. 6, W. Büchner, 'Über den Begriff der Eironeia', *Hermes*, 76 (1941), 339–58; Kleve 1983, 249 with n. 143; Angeli 1988*a*, index s.v. *μυκτήρ*. For a Platonic representation of Socrates in this light, Plat. *Rep.* 343 A.

1666–7 Philippson's restoration *κέν|[τρον*, if correct, might suggest that in what follows Philodemus argues that Socrates' famous 'sting' (Plat. *Apol.* 30 E) eventually hit back on himself.

1668 δ]ạ̣ι̣μόνιον: Socrates' claim to possess a private divine sign is represented as a kind of boasting (cf. Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 91) and the alleged divinity as a fake. Cf. Min. Fel. *Oct.* 38. 5 (where the daemon is a liar, i.e. a demon): *proinde Socrates scurra Atticus viderit nihil se scire confessus, testimonio licet fallacissimi daemonis gloriosus*; see further Kleve 1983, 236–7, 243.

1672 Philippson's *οἷς ᾧο]ṇτο* (only a possible restoration) would denote things people in general thought about Socrates' impiety: *οὐ μαχόμε|[να* will thus refer to the tradition (represented e.g. by the Platonic *Apologia*) that Socrates did not himself resist the verdict of the trial through flight, etc., or do everything he might have to avoid the outcome of the trial.

1673 [ἀσεβῆς]: the restoration is due to Philippson. The sense is reasonably clear; *ἐφαί||νετο* could of course control *εἰπών* (1670) alone: 'he had obviously said . . .'.

1673–4 *Order of Columns.* Cols. 58–9 are preserved on separate *disegni* as is usual in *N*. As successive columns of **229** (frr. 7–8), and as the right-hand side of one column followed by the left-hand side of a succeeding column in the Neapolitan numbering, they can link physically on the same rationale explained above on 840–1. The treatment of Socrates here, combined with mention of the Athenians, and perhaps Socrates, in col. 57 (cf. 1353–63) also suggests placement here on grounds of context. Lest it be wrongly suspected that this treatment of Socrates could have originally been one with the earlier one at 1353–63, it should be noted that this is impossible for the following reason: the earlier discussion of Socrates in preserved on O 1077 fr. 3, which must be several columns earlier that O 1077 2, which bears (at 1430) the stichometric letter N. Now col. 59, which follows the present col. 58, bears the stichometric letter O (see 1686). This means that several columns plus one stichometric letter (Ξ at 1631), representing 400 lines of text or *c.* 13⅓ columns, must have intervened between the two passages. Of these 15⅓ columns, the remains of 11 are preserved.

Col. 59

Socrates, continued.

1675–8 ἔ]|τ[ι] δ' ἦν . . . δέον: we cannot read ὅ]|τ[ι] with Gomperz and construe it with τοῖc | ἐπάγουcιν or τὸν . . . λόγον πρόχει|ρον for the reason that the sentence would be left without a main verb: δέον as the verbal adjective cannot stand alone. δέον (ἐcτί) would be otiose, for which we would just have δεῖ (see above on 444). Thus the force of the accusative absolute must be conditional or causal, leading to the conclusion ἦν πολὺc ἐν | τοῖc ὄχλοιc Cωκρά|τηc.

1676 ἦν πολύc: the sense is 'he was always in a crowd', 'he was a great one for crowds'. For the use of πολύc of a single person see Herod. 8. 59 πολλὸc ἦν ὁ Θεμοcτοκλέηc τοῖcι λόγοιcι, 'Themistocles spoke volubly'. According to LSJ (s.v. II. 3. b) ὁ πολύc is 'an ordinary man', *vulgus* (e.g. Epic. fr. 478 Us. = Porph. *Ad Marc.* 28 p. 292. 12 Nauck² = 122,16–17 des Places; Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 154; D.L. 2. 29), of which there is a hint here.

1676–7 ἐν | τοῖc ὄχλοιc: δι' ὄχλου εἶναι/γενέcθαι is 'to be troublesome', e.g. Aristoph. *Eq.* 888, Thuc. 1. 73, Plat. *Alc. I* 1032 A. But here with ἐν and the plural the meaning is 'in crowds', as is also suggested by the other contexts in which the epic line is quoted (see next note): cf. πιθανώτεροι ἀπαίδευτοι ἐν τοῖc ὄχλοιc. According to *Lex. Philod.* s.v. ὄχλοc 'vulgus' is the only meaning attested for Philodemus.

1678–81 The full hexameter appears at D.L. 2. 117, where Bion of Borysthenes, asked to discuss the question of whether or not the gods exist, is said to have replied (F 25 Kindstrand): οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ cκεδάceιc ὄχλον, ταλαπείριε πρέcβυ, where cκεδάceιc has been understood as the simple form of the verb ('get rid of', 'dispel', 'scatter'), while ὄχλοc has been taken to mean 'crowd' and the sentence as a question. Immediately before this Diogenes Laertius tells a story of apparently similar import about Stilpo and Crates (whether the Cynic or Peripatetic is not certain): Κράτητοc γοῦν αὐτὸν (sc. Cτίλπωνα = fr. 177 Döring) ἐρωτήcαντοc, εἰ οἱ θεοὶ χαίρουcι ταῖc προcκυνήcεcι καὶ εὐχαῖc, φαcὶν εἰπεῖν "περὶ τούτων μὴ ἐρώτα, ἀνόητε, ἐν ὄχλῳ (Ebert: ὁδῷ codd.) ἀλλὰ μόνον", τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ Βίωνα ἐρωτηθέντα, εἰ θεοί εἰcιν, εἰπεῖν, then quoting the same hexameter οὐκ — ὄχλον. Thus expressed is a desire not to discuss certain philosophical subjects in public, a willingness only to do so privately, if at all. If the emendation ὄχλῳ is right, then 'crowd' must be the meaning of the word in the hexameter line as quoted here (to argue for the emendation from the hexameter would, of course, be circular), and so also where it appears in Bion (ap. D.L., quoted above) and in our passage in Philodemus. Kindstrand on Bion F 25 discusses similar refusals by philosophers to treat the subject of the gods, or other difficult topics, as Socrates in the *Apology* (19 BC) disclaims knowledge of

natural philosophy and invites the jurors to bear witness that none of them has ever heard him discussing it.

Athenaeus 1.4B also quotes this hexameter from Clearchus of Soli (fr. 90 Wehrli), where it has been variously punctuated by editors as a question or a statement (see Bernabé 1982, 82 for the editorial record on this point). Clearchus told of a Charmos of Syracuse who served up each dish at his banquets with appropriately selected *στιχίδια καὶ παροιμίαι*—a different one for each dish. All the other quotations Athenaeus gives as examples accompanying the dishes are from the *Iliad* or Euripides, e.g. the entrée consisting of fish was served with the line *ἦκω λιπὼν Αἰγαῖον ἁλμυρὸν βάθος* (*Troi.* 1), and so on. At the serving of the *ἐψητοί* (a very small fish boiled in large quantities) Charmos would symposiastically recite, to the certain delight of all present, the line *οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ σκεδάσεις ὄχλον, ταλαπείριε πρέσβυ.*

This kind of doubling of anecdotes is not uncommon in biographical and convivial literature, and it is hardly suprising that Philodemus knew the line in connection with Socrates, especially given the context of the story about Bion. Bion denied that the gods had human form (F 26a–b Kindstrand); Diog. Laert. believed that he denied the gods existed (T 5 Kindstrand). Kindstrand (on F 25) argues that the implied danger for these philosophers lay not in being too outspoken about the gods in an Athenian context (so Derenne 1930, 204), but was connected with the refusal of the Cynics in particular to discuss certain topics in public 'because they thought that people in general could not really understand the question or because they considered the subject too serious for a discussion in public'; i.e. such refusals by philosophers to discuss the gods were originally indicative not of atheism (or the threat of prosecution for it) or of social hostility towards philosophical views of the gods, but rather of the relative difficulty and complexity of the subject of theology in general. Theology was controversial, a big headache, or a potential source of trouble. One were better advised to discuss it in private with one's followers than in the forum with the philosophically unindoctrinated. Here, however, Philodemus seems to have in mind also the fact that Socrates risked punishment by death for being too outspoken about the gods (so also above, 1353–83: Socrates was so punished, but not Epicurus: 1402–12, 1512–25), and that he could have avoided this by concealing his remarks from the uninitiated masses.

No source for this line is given by any of these testimonies. Its recurrence suggests that it was a well-known one. (Whether it was a question or a statement in its original context may have been forgotten, or part of the joke to those who remembered.) Unless he is simply mistaken or lying, Philodemus seems to have known a biographical tradition, invoked by someone (1678–9 *τοῖς | ἐπάγουσιν*, opponents?) that put the line in the mouth of Socrates in some context (apparently with *ὄχλος* in the sense of

'crowd'; cf. 1682–3 π[ολ]||λοὺ[c and below on 1681). The quotation of the line by Crates and Stilpo in D.L. shows that it is pre-Hellenistic. ταλαπείριος (cf. the ξεῖνος ταλαπείριος of *Od.* 7. 24, cf. 6. 193, 17. 84, 14. 511) is not Iliadic, which suggests a cyclic *epos*; the other Hellenistic instances (Manetho, *Apotelesm.* 5. 129, 212, Agathias, *AP* 10. 66) seem to be epic borrowings (see below). Philodemus' source for the line and its attribution to Socrates could have been an Epicurean attack on Socrates (e.g. like Colotes' or Idomeneus' *Περὶ τῶν Cωκρατικῶν*), drawing on a lost Socratic dialogue, in which Socrates politely excused himself from discussing some such delicate matter in public by quoting this line from a known epic. Socrates quotes epic verse without ascription not infrequently in the Platonic dialogues (e.g. *Cypria*, *EGF* F 24 = *PEG* 18 at *Euthyphro* 12 A, to give a non-Homeric example). Another possible derivation is from a parodic work in verse, like Timon of Phlius' *Silloi* (in hexameters) or his *Indalmoi* (in elegiacs); both works were notorious for their skilful use and parody (*cπουδαιογέλοιον*) of Homer and epic: see C. Wachsmuth, *Sillographorum Graecorum reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1885), 203–4. Long 1978, 68–90 notes that Timon's parody of epic provided 'a mock-heroic setting for the grandiose pretentions of his opponents'. A work of this sort is further suggested if τοῖc ἐπάγουcιν is taken to indicate other writers similarly hostile to Socrates, for unlike the Socratic and later Cynics who extolled Socrates (see K. Döring, *Exemplum Socratis* (Hermes Einzelschr. 43; Wiesbaden, 1979), esp. 1 and 5), the skoptic tradition represented by Pyrrho and Timon is known to have attacked him (Timon spared only Xenophanes and Pyrrho). Socrates is satirized in Timon frr. 25 (D.L. 2. 19) and 62 (Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7. 9) Diels (= *SH* 799 and 836), and though there is nothing in these fragments to indicate that Socrates spoke in his own person, other philosophers in the *Silloi* are represented as speaking. Socratics in general are attacked in Timon frr. 26–9 Diels (*SH* 800–3). In addition, we know that all the philosophers satirized by Timon were represented as different species of fish in an elaborate fishing scene in which Zeno of Citium, 'the greedy old Phoenician fisherwoman', tried in vain to catch all the philosophical fish in a Stoic net of dialectical mesh (Wachsmuth, *Sil. Graec.* 39; Long 1978, 79–80), which might point to a connection with the quotation of the hexameter line in Athenaeus (Arist. *HA* 541^{b}15 uses μυκτήρ of the cuttle-fish, cηπία or τευθίc: cf. above, 1645–6). Timon's Cynic contemporary, Crates of Thebes, is known to have written a similar sort of philosophical parody in hexameters: see Long 1978, 75, and cf. above on D.L. 2. 117. The fragments contain extensive adaptation of epic, especially Homer; there is no mention of Socrates, though fr. 1 Diels (D.L. 2. 118, *SH* 347), a passage which also draws on Hom. *Od.* 11, may echo Socrates' reference to Prodicus at Plat. *Protag.* 315 C 8.

The original epic context of the hexameter line is therefore unknown. J. Schweighäuser, *Animadversiones in Athenaei Deipnosophistas*, i (Strasbourg,

1801), 51–2, and A. Meineke, *Philologicarum exercitationum in Athenaei Deipnosophistas specimen 2* (Progr. d. Joach. Gymn. 4; Berlin, 1846), 1; id., *Athen.* iv. 2 assign it to a poem of the epic cycle, and are followed by K. Döring, *Die Megariker* (Amsterdam, 1972), 147 and Kindstrand on Bion F 25, but suggest no specific work or context. F. G. Welcker, *Der epische Cyclus oder die Homerischen Dichter*, ii (Bonn, 1849), 516 suggests that it is Menelaus speaking to Nestor in the *Cypria*, linking it with *Cypria*, *EGF* F 15 = *PEG* 17 (discussed below). The hexameter line does not appear in the editions of the epic fragments by Kinkel (1877) or Allen (1912); it is included as *EGF* adesp. F 5 by Davies and as *Cypria* 16 (cf. 17) by Bernabé in *PEG*. The epic context need not have been the same as in the sillographic poem (assuming that this was Philodemus' source, perhaps that of Diogenes and Athenaeus), since in the surviving sillographic fragments it is often the alteration (or inversion) of the epic context which makes the satirical point.

We do in fact know (from the address *ταλαπείριε πρέσβυ*) that the original epic context was an interchange between the speaker and a person of equal or higher social rank, perhaps older. Bernabé 1982 (an article to which I was directed by Dr Holford-Strevens; see also Bernabé on *Cypria*, *PEG* 16–17) usefully points out that this hexameter has distinguished predecessors in *Od.* 8. 149 *σκέδασον δ' ἀπὸ κήδεα θυμοῦ*, *Cypria*, *EGF* F 15 = *PEG* 17 (on which see further below) *θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν ἀποσκεδάσαι μελεδῶνας*, Theogn. 883 *ἀπὸ χαλεπὰς σκεδάσεις μελεδῶνας*, Soph. *OT* 138 *ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦτ' ἀποσκεδῶ μύσος*, epigr. ap. Demosth. 18. 289 *ἀντιπάλων ὕβριν ἀπεσκέδασαν*, *AP* 11. 55 *ἵνα Βάκχος ἀποσκεδάσειε μερίμνας*. These models suggest that in our line *οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ σκεδάσεις ὄχλον, ταλαπείριε πρέσβυ*, (1) we have tmesis in *ἀπὸ . . . σκεδάσεις* (cf. the simplex at Theogn. 1323 *σκέδασον δὲ μερίμνας*, obviously derived from 883), and that (2) in its original epic context *ὄχλος* meant not 'crowd' but 'trouble', 'grief' (as at e.g. Eurip. *Ion* 635, Hdt. 1. 86, Aristoph. *Eq.* 888, etc.; cf. *ὀχληρός* and *ὀχλέω*, *Il.* 21. 261 *ὀχλεῦνται*). *ταλαπείριος* tends to describe a *ξεῖνος* (*Od.* 7. 24, 17. 84, 19. 379, Hom. *Hymn. Ap.* 168) or a *ἱκέτης* (*Od.* 6. 193, 14. 511). On this basis Bernabé following Welcker connects the line with *Cypria*, *EGF* F 15 = *PEG* 17 (from Sud. s.v. *οἶνος*, Eustath. ad *Od.* 9. 197):

> *οἶνόν τοι, Μενέλαε, θεοὶ ποίησαν ἄριστον*
> *θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν ἀποσκεδάσαι μελεδῶνας.*

We know that these lines were spoken to Menelaus by Nestor in his palace at Pylos (the speaker cannot have offered wine to Menelaus at anywhere other than his own home, i.e. in a *ξενία* scene). To the latter Menelaus had come as a visitor in his grief over the loss of Helen (Procl. *Chr.* 112 ff. Severyns: *καὶ πρὸς Νέστορα παραγίνεται Μενέλαος. Νέστωρ δὲ ἐν παρεκβάσει διηγεῖται αὐτῷ ὡς Ἐπωπεὺς φθείρας τὴν Λυκούργου θυγατέρα ἐξεπορθήθη, καὶ τὰ περὶ Οἰδίπουν καὶ τὴν Ἡρακλέους μανίαν καὶ τὰ περὶ Θησέα*

καὶ Ἀριάδνην). Nestor consoled Menelaus in his travail by narrating a mythological catalogue offering negative paradigms that showed prohibited desire resulting in unmitigated misfortune for those who yielded to it. As Bernabé 1982, 86 notes, in the light of Nestor's characteristic amplitude and digression elsewhere, his παρέκβαcιc will not have been brief. Bernabé takes Welcker's assignment to Menelaus one step further in giving our line (punctuated as a 'frase enunciativa, no interrogativa' in 1982, 86 but as a question in *Cypria*, *PEG* 16), immediately after Nestor's narrative, to Menelaus, not to be consoled by Nestor's mythological paradigms. In direct response, he supposes, Nestor speaks *Cypria*, *EGF* F 15 = *PEG* 17 (quoted above), extolling wine as a queller of grief for mortals, as though to say: 'Menelaus, have a drink!' As entertaining as such a scenario might have been, an arrangement more in keeping with Homeric and sub-Homeric models would be to make Nestor the host offer wine to the grieving Menelaus (*Cypria*, *EGF* F 15 = *PEG* 17) upon his arrival at Pylos, in response to which (after perhaps the lapse of a few lines) the unconsolable Menalaus speaks οὐκ ἀπ' ἐμοῦ cκεδάceιc ὄχλον, ταλαπείριε πρέcβυ, κτλ., thereby eliciting and framing Nestor's consolatory mythological narrative described by Proclus. There is a direct parallel (pointed out to me by Nikolai Kozansky) in Stesichorus' *Eriphyle* (*PMGF* S148), in which the distraught Alcmaon, offered wine by Adrastus, responds (ll. 8–9) [cὺ μὲν φ]ίλε πῖνέ τε καὶ θαλίαιc / [εὔφραιν]ε θυμόν· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπὶ πρᾶ[(before the papyrus breaks off), where the rhapsodic formula αὐτὰρ ἐγώ not only articulates Alcmaon's refusal to be consoled by drink, but introduces a narrative unit or digression: see Simonides *IEG*² 11,20 with P. Parsons on *P. Oxy.* LIX 3965 ad loc. Cf. Achilles and Priam in *Il.* 24, where excessive grief provokes abstention from normal consumption resolved by the recitation of a mythological *paradeigma*; in *Od.* 9 Odysseus' refusal to partake of the εὐφροcύνη of the banquet prompts concern that eventually elicits his narrative.

1681 ὄχλον must either be supplied (from D.L. 2. 117) or understood over again from ὄχλοιc in 1677. It could easily have dropped on confusion with the succeeding λόγον. A kind of catchword in discussions of this subject, ὄχλοc appears e.g. in the new reading at 1405 (cf. 1575, 1604), where Epicurus is said to have escaped the Ἀττ[ι]κ[ὸν] | ὄ[χλ]ον; cf. Timon Phliasius fr. 22 Diels (*SH* 796. 2) on Plato, and 34 (*SH* 808. 1) on Arcesilaus.

1687 τῷ̣[ι χ]ρόνωι: for χρόνωι with the article in the sense 'in time', 'at last' see LSJ s.v. χρόνοc 3c; Aristoph. *Nub.* 67, 1242.

1696–7 τὸ καινὰ [δαι]|μόνια [πα]ρειcάγειν is part of the formal indictment of Socrates for impiety, the ἀντωμοcία preserved in the Metroon (Favorinus fr. 5. 1 Mensching = 34 Barigazzi), if the document to which Favorinus refers is genuine; cf. D.L. 2. 40; Xen. *Mem.* 1. 1. 1; Plat. *Apol.* 28 A ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖc ἔμπροcθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸc πολλούc, εὖ ἴcτε ὅτι ἀληθέc ἐcτιν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔcτιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήcει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ,

οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. The tradition and its variants are discussed by Derenne 1930.

1699 The paragraphos after l. 1685 marks the stichometric letter as a number sign; it is not punctuation. Here at 1699 it is unclear precisely what is indicated. But it could mark the end of the section on Socrates (as the diple obelismene marks a change of philosopher in *P. Herc.* 1428). Most likely the extra space before *ἄλλως* in *N* represents a punctuation, so that the paragraphos here marks a syntactical break.

1700–1 παραλλογώτατον: according to D.L. 9.67, Pyrrho liked to quote passages from Homer which illustrated the inconsistency (*ἀβέβαιον*) of men.

1701–2 *Order of Columns.* For the link between the present col. 59 and the preceding one (both fragments of *P. Herc.* 229) see on 1673–4. Between the present column and the more or less continuous cols. 63–86 there is a considerable lacuna: at least 12 columns or 360 lines. This can be determined from the fact that the present col. 59 (**229** fr. 8) displays at 1686 the stichometric letter O, whereas at in col. 79 (**229** fr. 4) the letter Φ appears (at 2274). This represents an interval of six stichometric letters at 200 lines each = 1,200 lines or 40 columns of text, of which no more than 21 columns can have been preserved. The present reconstruction assumes portions of 15 columns preserved in the interval. (There may also be the vestige of another stichometric letter at 2237.) After the present column the fragments of **229** begin to alternate individually with those from a series of inventory numbers (first **437/452**, then **1610//247/242**).

SECTION 4: ORIGIN OF ATHEISM AND JUSTICE (1702–2510)

Having argued that Epicurus, in contrast to Socrates, was not harmful to people in general, and after a reiteration of the Epicureans' pious attitudes towards the gods, Philodemus undertakes to provide an account of justice and its origin in human history. He relates an opponent's position, to which he opposes an Epicurean one. As is usual in the Herculaneum papyri, it is not always easy, given the state of the text, to distinguish the two, or always to be sure when Philodemus is talking about the hypothetical past (in his or his opponent's view) or about the present. As far as can be judged from the following columns, this account is concerned principally with the formation of false beliefs about the gods and their role in the consequent rise of injustice. Philodemus is particularly exercised to show that there is nothing to be gained from keeping back the truth about the gods from people in general, as some philosophers including his opponents advocate, or

depending on false stories about the gods to restrain wrongdoers. In the next section (see vol. ii) Philodemus claims that the myths of the poets contain nothing of the kind, while the views of rival philosophical persuasions would actually incite people to injustice. This account is therefore an extension of the treatment earlier in the treatise of philosophers who were punished for their views on the gods, or who for this reason, or in the interest of social peace, disguised true ideas on the gods from the masses (see e.g. 1184–1217, 1330–63 with commentary ad loc.). Philodemus' account in this section draws upon an earlier Epicurean position on the origin and function of both religious rites and poetic myths about the gods at various points in human history, such as is also represented by Lucretius in book 5. In the present section (the last in the first part of the treatise), the discussion of atheism and justice in human history leads neatly into the second part of the treatise on poets and *theologoi*, which seeks to prove that the poetic myths and philosophical explanations about the gods did not in fact accurately conserve the conception of the gods held by the earliest humans (above, 225–31), and so generally have only the effect of leading the thinking of most people astray, without affording society protection against injustice.

Col. 60A

1702 κ]αὶ περὶ ὧν: the exact antecedent of the relative pronoun is beyond recovery. For the topics which Philodemus now turns to treat in this section see above, 1584 *π[άνδ]εινοι λόγοι*, referring to the views held by the 'despised theologians and philosophers' at 1570–2: namely that it was necessary (to the maintenance of justice) for people in general to think that the gods were *δεινοί* and would punish them for their misdeeds (for a summary of this view see above, 1184–1217). Philodemus probably argued above that Socrates held this view, but also revealed the truth about the gods to others, so that he was viewed as meddling with the crowd and harmful to society.

1703–5 ἁρμο[στὸ]ν | [πα]ρησόμε[θ]α λόἰ[γο]ν̣: the critical account of the opponents' position that follows will be *ἁρμοστόν* 'consistent' with the Epicurean view of justice, perhaps also the evidence, discussed above, concerning Socrates and Epicurus as harming and not harming people respectively, and with Epicurean writings on the gods as cited earlier throughout the treatise (see next note).

1706–8 πάντω]ν ἐμνημοἰ[νεύο]μεν γραμμάἰτων: I take this to refer to Philodemus' citations (above) from the works of Epicurus and the *kathegemones* generally (perhaps also those cited in the columns lost between the

discussion of Socrates and the present section). Philodemus has particularly in mind their argumentation about the gods: that harms and benefits of a sort derive from the gods, that it is appropriate to worship them, that it is possible to provide arguments about them and to reconstruct a veridical concept (*πρόληψις*) of their nature, such as was held by the earliest of humans. On the term *γράμμα* of 'writings' in the Herculanensia see Capasso 1981, 375–404. Philippson, thinking that the criticism of the poets preceded this section of the treatise, took this to refer to the writings of the poets cited extensively in that section (see below on 2496–9). He restored *τοὺς ὀγ[κώ-δε]ι[c | . . . λόγους* in 1709–10, intending Apollodorus of Athens, who is cited later in the treatise (see vol. ii) for his mammoth 24-book *Περὶ θεῶν* at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 5 (vol. ii; Obbink 1994, 116): 'Apollodorus who compiled *On gods* in twenty-four books, pouring virtually everything he had into this, even if he polemicizes against the "synoikeizers", (he still did) not . . .', *[Ἀπολ|λό]δωρος ὁ τὰ Πε[ρὶ θε|ῶν] εἴκοσιν καὶ τέτ|[τα]ρα cυντάξας καὶ τὰ |[π]άντα cχεδὸν εἰc |[τα]ῦτ' ἀναλώcας, εἰ καὶ |[μ]άχεταί που τοῖc |[cυ]νοι-κειοῦcιν, οὗ δι|[* (unfortunately the text of this column breaks off here, but the column almost certainly went on to condemn him for some other aspect of his mythography). This is unnecessary, not only because we now know the correct order of the parts of the treatise, but also because the fragments of **452** surrounding this column can be seen to contain quotations from Epicurus' works (see 1787–91, 1820–1, 1887–98, cf. 1849–51: there of course may be or have been many more).

1711–13 εἰ δέ τιc | [ἕτε]poc καὶ παρατι[θεὶc] καὶ ἄλλα: I take this as a kind of saving clause protecting the author against allegations that he has left out evidence or has been less than accurate, thus affording an opening to an opponent or rival (cf. the similar saving clause covering the possibility of misquotation of the poets below at 2495–2501). It is possible, however, that the antecedent of *τιc |[ἕτε]poc* is none other than *λόγοc* (1704–5), i.e. the disreputable 'other *λόγοc*' mentioned below at 1857–61.

Col. 60B

Perhaps a string of citations from Epicurus (cf. 1787–92, 1820–1), discussing processes of reasoning towards the existence of divinity or its manner of existence: 1725 *διαλο[γίcματα*: Epic. *Ad Herod.* 68; *Ad Pyth.* 85; 1726 *cυλλογιcμὸ̣[ν*: Epic. *De nat.* 34. 31,9 Arr.[2] Proofs for the existence of gods are mentioned in this section at 1741–4.

1731–2 *Order of Columns.* The final section is made up of two related series of papyri. (1) In the first (cols. 60–8), **437** and **452** supply tops and bottoms of columns respectively. No link is absolutely certain in this series (the placement of tops upon bottoms here is entirely conjectural), but there is a very likely one (between cols. 64

and 65), combined with a remarkable similarity of vocabulary and subject throughout. We should be prepared for the possibility of some disordering during transcription, but since we cannot be sure on textual grounds (e.g. the presence of *sovrapposti* or *sottoposti*), I have simply presented the fragments in the reverse of their transmitted order: they were clearly transcribed from *scorze*. (2) In the second series, cols. 69–86 form a continuous series linked by a complex but indubitable chain of matching *sovrapposti* and columnar links. In this chain the fragments of **229** begin to alternate individually with **1610** and **247/242**, just as **1077** and **1098** did in the earlier part of the treatise. There are physical links between **242** and **229**, and between **1610** and **247**, while **247** provides the tops to **242**. Presumably when the roll was broken open, and after the two outer halves (**1077** and **1098**) had been removed, each series (**229**, **242/247**, **437/452**, and **1610**) was prized loose individually in an attempt to unroll the *midollo* of the roll (compare the fragments detached from the beginning of *P. Herc.* 1428, the *midollo* of the second roll of the treatise). Some broke in half (**242/247**, **437/452**) or were otherwise damaged at tops (**1610**) or bottoms (**229** fr. 4). That the fragments of **437** and **452** form part of this sequence can be best seen from the content of fr. 4 (1852–67), which is clearly related to the discussion at 2142–82 of the account of how some people attempt to secure political control by hiding the truth about gods and through the introduction of stories. Some of the fragments of **437** may have formed the tops of the columns whose bottoms are preserved as **242** (where these are not otherwise preserved as fragments of **247**). This arrangement leaves the last presented columns of **229** (frr. 7–8, cols. 58–9) separated by dozens of columns from the next (in descending order, fr. 6, col. 71). But we know from the stichometric notations that we are missing as many columns in the 229 sequence (see on 2302–3).

In cols. 60–8 Philodemus seems to be reviewing the theory of the veridical *πρόληψις* of the gods before entering into argument concerning the details of its degeneration and distortion over time in cultural history. Although I hope that the order of columns in this section (cols. 60–86) will prove acceptable, it would be unwise to rely too heavily upon it until it has faced criticism from others.

The columns of **437** and **452** were not among those grouped by Quaranta and the editors of *HV*² II as belonging to *De pietate* and edited by Gomperz (see Introd. § 2(*d*)). But we can be sure that they belong to the present treatise because the one surviving *scorza* of this series (fr. 4, col. 63) is written in the same hand as *P. Herc.* 1428 (see Introd. § 2(*g*) for the palaeographical identification). The *disegni* of **437** and **452** indubitably depict the same distinctive hand (note especially alpha and especially the xi in **452** fr. 5 at l. 1820), line-lengths, and column layout as all other parts of *De pietate*. The original Neapolitan *disegni* of **247**, for example, provide so favourable a comparison in appearance as to dispel any doubt.

Col. 61A

This column seems to treat the number of the gods (or the extent in variation of conceptions of them) allowed by some persons, but sketches out a divergence in thinking on this point by others. It is not clear whether the first group consists of current Epicureans, or rather

early humans with correct thinking about the gods; cf. above, 224–318, from Epic. *De nat.* 12, where it is explained that the earliest humans held conceptions of imperishable divine entities, insusceptible to harm; but because they associated their understanding of them with prayers and sacrifices, they no longer preserved their complete happiness and insusceptibility to destruction, and eventually became terrified by their ideas of the gods.

In the present passage it is said that these people not only allow the existence of gods, but of all conceivable gods, so that you could sooner count all men than all the gods whose existence they acknowledge. This may be an allusion (so Philippson 1921, 408; Kleve 1979, 27–35 at 30 n. 33) to the doctrine of *isonomia* or 'equal distribution' which Cicero attributes to the Epicureans at *De nat. deor.* 1. 50 (refuted by Cotta at 1. 109 but otherwise unattested). According to Velleius there, who takes as his point of departure the concept of infinity (all things are equally matched against each other): (1) if there is an endless number of mortal beings, the number of immortals can be no less, and (2) if the destructive force are innumerable, the causes of conservation must also be infinite. This argument follows immediately after the statement that our mind is able to grasp the blessedness and eternity of the gods; Kleve 1979, 27–35 argues that Velleius intends this as a proof for the *immortality* of the Epicurean gods (if so, it is the only one he gives for it), and notes that Cotta in his refutation mistakes it as a proof for the gods' *existence*. This may be relevant for understanding the present text, since this is followed by the statement that they 'attempt(ed) to furnish all arguments for the gods' existence'. With this passage should also be compared later in the treatise (see vol. ii) *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10,20–30 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 21) where Philodemus complains that the Stoics 'demonstrate to the many that they only allow one god, not many nor even all such as the common report has handed down', but boasts that the Epicureans 'assert that there exist not only all those that the Greeks say but many more as well'.

1735–6 I take the antecedents of *πάν]τα* and *τόν* to be *θεόc*, lost in what precedes (but see 1744 *θεούc*). Compare *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10,20–30 (quoted above) where it is implied that the Epicureans allow the existence of all conceivable divinities. The ability of someone to conceptualize them, or the fact that they are so conceived, is taken as evidence by the Epicureans, on the grounds that something must in *some* sense exist in order for it be thought of. But the expression 'god of the few', *τὸν καὶ τ[ῶν] | ὀλίγων*, i.e. every god credited even by a few (as opposed to many) people is scarcely an easy one.

More drastic measures may be contemplated: *τὸν καιν̣[ὸν ἢ] | ὀλίγο̣ν*, 'every (divinity) strange and small alike.'

1737–40 παρὰ [τοὺς | . . . κ]άντ[α]ριθμοῦντες: for *παρά* of correspondence or equivalence in counting and estimating see LSJ I.8–9. The sense is 'even counting every one (1735–6 *πάν*]|*τα*) in correlation with (or response to) all other humans', i.e. there are as many individual gods as there are humans. Cf. Pausanias 10.20.1 *πάρεστι δὲ ὅστις ἐθέλοι καὶ ἀνταριθμῆσαι τούς τε ἐπὶ βασιλέα Ξέρξην ἐς Πύλας καὶ τοὺς τότε ἐναντία Γαλατῶν ἀθροισθέντας*, 'it is possible, should anyone so wish, to compare the totals of those who mustered at Thermopylae against King Xerxes and those who mustered there to oppose the Gauls'.

1742 ἐπεχείρη[σαν: one expects the aorist to have temporal signification. The question is whether it should be translated as 'they (who are alive) have attempted' or 'they (who are dead) attempted'. And if the latter, whether he means past Epicureans, or is talking about the early history of thinking about the gods. If he is speaking of Epicureans here, then the claim is that attempt to provide proofs, not that they provide indubitable ones. For the Epicurean view on the necessity for proof and arguments about the gods, see above, 639–57, where, however, it is admitted that no one furnished (*εὑπ[όρης]ε̣ν*) completely certain proofs (*ἀποδείξεις*) for the existence of gods (*πε|ρὶ τ[οῦ θ]ε̣οὺς ὑπάρ|χε[ιν*). The speculative reconstruction of human thinking about the gods is perhaps the kind of 'proof' or *πίστις* about the gods which the Epicureans commend. Pre-historical reconstructions of an anthropological sort were a common way of presenting an argument or theory in Hellenistic philosophy and accounts of culture generally (see Kleingünther 1933, Spoerri 1959, Henrichs 1975*b*, Davies 1989). The account of cultural history in Lucretius, book 5, is the best known instance, and was dependent upon Epicurus' own use of this method (in *De nat.* 12, see his account above, 224–318). A historical reconstruction could be used, as in the present case, for refuting an opponent's view while advancing one's own position. The present account, however, is unlikely to be part of the very *earliest* stage of thinking about the gods, since the 'first men' on the Epicurean view entertained no debate over their nature or existence (above, 233–4), no doubts (cf. 2145–6 *ἐ*]|*ποχήν*), and no stories (2159–61 *μύθους καὶ τερατεί*|*ας*), and hence no arguments. The offering of arguments for the gods' existence is also mentioned earlier in the treatise in connection with Epicureans (477–8 *τοι*]*ο̣ύτων λό*|*γων* [*πίστε*]*ι̣ς*) and 'all humans' (650–5 *ἀπο*]*δείξεις*, cf. 626–8). In the present passage arguments for the gods' existence (1742–4) seem to be associated with a distinctly secondary, though not necessarily deviant, stage of thinking about the divine.

1745–9 See above, 1202–17, where the 'philosophers and *theologoi*' perceived that the false myths about the gods held the foolish in check. In the present passage Philodemus may be recapitulating or picking up that ac-

count, as follows: τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλῳ[ν] | πλῆθος ὑπολ[αμβά]|νει μόνον ὑ[ποψί|αν] τὴν δα[ιμόνων | ἧς] ἔδει· τὰς [διανοί|ας, 'But the great part of the others just understood the suspicion of the divinities that was necessary; while their ideas . . .'. The Epicureans argue that, while this may have been necessary at some time in the past, it has nothing to do with the gods *per se*, yet it is responsible for much false belief about them. For ὑ[ποψί|αν see above, 1213–14. Philippson's ὑ[φη|γη]τήν is too short, and so is ὑ[πη|ρέ]την. With 1748 δα[ιμόνων cf. 1852 ἥρωας, and see on 1851. If ὑ[πόνοι|αν] τὴν δα[ιμόνων were to be restored, it would be an un-Epicurean way of speaking about the gods.

1745–6 τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλῳ[ν] | πλῆθος: this must denote a group distinct from those who allow the existence of all conceivable gods and attempt to furnish proofs for their existence. So presumably the 'great part of the others' form imperfect conceptions of the divine. At 296–318 above there is a similar division of people who maintain clear conceptions of divinity and those who do not at some similarly intermediate stage in cultural history.

1761–2 *Order of Columns*. See on 1731–2.

Col. 62A

Under discussion in this column are 'disturbances', ταραχαί, presumably of the sort that result for humans from fear: e.g. fear of the gods, fear of detection in wrongdoing, or fear of the lack of political security. There is also a mention of things 'produced': 1763–5 π[ερὶ] . . . [παρεσκευ]|ασμένων (viz. pleasures and pains, or benefits and harms, from the gods for humans?), and a notice that the 'disturbances possess (someone or thing)': 1765–6 κατ̣[έχειν] | τὰ̣[ς] ταρα[χὰς. The effect of ταραχαί on the just and unjust becomes an increasingly important topic of attention in this section of the treatise, especially 2213–42, 2273–83, suggesting that the present fragment belongs with that group. The wretched state of the papyrus made it impossible for the *disegnatore* to transcribe this column accurately, necessitating a high proportion of corrections. In view of the instability of the text, I should not deem the fragment important, were it not for the occurrence of a rare word, potentially significant for the question of authorship, in 1773–4.

1762–3 TAC (*N*) in 1763 uncomfortably precedes the article in 1773–4. τάς followed by καί in any case raises suspicions; οὐδέ in 1764 would require punctuating before καί. Dr Holford-Strevens not unreasonably suggests correcting to read ἐν]|δεῖται.

1764–5 παρεσκευ]|ασμένων: cf. 1255–6 *παρασκευ[αζόμε]|νον*, a favourite Epicurean term in descriptions of causation, potentially of any physical condition, but especially of the constitution of mental or pathetic states, e.g. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 77 *τὸν μέγιστον τάραχον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡ ὑπεναντιότης παρασκευάσει*, and see Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* and *Lex. Philod.* s.vv. *παρα-* and *κατασκευάζειν* for many parallels. Here is it probably harms and benefits, *βλάβαι καὶ ὠφέλειαι* (i.e. resulting from our ideas about the gods, cf. 1025, 1045–6) or pleasures or desires, *ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι* (2207, 2209–10) that are *οὐδὲ παρεσκευασμένα*: any of these can under the right circumstances according to the Epicurean theory be so 'produced' by false and true conceptions of the gods respectively. If this is correct, the passage will be saying that even when these do not result, or have not yet resulted (from ideas of the gods), it is still necessary that 'disturbances' (i.e. fear of harm) affects some types of people differently from others (1766–7 *ἀλ]|λ[ότ]ριον θ[ατέροις*, cf. 2196–2205).

1765–6 κατ̣[έχειν]| τὰ[ς] ταρα[χάς: cf. 2219–21 *περὶ δὲ τούτων* (sc. necessary pleasures) *καὶ | φόβος ἀεὶ κατέχει | δεινὸς αὐτούς*; 2237–9 *οὐκ ἐλάττονας ἀ|ναδέχονται ταρα|χάς*, which passages suggest that here *τὰ[ς] ταρα[χάς* (1766) is the subject of the infinitive *κατ̣[έχειν* in a dependent construction.

1766–7 ἀλ]|λ[ότ]ριον θ[ατέροις: 'differently from the others', i.e. other types of people (cf. 2196–7 *οἱ δὲ λοι]|ποὶ διαπ[ίπτουσιν*, where a distinction is made between types of people: one group goes astray as a result of not being able to rest secure in society with people. This group could be designated here as responding differently with regard to the *ταραχαί*, but it is not entirely clear that *ἀλ]|λ[ότ]ριον* 'differently' does not differentiate different types of 'disturbance' and that we should restore *θ[ατέραις*, i.e. *ἄλλαις ταραχαῖς*. In either case, the passage must be understood in relation to the Epicurean position (detailed below at 2196–2212, and see especially 2113–14) that the freedom from fear of harm that comes from fear of the gods satisfies the highest type of desire/pleasure in the Epicurean classification (i.e. necessary and natural *ἐπιθυμίαι*) in contrast to a type of disturbance, the avoidance of which is not crucial for maintaining a clear view of the gods.

1768 ἀπό]νως: cf. 2207–8 *ἀπό]|νοις*, a very probable restoration: see commentary ad loc. with parallels there. If 1768–9 *δι[ὰ]| π[άντω]ν* is temporal and thus equivalent to *ἀεί*, then *ἀπόνως καὶ διὰ πάντων* would be a paraphrase of *μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον* (*KD* 1) or something very similar.

1769–72 οἰκε[ίαν] . . . τὴν ὅ[λως] . . . π[ερι]|ποῦσαν φύσιν: for *οἰκείαν* see above on 739 (Epicurus said that prayer is *οἰκεῖον* to us). With *ὅ[λως* cf. 264 *παντελο̣ῦς* (ΠΑΝΤΕΛΩϹ *N*). The use of *φύσις* in the sense of 'entity', 'existent', is exampled above, 230–1 *ἀφθάρτων | φύσεων* (with commentary ad loc.), where it can be seen to derive from Epicurus' usage of this term *φύσις*. The language here bears some similarity to that of 1255–9 above.

1771 κατ' ὄ̣ντων: cf. 521–2 ἐ]|κ τῶν ὄντων. Here, however, the article is lacking, and we should perhaps write κατ⟨ὰ τῶν⟩ ὄντων.

1772–3 δια]|μέν[ειν: so also 187 (restored), Epic. *Ad Herod.* 65 (bis), Lucr. 1. 122 *esse Acherusia templa . . . quo neque permaneant animae neque corpora nostra* (for *permaneant* and its construction see Lachmann and Munro; cf. Housman, *Classical Papers*, ii. 524).

1773–5 διὰ τὸν [πε]|ρίαλ̣λ̣ο̣ν ὄ̣ν[τ]α ν[ό]|μον: some correction is required, because the sequence of letters PIAMENEN presented by the apograph in 1774 cannot stand as transmitted. ΛΛ mistaken as M is unexceptionable, O for Ε is common enough in the apographs, a fibre in the papyrus being mistaken, as often, for a horizontal stroke at mid-level. The reading περίαλλον may be not only safely regarded as the most probable correction, but also one with strong arguments to recommend it. The occurrence of περίαλλον as an attributive adjective here is significant. While the adverbial περίαλλα is found in poetry (*Hymn. Hom.* 19. 46, Pind. *P.* 11. 5, Eurip., Soph., Aristoph., Apol. Rh., Nicander, Oppian), Philodemus is the only prose author to use this word, and the only author to use it as an attributive adjective. In fact, such a form is found only here and in Philodemus, *Epigram* 12 Sider (= *AP* 5. 132. 5–6, 12 Gow–Page) ὦ περιάλλων γλωττισμῶν, 'O fabulous tongue-kisses'. The meaning of περίαλλος is 'beyond compare', 'supreme', 'nonpareil' (γλωττισμῶν is a hapax). This is as good an argument as any that have been adduced for Philodemus' authorship of the treatise. The περίαλλος νόμος 'supreme law' indicates the esteem with which law was held by the Epicureans for having protected mankind from descending into a beastly state of existence (see Porph. *De abst.* 1. 22 and below on 2329–30). Concerns of legal rule are similarly raised at 1330–90 (οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὰ | [κοι]νά at 1373–4), 1508–21, 1675–1701 (Socrates), 2261–5 (justice and piety virtually the same thing), 2432–48 (justice of kings). At 2477–9 certain persons (either the opponents or the Epicureans) are said to get no 'special exemption' μ[η]|δεμιᾶς προνομ[ί]|α̣ς from the law.

1776]ηξιν: an abstract noun is wanted, perhaps in -πλ]ηξιν or διάρρ]ηξιν (Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 2. 106 ἅμα τήν τε σύνωσιν . . . καὶ τὴν διάρρηξιν), but the correction ὕπα]ρξιν (cf. 628) might be entertained.

Col. 62B

1785 καθάπ̣[ερ: cf. below, 1887–8, introducing a new citation in what appears to be a kind of catalogue of such quotations from Epicurean authors.

1787–8 ἐν δὲ τῶι must introduce a title. The only other candidate for this honour here is a book of Epicurus' Περὶ φύσεως, i.e. an ordinal in the form ε[.....]|σ̣τωι (for the form of the citation of *De nat.* by book-number alone see above on 225–7). But the shortest conceivable one (ἕ̣[κτῳ καὶ εἰκο]-|σ̣τῶι) produces too long a line. In 1788 the spacing is also against this, for it

requires reading *N*'s ι as τ, whereas the top stroke of the tau causes it to consume more space than the average letter, and iota regularly takes only half a letter-space, as here (but see 1818).

1791–2 *Order of Columns.* See on 1731–2.

Col. 63

Epicurus returned to Athens ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτους (307/6: D.L. 10. 2) but the Anaxicrates of the present citation is more likely the later archon of 279/8, since all Epicurus' letters post-date his return to Athens. That there was in existence such a letter by Epicurus is confirmed by two other testimonies: T 26 (Dorandi) Philod. *De Stoic.* col. 5,9–13 γρά[ψας . . .] εἶτ' ἐ[π'] Ἀναξικ[ράτους; and T 63 (Dorandi) *P. Herc.* 310 fr. 3 = *N* fr. 4 ἐπὶ Ἀναξι[κ]ράτους δὲ | {δε} [Δ]ιοδώρ[ω]ι προ[γρ]άψας πά[λιν (ed. Dorandi 1980, 166; προγράφω with πάλιν introducing an instance in a list is attested at *Pragm.* col. 32,16, cf. Spina 1977, 45 on *P. Herc.* 310). The latter citation reveals that the letter written ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτους was addressed to Diodorus, of whom Epicurus spoke on his deathbed as someone who was willing to look after the children of Metrodorus (*Pragm.* col. 31,11–19 = fr. 177 Us.). He is perhaps the model for the as yet unidentified Epicurean Diodorus who is praised at Sen. *Dial.* 7 (*Ad Gallionem de vita beata*) 19,1 because *sibi gulam praesecuit* (Seneca seems to have a contemporary in mind); cf. Usener 1867, 403. The text is beset with uncertainties, perhaps due to 'strati sovrapposti o sottoposti' (Dorandi 1980, 173 n. 68, following Crönert and Philippson; the original does not survive). In particular 1818 εισθην looks as though it may come from another layer (also δημων, cf. 1817 where the apograph reads ΜΕΡΩΝ). Philippson, noting the similarity of content, thought this column ought to come in the vicinity of *P. Herc.* 1098 frr. 10–12 (cols. 28–33 in the present edition), in which Epicurus' letters are cited to similar effect, and the citations are compiled in the form of a catalogue. With 1821 τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰ[κίας cf. 816 κατὰ] τὴν οἰκίαν.

Col. 64

1846 If τοῦ πατέρ[ος were right, we should have a quotation from poetry.

1849 For this formula in introducing a citation see above on 879 with references there.

1851 ὑμνήσει θε[οὺς] || ἥρωάς [τε: Aetius 1.7.34.8 (*Dox. Graec.* 307,15),

after telling us that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics thought that δαίμονες exist physically and that heroes are souls after they have been separated from their former bodies (good ones from the noble, bad ones from the low-born), says that Epicurus οὐδὲν τούτων ἐγκρίνει, 'approves none of it'. Cf. Philodemus' criticism of the doctrine of intermediate terrestrial δαίμονες later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. E d (*HV*² II 7b), Speusippus fr. 57 Tarán (quoted above on 1030–2). The δαίμονες have very likely been mentioned at 1748 (cf. 1668). Here Philodemus is pointing out that οἱ περὶ Ἐπίκουρον advocated praising the gods and heroes according to custom, but are wrongly confused with those do so out of other motives (fooling the many into obedience). Such people have a different definition of piety (see 1857–67).

Col. 65

An important text. Philodemus focuses on the position to be refuted in the following columns, explaining how Epicurean pronouncements about the cult of the gods might be mistakenly confused with a rival position. An important preliminary to this section is to reread the rival position outlined above, 1184–1217 (that false myths about the gods are supposedly necessary to keep the foolish in check), and the explanation given at 1330–75 for why the many as a result punish philosophers who reveal truths about the gods. The present passage compares the Epicurean statements on cult in the preceding columns with 'some' who are said to 'conceal' views about the gods that Epicurus holds to be true (1855 δοκο[ῦντα). Philodemus sharply distinguishes this position from his own (or of Epicurus') as a 'different definition (λόγος) about piety', one that creates (among people in general?) a strange but false impression, namely that such ideas, statements, or persons are motivated by jealousy or enmity (of/towards people in general).

1852 ἥρωας: for the collocation θεοὺς καὶ ἥρωας see e.g. Demosth. 23. 70. Before I linked this column with the preceding one (*N* 452 fr. 4) I had suspected something like the following preceded the beginning of the column: οὐδὲ ψευδολογοῦντές φασι θεοὺς εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας καὶ] || ἥρωας [τὸν καθ' ὑποψί]|αν (vel ὑπόνοι]αν) τρόπον etc., '[nor do they (sc. Epicureans or, perhaps, the earliest humans) offer a false account when they say that] daemons and heroes are gods, in the way that out of suspicion some do who conceal the things that seem true to the followers of Epicurus'.

1853 ἔ[νιοι: there does not seem to be space sufficient to restore ε[ἰκαῖοι 'foolish' (though cf. app. crit. on 1203 in the corresponding account above).

There is no indication that the 'some' could be rival Epicureans, but this is not entirely certain. Since much of what follows in the Epicurean account is reconstruction of early human history, the 'some' are probably earlier 'philosophers and *theologoi*' as at 1203–5 and 1572–3, or contemporary philosophers who call them to witness. Cf. below, 2481–90, where the '*theologoi* and poets' (criticized at length in the section that follows there) are said to be 'especially praised by those who attack us for teaching views that are impious and disadvantageous to mankind'. Philodemus holds that in earlier cultural history (cf. 225–31) people did not hide such (true) views from the many and foolish, as 'some' philosophers and poets later did. Lines 2480–4 confirm that his opponents in fact applaud such a move, and praise the early *theologoi* and poets (attacked in the second part of the treatise) whom they see as having originally invented false tales about the gods, first in the interests of social control, and later out of carelessness. The opponents, on the other hand, have criticized the Epicureans for revealing to the many that such views are false, thus 'teaching views that are impious and disadvantageous to mankind' (2486–90).

This language and subject of this passage bears close comparison with Sallustius 3 Nock (in spite of its radically different philosophical orientation). There Sallustius, in a series of questions standard in the curriculum of the later philosophical schools, asks why *οἱ παλαιοὶ μύθοις ἐχρήσαντο*. His answer is that concealing the truth about the gods through myths (*τὸ διὰ μύθων τἀληθὲς ἐπικρύπτειν*) prevents the *ἀνόητοι* (cf. 1213 *ἀνοητοτέροις*) from despising philosophy, while compelling the *σπουδαῖοι* to study it. He then proceeds to ask: *ἀλλὰ διὰ τί μοιχείας καὶ κλοπὰς καὶ πατέρων δεσμοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀτοπίαν ἐν τοῖς μύθοις εἰρήκασιν* (a direct reflection of Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 42 summarizing the criticism of the poets later in *De pietate*, see vol. ii), and says in response that the soul through this seeming *ἀτοπία* perceives the words of myth to be *προκαλύμματα*, and the truth a mystery (*τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀπόρρητον εἶναι*). Cf. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 187,20–1 *ἐν ταῖ[c] ἑρμη-|νείαc ἀτοπί[ac*; *De ira* 35,28; *De vit.* 34,18. Philodemus is quite fond of the adjective. Later in the treatise (see vol. ii; Schober 1988, 84, quoted above on 14) Philodemus says that as a rectangular herm Hermes is depicted with an *ἄτοπος μορφή*.

1854–5 ἀποκρυ[πτό]|μενοι: they 'keep back' their knowledge: cf. Plat. *Protag.* 348 E where Socrates says that all sophists, except Protagoras, conceal their profession (*τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων*, middle: 'in their own interest', as here) cf. 326 A; id. *Leg.* 702 C; Xen. *Mem.* 2. 6. 29; id. *Symp.* 1. 6; Sallustius 3 Nock, quoted in preceding note (*ἐπικρύπτειν*).

1855–6 τὰ δοκο[ῦντα] | τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐπ̣[ίκου]|ρον: for the meaning of *τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον* (= Epicurus), see above, 1367–8 with commentary. For *τὰ δοκοῦντα* of the true views of Epicurus about the gods see below, 2179–80 *τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ θε|ῶν Ἐπικούρωι*.

1857–9 ἕτερον αὐτ[οῖς] | περιτίθεμεν λό[γον] | εὐcεβείας: i.e. different (*ἕτερον*) from the true Epicurean one. Philodemus at once underscores the similarity of his position to one which holds that myths restrain wrongdoers, as he divorces himself from it. For *λόγος* used of definition see LSJ III.6. The language here is very close to the final words of the treatise (see vol. ii), where the author refers to the entire work, in what is the closest form of the title that survives, as 'the argument about piety according to Epicurus' (*P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,20–2 in vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 26 *τὸν περὶ τῆς εὐ|cεβείας λόγον τῆς | κατ' Ἐπίκουρον*). In 1857 *αὐτ[οῖς* (i.e. *detractores Epicureorum?*) picks up the subject of *ἔ[νιοι πράτ]τουcιν ἀποκρυ[πτό]|μενοι* in a new case and construction. For *περιτίθημι* in the sense of 'attribute', 'ascribe', 'assign', see Philod. *De poem.* col. 13,7; *Rhet.* ii. 38,15, 266,24.

1859–61 ἀποδό̣[ν]|τα φαντακίαν ἄ[το]|πον̣: for this sense of *φαντακία* see e.g. Philod. *De ira* col. 34,34–5: the sage *ἀποδώcει | φαντακίαν ὀργίλου*, but not for long; *Rhet.* ii. 71,13 *ὁ δ' ἑπό|μενος λόγος τὴν πρόχειρον | οὐ παρέχει φαντακίαν*; id. *De lib. dicend.* fr. 19,6 *πονηροῦ . . . [φαν]|τακίαν*. It is unclear to me whether Philodemus means that they create the strange but nevertheless true *φαντακία* that they themselves (who hold that myths restrain wrongdoers) are grudging and hostile towards society, or that they create the false (and therefore absurd) *φαντακία* that the Epicureans (who similarly believe that the gods do not harm wrongdoers in the traditional sense) are similarly hostile: see above, 1368–72 *τοῖc | περὶ τὸ]ν Ἐπίκουρον | [οὐδὲ τ]οιαύτας ἐνε|[κε]ίνηcαν ὑπο[ψίας | τὰcεβ]εῖν καὶ τὰμελε̣ί̣[ν | θεῶ]ν*, 'for the followers of Epicurus they have in no way aroused suspicions of being impious and neglecting the gods', where the latter is apparently denied (though see below, 2432–48, where some approval is implied). Cf. below on 1864–5. For *ἀτοπία* see above on 1853. A *φαντακία*, 'impression', could be *ἄτοποc*, 'objectionable', 'untoward', but still be accurate.

1861–2 τὰ μὲν φθ[όνου], | τὰ [δ]ὲ δυcμενεί[ac]: an echo of Isocr. 5. 68 *τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἔργων φθόνου ἔχει καὶ δυcμένειαν καὶ πολλὰc βλαcφημίαc*.

1862 τὰ δ[ὲ] δυcμενεί[ac], | καὶ διανοίαι: in addition to the appearance of fraud, this view causes in people the impression that philosophers are grudging and hostile towards society in general: thus Democr. *VS* 68 B 192 *φθόνον καὶ ζῆλον καὶ δυcμενίην*; Antiphon 4. 1. 3; Isocr. 5. 68 *φθόνοc καὶ δυcμένειαι*; Plat. *Rep.* 500C; *Protag.* 316D *φθόνοι καὶ ἄλλαι δυcμένειαι*. In tragedy *δυcμένεια* and *δυcμενής* frequently express the charge, suspicion, or impression of enmity toward the city. The fact that Socrates is said above (1682–6) to have offended many people and incurred *πολειτι[κ]αὶ | . . . δ[υc]|μένειαι*, 'political enmities' almost certainly makes him an example of a philosopher perceived in this light; so also above, 1217 *τ]ὸ δυcμενέc* which the 'philosophers and *theologoi*') are said to have had (i.e. toward the many?). Cf. below, 2429–47; Philod. *De bono rege* 29,4; id. *Rhet.* ii. 57,4, 158,10.

1863–4 το[ιού]|τοις ἀνδράσιν: normally in Philodemus *ἄνδρες* are the Epicurean founders: see above on 461–2.

1864–5 χαρι]|έντων: i.e. clever or sophisticated persons; see *Lex. Philod.* s.v., and cf. below, 1907.

1865–6 ψευδ[ολ]|έναις: cf. Philod. *De sign.* col. 16,3 *δαψιλῆ συνεῦρεν ψευδολογί|αν*; 21,14 *ψευδ]ολογεῖν φήσομεν | τοὺς λέγο[ντα]ς*. Cf. *ψευδοδοξία* at Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 14,34 and 16,19 (of false opinion giving rise to fear of the gods).

Col. 66A

A review of the gods' existence as conceptual entities; the *πρόληψις* of them; citation from Epicurus' *On Nature*, book 32 (cf. 1725–31).

1885–6 καθάπ[ερ ὁρί]|ζεται χρό[νος: here the fact that the gods exist in the first instance as conceptualized by humans is illustrated by comparison to the ontological status of time, which according to Epicurus is not even a *per se* entity (but rather an accident or attribute of other entities), yet is not in consequence any less real. Rather, it is in an epiphenomenon of our thinking about certain occurrences in relation to other events and objects. For the status of time as an accidental property of things see Epic. *Ad Herod.* 68–73 (*HPh* 7B); Demetrius of Laconia ap. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 10.219–27 (*HPh* 7C), where time is styled an 'accident of accidents'; Lucr. 1. 459–63.

1887 πρόληψιν: formation of the *πρόληψις* of the gods (and the implied lack of it among opponents) is also discussed above, 1300, and it (or something very like it) is said to have obtained among the 'first humans' in cultural history above at 224–31. On the *πρόληψις* of the gods see further Epic. *Ad Herod.* 76–7, *Ad Menoec.* 123–4; Lucr. 5. 1161–1225, 6. 68–79; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1. 43–9.

1888–90 κἀν [τῶι δευ]|τέρωι καὶ [τριακοσ]|τῶι: that the citation of a book-number is lurking here is confirmed by the occurrence of the verb of saying *φησ[* in 1891. Since the only other possible ordinal numeral that can be restored here is *κἀν [τῶι δευ]|τέρωι καὶ [εἰκοσ]|τῶι* (i.e. 22), and since a title does not seem recoverable in the surrounding context, the odds are overwhelming that Philodemus here cites a book of Epicurus' *On Nature*, since it is the only Epicurean work that extended to this length and since it is elsewhere consistently cited in this treatise by book-number alone (see above on 225–7). I prefer the restoration of book 32 here (rather than 22) on the assumption that the books of *De nat.* from 32 to 35 dealt with psychological processes (Sedley 1974, 92 and cf. above on 1055–62, where *De nat.* 35 is cited as having discussed how we conceptualize benefits from the gods).

1890–1 ἐ]ναργείαι: for *ἐνάργεια* 'vividness' in Epicurean theory of perception see Epic. *Ad Herod.* 48, 52, 71, 82; *KD* 22; Lucr. 3. 684; Cic. *Acad.* 2. 17, and see Philippson 1916, 568ff.

1893–4 ἓν τῶν [ἐν ὑπο]κειμένοις ὄν: see 212; cf. 358 (*ἑνότης*).

1894–7 τὴν δὲ] | φύσιν διανο[ητὴν | ἧ]ττον ἔχον [τῶν] | ἄλλων ὄντων: literally: 'having its nature less conceivable than the other entia'. For the technical sense of *διανοεῖν* in connection with how humans form ideas of divinity see above on 416–17.

Col. 66B

1907 Perhaps we have *χα]||ρίεν* here, 'clever', in reference to devices of rhetoric (cf. 1864–5, and for rhetoric in the present context: below, 1920). But the *ος* that follows does not inspire confidence (*χα]||ριέν⟨τ⟩ος*?), while the line-ends of 1908 and 1910 betray *sottoposti* or *sovrapposti*.

1910 αὐτοτελῆι: the antecedent may be divine *φύσις*, or divinity as an *αἰτία* of goods: the sense in which this could be said to be 'self-completing' is explained above at 1082–7: upon good humans there work virtuous influences both from the gods and from themselves. For *αὐτοτελής* see Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 66,2, *αὐτοτελῶς* Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 85; Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 22,13 (cf. app. crit. on 1094–7). For the divine as an *αἰτία* of goods see above on 737 and 1045; Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 124. Also relevant in this connection is the phrase *κα]τὰ συντέλε[ιαν* in the description at 211 (where see commentary) of the perfection and indestructible nature of the divine. At 352–4 it is explained how the divine can *διαιώνιον | ἔχειν τὴν τελείαν | εὐδαιμονίαν*, 'for ever have perfect happiness'; 264–5 *παντελοῦς | μακαρι[ό]τητος*.

1911–12 *Order of Columns.* see on 1731–2.

Col. 67A

This fragment deals with how rhetoric came to achieve the status of an art, *τέχνη*. The text contains many uncertainties. The fragment conforms in all other respects to the letter-shapes and ductus represented by the *disegni* in the other fragments of **437**, so there is no reason to doubt its placement here. If the restoration in 1923–4 *συμπε]ριφορα[* is right, it may even have formed part of the account of justice that follows (perhaps in the discussion of justice in courts of law below at 2254–72): cf. below, 2166–7 *συμπεριφέ[ρες]||θαι*, in reference to the origin of myths about the gods (for the term and its significance see further on 312–13).

1941–2 *Order of Columns.* see on 1731–2. Note that the order of the *disegni* in both

the **437** and **452** series has been reversed to recover their original sequence in the treatise.

Col. 68A

In view of the exiguous remains of this column, extensive reconstruction of this column is hazardous, especially in the first half of the column. It is important to note, however, that it discussed the acquisition by early humans of technical knowledge and skills (1945 τεχν[), perhaps rhetoric among them (cf. above, 1920), as securing provision for and hope of goods for civilization. For the sake of comparison I give Philippson's reconstruction:

68A	το μ[.....	437 1	
	μητη[.....		
	εἰ νοο[ῦσιν ἐκ τῶν		
1945	τεχν[ῶν ἡδονὰς		
	ἐξῆς καὶ τῶν [διὰ τῶν	(5)	
	ὥτων ἀποδέχ[εσθαι		
	τοὺς καὶ εἰς ε̣ὕρ̣[οιαν		ΘΥC[Ν
	καὶ κόσμον [μ]ερῶ[ν		
1950	δεδαπανηκότας		
	τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιμ[ε-	(10)	
	λεία[ς τε] καὶ ἅπαν[τα		
	ποιο̣[υ]μένους κ[α-		
	θ' ὅλο̣υ βίο̣υ εὐελ[πις-		Υ Ν
1955	τοῦν]τας διὰ τῶν		
	λόγων] τοὺς θ' ἕξει̣[ν	(15)	ΘΕΧΕC[Ν
	δυνάμεις] καὶ διὰ	(16)	
	[τούτων νομίζοντας]		

Philippson translates as follows:

Diese (Hoffnung) werden sie kaum bewahren, wenn sie denken, daß die aus den Künsten empfangenen Vergnügen und so auch aus den durch die Ohren (vermittelten), welche auf den Redefluß und den Schmuck der Redeteile viele Mühen verwandt haben und durchaus für das ganze Leben durch die Reden mit Hoffnung erfüllt werden und durch diese (politischen) Einfluß zu gewinnen meinen.

He compares further Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 138 fr. 9, 183 fr. 8; Cic. *De orat.* 3. 25 *et auribus multa percipimus, quae . . . nos . . . delectant . . . et oculis colliguntur paene innumerabiles voluptates*; ibid. 26 *hoc idem . . . transferri potest etiam ad artes.* For his correction ε̣ὕρ̣[οιαν in 1948 he compares Plat. *Phaedr.* 238 C.

1953–4 κ[α]|θ' ὅλομ βίον εὐελ[πιστίας: cf. 2271 *τὸ*]*ν ὅλομ βίο*[*ν*; 2222 'even if they escape detection all their lives' (*διὰ βίου*). Here the concern is clearly with obtaining confidence about domestic security throughout one's life, such confidence being securable, on the Epicurean argument, only through the guarantee of a shared religion. For *εὐελπιστία* as a domestic good see Philod. *De oec.* col. 26,43 cf. col. 25,13; Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 39: the person who dissociates *ἀμοιβή* 'reciprocity' from *χάρις* destroys his or her expectation of good in the future (*τὴν περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος εὐελπιστίαν*).

1956 ἐξει[ν: if the correction is right, this stands in *oratio obliqua* (reporting Epicurus or Hermarchus?), with the subject of the infinitive being *πρώτους ἀνθρώπους* (cf. 227–8).

1971–2 *Order of Columns.* See on 1731–2. Note that the order of the *disegni* in both the **437** and **452** series has been reversed to recover their original sequence in the treatise.

Col. 69

1996–7 ἡμᾶ[ς κ]ακίζου|[σιν: cf. 2440–2 *ἧττον | κακίζουσι τοὺς σ*[*ο*]-*|φούς.*

1997–8 τῆς [ἀ]λο[γ]ίας | [ἐπι]τηδεύσε[ω]ς: for the construction cf. Plato *Leg.* 853 B *πρὸς ἐπιτήδευσιν ἀρετῆς*. Here the expression must depend on a verb lost in what follows.

2001–2 *Order of columns.* Some of the columns of **437** may have originally formed some of the top halves of the columns of the same part of the papyrus where the bottoms are preserved as **242**. There are no physical links between the fragments of **437** and any other series, but the content of this fragment is so similar to that of the following columns as to recommend the connection.

The fragment that preserves the lower portion of the present col. 69 is physically linked to the following one; both are the bottom portions of two successive columns broken horizontally (thus their texts do not link, but are separated by 20 to 22 lines, the lost top of col. 70). This and the following column must been positioned here because they do not exhibit the *sovrapposto* that appears on the other fragments of **242** (see 2082–3, 2142–3, 2234–5). The fragments of **242** fall neatly into the descending sequence of their *disegno* numbers, with the exception that the order of frr. 9 and 10 must have been mistakenly reversed: for otherwise, i.e. if fr. 9 had truly intervened as its numbering suggests, then the *sovrapposto* would not have still been visible when fr. 10 was drawn

Col. 70

2028 ἀβλαβεῖς: a noun (or substantive) in 2027 ending in *-νοι* suggests that these are persons, perhaps *ἐκεῖ*]*|νοι*. Cf. below, 2051–2, where it is said that the gods' *εὐδαιμονία* derives from their *ἀβλαβία* towards everyone; see

also 1340–2 (piety includes τὸ πρὸ̣[c] | ἀνθρώπουc ἀβλα̣|βέc), 2473–4 (of Epicurean views?), and 1507–8 (Epicurus himself was ἄλυποc).

2031–2 *Order of Columns.* See on 1731–2 and 2001–2. The present col. 70 (from **242**) may have originally continued directly on with col. 71 (from **229**), in the same way that col. 74 (from **242**) certainly links with 75 (from **229**). The coincidence of plural verbs in col. 71 (2032–43) and *-νουcιν* in 2031 look right for such a combination, but since this fragment is missing its right side, certainty is impossible.

Col. 71

This column sketches out the opponents' conception of how justice should be maintained, namely by telling false stories about the gods, so that 'they (i.e. the benighted masses who need to be told things) will believe the gods to be formidable tyrants', and so that 'on account of their own bad consciences they will expect great disasters from them'. Philodemus, however, replies that, because they lack the assurance of freedom from harm, they would succeed neither in securing either their own safety nor the existence of justice in society at large. Instead, he exhorts those readers who are persuaded by his 'oracles' in this respect to emulate the blessedness of the gods, at least as far as this is possible for mortals to attain. Since such happiness as the gods possess consists (as the Epicureans believe) in doing no harm to anyone, humans should endeavour, as far as possible, to make themselves harmless to everyone. In this way they would approximate the disposition of the gods, and stand in contrast to the behaviour of the opponents toward the unjust.

Thus the main objection seems to be that depending on false beliefs about the gods to restrain wrongdoers from injustice would result in an unenlightened, un-Epicurean society. On the general reluctance among ancient philosophers to hold that error in any form might be beneficial see above, p. 463. An additional objection is brought forward below at 2226–41, where Philodemus explains that wrongdoers and the evil always think the gods are harming them, regardless of the stories about them. In the second part of the treatise (see vol. ii) Philodemus undertakes to demonstrate that the stories of the poets about the gods (together with their interpretation by rival philosophers) are not of a sort that would restrain wrongdoers anyway.

2032–43 These statements in the future, whether an approved Epicurean view or a predicted outcome of the opponents' position, should be compared with the identifiably Epicurean position below (2226–33) that the

wicked and unjust generally believe that the gods do harm to wrongdoers. It seems most likely that it expresses the result *desired* by opponents who rely on false beliefs about punishments by tyrannical gods to secure the good behaviour of the many. Philodemus then asserts that this will not in fact be accomplished (2039–43). Additional arguments against this approach are offered below, 2313–32 (since the gods do not actually appear to harm people, the unjust will completely escape notice, under the opponents' view).

The only other possible reference of these lines is a description of the detrimental influence of myths about the gods, that people *in general*, forgetting that the myths really exist to keep wrongdoers in check, will come to believe that the gods rule their lives as dreadful despots dispensing misfortunes. But that Philodemus is speaking here primarily of the predicted behaviour of the unjust according to the opponents' theory, that they will expect punishment from the god-tyrants out of a sense of guilt, seems to be pretty clearly indicated by the reference to their consciousness of their own misdeeds: 'because they too themselves know that they are guilty': *αὐτοὶ | δι' ἃ συνοίδασιν* (2034–5, cf. below, 2233–41). Note the prefix *συν-*; whereas *σύνοιδά σοι ταῦτα ποιήσαντι* means 'I know you did it', 'your crime is no secret from me' (as accessory or informer), with the reflexive *σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ* indicates that I cannot forget what I have done, but carry the (guilty) knowledge with me.

2038–9 προσδοκήσουσιν: the opponents' plan in this respect is contrasted with the Epicurean position on *προσδοκία* regarding the gods, below, 2204–5, 2353 (where it is explicitly said that the Epicureans relieve people of the kind of *προσδοκία* threatened in the present passage).

2039–40 τό γ' ἐφ' ἡμᾶς εἶναι: i.e. with respect to the kind of justice (= freedom from fear of harm, *μηδὲ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι*) with which we (Epicureans) are concerned or can offer. For the adverbial accusative with a prepositional phrase, cf. below, 2057–8 *ὅσ[ον ἐφ'] ἑ|αυτοῖς*.

2040–3 δι' ἣν | οὐκ ἐσχήκασι πίσ|τιν οὐδὲν ἂν πράτ|τοιεν: it is not clear whether *πίσ|τιν* refers to assurance of freedom for harm from the unjust or rather the Epicurean logical demonstration (also referred to as a *πίστις* at 2358) about the harmlessness of the gods' nature, which the opponents also fail to possess. But here the two meanings coincide, since on the Epicurean view the former is a necessary result of the latter (see below on the use of *πίστις* at 2358), so that the difference may be immaterial.

2042–3 οὐδὲν ἂν πράτ|τοιεν: this conclusion (referring to the opponents' failure in their attempt to secure immunity from punishment, detection of wrongdoing, or establishment of justice through promulgating false myths about the gods) may be repeated below at 2182 in the description of an early stage in the introduction of justice: those who introduced new and merely fashionable myths about the gods made it impossible for the false

beliefs about their nature to restrain people from injustice. Here it is phrased more conclusively, and juxtaposed to a recital of the Epicurean formula for justice (virtually = *μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι*, Epic. *KD* 31–3).

2043–50 The doctrine recited here links well with the digression on the 'just man' and the advantages he achieves through having 'noble expectations' from the gods (below, 2202–5). It is difficult to be absolutely sure about which one of these passages (cols. 76–7 and the present col. 71) came first in Philodemus' account (see below on order of columns). Frischer 1982, 78 with n. 37 compares this passage for the use of statuary of the gods and famous men as physical models for imitation, especially in connection with emulation of the Epicurean sage. See also Steckel 1968, 609, 621–2, 627; Rabbow 1954, 121.

2044–5 ἐχρησμῳ[ι]δήσαμεν: 'Praeceptum doctrinae tamquam oracula habentur' (Usener, *Glossarium* s.v.). In Church Latin *oraculum* may denote a papal pronouncement, as L. A. Holford-Strevens reminds me. Cf. Epic. *Gnom. Vat.* 29: 'In studying nature I should prefer to speak freely and like an oracle to give answers serviceable to all mankind, even though no one should understand me, rather than to conform to popular opinions and so win the praise freely scattered by the many', *παρρησίᾳ γὰρ ἔγωγε χρώμενος φυσιολογῶν χρησμῳδεῖν τὰ συμφέροντα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μᾶλλον ἂν βουλοίμην, κἂν μηδεὶς μέλλῃ συνήσειν, ἢ συγκατατιθέμενος ταῖς δόξαις καρποῦσαι τὸν πυκνὸν παραπίπτοντα παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἔπαινον*. It is fair to say that there is at least some irony imparted by both Epicurus' statement and Philodemus' here. Epicurus eschewed *μαντική*, while suspicion and criticism of the seer's art abounded at least as early as the end of the fifth century, as indicated by such critiques as Eurip. *IA* 520–1, 956–9, (perhaps) *Bacch.* 170–369, and the joke on Euthyphro at Plat. *Euthyph.* 3 E (see above on 707–8), and even earlier: Aristoxenus of Selinus (vii/vi BC) *IEG* ii. 45 West: *τίς ἀλαζονίαν πλείσταν παρέχει τῶν ἀνθρώπων; τοὶ μάντεις* (a reference I owe to Dr Holford-Strevens). For the Epicurean position, see further Diano, *SIFC* 12 (1935), 237–9; Obbink 1992*b*, 212 with nn. 65–6. On Epicurean philosophy as a kind of prophecy see further Bignone 1936, ii. 166 n. 1. The figurative use of the verb *χρησμῳδεῖν* (as here) may be as early as Plat. *Leg.* 712 A; cf. *Ep.* 323 C *τὰ κεχρησμῳδημένα*; Aristoph. *Eq.* 818.

For other instances see Metrodorus fr. 37 Körte (= *Gnom. Vat.* 10) which quotes the oracle of Homer's prophet: *τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα* (*Il.* 1. 70); the epigram preserved ap. D.L. 10. 12: *τοῦτο Νεοκλῆος πινυτὸν τέκος ἢ παρὰ Μουσέων / ἔκλυεν ἢ Πυθοῦς ἐξ ἱερῶν τριπόδων*; Lucr. 3. 14–15 *ratio tua coepi vociferari naturam rerum*; 5. 104 *effabor*; 5. 110–13 *qua prius adgrediar quam de re fundere fata* ('oracles', i.e. of Epicurus) */ sanctius et multo certa ratione magis quam / Pythia quae tripode a Phoebi lauroque profatur / multa tibi expediam doctis solacia dictis* = '"grounds of comfort" in case you suspect that you are guilty of impiety' (so Bailey), where 5. 111–12 are

repeated from 1.738–9 (Sedley, *GRBS* 30 (1989), 279 with n. 34 argues that the reference is to the unintelligibility of oracular speech); cf. 1.737 *ex adyto tamquam cordis responsa dedere*. On the Euthyphro of Plato's dialogue see above on 707–8. For the topos in connection with inspired or divinely revealed poetry cf. Callim. *In Del.* 5.94 *ἀλλ' ἔμπης ἐρέω τι τορώτερον ἢ ἀπὸ δάφνης*; Cat. 64.321 *fuderunt carmine fata*; Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.66 *haec ego nunc physicorum oracula fundo*, which practically rolls into hexameter (after Lucretius 5.110–11); *De fin.* 2.102 *idque testamento cavebit is, qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil ad nos pertinere post mortem? Haec non erant eius, qui innumerabilis mundos infinitasque regiones, quarum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, mente peragravisset* (cf. Lucr. 1.74); ibid. 2.20 (of Epicurus' *KD*) *sententiis quasi oracla edisses sapientiae*; *Tusc.* 1.17 *nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo certa ut sint et fixa qua dixero*; *De div.* 1.18 *multa . . . vates oracla furenti / pectora fundebant*; and, in a negative light (though an Epicurean context), *De nat. deor.* 1.42 *ea quae poetarum vocibus fusa*. The image is at least as old as Empedocles (see Clay 1983*a*, 49–51 and n. 118), with whom Epicurus shared the impetus at once to divorce himself from certain traditional beliefs about the gods and at the same time to invest his own pronouncements about divine nature with a kind of religious authority. See esp. Emped. *VS* 31 B 15 (cf. 31 B 112.10): *οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο* ('E. spricht ironisch' Diels–Kranz, which need scarcely preclude the poet's desire to associate his philosophical poetry with the language of traditional religion). Both Musaeus and Onomacritus were known as *χρησμολόγοι* (*VS* 2 A 6, 2 B 20a), while Epimenides (*VS* 3 A 5) actually claimed the authority of the Pythia for his pronouncements. On prophecy in philosophical contexts see W. A. Heidel, *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie*, 3 (1910), 337–53, Pease on Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.66; among Epicureans, Bignone 1936, ii. 166 n. 1; Schmid, *RAC* 5 (1961), 755. In a different but related line of development are the later literary fortunes of the image of the inspired writer as prophet, on which see H. Dahlmann, 'Vates', *Philologus*, 77 (1948), 337–53; J. K. Newman, *The Concept of* Vates *in Augustan Poetry* (Collection Latomus, 89; Brussels, 1967). On the assimilation of religious language in general, see above on 1538–9.

2047–8 μειμε[ῖc]ῖθαι: for emulation of gods' nature as an ethical expedient in Epicurean contexts see esp. Diog. Oen. fr. 125 col. 4,1–8 Smith: *περιγείνεται ἡ[μ]εῖν | τάδ' οἷα τὴν διάθεcιν | ἡμῶν ἰcόθεον ποιεῖ | καὶ οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν θνη|τότητα τῆc ἀφθάρτου | καὶ μακαρίας φύcεωc | λειπομένους ἡμᾶc | δείκνυcιν*; Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 1,14–17 (p. 16 Diels).

2049 εὐδαι{δαι}μονίαν: for a more extended instance of scribal repetition induced at a critical juncture (here the rise in tone to a rhetorical climax) see the unfortunate dittography of *χωρὶc | τοῦ γράμματα μαθεῖν οὐχ οἷ|όν τ[ε] γε|νέcθαι cοφόν* at Philod. *De ira* col. 49,35 (penultimate column). As for the unperturbed happiness of the gods, Quaranta compares with the present passage Cic. *De nat. deor.* 1.51 *ea videlicet qua nihil beatius nihil omnibus*

bonis affluentius cogitari potest. Their *vita* is in no way bothered, is involved in no *occupationes* nor *opera*, but delights in their own wisdom and excellence, being *semper cum in maximis tum in aeternis voluptatibus.*

2051–3 ἐξ ἀβλαβίας ἐθεωρεῖτο τ̣ο̣[ῖ]ς | πᾶσιν: this links the thesis here to the definition of piety above at 1339–44 (ἀβλα|βές at 1341–2, where see commentary; cf. above, 2028, below, 2473–4). Strictly speaking the ἀβλαβία in the present column is that of the gods ('since it has been observed to derive from *their* harmlessness'). But it may be acquired by humans through imitation of the god or divine sage; it is in this way that one may fulfil the stated definition of piety. A minor slip in this formulation of the argument may be τ̣ο̣[ῖ]ς | πᾶσιν, since even on the Epicurean view the gods do not make themselves harmless to *everyone* (i.e. they are not harmless to bad people), although such harm as they do cause (i.e. indirectly, to bad people, through their own faulty conceptions) apparently requires no real participation on the part of the gods of the good and the wise.

2055–7 αὑτοὺς παρέχειν ἀλύπους: perhaps a reference to Epicurus, similarly an object of such emulation as a divine sage, since he is praised above at 1507–8 (where see commentary) as ἄλυπος.

2058–60 ἔπειτα δ' | οὕτω με[γαλο]πρ̣ε̣|πεῖς θής[ουσι]ν ἀν[: Aristot. *EN* 1122ª18–1123ᵇ33, where the usual translation is 'munificence.' Cf. Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1097 C (Epic. fr. 183 Us., from an unknown letter) δαιμονίως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπεμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδήν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας. But cf. Philod. *Rhet.* i. 383,10; *De morte*, col. 32,16, where the adjective distinctly denotes high social status, political notoriety, etc. which is out of place here (cf. above, 1565–9). Cf. var. lect. above on 1526–7. Another intriguing occurrence is *P. Tebt.* i. 33,6 (the Roman senator L. Memmius on θεωρία to the Arsinoite nome in 112 BC) ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ποιούμενος μεγαλο{υ}πρεπέστερον, where it apparently refers to the lavishness or 'magnificence' of the religious sights being prepared for Memmius' visit. It is difficult to tell how the present passage continued ('and next they [sc. *Epicurei*] will wish to become μεγαλοπρεπεῖς for their ἀπραγμοσύνη'?).

2060–1 *Order of columns.* All the fragments of **229** have been ordered according to the descending sequence of their *disegno* numbers (with two predictable exceptions: see on 1673–4 and 2422–3). On this ordering the present col. 71 (**229** fr. 6) must precede the accounts of the unsuccessful attempts by some to secure justice through false beliefs about the gods in cols. 74–7 (which include **229** fr. 5, which in addition are continuously linked). So it is likely that this column comes relatively early in the account of justice, rather than following it as a summary or conclusion (as the rising tone of the author's exhortation at 2043–60 might suggest).

Col. 72

Already Gomperz suggested this fragment might belong to this part of the treatise, though his argument was hastily dismissed by Philippson. The fragment treats the devolution of thinking about the gods related to the introduction of false belief and the attempt of some to fool the many into obedience (see 2144–58). Some persons attempt to *μεταβαίνειν*, which may refer to moral or epistemological progress. In this they are hampered by not having learnt to have *χάρις* for their past goods (an allusion to the Epicurean position on the role of memory in the theory of pleasure), and to bear up against 'natural pains' (compare the division of desires into natural and non-natural at Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 127–32). Finally death exerts its influence over their thinking at this point, which is also said to have played a significant role in the degeneration of thinking about the gods above at 239–41. The present fragment probably describes the backgound to the rise of scepticism as described at 2145–50, from which it cannot be separated by more than a column or two, because of the presence of the *sovrapposto* (2082–3 = 2142–3, actually in place at 2234–5).

2084 μεταβαίνειν: this verb could also refer to the analogical formation of concepts by *μετάβασις* (*transitio*), much discussed in Philod. *De sign.* and discussed above, 326–7 and 329–32. Usener (ap. *Gloss. Epic.* s.v.) on this fragment compares D.H. *De comp. verb.* 22 *ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται μικρὰ μεγάλων εἶναι δείγματα τοῖς μὴ χαλεπῶς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὁμοίου τε καὶ ἀκολούθου μεταβαίνουσι θεωρίαν* (= those 'proceeding' to general principles); Epict. 1. 6. 10.

2085–6 μὴ μαθόντα χάριν | ἔχειν: the antecedent need not be a singular opponent, as claimed by Philippson; it could be a singular collective noun, perhaps even the one above at 1745–6 *τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλω[ν] | πλῆθος*, 'the great part of the others'.

2088–9 τὰς ἀλγηδόνας | τὰς φυσικάς: 'physical pains' will be those which cannot by nature be avoided. So Epicurus at *Ad Menoec.* 129 says that every pain is bad, but not every pain is by nature to be avoided, just as every pleasure, because of its natural affinity, is something good, yet not every pleasure is choiceworthy. On the division see below, 2208–12 with commentary.

2090–1 τοῦ θανάλ||[του: cf. above, 239–41.

Order of Columns. The *sovrapposto* at 2082–3 (= 2142–3, actually in place at 2234–5) locks this column into place in relation to the other fragments of **242** in an intricate web of connections. An interval of 1–2 columns must have originally intervened between successive fragments of **242**. From the physical joins in the

following columns the original order of individual layers of the *scorza* stack must have been as follows: **1610**, **242/247**, then **229**. This sequence repeats itself at least three times, each accounting for one complete turn of the papyrus roll. Thus we should expect a column of **229** to stand between the present col. 72 and the following col. 73 (then a fragment of **1610**). But this cannot be the next fragment of **229** (in the descending numeration of the *disegni*) because that fragment (fr. 5) must fall after col. 71, a fragment of **242** with which it physically joins. So we are missing one column between the present col. 72 and col. 73, which is also missing its top half.

Col. 73

2115–17]ẏúειν τὴν | [coφί]αν πρὸc τὰc | [ἀδικ]ί̣ac: perhaps: showing, exhibiting (vel sim.) 'their wisdom to the advantage of injustice', i.e. 'on the side of injustice'.

2117–18 δι' ἃc ἀ|[πεδεικνυ]όμην: the reasons referred to may be those discussed at 1184–1217 and the discussion of Socrates and other philosophers above.

2119 ἐπιcχεῖν: 'keep in check' (LSJ s.v. IV), perhaps here in reference to the notion that the false tales about the gods kept the misdeeds of the foolish in check, but possibly to the suspension of belief about them, *ἐποχή* mentioned at 2145–6. Cf. above, 1207–14.

2120–1 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 73 is joined to the following col. 74 on the *disegno* itself. Both are bottoms of successive columns. They are positioned here with certainty because of the *sovrapposto* in the contiguous preceding column at 2082–3 (= 2142–3, actually in place at 2234–5). The top of the following col. 74 is not preserved among the fragments of **247**, which later preserves tops of **242**), nor does it seem to be preserved among the fragments of **437**, because the lack of a suitable continuation of 2120 *ταυ*||[*τ-* among the column-beginnings in the fragments of **437**.

Col. 74

This and the following column describe the first stages of the introduction of injustice in cultural history. As an expansion of 1184–1217 above, these columns explained how injustice came into being with the introduction of false opinion. By suspending judgement (regarding the certainty of knowledge about the gods and the nature of justice), early man substitutes injustice and wrongdoing for justice. Thus allowing the many to believe false things about the gods (that they will punish evil-doers), each seeks to obtain his own *ἀcφάλεια* from the many, or of the many from each other. The truth (about the gods) is left open to all; but the way for injustice is paved, for there is

no guarantee that the few (who believe the gods do not really harm people) will not exploit the many in their ignorance for personal gain. Over time myths and fantastic stories are also introduced, and eventually not just as sources of unjust personal gain, as before, or for political security, but merely in conformity to fashion and current opinion. As a result those who, like Socrates and Critias' Sisyphus, attempt to manipulate the behaviour of the many through false tales about the gods in this way end up looking like charlatans and atheists.

2144 ἀδι[κ]ίαc: this was a key word in this section: it is mentioned again at 2147, 2228, 2321; implied at 2203, 2265. Philodemus probably said (perhaps in a genitive absolute, e.g. *γενηθεί]cης ἀδι[κ]ίας*) that, owing to uncertainty or false conclusions about the nature of the gods, injustice was introduced as a result. The conjunction *διόπερ* in 2145 (*quam ob rem*) introduces a new independent clause, the main verb of which is *ἀ[ν]||τειcάγουcιν* (2147–8). Assuming this is the historic present, its indicative mood and present tense show that it cannot have been the verb of a subordinate clause: its vividness precludes subordination. Note that therefore *ἐποχὴν ἀναιροῦντες* (2146–7) and *ἐξεργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀcφάλειαν* etc. (2150–2) succinctly represent the approved Epicurean formula for the survival of society and the maintenance of justice. That justice was already in effect at this stage in cultural history (rather than being merely a desired subsequent development), is suggested by the explicit statement that they 'substituted' (*ἀντειcάγουcιν*) injustice for an already existing justice (*δικαιοcύνη*, 2147–50). Since the introduction of injustice is here attributed to the the failure to maintain certain knowledge (2145–7), the lost clause preceding *διόπερ* in 2145 must have had something to do with the introduction of false opinion. This must also stand in contrast to 2158–65 *ο]ἱ δὲ | μύθους* etc.: 'But the others introduced fabulous and terrible stories, but not, as their predecessors had done, as a source of security to the state.' This is a pretty clear give away that what preceded *διόπερ* in 2145 was a *οἱ μέν* clause explaining that some erred (*cφάλλουcι* vel sim., historic present) in introducing or enduring false opinion about the gods for purpose of social control ('on account of which', etc.). The introduction of false opinion in human history is a continuing theme in *De pietate*: above at 235–88 (from Epic. *De nat.* 12). There it is said to be due, not to the myths, but to false inferences about the benevolence of the gods and to fear (so also Lucr. 5. 1161–1240). This false opinion was not, at least originally, universal: some thinkers preserved a view that the gods were not all-knowing and did not cause harm to humans, though they withheld this knowledge from the rest. It is this *ἀπάτη* that is related above at 1184–1217. Up to that point in the account of cultural history it is also coextensive with the opponent's plan for securing justice through false belief (see e.g. above 2032–9 with commentary). In the present passage

Philodemus polemically extends the historical account, supplying ulterior stages in which the plan backfires, resulting in (1) the substitution of injustice for justice, (2) inconsistency and madness in discourse about gods (2165–71), and finally (3) suspicions of atheism and charlantanry (2171–3).

2145–7 οὐ τὴ[ν ἐ]|ποχὴν ἀναιρ[οῦν]|τες: Philippson's restoration ἐ]|ποχήν is almost certainly right (as against Gomperz's ἀ]|ποχήν 'abstinence'). This sense of ἀναιρέω (here = 'by not denying, rejecting' scepticism) is familiar in this type of discourse; its employment here could derive from an earlier account, perhaps that of Colotes or Epicurus himself (cf. above, 522–3 from Epic. *De nat.* 12, and for echoes of it in the early tradition see on 133, 522). Likewise ἐποχή, the sceptics' suspension of judgement regarding certainty of knowledge (see Cic. *Acad.* 2. 59), is most closely associated with early Academic scepticism. The term occurs nowhere else in Philodemus; see rather Colotes ap. *Plut. Adv. Col.* 1124B μῦθος καὶ θήρα μειρακίων λαμπρῶν καὶ προπετῶν ὁ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγος ἐστίν, which has a familiar ring, and where the rise of injustice is linked with the failure to reject this very ἐποχή. In the same passage Colotes says that ἐποχή will turn our life into that of beasts: θηρίων βίον βιωσόμεθα. (Note also that Philodemus' manner of hypothetical reconstruction of the past in the narrative present here is virtually equivalent to Colotes' use of contingent futures: both prophesy imminent moral disaster as a form of refutation: one by reference to the past, the other to the future, as what would be the case if their opponents' epistemological programmes obtained as true.) Thus Philodemus (and his source) means here that at some early stage mankind fails to resist scepticism not only about the nature of the gods, but also about justice and the rational basis for morality as well, as suggested by Longo, *CErc* 12 (1982), 76. In the following column, it becomes clear that beliefs about the gods are included (cf. 2159–61 μύθους, τερατείας). Here the ἐποχή is not specifically said to be 'about the gods', though of course it may have been understood as such in the context of the lost preceding lines.

2147–8 ἀδικίαν ἀ[ν]|τεισάγουσιν: the verb is fairly rare: 'import instead (of)'; not attested for Epicurus or Philodemus, but see Demosth. 9. 39; [Plat.] *Ax.* 369E. Cf. similar terminology below, 2159, to describe the importation of new myths about the gods.

2150–1 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 74 can be seen to link syntactically with a fragment of **229** containing a well-preserved entire column (col. 75). This link proves that the columns of **229** and the account of the origin of justice in this section leads directly into the criticism of the poets in the next section of the treatise, for that section is introduced below in a column composed of **247/242**. Over half of the fragments of **242** and **247** deal exclusively with the poets (Schober 1988, 77–83). Thus at this point in the reconstructed roll, the alternating order **242/247, 229** is firmly established. Later the columns of **1610** (which preserve bottom halves only) must also be added to this sequence, since they later physically join

with fragments of **247/242** (cols. 76–7, 85–6; **1610** fr. 3 + 247 fr. 6a, for which see vol. ii; Schober 1988, 77). Thus the sequence of alternation can be summarized as follows: **242 + 229 + 1610 + 242/247 + 1610 + 242/247**. What can be seen to be happening here is that as the individual papyrus leaves of one *scorza* series (**229**) are exhausted, their position in the roll when it was broken open is occupied by another *scorza* series (i.e. one that became separated from the rest and assigned a different inventory number, in this case **1610**). Thus for a brief space the columns alternate between three sequences: **1610, 247/242**, and **229**, so that the roll appears in some places in the interior portions (before the *midollo* was removed intact) to have broken into thirds (i.e. of a complete turn of the roll) rather than halves as is the case for **1077//1098** earlier in the treatise.

Note also the series of letters in 2142–3, repeated also at 2082–3, but actually in their proper place in 2234–5. Assuming that 2142–3 and 2082–3 were *sovrapposti* (i.e. letters on an earlier layer of papyrus that failed to be removed with it and were mistakenly copied as part of the successive layers), this shows the order in which these columns must fall (allowing for the interposition of corresponding columns from the other two thirds of the roll). This is not entirely unproblematic; they could, on the other hand, have been *sottoposti* (in which case the present ordering would be reversed). But as noted already by Schober, they indubitably show that **242** fr. 9 (cols. 69–70) cannot have originally stood between **242** frr. 8 and 10 (as the numbering of the fragments would otherwise imply) because fr. 9 does not exhibit the duplicated letters.

Col. 75

See above on col. 74.

2151–2 ἐ]||ξεργαζόμενοι: 'securing for themselves.' Cf. in this sense Democr. *VS* 68 B 182 *τὰ μὲν καλὰ χρήματα τοῖς πόνοις ἡ μάθησις ἐξεργάζεται*, but cf. B 264 *μηδέ τι μᾶλλον ἐξεργάζεσθαι κακόν, εἰ μέλλει μηδεὶς εἰδήσειν* in the different sense 'do'. The verb in a still different sense 'work out', 'elaborate' later (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 15,13–19 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 26, of the completion of the final section of the treatise) *τοῦ μέρ[ο]υς | τοῦτο τῆς δ[ιαι]ρέ|σεως τῆς κατ' ἀρχὰς | ἐκτ[ε]θείσης ἀπο|χρώντω[ς ἐ]ξε[ι]ργασ|μένου*, 'this part of the outline set forth at the beginning having been sufficiently completed'; this sense also e.g at Philod. *De sign.* col. 29,23 (of Demetrius of Laconia's logical investigations).

2152–4 ἀσφάλειαν ἢ τὴν ἑαυτῶν παρὰ τῶν | πολλῶν: with *ἀσφάλεια* cf. Gorgias *VS* 82 B 11a.17 (*Apol. Palamed.*) *βίος περὶ κινδύνων τῶν μεγίστων, οὐκ ἔχει ἀσφάλειαν*; Epic. *KD* 7 (also from a cultural-historical account) *τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποήσεσθαι*; 13 *τὴν κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι*; 14 *τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει; ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια*; 28 *τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίαις μάλιστα . . . συντελουμένην*. Cf. again Colotes ap. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1124 D *τὸν βίον*

οἱ νόμους διατάξαντες . . . εἰς πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἔθεντο. A slightly different sense is found at Philod. *Rhet.* i. 263,34, 266,23. Originally ἀσφάλεια/ἀσφαλής referred to a state of ritual indemnity from harm granted to κήρυκες, ἄγγελοι, πρέσβεις, θεωροί while on θεωρία (e.g. Hdt. 3. 7). In tragedy it is linked with the safety of the city and the pre-Socratics and Thucydides it is adopted as an early term for political security. Central to the Epicurean conception of justice, ἀσφάλεια often crops up in Epicurean discussions of political theory. According to the Epicurean view nothing can increase the pleasure that comes from the security of freedom from being harmed by others: see further Vander Waerdt 1987, 402–22. Epicurus probably thought their desire for such security here naturally motivated. But Philodemus later argues that they did not succeed in obtaining true security from harm, because they were never able to be completely sure that their deception of the many would go undetected (which, the Epicureans argue, it did not: see 2171–4).

Note the division here between two types of ἀσφάλεια: (1) that of the wise (or powerful?) from the many, a facet in which the Epicureans expressed much interest, and (2) of the many from each other: (ἀσφάλειαν) τὴν ἐκείνων (sc. τῶν πολλῶν) παρ' ἀλλήλων, i.e. to keep the many from wronging each other, an attempt to secure social control. πολλῶν is probably to be understood with ἀνθρώπων in all the *KD* cited on above on 2152–4, and actually occurs in *KD* 14 (whereas securing the ἀσφάλεια of the many from each other is never said to be an Epicurean preocupation). Philodemus later argues this is futile anyway: false beliefs about the gods do not effectively prevent injustice, but rather encourage it.

2156–8 τὸ φαινόμε|νον ἕκαστοι πᾶσιν | ἐ[πιτρέποντ]ες: here τὸ φαινόμε|νον must refer to what is held to be true about the gods according to the Epicureans, with an allusion to their own epistemology (cf. 2145–6 ἐ]|ποχὴν), since truths are customarily said by Epicurus to be σύμφωνον τῷ φαινομένῳ (e.g. *Ad Pyth.* 87) or to be true if φαινομένων οὐδὲν ἀντιμαρτυρεῖ (ibid. 88), and see Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v. (τὸ) φαινόμενον for numerous examples. Philodemus does not specify that it is the truth about the gods that they 'left to everyone' (perhaps it was not specified in his source), but this seems to be called for by what follows (2158–65: introduction of strange, new myths). ἐ[πιτρέποντ]ες 'turn over', 'leave to', 'entrust' is due to Philippson and makes sufficient sense (cf. Antiphon *De veritate* in *CPF* vol. 1* no. 17.1–2 col. 6,9–13 ὅ γε πρῶ|τον μὲν ἐπιτρέ|πει τῷ πάσχον|τι παθεῖν καὶ τῷ | δρῶντι δρᾶσαι). However, ἐ[πιτρέχοντ]ες in the well-attested sense 'run over', 'treat lightly, summarily, or in haste' (LSJ s.v. 5) is equally viable in the context (cf. below, 2485).

2158–9 ο]ἱ δὲ | μύθους μὲν εἰσῆγον: possibly here ο]ἱ δέ introduces another group at the same (or slightly later) stage in the historical reconstruction, and thus = 'others' (i.e. others than those ἐ]||ξεργαζόμενοι of 2151,

assuming an original *οἱ μέν* before 2142). Cf. Lucr. 5. 405–6 (on the myth of Phaethon) *scilicet ut veteres Graium cecinere poetae / quod procul a vera nimis est ratione repulsum*. We know the names of at least some of those whom Philodemus has in mind here (see below on 2169–71). Note that this does not refer to the original invention of myth, for the fact that it is said that these people did not introduce myths in the same way as their predecessors makes it clear that myths about the gods already existed, presumably as a result of false opinion (see 256–318). (Similarly above at 1194–1217 nothing is said about the original formation of myths; they are simply assumed to have already existed, and were simply exploited by the unjust and the *'theologoi* and philosophers', a point which sharply distinguishes the Epicurean reconstruction from that of Critias in the *Sisyphus* fragment.) At a later stage, the Epicureans theorize, people persist in fabricating and introducing new myths and fantastic creations concerning the gods, without any concern for the alleged former function of myths about the gods, namely to fool the many into obedience. Included in the notion of *εἰcάγω* in this sense is 'introduce as valid, tender, negotiable, genuine, or believable' (at least to the many), as in the charge *τὸ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰcάγειν*, so that there are connotations present of attempted charlatanry or fraud as well. Cf. 2163 *εἰcφέρειν*.

2159 μύθουc: cf. Critias *VS* 88 B 6. 9–10 *γλώccαc τε λύουcιν / εἰc αἰcχροὺc μύθουc*. Epicurus' use of this word, though scarcely straightforward, is negative in the main: *Ad Herod.* 81 ('they' are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in *μῦθοι*); *Ad Pyth.* 87 (of rigid adherence to single-cause theory), 104 *ὁ μῦθοc ἀπέcτω* (an intriguing asseveration), 116 (*τοῦ μύθου ἐκβήcῃ* if you keep these things in mind); *Ad Menoec.* 134 (better to follow *τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ* than be enslaved to the *εἱμαρμένη* of the *φυcικοί*, 'for the former suggests an expectation of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity that is implacable', *ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήcεωc ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆc, ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην*, i.e. merely the lesser of two evils, though note here the relatively positive estimation of *τιμὴ καὶ παραίτηcιc θεῶν*); thus at Plut. *De def. orac.* 420B Epicureans are said to have called *πρόνοια* a *μῦθοc*; cf. *KD* 12 (one cannot dispel fear about important things if one does not know nature in general, but instead *ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺc μύθουc*); Colotes branded as a *μῦθοc* Arcesilaus' *περὶ ἐποχῆc λόγοc* (*Adv. Col.* 1124B); Heracl. *Alleg. Hom.* 4. 2–4 (Epic. fr. 229 Us., on which see Asmis 1993, especially 63–6) states that Epicurus 'purified himself of all poetry at one stroke as being a destructive lure of *μῦθοι*' (*ἅπαcαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν ὥcπερ ὀλέθριον μύθων δέλεαρ ἀcοφιούμενοc*), yet further charged that Epicurus stole his doctrine of pleasure as the goal of life from Homer, *Od.* 9. 6–7, 11, thus attesting at least one myth credited in part by Epicurus; Procl. *In Plat. rem. publ.* p. 382 Bas. (Epic. fr. 229) no *διδαcκαλία* to be found in

Homer's *μῦθοι*; Orig. *Contra Cels.* 1. 20 extr. where stories about the gods are referred to as *μῦθοι κενοί*. See also Philod. *De sign.* col. 38,11 with the De Lacys' note on the translation ad loc. (probably against Stoic appeal to myths). Apollodorus the Epicurean recorded in his *Περὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου βίου* that Epicurus (at the age of 14?) turned to philosophy out of disgust at the schoolmasters (*καταγνόντα τῶν γραμματιστῶν*) because they could not tell him the meaning of Chaos in Hesiod (D.L. 10. 2: *ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθησαν ἑρμηνεῦσαι αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ χάους*), which implies more a rejection of poetic mythology than of poetry *per se*, as is often assumed. Relevant in this connection is of course the extended demonstration in the next section below that the poets and philosophers did not adequately preserve clear ideas of the gods: e.g. later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1609 fr. 4,6–7 (Schober 1988, 98): some *ἐμύθε|[υ]σαν* that Epimetheus, not Pandora, opened the jar of evils for mankind; later in the treatise (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 fr. 18b,2–8 we are told that Diogenes of Apollonia (Schober 1988, 114 = T 6 Laks = *VS* 64 A 8) foolishly praised Homer for speaking 'not fictitiously (*μυθικῶς*) but truthfully about divinity' since he thought that Zeus was air: *Διογέ|νης ἐπαι[νεῖ] τὸν Ὅ|μηρον ὡς ο[ὐ] μυθικ[ῶς] | ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ το[ῦ] | θείου διειλεγμένον· | τὸν ἀέρα γὰρ αὐτὸν | Δία νομίζειν φησὶν | ἐπειδὴ πᾶν εἰδέ|ναι τὸν Δία λέγει καὶ* (at which point the text breaks off). On the fragment see Laks 1983, 102.

2160–1 τερατείλας: a familiar way of designating a false *μῦθος*. Note that here *μῦθοι καὶ τερατεῖαι* stand in contrast to the simply false things related or believed about the gods in the earlier stage. For the term see e.g. Aristoph. *Nub.* 318; Isocr. 12. 1; Polyb. 2. 17. 6; Jul. *Or.* 2. 56D *ἡ ποιητικὴ τερατεία*. Cf. *τερατεύομαι*: Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 114 *τοῖς τερατεύεσθαί τι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς βουλομένοις*. In all these cases *τερατεία* is something false, even absurd, than which intelligent persons such as the speaker know better. For *τερατώδης* used later in the treatise (see vol. ii) of mythological figures in Hesiod and Acusilaus see *N* 247 fr. 1,12–18 (Schober 1988, 82: Hesiod and Acusilaus say that Cerberus is immortal and, along with other *τ]ερατώδη*, the offspring of Echidna and Typhon); of monstrous prodigies: Philod. *De sign.* col. 7,27. This characterization identifies these people as the 'poets and *theologoi*' of 2481–2 and thus the poets and most of the philosophers criticized in the second part of the treatise. They are probably identical with the '*theologoi* and philosophers' mentioned above at 1204–5 (cf. 1310–11).

2161–5 Who exactly are *τοῖς πρό|τερον*? 2164–5 *οὔτε σωτηρίας αἰτ[ία] | πολειτείας* implies that there were also predecessors who were motivated by something in addition to a desire for political security, i.e. in addition to those who kept back the truth about the gods in order to fool the many into obedience (they acted out of a desire for political security). Were there also predecessors of an earlier era who first let the many believe the false

views about the gods that had arisen over time (above, 235–88) and unjustly exploited their ignorance for personal gain (as is said e.g. above, 1190–5)? It then becomes clear that the subjects of 2142–58 above are irrationally exploiting the existence of such injustice (as well as ignorance); and it is in this respect that they are said at 2147–50 to be 'exchanging justice for injustice' by not instead rejecting the tendency toward suspension of judgement and not reaffirming true views about the gods. In short, *τοῖc πρό-|τερον* will be the original innovators of injustice, treated in the lacuna preceding 2142.

2164 cωτηρίας: cf. Democr. *VS* 68 B 43 *βίου cωτηρίην*, 280 *τεῖχοc . . . καὶ cωτηρίην περιβαλέcθαι*; [Protag.] 80 C 1. Cf. also above, 1604, where its restoration is very likely. Its occurrence at 1046 (of the preservation afforded through God to men) is closely related.

2165–6 cὺν | δέ: there does not seem to be room for *τῶι* at the end of 2165 (it is so restored by Bücheler). But it is required here for the formation of the articular infinitive; thus *cὺν τῶι cυμπεριφέρεcθαι* would mean 'in addition to conforming to' etc. Perhaps it should be so added: *cὺν | δὲ ⟨τῶι⟩ cυμπεριφέ[ρεcθαι*.

2166–7 cυμπεριφέ[ρεc]|θαι: see above, 312–13, 751 with commentary for this term with its signification of conformance to the conventions of society, often with positive connotations in Epicurean texts regarding matters of religion. Perhaps 'conforming to fashionable opinions' is not being exactly condemned here, so much as their inconsistency and irrationality as expressed in the following phrase.

2168 ἐνιcχυούcα[ιc δόξαιc: the phrase is unique in Philodemus and probably derives, like much of the diction of this section, from his Epicurean source for the cultural history (probably Epic. *De nat.* 12, Colotes, or Hermarchus' *Contra Emped.*).

2169–71 ἅμα διὰ τὴ[ν ἀνω]|μαλίαν καὶ [τὴν μανί]|αν: the approach to political security taken by these people (i.e. the *o]ἱ δὲ* of 2158) is condemned as: (1) inconsistent, because it attempts to achieve justice though predicated on the existence of injustice (see above on 2161–5), and (2) as 'insane', for the reason that it denies phenomenal and analogical realities about the nature of the divine according to the Epicureans. For the topos of 'insanity' in characterization of an opponent's view, see Kleve 1977, 60–1 and above, 527–32 on the madness of Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias with commentary on 527. Doubtless these thinkers are to be recalled here as prominent among the '*theologoi* and philosophers'. The first two are among the philosophers criticized by name in the surviving portions of *P. Herc.* 1428 (see vol. ii; above, 723–8, 1359–60). Prodicus in particular is known to have been championed by the Stoic Persaeus, who is roundly chastised for it (see vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 2,27–4,13 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 13). Philippson 1921, 403 thinks that Protagoras is principally meant here, because of his putative

connection with *ἐποχή* (1908–9) for the sceptics. For *ἀνω*]|*μαλίαν* see also Epic. *Ad Pyth.* 113.

2171–4 As a result they are regarded as *ἀ*]|*cεβεῖc* (so also above, 1336–7 *διά* [*τε*] | *τοῦτ' οὐκ εὐ*[*cεβεῖc*; 1353–5 *οἱ πολλο*[*ὶ*] | *νομίζονται ἀcε*|*βεῖc*, of those like Socrates, who advocate such manipulation of the many), and also *φε*|*νακισταί*, like those above at 1853–7 who 'kept hidden' the truths about the gods. For *φε*|*νακισταί* compare Plut. *Adv. Col.* (quoted in full above on 880) of the Epicureans: *μὴ φανεροὶ γένωνται τοῖc πολλοῖc παραλογιζόμενοι καὶ φενακίζοντεc* (and see below on Epict. 2. 20. 33); *Σ* Aristoph. *Ach.* 88; cf. *Eq.* 634: in the comic world of Aristophanes *Φένακεc* are the tutelary gods of cheats and thieves. (For a catalogue of similar epithets of abuse invoked by Epicureans see Kleve 1977, 60–1; Philod. *De mus.* 104,4 of Damon *ἐφεν*[*ά*]-*κι*|*ζεν ἀτηρῶc*). The word and its derivatives have many associations with comedy, but also occur in oratory. It seems to be implied that such thinkers ultimately end up seeming impious because they themselves admittedly do not credit the gods of the many, and thus are punished like Socrates and 'the others' discussed above (see 1330–63). Perelli 1955, 55 argues that Philodemus has Socrates specifically in mind here, and compares *φε*|*νακισταί* here with Colotes ap. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 1118 D, where Socrates is styled as a *cοφιcτοῦ καὶ ἀλαζόνοc ἀνδρόc*, an appellation that is almost certainly connected with the report at Epict. 2. 20. 23 (Epic. fr. 368 Us.) where the Epicureans are credited with having thought the gods the inventions of 'cheats and sophists':

λάβε τὰ ἐναντία, ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτ' εἰcίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰcίν, οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐcτι πρὸc αὐτοὺc τό τ' εὐcεβὲc τοῦτο καὶ ὅcιον παρὰ τοῖc πολλοῖc ἀνθρώποιc λαλούμενον κατάψευcμά ἐcτιν "ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ cοφιcτῶν" ἢ νὴ Δία νομοθετῶν εἰc φόβον καὶ ἐπίcχεcιν τῶν ἀδικούντων.

Perelli argues persuasively that a hasty reading of the present passage, or one like it, combined with an intention to discredit the Epicureans, was responsible for Epictetus' confusion of the gods of the stories propagated by the theologues and poets in Philodemus' account with the gods in general, as though the Epicureans made no distinction between the two types of 'gods'. A similar, in some cases wilful, confusion can be seen to have infected the later tradition at large. Kleve 1977, 60, translates *φε*|*νακισταί* at 2173–4 as 'liars', comparing Philod. *De poem.* col. 25,30 *κωφά τ' ἐcτὶ καὶ μι*|*κροχαρῆ καὶ διεψευcμέ*|*να*.

2171 ἐπιγοεῖν: some correction is required, for the apograph's *ἐπιποεῖν*, printed by editors and tentatively recorded by LSJ s.v., is poorly attested and does not give good sense. *ἐπιπο*⟨*ν*⟩*εῖν* is another possible conjecture.

2174–5 'Non liquet' (Henrichs). I have maintained Bücheler's *καὶ τἀ-να*]*ν*|*τία* because [*cυνελό*]*ν*|*τι δ'* (= 'in brief'), adopted by Spengel and Gomperz, leaves *εἶπον* without a direct object and robs it of any point.

I construe τἀνα]ν|τία with οὐδενός, but take τῆς παρ|ρησίας φιλοσόφω[ι] | πρεπούσης not with οὐδενός ('the opposite of none of the frankness', which is senseless), but as a parenthetical genitive absolute: while frankness befits a philosopher, they succeeded in speaking frankly in opposition to no one at all. Cf. e.g. Aesch. *Agam.* 1373 τἀναντί' εἰπεῖν. More normal in this sense would be οὐδενί. But for ἐναντίος with the genitive see LSJ s.v. I 3a, Hdt. 1. 82 τὰ ἐναντία τούτων, Thuc. 7. 75. With the genitive the expression has a more hostile sense: cf. LSJ s.v. II.1b. The lack of *cυναλιφή* in τἀνα]ν|τία εἶπον is not problematical, being *scriptio plena*, rather than hiatus (S. L. Radt, *ZPE* 38 (1980), 56–8), though from the scribe's procedure elsewhere in the treatise we should have expected him to write τἀναντί' εἶπον.

2174–82 Philodemus can perhaps be heard at this point to diverge in tone and diction from the source used in the preceding lines, as the account returns from prehistory to more familiar topics and language: τἀνα]ν|τία simply reiterates 2169/75 ἀνω]|μαλίαν εἶπον, Philodemus wrote an entire treatise Περὶ τῆς παρ|ρησίας, and τῆς παρ|ρησίας φιλοσόφω[ι] | πρεπούσης is standard philosophical language. The locution τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ θε|ῶν Ἐπικούρωι certainly will not have occurred in any work by Epicurus or the *kathegemones*; for the phrase see above on 1855–7.

2178–82 Philodemus' criticism here is that such figures did not publicly or honestly espouse their true views on the gods as befits the παρρησία of a philosopher. One wonders whether this criticism at least was original with Epicurus, who almost certainly held that there would be times when, for political or social reasons, it was inappropriate to expound truths about the gods. Some would even see reticence and brevity, as well as finesse of language present, for instance, in the text of *Ad Menoec.* 123–4.

2181–2 οὐδ' ἔλεγον. | καὶ διεπράττοντο: this sounds very similar to the conclusion above at 2042–3, where it is said that such people 'would accomplish nothing', οὐδὲν ἂν πράτ|τοιεν. That the efforts of such individuals were ineffective and productive in themselves of injustice and confusion was certainly a view original with Epicurus, and is further developed in the following columns. Perhaps the sentence continued as follows: 'Nor did they say or achieve (what they intended, but created only anxiety and disturbance for themselves out of uncertainty over securing freedom from fear of detection).' For it is the psychological ill-effects of such behaviour (which is also according to the Epicureans the true basis for justice) that is treated in the following columns.

2182–3 *Order of Columns.* See on 2150–1. Note the minimal width of col. 74 in comparison with that of col. 75, a phenomenon well exampled in this treatise: compare the widths of cols. 3, 20, 36 with those of their surrounding columns. The disparity in all these cases is in any case negligible or attributable to divergent expectations about precision and consistency. Col. 75 was originally placed by Gomperz in the part of the treatise dealing with poets and philosophers; Philippson

1921, 403 first drew attention to the connection with the account of justice here, but did not suspect a textual link. The syntactical connection of *μόνην δ'* in 2150 with *ἀσφάλειαν* in 2152 could scarcely be fortuituous. The present col. 75 may have originally joined with the following col. 76. But that column is missing its top so there is a minimal lacuna (about 30 words).

Col. 76

Epicurus' threefold classification of desires is invoked by the author to explain that, as a result of this evolution in human history, many people are lead astray in their moral choices by not holding true, Epicurean views about the gods. In the process he adduces a rare positive argument for why the wise and pious individual will also be just. Such a person, having noble expectations from the gods (i.e. acknowledging that they provide a kind of harm and benefit), and grasping the difference between different types of desires, will fully enjoy not only unmixed and effortless pleasures but also ones that are necessary, i.e. to the maintenance of life itself. These he will enjoy, as a result of making himself harmless to others in emulation of the Epicurean gods, in the form of the pleasure that comes with security and freedom from fear of harm by others; this is the greatest and most valuable of all advantages that we can possess. But others, never being able to be sure of enjoying the comfort of such security, even if they escape the notice of others all their lives, are possessed by dreadful fear and anxiety about this. Moreover the unjust and the wicked generally, even if the gods do not harm them (in the way that the foolish believe that they can), in fact think that the gods harm them and that they are going to suffer eternal misfortunes for their misdeeds later on, so that they undergo no less disturbance than if they were really suffering such a fate.

An important preliminary to this section is to read Epicurus' classification of desires and pleasures at *Ad Menoec.* 127–32 (*HPh* 21B), especially 127–8, from which much of the language and moral theory of this passage derive (see also Cic. *De fin.* 1. 29–32, 37–9 (*HPh* 21A in part) and 45). Epicurus divides desires in general in those which are natural (*φυσικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι*) and those that are empty (*κεναί*). Those which are natural are further divided into those that are necessary and those that are merely natural (i.e. natural and unnecessary). Of the ones that are natural and necessary there is a further division: (1) those necessary for happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*), (2) those necessary for the body's freedom from stress (*ἀοχλησία*), and (3) those necessary for life itself (*αἱ*

δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν). It is the observation of these that makes it possible to refer every choice and avoidance (πᾶcαν αἵρεcιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν) to the health of the body and the soul's freedom of disturbance (ἀταραξία). The end is the blessed life (τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐcτι τέλοc), achieved by aiming in all our actions for freedom from pain, including anxiety over such matters of security. It is important to remember that Epicurus thinks that nothing, no other pleasure, can possibly increase that which comes with freedom from pain, including anxiety over detection of wrongdoing or threat of harm (see Cic. *De fin.* 2. 28). In this and the following column Philodemus argues that true, Epicurean beliefs about the gods are a source of such unalloyed pleasure, necessary to life itself. As a result the pious and wise individual will also be just (cf. ὁ δίκαιοc), because it is in his own self-interest to be, not out of fear of detection for wrongdoing, but for the positive benefits that accrue from emulation of the Epicurean gods (μὴ βλάπτειν μὴ βλάπτεcθαι). On the other hand those who suspend judgement about the gods must then live in constant fear over the lack of such security; even when they believe, as is often the case, that the gods do not harm them, they often suffer equal or greater disturbance in the form of uncertainty and anxiety.

The claim (that it is in this way that the just and wise man enjoys the greatest benefit from the gods) sounds genuinely Epicurean. It would be in keeping with Epicurus' approach to say that understanding this requires recognition of the specific *type* of desire (here according to a division which demonstrably derives from Epicurus) answered by the pleasure and advantage that accrues indirectly from the gods (i.e. from an understanding of their true nature). It would be interesting to know if the claim made here derives from Epicurus himself, or is simply Philodemus' interpretation of certain crucial points in his theology.

On the problem of what the Epicurean wise man will or will not do, with regard to justice, if he can escape detection, see Vander Waerdt 1987, 402–22.

2196–7 οἱ δὲ λοι]|ποὶ διαπ[ίπτουcιν: for πίπτω in composition, expressive of moral or intellectual disaster, see above on 1134–8. Here the 'rest' are said to fail in their choices and avoidances of natural goods and evils. The λοιποί must be some division out of those people named above, 2145–82, including at least some of those who attempt to manipulate the many into obedience by promulgating false beliefs and myths about the gods. For a similar division see above, 1745–6 τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλω[ν] | πλῆθοc, 'but the

great part of the others . . .'. They ought not be the many or the foolish, because these are at least believed (by the opponents) to be held in check through false beliefs about threatening divinities (though Philodemus also argues that this is not likely to be so in fact: see 2313–32).

2198–9 ἐν ταῖc αἱρ[έcεcι καὶ] | φυγαῖc: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 128 (where the expression occurs, cf. 129) and Epicurus' book *Περὶ αἱρέcεων καὶ φυγῶν* ap. D.L. 10. 27, 136 (Epic. fr. 1–2 Us., 7 Arr.²).

2199–200 ἱκα[νὰ μηδὲ] | παρ' ἓν ἄγ[οντεc: for *παρ' ἕν* in estimatations cf. LSJ s.v. *παρά* I.8. *οὐ παρ' ἕν* = *περὶ οὐδενός*, which we should expect to be predicative here. According to Schober *ἱκανὰ μηδὲ παρ' ἓν ἄγ[οντεc* = *τὰ ἱκανὰ περὶ οὐδενὸc ἡγούμενοι*, and in such phrases as Soph. *Ant.* 34–5 *παρ' οὐδὲν ἄγειν* is properly predicative. But here *ἱκανά* lacks the article, and so must be adverbial (perhaps read *ἱκα[νῶc*) 'not even sufficiently thinking (them, sc. choices and avoidances) to be worth one thing/anything', i.e. thinking them of no consequence. The understood object of *ἄγ[οντεc* must be the measures employed by the 'rest' in their attempt to secure justice (i.e. false stories about the gods): they labour under the constant fear that such measures might not be sufficient and effective. But it is possible that 'sufficient things' here refers to choices and avoidances, just mentioned, which when properly understood are held by the Epicureans to be sufficient to secure justice.

2201–2 κοι[μώμενοι] | τῆι περιφ[ορᾶι: this is not attested Epicurean language for this subject. Neither Epicurus nor Philodemus uses *κοιμάω*; *περιφορά* occurs only once in Philodemus (*De lib. dicend.* col. 12a,2), in the sense of 'disturbance' or 'confusion' (here = *θόρυβοc*, e.g. *Ad Menoec.* 132?). In Epicurus *περιφορά* is used of the motion of the heavens, no small source of anxiety and confusion (cf. *De dis* 3 col. 9,22 quoted on 329–32 and the note above on 312–13). But it could also mean 'social intercouse', i.e. 'society' (see Plut. *Per.* 5, and cf. *cυμπεριφορά*), thus here 'neither coexisting peacefully in society'. Schober, however, takes *τῆι περιφ[ορᾶι* to be a dative of cause, and Philippson translates: 'und nicht zur Ruhe kommend *infolge ihrer Unbeständigkeit*'. Such a term may of course carry more than one connotation: that of going about confusedly in society, anxious and mercurial, never being able to rest easy.

2202–3 ὁ δὲ] | δίκαιοc: we have not yet heard anything about this type of person. There are explicit or implied definitions of the pious and impious types above at 1130–65; but justice is certainly the main concern in this section, which centres on the rise of injustice in cultural history. Part of Philodemus' thesis in this section is that 'piety and justice are virtually the same thing' (2263–5). Thus he proceeds here by delineating the just man's expectations about the gods, and their consequences, in contrast to those of the unjust (see next column).

2203–5 ἀ]|ρίcτας . . . [προcδο]|κίαc: cf. above, 1083–5 (*ἄρίcται διαδό-*

cειc come from the gods for those who keep their oaths and are just) and 2036–9 ἐ|ξ αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θεῶν) cυμφο|ράc προcδοκήcου|cιν. For προcδοκία (= εὐελπιcτία, 9154–5, 2397–8) see Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 12,30; col. 13, 17; *Rhet.* ii. 8,7; *De lib. dicend.* fr. 32,6, and cf. Epic. *Ad Herod.* 81 αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν ἀεὶ προcδοκᾶν ἢ ὑποπτεύειν κατὰ τοὺc μύθουc; also in discussions of pleasure: Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1088 E (Epic. fr. 429 Us.) ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ψυχὴ τῶν ὄντων πέφυκε χαίρειν καὶ γαληνίζειν πλὴν ἐπὶ cώματοc ἡδοναῖc παρούcαιc ἢ προcδοκωμέναιc; Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 3. 125 ὃ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ προcδοκώμενον κενῶc λυπεῖ. Philodemus below at 2059–64 says that for the pious, the Epicureans set forth the greatest benefit from the gods and remove the worst kind of expectation as to them: μεγίcτη[ν] | αὐτοῖc (sc. τοῖc εὐcεβέcι) ὠφέλειαν [ἐκ] | τῶν θεῶν ὑ[ποπτά]|φοντεc καὶ τὴν πο|νηροτάτην ἀνα|κόπτοντεc α[ὐτοῖc] | προcδοκίαν, where the latter term stands in direct contrast to the ἄριcται προcδοκίαι said in the present passage to be possessed by the just, so that the ἄριcται προcδοκίαι here are further defined by the contrasting member, the 'worst kind of expectation' in the corresponding passage below, namely benefit (ὠφέλεια) derived from gods. Of course Philodemus believes (and earlier argued) that the gods are the source of harm (through faulty conceptions of them). While it is in this sense theoretically possible for the gods to harm anyone, on the Epicurean view, it is psychologically impossible that they actually do harm the just and the wise.

2205–12 The clause beginning ἅμα δέ should be regarded as an expansion of what comes before, explaining the result for the just of having ἄριcται προcδοκίαι about the gods. In this way it is possible to enjoy pleasures that are unmixed and effortless, and if the difference between types of desires is understood, also to enjoy those that are necessary. In the following column it is further said that there are none greater nor more advantageous than these. That these pleasures answer to Epicurus' category of 'necessary' desires is probably implied. By inference from what follows I think we can safely say that within the category of necessary desires they do not fulfil those necessary for εὐδαιμονία, nor again those necessary for the body (see Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 128 and introd. to this column above), but rather those necessary for life itself, since at 2214–18 Philodemus says that we derive the greatest κέρδοc and ἀπόλαυcιc from these. They are of course conducive to εὐδαμονία (see below, 2047–50: we should imitate the εὐδαιμονία of the gods), but Philodemus' concentration on justice and injustice in this section suggests rather that he is suggesting here that one of the benefits derived from the gods (i.e. from having the right view of the gods) is the pleasure that comes with political security, and so makes life itself possible.

2206–7 ἀκε]|ραίοιc ἡ[δοναῖc: 'unalloyed pleasures' are referred to in Epic. *KD* 12: 'One cannot dispel fear about the most important matters if one does not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects as true

some mythical story; so that without the study of nature it is impossible to attain unalloyed pleasures', *οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ' ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.* (It is uncertain whether the use of the imperfect *ἦν* here derives from a cultural-historical account like the present one, or refers to conclusions from past arguments in a discussion or treatise—an 'inferential' imperfect, on the assumption that the *KD* were excerpted bodily from their context and not adjusted to suit their independent existence. Or does Epicurus mean that it was historically impossible to dispel fears until he came along? Or rather that he has come to realize that natural science is needed, cf. *KD* 6?) *ἀκε*]|*ραίοις* must mean 'unalloyed' in the sense that they are not mixed with any pain, such as is only possible in the case of mental or katastematic pleasure. Bailey compares Lucr. 3. 37–40 *et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, / funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo / omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam / esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.* Cf. Philod. *De dis* 3 col. 8,36–7 *καθάρ*ε̣*ιοι γὰρ π*[*ερι*]*φλ*]*έγουσιν κ*(*αὶ*) *ἀκεραίους* | *παρέχοντες ἀεὶ τὰς φαντ*[*α*]*σίας.*

2207–8 ἡ[δοναῖς κἀπό]|νοις: the minimal lacuna presents a mystery left unsolved by even Schober. Philippson contrived to restore *κἀκέ*]|*νοις* i.e. *κ*(*αὶ*) *ἀκέ*]|*νοις*, a word that would only occur here. But apart from the risk in restoring a *hapax*, Schober was uncomfortable with the syntax: *καί* before [*χρῆται* + adjective–noun–adjective (though if the adjective after *ἡ*[*δοναῖς* is preceded by *καί* as in Philippson and the reconstruction adopted in the text, this difficulty can be resolved by restoring *κα*τ̣[*αχρῆται* instead of *καὶ* [*χρῆται*). Assuming that an adjective (of two terminations) describing *ἡ*[*δοναῖς* stood here, it will not have named one of the categories in the Epicurean classification of desires (necessary, natural, etc.), because those terms are used to describe desires (and not their corresponding pleasures), and in any case the clause predicating the classification follows the present clause. For *ἀπό*]|*νοις*, cf. Epic. *Περὶ αἱρέσεων καὶ φυγῶν* fr. 1 Us., 7 Arr.[2] (D.L. 10. 136) *ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ* ⟨*ἡ*⟩ *ἀπονία κατα*σ*τηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί*; explicitly of pleasure: Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1089 D (Epic. fr. 431 Us.) *τὴν εἴ τε ἡδονὴν ταύτην εἴ τε ἀπονίαν ἢ εὐστάθειαν*; D.L. 2. 89 (Epic. fr. 450 Us.) *μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις*; Philod. *De dis* 1 col. 7,9 (restored); *De Morte* col. 5,2 *καὶ δι' ἀκῶν κατ*[*αλυτι*]|*κῶν ἀπόνως ἀμαυρουμέν*[*ους ἢ τ*]*ὸ ζῆν μετὰ τὰς εὐωχίας ἐν τοῖς ὕπ*[*ν*]*οις κατ*[*α*]|*προϊεμ*[*έ*]*νους*; Aristot. *EN* 1168[a]24 *ἄπονον τὸ εὖ πάσχειν.*

2208–10 τοιαύτης] | διαφορᾶς [τῶν ἐπι]|θυμιῶν: for the division of desires see Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 127–8; id. *KD* 29, 30; Cic. *De fin.* 1. 45; and the introd. to the present column. The distinction in question is that between desires that are natural and necessary and those that are natural but not

necessary, perhaps also the subdivision of natural and necessary pleasures into those necessary for happiness, the body, or life. Philodemus probably means to imply that the just person has full enjoyment of the last type. The division strictly speaking is one of *ἐπιθυμίαι*, as here and at *Ad Menoec.* 128, though of course the desires in question have corresponding pleasures as their objects and each individual pleasure fulfils or answers to the desire of a particular class. In Epicurus pleasures are not classified like desires into natural, necessary, and so forth, but in terms of states of the soul, kinetic and katastematic. Thus the antecedent of *ἀναγκαί[αις* in 2212 must be *ἐπιθυμί-αις* (from 2209–10) and not *ἡδοναῖς* (2207).

The importance of understanding the distinction between the different types of desires is, on the Epicurean view, so that one may prioritize the gratification of one type (natural and necessary, e.g. desire for food, since all organisms need nourishment) over others (natural but unnecessary, e.g. desire for good food when one is hungry), and avoid others altogether (unnatural or empty desires, e.g. desire for good food when one is not hungry). These are matters of choice and avoidance, *αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγαί* in Hellenistic parlance (see 2198–9). The object is to give the Epicurean a way of achieving happiness, as Epicurus says in *Gnom. Vat.* 71: 'To all of our desires we should pose this question: What shall I get out of it if what I seek through this desire is achieved? And what if it is not?' For a discussion of the classification see Annas 1989, 147–53. For the present argument the thrust is that anyone who understood the distinction between desires would choose to satisfy first and foremost the need for freedom from fear of harm (achieved through emulation of the Epicurean gods) as that type of natural and necessary desire the fulfilment of which makes life itself possible.

2211–12 ταῖς] | ἀναγκαί[αις χρῆται: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 131 *πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις*, 'for the basic requirements of life', *ad necessarios vitae usus* (hardly 'the necessary business of daily life' as *HPh* 21B4 has it). *ἀναγκαί[αις ἡδοναῖς* cannot be resored for the reason that *ἐπιθυμίαι*, not pleasures, are classed as natural, necessary and so forth. The antecedent of *ἀναγκαί[αις* in 2212 must be *ἐπιθυμίαις* (from 2209–10) and not *ἡδοναῖς* (2207) (see previous note). For the expansion of the line-length in the final line of the column (often it is shorter than elsewhere in the column), cf. 2242, where the line-end is preserved intact.

2212–13 *Order of Columns.* The link between a fragment of **1610** (which preserves bottoms of columns only) with a fragment from **247** (which preserves tops of columns only) was to be suspected, since already Schober had discovered the links between cols. 85 and 86, and between **1610** fr. 3 and **247** fr. 6a (from the critique of poets that follows: see vol. ii; Schober 1988, 77). Both joins entail the same disposition of fragments (**1610 + 247/242**) as in the present new link between cols. 76 and 77. Given the occurrence of *οἱ δὲ λοι]|ποί κτλ.* in this column and the discussion of the unjust in that which follows, it is a fair assumption that this passage

cannot have come before the extended discussion of the introduction of injustice in cols. 74–5. Col. 76 is in fact locked into its present position (relative to col. 78) by the *sovrapposto* in 2195 (= 2254). The fact that the present passage is couched in verbs of the present tense probably indicates that Philodemus has now brought his hypothetical historical reconstruction down to present times, or else given it up. These present tenses could of course be narrative and historical; but in fact the remaining columns do not exhibit the past tenses characteristic of the cultural-historical narrative.

The present fragment is extant as *P. Herc.* 1610 fr. 2 on *tavoletta* 92 and was seen by Bassi on 6 September 1903, who noted this fact on the *disegno*. Though extremely poorly preserved, the papyrus being darkened to the point of completely obliterating the writing, close scrutiny with the binocular microscope revealed enough writing in the last five lines to verify the identification and correct a misreading of the copyist, suspected already by Schober (see the apparatus criticus on l. 2210).

Col. 77AB

See on col. 76.

2213–18 Since the enjoyment of freedom from fear of harm makes life itself possible, keeping our existence from being reduced to that of beasts, and since nothing can enhance the pleasure that comes from freedom of pain, such pleasures are greater than any other we can obtain. No physical enjoyment of any other pleasure can equal them in benefit. Although this is implied by Epicurus' teaching on justice elsewhere (see Vander Waerdt 1987), it is never so explicitly formulated, and never in connection with *προσδοκίαι* about the gods. For it is in this way that it is in the self-interest of the pious and wise man to also be just. According to Epicurus, justice is nothing in itself, but arises out of compacts between humans not to harm or be harmed (*KD* 31–3 *ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι*). Philodemus' reformulation here is that one becomes just by having noble expectations concerning the gods (2202–5), to the effect that if, in emulation of the Epicurean gods, one harms no one, one will not be harmed in return. The wise and pious will thus also be just, not out of fear of being detected in wrongdoing (as may be necessary in the case of the unjust and foolish), but because it is in one's own self-interest to obtain the advantages which accrue from such a compact.

2214–16 ἀλλαλ[κ]τόν . . . κέ[ρ]δος: For ἀλλαλ[κ]τόν 'exchangeable', 'equal', 'equivalent', 'balanced' (a Philodemean word) see Philod. *De oec.* cols. 15,37, 19,32. *κέρδος* occurs at Philod. *De oec.* cols. 2,36, 25,10; *De bono rege* 26,32; *Rhet.* i. 217,13, ii. 156 fr. 16.

2218 ἀπολαύσεως: strictly speaking this means 'enjoyment', commonly used in Epicurean contexts especially of *sensual* pleasures: see Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 131 *τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας* (*ἡδονάς*), cf. 132 *οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ*

κῶμοι cυνείροντες οὐδ' ἀπολαύcεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅca φέρει πολυτελὴc τράπεζα. Philod. *De dis* 3 fr. 77,5; Aristot. *Pol.* 1314^{b}28; id. *Top.* 102^{b}17–18 ὁ κατ' ἀπόλαυcιν βίοc; also in the sense of 'advantage': Xen. *Mem.* 2. 1. 33; Isocr. 1. 27. As a result, an absurd contrast emerges if we restore ταραχαί before 2213 (so Philippson followed by Schober) in apposition with ἕτερα[ι, for this clause would then mean 'than which disturbances there are none greater, nor is it possible to derive equal gain from any enjoyment (of sensual pleasure)', i.e. one could not derive from any (sensual) pleasure an advantage to compensate (literally 'exchangeable') for the disturbance. (ταραχαί was suggested by what follows, especially 2238–9; the addition of col. 77 as continuous with this passage shows how unpredictably digressive in style Philodemus' prose can be.)

2219–26 Philodemus proceeds to note that anxiety over such pleasure as derives from freedom of fear of harm causes the rest (2196–7 οἱ λοι]|ποί) to be beset by dreadful fear. Furthermore, this happens even if they succeed in escaping detection in their misdeeds and their attempt to fool the many with false stories about the gods. For they will never be able to have confidence that they will not be detected.

2219 περὶ δὲ τούτων: sc. natural ἐπιθυμίαι necessary for life or the corresponding ἡδοναί deriving from their satisfaction: for their equivalence in the classification see above on 2206–12. Possibly τούτων refers more generally to their misdeeds and promulgating of false tales about the gods. But it seems more likely that he refers here to the security-bringing benefits that they do not have but which result from the successful satisfaction of necessary desires.

2221 αὐτοὺc: cf. here τοὺc λοιπούc (2196–7). What follows suggests that he has specifically in mind the unjust, rather than those who misrepresent the gods out an honest attempt to secure social harmony or the safety of their states (cf. 2150–5, 2164–5).

2221–3 ἂν | καὶ διὰ βίου λανθάlνω[cι: for the language here and 2223–6 see Epic. *KD* 34–5, Lucr. 3.1014–22; Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1090 C, and the passages collected as Epic. fr. 532 Us.

2223–6 διὰ τὸ] μὴ δύlνacθαι περὶ [τού]lτου πίcτιν λ[α]lβεῖν: what they are unable to secure assurance about is the discovery by others of their deceit (unjust deeds, keeping the truth from the many about the gods). But τούτου ought to have a more specific reference, and I follow Schober in taking to it refer back to 2221–3 ἂν | καὶ διὰ βίου λανθά|νω[cι, i.e. that they could actually escape notice *all their lives*. According to *KD* 35, 'It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed, to be confident that he will escape detection, even if at present he escapes a thousand times; for up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.' Such uncertainty is sometimes held to be the basis of Epicurus' conception of justice, even for

the wise and just (but see above on 2214–19). Philodemus here supports the view that it should be seen as primarily motivating the behaviour of the unjust or those at least potentially so, since we now know that the plural subject here is being directly contrasted with *ὁ δίκαιος* (2202–3). Next Philodemus also applies the claim of *KD* 35 to point out: not only does the failure to obtain confidence about this last the entirety of their lives, but many believe that they will eternally suffer misfortune in their anxiety over this uncertainty (2233–41).

2226–8 Consideration is now extended to the unjust and wrongdoers at large. It is not entirely clear that this includes *οἱ λοι]ποί* who are the subject of 2196–2208. But it probably does include them at least potentially, since in going astray in their choices and avoidances (2197–9) they are obvious candidates for vice, injustice, exploiting the many in their ignorance etc. Above at 1184–95, those who believe the gods do not really do any harm are said to be incited *ε[ἰς δει]|νὰς ἀδικίας*.

2229–33 Philodemus' assertion that most wrongdoers believe the gods actually harm them is here meant to diffuse his opponents' claim that false tales about the retributive justice of threatening divinities will make the foolish act justly. He follows with the Epicurean account of how they suffer for their misdeeds none the less, an extension of Epic. *KD* 35. It is unclear whether 2233–41 would apply to the Epicurean sage (were he to commit an unjust act) or not; but the language of this passage and the restriction here to the 'unjust and wicked generally' (2227–9) suggests that it would not (especially if 2235 *αἰωνίοις* is taken literally; an Epicurean would not believe that he could suffer eternal punishments). So some other, positive argument is required to assure the sage's just behaviour (see on 2202–18).

2229–30 The force of the proposed negative is 'it is not the case', so that the sense of the whole is '(it is) not (the case that), if the gods do not harm them, they actually think they are not troubling them', i.e. they think they are even though they are not.

2232–3 οὐκ ἐ̣ἰνοχλεῖν: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 125 *ὃ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ*; *KD* 11 *εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ ⟨περὶ⟩ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν*; *De nat.* 11 fr. 26.42,20 Arr.[2]. Philodemus makes frequent use of the verb.

2235–6 αἰωνί̣οις περι{α}[βα]|λεῖν συμφορα[ῖς: a very close parallel text to the present passage is Epic. *Ad Herod.* 81: 'And because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery (*ἐν τῷ αἰώνιόν τι δεινὸν ἀεὶ προσδοκᾶν*), such as is depicted in legends (*ὑποπτεύειν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους*), or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves (a similar view argued at Philod. *P. Herc.* 1251 col. 9); and again, because they are brought to this pass not by reasoned opinion, but rather by some irrational presentiment, and therefore, as they do not know the limits of pain, they suffer a disturbance equally great or even more extensive (*μὴ*

ὁρίζοντας τὸ δεινὸν τὴν ἴσην ἢ καὶ ἐπιτεταμένην ταραχὴν λαμβάνειν) than if they had reached this belief through rational thinking.'

Yet Philodemus probably does not mean here that myths about punishment by the gods are necessary or desirable for providing psychological punishment in this life to the foolish and unjust for their misdeeds (possibly the view of his opponents); but rather that the period over which the unjust think they will be uncertain about escaping detection lasts an infinitely long time, so that they simply do in fact suffer equivalent punishment in the form of mental anguish (so also Lucr. 3. 1014–22). Fear of death and uncertainty about the limit of human life was an early development in Epicurean cultural history (already above, 239–41), antedating the introduction of myth. In any case Epicurus does not need false tales about punishments by gods in the afterlife for his conception of justice to operate among the unjust and foolish. Thus Philodemus argues below that if the poetic myths about the gods really kept the foolish in check (as his opponents claimed: see 2480–90), then the poets would not have represented the gods as subject to death, disease, and so on. For Philodemus' use of *βάλλω* and *πίπτω* in composition to express mental or moral disaster and anguish see above on 1134–8 (*περι[βα]|λεῖν* active future, here with the dative = lit. 'to surround with' etc., cf. 2240–1 *περιεβάλ|λοντο* apparently passive, lit. 'to be surrounded with such things'). (2235 actually reads *περια[*, but the *α* is clearly a *sottoposto*, and so appears in place again at 2143, along with the *sovrapposto* from the present column.)

2237 Philippson thought the caret-shaped sign that appears before this line might be *τ*, written by the scribe as a correction, namely: *ὡς|ˋτ'' οὐκ* (there is not room to supply *τ* at the end of 2236: *ὥστε | οὐ* with *scriptio plena* would be unexceptionable, but *ὥστ' | οὐ* for *ὥς|τ' οὐ* violates conventions of syllabification). But the scribe's usual procedure for this kind of correction (followed rigorously elsewhere in the treatise) is to write the added letter over the letter it is meant to follow (see e.g. 813). The correction is never in this treatise written marginally. Nor is it likely that this is a paragraphos, since this sign elsewhere in this part of the treatise appears only as a mark of punctuation (which is not needed here). The sign looks like nothing so much as a diple obelismene (which is used to mark a change of philosopher in *P. Herc.* 1428, but is not otherwise used in this part of the treatise), or the space-filler (see e.g. 2113) sometimes inserted by the scribe lest he leave space at line-end. It could be the remnant of a stichometric letter, either X or Y. If the former, then the following col. 75 (which contains at 2274 the stichometric letter Φ) has been misplaced, and actually belongs 200 lines (6⅓ columns) *before* the present col. 74. If the latter, then six columns have been lost between the present col. 74 and the following col. 75. But since the *disegnatore* certainly did not intend to represent any letter, nothing can be concluded with certainty.

2237–9 οὐκ ἐλάττονας ἀναδέχονται ταραχάς: cf. Lucr. 3. 1014–22; Philod. *De ira* col. 42,4–5 *τα|ρα[χ]ὴν ἀνα[δ]έχεται μεγά|λη[ν; 7–11 ὃ]τ' οὐδὲ*

κ̣[α]τὰ τὰc παρουcία̣[c] τῶν | μεγάλων ἀλγηδόνω̣[ν] με|γάλαιc cυνέχεται τ[αρα]|χαῖc.

2241 τοιαύταιc: sc. *cυμφοραῖc*.

2242 πρὸc τῶι καὶ κατ' ἀν[: Philippson's suggested supplement *πρὸc τῶι καὶ κατ' ἀν|||[θρώπουc δυcφημεῖcθαι* is not likely to be right, but *ἀν-|||[θρώπουc* may well be, suggesting that Philodemus here combined torment over fear of punishment after death with anxiety over detection by men in this life (cf. Epic. *KD* 35).

2242–3 *Order of Columns.* See on 2212. Philippson originally perceived the interconnection between cols. 77A and 77B, a single column broken horizontally; Schober was the first correctly to recover the syntax. After this brief summary of the Epicurean position on the way justice obtains positively for the wise and just, and negatively for the unjust, Philodemus proceeds to expose the weaknesses of his opponents' claim that false tales about the gods keep the foolish in check. If the present column of **247/242** joined with another column, we should expect it to link with one of **229** (cf. cols. 74–5). But none of the extant columns of **229** allows a syntactical link. So probably two columns on the **229** *scorza* fell between the present col. 77 and col. 79, only one of which (col. 79) was copied by the *disegnatore*. But cf. on 2237 for possible stichometric indications.

Col. 78

This fragment, if correctly read, quotes an objection levelled against the Epicureans. Compare Himerius ap. Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 234 p. 356a (Epic. fr. 511 Us.) *οἴχεται μὲν ἀρετὴ πᾶca τοῖc Ἐπικούρου λόγοιc καὶ δόγμαcιν, οἴχεται δὲ δικαcτήρια καὶ κρίcειc, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν αἱ τιμαί, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ τίμημα* (cf. Epict. 2. 20. 25). The Epicureans are charged with doing away with courts and trials and all that goes with them. Philodemus apparently invokes the quotation in order to refute it (see on 2258–9). It may therefore consist of an allegation that, according to the Epicurean view courts and trials (perhaps at an early stage of cultural history?) were unnecessary to the operation of justice, since 'justice and piety are virtually the same thing' (2263–5). Courts and trials are only necessary to the operation of justice after the concept of piety has undergone drastic degeneration, as described earlier in this section. The discussion of courtroom justice may also be connected with the topic of rhetoric (above, 1920) and the observing of oaths (below, 2273–7).

2254–5 ἁ[ρ]|μ[ό]c̣ει: the negative should be restored if not read in what precedes: 'Nor is (the following statement) fitting, suitable, applicable.' For the verb in this sense see Philod. *De poem.* col. 28,32; Demosth. 18. 42; Isocr. 9. 72. Cf. above, 1703–5 *ἁρμο[cτό]ν*.

2255 τὸ· "οὐ[κ: a quotation introduced by the neuter article, as often e.g. in Philod. *De poem.* Owing to avoidance of hiatus, the sequence τοου would not otherwise occur (except possibly at sentence-end). The parallel from Himerius was adduced by Schober. The traces in 2255 are, however, exiguous. A quotation should be regarded as only a possibility, not a certainty.

2255 οὐ[κ εἰc | τ]ἀρ[χ]ε̣ῖον: so Schober. Philippson printed οὐ[κ εἰc δι|κ]αc[τή]ρ̣ιον, which is far too long, but he also suggested οὐ[χ ὡc | κ]αὶ [ὅ]cιον, which fits the traces of *N* quite well: OY[..|.]AI[.]CION.

2257 τ]ι̣νεc: by implication, the Epicureans, since they believe that the ideal community could exist without courts and civic laws.

2258–9 ἀξιολ[ό|γω]ς αὐτάc: for the adverb see Xen. *Mem.* 1. 5. 5, and frequently in Philodemus, e.g. *Rhet* i. 2.6, ii. 238,26, *De morte* col. 28,23, etc. Philippson thought that his supplement ἀξιολ[ό|γου]c might be Philodemus' addition to the opponent's formulation. I take the point to be as follows: an opponent who believes that the Epicureans hold the view that false myths will restrain wrongdoers from injustice alleges that the Epicureans support their position by saying: 'some people do not even bother going to court, thinking that they can still enforce justice if wicked people are notably (ἀξιολ[ό|γω]ς) perturbed by "these" (2259 αὐτάc, i.e. probably "disturbances", ταραχάc)'. Philodemus is of course denying that this is anywhere close to the Epicurean view (2254–5 reading οὐ[χ] ἁ[ρ]|μ[ό]ς̣ει).

2260–1 ἀνέχωc[ι] τὴν [δι|κ]αιοcύνην: Schober's correction, followed here, simply presumes the sequence IC mistaken as K by the modern copyist. Philippson's correction ἀνέχωc[ι is possible, since it seems to echo Hom. *Od.* 19.111 εὐδικίαc ἀνέχηcι. (Schober objected to the use of a poetic word here, but among prose usages LSJ s.v. lists Thuc. 1. 141. 4, cf. Aristoph. *Thesm.* 948).

2263–5 ὅ]τι cχεδὸν ταὐτ[ὸ] | φαίν]εται τὸ ὃcι̣ο̣[ν καὶ | δί]κ̣αι[ον: the equivalence is crucial for the Epicurean definition of justice. Conventional justice is necessary only after the introduction of false belief about the gods perverts piety. So also at Plat. *Protag.* 331 B: justice is 'either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same (ὁμοιότατον)'.

2271 τὸ]ν ὅλομ βίο̣[ν: the time phrase probably refers to uncertainty of detection during 'one's entire life' that provides the Epicurean basis for justice. Cf. above, 1954–5, 2222.

2272–3 *Order of Columns.* This column must have followed col. 76 by 1–2 columns because of the *sovrapposto* preserved in 2195, probably in place at 2254 (it is impossible to be certain about this ordering, or even if δου at 2195 and 2254 actually is a *sottoposto* or *sovrapposto*; but the numbering of fragments suggests that this one was copied first, and therefore came later in the treatise). The present column (from **1610**) cannot have linked with the following col. 79 (from **229**), because we should have expected a **1610** fragment to have been followed by a column of **242/247** (apparently here missing, i.e. not copied by the *disegnatori*).

Col. 79

This sentence-fragment preserves someone's account of why oaths are (or should be) observed: namely because to forswear oneself (*ἐπιορκεῖν*) is to lie and also to be unjust; that both of these are disturbing (*ταραχώδες*) is apparently added as an indicator of this. The account seems to presuppose or elaborate the Epicurean view that piety and justice amount to virtually the same thing (so 2263–4). This explanation is further generalized to apply as well in the case of sacrifices and festivals, and 'they' are said to have believed and passed down such views. It is difficult to place this account in Philodemus' historical reconstruction in this section. The reference in the two aorist verbs in 2281–3 must refer either to an early stage of humankind (before the introduction of injustice) or to the views of Epicurus and his early followers. On the whole the balance of probability is in favour of the latter interpretation. Thus in 2283 *ὡς ἐγὼ κτλ.* will have introduced a self-citation of the author of his own demonstration above about Epicurean participation in cult (723–1022) and its justification.

2273 εὔδηλον: Philippson conjectured that the following might have preceded the opening of this column: *ἡμᾶς δὲ πάντας τοὺς ὅρκους φυλάττειν ἐστὶν*] || *εὔδηλον, ὅτι* etc. *εὔδηλον* could also introduce indirect discourse, with *ὅτι* specifying the content of what was 'entirely clear' rather than as an explanatory clause as Philippson takes it. It also of course could have been negatived, and the particle *δέ* in 2276 could have adversative force: i.e. 'it was *not* entirely clear that breaking one's oath is unjust and lying, *but* both are equally disturbing'. Much therefore remains unclear.

2276 ταραχώδες: the term is connected with the more common *ταραχή* and *τάραχος* both from *ταράττειν*. Breaking one's oath, as forms of injustice and lying, give rise to *ταραχαί* because, according to the Epicurean account of justice, one could never be sure of escaping detection: see Vander Waerdt 1988 and above, 2208–42 with commentary there.

2277 τὰ δ' αὐτά: the 'same things' believed and taught could have been that sacrifices and festivals and all such ritual forms should be observed because otherwise *ταραχαί* 'disturbances' would result. Cf. 1935–55.

2278–9 περὶ τῶν θυσιῶ[ν] | καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν: why sacrifices and festivals are singled out for mention is easy enough to understand: not performing sacrifices and celebrating festivals could give rise to anxiety for the Epicurean (or proto-Epicurean, if this is still part of the cultural history), eager to exercise *συμπεριφορά* and acknowledge the exalted status of the divine. But it is harder to discern in exactly what respect such neglect might be deemed equivalent to being unjust and lying, as is said about oath-breaking. (*θυσίαι*

are also mentioned at 1948 in connection with the making of provisions and expectations for life generally: 1953–5 κ[α]|θ' ὅλομ. βίον εὐελ[πιc]|τίαc.) Lying and oath-breaking are unjust and therefore disturbing (since one can never be certain of not being detected) and therefore will be avoided even by the just and unjust alike in order to avoid the anxiety of fear of detection. Since sacrifices and festivals often mark the existence or fulfilment of contracts, the swearing of oaths and curses, and other obligations, perhaps it is implied that they will be faithfully adhered to as well. Lying, not backed up by an oath, is not a breach of such a socially contracted obligation; but of course, even if the gods do not care, the person you have cheated will, so that you live in constant fear of his finding out, which is ταραχῶδεc (2276). See on 821, 1935–41. At 1082–9 the oath-keeping are equated with the just and aligned with the gods.

2281–3 διειvοήθηcάν τε καὶ π[α]|ρέδοcαν: I take these to be early Epicureans, whom Philodemus has defended with ample documentation on this score (religious oaths, sacrifices; for festival compacts see esp. 841–5) above at 723–1022. It is curious however that Philodemus does not in this case use δοξάζω or δογματίζω 'teach' (as e.g. 1300–1, 2488–9, see on 308), rather than παραδίδωμι 'passed down' as here (cf. 727, 1574).

2302–3 *Order of Columns.* This fragment has been placed at this point in the **229** sequence on the basis of context. For obvious reasons ταραχαί due to uncertainty about detection cannot arise until injustice already exists. Therefore this passage must come after cols. 74–5, which relate an early stage in its inception. In the margin before 1869 appears the stichometric letter Φ. This means that since l. 2274 above (in the account of Socrates, where the letter O appears) six stichometric letters have elapsed, amounting to 1,200 lines of text or forty columns, out of which portions of only fifteen survive (or twenty-three if the fragments of **452** represent a separate column each, rather than being the bottom of any of the tops preserved under the 437 series). If this column were placed later in the treatise on grounds of context the proportion of preserved columns would of course be increased. But the conclusion is nevertheless unavoidable that in this section there is a much lower percentage of preserved columns, less than 36% (or 56% on the alternative counting of **452**) of the original, compared with the earlier sections preserved in the **1077/ /1098** sequence (cols. 1–55), where the average rate of preservation is about 65%, but in some places as high as 85%. This accounts for the relatively greater obscurity and uncertainty faced in the reconstruction of this section. The loss is due to greater fragmentation in this section (also exhibited in the section on poets which follows, preserved in multiple *scorze*), to damage when the roll was broken open, and also to sheer chance. For, as the *disegnatori* worked their way through each *scorza*, if a reasonably complete legible column was not visible on a given layer of it, that layer was simply destroyed in removal to get to the one underneath, and so on.

Col. 80

A citation of Hermarchus is adduced to demonstrate the deficiency of the (opponents') view that false tales about the gods will effectively enforce justice among the unjust. According to Hermarchus, since the gods do not literally appear to harm wrongdoers, the most unjust of mankind would completely escape notice, if one had to rely on the opponents' conception of justice.

2313–20 The reconstruction in these lines is tentative. Philodemus probably said that it was unlikely that punishment (2313–14 κόλα]|σιν) would συνπ[επλέχ]|θαι τοῖς κα[κίς]|τοις if his opponents' arguments about the operation of justice were true, as he says he had argued previously, and as the following citation from Hermarchus establishes.

2320–9 On this fragment of Hermarchus see the commentary of Longo 1988*a*, 127–8 and ead. 1985, 235–40. We differ in substance only over the question of how the grammatical construction is introduced in 2320, where I have tried to keep closer to the apograph (and consequently whether we are to have the indicative or infinitive in 2323). Philodemus points out that the unjust man will surely realize that real-life wrongdoers go unpunished by the gods in contrast to what the myths portray. He adds the argument by Hermarchus (apparently without citing the work, which is unusual for this treatise) that the most criminal of mankind would go entirely unnoticed to people, if humans had to depend on this system of justice. A very similar point is made above, 1184–1201, where see commentary.

2321–2 τὸν ἄ[δικον] | ὑποτρέχει: for *ὑποτρέχει* in this sense ('l'ingiusto abbia presente ciò' Longo) see LSJ s.v. IV: Polyb. 16. 6. 10; Strabo 12. 3. 27; Epict. 4. 2. 2.

2323–6 ὡς] | βλάπτειν [οὐ δοκεῖ] | θεὸς τοὺς ἀ[δικοῦν]|τας: this is in keeping with Epicurean doctrine, for the god is said only to *seem* not to harm wrongdoers, i.e. in the literal, traditional sense or that depicted in the myths championed by the opponents. Hermarchus will, of course, have held that the gods do harm the unjust in the way set forth above, 1023–1108, and that the unjust are also harmed in consequence of their false views on the gods as described above, 2219–42.

2329–30 καὶ οἱ] | νόμοι: Epicurus did not of course dismiss law in theory, and Hermarchus in particular is thought to have held it in high esteem for having brought mankind out of a beastly uncivilized state (so Porph. *De Abst.* 1. 22). The claim here will have been that the operation of law under the sort of system of justice advocated by the opponents would be ineffective.

2330–1 παρὰ [μικρόν is 'only just'. With *οὐ δεχόμενα* the sense seems to be 'only just not admitting of punishment', i.e. such measures stop only just short of the formal enactment of specific laws and penalties. Philippson–

Schober's οὐδ' ἐχόμενα would mean 'only just not even conterminous with punishment', which yields less sense.

2332–3 *Order of Columns.* There is no physical link between this and the following columns. We should expect a column of **247/242** to intervene between the present one from **1610** and col. 81 from **229**, though this is not preserved. Philodemus is clearly focusing on existing poetic mythologies as a point of attack in the closing columns of this section, as a preliminary to that which follows (critique of the poets). He has apparently yet to demonstrate that the existing myths would not in fact perform the function of inhibiting injustice in the way alleged by his opponents, and it is to the specific poetic myths individually that he turns in the second part of the treatise. The self-citations in this column (2314–15, 2318–19 if the restorations are correct) of earlier discussions suggest a summation or conclusion from earlier material before proceeding to the attack on poetic mythology *per se* in the following columns.

According to a scholium of Bassi's on the *disegno*, this fragment was extant on 6 September 1908, and was the *scorza* on the right on *tavoletta* 92. This is not the text there at the present time. In its place there is a different fragment to the right of **1610** fr. 2 (see on 2212–13), written in the characteristic hand of *De pietate*. Perhaps this was a layer of the *scorze* originally underneath **1610** fr. 5. The content of this unpublished fragment (l. 1 προταμ̣[; 4 τ]ῶι cίτῳ[ι; 5 ἐνοί[̣.]αιc; 7 ζῳ̣ιο̣ν̣; 9 ἔcωcε; 12 θεοί) suggests the poetic and rival philosophical theologies considered in the second half of the work; it has therefore been relegated to vol. ii.

Col. 81

The author sets out to demonstrate that even those individuals described in the preceding (lost) columns who observed religious customs and beliefs with a view towards preserving their country's safety or its good reputation, did so without preserving the gods in their blessedness and imperishability. The reader is exhorted to consider whether such a demonstration really deprives the pious of the 'good hope' they have in the gods, as the opponents allege. The Epicureans, says the author, offer the pious in return the greatest of benefits from the gods and remove for them the 'basest expectation', by substituting the conviction that in the nature of the gods there is nothing terrible.

2333–8 Supply οὐδὲ cῴζοντεc (or φυλάττοντεc)] || ἐκείνουc, 'without preserving those (sc. the gods)' etc. from the previous column, which is lost (cf. above, 1142). The antecedent of ἐκείνουc must be θεούc, which is required by the verb (2333–4 εὔ|χονται). The subject of the verb, of course, must be those who promulgated false tales about the gods, not for personal gain, but in an attempt to secure justice and security of states: see 2150–77; that some did seek the security of their states by introducing myths (or exploiting existing ones) is explicitly stated at 2158–65 (esp. 2164–5 cωτη-

ρίας αἴτ[ια] | πολιτείας). For *cωτηρία*, see also above, 1046 (used by Epicurus of the *ὠφέλεια* to be derived from the gods). The *εὐδοκία* in question, I think, must be that of their states, and not their own personal reputation; for the *εὐδοκίαν πατρίων* cf. above, 1338–44, in an apparently accepted definition of piety: 'piety appears to include not harming both other people and especially one's benefactors and one's homeland.' On the reconstruction of the lost opening to the present column, cf. Philippson 1921, 363. An alternative would be to take Epicurus and the *kathegemones* as subject of the verb, and supply no negative with *φυλάττοντες* before 2333; but this seems less likely in the light of the objects of prayer stated here.

2338–9 ὡς | ἐπηγγειλάμην: the promise referred to came earlier in the discussion of cultural history; possibly it is preserved at 1703–5. Since the intervening discussion does not exclusively concern the gods, but deals with larger aspects of the nature of justice, it would have been natural to postpone the specific topic of the representation of gods in myth until this point.

2340 οὐκ εἰc μακράν: 'not later on', as at Hdt. 5. 108, Aesch. *Suppl.* 925, Aristoph. *Vesp.* 454; but the standard example is Demosth. 18. 36. However LSJ s.v. *μακράν*, who cite the present text, translate it exceptionally as 'not at length', perhaps because Philodemus implies that the demonstration will not exceed 'the present work' (2341–2). Since it is the catalogue of poets and philosophers in the second part of *De pietate* that provides the 'demonstration' referred to here, this meaning seems to be contradicted by the sheer length of the catalogue (it occupied an entire papyrus *volumen*). Very likely Philodemus means that he will begin the demonstration with the poets now (see the actual beginning in col. 86) without concluding the present book and beginning a new one (hence 'in the present work'). Possibly this statement signals a break between the two rolls of papyrus containing each part of *De pietate*. (It also corroborates that there were not two books.) In any case, unless it means something like 'soon', i.e. if it meant 'not at great length', *οὐκ εἰc μακράν* would have been a denial of the obvious, in the light of the multitude of evidence adduced by the author and the rhetorical intentions of the catalogue style of composition employed not only in the lists of poets and philosophers in the second part of the work (see vol. ii), but also in the first part (e.g. 723–1022 on Epicurean participation in cult). Philodemus has nothing to gain from irony on this point. For an instance signalling the end of a section elsewhere in the treatise see above, 1279–81 with commentary.

2341–2 ἐν τῇ [παρ]ο̣ύ̣[c]ῇ c̣[υν]|αγωγῇ: cf. above, 1465–8 *π̣[αρὰ | Ζήνωνι γενόμε|ναι cυναγωγαὶ δια|caφοῦcιν*, where *cυναγωγή* seems to mean 'discussion', perhaps 'lecture'. Here, however, in reference to the author's present discussion, it verges on the meaning 'treatise', 'work' as a whole (rather than a single section or subdivision of that work). Philippson 1921, 363–4 (who read *cυνε]cτ[ώc]η c̣[υν]|αγωγῇ*) took this to refer to an already existing theological work by the author: 'Sicherlich nicht un-

ser Buch—und dies liegt am nächsten—in einem weiteren Buche unsrer Schrift. Berührt ist diese Frage auch in *Περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς* [i.e. *De dis* 3 col.] 10,4, und es wäre immerhin möglich, daß Philodem unter *cυναγωγή* die Gesamtheit seiner theologischen Schrift meint.' *ἐνεστώcῃ* (Gomperz) would mean 'present', as in grammar: *ὁ ἐνεστὼc χρόνοc* = *tempus praesens*.

2342–3 παραcτ[ή]|cω: what Philodemus will demonstrate is that the cumulative evidence of the poets and philosophers, as amassed in the second part of the work, shows that people in the course of human history have not generally preserved the gods (i.e. 'those from whom they prayed' etc., 2333–7) in their original conception in their discourse (2338 *ἐλογοποίηcαν*).

2343–4 τῆc ἀγαθῆc | τοίνυν ἐλπίδ[oc: this is a direct reference back to 1413–18 above, where the opponents were said to have charged the Epicureans with 'depriving just and good people of the *καλὰc ἐλπίδαc* which they have in the gods' by removing the *παραμυθία* involved in prayer and sacrifice; cf. 988–9, and *ἐλπὶc χρηcτή* at Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102 B (Epic. fr. 30 Us., quoted above on 880). (*παραμυθία* is mentioned just below at 2419.) The present passage sketches out an Epicurean response, to the effect that the Epicureans in fact offer such people the greatest benefit from the gods, by removing the basest sort of expectation (*προcδοκίαν*) from the gods (= expectation of the worst things, i.e. harm from the gods; such harm need only be expected by the bad). Cf. 2202–5: the just man has the 'finest expectations from the gods' (*περὶ θεῶν ἀ*]|*ρίcτας ἔ*[*χει προcδο*]|*κίαc*).

2347–8 μεγίcτη[ν] | αὐτοῖc ὠφέλειαν: for the Epicurean doctrine of *ὠφέλεια*, see above, 1023–1108, 2202–8. So also above, 1293–4 the Epicureans claim to strive after the greatest piety, *μεγίcτην εὐcέβει*|*αν*.

2349–50 ὑ[πογρά]|φοντεc: for the technical sense of this word see above on 1048–9. Its use here indicates that such views about benefit and expectations from the gods are implicit in the general nature of things, the study of which (i.e. Epicurean *φυcιολογία*) 'sketches out' definitions about such things: cf. Epic. *Ad Menoec.* 123 *ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόηcιc ὑπεγράφη*.

2350–3 τὴν πολυηροτάτην ἀναlκόπτοντεc α[ὐτοῖc] | προcδοκίαν: cf. the contrasting form of *προcδοκία*, said to be possessed by the just, at 2202–5 *ὁ δὲ*] | *δίκαιοc* [*περὶ θεῶν ἀ*]|*ρίcτας ἔ*[*χει προcδο*]|*κίαc*.

2353–6 These lines are probably corrupt. I have not attempted to resolve them by departing wildly from the apograph. Philippson prints:

	προcδοκίαν ἢ [*οὐ*		Υ[*N*
	τοῦτ' ἐ̣κ̣κρού[*ομ*]*εν*		ΤΟΥΤΗΚΡΟΥ[...]ΕΝ *N*
2355	*καὶ ἀγαθὰc ἐ̣λ*[*πίδαc* ⟨*εἰc*⟩		ΚΑΙΑΓΑΘΑΙΤΗ[.... *N*
	τὸν αἰῶνα δ̣ό̣[*ντεc πιc-*		ΤΟΝ ΑΙΩΝΑ ΔΕ[.... *N*
	τάc, ἀντε[*ιcάγον-*	(25)	

A better approach would be:

	προcδοκίαν ὑ[*πὲρ*	Υ[*N*

	τοῦ χ' ηκρου[..]εν	ΤΟΥΤΗΚΡΟΥ[...]ΕΝ	N
2355	καὶ ἀγαθ' αἰτῆ[σαι	ΚΑΙΑΓΑΘΑΙΤΗ[....	N
	τὸν αἰῶνα δε[ίξαν-	ΤΟΝ ΑΙΩΝΑ ΔΕ[....	N
	τας, ἀντε[ισάγον-	(25)	
	τες δὲ κτλ.		

2358 πίστ[ιν: cf. above, 2222–6 διὰ τὸ] μὴ δύ|νασθαι περὶ [τοῦ]|του πίστιν λ[α]|βεῖν. Though πίστις appears in that passage in a different sense, the present use probably recalls it, for the claim is that the Epicureans provide such assurance of immunity from detection, which according to Epicurus is otherwise impossible to obtain. Instead the Epicureans offer a philosophical πίστις that the gods are not by nature terrible or harmful, that the benefits of justice and security accrue to humans through emulation of their nature. For πίστις in the sense of logical demonstration see above on 478 (cf. 652); for that of sacred oaths and pledges: 831–2. In the theological context πίστις in all these senses is the counterpart to ὑποψία, 'vain suspicion'. Cf. above, 2036–42: 'they will expect great misfortunes from them (sc. the gods). . . . On account of the πίστις which they (sc. the unjust) do not possess, they would accomplish nothing'.

2361–2 δυσεκκ[αρ]τέ|[ρη]τον: cf. Sext. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7. 23, and see Philod. *De dis* col. 12,6–7: there is no nature (including divine nature) able to inflict an ἀνεκκαρτέρητον ἢ δυσεκ|καρτέρητ[ο]ν κακόν (quoted more fully above on 1134–8), i.e. a harm which is impossible or difficult to endure. The occurrence of δυσεκκαρτέρητον in both the last and the present passage recalls the language and idea of the τετραφάρμακος, for the text of which see above on 1538–9 and further literature cited there. The present passage probably continued by saying that the Epicureans advance a demonstration, based on the fact that the gods are not δεινοί in their nature, that they cannot inflict upon anyone δυσεκκ[αρ]τέ|[ρη]τόν τι δε[ινόν, 'a terror which is difficult to endure'.

2362–3 *Order of Columns.* This column appears to move from the more general account of justice to the more specific consideration of the representation of the gods by the poets. The present column might be thought to introduce not that section, but rather the discussion of the development of injustice in cultural history (and to have come before cols. 74–5), but I have placed it here because it seems to introduce the section on poets and because I have followed strictly the descending order of fragments in the **229** series, in which it comes relatively late. The present column may also be closely connected to col. 79, because the mention of prayer (2333–4 εὔ|χονται) may be related to the topic of oaths, sacrifices, and festivals mentioned in that column: oaths (2273–4), sacrifices and festivals (2278–9), other similar forms (2280–1). With the whole series cf. the catalogue at 1934–55.

Col. 82

This column, like those of **437** and **452** (see above on 1731–2), was not one of those originally assigned to *De pietate* by Quaranta and printed together with the other fragments of *De pietate* in *HV*² II. Consequently it does not appear in the editions of Gomperz and Bücheler. It was identified as part of *De pietate* by Crönert (1906, 19 n. 101), and subsequently filled out with lavish restorations by Philippson (1921, 409; cf. also E. Bignone, 'Studi critici sul testo di Epicuro', *SIFC*³ 10 (1933), 71–118 at 110; Capasso 1982, 97 n. 29). Its Neapolitan apograph is preserved as fr. 9 of **1788**, a reproduction of which appears in *HV*² VIII 62 (there is no Oxonian apograph). Of the original papyri of **1788** there exists today one *scorza*, which is totally illegible and thus useless for purposes of identification of hand or content (it cannot be our fragment, for reasons I discuss below). In its place in *HV*² VIII the text of **1788** fr. 9 quite obviously does not belong either palaeographically or thematically with the other engraved apographs of **1788** (frr. 1–8, *HV*² VIII 53–61 (the hands represented are entirely different), a doxographical work of unknown authorship: Crönert 1906, 19 n. 101 (for the text ibid. 147; additional bibliography in *Catalogo*, 394–5; Capasso 1989, 263). Note that our fr. 9 is the last in the series, as though smuggled in at the end of the series. On the other hand, the letter-shapes and column layout in **1788** fr. 9 as represented on the apograph are so similar to those represented on the apographs that preserve other parts of *De pietate* as to be indistinguishable. Crönert hypothesized that fr. 9 was mistakenly included and designed along with the fragments of **1788**, a phenomenon not unknown in the Herculaneum papyri and which we have already had occasion to encounter in the fragments of *De pietate*.

Crönert's hypothesis, and the assignment of this fragment to *De pietate*, were confirmed through the discovery (June 1993) of a *scorza*, numbered **1114**, and mounted in *cassetto* 78 next to another fragment on the right written in a different hand but also labelled **1114**. This fragment (the one on the right) is written in the hand of **1007/1673**, Philod. *Rhet.* 4, and is so properly identified (*gruppo* H, *anonimo* XI) by Cavallo 1983, 34 (cf. 45, 64, 73). The *scorza* on the left, however, contains the remnants of some 21 lines inscribed in an entirely different hand than the one on the right. Its identification as the characteristic hand of *De pietate* (i.e. that of *P. Herc.* 1428) is unmistakable. The fragment consists of a conglomeration of at least three layers of

sottoposti and *sovrapposti*, and is extremely difficult to read. Lines 13–21 can be made out as follows, apparently the left margin of a column:

P. Herc. 1114 fr. sin. A

13 .ο[
14 πα[
15 ανδ[
16 μη[
17 ψο̣[
18 απα̣[
19 μεν̣[
20 μετ̣[
21 ν̣ιξ[

I have not been able to locate this sequence in the line-beginnings of any preserved column of the treatise. But there is no doubt that it belongs to *De pietate*, an identification now secured on palaeographical grounds.

Scattered higgledy-piggledy in the upper and lower portions of the same *cassetto* were two small, additional pieces of carbonized papyrus, which, after being cleaned and properly preserved by Dr Kleve and Mr Fosse, I was able to identify as having been written in the characteristic hand of *De pietate*. Both are *scorze* consisting of at least four congealed layers of papyrus, which, I believe, originally adhered to the surface of the larger piece numbered 1114 described above (they do not exhibit the membranaceous material glued to the back of some *scorze*), or were the layer below it. As not infrequently happens in the case of the *scorze*, the uppermost layers of the original *scorza* became separated from the lower layers over the passage of time: i.e. the exposed layer of the extremely thin papyrus disintegrated, thereby exposing to view a new text on the underlying layer. The disintegration of the *scorza* left two additional fragments of **1114** (originally **1788**) strewn carelessly about in the *cassetto*. This is the text of the first:

P. Herc. 1114 fr. sin. B

1].....[
2]τ̣ην δαν̣[
3]εριται ν̣[
4]τον ηφα[
5]κ̣τονι κα̣[
6]υιαν δε[
7]ι καιπ[

8]caμετ[
9]ρτη[

The second of these two pieces matches exactly with lines 15–21 of *N* 1788 fr. 9 (see ll. 2379–83; letters in braces are visible on the extant papyrus on an underlying layer of papyrus, which was exposed after the apograph was made, and are therefore to be deleted here):

P. Herc. 1114 fr. sin. C

1 ...]εο{ε}[
2 ...]ρι{ac}[
3 ..]νιc{λμ}[
4 ..]cδ{cτ}[
5 .]cλογο{νca}[(= 2381)
6 .]ν κρονον (= 2382)
7 ...]cηρχ (= 2383)

The text of ll. 5–7 can be seen beyond any doubt to match with that of ll. 19–21 of the Neapolitan apograph of **1788** fr. 9 (= 2381–3). The match proves beyond any doubt that the text preserved by the apograph of *N* 1788 fr. 9 was in fact, as Crönert thought, originally part of *De pietate*. Letters in braces are preserved on an identifiable underlying layer. After κρονον in l. 20 there is uninscribed space. If this represents the end of a line (as opposed to blank space left as punctuation), then this fragment (= 2379–83), and probably all the lines of **1788** fr. 9 after l. 16, were a *sovrapposto* mistakenly copied by the *disegnatore* as part of the same layer; for the lines of **1788** fr. 9,1–14 (= 2363–78) extend on further to the left. In addition the disposition of fragments B and C relative to each other and to fragment A is problematic. They appear to have once linked one above the other, as they are about the same width, their surfaces are very similar, and they both consist of about four congealed layers (I did not attempt removal of the *sovrapposti*). However, fr. B cannot have joined above or below, fr. C, or it would have been copied by the *disegnatore*, where as a different text appears in these places on the Neapolitan apograph of **1788** fr. 9 (2363–78 and 2384–7). If the uninscribed space after κρονον in 2382 (= l. 6 in the text above) is not the end of the line, perhaps fragment C originally consisted of the entire text of **1788** fr. 9, lying directly on top of fragment B, and the two were impacted together on top of fragment A.

While the attribution of these new fragments, and the text of **1788** fr. 9, to *De pietate* can now be taken for certain, there is not much in the

way of a continuous text on the basis of which to place the fragment at its proper position in the treatise (see further below on Order of Columns). However, if 2381–3 were *soprapposti* when they were drawn, they will have come later in the treatise (see vol. ii) than the present col. 82 (**1788** fr. 9), perhaps from the critique of the poets (i.e. B,2]τ̣ὴν *Δαν*[*αΐδα*; B,4 *τὸν Ἥφα*[*ιστον*; C,6–7 *τὸ*]*ν Κρόνον* | [..... ....]ς̣ *ἦρχ*[*ε*; see below on Order of Columns). If these lines were *sovrapposti*, then they came earlier. It is possible that all these fragments (*N* 1788, *P. Herc.* 1114 A–C) come from the second part of the treatise, though their placement relative to **247/242** and **1088**, the opening series in that section, is problematical.

2365 τύχην: cf. 2380 (*τῆ*]ς δὲ *τύ*[*χης*?). Philippson's assumption of an attack on the Stoic doctrine of fate here is unlikely to be right, since in *P. Herc.* 1428 below (see vol. ii) Philodemus uses the standard Stoic term *εἱμαρμένη* in his criticism of Chrysippus on this point (*P. Herc.* 1428 col 5,1–2; Henrichs 1974*a*, 15). Perhaps *τύχη* was mentioned in the sense of 'chance' as advocated by the early natural philosophers (cf. 1184–9, and see Usener, *Gloss. Epic.* s.v.; Capasso 1982, 97 with n. 29), or as the mythological entity.

2367 κυριεύει[: the Stoic problem of the *κυριεύων λόγος* may be relevant here, as L. A. Holford-Strevens reminds me. But 1285–6 *πάντων* [*τ*]*ῶν ἀγα*|[*θῶν*] *κυριεύοντα* (sc. *θεόν*) shows that the Epicureans could also adopt such language. Cf. also 942–3 and 755–8 with commentary.

2371 μικρά: mundane trivialities, over which no god or *λόγος* is needed to rule, on the Epicurean view?

2374–5 ἐξ ἀφροσ[ύνης τῆ]ς κακῶν λ[όγων: cf. 1605 with app. crit.

2379–83 Probably *sovrapposti* (see vol. ii).

2392–3 *Order of Columns.* See the discussion above. The placement of this fragment here is entirely conjectural. It is not impossible that it comes from the criticism of poets in the second part of *De pietate* (see below with vol. ii), perhaps part of **247** (like which it preserves the top ¾ of a column). I have placed the fragment here, not only because of its proximity with the second part of the work, but also because of a possible connection with recurring terms for 'ruling' in this fragment and in the surrounding columns: 2367 *κυριεύει*, cf. 2383 *ἦρχε*, and the same idea above at 2032–3 in connection with the belief, allegedly propagated by poetic myths, that the gods are tyrants who will harm evil-doers; on kings and their styles of rule *vis-à-vis* philosophers see also below, 2434–49 and cf. the *προνομία* 'political exemption' mentioned for the Epicureans (?) at 2477–9. But we are now within several columns of the end of the first part of the treatise, and the ruling of various mythological figures who vied for dominance in the mythical cosmogonies is the first topic in the second part of *De pietate* (for which see vol. ii; Schober 1988; Henrichs 1972*a*), so certainty is impossible. In this connection the possibility that 2382 could be read as *τὸ*]*ν Κρόνον*, i.e. the divinity who figures prominently in the early stages of cosmogony, should be raised. See also above, fr. B, 2]τ̣*ην δαν*[, with which compare

N 1088 fr. 6,22–3 below (Schober 1988, 87) *τῶι ποή[cαν]||τι τὴν Δανα[ΐδα* (*Danais*, *EGF* F 3 = *PEG* 3).

This fragment is extant as *P. Herc.* 1114. It has broken into several fragments and contains more than one layer of *sottoposti*.

Col. 83

The syntax of this column remains elusive. Judged from the following column to which it is physically linked, it dealt with the influence of the myths on thinking about the gods. There is clearly much interconnection with the language of the preceding columns. For an attempt at a complete restoration see Philippson 1921, 401.

2395 δι]αφορας: see 2209.

2397–8 εὐελπιcί[τίαν: also at 1954–5 above, = *προσδοκία* (2204–5, 2353; cf. *ἀγαθὴ ἐλπίς*: 1416–17, 2343–4; *ἐλπὶc χρηστή* at Plut. *Contra Epic. beat.* 1102B (Epic fr. 30 Us.), quoted above on 880.

2398 βέβαιον: cf. *P. Oxy.* II 215 col. 1,15 *τὸ βέβαιον* | *[εὐ]cεβείας ὑπάρχει*.

2411 δεινά: see 1562, 1584 (the *π[άνδ]εινοι λόγοι* of the theologues), 2032 (they will think the gods *δεινοί*), 2362; cf. app. crit. on 1192–3.

2419 παραμυθ[: above, 1423–4 with commentary.

2420 περι]ττῶc: see 2205–6.

2422–3 *Order of Columns.* The present col. 83 is able to join physically with the following col. 84 (even though they are in *ascending* order in **229**) on the same rationale as explained above on 1101–2 (cols. 38–9). There is an exactly parallel case in the same sequence above, cols. 58–9, a join which may be considered certain. The apograph represents a letter or two of blank space at the end of 2422, the last line in the column. But the disposition of **229** fr. 1 (right side of column) and fr. 2 (left side of column) suggests that they were both on the same layer of the *scorza*, but drawn as usual, as separate fragments, so that *κα]||ταλέλοιπε* should indeed be joined, in spite of the letter or two of blank space. Length of lines in this treatise often actually decreases as the scribe reaches the foot of the column.

Col. 84

It is absurd to suppose that any but the evil and foolish would believe that the gods check injustice, and that the gods and their children suffer misfortunes because they are really afraid of being harmed. Yet the opponents dare to charge the Epicureans with impiety. The powerful can be relieved of this wretched sort of existence if we realize that the philosophically enlightened fare better with people in general than do rulers who attempt to punish each and every injustice.

2422–3 κα]||ταλέλοιπε: for the sense of this verb ('allow the existence of') see e.g. 1047–8 and commentary on 36. Excellent sense is produced if we restore a negative or negative pronoun (*οὐ*]*δείς* in 2421?): '(No one) has allowed the existence of gods, representing the offspring of the gods and and the gods themselves as afraid . . .', i.e. a *reductio ad absurdum*. Cf. *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 13,7–12 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 23): 'It is clear that no one ever refrained from unjust action out of fear of the air or the aether or the whole universe', *τοῦ*|*τό χ*[*ε*] *παντὶ δῆλόν* | *ἐστιν ὡς οὐδὲ εἷς τῶν* | *πώποτε ἀνθρώ*-*πων* | *τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸν αἰ*|*θέρα φοβούμενος ἢ* | *τὸ πᾶν ἀπέχεταί τι*|*νος ἀδίκου πράγμα*|*τος*. In the second part of the treatise the author goes to great lengths to illustrate the kind of poetic mythology, filled with stories of such minor sub-divinities, and prodigious fantasies, which fails in the desired way to restrain people from injustice. There is even a separate section devoted to improprieties of the gods in interaction with humans as portrayed in the myths of poetry, including semi-divine offspring, and another devoted to bodily weaknesses of the gods: see Schober 1988, 71–2, Henrichs 1974*b*, Luppe 1984; 1985*f*. Thus with this phrase here and 2425–7 *αὐτοὺς* [*δυς*]||*τυ*-*χοῦντας πα*[*ρα*]|*στήσας* the author anticipates and introduces the rationale for the 'critique' that follows ('demonstration' would be the more accurate designation, since Philodemus' debate there is not with the poets *per se*, but with philosophical opponents who claimed that all the myths prevented injustice, and that the Epicureans, denying the truth of the myths, were inciting it: see 2480–9).

2423–7 θε]|ῶν ἐγγόνους κ[αὶ δαί]|μονας αὐτοὺς [δυς]|τυχοῦντας πα-
[ρα]|στήσας: so below (vol. ii), *PN* 433 fr. 3,6–10 (Schober 1988, 92) *τοῖς* | *ὑ*]*ποχθονίοις* [*δαίμο*]||*σιν . . .* (*διὸ κἂν* [*γελάσει*]||*έν τις*); *P. Herc.* 1088 fr. 10,9–21 (Schober 1988, 84) *καίτοι τὸ* | *μὲν ἢ γεννηθῆναι* | *τὴν μορφὴν ἄτο*|*πον ἢ τῶν μερῶν* | *ὕστερόν τινι δυς*|*τυχῆσαι τὴν κακί*|*αν ἐκφεύγειν δύνα*|*ται, τὸ δὲ* [*πο*]*νηρο*|*τάτους ε*[*ἰσάγ*]*ειν θε*|*οὺς ἄνωθ*[*εν*] *ἐκ γε*|*νετῆς ὑπερβολάς* | *ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπολει*|*πόντων ἀσεβείας*, (of odd divine births, Hermes represented as a rectangular herm) 'and yet to be born with an odd shape, or suffer mutilation later, need not involve any wickedness, but to represent the gods as most wicked right from their birth is a sign of those who lack nothing in their insurpassable impiety' (for the genitive of characteristic see above, 436).

2427–8 ὅτι νε[ίκη] | φοβοῦνται με[γάλα: the subject of *φοβοῦνται* must be the *ἔγγονοι* and *θεοί*. The *ὅτι* clause gives the reason why they would be thought *δυστυχοῦντας* (2425–6) if the myths were believed. The plural shows that the subject of *φοβοῦνται* are not potential believers themselves (cf. 2422–3 *κα*]||*ταλέλοιπε*).

2430–1 κατηγοροῦντε[ς] | ἀσέβε[ι]αν ἡμῶ[ν: the *disegnatore* is unlikely to have mistaken A for Є, even in a broken context at line end. I think we must reckon that the reading *κατηγοροῦντας* stood in the papyrus in error.

Lines 2429–31 are virtually parenthetical: the opponents have the effrontery to accuse the Epicureans of impiety, when their own view (2423–8) makes the gods out to be degenerate. For the explicit charge see below, 2485–9: the detractors allege that we are teaching things *ἀcεβῆ καὶ | [ἀcύ]μφορα τοῖc ἀν|[θρώ]ποιc*. But see 1353–60 *οἱ πολλο[ὶ] | νομίζοντεc ἀcε|βεῖc τοὺc οὕ-τω{ι} πε|ρὶ θεῶν ἀποφαινο|μένουc κολάζου|cιν* (of Socrates and others punished by the Athenians), 1382, 1407 (Epicurus escaped the Athenian masses because he had less impious views), 1512–23, 1673 (restored), cf. 1570–1 *δια]|βληθέντων*. I do not think we are to understand that any opponents ever did formally accuse the Epicureans of impiety in the legal sense (if they could have); there is certainly no evidence that Epicurus was so accused (Philodemus asserts above, 1505–55, that he was not in fact). The implication here is that the opponents' charges are no more philosophically serious than such rhetorically inflated charges, which were more common in the literature of the rhetorical schools than in actual legal practice of the third and second centuries. In the second part of the treatise Philodemus turns the same rhetorical charge back against the poets and in *P. Herc.* 1428 against the Stoics (see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 20–5).

2432 ὥcπερ προ̣ε̣[ῖπον: resumptive, after the digression ending in 2423–31 above (and perhaps beginning in col. 81 at 2233–43). The argument here is also closely related to that made in col. 77 (2213–42), where the evil are said to be restrained from wrongdoing by their own bad consciences.

2433–5 ἵν' ἡμεῖc ἐπικο̣[υφι]ζ̣ώμεθα: cf. Demosth. 23. 70 *ὅτι οἱ ταῦτ' ἐξ ἀρχῆc τὰ νόμιμα διελόντεc, οἵτινέc ποτ' ἦcαν, ἥρωεc εἴτε θεοί, οὐκ ἐπέθεντο τοῖc ἀτυχήcαcιν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπίνωc ἐπεκούφιcαν, εἰc ὅcον εἶχε καλῶc, τὰc cυμφοράc*.

2435 τῶν κρατούν[των: 'those in power', 'the authorities'. I suspect that Philodemus implies an analogy between human rulers and those depicted by poets in the myths as ruling. This is then backed up (2439–49) with a consideration concerning how ordinary people regard their rulers: they have higher esteem for those who are wise and realize that wrongdoers will be restrained by their own bad consciences (2224–41), than for those who (like the gods in myth) personally and laboriously attempt to punish and avenge every injustice against them. Perhaps Philodemus envisages the opponents as lodging their charges of impiety against 'us' (2485–9) also before 'those in power', 'the authorities' (*τῶν κρατούν[των*); what follows (2434–49) shows that Philodemus specifically has Hellenistic monarchs in mind.

2436–8 ἀνηκέcτο̣[ιc] cυ̣[μ]|φορα[ῖ]c περιβαλ[λό]|μ[ε]νον: here passive: 'enveloped', 'involved in incurable misfortunes'. The phrase finds echoes at 2235–6 *αἰωνί̣οιc περι[βα]|λεῖν cυμφορα[ῖc* (fut.), 2240–1 *περιεβάλ-|λοντο τοιαύταιc* (passive), 1136–8 *εἰ[c ἀνυ]|πέρβλητον ἀ[cέβει]|αν ἐκβάλ-λειν*, and derives from courtroom rhetoric, in perorations referring to the threat of punishment for conviction of capital crimes: see Antiphon 3. 2. 12

μή . . . ἀώροις συμφοραῖς περιβάλητε; Lys. 4. 20 μηδὲ ἀνηκέστῳ συμφορᾷ περιβάλητε (the jury is besought not to bring down disaster upon the innocent by unmerited conviction); Andoc. 1. 142 ἀνηκέστοις πόλιν συμφοραῖς περιβαλεῖν (the Spartans are resisting their allies proposals to destroy Athens for good); cf. Eurip. *Or.* 906 περιβαλεῖν κακῷ τινι. Philodemus means that the myths envisage gods eternally beset with unceasing disasters and misfortunes for which they are responsible for administering the appropriate brand of justice. An alternative here is to articulate περιβάλ[λο]||μεν, ὃν τρόπον: (according to the opponents) 'It is in order to lighten the burden (reading τὸ[ν πόνον in 2434) of rulers that we surround (i.e. the gods) with incurable evils (i.e. in myths), just as people reproach less the wise (i.e. for doing this, through myths) than they do kings for dispensing justice in individual cases.' For ὃν τρόπον in this sense see later in the treatise (vol. ii) at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 5,3 (Henrichs 1974*a*, 16). A problem in recovering the syntax of this complex sentence is that it is unclear whether Philodemus is giving his own view here or summarizing an opponent's point.

2438–49 Philodemus recommends lightening the responsibilities of those in power (2435 τῶν κρατούν[των) on the grounds that people in general (οἱ τ[υ]||χόντες, apparently an argument from *consensus omnium*) more reproach 'good' kings for doing the job of dispensing justice personally and individually, than they do philosophers or the philosophically enlightened king who relies on the inhibitions of conscience, as explained at 2226–41. The former type of ruler would incur the κακία, 'reproach', of people in general. On the Epicurean view only the foolish need to be held in check by fear of punishment, while the wise have a different motive for being just. In the present passage, perhaps directed to the putative addressee, the Epicurean position on religion and justice is also recommended to the king who would be wise. On Philodemus' political theory on kingship, well illustrated in his treatise explicating kingship in the Homeric poems (*De bono rege*), see especially O. Murray, *JHS* 55 (1965), 161–82; *CErc* 14 (1984), 157–60; Dorandi 1982*a*, 42–5. On advice to the potential king in Philodemus' reading of Homeric poetry see Asmis 1991, 1–32.

2447–8 τ[ῶν τιμω]ρομένων [εἴ] | τ[ινε]ς [ἠ]δ̣[ίκ]ησαν: cf. Xen. *Anab.* 5. 4. 6 εἰ οὖν βούλεσθε, ἔξεστιν ὑμῖν ἡμᾶς λαβεῖν ξυμμάχους καὶ τιμωρήσασθαι εἴ τί πότε ὑμᾶς οὗτοι ἠδίκησαν.

2449–50 τῶν ἀνθρώπων | τ[ῶ]ν [τὰ ὅ]μοια δυσ|[τυχούντων (Philippson): i.e. similar to those things depicted in myths? Perhaps the sentence continued to give grounds for why the myths are sometimes thought to restrain people from injustice.

2450–1 *Order of Columns.* See on 2422–3. The 'offspring of the gods and daemons' potentially allowed at 2423–5 sound very like those of the poets criticized in the next section of the treatise (see above on 2422–3, 2423–4). The present column has therefore been placed as close as possible to the introduction to that section in col.

86 (allowing for the expected interposition of the physically adjoining fragment of **1610**). The present col. 84 (and the previous column, which is physically attached to it) are the earliest numbered fragments in **229**, so we should expect them to fall latest in the original order of those fragments in the treatise, as they do in their present position. Note this pattern is also borne out by the three earliest columns of **229**, cols. 56–8 (frr. 7–9). Fr. 9 (the highest-numbered fragment) is thus the earliest fragment of **229** in the treatise, but the last in the relevant *scorza* stack, and so survives as the only extant *scorza* of this sequence.

Col. 85

Epicurus' views on the gods are contrasted with another set of views, according to which perhaps the gods do not do any harm (cf. above, 1184–1202). The author argues that if those who advocate such views (*οἱ τἀβλαβῆ παρεισάγοντες*) are not liable to a charge of impiety, as causing no real harm, then neither should Epicurus be charged with impiety, as his opponents allege. He procedes to introduce a catalogue of 'self-important *theologoi* and poets' together with their tales about the gods, championed by his opponents as pious truths about gods or falsehoods that would keep the many in check. The opponents claimed further that the Epicureans were impious for revealing that the stories of the 'self-important *theologoi* and poets' were false, and were therefore acting in a manner impious and disadvantageous to humankind. Philodemus will display the poets once and for all in a 'chorus of arch-enemies' in order to demonstrate that their songs failed to preserved true conceptions of the gods (see above, 2333–43), and could perform no function in the maintenance of justice. In *P. Herc.* 1428 (see vol. ii) he concludes the treatise by similarly cataloguing the statements about the gods of the Greek philosophers, from Thales to Diogenes of Babylon, finishing with the Stoics, whose views, he argues in the concluding columns of the treatise, so far from promoting justice, would even incite injustice.

2466–8 *εἰ το[ῦ|το] καὶ περὶ θεῶν | [ἐν]ό[ηκε]ν*: probably Epicurus is the subject. The lost passage that preceded must have characterized Epicurus' views on the gods: he said that they were ... (a superlative in *]τάτους*, 2465).

2469–71 *ἡ κατ' ἰδία[ν] . . . συκο[φαν|τ]ία*: *κατ' ἰδίαν* must be adjectival: 'privately motivated', 'self-seeking', 'aimed at personal advantage'. *συκοφαντία* is not 'chicanery', as in Roman comedy, but rather 'pedantic objection'; so also Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 143,16, where it means little more than 'calumny', perhaps with an allusion to the rhetorical tactics of the courts. Cf. below, 2498–9 *μη|[δὲν] συκοφαντεῖν*, a plea 'not to carp at' the author's minor

slips in ascription, which is addressed to 'those concerned with accuracy under all circumstances', i.e. the reader or potential detractors.

2473–4 οἱ τ̣[ὰ]|βλ⟨αβ⟩ῆ παρεισάγο[ντες: these are probably those individuals discussed above who introduced new myths not in the hope of attaining political security, but simply out of conformity to fashion (2158–9 *ο]ἱ δὲ | μύθους μὲν εἰσῆγον*, 2163 *ταῦτ' εἰσφέρειν*). It might have been argued that such fabrications were at best harmless to society (see 2165–82). Philodemus would then be arguing in this passage that if such individuals were not to be blamed, then it was scarcely more than *συκοφαντία*, 'a pedantic objection', for the opponents to charge the Epicureans with impiety for holding true and pious views (2471–2 'all but sacrosanct').

2476–7 κατηγ[ορη]|θήσεσθαι: once again the language of the court-room, cf. above at 2430–1 *κατηγοροῦντε̣[ς] | ἀσέβε[ι]αν ἡμῶ̣[ν*. Similarly at 1165–76 Philodemus' response is a counter-argument in the form of a rhetorical *πίστις*: others equally culpable are not charged, so why the Epicureans?

2477–9 κἂν μ[η]|δεμιᾶς προνομ̣[ί]|α̣ς τυγχάνωσιν̣: Philodemus points out that the Epicureans expect no political favouritism or exemption. This may bear some relation to the digression on kingship above at 2433–48, where it may be implied that the Epicureans would get special exemption from kings who are wise. Here he suggests that even in the non-Epicurean community, ruled by non-sages, the Epicureans do not deserve to be charged for impiety or harassed for their views.

2479–80 [ἐκατάρ]|ξομαι: since Philodemus never uses the simple form of the verb, Henrichs's supplement is doubtless correct. For *κατάρχω* in the middle see *Rhet.* i. 326,6; with *ἀπό Rhet.* ii. 34,15, cf. *De mus.* 10,1. This begins the critique of poets proper. Earlier editors took the verb (viz. *ἄρξομαι*, in earlier editions) to refer to the begining of the *treatise*, rather than simply introducing a new section. Now, however, the critique of poets that follows can be seen to be closely connected to the entire preceding section dealing with the origin of justice in cultural history in relation to views on the nature of the gods. Schober, believing that the critique of poets stood first in the treatise, took the preceding fragments of **247/242** and **1610** to form part of a *praefatio* to the treatise as a whole. But he did not know the correct order of these fragments or all the links between them, nor did he discern that the fragments of **229** also form part of this account. Philodemus' intention to engage in such a demonstration is already indicated at 2340–4 (and was probably part of the plan since 1184 ff.), but the demonstration cataloguing the absurdities of the 'poets and *theologoi*' has been postponed until after the digression on the rise of injustice and the discussion of tyrants and kings in connection with the charge of impiety against Epicureans.

2480–1 *Order of Columns.* The link between the columns of **1610** (preserves bottoms of columns only) and **247** (tops of columns only) was first discerned by Schober: cf. above, cols. 73–4, a link with the same disposition of fragments; so

also **1610** fr. 3 and **247** fr. 6a (from the critique of poets that follows: see Schober 1988, 77).

Col. 86AB

2480–1 ἀπὸ τ[ῶν || cεμ]νῶν θεολόγων | [καὶ π]οητῶν: by way of ironic deference the poets and philosophers are styled at the outset as *cεμνοί*, i.e. people who give themselves airs, especially in religious matters; cf. *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 10,19 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 21); Xen. *Oec.* 10.3 *αἱ δ' ἀεὶ καθήμεναι cεμνῶc*, women who 'always sit about like fine ladies'. They are stylized in the text together as a holy 'chorus' (2491 *χορόν*) with their songs about the gods. On the word *cεμνόc* see Henrichs 1974*a*, 27 with nn. 47–8 citing *cεμνὸc φιλόcοφοc* at Orig. *Contra Cels.* 4.48 = *SVF* ii. 1074 (ironically of Chrysippus as an allegorizing *theologos*). They are more politely referred to above 1203–5 as *οἱ δι]καιοι τῶν [θεολ]όγων | καὶ φιλοσόφων* (if the restoration is correct), but at 1570–2 as *τῶ[ν δια]|βληθέντων [θεολ]|όγῳ[ν ἢ] φιλο[cόφων* (cf. 1310–11, where the *ποηταί* are named in a negative vein). In the cultural history above they are discussed at 2165–74, where they come under similarly derogatory description, for having seemed *ἀcεβεῖc . . . καὶ φε|νακιcταί*. For other possible allusions to them in the first part of the treatise see 1853–67 and also above 299–308, 524 ff. Of them thus far only Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias have been named (at 524–6). For the scope of reference in the case of the poets (Homer, Orpheus, and Musaeus to Callimachus) and philosophers (Thales to Diogenes of Babylon) see vol. ii; Henrichs 1972*a*; 1975. For poets as the first theologians see Aristot. *Met.* *A*3, 938^{b}29; Lucr. 5.405–6.

2483–4 τούτουc | [ἐγκω]μιάζουcιν: this identifies the position of the 'detractors' (2485 *κατ]α[τρ]έχοντεc*): by implication they praise the '*theologoi* and poets' telling stories about the gods that are *advantageous* to mankind, i.e. allegedly for obtaining security by frightening wrongdoers into refraining from crime.

2484–6 οἱ | [κατ]α[τρ]έχοντεc ἡ|[μῶ]ν: 'those deriding us'. The supplement is due to Schober's mentor Christian Jensen (private communication from A. Henrichs). For its use of opponents with genitive object see Philod. *Rhet.* i. 69,2; *De vit.* p. 42,14 Jensen *λ[οι]πὸν ἔcτιν μὲν ὅτε τοι|οῦτοί τινέc εἰcιν ὑπεροχὴν | ἐμφαίνοντεc ἰδίαν ἢ τῶν | οὐc ἀποcεμνύcουcιν, ἔcτιν | δ' ὅτε κατατρέχοντεc μόνον | ἐνίων*. Since Philodemus concludes the treatise in *P. Herc.* 1428 with an attack on the Stoics for deviously 'accommodating what the poets say to the views of the Stoics' (col. 6,16–26, see vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 17) and for developing their own philosophical mythology, a safe bet would be that the 'detractors' here are Stoics contemporary with Philodemus' teacher Zeno, perhaps Diogenes of Babylon (the latest philosopher named in *P. Herc.* 1428) and his pupils. It is not entirely certain that *οἱ*

| [κατ]α[τρ]έχοντες 'the detractors' here are identical with Philodemus' opponents throughout the treatise (see above on 297–8, where all references to opponents in the treatise are tabulated).

2486–9 ὡς ἀcεβῆ καὶ | [ἀcύ]μφορα τοῖc ἀν|[θρώ]ποιc δογματι|[ζόν]τωv: the subject of the participle is 'us', i.e. the Epicureans. The 'detractors' attack 'us' for/in the idea that, we are teaching things impious and disadvantageous to mankind. For *δογματίζω* as a term for approved Epicurean teaching see above on 308, cf. 791, 1300–1.

2489–90 ἀξιῶ δ' ὃ|[τι: the supplement is Schober's, who compares for the construction Philod. *Rhet.* ii. 91,5–7 *δοκῶι δ' ὅτι καὶ . . . παραβληθήcεται* (= *Rhet.* ii. 116,3–5). Here the verb of the *ὅτι* clause is 2494 (*ἀνωφελὴc*) *ἔcται*, completed by the infinitive *διαδ]οῦναι* in 2492. Daniel Delattre, however, suggests to me that we should supply the article *τό* at the beginning of 2490, thus making the articular infinitive *τὸ . . . ἀποδ]οῦναι* the subject of the *ὅτι* clause whose predicate is *ἀνωφελὴc ἔcται*.

2491 ὡc χορόν: *N* has]Λ|, the first letter of which is compatible with the middle part of omega. For a parallel see Philod. *Rhet.* i. 237,5–6 *ὡc ὁ τῶν πολιτευομένων χορός*, 'like the crowd of politicians'. Cicero attests the Academic Philo saddling the Epicureans with this figure of speech in his characterization of Philodemus' teacher Zeno, *De nat. deor.* 1.59 (Cotta) *Zenonem, quem Philo noster coryphaeum appellare Epicureorum solebat*, which he immediately glosses as *princeps Epicureorum*—though the image is an almost exclusively Greek one, as can be seen from the list of parallel expressions given by Pease ad loc. (Similarly of Zeno of Citium at Philod. *De Stoic.* col. 13,24 *καὶ | [γὰ]ρ ὁ κορυφαῖος α[ὐτῶν* with Dorandi ad loc.) The move from the comparison of the head of philosophical school with the leader of a dramatic chorus to the school itself as a chorus is an easy one: Cic. *De fin.* 1. 26 *totum Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti*; D.H. *De comp.* 24 *Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χορόν*. Of Stoics: Galen, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 2. 5. 35 *Ζήνων καὶ Χρύcιππος ἅμα τῷ cφετέρῳ χορῷ παντί* (which probably alludes to their citations of the poets); Themist. *Or.* 2. 27 c (*SVF* iii. 251) *ὁ ἐκ τῆc ποικίλης χορός*; Olympiod. ad Plat. *Phaed.* 28 Finckh (*SVF* ii. 1030) *ὁ φιλόcοφος χορὸc ὁ τῶν Cτωικῶν*. Of poets (as here): Liban. *Ep.* 1089, 2, with the very important difference that here the poets are said to be extolled by the Stoics as supporting, or at least not inconsistent with, the Stoic position.

2493–6 οὐ πό|[νος] ἀνωφελὴc ἔcται | [πα]ντάπαcιν οὔτε | [μα]κρός: for similar apologies or denials in respect to length or structure in this treatise see above on 1279–81 and 2338–43. Here [*μα*]*κρός* is the supplement of Bücheler. If correct, Philodemus is striking an ironic note. For the catalogue of poets that follows is very long (*c.* 150 cols.). Therefore restoring *οὔτε | [μι]κρός* here would more accurately describe the extent of the catalogue, while *οὔτε | [πι]κρός* 'neither useless nor bitter' would suggest Lucr. 1. 940–1 *perpotet amarum / absinthi laticem*. In any case note that Philo-

demus does not say either that the 'choreography' of poets that follows is either useful (*cυμφέρον, ὠφελής*) or sweet (*ἡδύς*, Lucr. 1. 947 *quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle*), and hence necessary for the philosopher as a *τέχνη*. He comes very close to it; perhaps he means it is at least potentially useful and attractive in itself. Yet he explicitly states his concern not to seem to be spending too much time on such matters. This is at least partly belied by the sheer length and erudition of the catalogue that follows.

2499–2501 ἐ̣ι̣[ὰ]ν̣ εὕρω[cι]ν ἐνηλ⟨λ⟩α̣ι̣[γμ]ένον ὄνομα: for the Epicurean concern with accuracy, *ἀκρίβεια*, see Angeli 1985, 63–84. At 2199–2203 Philodemus makes clear that he is less concerned with engaging in the poets *per se* than with his philosophical opponents who had praised them (2483–4 *μ]άλιcτα τούτουc | [ἐγκω]μιάζουcιν*): except for the purpose of refuting 'those who attack us' (2485–6), he would not have even wasted his time on the poets, and he implies that he will treat them cursorily so as not to seem to dwell on them too long (apparently a case of denying the obvious), so that such slips in accuracy are likely to have occurred. The sense of *ἐνηλλαγμένον* may well be 'changed in their order', i.e. 'metathesized', and of *ὀνόματα* simply 'words' in quoted texts, as though to say: 'Don't blame me if I don't quote them verbatim.' In *De poem.* Philodemus is much exercised about the effect of transpositions, *ἐναλλαγαί*, of words on the quality of a poem (e.g. *De poem.* 2, Tr. C cols. 17,2–18,5). The apology here and the feigned lack of concern, in contrast with the length of the catalogue of poets, may reveal habits of a scholar in potential conflict with his philosophical attitude towards poetry, one that refused to accord value to poems 'in so far as they are poems' (see Asmis 1991 and 1993). On the other hand Philodemus may be shrewdly expressing doubts here about the reliability or precision of the sources for his citations of the poets, probably the works of Zeno's Stoic opponents, for 2484 *ἐγκω]μιάζουcιν* shows pretty clearly that Philodemus (or his teacher and predecessor Zeno) took these examples in scores not from the texts of the poets themselves, but rather from the writings of the Stoics. Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, and Apollodorus of Athens, as we learn later in *P. Herc.* 1428 (see vol. ii), had cited positively many of the same poetic examples condemned by Philodemus in support of their own theology of accommodation (*cυνοικείωcιc*). According to Galen, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 3. 176. 7 (cf. 3. 182. 9) Chrysippus' quotations from the poets in his *Περὶ ψυχῆc* alone numbered in the thousands. In other words, in the present passage Philodemus' warning against slips in accuracy absolves him of responsibility for potential errors in his source. (Of course he may have explicitly acknowledged this borrowing in the following column, which is unfortunately missing.) At the same time, as Dr Holford-Strevens remarks, Philodemus may simply be modestly affecting to be quoting from memory, as literary men would do, 'to prove he was a gentleman and not a schoolmaster' (for the topos see W. Kroll, *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen*

Literatur (Stuttgart, 1924), 290, and cf. Gellius 1. 3. 10, 6. 16. 4, and the similarly ironic profession of ineloquence at Antiphon 5. 1), while in reality saying 'you won't find a single error here'.

Col. 82B

Note that Schober's apparatus criticus for this fragment (also that for **1610** fr. 3) was omitted by error in the 1988 publication in *CErc* 18 (p. 77). Less unintentional in that printing was the omission throughout of Chr. Jensen's handwritten comments, and, more important, the discrepancies between his text and the readings recorded by the apographs, carefully documented and annotated by Schober in parallel columns throughout the original handwritten dissertation.

2504–5 cπεύδε̣[ιν | μ' ἵν]α̣ π̣ου μ̣ὴ φανῶ: for the idiom see LSJ s.v. *cπεύδω* II.4 and cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 926 *εἰc τοὺc πλουcίουc cπεύcω c' ὅπωc ἂν ἐγγραφῇc*. Like Schober (who printed here *πρὸ*] *ὁ̣δοῦ*) I have despaired of a solution that will accommodate *N's*]ΑΔΟΥ, though *ἵνα* or *ὅπωc* is to be expected with *μή*. For *που* in Philodemus see *De oec.* col. 13,17, 15,15; *De ira* 31,25, 44,2.

2505–7 μ̣ὴ φανῶ [τὸν | πο]λ̣ὺν̣ π̣ροcεδρεύ̣[cαι] τοιούτουc χρόνον: to spend too much time dwelling on the poets and *theologoi* might be thought to detract from the Epicurean position or have adverse psychological consequences for the Epicurean. In *P. Herc.* 1428, however (see vol. ii), it is allowed that some types of poetry are fitting for a poet and philosopher (see col. 11,9–12,2; Henrichs 1974*a*, 21–2: possible exception for the poetry of Diagoras), and at *P. Herc.* 1428 col. 13,23–14,2 (vol. ii; Henrichs 1974*a*, 24) the comic poetry of the Athenian Timocles is even quoted in argument against Stoic theology. So it is not the case that Philodemus is adverse to poetry *per se*, although the fact that his opponents hold that the myths provide political advantages (i.e. have social value, denied by the Epicureans) requires him to adopt a hostile attitude towards poetry here. Yet the length at which the litany of poets and *theologoi* is drawn in the second part of the treatise belies the author's statements in this column. The author clearly believed it was important for the Epicurean to be familiar with poetry about the gods, its authors, conventions, and typical conceits (see further Obbink 1995*b*). Since there was no place for the study of poetry in the Epicurean curriculum, he undertakes in the second part of the treatise to provide a comprehensive, though tachygraphic, survey of it.

2510–11 *Order of Columns.* See on 2480–1. Schober first united the two pieces of papyrus (col. 86A–B), a single column broken horizontally. The critique of poets follows.

CONSPECTUS STUDIORUM

Collections of Fragments

AP: Palatine Anthology.
CA: J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford, 1925).
VS: H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[6], 3 vols. (Berlin, 1952).
Dox. Gr.: H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879).
EGF: M. Davies, *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Göttingen, 1988).
FGrH: F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin and Leiden, 1923–58).
FHG: C. and T. Müller, *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1848–70).
Gow–Page: A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, *The Greek Anthology. The Garland of Philip*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1968).
HPh: A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987).
KRS: G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*[2], (Cambridge, 1983).
M.–W.: R. Merkelbach and M. L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodea* (Oxford, 1967).
Nauck[2]: A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*[2] (Leipzig, 1889).
OF: O. Kern, *Orphicorum fragmenta* (Berlin, 1912).
PCG: R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin, 1983–).
PEG: A. Bernabé, *Poetarum epicorum Graecorum testimonia et fragmenta*, i (Leipzig, 1987).
PLG: T. Bergk, *Poetae lyrici Graeci* (Leipzig, 1882).
PMG: D. L. Page, *Poetae melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962).
PMGF: M. Davies, *Poetarum melicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, i (Oxford, 1991).
SH: H. Lloyd-Jones and P. J. Parsons, *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (Texte und Kommentare, 11; Berlin, 1983).
SSR: G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae*, 4 vols. (Naples, 1990).
SVF: H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903–5).

TrGF: B. Snell and S. Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta* (Göttingen, 1971–).

Collections of Papyri

CPF: *Corpus dei papiri filosofici*, I.1*–I.1** (Florence, 1989–).
*HV*¹: *Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt collectio prior*, 11 vols. (Naples, 1799–1855).
*HV*² II: *Herculanensium voluminum quae supersunt collectio altera*, ii (Naples, 1863).
P. Herc.: *Catalogo dei papiri ercolanesi* (Naples, 1979).
P. Oxy.: *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (London, 1898–).
PGM: A. Henrichs and K. Preisendanz, *Papyri Graecae magicae: Die griechischen Zauberpapyri*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1973–4).
Suppl. Mag.: R. W. Daniel and F. Maltomini, *Supplementum magicum*, 2 vols. (Papyrologica Colonensia, 16.1; Opladen, 1990).

Collections of Inscriptions

CIG: *Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum* (Berlin, 1828–77).
IG: *Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin, 1873–).
LSAM: F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1955).
LSCG: F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées de cités grecques* (Paris, 1969).
LSS: F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées de cités grecques: Supplément* (Paris, 1962).
OGI: W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae* (Leipzig, 1903–5).
SEG: *Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum* (Leiden, 1923–).
*SIG*³: W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum*³ (Leipzig, 1921–4).

Dictionaries, Grammars, and Lexica

LSJ: H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, rev. H. S. Jones (with supplement 1968), *A Greek–English Lexicon* (Oxford, 1968).
RE: G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, and K. Mistelhaus (eds.), *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1893–1972).
Lex. Philod.: C. J. Vooys [= Vooijs], *Lexicon Philodemeum, Pars Prior* (Purmerend, 1934), and C. J. Vooijs and D. A. van Krevelen, *Lexicon Philodemeum, Pars Altera* (Amsterdam, 1941).
Gloss. Epic.: H. Usener, *Glossarium Epicureum*, ed. M. Gigante and W. Schmid (Rome, 1977).

Kühner–Blass: R. Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, pt. i, rev. F. Blass (Hanover, 1890–2).
Kühner–Gerth: R. Kühner, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*, pt. ii, rev. B. Gerth (Hanover, 1898–1904).
Mayser: E. Mayser (and H. Schmoll), *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1906–70).
MGrHerc: W. Crönert, *Memoria Graeca Herculanensis* (Leipzig, 1903).
Smyth: H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, Mass., 1920).
Schwyzer: E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1968–77).

Abbreviations for journals follow *L'Année philologique*; *CErc* = *Cronache ercolanesi*.

Epicurean Authors

Carneiscus = Capasso 1988
Demetrius of Laconia:
De dis = De Falco 1923, 65–80 + Renna 1982
De poem(atis) = Romeo 1988
P. Herc. 1012 = Puglia 1988
Diogenes of Oenoanda = Smith 1993
Epicurus, *De nat(ura)* = Arrighetti 1973 (Arr.^{2}) except:
De nat. 14 = Leone 1984
De nat. 28 = Sedley 1973
Hermarchus = Longo 1988*a*
Idomeneus = Angeli 1981
Philodemus:
De bono rege = Dorandi 1982
De dis 1, 3 = Diels 1916*b*, 1917
De Epic(uro) 2 = Vogliano 1928, 59–61 + Tepedino 1994 (cf. 1992)
Epigrams = Gow–Page i. 1350–69; ii. 371–400 (cf. Gigante 1988*b*; Sider)
P. Herc. 1251 = Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 1995
Ind(ex) Acad(emicorum) = Dorandi 1991*a* (cf. Mekler 1902; Gaiser 1988)
Ind(ex) Stoic(orum) = Dorandi 1994 (cf. Traversa 1952)
De insania = Bignone 1919
De ira = Indelli 1988
De lib(ertate) dicendi = Olivieri 1914
De morte = Kuiper 1925 + Gigante 1983, 115–234
De mus(ica) = Kemke 1884, Rispoli 1969, Delattre 1989, except:
De mus. 4 = Neubecker 1986 (cf. van Krevelen 1939)
De oec(onomia) = Jensen 1907 (cf. Laurenti 1973)
De piet. part 1 = this edition

part 2 (see vol. ii): criticism of the poets = Schober 1988; of the pre-Socratic philosophers: Gomperz 1866, 62–73, except for fr. 16 (Democritus) and fr. 19 (Prodicus) = Henrichs 1975*b*, fr. 18 (Diogenes of Apollonia) = Laks 1983, fr. 22 (Speusippus) = Tarán 1981; of the Stoics (*P. Herc.* 1428) = Henrichs 1974*a*

De poem(atis) 2 = Sbordone 1976 (cf. Hausrath 1889)

De poem(atis) 5 = Mangoni 1993 (cf. Jensen 1923)

Pragm(ateia) = Spina 1977 (cf. Liebich 1960)

Πρὸς τοὺς [---] (*P. Herc.* 1005) = Angeli 1988

(De) Rhet(oricis) = Sudhaus 1892, 1896, except:

Rhet. 1, 2 = Longo 1977

Rhet. 3 (second half) = Hammerstaedt 1992

De sign(is) = De Lacy and De Lacy 1978

De Stoic(is) = Dorandi 1982*b*

Test. Socr. = Acosta Méndez and Angeli 1992

Tratt(ato) = Capasso 1982

De vit(iis) = Jensen 1911

Polyaenus = Tepedino 1991

Polystratus, *De contemptu* = Indelli 1978

Metrodorus = Körte 1890

Zeno of Sidon = Angeli and Colaizzo 1979

Incerti

P. Herc. 176 = Angeli 1988*b* (+ Vogliano 1928, 23–75 for remainder), Tepedino 1991

Vita Philon(idis) (*P. Herc.* 1044) = Gallo 1980, 23–166

P. Oxy. II 215 = Obbink 1992*a*

Modern Studies

Acosta Méndez, E., and Angeli, A. (1992): *Filodemo: Testimonianze su Socrate* (La scuola di Epicuro, 13; Naples).

Adam, H. (1974): *Plutarchs Schrift non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* (Amsterdam).

Alberti, A. (1995): 'The Epicurean Theory of Law and Justice', in Laks and Schofield 1995: 161–90.

Angeli, A. (1981): 'I frammenti di Idomeneo di Lampsaco', *CErc* 11: 41–101.

—— (1983): 'Filodemo: Le altre opere. Il pensiero teologico di Filodemo', in *Syzetesis*, ii. 600–12.

—— (1985): 'L'esattezza scientifica in Epicuro e Filodemo', *CErc* 15: 63–84.

—— (1988*a*): *Filodemo: Agli amici di scuola (PHerc. 1005)* (La scuola di Epicuro, 7; Naples).
—— (1988*b*): 'La scuola epicurea di Lampsaco nel *PHerc.* 176 (fr. 5 coll. I, IV, VIII–XXIII)', *CErc* 18: 27–51.
—— (1993): 'Frammenti di lettere di Epicuro nei papiri d'Ercolano', *CErc* 23: 11–27.
—— (1994): 'Lo svolgimento dei papiri carbonizzati', in Capasso 1994: 37–104.
—— and Colaizzo, M. (1979): 'I frammenti di Zenone Sidonio', *CErc* 9: 47–133.
Annas, J. (1989): 'Epicurean Emotions', *GRBS* 30: 145–64.
Arrighetti, G. (1955): 'Filodemo περὶ θεῶν III fr. 74–82', *PP* 44: 322–56.
—— (1958): 'Filodemo, De dis III, col. X–XI', *SCO* 7: 83–99.
—— (1961): 'Filodemo, De dis III, col. XII–XIII 20 (*quasi corpus, quasi sanguis* = ποιὸς ὕπνος)', *SCO* 10: 112–21.
—— (1973 = Arr.²): *Epicuro, Opere*² (Turin).
—— (ed.) (1982): *Aspetti di Hermann Usener, filologo della religione* (Pisa).
—— (1983): 'Filodemo, "Gli dèi" III fr. 75 (Antifane, gli stoici e i πράγματα)', *CErc* 13: 29–31.
Asmis, E. (1981): 'Lucretius' Explanation of Moving Dream Figures', *AJP* 102: 138–45.
—— (1984): *Epicurus' Scientific Method* (Ithaca and London).
—— (1990): 'Philodemus' Epicureanism', *ANRW* II 36.4: 2369–2408.
—— (1991): 'Philodemus' Poetic Theory and *On the Good King According to Homer*', *CA* 10: 1–32.
—— (1993): 'Epicurean Poetics', in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 7: 63–93, 104–5 = Obbink 1995*a*, 15–34.
Ax, W. (1986): *Stimme und Sprache: Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie* (Hypomnemata, 84; Göttingen).
Babut, D. (1974): *La Religion des philosophes grecs* (Paris).
Bailey, C. (1926): *Epicurus: The Extant Remains* (Oxford).
—— (1928): *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus: A Study* (Oxford).
Barchiesi, A. (1978): 'Il lamento di Giuturna', *MD* 1: 99–121.
Barigazzi, A. (1955): 'Uomini e dèi in Epicuro', *Acme*, 8: 37–55.
Barnes, J. (1988): 'Epicurean Signs', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Supplementary Volume* (Oxford), 91–134.
—— *et al.* (eds.) (1982): *Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice* (Cambridge).
Bassi, D. (1909): 'La sticometria nei papiri ercolanesi', *RFIC* 37: 321–63, 481–515.
—— (1911): 'L'illustrazione inedita di Bernardo Quaranta dell'opera περὶ εὐσεβείας di Filodemo', in *Symbolae Litterariae in honorem J. De Petra*, 129–42 (Naples).

BASSI, D. (1913): 'Papiri ercolanesi disegnati', *RFIC* 41: 427–64.
BERNABÉ, A. (1982): 'Cyclica (I)', *Emerita*, 50: 81–92.
BERNAYS, J. (1866): *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit* (Berlin).
BIGNONE, E. (1919): 'Philodemea (Pap. Herc. ined. 168 col. 1, 2: Pap. Herc. 57 col. 1, 2, 4, 5, 9)', *RFIC* 47: 414–21.
—— (1920*a*): review of Philippson 1916–18, in *GCFI* 1: 85–6.
—— (1920*b*): *Epicuro. Opere, frammenti, testimonianze sulla sua vita* (Bari).
—— (1936): *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Florence).
BINDER, G., KOENEN, L., and LIESENBORGHS, L. (1967): 'Ein neues Epikurfragment bei Didymos dem Blinden', *ZPE* 1: 33–44.
BING, P. (1988): *The Well-Read Muse: Present and Past in Callimachus and the Hellenistic Poets* (Hypomnemata, 90; Göttingen).
BIRT, T. (1882): *Das antike Buchwesen* (Berlin).
BLANK, D. L. (1994): 'Diogenes of Babylon and the κριτικοί in Philodemus: A Preliminary Suggestion', *CErc* 24: 55–62.
BLICKMAN, D. R. (1989): 'Lucretius, Epicurus, and Prehistory', *HSCP* 92: 157–91.
BLOMFIELD, C. J. (1810): anonymous review of Drummond and Walpole 1810, in *Edinburgh Review*, 16 (August 1810), 368–84.
BOLKESTEIN, H. (1929): *Theophrastos' Charakter der Deisidaimonia als religionsgeschichtliche Urkunde* (RGVV 21/2; Giessen).
BOLKESTEIN, J. C. (1936): *Ὅσιος en Εὐσεβής: Bijdrage tot de Godsdienstige en Zedelijke Terminologie van de Grieken* (Proefschrift; Amsterdam).
BOLLACK, J., and LAKS, A. (1976): *Études sur l'épicurisme antique* (Publications de l'Université de Lille III, Cahiers de philologie, 1; Lille).
BOSERUP, I. (1971*a*): 'Mod en ny rekonstruktion af Filodems skrift *Om fromheden*', *Museum Tusculanum*, 17: 26–39.
—— (1971*b*): 'Zu Philodems De Pietate und Heraklit B 80', *ZPE* 8: 109–15.
BOYANCÉ, P. (1937): *Le Culte des Muses chez les philosophes grecs: Études d'histoire et de psychologie religieuses* (Paris).
BREMMER, J. (1982): 'Literacy and the Origins and Limitations of Greek Atheism', in J. den Boeft and A. H. M Kessels (eds.), *Actus: Studies in Honour of H. L. W. Nelson* (Utrecht), 43–55.
—— (1983): *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton).
—— (1986): review of Arrighetti 1982, in *Mnemosyne*⁴, 39: 561–4.
BRUNSCHWIG, J. (1994): *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*, trans. J. Lloyd (Cambridge).
—— and NUSSBAUM, M. C. (1993): *Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge).
BRUNT, P. A. (1989) 'Philosophy and Religion in the Late Republic', in Griffin and Barnes 1989, 97–119.
BÜCHELER, FR. (1865): 'Philodemos Περὶ εὐσεβείας', *JbClPh* 91: 513–41 = *Kleine Schriften*, i (Leipzig and Berlin, 1915), 580–612.

BUFFIÈRE, F. (1973) *Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque*² (Paris).
BULLOCH, A. W., GRUEN, E. S., LONG, A. A., and STEWART, A. (eds.) (1993): *Images and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles).
BURKERT, W. (1983): *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*, trans. P. Bing (Berkeley and Los Angeles).
—— (1985*a*): *Greek Religion*, trans. J. Raffan (Cambridge, Mass.).
—— (1985*b*): 'Der Autor von Derveni: Stesimbrotos *Περὶ Τελετῶν*?', *ZPE* 62: 1–5.
BURNYEAT, M. (1976): 'Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy', *Philosophical Review*, 85: 44–69.
—— (1978): 'The Upside-Down Back-to-Front Sceptic of Lucretius IV 472', *Philologus*, 122: 197–206.
—— (1980): 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?', in Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes 1980, 20–53 = Burnyeat 1983, 161–74.
—— (1982): 'Gods and Heaps', in Schofield and Nussbaum 1982, 315–38.
—— (ed.) (1983): *The Sceptical Tradition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles).
CANFORA, L. (1974): *Conservazione e perdita dei classici* (Padua).
CAPASSO, M. (1976): 'L'opera polistratea sulla filosofia', *CErc* 6: 81–4.
—— (1981): 'I "Problemi di filologia filosofica" di Mario Untersteiner', *Elenchos*, 2: 375–404.
—— (1982): *Trattato etico epicureo (PHerc. 346)* (Naples).
—— (1983): *Storia fotografica dell'Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi* (Naples).
—— (1986): 'I papiri e la collezione dei rami ercolanesi', in *Contributi*, ii. 131–56.
—— (1987) *Comunità senza rivolta: Quattro saggi sull'epicureismo* (Naples).
—— (1988): *Carneisco: Il secondo libro del Filista (P.Herc. 1027)* (La scuola di Epicuro, 10; Naples).
—— (1989): 'Primo supplemento al catalogo dei papiri ercolanesi', *CErc* 19: 193–264.
—— (1991): *Manuale di papirologia ercolanese*, Università degli Studi di Lecce, Dipartimento di filologia classica e medioevale (Testi e studi, 3; Lecce).
—— (ed.) (1992): *Papiri letterari greci e latini* (Papyrologica Lupiensia, 1; Lecce).
—— (1993): 'Epicarmo nei papiri ercolanesi', in *Ercolano*, 295–300.
—— (ed.) (1994): *Il rotolo librario: Fabbricazione, restauro, organizzazione interna* (Papyrologica Lupiensia, 3; Lecce).
—— (1995): *Volumen: Aspetti della tipologia del rotolo librario antico* (Cultura, 3; Naples).
CAPONE BRAGA, G. (1951): *Studi su Epicuro* (Milan).
CASTNER, C. J. (1982): 'Epicurean *Hetairai* as Dedicants to Healing Deities?', *GRBS* 23: 51–7.

CASTNER, C. J. (1988): *Prosopography of Roman Epicureans* (Studien zur klassischen Philologie, 34; Frankfurt am Main).

Catalogo (1979): *Catalogo dei Papiri ercolanesi*, sotto la direzione di M. Gigante (Naples).

CAVALLO, G. (1983): *Libri scritture scribi a Ercolano: Introduzione allo studio dei materiali greci*, Primo suppl. a *CErc* 13 (Naples).

CHILTON, C. W. (1962): 'An Epicurean View of Protagoras', *Phronesis*, 7: 105–9.

—— (1967): *Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta* (Leipzig).

CLAY, D. (1980): 'An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams', *AJP* 101: 342–65.

—— (1982) 'Epicurus in the Archives of Athens', in *Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography Presented to Eugene Vanderpool* (Hesperia Suppl. 19; Princeton), 17–26.

—— (1983*a*): 'Individual and Community in the First Generation of the Epicurean School', in *Syzetesis*, i. 255–79.

—— (1983*b*): *Lucretius and Epicurus* (Ithaca).

—— (1986): 'The Cults of Epicurus', *CErc* 16: 11–28.

—— (1989): 'A Lost Epicurean Community', *GRBS* 30: 313–35.

—— (1992): 'Lucian of Samosata: Four Philosophical Lives', *ANRW* II 36.5: 3406–50.

COLE, TH. (1990): *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*² (Atlanta).

COMPARETTI, D. (1880): 'Relazione sui papiri ercolanesi', *Atti Accad. Lincei*, Cl. Sc. mor., st. e filol., Serie II, 5 (1880), 145–78 = D. Comparetti and G. De Petra, *La Villa ercolanese dei Pisoni: I suoi monumenti e la sua biblioteca* (Turin, 1883, repr. Naples, 1972), 57–88.

Contributi 1 (1980): *Contributi alla storia della Officina dei Papiri ercolanesi*, i (I Quaderni della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli 5,2 = I Papiri Ercolanesi, 3; Naples).

Contributi 2 (1986): *Contributi alla storia della Officina dei Papiri ercolanesi*, ii (I Quaderni della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli 6,1 = I Papiri Ercolanesi, 4; Rome).

COUSSIN, P. (1941): 'Les Sorites de Carnéade contre le polythéisme', *REG* 54: 43–57.

CRIBIORE, R. (1993): 'Writing, Teachers and Students in Greco-Roman Egypt' (diss. Columbia).

CRÖNERT, W. (1898): 'Fälschungen in den Abschriften der herculanensischen Rollen', *RhM*² 53: 585–95 = 1975, 15–25.

—— (1901): 'Neues über Epikur und einige herkulanensische Rollen', *RhM*² 56: 607–26 = 1975, 103–25.627

—— (1903): *Memoria Graeca Herculanensis* (Leipzig).

—— (1906): *Kolotes und Menedemos* (Leipzig).

—— (1975): *Studi ercolanesi*, introd., Ital. trans. E. Livrea (Naples).

La cultura classica (1987): *La cultura classica a Napoli nell'Ottocento*, Premessa di M. Gigante, 2 vols. (Naples).

DAVIES, M. (1989): 'Sisyphus and the Invention of Religion ("Critias" *TrGF* 1 (43) F 19 = B 25 DK)', *BICS* 36: 16–32.

DECHARME, P. (1904): *La Critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs* (Paris).

DECLEVA CAIZZI, F. (1977): 'La tradizione antistenico-cinica in Epitteto', in G. Giannantoni (ed.), *Scuole socratiche minori e filosofia ellenistica* (Bologna), 90–1.

DE FALCO, V. (1923): *L'epicureo Demetrio Lacone* (Naples).

DE LACY, P. H. (1948): 'Stoic Views of Poetry', *AJP* 69: 241–71.

—— (1966): 'Galen and the Greek Poets', *GRBS* 7: 259–66.

—— and DE LACY, E. A. (1978): *Philodemus, On Methods of Inference*² (La scuola di Epicuro, 1; Naples).

DELATTRE, D. (1988): 'A propos de livres II et III du *Περὶ μουσικῆς* de Philodème: Essai de "reconstruction" de colonnes mutilées', in *Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology*, i (Athens), 193–208.

—— (1989): 'Philodème, *De la musique*: Livre IV, colonnes 40* à 109*', *CErc* 19: 49–144.

—— (1991): 'Une "citation" stoïcienne des *Lois* de Platon (II 669b–e) de Platon dans les *Commentaires sur la Musique* de Philodème?', *Revue d'histoire des textes*, 21: 1–17.

—— (1992): 'Combien de livres comptaient les *Commentaires sur la musique* de Philodème', in Capasso 1992, 179–91.

—— (1993): 'Philodème, *De la Musique*' (Thèse de doctorat; Sorbonne).

DELLA VALLE, G. (1935): *Tito Lucrezio Caro e l'epicureismo campano* (Naples).

DENNISTON, J. D. (1952): *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford), Ital. trans., ed. E. Renna, *Lo stile della prosa greca*, con una premessa di M. Gigante e prefazione di H. Lloyd-Jones (Bari, 1993).

DERENNE, E. (1930): *Les Procès d'impiété intentés aux philosophes à Athènes* (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liége, 45).

DIANO, C. (1935): 'Note Epicuree: I', *SIFC* 12: 61–86, 237–89.

—— (1946): *Epicuri Ethica* (Florence).

—— (1974): *Scritti epicurei* (Florence).

DIELS, H. (1878): 'Atacta', *Hermes*, 13: 1–3.

—— (1879): *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin).

—— (1882): 'Stichometrisches', *Hermes*, 17: 377–84.

—— (1916*a*): 'Ein epikureisches Fragment über Götterverehrung', *SPAW* 1916, 886–909 = *Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, ed. W. Burkert (Darmstadt, 1969), 288–311.

—— (1916*b*): 'Philodemos über die Götter, Erstes Buch', *APAW* 1916, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Nr. 7 (Text und Erläuterung).

DIELS, H. (1917): 'Philodemos über die Götter, Drittes Buch', *APAW* 1917, Nr. 4 (Text) und 6 (Erläuterung).

DIETZE, J. (1896): 'Die mythologischen Quellen für Philodemos Schrift περὶ εὐσεβείας', *JbClPh* 153: 218–26.

DIONIGI, I. (1976): 'Lucr. 5, 1198–1203 e P. Oxy. 215 col. I 7–24: L'epicureismo e la venerazione degli dèi', *SIFC* 48: 118–39.

DODDS, E. R. (1951): *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley).

DORANDI, T. (1980): 'Testimonianze sugli arconti nei papiri ercolanesi', *CErc* 10: 153–74.

—— (1982*a*): *Filodemo: Il buon re secondo Omero, edizione, traduzione e commento* (La scuola di Epicuro, 3; Naples).

—— (1982*b*): 'Filodemo: Gli stoici (PHerc. 155 e 339)', *CErc* 12: 91–133.

—— (1987): 'Stichometrica', *ZPE* 70: 35–8.

—— (1988*a*): 'Fragmenta Herculanensia Inedita', *ZPE* 71: 43–50.

—— (1988*b*): 'Una "ri-edizione" antica del *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* di Filodemo', *ZPE* 73: 25–9.

—— (1990*a*): 'Filodemo: gli orientamenti della ricerca attuale', *ANRW* II 36.4: 2328–68.

—— (1990*b*): 'Gli arconti nei papiri ercolanesi', *ZPE* 84: 121–38.

—— (1991*a*): *Filodemo, Storia dei filosofi: Platone e l'Academia* (La scuola di Epicuro, 12; Naples).

—— (1991*b*): *Ricerche sulla cronologia dei filosofi ellenistici* (Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 19; Stuttgart).

—— (1992): 'Papiri ercolanesi fra "scorzatura" e "svolgimento"', *CErc* 22: 179–80.

—— (ed.) (1993): *Theodor Gomperz, Eine Auswahl herculanischer kleiner Schriften (1864–1909)* (Philosophia antiqua, 59; Leiden).

—— (1994): *Storia dei filosofi: La Stoa da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. 1018)* (Philosophia antiqua, 60; Leiden).

—— and SPINELLI, E. (1989): 'Ancora su PHerc 1077, fr. B', *ZPE* 77: 12.

DOVER, K. J. (1976): 'The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society', *Talanta*, 7: 25–54 = *Collected Papers*, ii (Oxford, 1988), 135–58 with 'Additional Note' on p. 158.

DRACHMANN, A. B. (1922): *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (London).

DRUMMOND, W., and WALPOLE, R. (1810): *Herculanensia; or Archaeological and Philological Dissertations, containing a Manuscript Found among the Ruins of Herculaneum* (London).

DUENING, H. H. (1870): *De Metrodori Epicurei vita et scriptis* (Leipzig).

DUMONT, J.-P. (1984): 'Diogène de Babylone et la déesse Raison', *BAGB* 3: 260–78.

EDELSTEIN, L. (1940): 'Primus Graius Homo', *TAPA* 71: 78–90.

EFFE, B. (1970): '*Προτέρη γενεή*: Eine stoische Hesiod-Interpretation in Arats Phainomena', *RhM*^{2} 113: 167–82.

EINARSON, B., and DE LACY, P. H. (1967): *Plutarch's Moralia*, xiv (Cambridge, Mass.).

Epicuro e l'epicureismo (1993): *Epicuro e l'epicureismo nei papiri ercolanesi* (Naples).

Ercolano (1993): *Ercolano 1738–1988: 250 anni di ricerca archeologica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale Ravello—Ercolano—Napoli—Pompei*, ed. L. Franchi Dell'Orto (Rome).

ERLER, M. (1992): 'Orthodoxie und Anpassung. Philodem, ein Panaitios des Kepos?', *MH* 49: 171–200.

—— (1993): '*Philologia Medicans*: Wie die Epikureer die Texte ihres Meisters lasen', in W. Kullmann and J. Althoff (eds.), *Vermittlung und Tradierung von Wissen in der griechischen Kultur* (Tübingen), 281–303.

FAHR, W. (1969): *θεοὺς νομίζειν: Zum Problem der Anfänge des Atheismus bei den Griechen* (Spudasmata, 26; Hildesheim).

FERGUSON, J. (1990): 'Epicureanism under the Roman Empire', *ANRW* II 36.4: 2257–2327 (revised and supplemented by J. P. Hershbell).

FESTUGIÈRE, A.-J. (1942): *La Sainteté* (Paris).

—— (1968): *Epicure et ses dieux*² (Paris).

FISCHEL, H. A. (1973): *Rabbinic Literature and Greco-Roman Philosophy: A Study of Epicurea and Rhetorica in Early Midrashic Writings* (Studia Post-Biblica, 21; Leiden).

FORTENBAUGH, W. W. (1992): *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence*, ed. and transl. W. W. Fortenbaugh *et al.* (Philosophia antiqua, 54.1–2; Leiden).

FRACCAROLI, G. (1900): 'Un frammento d' Epicuro', *Atti dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, 35: 513–25.

FRISCHER, B. (1982): *The Sculpted Word: Epicureanism and Philosophical Recruitment* (Berkeley and Los Angeles).

FURLEY, D. J. (1971): 'Knowledge of Atoms and Void in Epicureanism', in J. P. Anton *et al.* (eds.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (Albany, NY), 607–19.

—— (1977): 'Lucretius the Epicurean: On the History of Man', in *Lucrèce* (Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens*, 24; Geneva), 1–38.

—— (1987): *The Greek Cosmologists*, i (Cambridge).

—— (1990): *Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature* (Cambridge).

GAISER, K. (1988): *Philodems Academica: Die Berichte über Platon und die Alte Akademie in zwei herkulanensischen Papyri* (Supplementum Platonicum, 1; Berlin).

GALLO, I. (1975, 1980): *Frammenti biografici da papiri*, i: *La biografia politica*, ii: *La biografia dei filosofi* (Rome).

GEFFCKEN, J. (1907): *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig).

GIGANTE, M. (1955): 'Filodemo, De morte IV 37–39', *La parola del passato*, 44: 357–89 = 1983, 163–234.

GIGANTE, M. (1957): 'Lucretius Sisyphum Critiae est imitatus', *Dionisio*, 20: 97–8.
—— (1975): '"Philosophia medicans" in Filodemo', *CErc* 5: 53–61.
—— (1978): 'Usener e i testi epicurei nei papiri ercolanesi', *CErc* 8: 5–20.
—— (1983): *Ricerche filodemee*² (Naples).
—— (1988*a*): 'Prefazione alla stampa della dissertazione di A. Schober sulla prima parte dell'opera "De pietate" di Filodemo', *CErc* 18: 65–6.
—— (1988*b*): *Filodemo, Epigrammi scelti*² (Naples).
—— (1990): *Filodemo in Italia* (Florence) = *La Bibliothèque de Philodème et l'épicurisme romain* (Paris, 1987) = *Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum* (Ann Arbor, 1995).
—— (1993): *Atakta: Contributi alla papirologia ercolanese* (Naples).
GILL, C. (1983): 'Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?', *Phronesis*, 28: 136–49.
GOMPERZ, TH. (1864): 'Zu Philodem περὶ εὐσεβείας', *ZOEG* 15: 637–48, 731–6.
—— (1866): *Philodem über Frömmigkeit*, Herculanische Studien, zweites Heft (Leipzig).
GRILLI, A. (1957): 'Su alcuni frammenti di Filodemo (*Περὶ θεῶν* fr. 74, 76, 78–82)', *La parola del passato*, 52: 23–45.
GRIFFIN, M., and BARNES, J. (eds.) (1989): *Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society* (Oxford).
HADZITS, G. D. (1908): 'The Significance of Worship and Prayer among the Epicureans', *TAPA* 39: 73–88.
HAMILTON, R. (1992): *Choes and Anthesteria: Athenian Iconography and Ritual* (Ann Arbor, Mich.).
HAMMERSTAEDT, J. (1992): 'Der Schlussteil von Philodems drittem Buch über Rhetorik', *CErc* 22: 9–118.
HARRISON, J. E. (1922): *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*³ (Cambridge).
HARTUNG, J. A. (1865): *Philodemi Epicurei de deorum reverentia* (1865).
HAUSRATH, A. (1889): 'Philodemi περὶ ποημάτων libri secundi quae videntur fragmenta', *JbClPh* Suppl. 17: 213–76.
HAYTER, J. (1810): *Observations upon a Review of the Herculanensia in the* Quarterly Review *of Last February in a Letter to the R. H. Sir W. Drummond, to which is subjoined a Letter to the Author from Sir W. Drummond* (London).
—— (1811): *A Report upon the Herculaneum Manuscripts in a Second Letter to his Royal Highness, the Prince Regent* (London).
HEIDEL, W. (1896): *Pseudo-Platonica: A Dissertation* (Baltimore).
HENRICHS, A. (1970) 'Pagan Ritual and the Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians', in P. Granfield and J. A. Jungmann (eds.), *Kyriakon: Festschrift J. Quasten* (Münster), i. 18–35.

—— (1972*a*): 'Toward a New Edition of Philodemus' Treatise *On Piety*', *GRBS* 13: 67–98.
—— (1972*b*): *Die Phoinikika des Lollianos: Fragmente eines neuen griechischen Romans* (Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, 14; Bonn).
—— (1974*a*): 'Die Kritik der stoischen Theologie im *PHerc.* 1428', *CErc* 4: 5–32.
—— (1974*b*): 'Iuppiter Mulierum Amator in Papyro Herculanensi', *ZPE* 15: 302–5.
—— (1974*c*): 'Die Proitiden im Hesiodischen Katalog', *ZPE* 15: 297–301.
—— (1974*d*): 'Zur Neuausgabe von Philodems Schrift "Über die Frömmigkeit"', in *Akten des XIII. Internationalen Papyrologenkongresses, Marburg 1971* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 66; Munich), 157.
—— (1975*a*): 'Philodems De Pietate als mythographische Quelle', *CErc* 5: 5–38.
—— (1975*b*): 'Two Doxographical Notes: Democritus and Prodicus on Religion', *HSCPh* 79: 93–123.
—— (1976): 'The Atheism of Prodicus', *CErc* 6: 15–21.
—— (1977*a*): 'Ein Meropiszitat in Philodems 'De Pietate'', *CErc* 7: 124–5.
—— (1977*b*): 'Zur Meropis: Herakles' Löwenfell und Athenas zweite Haut', *ZPE* 27: 69–75.
—— (1983): 'Die Kekropidensage im PHerc. 243: Von Kallimachos zu Ovid', *CErc* 13: 33–43.
—— (1984*a*): 'Eine neues Likymniosfragment bei Philodem', *ZPE* 57: 53–7.
—— (1984*b*): 'The Sophists and Hellenistic Religion: Prodicus as Spiritual Father of the Isis Aretalogies', *HSCPh* 88: 139–58.
—— (1985): 'Zur Genealogie des Musaios', *ZPE* 58: 1–8.
HIRZEL, R. (1877–83): *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, 3 vols. (Leipzig).
INDELLI, G. (1978): *Polistrato: Sul disprezzo irrazionale delle opinioni popolari* (La scuola di Epicuro, 2; Naples).
—— (1980): 'John Hayter e i Papiri Ercolanesi', in *Contributi*, i. 217–25.
—— (1983): 'Studi sulla teologia', in *Syzetesis*, ii. 427–9.
—— (1986): 'Platone in Filodemo', *CErc* 16: 109–12.
—— (1988): *Filodemo, L'ira* (La scuola di Epicuro, 5; Naples).
—— and TSOUNA-MCKIRAHAN, V. (1995): *[Philodemus] [On Choices and Avoidances]* (La scuola di Epicuro, 15; Naples).
Indici (1995): *Indici dei papiri ercolanesi in Cronache Ercolanesi 1971–1995* (Terzo Supplemento a Cronache Ercolanesi; Naples).
IORIO, A. DE (1825): *Officina de' papiri descritta* (Naples).
ISNARDI PARENTE, M. (1974): *Opere di Epicuro* (Turin).
JAEGER, W. (1947): *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford).

JANKO, R. (1991): 'Philodemus' *On Poems* and Aristotle's *On Poets*', *CErc* 21: 5–64.

—— (1992): 'A First Join between *PHerc.* 411 + 1583 (Philodemus, *On Music* IV): Diogenes of Babylon on Natural Affinity and Music', *CErc* 22: 123–30.

—— (1993): '*Philodemus resartus*: Progress in Reconstructing the Philosophical Papyri from Herculaneum', in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 7: 265–302 = Obbink 1995*a*, 69–96.

JENSEN, C. (1907): *Philodemi περὶ οἰκονομίας qui dicitur libellus* (Leipzig).

—— (1911): *Philodemi περὶ κακιῶν liber decimus* (Leipzig).

—— (1923): *Philodemus über die Gedichte, fünftes Buch* (Berlin).

KASSEL, R. (1986): 'Dativ des Zitats', *ZPE* 62: 37.

KEMKE, I. (1884): *Philodemi De Musica librorum quae exstant* (Leipzig).

KINDSTRAND, J. F. (1976): *Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary* (Studia Graeca Upsaliensia, 11; Uppsala).

KLEINGÜNTHER, A. (1933): *Πρῶτος εὑρετής: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung* (*Philologus*, Suppl. 26; Leipzig).

KLEVE, K. (1963): *Gnosis theon: Die Lehre von der natürlichen Gotteserkenntnis in der epikureischen Theologie* (*Symbolae Osloenses*, Fasc. Suppl. 19; Oslo).

—— (1973): 'Zu einer Neuausgabe von Philodemos, Über die Götter, Buch I (PHerc. 26)', *CErc* 3: 89–91.

—— (1977): 'The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius: A Study in the History of Epicurean Criticism', in *Lucrèce* (Fondation Hardt, *Entretiens*, 24; Geneva), 39–76.

—— (1978): 'On the Beauty of God: A Discussion between Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics', *SO* 53: 69–83.

—— (1983): 'Scurra Atticus: The Epicurean View of Socrates', in *Syzetesis*, i. 227–53.

KÖRTE, A. (1890): 'Metrodori Epicurei fragmenta', *JbClPh* Suppl. 17: 531–97.

KREVELEN, D. A. VAN (1939): *Philodemus, De muziek: Met vertaling en commentaar* (Hilversum).

KRISCHE, A. B. (1840): *Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker: Eine Prüfung der Darstellung Ciceros* (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, 1; Göttingen).

KRISTELLER, P. O. (1993): *Greek Philosophers of the Hellenistic Age* (New York).

KROHN, K. (1921): *Der Epikureer Hermarchos* (Diss. Berlin).

KROKIEWICZ, A. (1929): 'De dis Epicuri', *Eos*, 32: 91–120.

KUIPER, T. (1925): *Philodemus Over den Dood* (Amsterdam).

LAKS, A. (1976): 'Édition critique et commentée de la "Vie d'Épicure" dans Diogène Laërce (x, 1–34)', in Bollack and Laks 1976, 1–118.

—— (1983): *Diogène d'Apollonie: La dernière cosmologie présocratique* (Publications de l'Université de Lille III, Cahiers de philologie, 9; Lille).

—— and SCHOFIELD, M. (eds.) (1995): *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy* (Cambridge).
LAURENTI, R. (1973): *Filodemo e il pensiero economico degli epicurei* (Milan).
LAURSEN, S. (1987): 'Epicurus On Nature Book XXV', *CErc* 17: 77–8.
LEFKOWITZ, M. R. (1987): 'Was Euripides an Atheist?', *SIFC* 5: 149–66.
—— (1989): '"Impiety" and "Atheism" in Euripides' Dramas', *CQ*² 39: 70–82.
LEHNUS, L. (1973): 'Nota al Fr. 80 di Pindaro', *ZPE* 10: 275–7.
LEMKE, D. (1973): *Die Theologie Epikurs: Versuch einer Reconstruktion* (Zetemata, 57; Munich).
LENGNICK, B. (1871): *Ad emendandos explicandosque Ciceronis libros de natura deorum quid ex Philodemi scriptione περὶ εὐσεβείας redundet* (diss. inaug. Halle).
LEONE, G. (1984): 'Epicuro, Della natura, libro XIV', *CErc* 14: 17–101.
LIEBERG, G. (1979): 'Die Theologia tripertita als Formprinzip antiken Denkens', *RhM*² 125: 25–53.
LIEBICH, W. (1954): 'Ein Philodem-Zeugnis bei Ambrosius', *Philologus*, 98: 116–31.
—— (1960): *Aufbau, Absicht und Form der Pragmateiai Philodems* (Berlin).
LITTA, V. (1977): *I Papiri Ercolanesi II (Indice topografico e sistematico)* (I Quaderni della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli, Serie IV, 6; Naples).
LOBECK, C. A. (1829): *Aglaophamus sive de theologiae mysticae Graecorum causis*, 2 vols. (Königsberg).
LOENEN, D. (1960): *Eusebeia en de cardinale deugden: Een studie over de functie van eusebeia in het leven der Grieken en haar verhouding tot de ethiek* (Amsterdam).
LONG, A. A. (1975–6): 'Heraclitus and Stoicism', *Φιλοσοφία*, 5–7: 133–53.
—— (1978): 'Timon of Phlius: Pyrrhonist and Satirist', *PCPhS* 204: 68–90.
—— (1980): 'Stoa and Sceptical Academy: Origins and Growth of a Tradition', *LCM* 5.8: 161–74.
—— (1986): 'Epicureans and Stoics', in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality* (New York), 135–53.
—— (1988): 'Reply to Jonathan Barnes, Epicurean Signs', in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume* (Oxford), 135–44.
—— and SEDLEY, D. N. (1987): *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols. (Cambridge).
LONGO AURICCHIO, F. (1977): *Φιλοδήμου Περὶ ῥητορικῆς libros primum et secundum ed. F. Longo Auricchio* (*Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi* a cura di F. Sbordone, 3; Naples).
—— (1978): 'La Scuola di Epicuro', *CErc* 8: 21–37.
—— (1980): 'John Hayter nella Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi', in *Contributi*, i. 159–215.

LONGO AURICCHIO, F. (1985): 'Appunti sul pensiero teologico dei primi maestri epicurei', *Vichiana*, 14: 235–40.
—— (1988*a*): *Ermarco, Frammenti: Edizione, traduzione e commento* (La scuola di Epicuro, 6; Naples).
—— (1988*b*): 'Nuove letture nella col. XIII del III libro *Sugli dèi* di Filodemo (PHerc. 152/157)', in *Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology* (Athens), i. 219–24.
—— (1992): 'The Contribution made by the Herculaneum Papyri to our Knowledge of Epicurean Philosophy', *Journal of the Accordia Research Centre* (Univ. of London), 3: 107–23.
—— (1993): 'Bilancio su Ermarco', in *Ercolano*, 273–76.
LUDWICH, A. (1897): *Über Homercitate aus der Zeit von Aristarch bis Didymos* (Königsberg).
LUPPE, W. (1974*a*): 'Zeus und Nemesis in den Kyprien: Die Verwandlungssage nach Pseudo-Apollodor und Philodem', *Philologus*, 118: 193–202.
—— (1974*b*): 'Die "Nemesis" des Kratinos: Mythos und politischer Hintergrund', *Wiss. Z. Univ. Halle*, 23: 49–60.
—— (1975): 'Nochmals zur Nemesis bei Philodem', *Philologus*, 119: 143–4.
—— (1983): 'Atlas-Zitate im 1. Buch von Philodems De Pietate', *CErc* 13: 45–52.
—— (1984): 'Epikureische Mythenkritik bei Philodem: Götterliebschaften in PHerc. 243 II und III', *CErc* 14: 109–24.
—— (1985*a*): 'Hekate als "Amme" der Persephone', *ZPE* 58: 34.
—— (1985*b*): 'Artemis und Athene bei Stesimbrotos (FGrHist 107 F 17)', *ZPE* 61: 22.
—— (1985*c*): 'Einige Bermerkungen zum Text Philodems über Götterverwundungen (*Περὶ εὐσεβείας* P.Herc. 1088 IV)', *ZPE* 61: 19–21.
—— (1985*d*): 'Sophocles F 278 Radt bei Philodem', *ZPE* 62: 6–8.
—— (1985*e*): 'Zu zwei Papyri aus Philodem *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*', *Philologus*, 129: 186–92.
—— (1985*f*): 'Götterfesselungen bei Hesiod, Aischylos und Euripides—Zu Philodem PHerc. 1088 III 8 ff.', *CErc* 15: 127–9.
—— (1985*g*): 'Zeus und die Kyklopen bei Pindar nach Philodem', *Philologus*, 129: 151–5.
—— (1986*a*): 'Zeus und Thetis in Philodem 1602 V', *MH* 43: 61–7.
—— (1986*b*): 'Leiden und Krankheiten der Götter bei Philodem, De pietate 1088 I', *CErc* 16: 67–9.
—— (1986*c*): 'Götter-Sukzessionsmythos bei Satyros: Philodem, De Pietate 1088 VIII/IX + 433 VIa', *CErc* 16: 71–7.
—— (1986*d*): 'Poseidons Geliebte: Philodem, *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* P. Herc. 1602 VI', *Tyche*, 1: 157–67.
—— (1986*e*): 'Philodem *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* P. Herc. 433 VII', *WJA*^{2} 12: 125–9.
—— (1986*f*): 'Supplementum Hellenisticum fr. 78', *ZPE* 64: 51–2.

—— (1986*g*): review of R. Kannicht and B. Snell, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, 2: *Fragmenta adespota* (Göttingen, 1981), in *Gnomon*, 58: 97–105.
—— (1987*a*): 'Heiratsanspruch des Typhon: P. Herc. 433 V', *Philologus*, 131: 150–3.
—— (1987*b*): 'Zu einigen Stellen in Philodem *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* P. Herc. 433', *APF* 33: 79–85.
—— (1987*c*): review of S. L. Radt, *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, 3: *Aeschylus* (Göttingen, 1985), in *GGA* 239: 24–38.
—— (1995*a*): 'Verstümmelungen sowie körperliche und charakterliche Mängel bei Göttern in Philodems *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* (zu Kronos, Hephaist und Ares)', *CErc* 25: 203–10.
—— (1995*b*): 'Der vieläugige Argos bei Philodem: Kleinigkeiten zu *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* N 1088 XII', *APF* 41: 175–7.
—— (1995*c*): 'Philodem, *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* 242 II and 247 II. Textkritische Verbesserungen', *Tyche*, 10: 103–6.
—— (1995*d*): 'Gorgonen in der Unterwelt? Philodem *Περὶ εὐσεβείας* N 242 I', *ZPE* 109: 31–4.
McIlwaine, I. (1988): 'British Interest in the Herculaneum Papyri, 1800–1820', in *Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology* (Athens), i. 321–30.
McNamee, K. (1992): *Sigla and Select Marginalia in Greek Literary Papyri* (Papyrologica Bruxellensia, 26; Brussels).
Mangoni, C. (1993): *Filodemo, Il quinto libro della poetica* (La scuola di Epicuro, 14; Naples).
Mansfeld, J. (1993): 'Aspects of Epicurean Theology', *Mnemosyne*^{4}, 46: 172–210.
Marcovich, M. (1975): 'Democritus on Gods: PHerc 1428 fr. 16 = VS 68 A 75', *ZPE* 19: 244.
Massimilla, G. (1992): 'Poeti lirici nei papiri ercolanesi di Filodemo', in *Proceedings of the XIXth International Congress of Papyrology* (Cairo), i. 249–59.
Meier, J. (1978): *Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background* (*Hermes* Einzelschriften, 40; Wiesbaden).
Meijer, P. A. (1980): 'Philosophers, Intellectuals and Religion in Hellas', in Versnel 1980*a*, 216–63.
Mekler, S. (1902): *Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis* (Berlin).
Merlan, Ph. (1960): *Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle* (Klassisch-philologische Studien, 22; Wiesbaden).
Meutzner, G. (1864): 'In Philodemi librum de pietate', *JbClPh* 10 = *Neue Jahrb. für Philol. und Pädag.* 89: 672.
Monet, A. (1988): 'Quelques nouvelles lectures du PHerc. 19/698 et leurs implications', in *Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology* (Athens), i. 233–6.

MONET, A. (1993): 'Philodème, Sur les sensations: Édition critique et commentaire du PHerc. 19/698' (Thèse de doctorat presentée devant l'Université de Lille III).

MÜNZEL, R. (1888): *Quaestiones mythographicae* (Berlin).

MURR, C. G. VON (1806): *Philodem von der Musik: Ein Auszug aus dessen viertem Buch* (Berlin).

MURRAY, O. (1965): 'Philodemus on the Good King According to Homer', *JRS* 55: 161–82.

MUSSO, O. (1976): 'Un verso dell'inno omerico a Demetra e un frammento di Saffo', *ZPE* 22: 37–9.

NAUCK, A. (1864): 'Über Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας', *Bulletin de l'Académie Impérial des Sciences de St-Pétersbourg*, 7. 568–76 = *Mélanges gréco-romains tirés du Bulletin de l'Académie Impériale de St-Pétersbourg*, ii. 585–626; 'Nachtrag zu den Bemerkungen über Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας', ibid. 627–38.

NESTLE, W. (1918, 1921, 1922): reviews of Philippson 1916, 1918, 1920, 1921, in *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift*, 38 (1918), 841–2; 41 (1921), 28–9; 42 (1922), 1161–2.

—— (1923): *Die Nachsokratiker*, 2 vols. (Jena).

—— (1942): *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (Stuttgart).

NEUBECKER, A. J. (1986): *Philodemus Über die Musik, IV. Buch* (La scuola di Epicuro, 4; Naples).

NILSSON, M. P. (1955, 1967, 1961): *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, i² (Munich, 1955), i³ (Munich, 1967), ii² (Munich 1961).

NORDEN, E. (1923): *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede* (Leipzig, 1913, repr. 1923).

—— (1958): *Die antike Kunstprosa*⁵, 2 vols. (Darmstadt).

NOVÁK, J. (1878): 'Užil-li Cicero, spisuje I. knihu de natura deorum, Filodemova spisu περὶ εὐσεβείας a Lukretiovy básně "de rerum natura"?', *Listy filologické*, 5: 44–52.

OBBINK, D. (1984): '*P.Oxy.* 215 and Epicurean Religious *theoria*', in *Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia* (Naples), ii. 607–19.

—— (1986): 'Philodemus, *De Pietate* 1' (diss. Stanford).

—— (1988*a*): 'Hermarchus, Against Empedocles', *CQ*² 38: 428–35.

—— (1988*b*): 'The Origin of Greek Sacrifice: Theophrastus on Religion and Cultural History', in W. W. Fortenbaugh and R. W. Sharples (eds.), *Theophrastean Studies: Natural Science, Ethics, Religion, and Rhetoric* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London), 272–95.

—— (1989): 'The Atheism of Epicurus', *GRBS* 30: 187–223.

—— (1991): review of Indelli 1988, in *BASP* 28: 79–90.

—— (1992*a*): 'Epicuro (?), Sulla religiosità e il culto popolare', in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici*, 1.1** (Florence), 167–91.

—— (1992*b*): 'What All Men Believe—Must Be True: Common Concep-

tions and *Consensio Omnium* in Aristotle and Hellenistic Philosophy', *OSAP* 10: 193–231.

—— (1994): 'A Quotation of the Derveni Papyrus in Philodemus' On Piety', *CErc* 24: 111–35.

—— (ed.) (1995*a*): *Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus and Horace* (New York and Oxford).

—— (1995*b*): 'How to Read Poetry About Gods', in 1995*a*, 189–209.

—— and VANDER WAERDT, P. A. (1991): 'Diogenes of Babylon: The Stoic Sage in the City of Fools', *GRBS* 32: 355–96.

OLIVIERI, A. (1914): *Philodemi περὶ παρρησίας libellus* (Leipzig).

OHLY, K. (1924): 'Die Stichometrie der Herkulanischen Rollen', *APF* 7: 190–220.

—— (1928) *Stichometrische Untersuchungen* (Leipzig).

PANČENKO, D. V. (1980): 'Evripid ili Kritij?', *VDI* 1980, no. 1, 144–61.

PASCAL, C. (1906): 'La venerazione degli dèi in Epicuro', *RFIC* 34: 241–57.

—— (1914): *Epicurei e mistici*[2] (Catania).

PEASE, A. S. (1955): *M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum libri III* (Cambridge, Mass.).

PERELLI, L. (1955): 'Epicuro e la dottrina di Crizia sull'origine della religione', *RFIC* 83: 29–56.

PETERSEN, C. (1833): *Phaedri Epicurei, vulgo anonymi Herculanensis, de Natura Deorum, fragmentum instauratum et illustratum* (Hamburg).

PFEIFFER, R. (1968): *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford).

PHILIPPSON, R. (1916): 'Zur epikureischen Götterlehre', *Hermes*, 51: 568–608.

—— (1918): 'Nachträgliches zur epikureischen Götterlehre', *Hermes*, 53: 358–95.

—— (1920): 'Zu Philodems Schrift Über die Frömmigkeit', *Hermes*, 55: 225–78, 364–72.

—— (1921): 'Zu Philodems Schrift Über die Frömmigkeit', *Hermes*, 56: 364–410.

—— (1938): 'Philodemos', *RE* xix/2: cols. 2444–82.

—— (1939): 'Die Quelle der epikureischen Götterlehre in Ciceros erstem Buche De natura deorum', *SO* 19: 15–40.

—— (1940): 'Des Akademikers Kritik der epikureischen Theologie im ersten Buche der Tuskulanen Ciceros [*sic* for *De nat. deor.*]', *SO* 20: 21–44.

—— (1983): *Studien zu Epikur und den Epikureern*, ed. W. Schmid and C. J. Classen (Olms Studien, 17; Hildesheim).

Photographs of the Oxford Facsimiles of the Herculanean Papyri, Reproduced Photographically at the Expense of the Oxford Philological Society by Messrs. Kingsbury and Notcutt (London, 1890).

PICAVET, F. (1888): *De Epicuro novae religionis auctore* (Paris).

PLEKET, H. W. (1980): 'Religious History as the History of Mentality: The

"Believer" as Servant of the Deity in the Greek World', in Versnel 1980*a*, 152–92.

PRICE, S. R. F. (1984): *Rituals of Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge).

PUGLIA, E. (1982): 'La filologia degli epicurei', *CErc* 12: 19–34.

—— (1988): *Demetrio Lacone: Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro (PHerc. 1012)* (La scuola di Epicuro, 8; Naples).

—— (1992): 'La duplice soscrizione del *PHerc.* 1497', *CErc* 22: 175–8.

RABBOW, P. (1954): *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich).

RADT, S. L. (1986): 'Dativ des Zitats', *ZPE* 64: 10–12.

'Ragguaglio' (1834): 'Ragguaglio [signed O. K.] de' lavori dell'Accademia ercolanese per l'anno 1833, letto dal Segretario perpetuo cav. F. M. Avellino nella tornata generale de' 30 Gennaio 1834', *Annali Civili del Regno delle Due Sicilie*, fasc. 8: 73–5 = *Bullettino dell'Instituto di Corrispondenza Archeologica* (Rome, 1835), 45–7.

RAUBITSCHEK, A. E. (1935): *Epikureische Untersuchungen* (diss. Vienna).

—— (1949): 'Phaedrus and his Roman Pupils', *Hesperia* 15: 96–103 = *The School of Hellas* (New York and Oxford, 1991), 337–44.

RAWSON, E. (1985): *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (London).

REICHE, H. (1971): 'Myth and Magic in Cosmological Polemics', *RhM*² 114: 296–329.

REINHARDT, K. (1910): *De Graecorum theologia capita duo* (diss. Berlin).

RENNA, E. (1982): 'Nuove letture nel P. Herc. 1055 (libro incerto di Demetrio Lacone)', *CErc* 12: 43–9.

—— (1983): 'Per la teologia epicurea in Demetrio', *CErc* 13: 25–8.

—— (1984): 'Considerazioni sulla concezione antropomorfica degli dèi nel *PHerc.* 1055', in *Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia* (Naples), ii. 447–52.

—— (1990): 'Uno spunto polemico contro la teologia astrale nel PHerc. 1055 (libro incerto di Demetrio Lacone)', in *Miscellanea Papyrologica* (Papyrologica Florentina, 19; Florence), 23–5.

—— (1992): *Vesuvius Mons: Aspetti del Vesuvio nel mondo antico. Tra filologia archeologia vulcanologia* (Naples).

RISPOLI, G. M. (1969): 'Il primo libro del περὶ μουσικῆς di Filodemo', in F. Sbordone (ed.), *Ricerche sui Papiri Ercolanesi* (Naples), i. 225–86.

—— (1988): 'Correzioni, varianti, glosse e scoli nei papiri ercolanesi', in *Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology* (Athens), i. 309–20.

—— (1987): 'Bernardo Quaranta', in *La cultura classica*, ii. 505–28.

RIST, J. M. (1972): *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge).

ROMEO, C. (1988): *Demetrio Lacone, La Poesia (PHerc. 188 e 1014)* (La scuola di Epicuro, 9; Naples).

RUDHARDT, J. (1960): 'La définition du délit d'impiété d'après la législation attique', *MH* 17: 87–105.

RUSTEN, J. S. (1982): *Dionysius Scytobrachion* (Papyrologica Colonensia, 10; Opladen).

—— (1993): *Theophrastus, Characters; Herodas, Mimes; Cercidas and the Choliambic Poets*, ed. and trans. J. Rusten, I. C. Cunningham, and A. D. Knox (Cambridge, Mass.).

SALVADORI BALDASCINO, L. (1992): 'Per una edizione di PHerc. 168', in *Proceedings of the XIXth International Congress of Papyrology* (Cairo), i. 269–78.

SAUPPE, H. (1864*a*): 'Commentatio de Philodemi libro qui fuit de pietate', *Index scholarum publice et privatim in Academia Georgia Augusta per semestre aestivum a. MDCCCLXIV habendarum* (Göttingen), 3–17 = *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Berlin, 1896), 387–403.

—— (1864*b*): 'Aus Philodemos Buche *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*', *Philologus*, 21: 139–41 = *Ausgw. Schr.* 403–4.

SBORDONE, F. (1976): *Ricerche sui papiri Ercolanesi*, ii. (Naples).

SCATOZZA HÖRICHT, L. A. (1987*a*): 'Francesco Maria Avellino', in *La cultura classica*, ii. 825–46.

—— (1987*b*): 'Giulio Minervini', in *La cultura classica*, ii. 847–64.

SCHIAN, R. (1973): *Untersuchungen über das 'argumentum e consensu omnium'* (Spudasmata, 28; Hildesheim and New York).

SCHMID, G. (1885): *Philodemea* (Beilage zum Jahresbericht der St. Katharinenschule in St. Petersburg).

—— (1905): 'Ad papyros Graecas, praesertim Herculanenses coniecturae', *Bulletin de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St-Pétersbourg*, 22/2: 013–035.

SCHMID, W. (1939): *Ethica Epicurea: Pap. Herc. 1251* (Studia Herculanensia, 1; Leipzig).

—— (1943): 'Nugae herculanenses', *RhM*² 92: 35–55.

—— (1951): 'Götter und Menschen in der Theologie Epikurs', *RhM*² 94: 97–156.

—— (1955): 'Zur Geschichte der herkulanensischen Studien', *La parola del passato*, 10: 478–500.

—— (1957): 'Contritio und "ultima linea rerum" in neuen epikureischen Texten', *RhM*² 100: 301–27.

—— (1961): 'Epikur', *RAC* 5: 681–819 = 1984, 151–266, Ital. trans. I. Ronca, *Epicuro e l'epicureismo cristiano* (Antichità class. e crist. 14; Brescia, 1984).

—— (1962): 'Textprobleme eines epikureischen Fragments über Götterverehrung (*Pap. Oxy.* 215)', *RhM*² 105: 368–77.

—— (1963): 'Chi è l'autore del *Pap. Oxy.* 215?', in *Miscellanea di studi alessandrini in memoria di A. Rostagni* (Turin), 40–4 = 1984, 89–93.

—— (1984): *Ausgewählte philologische Schriften*, ed. H. Erbse and J. Küppers (Berlin and New York).

SCHOBER, A. (1915): 'Ein Homerzitat bei Philodem *περὶ εὐσεβείας*', *RhM*² 70: 638–9.

—— (1988): 'Philodemi *περὶ εὐσεβείας* libelli partem priorem restituit Adolf Schober', (Diss. ined. Königsberg, 1923) = *CErc* 18: 67–125.

SCHOFIELD, M. (1980): 'Preconception, Argument, and God', in Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes 1980, 283–308.

—— (1983): 'The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium', *Phronesis*, 28: 31–58.

—— (1991): *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge).

—— BURNYEAT, M., and BARNES, J. (eds.) (1980): *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology* (Oxford).

—— and NUSSBAUM, M. C. (eds.) (1982): *Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen* (Cambridge).

—— and STRIKER, G. (eds.) (1986): *The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics* (Cambridge).

SCHUBART, W. (1921): *Das Buch bei den Griechen und Römern*² (Leipzig, 1921, cf. 1961³).

SCOTT, W. (1883): 'The Physical Constitution of the Epicurean Gods', *JPh* 12: 212–47.

—— (1885): *Fragmenta Herculanensia* (Oxford).

SEDLEY, D. N. (1973): 'Epicurus, On Nature Book XXVIII', *CErc* 3: 5–83.

—— (1974): 'The Structure of Epicurus' On Nature', *CErc* 4: 89–92.

—— (1976*a*): 'Epicurus and his Professional Rivals', in Bollack and Laks 1976, 121–59.

—— (1976*b*): 'Epicurus and the Mathematicians of Cyzicus', *CErc* 6: 23–54.

—— (1982): 'On Signs', in Barnes *et al.* 1982, 239–72.

—— (1983*a*): 'Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism', in *Syzetesis*, i. 1–51.

—— (1983*b*): 'The Motivation of Greek Scepticism', in Burnyeat 1983, 9–29.

—— (1984): 'The Character of Epicurus' *On nature*', in *Atti del XVII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia* (Naples), ii. 381–7.

—— (1989*a*): 'Epicurean Anti-Reductionism', in J. Barnes and M. Mignucci (eds.), *Matter and Metaphysics* (Naples), 297–327.

—— (1989b): 'Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman World', in Griffin and Barnes 1989, 97–119.

SEGAL, C. (1992): 'Boundaries, Worlds, and Analogical Thinking, or How Lucretius Learned to Love Atomism and Still Write Poetry', in K. Galinsky (ed.), *The Interpretation of Roman Poetry: Empiricism or Hermeneutics?* (Frankfurt am Main), 137–57.

SIDER, D. (1993): 'Commentary on Asmis', in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 7: 94–105 = Obbink 1995*a*, 35–41.

—— (forthcoming): *The Epigrams of Philodemos: Introduction, Text and Commentary.*

SMITH, M. F. (1983): 'A Bibliography of Work on Diogenes of Oenoanda', in *Syzetesis*, i. 683–95.

—— (1993): *Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription* (La scuola di Epicuro, Supplemento 1; Naples).

SPENGEL, L. (1864): 'Aus den Herculanischen Rollen: Philodemus *Περὶ εὐσεβείας*', *Abh. d. Kgl. Bayer. Akad. d. Wiss.*, Philos.-philol. Cl. 10,1: 127–67.

SPINA, L. (1977): 'Il trattato di Filodemo su Epicuro e altri (PHerc. 1418)', *CErc* 7: 43–83.

SPOERRI, W. (1959): *Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter* (Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 9; Basle).

STECKEL, H. (1968): 'Epikuros', *RE* Supp. XI: 579–652.

STEWART, Z. (1977): 'La religione', in *La società ellenistica. Economia, diritto, religione* (Storia e civiltà dei Greci, ed. R. Bianchi Bandinelli, 8; Milan), 501–616.

STRATHMANN, G. (1892): *De hiatus fuga, quam invenimus apud Philodemum Epicureum* (Real-Progymnasium der Stadt Viersen).

STRIKER, G. (1980): 'Sceptical Strategies', in Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes 1980, 54–83.

SUDHAUS, S. (1892, 1896): *Philodemi volumina rhetorica*, 2 vols. (Leipzig).

—— (1895): *Philodemi volumina rhetorica: Supplementum* (Leipzig).

Syzetesis (1983): *Συζήτησις: Studi sull'epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante*, 2 vols. (Naples).

TARÁN, L. (1975): *Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia).

—— (1981): *Speusippus of Athens* (Philosophia antiqua, 39; Leiden).

TAYLOR, C. C. W. (1980): 'All Perceptions are True', in Schofield, Burnyeat, and Barnes 1980, 105–24.

TEPEDINO GUERRA, A. (1988): 'Nuove letture del fr. 8 col. i *PHerc.* 1232: Filodemo, *Su Epicuro*', in *Proceedings of the XVIII International Congress of Papyrology* (Athens), i. 225–31.

—— (1991): *Polieno, Frammenti* (La scuola di Epicuro, 11; Naples).

—— (1992): 'Osservazioni su alcuni frammenti del II libro dell'opera filodemea Su Epicuro', in Capasso 1992, 167–78.

—— (1994): 'L'opera filodemea Su Epicuro (PHerc. 1232, 1289 β)', *CErc* 24: 5–54.

TIELEMAN, T. (1992): *Galen and Chrysippus: Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books II–III* (Quaestiones Infinitae, 3; Utrecht).

TRAVERSA, A. (1952): *Index Stoicorum Herculanensis* (Genoa).

TULIN, A. (1990): 'Plato's Euthyphro' (diss. Columbia).

TURNER, E. G. (1980): *Greek Papyri: An Introduction*[2] (Oxford).

—— and PARSONS, P. J. (1987): E. G. Turner, *Greek Manuscripts of the Ancient World*[2], rev. P. J. Parsons (Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, *Bulletin* Suppl. 46; London).

USENER, H. (1887): *Epicurea* (Leipzig).
—— (1977): *Glossarium Epicureum*, edendum curaverunt M. Gigante et W. Schmid (Lessico intellettuale europeo, 14; Rome).
VANDER WAERDT, P. A. (1987): 'The Justice of the Epicurean Wise Man', *CQ*² 37: 402–22.
—— (1988): 'Hermarchus and the Epicurean Genealogy of Morals', *TAPA* 118: 87–106.
—— (1989): 'Colotes and the Epicurean Refutation of Skepticism', *GRBS* 30: 225–68.
—— (ed.) (1994): *The Socratic Movement* (Ithaca).
VERSNEL, H. S. (ed.) (1980*a*): *Faith, Hope and Worship: Aspects of Religious Mentality in the Ancient World* (Leiden).
—— (1980*b*): 'Religious Mentality in Ancient Prayer', in 1980*a*, 1–64.
VICOL, A. C. (1945): *Cicerone espositore e critico dell'epicureismo* (Ephemeris Dacoromana, 10; Rome).
—— (1949): 'Considerazioni sulla dottrina teologica di Epicuro', *GIF* 2: 193–205.
VLASTOS, G. (1946): 'On the Prehistory in Diodorus', *AJP* 67: 51–9.
VOGLIANO, A. (1928): *Epicuri et Epicureorum scripta in herculanensibus papyris servata* (Berlin).
WACHSMUTH, C. (1879): 'Stichometrisches und Bibliothekarisches', *RhM*² 34: 38–51.
WATTENBACH, W. (1876): *Schrifttafeln zur Geschichte der griechischen Schrift und zum Studium der griechischen Palaeographie* (Berlin).
WEST, M. L. (1983): 'Two Lunatic Notes', *ZPE* 50: 46.
—— (1985): 'The Hesiodic Catalogue: New Light on Apollo's Love-Life', *ZPE* 61: 1–7.
WESTMAN, R. (1955): *Plutarch gegen Kolotes* (Helsinki).
WIDMANN, H. (1935): *Beträge zur Syntax Epikurs* (Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 24; Stuttgart and Berlin).
WINIARCZYK, M. (1976): 'Der erste Atheistenkatalog des Kleitomachos', *Philologus*, 120: 32–46.
—— (1984): 'Wer galt im Altertum als Atheist?', *Philologus*, 128: 157–83.
—— (1987): 'Nochmals das Satyrspiel "Sisyphos"' *WS* 100: 35–45.
—— (1990): 'Methodisches zum antiken Atheismus', *RhM*² 133: 1–15.
WOODWARD, P. G. (1989): 'Star gods in Philodemus, PHerc. 152/157', *CErc* 19: 29–48.
YOUNG, T. (1810): anonymous review of Drummond and Walpole 1810, in *Quarterly Review* (Feb. 1810), 1–20.
YUNIS, H. (1988): 'The Debate on Undetected Crime and an Undetected Fragment from Euripides' Sisyphus', *ZPE* 75: 39–46.

CONCORDANCES

I

To be read as follows: p. 6 Gomperz = col. 72 Obbink, *HV*² II 23 = col. 83 Obbink, etc.

	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p. → OBBINK (col.)
1	—	—	—	—
2	—	—	—	—
3	—	—	—	—
4	—	—	—	—
6	—	72	—	—
7	—	86B	—	—
8	—	69–70, 73–4, 77B	—	—
20	—	86A	—	—
21	—	77A	—	—
22	—	—	—	—
23	83	—	—	—
24	84	—	—	—
25	81	—	—	—
26	79	—	—	—
27	75	—	—	—
28	71	—	—	—
29	58	—	—	—
30	59	—	—	—
31	56	—	—	—
32	—	—	—	—
33	72	—	—	—
34	—	—	—	—
35	77B, 86B	—	—	—
36	69–70, 73–4	—	—	—
48	86A	—	—	—
49	77A	—	—	—
62 (*HV*² VIII)	82	—	—	—
63	—	—	—	—
64	—	—	—	—

	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p. → OBBINK (col.)
65	47	—	—	—
66	45	—	—	—
67	41	—	—	—
68	38	—	—	—
69	39	—	—	—
70	36	—	—	—
71	35	—	—	—
72	34	—	—	—
73	32	—	—	73–4
74	29	—	—	77A–B, 78
75	30	—	—	69, 76, 80
76	27	—	—	70, 85, 86A
77	25	—	—	86B
78	18	—	—	—
79	23	—	—	—
80	13	—	—	—
81	16	—	—	—
82	19	—	—	—
83	8	—	—	—
84	10	—	—	—
85	9	—	—	—
93	—	53	—	—
94	—	49–50	—	—
95	—	45–7	—	—
96	—	—	—	—
97	—	41	—	—
98	55	38	—	—
99	54	39	—	—
100	51	36	—	—
101	42	35	—	—
102	48	34	—	—
103	43	32	—	—
104	44	29	—	—
105	40	30	—	—
106	37	27	—	—
107	33	25	—	—
108	31	18	—	—
109	28	23	—	—
110	26	13	—	—
111	24	16	—	—
112	20	19	—	—
113	21	8	—	—
114	22	10	—	—
115	17	9	—	—
116	15	55	—	—
117	14	54	—	—
118	12	51	—	—
119	11	42	—	—

	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p. OBBINK (col.)
120	3	48	—	—
121	2	43	—	—
122	7	44	—	—
123	4	40	—	—
124	6	37	—	—
125	5	33	—	—
126	1	31	—	—
127	—	28	—	—
128	—	26	—	—
129	—	24	—	—
130	—	20–1	—	—
131	—	22	—	—
132	—	17	—	—
133	—	14–15	—	—
134	—	11–12	—	—
135	78	3	—	—
136	76	2	—	—
137	85	7	—	—
138	80	4	—	—
139	—	5–6	—	—
140	—	1	—	—
141	—	76, 78	—	—
142	—	80, 85	—	—
143	—	83	—	—
144	—	84	—	—
145	—	81	—	—
146	—	79	—	—
147	—	75	—	—
148	—	71	—	—
149	—	58	—	—
150	—	59	—	—
151	—	56	—	—
237 (Ph. 1920)	—	—	86A	—
238 (Ph. 1920)	—	—	86B	—
239 (Ph. 1920)	—	—	73, 77A–B	—
240 (Ph. 1920)	—	—	69, 74	—
241 (Ph. 1920)	—	—	72	—
365	—	—	49, 52–3	—
366	—	—	50	—
367	—	—	—	—
368	—	—	38, 41, 45–7	—
369	—	—	35–6, 39	—
370	—	—	32, 34	—
371	—	—	29	—
372	—	—	30	—
373	—	—	25, 27	—
374	—	—	18, 23	—
375	—	—	13, 16	—

	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p. → OBBINK (col.)
376	—	—	19	—
377	—	—	8	—
378	—	—	9–10	—
379	—	—	—	—
380	—	—	54–5	—
381	—	—	42, 51	—
382	—	—	43–4, 48	—
383	—	—	40	—
384	—	—	33, 37	—
385	—	—	31	—
386	—	—	28	—
387	—	—	20, 24, 26	—
388	—	—	17, 21–2	—
389	—	—	—	—
390	—	—	14–15	—
391	—	—	12	—
392	—	—	11	—
393	—	—	2–3	—
394	—	—	7	—
395	—	—	4	—
396	—	—	6	—
397	—	—	1, 5	—
398	—	—	—	—
399	—	—	76	—
400	—	—	78, 80, 85	—
401	—	—	83	—
402	—	—	84	—
403	—	—	79, 81	—
404	—	—	58, 75	71
405	—	—	56, 68A	—
406	—	—	67A	—
407	—	—	62A, 65, 66A	—
408	—	—	61A	—
409	—	—	60A, 82	—
410	—	—	63	—

2

OBBINK → col.	lines	*P. Herc.* inv. no.	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p.
1	1–29	*P. Herc.*, *N* 1098 fr. 29	126	140	397	—
2	30–59	*N* 1098 fr. 24	121	136	393f	—
3	60–88	*N* 1098 fr. 23	120	135	393	—
4	89–116	*N* 1098 fr. 26	123	138	395	—
5	117–44	*N* 1098 fr. 28	125	139	397	—
6	145–72	*N* 1098 fr. 27	124	139	396	—
7	173–202	*N* 1098 fr. 25	122	137	394	—
8	203–31	*N* 1077 fr. 19^{1-2}	83	113	377	—
9	232–60	*N* 1077 fr. 21^{1-2}	85	115	378	—
10	261–89	*N* 1077 fr. 20^{1-2}	84	114	378	—
11	290–318	*N* 1098 fr. 22	119	134	392	—
12	319–46	*N* 1098 fr. 21	118	134	391	—
13	347–75	*N* 1077 fr. 16^{1-2}	80	110	375	—
14	376–402	*N* 1098 fr. 20	117	133	390	—
15	403–31	*N* 1098 fr. 19	116	133	390	—
16	432–60	*N* 1077 fr. 17^{1-2}	81	111	375	—
17	461–88	*N* 1098 fr. 18	115	132	388	—
18	489–518	*N* 1077 fr. 14^{1-2}	78	108	374	—
19	519–48	*N* 1077 fr. 18^{1-2}	82	112	376	—
20	549–78	*N* 1098 fr. 15	112	130	387	—
21	579–606	*N* 1098 fr. 16	113	130	388	—
22	607–36	*N* 1098 fr. 17	114	131	388	—
23	637–65	*N* 1077 fr. 15^{1-2}	79	109	374	—
24	666–95	*N* 1098 fr. 14	111	129	387	—
25	696–725	*N* 1077 fr. 13^{1-2}	77	107	373	—
26	726–53	*N* 1098 fr. 13	110	128	386	—
27	754–82	*N* 1077 fr. 12^{1-2}	76	106	373	—
28	783–810	*N* 1098 fr. 12	109	127	386	—
29	811–40	*N* 1077 fr. 10^{1-2}	74	104	371	—
30	841–70	*N* 1077 fr. 11^{1-2}	75	105	372	—
31	871–98	*N* 1098 fr. 11	108	126	385	—
32	899–927	*N* 1077 fr. 9^{1-2}	73	103	370	—
33	928–57	*N* 1098 fr. 10	107	125	384	—
34	958–86	*N* 1077 fr. 8^{1-2}	72	102	370	—
35	987–1014	*N* 1077 fr. 7^{1-2}	71	101	369	—
36	1015–44	*N* 1077 fr. 6^{1-2}	70	100	369	—
37	1045–72	*N* 1098 fr. 10	106	124	384	—
38	1073–1101	*N* 1077 fr. 4^{1-2}	68	98	368	—
39	1102–29	*N* 1077 fr. 5^{1-2}	69	99	369	—
40	1130–59	*N* 1098 fr. 8	105	123	383	—
41	1160–88	*N* 1077 fr. 3^{1-2}	67	97	368	—
42	1189–1217	*N* 1098 fr. 4	101	119	381	—
43	1218–46	*N* 1098 fr. 6	103	121	382	—
44	1247–75	*N* 1098 fr. 7	104	122	382	—

OBBINK →

col.	lines	*P. Herc.* inv. no.	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p.
45	1276–1305	*N* 1077 fr. 2^{1-2} (= *P. Herc.* 1093)	66	96	368	—
46	1306–34	*O* 1077 fr. 3^{1-2} sin.	—	95	367	—
47	1335–63	*O* 1077 fr. 3^{1-2} dext. (= *N* 1077 fr. 1^{1-2})	65	95	367	—
48	1364–93	*N* 1098 fr. 5	102	120	382	—
49	1394–1420	*O* 1077 fr. 2^{1-2} sin.	—	94	365	—
50	1421–48	*O* 1077 fr. 2^{1-2} dext.	—	94	366	—
51	1449–76	*N* 1098 fr. 3	100	118	381	—
52	1477–1504	*O* 1077 fr. 1 sin.	—	—	365	—
53	1505–32	*O* 1077 fr. 1 med.	—	93	365	—
54	1533–60	*O* 1077 fr. 1 dext. + *N* 1098 fr. 2	99	117	380	—
55	1561–88	*N* 1098 fr. 1	98	116	380	—
56	1589–1616	*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 sin. = *N* 229 fr. 9	31	151	405	—
57	1617–44	*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 dext. (ined.)	—	—	—	—
58	1645–73	*N* 229 fr. 7	29	149	404	—
59	1674–1701	*N* 229 fr. 8	30	150	404	—
60A	1702–24	*N* 437 fr. 7	*HV*² IX 120	—	409	—
60B	1725–31	*N* 452 fr. 8	—	—	—	—
61A	1732–53	*N* 437 fr. 6	*HV*² IX 119	—	408	—
61B	1754–61	*N* 452 fr. 7	—	—	—	—
62A	1762–84	*N* 437 fr. 5	*HV*² IX 119	—	407	—
62B	1785–91	*N* 452 fr. 6	—	—	—	—
63	1792–1821	*N* 452 fr. 5	—	—	410	—
64	1822–51	*N* 452 fr. 4	—	—	—	—
65	1852–81	*P. Herc.*, *N* 437 fr. 4	*HV*² IX 118	—	407	—
66A	1882–1905	*N* 437 fr. 3	*HV*² IX 118	—	407	—
66B	1906–11	*N* 452 fr. 3	—	—	—	—
67A	1912–33	*N* 437 fr. 2	*HV*² IX 117	—	406	—
67B	1934–41	*N* 452 fr. 2	—	—	—	—
68A	1942–64	*N* 437 fr. 1	*HV*² IX 117	—	405	—
68B	1965–71	*N* 452 fr. 1	—	—	—	—
69	1972–2001	*N* 242 fr. 9a	36	8	240 (1920)	75f
70	2002–31	*N* 242 fr. 9b	36	8	240 (1920)	76
71	2032–60	*N* 229 fr. 6	28	148	404	—
72	2061–90	*N* 242 fr. 10	33b	6	241 (1920)	73
73	2091–2120	*N* 242 fr. 8a	36	8	239 (1920)	73
74	2121–50	*N* 242 fr. 8b	36	8	240 (1920)	73
75	2151–82	*N* 229 fr. 5	27	147	404	—
76	2183–2212	*P. Herc.*, *N* 1610 fr. 2	136	141	399	75
77A	2213–32	*N* 247 fr. 8	49	21	239 (1920)	74
77B	2234–42	*N* 242 fr. 7	35	8	239 (1920)	74
78	2243–72	*N* 1610 fr. 1	135	141	400	74f
79	2273–2302	*N* 229 fr. 4	26	146	403	—
80	2303–32	*N* 1610 fr. 4	138	142	400	75

OBBINK col.	lines	*P. Herc.* inv. no.	*HV*² II 1863 p.	Gomperz 1866 p.	Philippson 1921 p.	Schober 1988 p.
81	2333–62	*N* 229 fr. 3	25	145	403	—
82	2363–92	*P. Herc.* 1114 = *N* 1788 fr. 9	*HV*² VIII 62	—	409	—
83	2393–2422	*N* 229 fr. 1	23	143	401	—
84	2423–50	*N* 229 fr. 2	24	144	402	—
85	2451–80	*N* 1610 fr. 4	138	142	400	76
86A	2481–2502	*N* 247 fr. 7	48	20	237 (1920)	76
86B	2503–10	*N* 242 fr. 6	35	7	238 (1920)	77
Comm. ad 29		*P. Herc.* 242 ined.	—	—	—	—
Comm. ad 29		*P. Herc.* 247 ined.	—	—	—	—
Comm. ad 29		*P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 (=3) Dorandi	—	—	—	—

INDEX VERBORUM

An asterisk indicates that the word to which it is attached is not recorded in LSJ or Supplement. Square brackets show that a word is substantially restored; 'ap.' indicates that the word is recorded as a suggestion in the apparatus criticus, a dagger that it has been rejected there from an earlier edition. The article and *καί* are not indexed. References are to the continuous line-numbers of the text.

A. Greek Words

ἀβλαβής 252 ap., 1341–2, 2028, [2473–4]
ἀβλαβία 2051–2
ἀγαθός 492–3, 785–6, 887, 963–4, 970, [988–9], 1025, 1083–4, [1096], [1102–3], 1151, 1282, 1285–6, 1414, 1613–14 ap., 1615–16 ap., 2087, 2203–4, 2343, 2355 ap., 2442–3
ἄγαλμα 911
ἀγαπάω 1017–18 ap., [2259–60]
ἅγιος 759–60, [975–6], 1290, 1291
ἁγνεύω 698–9
ἁγνός 759–60†
ἄγω 813, [1595], [2200]
ἄδεια 1189
ἀδελφός 945, 1476
ἄδηκτος 232
ἀδικέω 2274, [2325–6], [2448]
ἀδικία 1193, [2117], 2144, 2147
ἄδικος 2228, [2321]
ἀδυναμία 645
ἀεί 2220, 2427†
ἀηδής 1319
ἀθανασία 1139
ἀθάνατος 69–70
Ἀθηνᾶ [302]
Ἀθῆναι 558
Ἀθηναῖος 1358, 1595–6
ἄθεος 300 ap., 611 ap., 630†, 1237
ἄθροισμα 356 ap.
αἰδέομαι 1235–6
ἀΐδιος 68–9, 103–4†
αἰνίττομαι 300–1
αἱρέω 1226–7
αἵρησις 1505–6, 2198
αἰσθάνομαι [191–2], 413–14
αἴσθησις 138, 419–20, 991 ap.
αἰσθητός 451–2
αἰσχρός 2496 ap.
αἰσχύνομαι 2429
αἰτία [737], 1045, 1097, [2118–19]
αἴτιος [2164]
αἰών 2356, 2369 ap.
αἰώνιος 2235
ἄκακος 759–60†
ἄκενος 2207–8†
ἀκέραιος [2206–7]
ἀκολουθέω [1318], 2413 ap.
ἀκολούθως 1455

ἀκριβής 2497–8
ἄκρος 1140
ἀλείφω 811†
ἀλγηδών 196, 493–4, 2088
ἀλήθεια 668, 2239–40
ἀληθής [673–4], 698–9†, 1206–7, 1349, 1387, 2400
ἀληθινός 782
ἀλλά [50], 103, 137, 150, 151–2, 162, 201, 447–8, 497, 735–6, 743, 954, 1207, 1353, [1408], 1510–11, 1528, 1575, 1598, 1908, 2156, 2169†, 2233, 2340–1, 2393; ἀλλὰ καί 210, 792, 865, 1850, 2173; ἀλλὰ μήν 201–2
ἀλλακτός 2214–15
ἀλλήλων 1334–5, 2155
ἄλλος 7, 207, 236, 293–4 ap., 311–12, 337, 373, 374, 426, 455, [479], [526], [726], 810, [995–6], [1108], [1191], 1297, 1361, 1713, 1738, 1745, 1897, 1939, 2233 ap., 2280
ἀλλότριος [1256–7], [1766–7]
ἀλλοτριότης 1054
ἀλλόφυλος 1334–5†
ἄλλως [1216–17], 1759, 1999; ἄλλως δὲ καί 1699–1700, 2226
ἀλογία [1997]
ἄλυπος 1159 ap., 1507–8, 2056–7
ἅμα 1524, 2169; ἅμα δέ 2205
ἀμέλει [458], 2160; ἀμέλει γὰρ 1344–5
ἀμελέω 1371
ἀμετάβλητος 201†
ἀμύκτηρ 1645
ἄν 106, 326, [349], [467], 473, 629, 930, [1168], 1299, [1382], [1740], 2042
ἄν = ἐάν *see* ἐάν
ἀνά + acc. 770
ἀναγιγνώσκω 2210–11†
ἀναγκαῖος 166–7, 203, 1568–9, 2212, 2242 ap.
ἀναγκαστῶς [691–2]
ἀνάγκη 197, 640, 712 ap., 772†
ἀναδέχομαι 2237–8
ἀναιδής 1596–7 ap.
ἀναιρέω 445, 474–5, 522–3, 1422–3, 1669, 2146–7, 2291
ἀναίσθητος 50–1 ap.
ἀνακόπτω 2351–2
ἀνάλγητος 436
ἀναλογία 236–7
ἀναμένω 638
ἀνάμεστος 825–6
ἀναμφιλέκτως 383, 691–2 ap.
Ἀναξικράτης 1820
ἀνάξιος 262
ἀναποδείκτως 691–2 ap.
ἀνασκευή [488]
ἀναστέλλω 1209–10
ἀναστρέφω 684, 689
ἀναφέρω [538]
ἀνεπινόητος 1728
ἄνευ 2257 ap.
ἀνέχω 2260
ἀνήκεστος 2436
ἀνήρ [461–2], 516, 680, 956, 1414, 1864
Ἀνθεστήρια [867–8]
ἀνθρώπειος 1153–4
ἄνθρωπος 228, 240, 448–9, 647, 712 ap., [1034–5], [1046–7], 1161, 1335, 1341, 1363–4 ap., 1374–5, 1410, 1461–2, 1470–1, 1548, 1738–9, 1853, 2060 ap., 2196–7 ap., 2242 ap., 2329, 2373–4 ap., 2449, 2487–8
ἀνίημι 1594, 2510
ἀνόητος 1213, 1317, 2321†
ἀνόμοιος 307–8 ap.
ἀνόσιος 176, 645, 648, 1176
ἀνοσίως 1131
ἀνταριθμέω 1739–40
ἀντεισάγω 2147–8, 2357–8
ἀντέχω 2485†
ἀντί + gen. 2148–9
ἀντιλέγω 2025–6 ap.
ἀντιλογία 1511–12
ἀντιπίπτω 472–3
ἀντιμεταλαμβάνω 590–1
Ἀντισθένης [536–7]
ἀνυπέρβλητος 1136–7
ἀνυπόμνηστος [1566–7]
ἀνωμαλία 2169–70
ἀνώτατος 437–8
ἀνωφελής 2494
ἀξιόζηλος 1284
ἀξιόλογος 2258–9†
ἀξιολόγως [2258–9]
ἀξιόπιστος 462
ἄξιος [641–2]
ἀξιόω 632, 1646–7, 2489
ἀπαγόρευμα 1234–5
ἀπαγορεύω 1372–3
ἀπαντάω [2445]
ἀπαρτίζω 1276
ἅπας 187, 386, 459, [732], 1142, 1197,

1240, 1253, 1521–2, 1614–15, 1673, 1738, 1952; *see also* πᾶc
ἀπάτη [540–1], [1190]
ἀπειλή *see* ἀπειλία
ἀπειλία 682–3†
ἀπειρία 1998–9 ap.
ἄπειροc 675
ἀπεχθημοσύνη 1168–9
ἀπέχω 1469
ἁπλοῦc 160–1
ἁπλῶc 450, 691, [1376–7]
ἀπό + gen. 420, 498, 676, 891, 899, 950, 1680, 2333, [2358], 2480
ἀποβαίνω 1323, 1649–50
ἀποβλέπω 309–10 ap.
ἀπογράφω (mid.) 686–7
ἀποδείκνυμι (mid.) [2117–18]
ἀπόδειξιc 470, 652
ἀποδέχομαι [1947]
ἀποδίδωμι 1859–60, [2286]
ἀποκρύπτω (mid.) 1854–5
ἀπόλαυcιc 2218
ἀπολείπω 128–9, 137–8
ἄπονοc [2207–8]
ἀπόνωc [1768]
ἀποποιέω 1465†
ἄποπτοc 2178
ἀπορέω 1427–8 ap.
ἀποστερέω 2346–7
ἀποτελέω 163, [217–18], 359 ap., 370, 1131–2†
ἀποφαίνω 669; (mid.) 224–5, 1066, 1097–8, 1152–3, 1356–7
ἀποχή 2145–6†
ἀπραγμάτευτοc 1287
ἀπραγμόνωc 1593
ἀπώματοc 2508
ἀργύριον 950–1
Ἄρηc [303]
ἀριθμόc 102, 328
Ἀριστοτέληc [1094–5]
Ἄρίcτων 1, 11
Ἀριστώνυμοc 797–8
ἁρμόζω [2254–5]
ἁρμοστόc 1703
ἀρχαῖοc 300†, [580], 587
ἀρχεῖον [2256]
ἀρχή 490–1
ἄρχω 2383 ap.; (mid.) 2479–80†
ἀcέβεια [1137–8], 1844–5 ap., 2170–1†, 2431
ἀcεβέω 608–9†, [1371]
ἀcεβήc 1144, 1354–5, 1382, 1407, [1673], 2171–2, 2486
ἀcθένεια 1036
ἀcθενέω 191–2†, 1149
ἀcθενήc 191–2†
ἀcταθήc 169–70, 336
ἀcτάθμητοc 191–2†
ἀcτικόc [809–10]
ἀcύμφοροc 2487
ἀcφάλεια 711, 2152
ἀcφαλήc 1200–1
ἀταραξία 1352–3
ἄτε 308 ap., 1398–9
ἄτομοc 42, [375], 491
ἄτοποc [1860–1]
Ἀττικόc 809–10†, 1404
ἅττω 1194
αὖ 1546
αὐθέκαcτοc 1377–8
αὐλόc 1934 ap.
αὐτόc 65–6, 95, 126, 212, 217, 264, [313], 323, 330, 356, 435, 446, 479–80, [516], [518], 530, [641], [656], 703, 767, 793, 799–800, 812, 830, 833–4, 854, 885–6†, [917], 935, 938, 940, 946, 997, 1041, 1070–1, 1086, [1090–1], 1150, [1153], 1186, 1207, 1226, 1314, 1352, [1411–12], 1526, 1536, 1553, [1555], [1653–4], 1665, 1785–6, 1818, 1845–6 ap., 1857, 1909, 2034, 2037, 2215, 2221, 2232, 2259, 2263, 2277, 2348, [2352], 2425, 2476, [2491]
αὐτοῦ 885–6, 1527–8, 2036, 2055–6; (ἑαυτοῦ) 2057–8, 2152–3
αὐτότατοc 365
αὐτοτελέω 1094–5†
αὐτοτελήc 1910
ἀφή 891†
ἀφθαρcία 263, 773†
ἄφθαρτοc [49–50], 103, 145, 230, 343, [1638]
ἀφθάρτωc 209–10
ἄφθονοc 1615–16
ἀφθόνωc 2207–8†
ἀφίcτημι 141†, 697–8, 1998–9
ἄφραcτοc 1303
ἀφρονέω 2030–1 ap.
ἀφροcύνη 1605 ap., 2374
Ἀχαιόc [300]

βαδίζω 768

βαίνω 230
βακχεύω 529–30
βάρβαρος 584
βασιλεύς 2443–4
βέβαιος 2398
βιβλίον 207, 481, 695 ap.
βίος 739, 897, [1215], [1264], 1394, [1465], 1506, 1515, 1560 ap., 1569, 1954, 2222, 2271, 2434 ap.
βλάβη 233, 251 ap., [1025], 1032, 1045†, 1184
βλαπτικός 1470, 1552–3
βλάπτω 19–20 ap., 1179, 1185, 1544, 2230, 2324
βοήθεια 951
βούλησις 2029

γάρ 231, 350, 427, 454, 464, 499, 738, 758, 837, 997, 1043, 1139, 1249, 1321, 1384, 1390, 1452, 1546, 1646, 1736, [1884], [2285], [2502], 2510; *see also* ἀμέλει γὰρ, καί γάρ, μὲν γάρ, μήτε γάρ, οὐ γάρ, οὐδὲ γάρ, οὐδεὶς γάρ, οὔτε γάρ, οὕτω γάρ
γε 62, 306, 372, 467, 642, 724, 834, 993, 1273, [1277], 1385, 1701, 2039, 2321, 2471; γε μήν 695; *see also* καίτοι γε
γέλοιος 824
γέλως 601
γενέτης 1473
γεννάω 325–6 ap.
γίγνομαι 325–6, [375], 554, 962, 1274, 1399–1400, 1466–7, [1471], 1550–1, 1672, 1701†, 1847, 2402 ap., 2509
γιγνώσκω 421, 749–50, 1197–8, 1549
γνησίως 984 ap., 1524–5
γνῶσις [1332]
γόης 2482 ap.
γονεύς 1473†
γράμμα 1233, 1707–8
γραφή [1105]
γράφω 205, 516–17, 641, [752], 801, 836, [953–4], 995
γυμνάζω 79 ap.

δαιμόνιος [201], 947, 1668, 1696–7
δαιμονίως 923–4
δαίμων 921, 1145†, [1748], 2424–5
δαπανάω 1950
δέ 40, 47, [48], 96, 164, 179, [188], 189, 218, 235, 285, 331, 364, 433, 458, 465, 502, 518, 629, [633], 647, 654, 683, 697, 765, 791, 829, [838], 841, 848, [877], 890, 1023, 1055, [1063], 1071, 1128, 1135, 1144, 1147, 1163, 1185, 1187, 1190, [1202], 1224, [1230], [1278], 1348, [1387], 1396, 1442, 1449, [1461], 1522, [1556], 1676, 1711, 1727, 1745, [1820], 1849, [1862], [1894], 2039, 2043, 2150, 2158, 2166, [2196], [2202], 2219, 2276, 2277, [2320], 2322, 2480, 2489, 2503; δὲ καί 9, 206, 752, 1166, 1169, 1263, 1413, 1429, 1517, 1518, 2497; *see also* ἄλλως δὲ καί, ἅμα δέ, ἔπειτα δέ, ἔτι δέ, καί . . . δέ, οὔτε δέ
δεῖ 444, 725, [813], 952, 1038–9, 1375, 1650, 1678, 1749, 1763
δείδω [1695]
δεινός 930, [1192–3], 1562, 2032, 2221, [2359], [2362], [2404], 2411, 2465 ap.
δεῖπνον [812]
δεισιδαίμων 1135–6
δεύτερος 897†, 957 ap., [1888–9]
δέχομαι 2331
δή *see* καὶ δή
δηκτικῶς 269
δηλόω [1555–6], [1694]
Δημήτηρ 856–7 ap.
δῆμος 1405†, 1819
διά + gen. 172, 475, 540, 789, 792, 830, 967, 1047, 1049, 1540, 1540–1, [1558], 1593, [1768], 1785, 1955, 2222, 2318
διά + acc. 175, 275, 295, [306], 644, 735, 736, 768, [1130], 1199, 1336, 1399, 1418–19, [1590], 1615, 1674, 1696, 1756, 1773, 2035, 2040, 2117, 2169, [2223], 2313, 2501, 2504
διαβάλλω [176–7], 297–8, 1570–1
διαβολή 1556–7
διαγελάω 729
διαγιγνώσκω [2210–11]
Διαγόρας 525
διάγω 895, 934, 934–5
διαγωγή 2341–2†
διαδίδωμι 727, [2492]
διάδοσις 1084–5
διάθεσις 158, 161 ap., 1272
διαθήκη [1936]
διαιρέω 438–9

δίαιτα 150–1, [161], 319 ap., [1595]
διαιώνιος 46, 352, 693, 1596†
διαλαμβάνω [1596–7]
διαλανθάνω 1409, 1597–8†
διαλεκτικός 15–16 ap.
διάληψις 273–4
διαλόγισμα 1725
διαλογισμός 234
διάλυσις 268–9, 278–9 ap.
διαλύω 1257
διαμένω 143–4, [187], 638 ap., [1772–3]
διανοέω 416–17; (mid.) 2281–2
διανοητής [1895]
διάνοια 259, 1729, 1863
διαπίπτω 2197
διαπράττω (mid.) 2182
διασαφέω 208–9, 1058–9, 1467–8
διαστέλλω [1229–30]
διαστολή 98
διασώζω 1395
διαταράττω 888–9
διατελέω 1277
διατίθημι 588
διατριβή 1912 ap.
διαφορά 2209, 2393
διάφορος 814–15
διαφυλάττω 834†, 1527
διδάσκω 163–4
διερεθίζω 1683
δικάζω (mid.) 1079
δίκαιος 890, 1029, 1083, [1203–4], 1415, 2203, [2265]
δικαιοσύνη 1582 ap., 2149–50, 2260–1
δίκη 1510, [1557–8]
διό: διὸ καί 1292
διοικέω 722
διόπερ 2145
διότι 1059, 1413, 1691
Διότιμος 842
δόγμα 494–5, 535–6†, 1350, 1558–9, 1935
δογματίζω 308, 791–2, 1300–1, 1456–7, 2488–9
δοκέω [1664–5], 1855, 2000, 2162, 2172, 2179, [2324]
δοκιμάζω 823
δόξα 67†, 312, 760, 885, [891–2], 900, [1231], 1233, 1333 ap., 1431, [2168]
δοξάζω [67], 1146†, 1295, 2472–3
δύναμαι 350, 359–60, 597–8, [626–7], 1690, 2223–4
δύναμις 746
δυνατός 69–70†, [156], 2217
δυσαισθησία 1170–1
δυσεκκαρτέρητος 2361–2
δυσέκκρουστος 2361–2 ap.
δύσκολος 1309
δυσμένεια 1685–6, 1862
δυσμενής 741, 1217
δυστυχέω 2425–6, 2450–1 ap.
δυστυχής 2421 ap.
δωδέκατος 225–6, 524

ἐάν 2499–2500; ἄν = ἐάν 461, 929, 2221, 2257, [2326], 2473, 2477
ἑαυτοῦ see αὐτοῦ
ἔγγονος 2424
ἐγκαλέω 1514, 2475
ἔγκλισις 93
ἐγκύρω 1573
ἐγκωμιάζω 2484
ἐγώ 320, 502, [1127], 1695, 2283, [2505]; *see also* ἐμός
ἐθισμός 1381
ἔθος 1375
εἴωθα 268
εἰ 62, 177, 437, 467, 602, [655], 683, 721, 742, 1711, 1944, 2230, 2239, [2438], [2447], 2466
εἶδος 442, 453
εἴδωλον 216 ap., 323–4
εἰκάζω 306, 530
εἰκαῖος 1203–4†, 1425 ap., 2481 ap.
εἴκοσι 814
εἰκότως 2503–4
εἰλαπιναστής 815
εἱμαρμένη 1063–4
εἰμί 7, 39, [50], [70], 132, 134–5, [136], [195], 199, 216, 231, [348], 366, 378, 391, 413, 436–7, 455, [463], 469, 491, 522, 674, [707], 739, 828, 858, [929], 930–1, 931–2, 937, 950, [1044–5], 1098, 1176, [1226], 1282, 1505, 1567, 1676, [1744], 1771, 1774, [1886], [1892], 1894, 1897, [2027], 2040, 2144 ap., 2213, 2274, [2359–60], 2364, [2398], 2494
ἔοικα (ἐοικότα) 2162–3
εἴπερ 705, 1759
εἶπον [320], 1072, 1177, 1547, 1670, 2175
εἰρήνη 1106†
εἷς 212, 1893, 2200
εἰς + acc. 232, 258, [310], 414, 484, 766, 919, [1136], [1192], [1342], 1569, 1948, [2255], 2340

εἰcάγω 2158†, 2159
εἰcαναπέμπω* 421–2
εἰcευπορέω 1743
εἰcφέρω [179–80], 594 ap., 2163
ἐκ + gen. 40, 94, 134, 157, [197], 216, 218, 326, 331, 350, 356, 372, 521–2, 712, 783, 1024, 1037, 1101, 1149–50, 1443–4, 1446, 1517, 1518–19, 1686, 1816, 2036–7, 2051, 2178, 2217, 2348, 2374
ἕκαcτος 495, 1591, 2157
ἑκάτερος 245, 298–9, 1145–6, 2276–7
ἐκβάλλω 1138
ἔκδοcιc 2502–3
ἐκεῖνος [179], [332–3], [987], [996], [1065], 1086–7, [1166–7], 1692, 2048, 2154–5, 2320–1, 2333, 2401
ἐκκρούω 2354 ap.
ἑκούcιος 461
ἐκτείνω 878, 1280–1
ἐκτίθημι 135†, 313–14, 464, 498–9, 634–5, [1669]
ἔκτος 1078
ἐκφεύγω 1403–4
ἐλάccων 2237
ἐλπίc 989, 1417, 2344
ἐμόc 1680
Ἐμπεδοκλῆc 554–5, 1000–1, 1104–5
ἐμφαίνω 558–9, 1163–4, [1375–6]
ἔμφρων 440
ἐν + dat. 10, 14, 35, 99, 165, 183, 189, 208, 225, 362, 382, 441, 458, 481, 523, 543, 695, 700, 738, 753, 765, 886, 896, 948, 959, 990, 999, 1039, 1043, 1050, 1055, 1062, 1066, [1078], 1088, 1092, 1103, 1161, 1261, 1266, 1388, 1417, [1463], 1676, 1786, 1888, [1893], 2198, 2341, 2498
ἐναλλάccω 2500–1
ἐναντίος 251 ap., 1108, 1128, 1297–8, 1444, 1759–60 ap., [2174–5]
ἐνάργεια 637–8, 1890–1
ἐναργήc [1331–2]
ἐνδέχομαι 892–3
ἕνεκα + gen. 643, 1175
ἐνέργεια 787, 1540
ἕνιοc [305], 614, [1108], [1184–5], 1223, 1513, 1516–17, [1853], [2257], [2468–9]
ἐνιcχύω 2168
ἐννοέω 170–1 ap.
ἐννόημα 124 ap., 142, 243 ap.
ἔννοια 124 ap., 243, 1332–3 ap., [1866]
ἐνότηc [214], 327–8, 349, 358
ἐνοχλέω 533, 2232–3
ἐντυγχάνω 2496–7
ἐξαιρέω 522–3†, 1131–2
ἐξαίcιοc 276–7 ap.
ἐξεργάζομαι 2150–1
ἔξecτι [67]
ἐξῆc 891–2 ap., 1946
ἕξιc [140]
ἐξορίζω [1146], 1519–20
ἔξω 229
ἔξωθεν 938–9
ἔοικα 1070, 1339
ἑορτή 726 ap., 766, 795, 802, 807, 1017, [1124], 1398, [1452], 1789, 2279
ἐπαγγέλλω 2339
ἐπάγω 1679
ἐπαγωγή 2341–2†
ἐπακούω 581
ἐπαναίρω 1685
ἐπαναχώρηcιc [1039–40]
ἐπαπόρηcιc 1039–40 ap.
ἐπειδάν 372
ἐπειδή 1338, 2482–3
ἐπειδήπερ 45, 354–5, 648–9, 2050–1
ἔπειτα [1556]; ἔπειτα δέ 2058
ἐπευχή 1817–18†
ἐπέχω 2119
ἐπί + gen. 500, 797, 840, 841, 938–9, 1820, 1821
ἐπί + dat. 1514, [2057]
ἐπί + acc. 229, [811], [1647], [1817], 2039–40, [2444]
ἐπιβολή [287], [1317]
ἐπιβλέπω 309–10
ἐπιδείκνυμι 1576, 2115 ap.
ἐπιθυμία 2209–10
ἐπικομίζω 2433–4†
Ἐπίκουροc 121†, 164–5, 189, 361, 497, 519–20, 554–5, 730, 997–8, 1173, 1230–1, 1368, 1389–90, 1403, 1406†, 1443, 1523–4, [1856–7], 2180
ἐπικουφίζω (mid.) [2433–4]
ἐπικρεμάννυμι 1211–12
ἐπικρύπτω 2158 ap.
ἐπιλαμπρύνω 817–18
ἐπιλόγιcμα 1727
ἐπιμέλεια 1951–2
ἐπιμελήc 1538–9 ap.
ἐπιμιμνήcκω 869

ἐπινοέω 135–6, [1147], 2171
ἐπινόημα 229†
ἐπίνοια 316–17, 744, 767, 788, 875–6, 921–2, 1018–19
ἐπιορκέω 2273–4
ἐπίρρησις 822
ἐπιστολή 1067
ἐπίσταμαι [2439]
ἐπιστρέφω (mid.) 1401–2
ἐπισύγκρισις* 374–5
ἐπιτελής 1538–9
ἐπιτήδευσις [1998]
ἐπίτηκτος 1656
ἐπιτίμησις 585–6, 1366–7
ἐπιτρέπω [2158]
ἐπιτρέχω 2158 ap.
ἐπιτυγχάνω 2425–6†
ἐπιφέρω 944–5, 2158†
ἐπιχειρέω 1742
ἕπομαι 627, 1388†
ἑπομένως [304], 1193–4, [1202]
ἐποχή 2145–6
ἐργάζομαι 476
ἔργον 793, 969
ἔρμα 14
Ἑρμαρχος 542, 993, 1099–1100, 2323
ἔρχομαι 2053, 2256
ἐρωτικῶς [1476]
ἑσθλός 140
ἕτερος 591–2, 1360, [1712], [1767], 1857, 2213, 2408
ἔτι 266, 541; ἔτι δέ [184], 234, [889], [1675–6], 2447–8 ap.
ἔτος 1590
εὐδαίμων 267–8
εὐδαιμονία 291–2 ap., 354, 2049
εὔδηλος 455–6, 2273
εὐδοκία 2337
εὐελπιστία [1954–5], 2397–8
εὐεργεσία 1394 ap.
εὐεργετέω 1100–1 ap.
εὐθύνω 1174
Εὐθύφρων 704, 959
εὔορκος 1082
εὐπαίδευτος 1361–2
εὐποιητικός 243–4 ap.
εὐποιός 1343
εὐπορέω 653
εὕρημα 14†
εὑρίσκω 793–4, 2500
εὐρωστέω 2089–90
εὐσέβεια 249–50, [1162], 1293–4, 1339–40, [1844–5], 1859
εὐσεβής 1144†, [1337], 2345
εὐσκοπέω 62
εὐσταθής 169–70 ap.
εὐφημέω 924–5
εὐφημισμός 676
εὔφωνος 1421–2
εὐχαριστέω 140–1†
εὐχή 1117, 1422†, [1436–7], [1817–18]
εὔχομαι 551–2†, 2333–4
εὐωχέω 819, [847–8]
εὐωχία 1424–5
ἐφάρμοσις 1123–4
ἔχω [48], [193], [242], 270, 291 ap., [314], 353, 415–16, 757, 760, 770, 947–8, 1053, [1106–7], [1277], 1326, 1393, 1407, 1418, 1512, 1591, 1682, 1896, 1956, 2041, 2086, [2204]
ἕως 1381

ζάω 309, 2356–7 ap., 2417
Ζεύς 834, 894, 895
ζηλόω 1294
ζηλωτής 946
Ζήνων 60–1†, 634 ap., 1466
ζητέω 2355 ap.
ζήτησις 182†
ζωή [933]
ζῷον 236, 692

ἤ 357, 389, 729, 786, [1033], [1234], [1449], 1540, [1557], 1565, 2152, 2154, 2442, 2446
ἠβάσκω [1449]
ἡγοῦμαι 1129
ἤδη [320–1], [1347]
ἡδονή 139, 492, 1095–6†, [2207]
ἡδύς 1264–5
ἡμεῖς 177, 214–15 ap., [517], 531–2, 636, [657], [740], 879, 961, [1037], 1097, [1144], [1163], 1227, [1274], 1315, 1319, [1323], 1348, 1351–2, 1394, 1705, [1996], 2026 ap., 2040, 2431, 2433, 2485–6
ἤπερ 2239
ἤπιος 1345–6
Ἡρόδοτος 932 ap.
ἥρως 1852
ἧττων 355–6, [1406–7], [1896], 2440

θάνατος 241, [260–1], 2090 ap.
θανατόω 1520–1

θάττων *see* ταχύς
θαυμάζω 643–4
θεῖος 104, 134, [194], [199], 521, 761, 951†, 1099, 1304–5, 1598
θέλω 1544, 2050
Θεόδοτος 164†, 800–1; ὁ Κολοφώνιος 955–6
θεολογία 840, 968
θεολόγος [1204], [1224], [1571–2], 2481
θεός [6–7], [37], 43–4, 45 ap., 49, 53–4 ap., [69], 100†, 190, 286, 382–3, 433, 444, 469, 535, 611 ap., 628, 651, 700, [742], [754], 789, 822, 860, [868], [879], [910–11], 931, 936, [951], 958, 965, 1010, [1024], 1038, 1044, 1047, 1053, 1102, [1119], [1141], [1145], 1181, 1232–3, 1248, [1249], 1262, 1296, 1307, 1356, [1372], [1385], 1418, 1433, [1473–4], [1670], 1744, [1790], [1851], [1890], 2032 ap., 2045–6, 2179–80, [2203], 2231, 2325, 2349, 2423–4, 2467
θεότης 1264–5†
θέσις [539–40]
θεωρέω 902, 1210–11, 2052, 2262
θεωρία 726, 918, [1388–9]
θηριώδης 1215
θλίβω 811
θνητός 549, [893–4], 2047
θυσία 258, 796, 1453, 1788 ap., 1850, 1948, 2278
θύω 303, 880, [890–1]
θύωμα 295 ap.

ἴδιος 1565–6, 2469
ἰδιότης 349†, 1944 ap.
ἰδιώτης 953
ἱερός 728, [843], [906], [1788], 1817, [1851], [1949]
ἱκανός 2199
ἱκεσία 1941 ap.
ἱκετεία 1941 ap.
ἱκνέομαι 650
ἵλεως 931, 936–7, 1291–2
ἵνα [748], [877], 1071, 1214, 1279, 2433, [2505]
ἵππος 450
ἴσος 1473
ἰσχύς 1304
ἰσχύω 1537

καθάπερ 317–18, 362, 536, 656, 1037, 1784, 1885, 1887–8, 1917, [1925–6], [2364]
καθαρός 242–3, 759, 843 ap., 933, 1301–2
καθαρῶς [1311–12]
κάθαρσις 633
καθηγεμών [1648]
καθηγητής 635–6 ap.
καθήκω 881–2
καθίστημι 233–4, 1589 ap., [2399]
καθόλου 1454, [1897–8]
καινολογέω 1434–5 ap.
καινός 1670 ap., 1696, 1736–7 ap.
καίπερ 1893
καί in combination: καὶ γάρ [533], 868, 1742, 1911; καί . . . δέ 897; καὶ δή 2231; καὶ μήν [467], [846]; *see also* ἀλλὰ καί, ἄλλως δὲ καί, δὲ καί, διὸ καί, τε καί
καίτοι 1606 ap.; καίτοι γε 1360–1
κακία [2029–30], [2444–5]
κακίζω [1996–7], 2441
κακοδαίμων 2424–5†
κακός 494, 1026, 1152, [2258], [2316–17], 2375; *see also* ἧττων
κακουργία 1208, 2117†
καλέω 217–18†, 330, 818–19, [1263]
καλλιέρησις 1420
καλλιθυτέω [1790–1]
καλός 595, [1271], 1416
καλῶς 717, 881, 882
κάμνω 1364 ap.
κατά + gen. 90 ap., 640, [843], [1190], 1319, 1771, 1818
κατά + acc. [101–2], 124 ap., 141–2, 211, [213], 273, [301], 312, 328, 451, 467–8, 539, 548, 668, 743, 756, [816], [873], 883–4, [957], 967, 971, 1022, 1036, 1166, 1505, [1534], [1591], 1708, 1953–4, 2239, 2242 ap., [2326], 2469
καταγιγνώσκω 296, 1298–9
καταδεής 1032–3
καταισθάνομαι 1313–14
κατακωλύω 2115 ap.
καταλαμβάνω [922–3], [1651], [1891–2]
καταλείπω [36], 361–2, 693–4, 1026–7, 1047–8, 2422–3
κατάληψις 772 ap.
καταμέμφομαι 706–7
καταξιόω 1268
καταριθμέω 36†
κατάρχω (mid.) 2479–80
κατατρέχω 2485

κατατυγχάνω 174–5
καταφάσκω 94
καταφρονέω 1165, 1451, 2090 ap.
καταχράομαι [1431–2], [1457], 2206 ap.
κατέχω 772, [1765], 2220
κατηγορέω 1171–2, 2430, 2476–7
κατήγορος 688
κατισχύω 1259
κελεύω 530–1
κενός 186, 276–7 ap., 1231, 1430–1, 1757
κέντρον [1666–7]
κέρδος 2215–16
κηδεμονία 1474–5 ap.
κηδεμών 1346–7
κινέω 465; (mid.) 1085, 1369–70, 2030
κοιμάω (mid.) [2201]
κοινός 537, [1133–4], [1373–4]
κοινότης 439
κοινόω 2201 ap.
κοινωνία 557, 1938–9
κοινῶς 2229
κολάζω 1079 ap., 1357–8
κόλασις [2313–14], 2332
Κολοσσικός 955–6†
Κολοφώνιος 955–6
κοσμέω 1258
κόσμος 1949
κρατέω 2435
κρίσις 342, [422–3], 2313†
κριτήριον [874]
Κριτίας 526
Κρόνος 2382 ap.
κρυφαῖος 1195
κυλίνδω 579†
κύριος 220†, [1462–3], 1558
κυριόω 942–3 ap., 1286, 2367
κωλύω 1260
Κωλώτης 749–50†, 838
κωμωιδέω 1522–3
κωμωιδία 1532

λαμβάνω 229–30†, 324–5, [423–4], 1440–1 ap., 2216, 2225–6
λανθάνω 1206, 1440–1 ap., 2222–3, [2326]
λέγω 12–13 ap., 34, [38], 104–5†, 371, [469], 522–3†, 648, 679–80, 701, [707–8], 829, [891], 960, 998, 1135, 1179–80, 1278–9, 1363, [1386–7], 1400, 2181, 2508–9
Λεόντιον 866–7 ap.
λίαν 2170–1†
λιτή 1422
λογοθεραπεία 552–3
λογοποιέω 2338
λόγος 95 ap., 477–8, 699, [878], 948, 1173–4, 1378, 1515–16, 1535 ap., 1541, 1584, 1681, [1704–5], 1743†, [1858], [1967–8], 1968–9 ap., 2319, 2327, [2375], 2434 ap.
λοιπός 318, [1660], [2196–7]
λυμαντικός 1333
λυπέω 741†, 1541–2, [1578]

μάθημα 76 ap.
μαίνομαι 528–9
μακάριος 692, 1243, [1265–6]
μακαριότης 265, 1140–1, [1275–6]
μακρός 697, 1686–7†, 2340, [2496]
μαλακία [197–8]
μάλιστα 723–4, 766, 833, 1342, 2034, 2054, 2483
μᾶλλον 1251, 1581, 1867, 2114, [2503]
μανθάνω 278–9 ap., 2085
μανία [519], [2170–1]
Μάτρων 936
μάχομαι 12, 1671–2
μέγεθος 246
μεγαλομερῶς 1526–7
μεγαλοπρεπής 1526–7 ap., 2059–60
μεγαλοπρεπῶς 1526–7 ap., 2059–60 ap.
μεγαλόφρων 1288–9
μεγαλόψυχος 1289–90
μέγας 131, 720–1, 754–5, 762, 1034, 1069, [1190–1], 1293, 2036, 2214, 2347, [2415], [2428]
μειρακιώδης 2364–5 ap.
μέλλω 439–40, 1544†, [2446]
μέλω [838]
μεμπτῶς 683–4
μέμφομαι 527
μέν 39, [45], 216, 329, 372, 392, 515, 821, 1028, 1146, 1345, 1513, [1670], 1861, 1928, 1967, 2001, 2046, 2159, 2167, 2396; μὲν γάρ 798; μὲν οὖν 1705
μέντοι 104–5, 596, 1068
μέρος 451, 539, 1949 ap.
μετά + gen. 1653
μετά + acc. 820, 1419
μεταβαίνω 2084
μεταβολή 99–100, 185, 1427
μεταξύ 327
μεταφορά 547
μετέχω [186], 195, 803–4

μετεωρίζω 463
μέχρι (+ gen.) 2369, 2414
μή [101], 120, 144, 177, 185, 190, 194, 209, [269], 388, 412, 433, 437, 489, 531, 593, 602, 644, [655], 678, 698, 722, 742, [844], [877], 1002, 1071, 1214, 1279, 1308, [1382], 1550, 1565, 2085, 2223, 2230, [2262], 2359, 2505
μηδέ 235, 1316–17, 1511, [2199], 2473, [2475–6]
μηδείς 48, 365, 466, 1154–5, 1245, 1314, 1400–1, 1439, 1509, 1509–10, [1563], 2477–8, [2498–9]
μηθέν 884–5
μηκέτι [336]
μήν *see* ἀλλὰ μήν, γε μήν, καὶ μήν, οὐ μήν
μήτε 44, 1553, 1554, 2201; μήτε γάρ 42
μήτηρ 856–7 ap.
Μητρόδωρος 2–3, 96, 180–1, 702–3, 928 ap., 1848–9 ap.
μιαρός 1268–9
μικρός [2330], 2371, 2496 ap.; *see also* ἐλάσσων
μιμνήσκω 2047–8
μισέω 725
μῖσος [1687–8], 2434 ap.
μισόχρηστος 1529
μνήμη [963], 970
μνημονεύω 443, 457–8, 630 ap., 1535, 1706–7
μοῖρα 2428 ap.
μόνον (adv.) 51–2, 102, 146, 152–3 ap., 209, 445, 734, [790], 1125, [1472], [1475], 1543, 1670–1 ap., 1747, 1849, 2173, [2320], [2471]
μόνος 1172, 1227, 1292, 1523, 2150
μυθολόγος 1204†
μῦθος 1209, 2159
μυκτήρ 1645–6
Μῦς 60†
μυστήριον 559, 809, 1397–8

ναί 837
νεῖκος [2427]
νέμεσις 1045
νέμω [952]
Νεοκλῆς 165 ap.
νέος 2427†
νεότης 278 ap.
νή 895
νοερός 413
νοέω [100], 170–1 ap., 262–3, 388–9, [1030], [1309], 2418 ap., [2468]
νόημα 229
νόησις [1270]
νοητός 452
νομίζω 43, 52–3, 631–2, 646, [876–7], 1013–14, [1059–60], 1354, 1396–7, 1504, 1735, 1755, 2231–2, 2466
νόμος 735, 750, 884, 1373, 1380, 1774–5, 2330
νῦν 634

ὄγδοος 1088–9
ὀγκώδης 1709†
ὅδε 321, 835, [1129], 1448
ὁδός 2505†
ὅζος 837
ὅθεν 1664
οἶδα 204
οἰκεῖος 739, 904–5, 1016, [1769]
οἰκειότης 1052, [1106]
οἰκειόω [1273]
οἰκία 816, [1821]
οἶμαι 724, 1384, [1650], [1672], 1885, 2320 ap.
οἰονεί 755
οἷος 390, [1310], 1372
ὀλίγος 1737
ὅλος [335], 389, 671, [1215], [1770], 1954, 2271, [2492–3]
ὅλως 232, 316, [816–17], 1186, 1274 ap., [1459], 1566, 2368
ὁμιλία 213–14
ὅμοιος [152], 219, 307, 324, [348], 357, 373, 831, 1181, 2280–1, [2450]
ὁμοιότης 90–1, [273], 351
ὁμοιότροπος 2280–1 ap.
ὁμοιόω 1029–30†
ὁμοίως 894, [1077], 1100
ὁμολογέω 12–13 ap., 1069–70, 1434–5
ὁμόφωνος 586
ὁμῶς 369
ὅμως 653, 1459 ap.
ὀνειρώττω 1450
ὄνομα [535–6], 587 ap., 669, 2501
ὀνομάζω 876–7 ap.
ὄναρ 290 ap.
ὀνειδίζω 3, 159–60
ὄνησις [1040]
ὄντως 1406†
ὁπλομαχία 296–7
ὁπώρα 816–17†
ὅπως 2257, [2360]

ὀργή 1148
ὀρθῶc 104, 875
ὁρίζω 1433–4, [1885–6]
ὅρκος 821, 836†, 839, 1458, 1936
Ὀρφικός 809–10†
ὅc 8, 40, 106, [299], 306, 420, 551, [641], 881, 891, [1034], 1052, 1145, 1199, 1394, 1417, 1437, 1456, [1535], 1545, [1672], 1702, [1749], 1907, 2035, 2040, 2043, 2213, 2508
ὅcιος 635 ap., [707], [817], [961], [1138], 1295–6, 2256 ap., 2264
ὁcιότηc 206–7, 363–4, 1132–3, 1267
ὁcίωc [880–1], 952, 991
ὅcoc 927, 1568, [2057], 2318
ὅcπερ [1091], [1686], [1852], 2083 ap., [2322]
ὁτέ 329, 331
ὅτι [821], 829, 1172, 1378, 1405, 1510, 1545 ap., 1547, 1581, [1646], [1668], 1675–6†, 1997, [2028], [2263], 2273, 2427, [2489–90]
οὐ(κ/χ) 50–1, 70, 102, [233], 333, 355, [443], [470], 497, [664], 677, 734, 740, 783, 790, 836, 930, 953, 1036, 1125, [1128], 1337, 1405, [1472], 1510, 1548–9, 1592, 1596, 1671, 1675, 1679–80, 1849, 2041, 2145, [2171], 2213, 2229–30, 2232, 2237, [2255], 2258, 2320, [2324], 2331, 2340, [2399], [2471], 2493, [2508]; οὐ γάρ 677, 694, 1205–6; οὐ μήν [70–1]
οὐδαμῶc 175, [1165–6]
οὐδέ 7–8, [35], 311, 456, 471, 473, 475, 532–3, 582, 1036–7, 1185, 1187, [1259–60], [1369], [1474–5], 1528, 1532, [1764], [2028], 2178, 2181, 2214, 2429; οὐδὲ γάρ 265–6, 1570
οὐδείc 500, 649, [955–6], 1012, [1577–8], 2042, 2177–8, 2216, 2217–18; οὐδεὶc γάρ 1176–7
οὐδέτεροc 298–9 ap.
οὖν 105†, 179, [1161], 1230; *see also* μὲν οὖν
οὐcιώδηc 968–9
οὔτε 316, 713, 1661, 2164, 2495; οὔτε γάρ 308–9; οὔτε δέ 2161
οὗτοc 9, [45], 63–4, 173, 175–6, 202, 208, 223–4, 239, 248, 304, [307–8], 315, 369, 423, 441, 447, 456–7, [466], 503, 542, [555], 678, 706, [753], 769, 791, 813, 820, 1001, [1041], [1057], 1071, [1095–6], 1122, 1188–9, 1202, 1261, 1337, 1376, 1419, [1462], 1599, 1616, 1659, [1671], 1674–5, 1734, [1763–4], [2120–1], 2163, 2219, 2224–5, 2318, 2327, [2345], [2434], [2466–7], 2483
οὕτω(c) 455, [662], [688–9], 696, 1355, 1506–7, 2039, 2059, 2417 ap.; οὕτω γάρ 892
οὐκέτι 1198
οὐκοῦν 2468
οὐχί 448
ὀφείλω 1734–5
ὄχλημα 1246–7
ὄχληcιc [1757]
ὄχλοc 1405, 1575, 1604–5 ap., 1677, 1681

πάθοc 307, 770–1†, 1158 ap.
παιδομαχία* 296–7 ap.
παῖc 1426
πάλιν 879, 932†
παναγήc 2472
πανάξιοc 262†
πάνδειvoc [1584]
πανεχθήc 2490
παντάπαcι 2495
πανταχῆ (adv.) 1278
πανταχόθεν 267
παντελήc 264
παντελῶc 723, 1699
παντοῖοc 307†
παρά + gen. 1310–11, 2153, 2155
παρά + dat. 300, 554, [1465]
παρά + acc. 678, 1085–6, 1086, 1189, 1737, 2200, 2330
παραβαίνω 728–9, 845
παραγραμμίζω 534
παραδίδωμι 1574, 2282–3, 2492 ap.
παραινέω 829–30, [842], 1308
παραιρέω (mid.) 1415–16
παραίcθηcιc 418
παραιτέομαι 366–7
παραίτηcιc 182
παράκοπος 655
παρακόπτω 528
παραλείπεcθαι 205
παράλογοc 1700–1
παραμυθία 1423–4, 2419–20 ap.
παραπλήcιοc 247
παραπληcίωc [984], 1087–8
παραcημαίνομαι 545–6
παρακευάζω 1255–6, [1331], [1764–5]

παρασκεύασμα 1350–1†
παρασκευαστικός 1350–1
παρασκευή 1150
παρατείνω 2402 ap.
παρατίθημι 1280, [1712–13], 1737–8†
παρεγγυάω 733–4, 842 ap.
πάρειμι 1662, 1704, 2341
παρεισάγω 1697, 2474
παρέρχομαι 675
παρέχω 158–9, 532, 685, [1192], [1216], 1544, 2056
παρίστημι 141, 514, [2319–20], 2342–3, 2426–7
παροιμιάζω 2484
παρομολογέω 1693–4
παρρησία 2175–6
πᾶς 47, 143, [178], 344, [369], 425, 450, 490, 519, [599], 626, 639–40, 646, 654–5, [674], 758 bis, 769, 794, 803, 819, [839], [840], 882–3, 919, 1132, 1247, 1254, [1259], [1268], [1272–3], 1281, 1285, 1348–9, 1379, 1386, [1453], 1530, 1538, 1689, 1693, [1706], 1735–6, [1769], [1785], 1884, 1909, 1911, 1941, 1967, 2027, 2053, 2055, 2157, 2227, 2270, 2317, 2444, 2498; *see also* ἅπας
πατήρ 856–7 ap., 1846 ap.
πάτριος 795, 1436, 2336
πατρίς 1344, 2336†
πείθω 1675; (mid.) 1379–80; (pass.) 2043–4, 2060†, 2233–4
πειράω 366–7†
πέμπτος [1055]
πεντεκαιτριακοστός 1055–6†
πέρα 1655–6
περαίνω 489–90, [1023], 2470†
περαίτερος *see* πέρα
περί + gen. 13, 99, 184–5, 190, 202, 206, 226, 249, 363, 382, 479, 546–7, 556, 650–1, 700, 738, 753, 761, 799, 886, 896–7, [897], 909, [958], 990–1, [997], 1043, 1051, 1063, 1078, 1093–4, 1262, 1266–7, 1296, 1355–6, 1433, 1451, [1465], [1592], 1702, [1703], 1778, 2045, 2179, [2203], 2219, 2224, 2278, 2467
περί + acc. 239, 1145, [1368], 1856
περίαλλος [1773–4]
περιαντλέω 2235–6†
περιαιρέω 133
περιβάλλω 2235–6; (pass.) 2240–1, 2437–8
περιγράφω 434–5, 600–1
περίειμι [1771–2]
περιίστημι 66
περιληπτός 419
περιπίπτω 2235–6†
περιτίθημι 1858
περιττῶς [2105–6], [2420]
περιφορά [2202]
πικρός 1557, 2496 ap.
πίπτω [19–20], 1406 ap., 1531
πίστις 203 ap., [478], 770–1, 831–2, 1459, [1743], 2041–2, 2225, 2356–7 ap., 2358
πλάττω 496
Πλάτων 704–5
πλείων 499
πλῆθος 1746, 2502
πλήν 1568
πλησίος 718–19
ποιέω 41, 97–8, 198, 317, 375 ap., 501, 553, 679, 705, 742–3, [874–5], 1203, 1564, [1769–70], 1953
ποιητής 168 ap., 2482
ποικίλος 1507
ποῖος 1044, 1600 ap., 2334†
ποιός 1343†, 2334
πολεμέω 473–4
πόλεμος 929
πόλις 302, 1517–18, 1592, 1815 ap.
πολιτεία 1336, 2165
πολίτης 800
πολιτικός [957], 1684, 1968 ap.
πολλάκις 2234
Πολύαινος 10, 865–6, [932], 1092
πολύς 13, 65, 68, [198], 203 ap., 311, 371, 847, 870, 998, 1049, 1102, [1170], 1353, [1409–10], 1561, 1647, 1676, 1682–3, 1951, 2154, 2446, 2464 ap., [2506]
πομπή 257
πονηρός 2229, 2350–1
πόνος 2404 ap., 2434 ap., [2493–4]
ποτέ 334–5
που 2505
πρᾶγμα 64, 531, 535–6†, 672
πραγματεία 826–7, 1093†, 1105†
πράττω 335 ap., 719–20, 883, 966–7, 1261, [1455–6], [1853–4], 2042–3, 2227–8
πρέπω 2177
πρίν [320]
προαίρεσις 642–3
προγίγνομαι 2086–7

πρόγονος 1225
Πρόδικος 524–5
προεῖπον [2432]
προκαλέω 1390 ap.
προκοπή 949
προλαμβάνω 441–2
πρόληψις 1300, 1887
προνοέω 598–9
πρόνοια 2366–7 ap.
προνομία [2478–9]
προπίπτειν [336–7]
πρός (+ uncertain case) 15, 127, 166
πρός + gen. 446
πρός + dat. 751, 2242
πρός + acc. 11, 60†, 268, 544, 551, 627, 703, 865, 938, 953, 954, 959, 974, 1000, [1052], 1069, 1072, [1093], 1104, 1275, 1322, 1334, 1340, 1475, 1508, [1844], 2088, 2116, 2335, 2492
προσαγόρευμα 1234 ap.
προσαγορεύω 215
προσάγω 305
προσδέομαι [1155], 1188
προσδοκέω 2038–9
προσδοκία 2204–5, 2353
προσδοξάζω 1009–10
προσεδρεύω 2506–7
πρόσειμι [259–60]
προσεπιφέρω 1412–13
προσέρχομαι 629
προσέτι 2275
προσεύχομαι 737–8
προσέχω 518
προσήκω 259–60 ap., 828, 961–2, 1119–20, [1844]
προσκόπτω 1698
προσκύνησις 898, 1117–18
προσμένω 2371–2 ap.
προσοργίζομαι 1657–8
προστάττω [1383]
προστίθημι 546, 592
προστρέπω 261
πρότερος (πρότερον) 541, 2161–2
πρόφασις 1689
προφέρω [1390], [2331–2]
πρόχειρος 1681–2
πρῶτον 1549–50
πρῶτος 227, 1093, [1105], 2046
Πυθοκλῆς 1104–5†
πυκνός 162 ap.
πυκνότης 162 ap.
ῥάδιος 1264–5†
ῥήγνυμι [1533]
ῥητορική [1920], [1927–8]

σάρκινος 418–19
σεβασμός 976–7, 1821 ap.
σέβομαι [551–2], [654], [911–12]
σέβωμα 241†
σεμνός 762–3, 888, 1042, 1283, [2481]
σεμνότης 1011–12
σέμνωμα 902–3, 975, [1022], 1042†
σημεῖον 1458–9
σίνομαι 1530–1
σιωπάω 1200
σκεδάζω 1680–1
σοφία 740†, [2116]
σοφιστής [1534–5]
σοφός 483, 758–9, 1534–5 ap., 1851 ap., 2441–2
σπεύδω 2504
σποδή 1937
σπουδαῖος 1421
σπουδαιότης 746–7
σπουδή 556
στέμμα 1940–1
στερέμνιος 415 ap.
στερέω 237–8
στοιχεῖον 357–8
στοιχείωσις 352–3
στόμα 770, 1529–30
Στωικός 614 ap.
συγγιγνώσκω 1167
σύγγραμμα 1279–80
συγγραφή 295 ap.
σύγκρισις 39–40, 40–1, 44, 101, 188, 192–3, 329, 374–5 ap.
συκοφαντέω 2499
συκοφαντία [2470–1]
συλλέγω 1667–8
συλλόγισμα 1726
συμβαίνω 480, 1612
συμβιάω 1525
συμβιώτης 850–1
συμβόλαιος [1463–4]
συμμαχία 1519
συμπεριλαμβάνω 1020–1, 1338–9
συμπεριφέρω (mid.) 2166–7
συμπεριφορά 312–13, 468, 751, 907–8, 1923–4, 2236
συμπλέκω 2315–16
συμπολιτεύω (mid.) 1551–2
συμπόσιον [1787–8]

σύμφημι [178]
συμφορά 2037–8, 2436–7
συμφύω 453–4
σύμφωνος [193]
σύν + dat. 935, 1057, 1133, 1142, 2165
συνάγω [1789–90]
συναγωγή 1467, 2341–2
συναθροίζω 1688
συναιρέω 2174–5†
συνάπτω 1035, 1143–4
συναριθμέω 433–4
συναφή 549–50
σύνειμι 1582 ap.
συνεορτάζω 807–8, [866–7]
συνεπαινέω 1847–8
συνέπομαι 583
συνεργία 1065, 1103 ap.
σύνεσις 1103†, [1708–9]
συνέστιος [1759–60]
συνέχω 1103
συνεχῶς [212–13]
συνήθεια 920
συνθεσία [1464–5]
σύνθετος 44†
συνθήκη [844], 1937–8
σύνοιδα 299 ap., 2035
συνοικειόω 299 ap.
συνοράω [299], [1270–1], 1694†, 2180–1
συσχολάζω 1554–5
συντέλεια 1156 ap.
συνταράττω 1315–16
συντέλεια 211
συντελέω 217–18 ap.
συντίθημι 299 ap., 1710–11 ap.
σύστασις 321–2
σφοδρός 771
σχεδόν 2263
σώζω [1142]
Σωκράτης 702, 924 ap., 1359, 1661–2 ap., [1666], 1677–8
σῶμα 35–6, 37–8, [48], 432, 458–9
σωματικός [136]
σωτήρ 856–7 ap., 1061†
σωτηρία 1046, 2164, 2335–6

τάξις 333
ταπεινός 1164
τάραγμα 238
ταράττω 120 ap., [287–8], [333–4], 335
ταραχή 1766, 2238–9
ταραχώδης 2276
ταρβέω 244–5
τάττειν 459–60
τάχα 628–9, 1169
ταχύς [1740] (θάττων)
τε 414, 812, 1043, 1050, 1100, [1257], [1336], 1452, 1566, [1851]; τε καί 762, 2282
τεκμήριον 132
τέλειος 353
τελειότης 748–9, 1264, 1305
τελειόω [1029–30]
τελεστής [909]
τελετή [1816]
τελευταῖος 543, 999
τελέω 906
τελέως 46, 435–6
τέρας 293 ap.
τερατεία 2160–1
τέχνη [1945]
τηρέω 266, 731, 733, 2269
τίθημι 1090, 1385–6, 2060
τιμάω 713–14, 1162–3, 1347–8, 1385–6 ap., [1388], 1474
τιμή 994, 1119
τιμωρέω [2447]
τις [140], 200, [262], 441, [540], 655–6, 707, 785, [789], 799, 837, [1038], [1044], 1053, 1057, [1071], 1167, 1224, 1359–60, 1382, 1518, [1534], 1541, 1546, [1665], [1667], 1711, [2257], 2334, 2362, 2439, [2448]
τοιγαροῦν 1512–13
τοίνυν 368, [690], 724, 820, 1330, 1469, 1471–2, 2344
τοιοῦτος 97, 477, 827, 1014–15, 1118–19, [1130–1], 1160, [1175], 1369, [1454], 1536–7, 1691–2, 1863–4, [2208], 2241, 2507
τολμάω 1546–7
τόπος 432
τοσοῦτος 475–6, 1468, 1590
τότε 1684, [2167]
τράπεζα 843–4, 1939–40
τρεισκαιδέκατος 1050–1
τριακοστός 1056, [1889–90]
τρόπος 91†, 836, 1091, 1130, 1853†, 2281, 2346, 2438
τυγχάνω 181, 1201, 2439–40, 2479
τύραννος 2033
τυφόω 1228–9
τύχη 498, 1585 ap., 2365, 2380 ap.

υἱός 1845 ap.

ὑμνέω 986 ap., 1951
ὕπαρ 290 ap.
ὕπαρξις 628
ὑπαιτιολογία 365–6†
ὑπάρχω [213], 290 ap., 351–2, 381, 651–2, 655 ap., 656
ὑπεναντιολογία 365–6
ὑπεναντίος 1299–1300
ὑπεξαίρετος* 471–2
ὑπέρ + gen. 235, [256], 285, 360, [996], 1064, 1744
ὑπεράνω 1383–4
ὑπερβάλλω 745
ὑπέρβασις 326–7
ὑπερέχω 757
ὑπεροχή 1303
ὑπό + gen. [515], 1208, 1528
ὑπογράφω 1048–9, [2349–50]
ὑποδείκνυμι 367–8, [2314–15]
ὑπόκειμαι [1893–4]
ὑπολαμβάνω 8, 460, 689–90, 768–9, 1306–7, 1320–1, 1746–7
ὑπολείπω 1182–3, 2032–3
ὑπόληψις 295 ap., [315], 1370†, 1408
ὑπομένω 1746–7†
ὑπομιμνήσκω 824–5
ὑπονοέω 1196–7, 1459–60
ὑπόνοια 315 ap., 1370†, 1747–8 ap.
ὑποτείνω 538
ὑποτελέω 359
ὑποτρέχω 2322
ὑποφέρω 2403–4
ὑποψία 686, 1213–14, [1370], [1747–8]
ὑφηγητής 1747–8†
ὑψηλός 1288

φαίνω 255–6 ap., 2505; (mid.) [200], 349, 730–1, [895–6], [1330], 1673–4, 2156–7, [2264], 2470
φανερός 835
φαντασία 291 ap., 673, 1542–3, 1860
φαυλίζω 579
φαῦλος 2328
φάσις 634
φενακία 1861†
φενακιστής 2173–4
φέρω [470–1]
φεύγω 2362 ap.
φημί 63, 100, 131, [183], 228, 446, 527, 740, 755, [802], 880, 890–1†, [912], [918–19], 949, 1042, [1056], 1186, [1223], 1262, 1294–5, 1402, 1891, [2323]
φθάνω 1741
φθαρτός [47], 188–9, 343 ap.
φθόνος [1861]
φιλαλήθως 105
φίλαυλος 1933–4 ap.
φιλία [939–40], 1663
φιλομαχία [296–7]
φίλος 732–3, [940], 1478–9 ap.
φιλοσοφέω 1312
φιλοσοφία 1094, 1411, 1926–7, 2116†
φιλόσοφος 483 ap., 1180, 1205, 1516, 1572, 1714–15 ap., 2176
φιλοτιμέομαι 2054–5
φλυαρέω 522–3†
φλυαρία 1395–6
φοβοῦμαι 1198–9, 1236, 2428
φόβος 241, 2220
φρόνιμος 1028
φροντίζω 1324
φυγή 2199
φυλακή 1539
φυλάττω [786–7], 832, 834, 1134, 1269, [1460–1]
Φύρκων 798–9, 954–5
φυσικός 736, 2089
φυσικῶς 893†
φύσις 47†, 63, [125–6], 140 ap., 191, [195], [199], 214 ap. 226–7, 231, 322–3, 369–70, 420–1, 453, 550, 747, 765, 873, 893, 971 bis, 1099, 1599 ap., 1758, 1772, 1895, 2360
φωνή [1533]

χαρά 162 ap.
χαρίεις [1864–5]
χάριν + gen. 447
χάρις 1040 ap., 1148, 2085, 2356–7 ap.
Χαρῖνος 841, 939
χλευάζω 1658
χορός 2491
χοῦς (οἱ Χόες) 807
χράομαι 547–8, 796–7, 823–4, [918], 1337†, [1379], 1385, 1438–9 ap., [1690–1], [2206], [2212]
χρεῖος 2421–2 ap.
χρησμῳδέω 2044–5
χρόνος 790, 1438, 1687, [1886], 2493, 2507
χυδαῖος 1182
χωρίς + gen. 1147

ψεύδομαι 1865–6, 2275–6
ψευδομαχία 296–7 ap.

ψήφισμα 1632 ap.
ψυχή 4 ap., 489†, 1101

ὥρα 647–8
ὡς 34, 454, 514, 523, 726, 740, [895], [1134], 1175, 1177, [1223], 1299, 1349, 1358, [1389], 1449, 1455, 2047, 2236 ap., 2283, 2314, [2323], 2338, 2486, 2491
ὡσαύτως 1187
ὥσπερ [1228], 1594, 2432
ὥστε [176], [197], 314, 334, 466–7, 685, 701, [1472], 1496, 1508, 2050, 2236–7
ὠφελέω 1178, 2287 ap.
ὠφελία [876], 924 ap., 1024, 1031, 1040 ap., 1045†, 1058, 1089–90, 1183, 2348
ὠφέλιμος 1315, 2287 ap.

B. Ancient Works Cited in the Text

Ἐπικούρου Ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτους 1820
Ἐπικούρου Ἐπιστολαὶ πρὸς τοὺς μεγάλους 1068–9
Ἐπικούρου ὁ Ν[165
Ἐπικούρου ὁ Νεοκλῆς 165 ap.
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ βίων 738–9
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ εἱμαρμένης 1063–4
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ θεῶν 165 ap., 189–90, 382–3 ap., 753–4, 1043–4, 1151–2†, 1261–2
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ ὁσιότητος 206–7, 362–4, 1266–7
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ φύσεως ζ΄ (?) 1078
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ φύσεως η΄ (?) 1088–9
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ φύσεως ιβ΄ 225–7, 523–4
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ φύσεως ιγ΄ 1050–1
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ φύσεως λβ΄ 1888–90
Ἐπικούρου Περὶ φύσεως λε΄ 1055–6
Ἐπικούρου Πρὸς Πολύαινον 865–6, 932
Ἐπικούρου Πρὸς Πολύαινον ἐπὶ Χαρίνου 840–1, 938–9
Ἐπικούρου Συμπόσιον 1787–8
Ἐπικούρου Φύρκωνι ἐπ' Ἀριστωνύμου 797–9
Ἐπικούρου Φύρκωνι ἐπὶ Διοτίμου 841–2
Ἑρμάρχου Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα πρῶτος 1103–5
Ἑρμάρχου Πρὸς Ἐμπεδοκλέα τελευταῖος 542–5, 999–1001
Μητροδώρου (?) *Περὶ* [990–1, cf. 959–60
Μητροδώρου Περὶ μεταβολῆς 99–100, 184–5
Μητροδώρου Πρὸς Εὐθύφρονα Πλάτωνος 702–5
Μητροδώρου Πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστὰς ζ΄ (?) 1078
Μητροδώρου Πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστὰς η΄ (?) 1088–9
Πολυαίνου Πρὸς Ἀρίστωνα 11
Πολυαίνου Πρὸς τὸ Περὶ φιλοσοφίας Ἀριστοτέλους 1092–5
auct., op. inc. ζ΄ 1078
auct., op. inc. η΄ 1088–9

GENERAL INDEX

Numerals in italics refer to line-notes in the commentary; roman type to pages

abstract terms in -μα, among Epicureans *238*
Academics *131*
accuracy 277; *2499–2501*
Achaeans 127 n. 1
adjectives, in two terminations *759–60*
adjudication 181
affinity/alienation, of God for some 179, 183; *1050–1, 1105*
allegory 127 n. 2, 235 n. 2; *297–8, 299–301*
analogy 123; *89–95*
anaphora 88
Anaxagoras *138*
Anaxicrates, archonship of 231, 558
anger, from God 185
animals 123 and n. 6
Anthesteria 161 n. 9, 165, 430; *794–6*
  ghosts, pollution at *806–8*
Anthesterion 161 n. 10
anthropocentrism *138*
anthropomorphism 5; *538*
Antigonus *929*
Antisthenes 143; *536–7, 538, 697–701*
antithesis, lack of 87
Apia *935–6*
apographs vii, 26, 32, 58–60
  double copies 59
  falsification/miscopying in 59
Apollodorus of Athens 17 n. 2, 288
apologetic 31 n. 4, 81, 94
Arcesilaus, and New Academy *707–8*
archon-dates:
  in letters of Epicurus *840–1*
  in *subscriptiones* of Περὶ φύσεως *523–4*
Ares 127; *14, 302–3*
argument:
  for the existence of gods 3
  progression of in *De pietate* 282–3
  rhetorical *649*
Aristobulus *165*
Ariston of Chios 107; *1, 4, 297–8*
Aristonymus, archonship of 161
Aristotle, *On Philosophy* *1092–4*
Aristoxenus *525*
Arrighetti, Graziano 37
assimilation 73
assistance, for humans from gods 179
association with others 239
atheism 1–4
  of Epicurus, source 14–17
atheists 14, 139, 143, 191; *1513–16*
  catalogue of 82; *225–7, 523–4*
Athena 127; *302–3*
  epithets of 22
Athenians 13, 203, 211 n. 2; *1376, 1402–12*
  as most educated 199; *1361–3*
  lifestyle of 217, 540; *1593–8*
Attic prose, Classical 87–8
Atticus 8 n. 1
authorship 88–9, 96; *1773–5*
  argument from style 86
  ascribed to Philodemus 89 n. 2

Bacchants 143; *529–32*
Batis *935–6*

belief, suspension of *2119*
benefit, for humans from God 167, 177, 179, 181, 203; *1348–53*; *see also* harms and benefits
benevolence, from God 185
Bion *1678–81*
blessed and imperishable beings 191
blessedness 6, 125, 193
bodies:
  compound 109
  Epicurus' classification of 287; *37–41*
  gods included among 109
  primary 109, 137, 141; *211*
  solid 135
  and void 337; *432*, *451–3*
book (= λόγος) 90, 94 n. 2
book-number, position of in citations *896–7*, *1105*
books:
  about gods 155; *700*
  Epicurean 139, 151, 163, 225, 282, 371; *1706–8*
    about gods 343
    filled with oaths 418
    memorial and consolatory *797–9*
    see also titles
Bücheler, Franz 30, 52

Callimachus *2480–1*
Carneades *159–60*
causation:
  expressions for 460–2
  physical, types of *736–7*
causes:
  of goods, divine nature as 181
  physical 157; for worship *736–7*
Chaeredemus *165*
Charinus, archonship of 165, 171; *840–1*, *841–2*, *929*, *932*
charlatans, philosophers as *2171–4*
chiasmus 88
children 205, 207; *935–6*
Choes 161, 409; *794–6*, *806–8*, *866–8*
choice and avoidance 257; *2208–10*
choices, of life *1505–6*
Chrysippus 17; *297–8*, *1545–7*
Cicero 96
  dates in letters of *840–1*
citations of authors 82
  precision and reliability *2499–2501*
cities 217, 231, 241
City Dionysia *808–10*
civilization, early 309
clarity *1890–1*
Clearchus of Soli *1678–81*
colloquialisms 87
Colophon 161 n. 6; *799–801*, *946–9*, *954–6*
colophon 68–9, 88
Colotes 163; *705–6*, *1214–16*, *2171–4*
columns, of the papyrus roll:
  dimensions of 75
  order of 37–62, 280–1; *see also after individual columns*
  totals tabulated 69
combinations, of papyri transmitted separately 36, 40
comedy 211; *1358–63*, *1528–32*
  Epicureans in 13, *880*
common:
  meals 390
  opinion *177–8*
  traditions 183, 201
  usage *213–14*
compacts *2213–18*
composition:
  as argument 88
  catalogue style *1277–81*, *879*
  by compilation viii
  date of 23
  length and structure *2493–6*
  by summary and refutation 18; *1465–8*
  see also organization; transition
compounds 109, 113, 119; *100–1*, *169–70*
  of identical/similar elements *98*, *101–2*
conception, generic (πρόληψις) 5, 84, 237; *646–7*, *1298–1301*
  contamination of 8
  development of 56; *1317–18*
  as God 11
  of God 195; *229*, *1731–2*, 562, *1887*
  preservation of 8
  regularity of 8
concluding/connection, expressions for 89–94
conscience, of wrongdoers 247
consensus omnium, argument from *177–8*, *213–14*, *527–9*, *646–7*; *see also* humans, all
  epistemological significance 460
consolation 271
constitution 119, 129, 133
  of identical/similar elements 129, 131
contracts 239; *1462–5*
contributions, of money to Epicurean

school *950–2, 954–6*
convention 143
cooks, Epicurean in comedy *843–4, 880, 1528–32*
copyists, Italian 44, 60
coronis 93
corrections, scribal 76
corruption, textual 555; *229, 628–9*
  H for N *325–6*
  M for Π *1055–6*
  N for AI *757–8*
  Y for I *548–9, 639–40*
cosmogonies 279
court-trials 592
  rhetoric of *2476–7*
covenants and agreements 165, 239, 430; *843–4*
Crates *1678–81*
criterion of knowledge 167, 253 n. 1
Critias 13, 143; *697–701, 1176–88, 2480–1*
  as author of *Sisyphus* 463; *526, 540–1, 1196–8, 1214–16, 2158–9*
  in Satyrus *526*
critical part vi; 52
criticism:
  of myths 97
  philosophers 85
  poets 30–1, 52, 55, 70, 85, 94, 97, 277 n. 6; *1202–5*
Crönert, Wilhelm 33
crowd:
  at Athens *1358–63*
  Socrates always in *1676*
cult and ritual 3, 10, 455
cultural history vii, 7, 10, 55, 82
  chronology as aid in reconstruction 82; *231–2*
  development of justice and law 85; *2479–80, 542–3*
  distortion of ideas of gods in 310
  earlier philosophers in 482; *1176–88*
  fear of death in *235–8*
  gods as subject to sufferings in 314
  imperfect tense as stylistic feature of 247 n. 6; *233–4, 1009–10, 2206–7*
  linking particles and temporal adverb in accounts of *234–5, 265–6, 1193–4*
  religion in 85
customs 127, 201, 263 n. 3, 265; *1381–2*
cyclic epos *1678–81*
Cynics 223 n. 2, 542; *1678–81*
Cypria 1678–81
daimonion, 01
Danais 604
dating:
  by archons, formula
  of *De pietate* 23
  of letters *840–1*
dead, cult of 390
death 249
  books on theme of *797–9*
  fear of 123; *260–1, 2235–6*
deception, regarding the gods 189
dedications 10, 390, 443; *794–6*
  by Epicureans at Eleusis *808–10*
definition 95; *470*
  Epicurean rejection of *707–8, 1017–18*
  role in Academy *707–8*
Demetrius of Athens *929*
Demetrius of Laconia, style of 86
Democritus 5 and n. 3; *229, 1176–88*
demonstration 251, 281; *470*
  of non-contradiction 131; *364–7*
  logical *770–1, 2358*
  promised, as transition *2340*
  Epicurean 139
desires and pleasure, classification of 257, 571, 582; *1766–7, 2205–6, 2206–7, 2207–8, 2208–10, 2211–12, 2213–18*
detection of crime, fear of during whole life 259, 265; *1953–4, 2213–18, 2219–26, 2223–6, 2271*
Diagoras 13, 143; *525, 526, 697–701, 2480–1*
dialectic 95; *470*
Dicaearchus 6
Diels, Hermann 34
dinners, communal, Epicurean 163, 418, 430; *818–19*
Diodorus 558
Diogenes of Apollonia *138*
Diogenes of Babylon 17, 18–23, 288; *206–7, 297–8, 1465–8, 1545–7, 2484–6*
  On Athena 18–23, 20–1, 21 n. 1; *703–5*
Dionysus 161 n. 9
Dioscuri, oath by 163 n. 6; *836–7*
Diotimos, archonship of 165; *841–2*
disposition 115, 292
disturbance 123, 129, 143, 193, 197, 229, 257, 263, 555; *880, 888–9, 1764–5, 2218*
divine, emulation of 9
division into parts 31, 95, 70, 279–81
  into papyrus rolls 70
do ut des 732

documents, used by Philodemus *945–6*
dogmatic part 30, 52
dogmatists 4; *655–6*
Dositheus *799–801*
dreamers 207
dreams 6

earthquakes and tremors 181 n. 4; *1083–5*
editions of works cited *277*
editorial techniques, multiple 37 and n. 5
Eleusis *558–9*
  dedications by Epicureans at *808–10*
elision 73–4
ellipsis 88
Empedocles 143, 175, 349; *697–701*
  use of metaphor *546–7*
engravings, of Naples apographs 28–9
entailment *626–8*
entity (= φύσις) *230–1*
Epicurean curriculum, poetry in *2205–7*
Epicureans:
  as harmful to society *277*
  generosity and extravagance of *1526–8*
  honoured after death *843–4*
  on myth *2159*
Epicurus *passim*
  = *οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον 1367–8*
  acts of cult by *792–3*
  as atheist 12
  birthday of 163 n. 2; *1473–4*
  brothers of 117 n. 2, 171, 207; *165*
  charged with harming people *1470–1*; with impiety 526
  dual mode of citing letters *840–1, 938–9*
  father of, a schoolmaster *165*
  Great Epitome 37–41
  Letter to the Child (?) *935–6*
  letters dated by archon *797–9, 938–9*
  letters to, from others *945–6*
  and mysteries at Athens 145, 349
  On Destiny 179; *1055–6*
  On Gods 157, 177, 193, 455, 498; *206–7, 738–9, 753–4*
  On Gods (?) 133
  On Holiness 121, 131, 193, 498; *206–7*
  On Lifecourses 167, 435; *737–8, 896–7*
  On Nature 37–41, 1078
    (?) 6: 181
    (?) 8: 181
    12: 121, 143; *225–7*
    13: 179; *225–7, 1050–1*
    32: 237
    35: 179; *1055–6*
    archon-dates in *523–4, 938–9*
    citation of, in *De pietate 206–7, 225–7*
    date of composition *541*
    number of books of *1055–6*
    papyri of *207*
    title of *523–4*
  parents and brothers, cult of 207; *1473–4*
  published treatises vs. letters to insiders *1069–70*
  rhythmic style in *1538–9*
  self-citation *891–2*
  style *931–2, 2178–82*
  Symposium 229, *1412–18*
  'those who lived with him' 211
  To Neocles (?) 117 n. 2; *945–6*
  To Phyrson 1–2: *797–9*
  To Polyaenus 430; *840–1, 865–6*
  To Pythocles, authenticity of *705–6*
  true views of 235
  unknown at Athens 203, 213, 516; *1402–12, 1545–65*
  views cited first in *De pietate*, followed by *kathegemones* 577
  will of 207
  words, not actions, censured by opponents 187
  works of 554–5; deposited in Athenian Metroon *797–9, 840–1*
epithets of the gods, used by Epicurean founders 163, 501
epitomes 65
  of Epicurus' letters *840–1*
euphemism, in oaths *836–7*
Euripides *526*
Euthyphro 155, 173; *700, 707–8*
examples, lists of 88
exemplar, scribal 76
exemption, political *2477–9*
exile 211
expectation:
  of goods 175, 203, 241, 271, 564, 597; *880, 988–9, 1412–18, 2203–5*
  by just persons 516
  of misfortunes from the gods 247, 259, 265, 597
expunction point 76

false belief, origin of 571–2
fear:
  of death 310
  of harm, freedom from *2040–3*

of punishment 259, 265
feasting 163, 205, 418; *794–6, 843–4*
at Epicurean celebrations *818–19*
rationale for *1422–3*
festivals 10, 159, 161, 161 n. 11, 177, 183, 203, 207, 229, 263, 403, 409; *765–6, 794–6, 811–12, 2278–9*
mocked by Epicurus *1398–9*
Festugière, A.-J. 36–7
focusing (ἐπιβολή) ability of the mind *331–4, 1317–18*
foolish 189
foreigners 147
format of writing, papyrus roll 75
frankness, as philosophical virtue *2174–5*
freedom from fear of harm 189; *2213–18*
pleasure from 582
friendship 171, 221; *939–45*

Galen *302–3*
garlands 239
gastronomy, Epicurean *880*
genre, of *De pietate* 82
Gigante, Marcello ix
God:
as bad-tempered 197
epithets defining 195
gender of *1047*
gods *passim*
as all-knowing 189
blessed and eternal, existence of 153
as bodies 115
children of 273, 605
conceived by similarity *185–9*
constitution of *190–4*
as material 288
development of beliefs about *549*
early thinking about *1742*
emulation of lifestyle of *1263–4, 1340–2, 2047–8, 2051–3*
as eternal and immortal 111
existence of:
arguments for 149, 151, 227, 281–389, 645; *1742*
denial of 4
expressions for: positive *36, 137*; negative *133*
as hostile 157
as ideas *1085–7*
ideas of *229*
included among bodies and void 136
included among existents 115
interaction with humans 279
as invulnerable to destruction 294–5
as kindly and propitious 199
lifestyles of 294
number of 552
ontological status of *1085–7*
as originally humans 280
as propitious 171
reliability and regularity of concepts of 298; *225–31*
shape of *14*
strange, introduction of *1358–63*
as subject to death and disease *306–7, 2235–6*
as terrifying tyrants 247
Gomperz, Theodor 31, 51
goods:
from gods 183
past 249
graphics, occurring finally 93

hand, scribal 57, 74–6
date of 74
decoration of 74
identity of 54 n. 1
haplography *229*
happiness *353–4*
of the gods 125
harm:
to citizens from the philosopher 213, 215, 609
to the bad from the gods 177
surrounding powerful gods 273; *2436–8*
harmlessness, as ethical goal 247, *2051–3*
harms and benefits, doctrine of 3, 11, 84, 458–9; *455, 1055–6, 1764–5*
classification of view on *1176–88*
Hayter, Revd John 24, 26, 48 and n. 1
Hegesianax *799–801*
Henrichs, Albert ix, 37
Hephaestus 604
heresy, concept of 3 n. 1
Hermarchus 265, 349, 455, 596; *1099–1101, 1198–1201*
Against Empedocles *997–1001, 1078, 1103–8*; 1: 181–2; 22: 143, 175
date of composition *541*
Hermes *14, 539–40*
herms *14*
Herodotus *932*
heroes 235; *1852*
cult of *843–4*

heroes (*cont.*)
Greek 125
hiatus 73, 86, 98; *768–70*
holiness 185
definition of 155
Homer *14, 2480–1*
reading of as advice to kings *2438–49*
honours, for gods as fitting 183
horses 137
hostility 189
towards Epicureans 187
towards philosophers 235
of philosophers towards society *1862*
political, towards Socrates 223
house, of Epicurus (?) 163
humans 127
all 177, 199 and n. 1, 201, 151; *see also consensus omnium*
early 121, 127 n. 9, 135, 263 n. 1; *225–31, 233–4*
many 215, 255
hymn 173; *768–70, 825–8, 986*
hyperbaton 87
hypomnemata 81

identity 113 n. 2
images 6, 129; *98, 209–19*
in dreams 6
similarity of 113 n. 2
streams of, from gods *169–70*
as true 153; *673–5*
imagination *98*
imperishability 6
impiety 84, 119, 185, 199, 255, 273, 281
charge of 14, 295
prosecution for *1174*
suspicions of 201
impious man, definition of 185, 483
indestructibility 125
inference, analogical *546–7*
influences, from gods 181
initiation 10, 169; *794–6*
injustice 253, 491
origin of 189, 549, 572
insanity 151, 255; *2169–71*
intercolumnium 72
intermundia 7 n. 5
intervention of gods 7
inventory numbers 40 n. 1
first assigned 29 n. 1
invitations, to Epicurean dinner 163
invocations 390
iota, irrational 73
iotacism 73
irony 87
isonomia, doctrine of 553; *673–5*

just man 257; *1028–9, 2201–2*
justice 3, 215, 253, 261, 509, 563, 592
almost the same as holiness *2263–5*
and atheism, origin of 549–614
as compacts not to harm *2213–18*
section on 55

Karneiskos, *Philista 165*
kathegemones 139, 141, 153, 163, 177 nn. 2 and 8, 181 n. 7, 195, 235, 263 n. 1, 458; *679–80, 1863*
as subjects of unspecified plural verbs *1023–42*
order of citation in *De pietate 1078*
kings:
advice to, by philosopher *2438–49*
good 273; *2438–49*
kingship, Philodemus' theory of *2438–49*
kisses, thrown to statues 167 n. 4
knowledge:
clear 197, 237
of gods 5
technical 564
Krische, August Bernhard 30
Kronos 604

Lampsacus *929, 935–6*
language:
Epicurean theory of *549–52*
origin of *539–40*
in worship *552–3*
law 157, 167, 201, 211; *1381–2*
civic *732*
sacred *732*
supreme 229; *1773–5*
lawsuit 211
lemmata 282
Leontion *811–12, 825–8*
letter, private, dates in *840–1, 841–2*, 932, *938–9*
letter shapes, mistaken by modern copyist 61
life:
choices of *1505–6*
modes of 211, 273; *737–8*
reduced to beastly state 189; *2213–18, 2329–30*

lifestyles 117
lines, number of 62, 68
literary form 81–4
litotes 88
location, of primary bodies 137
logic *626–8*
  Epicurean *470*
Lucretius 2 n. 2, 550
Luppe, Wolfgang 37
lying 263; *2276*
Lysimachus *929*

madmen 151, 349, 377; *527–9, 655–6*
magic, in philosophy *1538–9*
Matro 171; *935–6*
meat, sacrificial *843–4, 1412–18*
memory:
  and recitation *1538–9*
  of the divine 173
  quotation by in Philodemus *2499–2501*
Menelaus 223 n. 2; *1678–81*
metaphor 143; *546–7, 895–6*
Metrodorus 107, 155, 171 n. 1, 288, 377; *4, 15, 27–41, 180–1, 700, 701–3, 932*
  (?) *On [---]* 175
  Against Plato's Euthyphro 155, 173, 453; *703–5*
  Against Plato's Gorgias 705–6
  Against the Sophists 1078
  On Change 113, 119; *89–95*
  On Gods 119
  On Philosophy 1092–4
midollo 38
misfortunes *see* harms
Mithres *1066–9*
money, contributions of 171
monographs (*συγγράμματα*) 82
motion *1083–5*
Musaeus *2480–1*
Mys 289; *60*
mysteries 10, 203
  at Athens 161 n. 10; *558–9, 808–10*
  initiation 409
  language from in philosophical context *808–10, 1263–4*
  mocked by Epicurus 516
  urban 161
myths 127 n. 4, 247 n. 1, 273 n. 9, 491; *331–4, 1176–88, 1205–8, 1310–11, 1344–53, 1358–63*
  as deterrent to crime 550, 559, 566, 596, 609; *1745–9, 2032–43*
  Epicureans on *2159*
  false *2160–1*
  introduction of in cultural history 255
  origin of 566, 573
  about punishment by gods *2235–6*
  truth about revealed by philosophers *1330–2*
names:
  of authors and titles in citations 277
  of gods 159; *607*; avoidance of *836–7*; explanations for 143, 349
natural and necessary desires *2208–10*
Nauck, August 30
Nemesis *1045–6*
Neocles 171 n. 5, 445; *165, 945–6, 953*
neologisms 87; *902–3*
Nestor 223 n. 2; *1678–81*
Norden, Eduard 5

oath-keepers, as just and aligned with gods 181; *1082–9*
oaths 10, 207, 239, 263, 390, 418, 592; *821–2, 836–7*
  examples by Epicurus alone *823*
  perjured *836–7*; as disturbing 594; *2276*
  polemical context in Epicurus *825–8*
  used by Epicurean founders 163
obeisance 167, 183, 435; *897–8*
observance of cult and ritual 157, 169, 201, 377, 389–458
offerings 241
  propitious 203
opponents 82, 109 n. 5, 137, 137, 141 n. 1, 153, 187, 243, 275 n. 2, 287, 292, 342, 374, 516, 597; *688, 1171–2, 1412–18*
  mentioned in *De pietate*, list of *297–8*
  original criticism of Epicurus *1394–1402*
oracle, Epicurean philosophy as 247
orators, sophistic 213, 215; *1534–5, 1562*
organization of *De pietate* 279
orgeones 390
Orpheus *2480–1*
orthography *230, 330*
outline of topics 89, 95; *1277–81*

paidagogos 171 n. 3; *935–6*
pain 249; *1246–7*
  as evil 141
  as object of avoidance *489–500*
Panaetius 491
papyrus *passim*

papyrus (*cont.*)
condition 24–6
first Greek 26
from Egypt 26, 57; *840–1*
roll 32, 280; dimensions of 70–1; means of opening 24–6, 37–8
paragraphos 75
parallelism, stylistic 87
paraphrase 82
Parmenides *138*
part 2 of *De pietate* vi, 25 n. 1, 30, 85, 277 n. 6, 279, 288, 566; *1465–8, 2392–3*
papyrus roll containing 72
style of 98
perceptibles 137
by thought 336
perception 5–6, 115; *418–19*
signposts of *14*
periodicity, lack of 87
Persaeus 17; *297–8, 1545–7*
on Stoic prayer *1412–18*
περὶ-Literatur 82
Petersen, Christian 30
Phaedrus 89, 96 and n. 3
On gods 22
style of 94 n. 1
pharmaka, verbal *1538–9*
Philippson, Robert 34–5, 51
Philodemus *passim*
and prose 86–7
authorship of *De pietate* conventionally ascribed 89 n. 2
style 86–8; *1395–6, 1545–65, 2049, 2174–82, 2218*
Philonides of Laodicea *794–6*
epitomes of Epicurus' letters by *840–1*
philosophers:
chronological order of 83
criticism of 279–80, 293
divulgation of truth about gods 507, 559
executed, prosecuted in court, exiled, satirized in comedy 211, 526
just 189
reviled by the many 215
who denied the gods harm humans 187
philosophical part vi
philosophy 239
Phyrson of Colophon 161, 171
pietas, vs. *sanctitas 206–7*
piety 187, 195, 233
almost the same thing as justice 261, 509; *1340–2*
Cynic view of *1147–55*
definition of: Epicurean *707–8, 1147–55*; non-Epicurean 235; Stoic *890–1*
as not harming 199; *1337, 1338–44*
pious man, definition of 185, 483; *1138–44*
Piso *816*
places of gods' existing 7
Plato 155; *138, 959–60, 1092–4*
Euthyphro 155 n. 3–4, 377; earliest notice of *703–5*; read sceptically *703–5, 707–8*
knowledge of his works at Herculaneum *703–5*
pleasure 115, 292
as a good 141; *489–500*
classification of 257; *169–70*
katastematic *2206–7*
necessary 257
pledges, tokens of good faith 207
Plutarch *797–8*
poets 4, 197, 247 n. 1, 279; *1310–11, 1853*
quotations of 20
poets and mythographers, criticism of 279–80, 491; *302–3, 2479–80*
chorus of, as opponents 609; *2480–1*
poetry *312–13*
Epicurean hostility toward *2505–7*
religious, sung *768–70*
symposiastic *525*
political exemption 275
politics 171, 199
Epicureans involved in *953*
Polyaenus 145, 165, 167 n. 1, 171, 171 n. 2, 288; *577, 840–1, 932, 935–6, 1066–9*
Against Ariston 107; *10*
Against Aristotle's On Philosophy 181
Philodemus' fondness for *1092–4*
Polystratus *10*
Posidonius 15–16; *297–8, 489–500, 497–8*
praeteritio 88
praise 233
prayer 10, 125, 183, 205, 231, 265, 390, 445; *737–8, 931–2, 1420–1*
criticism of, by Hermarchus *821–2*
as natural 157
by Stoic wise man *988–9*
pre-Socratic philosophers *1202–5*
precaution, ritual (*φυλακή*) 213, 530
preservation, for humans from gods 179; *1045–6, 1059–62*
priests 169 n. 2
primary bodies, indivisibility of *489–500*

processions 123, 310
prodelision 74
Prodicus 13, 143; *524–5, 526, 529–32, 697–701, 2480–1*
progress:
  in studying philosophy 171 and n. 6
  philosophical 571; *743–4, 766–8, 946–9*
proofs 139, 281; *649*
  rhetorical *770–1, 2358*
prophetic language in philosophy *2044–5*
Protagoras *526*
psychology *1055–6*
punctuation 75
punishment 265
  and reward from gods 7; *see also* harms and benefits
purification 149
purity, ritual *759–60, 1268–9, 1311–12*
  in philosophical expressions *758–9, 933*
Pythocles *935–6*

Quaranta, Bernardo 27–8
questions, rhetorical 87

reductio ad absurdum 338; *443–4, 448–50, 649, 489–500*
refutation *2145–7*
religiosity, Epicurean, seriousness of *897–8*
religious institutions, writing on, Roman vs. Greek 83
religious language, in philosophical contexts *1538–9*
religious practice, of Epicurus 10
religious (δεισιδαίμονες), persons reputed 185
repetition, scribal *2049*
reputation, of country 265, 597
retribution, of gods towards humans 179; *1045–6*
rhetoric 239, 592
  in cultural history 563; *1907*
righteousness *890–1*
rites 161 n. 11, 169, 231, 233
  observed by wise man *732*

sacral language, Roman *1538–9*
sacrifice 10, 123, 127, 161 and n. 11, 167, 205, 207, 229, 233, 241, 263, 310, 435; *794–6, 880, 890–1, 2278–9*
  animal *843–4*
  civic 390
sage 159, 177, 273; *758*
  divine *2055–7*
sarcasm 87
Satyrus *526*
Sauppe, Hermann 30
scepticism 4, 251, 253; *2145–7*
  origin of 571
sceptics *527–9*
Schmid, Wolfgang 37
Schober, Adolf 36
  apparatus and annotation of 614
scholia 78–80
scorza 25, 540, 601; *29–30*
scorzatura 25, 38 n. 3
Scott, Walter 32, 48
scriptio plena 87; *768–70*
security (ἀσφάλεια) 84, 155, 255, 566, 572, 597; *711, 1200–1, 1953–4, 2161–5*
seers, criticism of *2044–5*
sensation 135, 292
  attributed to gods *138*
signs *131*
similarity 113 n. 2, 121, 129; *90–1*
slaves 171 n. 3, 289; *935–6*
social convention *468*
society 157, 169, 239, 257; *312–13, 750–1, 2166–7, 2201–2*
Socrates 155, 199, 201 n. 1, 377, 509; *700, 1358–63*
  always among crowds 223
  arrogance of 221
  change in attitude towards *701–3*
  guilty of charge of impiety 221
  hostility of people to *1366–7*
  indicted for introducing strange gods *1696–7*
  punished by Athenians 513
  reviled by Epicureans 542, 701–3
  treatment by Plato and Xenophon *705–6*
Socratic literature 81
sophistic thinkers 4
sottoposto and *sovrapposto* 571, 558; *229, 1486–94, 2235–6*
soul 20, 181; *1099–1101*
sovereignty, of God 159
speech about gods (= θεολογία) 173; *838–40*
Spengel, Leonhard 29–31
statues 10, 169, 390, 443; *794–6*
  and amulets, Epicurean *1538–9*
Stesimbrotus of Thasos *535*
stichometry 62–73, 63 n. 2
  letter-signs, alphabetic 63 n. 1, 64–8, 542

Stoics 4; *159–60, 538, 654, 1176–88, 2484–6*
style:
  as argument for authorship 86
  of *De pietate* 86–8; in part 2: 98
  indirect quotation in *931–2*
  of Philodemus 58, 86 n. 2
  pre–Atticist 86
  variation in 86
subscriptio 54
superlatives, of divine nature *754–5*
supersitious man, of Theophrastus *1135–6*
suspension of judgement 251, 253 n. 1
suspicion *686*
syllabification 73; *521–2, 783*
synoikeiosis 17 n. 2, 280; *2484–6*

tables, sacred 239; *843–4*
teachers, Epicurean *935–6*
terms for existence, Stoic *628*
terrors 271
testament of Epicurus 207
tetrapharmakos *1134–8, 1538–9*
text:
  continuous lineation of 99
  relationship of witnesses to 77–8
theme 84–5
Theodotus of Colophon 161, 163 n. 3; *797–9, 806–8, 811–12*
theologia tripertita 491
theologues 189, 191, 609; *497, 1202–5, 1310–11, 1376, 1853, 2160–1*
  and poets 8, 277
theology:
  Epicurean 409, 282; *607*
  Long–Sedley view of 11
  place in Epicurean curriculum 4
  place in Stoic curriculum 4 n. 3
Theophrastus 6–7
  on affinity of gods for humans *1105*
thinkables 137
time *1885–6*
  defined 237
Timocrates 13; *1524–5*
titles:
  of *De pietate* 89
  alternative, for Epicurus' letters *797–9*
  citation of *206–7*; variation in *703–5*
  Epicurean and Platonic *703–5*
  names as *165, 797–9*
touch *549–52*
tranquillity 199
transcendence, in perception 129
transcription, diplomatic vii
transition:
  from criticism of poets to philosophers 17 n. 2
  from section to section *790–2, 1277–81, 2340, 2479–80, 2480–1*
transposition, textual *355–8*
trials of philosophers 14
twentieth, of month, Epicurus' birthday kept on 163, 418; *813–14, 816–18*
  site of celebrations *816*

unities 121, 129, 131, 329; *209–19, 349*
  from identical/similar elements *355–8*
universe 141
  as infinite 153; *673–5*
unjust man 259, 265
unnatural or empty desires *2208–10*
Usener, Hermann 33

Varro 491
void 119

war 171; *929*
weakness, of the divine 177, 279
whole entities 133
wicked persons 259
wise man, *see* sage
word-order *703*
worship 10, 151, 167, 173
  lingustic acts in 145

Xenophon, treatment of Socrates *703–5*

Young, Sir Thomas 26–7 n. 1

Zeno of Citium 17, 96, 207, 368, 521, 636; *701–3, 1402–12, 2491*
  On Piety 17; *1465–8*
  philological investigations of *705–6*
  works adapted by Philodemus 18
Zeus:
  emulation of 167, 435; *894*
  swearing by 418; *836–7*

INDEX LOCORUM POTIORUM

Numerals in italics refer to line-notes in the commentary, roman type to pages

'Aëtius' *Plac.* 1.7 (*Dox. Gr.* 307): *349*
Aristotle
  Metaphysics
    *A*6, 987ª29–ᵇ14: *705–6*
    *M*4, 1078ᵇ12–30: *705–6*
  Περὶ εὐχῆς
    83 and n. 1
Athenaeus 5. 179D: *1412–18*
Atticus
  fr. 3. 8–9 des Places (Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 15. 5, p. 800A): 461
  fr. 3. 66–9 des Places (Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 15. 5. 9, p. 800A): *1059–62*
  fr. 3. 75–81 des Places (Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 15. 5. 11, p. 800B): 8 n. 1
Augustine, *CD* 4. 27, 6. 5: 491
Cicero
  Ad Atticum
    12. 52: 96
    13. 38. 1: 23
    13. 39. 2: 22; *302–3*
  De finibus
    1. 6: 97
    1. 26: *2491*
    1. 29–32, 37–9: 582
  De natura deorum
    1. 18–56: 97
    1. 25–41: *306–7*
    1. 26, 29, 30: *138*
    1. 34: 98
    1. 37: *4*
    1. 41–2: 21 n. 1, 22
    1. 41: *302–3*
    1. 42–3, 25–41: 279
    1. 43: 30, 98; *229*
    1. 44–50: 282
    1. 50: 553
    1. 59: *2491*
    1. 62–4: *225–7, 526*
    1. 93: 282; *542–3, 701–3, 703, 705–6, 959–60, 1358–63*
    1. 94: 98; *527–9*
    1. 115: 98; *206–7*
    1. 117–18: *225–7, 523–4, 526*
    1. 123: 15; *206–7, 489–500, 497–8, 1394–1402*
  De officiis
    1. 6: 97
  In Catilinam
    4. 7–8: 492
Cornutus, *De natura deorum* 27,19 Lang: *299–301*
Critias *VS* 88 B 25 = *TrGF* 12. 43 F 19: *1196–8, 1205–8, 1214–16*
Cypria
  EGF F 15 = *PEG* 17: *1678–81*
  EGF F 24 = *PEG* 18: *1678–81*
  PEG F 16 = *EGF* adesp. F 5: *1678–81*
Diogenes Laertius
  2. 97: *526*

Diogenes Laertius (*cont.*)
2. 117: *1678–81*
7. 119: *206–7*
10. 3: 171 n. 5
10. 24: *1092–4*
10. 27: *206–7*
Diogenes of Oenoanda
fr. 12 col. 3,4–4,3: *539–40*
fr. 16: *525, 526, 1359–60*
fr. 149 col. 3,2–3: *527–9*
Epicurus
Ad Herodotum
73–7: *225–7*
77: 11; *266, 1147, 2235–6*
Ad Menoeceum
123–4: 8
123: 14; *1134–8*
124: 458–64; *1023–42, 1034–5, 1538–9*
127–32: 582
129: *2088–9*
Ad Pythoclem
93–8: *225–7*
105–6: 181 n. 4; *1083–5*
De natura
inc. lib. fr. 36. 14,4–5: *225–7*
KD
1: 143 n. 3; *529–33*
12: *2206–7*
16: *720–2*
31–5: *1538–9*
31–3: *2042–3, 2213–18*
35: *2223–6*
Epictetus 2. 20. 3: 542
Euripides
Bacchae
170–369: *526*
274–85: *535*
286–97: *529–32*
Homer
Odyssey
6. 42–6: 7
19. 11: 261
Horace
Epistles
1. 1. 34–7: *1538–9*
1. 16. 79: 93
Isocrates 5. 68: *1861–2*
Lucretius
1. 77: *14*
1. 122: *1772–3*
1. 609–12: *211*
1. 731: *461–2*
1. 738–9: *2044–5*
2. 434: *931–2*
3. 14–15: *2044–5*
3. 37–40: *2206–7*
3. 371 = 5. 622: *461–2*
4. 18–23: 7
5. 104–9: *931–2*
5. 104: *2044–5*
5. 110–11: *2044–5*
5. 111–12: *2044–5*
5. 146–7: 7
5. 164–5: *527–9*
5. 351–63: *349*
5. 405–6: *2158–9*
5. 571: *225–7*
5. 1020: *1538–9*
5. 1168–93: 310
5. 1168: *225–31*
5. 1189–1203: *707–8*
6. 68–78: *740–2*
6. 535–56: *1083–5*
6. 546–7: 181; *1083–4*
P. Barc. inv. no. 158–61: *1538–9*
P. Derveni: *535*
P. Flor. 323,13: *1566–7*
P. Herc. 176
fr. 5 col. 17,10: 91
fr. 5 cols. 19–23: *935–6*
P. Herc. 465 fr. 12: *1538–9*
P. Herc. 558 fr. 11,2: *225–7*
P. Herc. 998 fr. 12: *225–7*
P. Herc. 1005 (*Πρὸς τοὺς* [---])
col. 5,10–14: *1538–9*
col. 10,20: *1465–8*
col. 11: *705–6*
col. 11,6: *636*
col. 14: 17
col. 14,4–13: *1465–8*
P. Herc. 1077 (*op. inc.*) fr. 1 (= 3): *29–30*
P. Herc. 1111
fr. 44: *225–7, 703, 705–6, 959–60*
fr. 44,1–15: *206–7*
fr. 44,4–5: *1050–1*
fr. 44, 10: *1*
fr. 45,4: *1050–1*
P. Herc. 1232 (*De Epic.*) fr. 8 col. 1: *811–12, 818–19*
P. Herc. 1251 (*Eth. Ep.*) col. 4: *1538–9*
P. Masp. 98,14: *1566–7*
P. Oxy. II 215: 34, 57; *312–13, 902–3*
col. 1,1–10: *654*
col. 1,2–3: *739–40*

col. 1,4–24: 391
col. 1,5–16: *737–8*
col 1,5: *825–8*
col. 1,16–24: *707–8*
col. 1,16–21: *744–7*
col. 1,17–23: *1281–2*
col. 1,24: *1189*
col. 1,28–32: *740–2, 744–7*
col 1,33: *825–8*
col. 2,15–19: *1164*
P. Oxy. XII 1590,5: *312–13*
P. Oxy. XLVII 3318: *1103–8*
P. Oxy. LIII 3711 col. 1,28–30: *1538–9*
P. Tebt. I 33,6: *2058–60*
Philodemus
De dis 1
col. 12,2–13: *1134–8*
De dis 3
col. 9,18–28: *329–32*
fr. 6,4: *206–7*
De morte
39,18: 93
inc. lib., *P. Herc.* 807 fr. 6: *225–7*
De musica
34,12: *299–301*
4,6: 391
DE PIETATE, PART 2
P. Herc. 242
N fr. 2b,6–7 (Schober 1988, 82): *325–6*
N fr. 3 (Henrichs 1975*a*, 30): 22; *302–3*
P. Herc. 247
N fr. 1,12–18 (Schober 1988, 82): *2160–1*
N fr. 4b (Pindar fr. 266 S.-M.): *1465–8*
N fr. 6a (Pindar fr. 80 S.-M.): *1465–8*
P. Herc. 433
N fr. 3,6–10 (Schober 1988, 92): *2423–7*
N fr. 4,21 (Schober 1988, 89 + Henrichs 1975*a*,21–2): *418–19*
P. Herc. 1088
N fr. 4,9–10 (Luppe 1985*c*): *302–3*
N fr. 5,21–2 (Schober 1988, 91): *302–3*
N fr. 6 (Schober 1988, 87): *299–301*
N fr. 6,19–21 (Schober 1988, 87): *1465–8*
N fr. 6,22–3 (*Danais*, *EGF* F 3 = *PEG* 3): *2392–3*
N fr. 6,28–9 (Schober 1988, 88): *302–3*
N fr. 9 + 433 fr. 6a,12–13 (Luppe 1986*c*, 76): *302–3*
fr. 10 (p. 84 Schober; Luppe 1995*a*, 206): *14*
fr. 10,9–21 (p. 84 Schober; Luppe 1995*a*, 206): *2423–7*
fr. 10,16–21 (p. 84 Schober; Luppe 1995*a*, 206): *436*
fr. 10,20–1 (p. 84 Schober; Luppe 1995*a*, 206): *137*
fr. 10,23–5 (p. 84 Schober; Luppe 1995*a*, 206): *302–3*
fr. 10,27 (p. 84 Schober; Luppe 1995*a*, 206): *296–7*
P. Herc. 1428: 54; *4, 296–7, 2430–1*
fr. 5 (Obbink 1994, 116): 17; *1706–8*
fr. 6d (p. 71 Gomperz): 542
fr. 10 (Schober 1988, 113): *705–6*
fr. 18b,2–8 (Schober 1988, 114): *2159*
fr. 19 (Henrichs 1976, 16–17): *1196–8*
fr. 20,20–30 (Schober 1988, 115): *701–3*
fr. 21 (p. 72 Gomperz): *536–7, 538, 1029–30*
fr. E d (Tarán 1981, 375): *1032–4, 1851*
P. Herc. 1428 (Henrichs 1974*a*)
col. 1: *1*
cols. 2–3: *1176–88*
cols. 2,27–4,13: *2169–71*
col. 4: *1412–18*
col. 4,2–9: *1394*
col. 4,9–11: *1597–8*
col. 5,1–2: *2365*
col. 5,16: *302–3*
col. 5,28–9: *1449–51*
col. 5,3: *2436–8*
col. 6,16–26: 17
col. 7: *535*
col. 7,6–12: *1394*
col. 7,21–7: *1551–3*
col. 8,5: *1064–5*
cols. 8,14–10,8: 19–20
col. 8,14: *302–3*
col. 9,1–2: *703–5*
col. 9,4: *302–3*
col. 9,27–9: *535*
col. 10,8: *302–3*
col. 10,9–13, 18: *137*
cols. 10,16–11,5: *538*
col. 10,19: *2480–1*
col. 10,20–30: 553
col. 10,32: *137*
col. 10,33: *654*
cols. 11–12: *705–6*

P. Herc. 1428 (*cont.*)
col. 11: *525*
col. 11,7–14: *525*
col. 11,9–12,2: *2405–7*
cols. 11,12–12,2: *1359–60*
col. 11,15–33: *986*
col. 12: *308*
col. 12,9–12: *1359–60*
col. 12,11–12: *522–30*
col. 12,13–32: 462–3; *1205–8*
col. 12,26–8: *36*
col. 12,27–8: *325–6*
cols. 12,33–13,1: 90
col. 13,7–12: *2422–3*
col. 13,17–22: *138*
col. 13,23–14,2: *2405–7*
col. 14,17: *1394–5*
col. 14,20–4: *1401–2*
cols. 14,32–15,8: 1–2; *1176–88*
col. 15: 93
col. 15,1–8: *225–7*
col. 15,13–23: 31 n. 1, 89
col. 15,13–19: *2151–2*
col. 15,13–17: 279
col. 15,14–19: 343
col. 15,20–2: *1857–9*
col. 15,21: *474–81*
P. Herc. 1609
N fr. 1 (Schober 1988, 94): *302–3*
N fr. 4,6–7 (Schober 1988, 98): *2159*
P. Herc. 1610
fr. 3,15–19 (Henrichs 1972*a*, 77): *705–6*
P. Herc. 1648
N fr. 1 (Schober 1988, 94: *302–3*
N fr. 5,2–4 (Schober 1988, 96): *1214–16*
N fr. 6 (Schober 1988, 96): *302–3*
De poematis 2
col. 9,28: *527–9*
P. Herc. 1676 fr. 2 + *N* 1081 fr. 12 (p. 223 Sbordone): *299*
De poematis 5
col. 32,9: *299–301*
De Stoicis
18,1: 91
Epigrammata
4 Sider (*AP* 11. 41): 93
12 Sider (*AP* 5. 132. 5–6): *1773–5*
27 Sider (*AP* 11. 44): *811–12, 816*
34 Sider (*AP* 6. 349): *931–2, 1361–3*
Plato, *Protag.* 331 B: *2263–5*
Plutarch
Adversus Colotem
1112 EF: *230–1*
1118 D: *2171–4*
1124 B: *2145–7*
Contra Epicuri beatitudinem
1089 C: *811–12*
1101 AB: *797–9*
1102 B: *880, 897–8*
Non posse suaviter vivi
1097 B–D: *1545–7*
Scholia on Epicurus
Ad Herodotum
39: *432*
74: *225–7*
Ad Pythoclem
96: *2257*
KD
1: *212–13, 370*
Sallust, *Cat.* 51. 20, 52. 13: 492
Sallustius 3 Nock: *1853*
Seneca
Epistulae morales
6. 6: *461–2*
18. 1: *840–1*
21. 4: *1066–9*
Sextus Empiricus
Adversus mathematicos
9. 13: 4
9. 25: *225–31*
9. 50–1: 1 n. 3
9. 58: 16
Theophrastus
Characters
16: *1135–6*
De pietate
F 584 A: *229, 655–6*
Xenophon
Memorabilia
4. 3. 13: *701–3*

Pl. 1. Unopened papyrus scrolls carbonized during the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79

Pl. 2. Herculaneum papyrus containing *De pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1077 Neapolitan fr. 2 = col. 45)
5.9 × 5.3 cm.

Pl. 3. Herculaneum papyrus containing *De pietate* (*P. Herc.* 229 fr. 9 = cols. 56–7)
16.5 × 8.2 cm.



Pl. 4. Detail of Pl. 3, intercolumnium of *P. Herc.* 229 frr. 8–9, with stichometric letter Ξ
3.0 × 3.3 cm.



. 5. Oxonian Apograph of *P. Herc.* 1077 fr. 1 (= cols. 52–4): Bodleia Library Oxford, MSS. Gr. class. c. 4 fol. 958
31.5 × 22 cm.



Pl. 6. Neapolitan Apograph of *P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 2 (= col. 54): Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli
31.5 × 22 cm.

Pl. 7. Herculaneum papyrus (*scorza*) containing *De pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1098 fr. 29 = col. 1), several columns after the beginning of the papyrus roll
18.1 × 9.9 cm.



Pl. 8. June 1993 photograph of Herculaneum papyrus containing the final columns of *De pietate* (*P. Herc.* 1428 cols. 12–15 + *subscriptio*)
18.4 × 35.0 cm.